Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (3 of 2021), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Conversion from one religion to another religion by misrepresentation, force, fraud, undue influence, coercion, allurement  -- Regular bail – Discretion of Court -- The offence alleged is not that serious or grave like murder, dacoity, rape etc. -- Trial court declined bail as trial courts seldom muster the courage of granting bail, be it any offence -- However, at least, it was expected of the High Court to muster the courage and exercise its discretion judiciously -- Grant of bail is a matter of discretion, but discretion has to be exercised judicially keeping in mind the well settled principles of grant of bail -- Discretion does not mean that the judge on his own whims and fancy declines bail saying conversion is something very serious -- Petitioner is going to be put to trial and ultimately if the prosecution succeeds in establishing its case, he would be punished – Bail allowed.

(Para 10-13, 21)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988)Section 166 -- Compensation in Motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case -- Mason -- From the nature of the head injuries, it cannot be held that the first appellant would have returned to complete normalcy and is entitled to loss of income only at Rs.100/- per day -- Appellant continued to suffer from disability such as memory loss, defective speech, etc. -- Tribunal concluded that the first appellant was earning Rs.450/- per day, then applied the multiplier for 70% disability loss -- Employability of a person with serious head injuries is a circumstance which ought to have been kept in the perspective for determining the loss of income of the first appellant -- Age of the first appellant, even assuming as 50 years, as contended by the Insurance Company, the compensation for loss of income and also loss for future earnings can be determined at Rs.7,50,000/ (lumpsum) – Total compensation works out to Rs. 12,09,017/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of payment.

(Para 11, 12)

Constitution of India, Article 141 -- Domestic worker – Rights of –  Despite their growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the most vulnerable to exploitation and abuse -- Direction given to the Ministry of Labour and Employment in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending a legal framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of the rights of domestic workers -- The composition of the Expert Committee is left to the wisdom of the Government of India and its concerned Ministries -- It will be appreciated if the Committee submits a Report within a period of 6 months, whereupon the Government of India may consider the necessity of introducing a legal framework which may effectively address the cause and concern of domestic workers.

(Para 39, 55 (iv, v))

Criminal jurisprudence – Contradiction in statement/ prosecution story -- ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ -- Principle of ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ does not apply to the Indian criminal jurisprudence and only because there are some contradictions which in the opinion of this Court are not even that material, the entire story of the prosecution cannot be discarded as false -- It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff -- In a given case, it is also open to the Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted where there are a number of accused persons.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Dowry case – Cruelty – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Appellant sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence u/s 498-A of IPC and one year imprisonment for the offence u/s 4 of DP Act, sentence to run concurrently -- Appellant has undergone approximately 3 months in custody – Incident pertains to the year 2006, marriage was solemnized on 31.03.2006 and the couple lived together exactly for three days -- Complainant is married and settled abroad -- Case prolonged for a period of nearly 19 years -- Sentence set aside, substituted for the period already undergone and Rs. 3,00,000/- payable as compensation.

(Para 13-16)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Condonation of delay – Challenge to -- Discussion on merit in appeal – Scope of -- Scope of the appeal before the High Court was limited to examining the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, declining condonation of delay -- When merits of the orders impugned in the appeal was not touched upon by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court ought not to have commented on the merits -- Merits of the order could be examined by the Appellate Court.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Evidence -- In order to render any witnesses’ testimony as unreliable, the inconsistencies shall be material ones and of such a nature that they create substantive doubts in the mind of the court towards the story or the chain of events as sought to be established by the prosecution -- Mere conjectures or hypothetical inconsistencies cannot form the basis for acquittal when the evidence, viewed as a whole, points to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 38)

Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (60 of 1958), Section 48(1) -- Revenue authority – Power of review – Waiver of parties – Permissibility of -- Cannot concur with the High Court’s reasoning that the Appellants “submitted themselves” to the authority’s review process or somehow acquiesced in the second decision -- Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver -- The law does not permit a statutory functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of how the parties engage in subsequent litigation.

(Para 13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323 – Hurt – Complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences – Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused – Ingredients of offence u/s 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie.

