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Posted On: 27-06-2025
454. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 30.04.2025 Decided on: 24.06.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in  motor vehicle accident case – Non-renewal of Driving License -- Liability of Insurance Company – Recovery rights in the absence of service of summons to driver/ owner -- Driver possessed valid driving license since 1968 -- Renewed w.e.f. 12.11.1992 to 11.11.1995 – Not renewed from 12.11.1995 to 25.03.1997 – Renewed on 26.03.1997-- Accident took place on intervening night of 1/2.12.1996 --  Driver of the offending vehicle cannot be presumed to be having possessed with legal and valid driving license as on the date of accident -- Insurance company to deposit the amount at the first instance followed by its recovery from the insured. Beli Ram V. Rajinder Kumar reported as 2021 (3) ACC 436 relied.

-- recovery rights need to be conferred upon the appellant/ insurance company, however, appellant/ insurance company has not made any bonafide efforts to serve Respondents No. 4 & 5, during the pendency of their present appeal for the past 25 years and the same thus has been dismissed qua Respondents No. 4 & 5, as such, no such directions can be passed in favour of the appellant/ insurance company in the absence of Respondents No. 4 & 5 on account of their own act and conduct.

(Para 9, 15)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in  motor vehicle accident case – Accident on intervening night of 1/2.12.1996 – Minimum wages of Rs.3,000/- per month taken as per the notification of the State Government while considering deceased as a skilled labour -- Deceased to be around 29 years on the date of accident, multiplier of 17 needs to be applied -- Claimants held entitled to Rs.18,000/- as compensation under the head of funeral expenses and Rs.18,000/- towards loss of estate by applying 10% increase under the conventional heads -- Loss of consortium to the tune of Rs.48,000/- x 3 (Rs.1,44,000/-) as respondents no.1 to 3 being wife and children – Deduction 1/3 applied – Total compensation comes to Rs.7,51,200/- with interest @ 12% per annum being just and proper in the prevailing economic scenario/ facts and circumstances.

(para 9-14)

Posted On: 26-06-2025
456. (SC) (Decided on: 23.05.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 4 -- Deletion of party/ Legal heirs – When a particular party has been impleaded as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 4 after due inquiry by the court and without any objections, the party can approach the court anytime later and seek his deletion from the array of parties by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10.

(Para 51)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 4, Section 11 -- Deletion of party/ Legal heirs – Res-judicata -- High Court, in its impugned order, held the application of the appellant under Order 1 Rule 10 to be barred by res judicata and thus not maintainable on that ground – Held, no infirmity in the said observation made by the High Court -- Issue as regards the impleadment of the appellant as a legal heir of the original defendant had attained finality between the parties and thus the subsequent application under Order 1 Rule 10 seeking to get his name deleted from the array of parties could be said to be barred by res judicata.

(Para 53, 54)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 4, Section 11 -- Deletion of party – “at any stage of the proceedings” -- Order 1 Rule 10 allows the court to exercise its power at any stage, however the same cannot be construed to mean that the defendant can keep reagitating the same objection at different stages of the same proceeding, when the issue has been determined conclusively at a previous stage.

(Para 54)

Posted On: 23-06-2025
461. (SC) (Decided on: 29.04.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 341, 201, 148, 149, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197, 201, 228 – Police encounter – Murder -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Framing of charge-- Quashing of -- Petitioners/ police officials stand accused of surrounding a civilian vehicle in plain clothes and jointly firing upon its occupant -- Such conduct, by its very nature, bears no reasonable nexus to the duties of maintaining public order or effecting lawful arrest -- Mistaken identity attracts no culpability is a matter of defence; whether the petitioners acted in good faith, or whether they fired at all, are questions of fact that can only be resolved on evidence at trial -- At the stage of summoning or of framing of charges the Court is not expected to weigh the probative value of the materials in microscopic detail but merely to see whether the facts, taken at their face, disclose the commission of an offence -- Order of the Magistrate summoning the petitioners, and the subsequent order of the Sessions Court framing charges, proceed on an appreciation that there exists prima-facie evidence of concerted firearm assault -- No error of law or perversity of approach is shown – SLP dismissed.