(Para 17-19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 509 – Insult the modesty of woman – Appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in a “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment -- Following the complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) was initially registered and later converted into an FIR after two months later -- The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC -- Prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC not disclosed.

(Para 4, 5, 28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323, 504, 506, 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings – Criminal intimidation -- Insult the modesty of woman – After the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered, indicated that no cognizable offence -- Subsequently, an FIR was lodged (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was filed, u/s 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC -- Only Section 509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are noncognizable offences -- FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge u/s 509 of the IPC -- Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of "filthy language" by the appellants in scolding the complainant -- Discrepancies and variations, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 40-45)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- The provocation must be both grave and sudden -- In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-control -- If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception -- Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not grave.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following conditions must be complied with:

(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused;

(ii) The provocation must be grave;

(iii) The provocation must be sudden;

(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;

(v) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control; and

(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- Accused must establish the following circumstances:

(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and sudden;

(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power of self-control; and

(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Burden of proof -- It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be attributed to it.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1, 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant -- However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation -- The incident occurred at a spur of a moment -- The act was not pre-planned or pre-meditated -- What is important to note is that the appellant had no weapon in his hands -- He picked up a cement stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the head of the deceased -- Therefore, it could be said that the appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner – Conviction u/s 304 Part 1 of the IPC, upheld – Sentence reduced to already  undergone.

(Para 30-33)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 -- Extra-judicial confession before Village Police Patil – Admissibility of – Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer – Same is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act -- However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.

(Para 36, 42)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 154 -- Discovery panchnama – Proof of -- Witness turned hostile -- If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama through the evidence of the Investigating Officer -- Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved -- From the plain reading of the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.

(Para 47-49)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Motive -- Murder -- Motive is a double-edged weapon -- Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that too for a serious offence like murder -- Motive may be considered along with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating circumstances.

(Para 51)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden to establish innocence -- Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs -- The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution -- However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him -- However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is subject to one well-settled principle of law -- The prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- If the prosecution has not been able to lay the foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it cannot starightaway invoke the said Section and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.

(Para 55)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 16, 34, 37 -- Jurisdiction of Arbitrator – Objection to -- After submitting to the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator, the respondent could not have belatedly objected to the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 -- NDPS -- Conscious possession of contraband – Burden of proof -- It is the burden of the prosecution to establish that the contraband was seized from the conscious possession of the accused -- Only when that aspect has been successfully proved by the prosecution, the onus will shift to the accused to account for the possession legally and satisfactorily.

(Para 16)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 35 -- NDPS – Culpable mental state – Presumption of – In any prosecution under the NDPS Act, the court shall presume that the accused had the requisite mental state, including intention, knowledge, and motive, unless the accused can prove otherwise -- This shifts the burden of proof onto the accused to demonstrate that they lacked knowledge or intent regarding the possession of the drugs.

(Para 20)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 -- NDPS -- Conscious possession of contraband – Requirement of -- Conscious possession refers to a scenario where an individual not only physically possesses a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance but is also aware of its presence and nature -- It requires both physical control and mental awareness -- Conscious possession implies that the person knew that he had the illicit drug or psychotropic substance in his control and had the intent or knowledge of its illegal nature.

(Para 21)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Transfer of prisoner from one jail to another – Challenge to -- It is lucid that transfer of convict prisoner from one prison to another is purely an administrative decision and hence, the same cannot be interfered with by the court unless it is arbitrary and contrary to law.

(Para 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Right of prisoner – Dignify life -- It is imperative on the part of the prison authorities to rehabilitate the prisoners into law abiding citizen, besides maintaining security and rule of law in the prison -- Prison administration needs to be reformed for creating a better environment and prison culture to ensure the prisoners enjoy their right to dignified life under Article 21 -- It is essential to continuously monitor the physical conditions prevailing in the prison, compliance with basic and fundamental rights of the prisoners, etc. -- State recognizes that a prisoner loses his right to liberty but still maintains his right to be treated as a human being and as person -- His human dignity shall be maintained and all basic amenities should be made available to him -- Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life, with due regard to the maintenance of the rights of prisoners -- Thus, the objective of reforms and rehabilitation of the prisoners has to be pursued diligently.

(Para 3, 17.2)

A. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 80 – Order/ Award of Micro and Smal enterprises Facilitation (MSEFC) – Challenge to – Alternative remedy of arbitration – Writ jurisdiction :

Following questions referred to a larger Bench of five Judges, namely:

(i) Whether the ratio in M/s India Glycols Limited (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1852) that a writ petition could never be entertained against any order/award of the MSEFC, completely bars or prohibits maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court?

(ii) If the bar/prohibition is not absolute, when and under what circumstances will the principle/restriction of adequate alternative remedy not apply?

(iii) Whether the members of MSEFC who undertake conciliation proceedings, upon failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the MSMED Act read with Section 80 of the A&C Act?

The first and second question will subsume the question of when and in what situation a writ petition can be entertained against an order/award passed by MSEFC acting as an arbitral tribunal or conciliator.

(Para 2, 19)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Alternative remedy -- Existence of the statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ -- The writ jurisdiction being discretionary by policy, the writ courts generally insist that the parties adhere to alternative statutory remedies, as this reinforces the rule of law -- However, in exceptional cases, writ jurisdiction can still be exercised as a power to access the court for justice and relief.

(Para 15)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Promotion to Tracer -- Negative equality – Permissibility of – As per Rules, the post of Tracer is to be filled up to 100% by way of direct recruitment -- While referring to two communications appointing two as Tracer on promotion, the petitioner is claiming violation of Article 14, namely the discrimination – Held, Court cannot put a stamp on the illegalities committed by the department while perpetuating the same -- A litigant coming to the Court cannot claim negative discrimination seeking direction from the Court to the department to act in violation of the law or statutory Rules -- It is a settled proposition of law that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality.

(Para 30, 31)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 52A -- NDPS – Samples from contraband – Compliance/ Non-compliance/ Delayed compliance of Section 52A of NDPS Act – Effect of – Law summarised:

(I) Although Section 52A is primarily for the disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate context of drug disposal, as it serves a broader purpose of also introducing procedural safeguards in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure inasmuch as it provides for the preparation of inventories, taking of photographs of the seized substances and drawing samples therefrom in the presence and with the certification of a magistrate. Mere drawing of samples in presence of a gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient compliance of the mandate under Section 52A sub-section (2) of the NDPS Act.

(II) Although, there is no mandate that the drawing of samples from the seized substance must take place at the time of seizure as held in Mohanlal (2016) 3 SCC 379), yet we are of the opinion that the process of inventorying, photographing and drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far as possible, take place in the presence of the accused, though the same may not be done at the very spot of seizure.

(III) Any inventory, photographs or samples of seized substance prepared in substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act and the Rules / Standing Order(s) thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as primary evidence as per Section 52A subsection (4) of the NDPS Act, irrespective of whether the substance in original is actually produced before the court or not.

(IV) The procedure prescribed by the Standing Order(s) / Rules in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in-charge of the investigation, and as such what is required is substantial compliance of the procedure laid therein.

(V) Mere non-compliance of the procedure under Section 52A or the Standing Order(s) / Rules thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering the prosecution’s case doubtful, which may not have been there had such compliance been done. Courts should take a holistic and cumulative view of the discrepancies that may exist in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same more carefully keeping in mind the procedural lapses.

(VI) If the other material on record adduced by the prosecution, oral or documentary inspires confidence and satisfies the court as regards the recovery as-well as conscious possession of the contraband from the accused persons, then even in such cases, the courts can without hesitation proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding any procedural defect in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

(VII) Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the said provision or rules thereunder may lead the court to drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution, however no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when such inference may be drawn, and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

(VIII) Where there has been lapse on the part of the police in either following the procedure laid down in Section 52A of the NDPS Act or the prosecution in proving the same, it will not be appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory presumption of commission of an offence from the possession of illicit material under Section 54 of the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied as regards the seizure or recovery of such material from the accused persons from the other material on record.