(Para 7-10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197, 201 – Suppression of evidence -- Sanction form Government – Cognizance by Magistrate -- Where the very accusation is suppression of evidence, the nexus is absent on the face of the record -- In such a situation the  bar of Section 197 CrPC is not attracted, and sanction is not a condition precedent to cognizance.  

(Para 16)

Posted On: 22-06-2025
467. (SC) (Decided on: 23.05.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – It is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped -- At the  preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims -- If any triable issues arise from the pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected.

(Para 8)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Agreement to sell -- Unregistered agreement to sell cannot under any circumstance, create or convey any right, title or interest.

(Para 9.4)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Multiple cause of action -- Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible where different causes of action are independently pleaded and supported by distinct facts.

(Para 9.6)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act No. 3 of 1955), Section 207 -- Rejection of plaint – Jurisdiction of civil Court/ revenue court -- Issues relating to title of immovable property fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of civil courts and not revenue authorities -- Revenue entries are administrative in nature and intended only for fiscal purposes -- Issues raised in the plaint pertain to ownership, validity of sale deeds, and declaration of title, which are civil in nature and, therefore, triable exclusively by a civil court -- Applicability of Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters relating to khatedari rights and recovery of possession based on tenancy does not arise -- By rejecting the plaint High Court at the preliminary stage, committing a jurisdictional error -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside.

(Para 10)

Posted On: 19-06-2025
474. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 26.05.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- ad valorem court fee -- Rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, is a dire power conferred upon the Court to terminate a civil action, at the threshold -- Conditions precedent to exercise of power, therefore, are stringent and have to be very meticulously seen, to be existing – Averments made in the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration -- Averments made in the plaint, will have to be accepted, as correct, for the purpose of consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, filed at the behest of the defendant and the Courts, ought not to go beyond the same and appreciate/ touch the merits of the case.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- ad valorem court fee -- Courts cannot pre-judge the truth, by examining the merits of the matter – Court has to consider complete assertions and one or two lines, in between, as such, cannot be picked up – Plaintiff  categorically stated in plaint about himself together with his family members, being head of the family, to have decided to make such an arrangement of his property, that both his family and property could be protected to its best -- From the contents of the plaint, it is evident that petitioner-plaintiff himself is not seeking possession of the land, which forms part of the family settlement -- He is seeking the modification/ rectification of the shares -- Payment of Court fee or not, shall be appropriately considered by framing an issue upon the same -- Payment of ad valorem Court fee under these circumstances, is mixed question of fact and law, which could not be decided, at the threshold.

(Para 16-26)

Posted On: 15-06-2025
484. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 12.05.2025 Decided on: 02.06.2025)

A. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1), 5 -- Deposition of witness -- Oath – Affirmation -- Section 4(1) requires that all the witnesses shall take oath or affirmation before deposing in the Court -- DW-3 refused to take oath in the name of God, however, he was also not called upon to make solemn affirmation -- Learned counsel representing the defendant also did not offer him the second option i.e. affirmation – Held, both the Courts have correctly held that the deposition cannot be read in evidence.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68, 70 – Will – Proof of -- Admission -- First Appellate Court held that the second Will is proved because “GP”  himself produced Will for sanction of the mutation and thereafter, mortgaged his share for taking loan from Banks – Held, finding is not correct because Section 68 of the 1872 Act requires examination of one attesting witness in the Court -- Section 70 of the 1872 Act will not be applicable because “GS” is not a party to the attested document i.e. Will.

(Para 4)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 41, 52 -- Lis pendens – Bonafide purchaser -- Suit was instituted on 24.02.1989, whereas, the sale deed was executed on 01.06.1990 -- Hence, defendants No.2 to 6 cannot claim benefit of bonafide purchasers because they have failed to prove that they are not governed by rule of lis pendens.