(IX) The initial burden will lie on the accused to first lay the foundational facts to show that there was non-compliance of Section 52A, either by leading evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, and the standard required would only be preponderance of probabilities.

(X) Once the foundational facts laid indicate non-compliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the onus would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by cogent evidence that either (i) there was substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52A of the NDPS Act OR (ii) satisfy the court that such non-compliance does not affect its case against the accused, and the standard of proof required would be beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Para 50)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Annulment of decree – Power of -- A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed -- Decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree -- Power u/s 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it -- Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Decree of appellate Court – Execution of -- Once the High Court as an appellate court in second appeal renders its judgment it is a decree of the second appellate court which becomes executable.

(Para 34)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Modification of decree -- When time for payment of money is extended, it does not mean a modification of the decree -- Trial court has power to extend the time, and the expression “such further period as the court may allow” would mean the court which had passed the decree, or, where the application u/s 28 of the Act of 1963, is filed.

(Para 44, 45)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324, 326, 34 – Grievous hurt – Common intention -- Accused No.3 was armed with a knife and Accused No.2 had in his hand a chopper -- Merely for the reason that the injuries inflicted by Accused no.2 were less than what was inflicted by Accused no.3 and the injuries were not a grievous conviction u/s 326 cannot be converted to Section 324 -- Presence of Accused no.2 on the spot is as an accomplice of Accused no.3 and hence, Section 34 of the IPC is clearly made out –  Accused No.2 ordered to be convicted u/s 326 read with 34 of the IPC and sentenced for the same period as was given by the High Court to Accused No.3 i.e. two years RI along with the fine of ? 75,000/-.

(Para 7-11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 – Common intention -- Common intention and the pre-meeting of minds can take place at the spur of the moment itself during the course of the incident.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Dowry death – Acquittal -- For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv) the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry -- Both the witnesses have not deposed about the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating that there was a demand for dowry -- Version regarding the demand for dowry is an omission -- No legally admissible evidence of the demand for dowry  -- There is no specific evidence of any cruelty – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Dismissal of judicial officer – Probation -- Opportunity of hearing -- Foundation of the order dispensing with petitioner's service is the complaint filed by his former wife and the report submitted by the Administrative Judge --  Committee relied upon the report of the Administrative Judge -- Petitioner was never issued any charge sheet – Petitioner claims that he was not even supplied copy of the complaint or the statement of his former wife recorded by the Registrar General, he was called in the office of the Registrar General and was asked to give his response there and then -- In the Annual Confidential Reports with respect to years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, he was rated as 'Good Officer' -- District Judge also rated the petitioner as a 'Good Officer' -- Report of Administrative Judge with regard to work and conduct of the petitioner is also without granting him an opportunity of being heard --  Substantially, it can be concluded, the report of the Administrative Judge is based on the complaint filed by the petitioner's former wife – Petitioner ordered to be reinstatement with continuity of service, back wages and seniority -- However, the respondent shall have the liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

(Para 4.1)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 31 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 – Proceedings under DV Act – Inherent Powers of High Court :

Questions referred to Larger Bench for adjudication:

(i) Once Section 28(1) prescribes that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can it be held that application of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is ousted?

(ii) In case Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not applicable, can an aggrieved person invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

(iii) In case the aggrieved person is entitled to invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can it be said that the same is limited only qua the issue of jurisdiction as held by Madras High Court?

Questions referred by the Ld. Single Bech answered as under:

i) Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 B.N.S.S. is applicable qua proceedings arising out of complaint under Section 12 of the Act of 2005. The only exception is the cases where provisions of the Act of 2005 have been invoked in proceedings pending before Civil Court or Family Court.

ii) In view of answer to question No.(i), there is no need to answer question No.(ii).

iii) The power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are subject to self-restraint. The same can neither be curtailed by statute nor by judicial order. In terms of dictum of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar's case (1997) 3 SCC 261 and Surya Dev Rai's case  (2003) 6 SCC 675, Article 227 is part of basic structure of the Constitution of India and is even beyond Constitutional amendment.

(Para 3, 32)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 -- Specific performance of contract – Hardship -- Rise in price – Inadequacy of price -- Mere rise in price subsequent to the date of the contract or inadequacy of price is not to be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of specific performance of the contract -- Hardship involved should be one not foreseen by the party and should be collateral to the contract -- Issue of hardship would come into play only if it is established by cogent evidence that, who executed the Agreement of Sale was unable to foresee the hardship at the time of entering into the contract.

(Para 29-34)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law – Interim order – Power of -- Second appeal will be maintainable before the High Court, if the case involves a substantial question of law -- High Court, without formulating substantial questions of law, granted the interim relief by directing the parties to maintain status quo, till the next date of hearing – Held, High Court could not have passed the interim order without satisfying itself of the existence of a substantial question of law, as mandated u/s 100 CPC – Interim order passed by High Court set aside.

(Para 10.4, 11, 13)

Constitution of India, Article 32, 136 – Judgment of High Court – Whether can be declared illegal -- Writ jurisdiction -- Judgment of the High Court cannot be declared as illegal -- If the petitioners have not been heard and are affected by the said judgment, the remedy available to them is to either file a petition/application for recall of the said order/judgment or to challenge the same by way of a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 3)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 136 – Right to access court -- Right to access the courts is a cornerstone of our democracy -- However, this right is not absolute and must be exercised responsibly -- When litigants engage in forum shopping, file repetitive and meritless pleas, and deliberately delay proceedings, they erode the very foundation of our legal system -- Petitioner’s repeated and frivolous litigation has wasted the court’s valuable time and resources -- These types of litigants are choking the system of the court, which is resulting in delays in decision of other cases -- It is also the duty of the Courts at different levels to curb such type of litigation so that more time is available for dealing with genuine litigation – SLP dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-

(Para 3, 18-23)

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 8, 18 – Arbitration u/s 18 of MSME Act, 2006 -- MSME Registration – Requirement of -- Section 18 is not restrictive and is a remedy for the resolution of disputes, and as such, it is kept open-ended to enable ‘any party’ to refer the dispute to seek redressal -- Submission rejected that ‘any party to a dispute’ is confined to a ‘supplier’ who has filed a memorandum under Section 8 of the Act – However, for clarity and legal certainty, matter referred to a bench of three Judges for an authoritative pronouncement.

(Para 1.2)

Constitution of India, Article 309(2) – Appointment based upon Executive orders -- Law is settled that in the absence of rules, recourse to recruitment based on executive orders could be taken.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Principles that courts must adhere to while appreciating and evaluating evidence in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as follows:

(i). The testimony of each prosecution and defence witness must be meticulously discussed and analysed. Each witness's evidence should be assessed in its entirety to ensure no material aspect is overlooked.

(ii). Circumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Thus, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the testimony of each witness must be explicitly delineated.

(iii). Each of the links of incriminating circumstantial evidence should be meticulously examined so as to find out if each one of the circumstances is proved individually and whether collectively taken, they forge an unbroken chain consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(iv). The judgment must comprehensively elucidate the rationale for accepting or rejecting specific pieces of evidence, demonstrating how the conclusion was logically derived from the evidence. It should explicitly articulate how each piece of evidence contributes to the overall narrative of guilt.

(v). The judgment must reflect that the finding of guilt, if any, has been reached after a proper and careful evaluation of circumstances in order to determine whether they are compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis.

(Para 30)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Document sought to be produced by way of additional evidence by the respondents before the Appellate Court were well in existence and their knowledge -- Only reason assigned for not producing the same, is lack of knowledge to produce the same -- Plaintiffs want to patch up their evidence by adducing additional evidence in appeal -- Same is beyond the scope of Order 41 Rule 27 – Lower Appellate Court erred in allowing the application filed by the plaintiffs under Order 41 Rule 27 to lead additional evidence – Application dismissed.