(Para 6)

Posted On: 15-06-2025
486. (SC) (Decided on: 04.06.2025)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Motive – Role of -- A complete absence of motive, although not conclusive, is a relevant factor which weighs in favour of the accused -- Final effect of such absence on the outcome of the case shall depend upon the quality and weight of surrounding evidence -- Appellant and deceased were friends, the fact that the appellant brought him home could not be termed as per-se incriminating -- Therefore, motive explains the circumstances on record and enables the Court to draw better inference in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201, 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 5, 25 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Subsequent conduct – Theory of accidental death -- Act of removal of the dead body and concealment of articles was a result of fear of his father is quite natural -- A young boy studying in first year of college, with no criminal background and with no motive in sight, would certainly have become scared on seeing that his friend has accidentally shot himself in the living room of his house with the pistol belonging to his father and is lying in a pool of blood -- Subsequent conduct does not become so unnatural that it could be made the basis to convict him for the commission of murder without additional evidence to that effect -- Mere suspicion, no matter how grave, cannot take the place of proof in a criminal trial -- Theory put across by the appellant is fairly probable and is supported by medical evidence including the examination of the bullet injury and trajectory -- Benefit of a counter possibility goes to the accused in such cases – Held, circumstantial evidence on record is not consistent and leaves a reasonable possibility of an alternate outcome i.e. of innocence of the appellant on the charges of murder and illegal usage of fire arm – Conviction u/s 302 IPC and Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act, set  aside -- Conviction u/s 201 IPC sustained.

(Para 26-29)

Posted On: 15-06-2025
487. (SC) (Decided on: 09.06.2025)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Narco-analysis test – Nature of -- Narco-analysis test is an interrogation method whereby a suspect of a crime is injected with a psychoactive drug under controlled conditions to suppress their reasoning power or the ability to determine what is good/bad for themselves.

(Para 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 20, 21 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Criminal jurisprudence -- Narco-analysis test without consent – Self-incrimination -- Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution are non-derogable and sacrosanct rights to which the judiciary cannot carve out exceptions – Involuntary administration of narco-analysis and similar tests is in contravention of the protection given by Article 20(3) of the Constitution, i.e. the right against self-incrimination -- Results of such involuntary tests cannot be considered as ‘material evidence’ in the eyes of the law -- Under no circumstances, is an involuntary or forced narco-analysis test permissible under law -- A report of such involuntary test or information that is discovered subsequently is also not per se admissible as evidence in criminal or other proceedings -- While the need for modern investigative techniques may be true, such investigative techniques cannot be conducted at the cost of constitutional guarantees under Articles 20(3) and 21.

(Para 8-12)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 45 – Narco-analysis test -- For voluntary tests, it must be ensured that appropriate safeguards are in place -- Results of the same cannot be admitted directly as evidence -- Pertinently, any fact or information that is discovered subsequent thereto, with the help of the information supplied in the result, can be admitted into evidence with the aid of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 – It cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused person.

(Para 8.6, 16)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Regular bail – Rowing enquiry – Permissibility of -- It is settled law that while entertaining an application for grant of bail, the Court has to take into consideration the allegations against the accused; period of custody undergone; nature of evidence and the crime in question; likelihood of influencing witnesses and other such relevant grounds -- It does not involve entering into a roving enquiry or accepting the use of involuntary investigative techniques.

(Para 11)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 315 -- Narco-analysis test – Right of accused -- The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test at an appropriate stage -- Appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial -- However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco-analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test.

(Para 21)

Posted On: 12-06-2025
489. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 02.04.2025 Decided on: 09.04.2025)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 1, 5 – Objection of the Limitation Act -- Condonation of delay -- Limitation Act, 1963 is a law based on public policy that aims to bring finality to legal disputes -- Its purpose is to prevent uncertainty in matters of property and rights -- The Act emphasizes that the law supports those who act promptly to assert their rights and not those who are negligent or inactive -- At the same time, Section 5 provides an exception by allowing courts to admit delayed appeals or applications, if “sufficient cause” is shown -- This gives courts discretion, requiring them to assess two key elements: (1) whether a valid reason exists, and (2) whether it justifies missing the original deadline, though the Act doesn’t define “sufficient cause,” leaving it to courts to interpret based on the facts of each case.

(Para 15)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay -- Misrepresentation by representative of company -- Appellate Court rejected the application for condoning a 38-day delay in filing the appeal --- Held, misrepresentation was not by any of the Director/Managing Director of the company itself as a litigant -- Legal position regarding the interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 mandates a justice-oriented and pragmatic approach, rather than a rigid and overly technical one – Plaintiff company has significant interests at stake, involving approximately 31 acres of valuable land worth crores of rupees -- Delay in filing the appeal was limited to 38 days -- Period not so excessive as to be considered inordinate or irredeemable – Outright dismissal of the appeal without adjudicating it on merits, especially in light of the substantial stakes involved, runs contrary to the spirit of Section 5 --  Impugned order rejecting the application for condonation of a 38-day delay and consequently dismissing the appeal set aside.