(Para 19, 20, 23)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 25 – Additional issue at Appellate stage -- Specific plea with respect to adverse possession was raised by the defendants -- No issue was framed – Remand order shall only be in terms of Order 41 Rule 25 in form a reference to the Trial Court to take evidence and record findings on the additional issue No.3-A framed by the Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 21-23)

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 47A(1) -- Registration of document -- Reference to Collector – Nature of -- Registering Officer, after registration of the document, can refer the same for adjudication before the Collector, if he has reason to believe that there was deliberate undervaluation of the property -- Such a reference is not a mechanical act, but the Registering Officer should have a basis for coming to prima facie finding of undervaluation of the property -- Duty is enjoined upon the Registering Officer to ensure that Section 47-A(1) does not work as an engine of oppression nor as a matter of routine, mechanically, without application of mind as to the existence of any material or reason to believe the fraudulent intention to evade payment of proper Stamp Duty.

-- The expression ‘reason to believe’ is not synonymous with subjective satisfaction of the officer. The belief must be held in good faith, it cannot be merely a pretence. It is open to the Court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief must have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not irrelevant or extraneous to the purpose of the section. The word ‘reason to believe’ means some material on the basis of which the department can re-open the proceedings. However, satisfaction is necessary in terms of material available on record, which should be based on objective satisfaction arrived at reasonably.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 47A(1) -- Registration of document – Reference to Collector – Undervaluation property – Material to support – Roving enquiry – Permissibility of -- It is not permissible for the Registering Officer to undertake a roving enquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the correct market value of the property -- If the Registering Officer is bona fide of the view that the sale consideration shown in the sale deed is not correct and the sale is undervalued, then it is obligatory on the part of the Registering Authority as well as the Special Deputy Collector (Stamps) to assign some reason for arriving at such a conclusion -- In such circumstances, if the document in question is straightway referred to the Collector without recording any prima facie reason, the same would vitiate the entire enquiry and the ultimate decision.

(Para 27)

C. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 47A(1) -- Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968, Rule 4, 6, 7 -- As per Rule 6 of the Rules 1968, after passing the provisional order, it is obligatory on the part of the Collector to communicate the market value of the property and the duty payable by the parties concerned in Form II – After the issue of Form II, the parties concerned have to be given an opportunity to submit their representation in respect of determining the market value of the subject property -- Thereafter, as contemplated in Rule 7 of the Rules 1968, the Collector, after considering the representation if received in writing and the submissions that might have been urged at the time of hearing or even in the absence of any representation from the parties concerned, proceed to pass the final order -- Collector (Stamps) directly issued the final order in violation of the Rules 4 and 6 – High Court set aside orders passed by Chief Revenue Controlling Officer-cum-the-Inspector General of Registration – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 2, 30-32)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 409 – Criminal breach of trust -- For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201, 206, 217, 406, 409, 462, 34, 37, 120B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust by Bank – Quashing of FIR – No allegation of entrustment of the property which the appellant-bank has misappropriated or converted for its own use to the detriment of the respondent No.5, as such, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 IPC would  not be applicable -- Since there was no entrustment of any property, the ingredients of Section 462 IPC are also not applicable -- Offences u/s 206, 217 and 201 of the IPC requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said Sections also would not be available against the appellant-bank --  FIR/complaint also does not show that the appellant-bank and its officers acted with any common intention or intentionally cooperated in the commission of any alleged offences, as such, the provisions of section 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable -- Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship to the appellant-bank – FIR quashed.

(Para 23-31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Constitution of India, Article 142 – Transfer petition -- Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Contents of the FIR clearly suggest that both the parties being adult had consensual relations for years before the complaint was filed alleging that there was backing out of promise to marry -- No case is made out u/s 376 IPC -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 2, 6, 8)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution -- Quashing of Sanction order -- Whether the Sanction has been granted by the competent authority or not, would be a matter of evidence -- There is not a whisper in the impugned order about any failure of justice having occurred on account of the impugned Sanction Order -- High Court also should not have entertained the petition for quashing the Sanction Order when the prosecution had already examined seven witnesses – High Court has committed gross error in quashing the Sanction Order and the consequent proceedings vide the impugned order -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 8-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 –Additional accused – Who can be summoned -- Trial Court has jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial -- Initially named in the F.I.R. as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face the trial.

(Para 21(a))

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Evidence – Charge-sheet/ Case Diary -- Consideration of -- Trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence.

(Para 21(b))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – 'any person not being the accused’ – Meaning of -- Phrase 'any person not being the accused' occurred in Section 319 covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court -- Persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the Criminal Court are included in the said expression.

(Para 21(c))

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Satisfaction of Investigation Officer – Requirements of -- It would not be proper for the trial court to reject the application for addition of new accused by considering records of the Investigating Officer -- When the evidence of complainant is found to be worthy of acceptance then the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer hardly matters -- If satisfaction of Investigating Officer is to be treated as determinative then the purpose of Section 319 would be frustrated.

(Para 21(c))

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 12 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 3, 25 – Conviction under Arms act – Release on Probation -- Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction -- When a person who is found guilty, is extended the benefit of Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, then he shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction of an offence under such law.

(Para 10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) -- NDPS – Recovery of 20 kg of ganja -- Acquittal – Taxi driver – Conscious possession -- Courts below convicted the appellant solely for the reason that the appellant was not able to give details of the passengers -- Contraband was seized from the taxi while he was carrying two passengers who fled from the scene -- It was not expected of any taxi driver to give details of the passengers, as ordinarily, no taxi driver/owner before allowing the passenger to board the taxi ask for such details from the passenger(s) -- No effort was made to search out the two passengers who may reveal the truth -- No incriminating material was seized from the person of the appellant and he had not made any effort to run away, moreover, the two bags from which the contraband was seized were not found to be hidden but were rather visible -- Conviction order, set aside.

(Para 2, 6-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366, 376 (2)(n) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Rape -- Appeal against conviction – Delay of 1637 days -- Condonation of delay – High Court dismissed the appeal on delay – Held, right to appeal, particularly when it concerns the liberty of an individual, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution -- High Court's order dismissing the appeal solely due to delay, without properly examining the reasons for the delay warrants reconsideration – Dismissal of the appeal was erroneous -- Delay of 1637 days condoned -- High Court requested to dispose of the Criminal Appeal on merits in accordance with law.

(Para 5-8)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case – Loss of one eye -- Diamond Cutting labourer – 100% disability -- Diamond cutting is a task of immense skill which involves a great degree of precision and exactitude -- Seeing only with one eye, unquestionably makes it greatly difficult to effectively carry out these processes -- 65% as functional disability is insufficient --  Disability of the claimant-appellant be taken as 100% -- Total compensation assessed as Rs.15,98,000/- to be paid alongwith interest @ 8 % p.a payable from the claim petition.

(Para 7-9)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on his head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused -- When a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness -- Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Money claim – Writ jurisdiction -- It is not an inviolable rule that no money claim can be adjudicated upon in exercise of writ jurisdiction -- Non-payment of admitted dues, inter alia, may be considered an arbitrary action on the part of respondents and for claiming the same, a writ petition may lie – Writ petition restored for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

(Para 8, 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Maintainability of writ – Availability of alternative remedy – Ground of -- Throwing a writ petition on ground of availability of alternative remedy after 10 years, particularly, when parties have exchanged their affidavits, is not the correct course unless there are disputed questions of fact which by their very nature cannot be adjudicated upon without recording formal evidence -- Writ petition restored for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

(Para 8, 10)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Vehicle not involved in accident – Stand of -- Onus of proof -- In cross-examination, no suggestion was given to any of the witnesses produced by the complainants that the vehicle as claimed by the complainants was not the vehicle, which was involved in the accident and that it was some other vehicle -- Final Report u/s 173 of the Cr. P.C. also stated that the vehicle as claimed by the complainants was the vehicle involved in the accident -- Therefore, the onus was on the Insurance Company or Owner/ driver to get the same disproved by either calling the Investigating Officer as a witness or by any other means to establish a factual position to the contrary.

(Para 3, 9)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Fraud in policy – Onus of proof -- Insurance Company has not been able to prove that it had not received the money/premium prior to the accident and the only stand taken was that the insurance was fraudulently obtained -- Fraud vitiates everything, but merely alleging fraud does not amount to proving it -- For, it has to be proven in accordance with law by adducing evidence etcetera, the onus of which would also lie on the person alleging fraud -- Insurance Company’s liability under the issued insurance certificate/policy to cover the incident, cannot be escaped by alleging fraud.