(Para 18-22)

Posted On: 11-06-2025
493. (SC) (Decided on: 26.05.2025)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 90, 376(2)(n), 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Criminal intimidation – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Complainant/ respondent no2 and appellant interacted frequently and fell in love – She engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions – The narrative of the Complainant/ Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct -- Consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact -- No material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise.

-- Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant.

-- No evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the Complainant/ Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence under section 506 IPC.

A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State -- It a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC -- Ingredients of the offence under Sections 376 (2)(n) or 506 IPC are not established -- Appellant is just 25 years of age, and has a lifetime ahead of him, it would be in the interest of justice that he does not suffer an impending trial and, therefore, the proceedings quashed at this stage itself.

(Para 8-11)

Posted On: 10-06-2025
497. (SC) (Decided on: 16.04.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Duty of Court – Object of provision -- Order VII Rule 11 CPC serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication -- There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is surreal -- Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are standalone grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit -- However, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses (a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive -- When clever drafting veils the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the threshold -- Power to reject a plaint under this provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit or barred by law.

(Para 14.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (a) – Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- Merely including a paragraph on cause of action is not sufficient but rather, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must disclose a cause of action -- Plaint should contain such cause of action that discloses all the necessary facts required in law to sustain the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s) -- Even if a right is found, unless there is a violation or breach of that right by the defendant, the cause of action should be deemed to be unreal -- A pure question of law that can be decided at the early stage of litigation, ought to be decided at the earliest stage.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A, 54 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 41(j) – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269ST – Rejection of plaint -- Suit for declaration – Based upon agreement to sell -- Unless and until the sale deed is executed, the purchaser is not vested with any right, title or interest in the property except to the limited extent of seeking specific performance from his vendor -- Any right, until the sale deed is executed, will vest only with the owner -- Since the respondents are not divested any right by virtue of the agreement, they cannot sustain the suit as they would not have any locus -- Consequently, they also cannot seek any declaration in respect of the title of the vendors -- Respondents/ plaintiffs claim to have paid the entire consideration of Rs.75,00,000/- in cash, despite the introduction of Section 269ST to the Income Tax Act in 2017 and the corresponding amendment to Section 271 DA – Yet another defect in the plaint is regarding the identity of the property – Plaint ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC – Application U/O 7 R 11 (a) & (d) allowed.

(Para 15-20)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Defence of defendant – Consideration of -- Principle that only averments in the plaint are to be considered under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- While it is true that the defendant's defense is not to be considered at this stage, this does not mean that the court must accept patently untenable claims or shut its eyes to settled principles of law and put the parties to trial, even in cases which are barred and the cause of action is fictitious -- Where the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless, courts should exercise their power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and not waste judicial time on matters that are legally barred and frivolous.

(Para 17)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A, 54 – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269ST – Permissible limit of two lacs in cash -- Suit filed claiming Rs.75,00,000/- paid by cash – Not only it create a suspicion on the transaction, but also displays, a violation of law -- When there is a law in place, the same has to be enforced -- Most times, such transactions go unnoticed or not brought to the knowledge of the income tax authorities -- Ignorance in fact is excusable but not the ignorance in law – Directions issued:

(A) Whenever, a suit is filed with a claim that Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is paid by cash towards any transaction, the courts must intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department to verify the transaction and the violation of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, if any,

(B) Whenever, any such information is received either from the court or otherwise, the Jurisdictional Income Tax authority shall take appropriate steps by following the due process in law,

(C) Whenever, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is claimed to be paid by cash towards consideration for conveyance of any immovable property in a document presented for registration, the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar shall intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authority who shall follow the due process in law before taking any action,

(D) Whenever, it comes to the knowledge of any Income Tax Authority that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- or above has been paid by way of consideration in any transaction relating to any immovable property from any other source or during the course of search or assessment proceedings, the failure of the registering authority shall be brought to the knowledge of the Chief Secretary of the State/UT for initiating appropriate disciplinary action against such officer who failed to intimate the transactions.