(Para 13-16)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 2(12A), 162, 164B – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Hit and run case – Golden hour treatment -- It is the obligation of the Central Government under Sub-Section (2) of Section 162 to make a scheme for cashless treatment of accident victims during the golden hour -- Such a scheme may contain provisions for creating a fund for such treatment.

-- Provision made in Section 162 for framing a scheme for providing cashless treatment in the golden hour seeks to uphold and protect the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

-- It is a statutory obligation of the Central Government to frame the scheme.

Central Government directed to make a scheme in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 162 of the MV Act as expeditiously as possible and, in any event, by 14th March 2025.

(Paara 4-8)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4-24 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 10 -- Objection to arbitration award – Limitation – Extended period – Exclusion of holiday – Permissibility of :

(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the ACA.

(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

(Para 1.1)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay --  Liberal approach -- Concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation -- Limitation is not merely a technical consideration -- Rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity -- No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.

(Para 13-17)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Recovery suit – Pronote – Proof of -- Non-appearance of defendant – Adverse inference -- Defendant having not entered the witness box, adverse inference is liable to be drawn against him that he did not want to face the cross-examination -- In the presence of the testimony of the two attesting witnesses of the pronote as well as receipt proving due execution of the same by the defendant, no reliance could have been placed upon the statement of an expert witness disputing the signature of defendant, particularly when defendant himself had not entered into the witness box, to deny his signature.

(Para 10)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005) , Section 12 – Maintenance to wife/ children – Wife started earning – Effect of -- In case the wife in order to meet the responsibilities of herself and her two children started working at some place to make additional income, cannot be a reason for the husband to escape his liability to pay the maintenance.

(Para 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (4) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 – Maintenance to wife -- Decree of restitution of conjugal rights – Effect of -- Mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C -- It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree.

(Para 29)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (4) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 34, 35, 36, 37 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 40, 41, 42, 43 -- Maintenance to wife -- Decree of restitution of conjugal rights – Effect of -- Contention that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings – Held, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings.

-- Section 41 of Evidence Act specifically deals with instances where an earlier judgment, order or decree constitutes conclusive proof whereas Section 42 provides that an earlier judgment is relevant if it relates to matters of public nature relevant to the inquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

-- Two proceedings are altogether independent and are not directly or even indirectly connected, in the sense that proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. do not arise from proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights.

(Para 30-34)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (1) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9, 13 – Maintenance to wife -- Decree of restitution of conjugal rights – Effect of -- A wife, who suffered a decree of divorce on the ground of deserting her husband, would not be entitled to maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. as long as the marriage subsisted, but she would be entitled to such maintenance once she attained the status of a divorced wife, in the light of the definition of a ‘wife’ in Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. Rohtash Singh’s case (2000) 3 SCC 180, relied.

(Para 38)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Limitation – Date of knowledge --  Suit for cancellation of registered sale deed in 2004, which they executed by conveying the plaint scheduled property in favour of the respondents in 2017 -- Alleged that the said sale deed was brought through fraudulent means and the Appellants came to know of it only in 2017, when the Deputy Collector issued notice to the Appellants on an application filed by the Respondents for correcting the revenue entries -- High Court was not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself -- Judgment of the High Court is unsustainable – Suit restored.

(Para 2, 13, 16)

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section , 22(1)(d), 26A -- Prohibited article -- No notification issued u/s 26A of the D&C Act, 1940 prohibiting or restricting the aromatic tincture of cardamom -- Absence of such a notification is decisive -- Without it, the tincture remains a licensed medicinal preparation that can be manufactured and sold in accordance with the general rules and the conditions of the license held by the Appellants -- Respondent authorities cannot, on their own accord, treat this lawful product as a “prohibited article.” -- Section 22(1)(d) is not a substitute for Section 26A of the D&C Act, 1940.

(Para 9-11)