(Para 18.1)

Posted On: 10-06-2025
498. (SC) (Decided on: 28.05.2025)

A. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Guidelines, Para 172 -- UNESCO -- World Heritage Status – Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) -- Construction of verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 in Punjab and Haryana High Court -- Court Room Nos. 2 to 9, which have the preexisting verandahs, provide shelter to the lawyers and litigants and at the same time the area in front of the Court Room No. 1 is unprotected and exposes the lawyers and the litigants to sun, winds and rain -- Neither such verandah can be said to be a major restoration nor a new construction within the main structure of the High Court building -- Such an addition would unquestionably not violate the mandate of paragraph 172 of the Operational Guidelines thereby posing a risk to the OUV of the High Court building -- Decision of the High Court in directing construction of the verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 in alignment with the design of the pre-existing verandahs in front of Court Room Nos. 2 to 9 is absolutely justified and would not violate the UNESCO guidelines.

(Para 34-39)

B. Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031 – Parking area in Punjab and Haryana High Court – Land part of Green belt -- Laying of green paver blocks in open parking area -- Said area is already being used by the lawyers and litigants to park their vehicles during Court hours -- Almost 3000 to 4000 four-wheeler vehicles are parked in the area on any given working day -- This practice has been prevalent since last many years because the pre-existing parking facility has fallen woefully short with the efflux of time and increase of footfall into the High Court campus -- Land in question is a part of the green belt, however, Supreme Court has time and again addressed this issue and has provided that for sustainable development, a balanced view is necessary -- Requirement of a proper parking space for the lawyers and the litigants is imperative -- Orders passed by the High Court for placing green paver blocks in the open area being used for parking, upheld -- High Court administration may consult with the landscaping experts and ensure plantation of a suitable number of trees at appropriate intervals so as to facilitate parking of maximum number of vehicles and creating shade as well as shelter for the said vehicles and in addition thereto, increasing the green cover in the area -- This exercise shall be monitored by the concerned Committee of the High Court.

(Para 40-45)

Posted On: 09-06-2025
499. (SC) (Decided on: 02.06.2025)

A. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 55 -- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (24 of 1961), Section 48 -- Charge on immovable property -- Alienation of such property – Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller -- Whether Void or voidable -- It would not be within the domain of the member-loanee who himself commits a breach to take a stand that the act done by him should be declared void, without the society coming forward before an appropriate forum to set aside such alienation -- Law cannot, and does not, reward a person for his/her own wrongs.

(Para 24)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 55 -- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (24 of 1961), Section 48 -- Charge on immovable property -- Alienation of such property – Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller -- Whether Void abinitio or voidable -- Society, in whose favour the charge was created on the land in question, never moved before any forum for enforcing its charge over the suit land or raised any grievance with regard to either of the Sale Deeds -- Section 48(e) of the Act says that any alienation made in contravention of the provisions of clause (d) shall be void has to be read as directory to the extent that the same can be acted upon only at the instance of the party aggrieved (viz. the society concerned) upon whom the right has been created under the statute -- With regard to a transaction, unless the society comes forward to seek its nullification/ setting aside, the same would at best be a voidable action and not void ab initio.

(Para 25)

Posted On: 09-06-2025
500. (SC) (Decided on: 20.05.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 -- Doctrine of proportionality – Service matter – Disciplinary proceedings -- As a general principle, not only in service jurisprudence but also in other branches of law, the doctrine of proportionality is deeply embedded as a part of constitutionalism -- Traces of this doctrine are visible through Articles 14, 16, and 21 of Constitution -- Doctrine of proportionality forbids the competent Authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully, or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the Court -- When the punishment of dismissal is awarded on a trivial issue, the Court will be well within its jurisdiction to question the quantum of punishment and annul it -- However, the enforcement of the maxim varies from case to case as the facts and circumstances of each case are necessary parameters to decide how to invoke this principle.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Dismissal from service -- Respondent was posted in a sensitive border area performing the duties of Sentry -- Respondent, was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment, and discipline -- However, contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box -- He has, therefore, committed robbery of the cash amount, which he was designated to protect -- In Para Military Forces  discipline, ethics, loyalty, dedication to service, and reliability are essential to the job -- All members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter -- He was found guilty of minor misconducts on eight separate occasions, where punishments were awarded -- Misconduct proved against the respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient – Dismissal order upheld.

(Para 2, 11-13)