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Posted On: 05-06-2024
402. (SC) (Decided on: 15.03.2024)

A. “May” – “Shall” – Interpretation -- Word “may” ordinarily does not mean “must” -- Ordinarily, “may” will not be construed as “shall” -- But this is not an inflexible rule -- The use of the word “may” in certain legislations can be construed as “shall”, and the word “shall” can be construed as “may” -- It all depends on the nature of the power conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of the exercise of the power -- The legislative intent also plays a role in the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the word “may” has been used is also relevant.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the case is being tried as a warrant case -- In the case of a summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Recovery of -- By a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery -- Section 421 of the Cr.PC deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence -- Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr.PC. for recovery of interim compensation -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered treating it as fine -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered by the Trial Court by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property of the accused -- If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A from the complainant.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A(5) – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-payment of interim compensation – Right to defend -- Non-payment of interim compensation by the accused does not take away his right to defend the prosecution.

(Para 12)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Power of Trial Court – It can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty -- Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint u/s 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Word “may” used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as “shall”. Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

(Para 14)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

(Para 15)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Financial distress -- Factors to be considered while exercising discretion -- When the court deals with an application u/s 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A -- Presumption u/s 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation -- At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration –  Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted – Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused -- If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation -- Factors set out are not exhaustive -- There could be several other factors, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. -- While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

(Para 16)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Law summarised:

a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.”

b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.

c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.

iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc.

v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.

(Para 19)

Posted On: 04-06-2024
406. (P&H HC) (Reserved on 18.01.2024 Decided on: 03.04.2024)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint – Presumption as to liability – Rebuttal – Standard of proof -- Once execution of the cheque is proved/ admitted, the presumptions u/s 118(a) and 139 of the said Act would arise that it is supported by a consideration -- Such presumptions are rebuttable in nature and the accused can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence, and if the accused is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the complainant who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would dis-entitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument -- Standard of proof so as to prove defence on the part of an accused is 'preponderance of probabilities' and inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Void cheque – Alteration in cheque -- Amount written in cheque corrected in figures or in number without the knowledge and consent of maker of the cheque amounts to material alteration and also amounts cancellation -- The figure “2" was specifically inserted in cheque specifically without the knowledge of the drawer is a material alteration which makes the documents void -- Accused is not liable for any type of legal recoverable debt -- Nothing is on file to prove any type of transaction or debt to held the accused liable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 8-10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Receipt issued on the letter pad of the shop of accused is also not proved the liability of the accused in any manner as no witness regarding the receipt is on the letter pad and without any witness the document did not prove any type of liability towards the accused.

(Para 9)

Posted On: 28-05-2024
420. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on 17.05.2024 Decided on: 24.05.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 156(3), 177, 190 -- Registration of FIR – Territorial jurisdiction -- Power of Magistrate – A Magistrate can order investigation of only those cases which the Court has jurisdiction to enquire into and try under Chapter XV of J&K CrPC which is applicable to the case -- Section 177 of CrPC which falls in Chapter XV provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.

(Para 10)

B. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 188, 561A -- Quashing of FIR -- Territorial jurisdiction -- A proposal for insurance policy from the travel agent of deceased  at Delhi and it was forwarded to the authorised agent of petitioner/ company stationed at Delhi -- Travel insurance was to take effect from Delhi as the deceased had booked himself from Delhi to Frankfurt -- Death of the deceased in Switzerland -- Thus, neither any event nor its consequence has taken place within the territorial limits of either CJM or within the territorial limits of Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu -- Neither the petitioner-company, nor respondent No.2 is a State subject -- They are not even registered as companies within the jurisdiction of erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir -- Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 4 of RPC and Section 188 of CrPC would not be attracted -- Order of Ld. CJM, Jammu, directing the SHO to register the impugned FIR and investigate the same is, without jurisdiction – FIR quashed.

(Para 11-13, 21)

C. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 304 (II), 420, 409, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 561A -- Medical insurance policy – Non-honour of medi-claim – FIR for cheating, forgery & culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Quashing of FIR -- Transaction between the insurer and the insured is purely contractual in nature, if any of the parties to this contract defaults in honouring its commitment, it cannot form a basis for launching a criminal prosecution -- Merely because, on the basis of non-payment of compensation under the insurance policy to the complainant, her son breathed his last, it cannot be stated that the petitioner-company was, in any manner, responsible for his death and it cannot be prosecuted for a serious offence like culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Petitioner/ company cannot be held responsible for forgery of the cancellation letter purported to have been issued by deceased through his agent – FIR quashed.

(Para 14-21)

Posted On: 26-05-2024
425. (Allahabad HC) (Decided on: 21.5.2024)

A. Constitution of India, Article 233, 234 -- Judicial Officer – Code of Conduct -- Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary -- Judge’s official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of the propriety and probity -- The standard of conduct is higher than expected from a layman and also higher than expected of an advocate -- Even his private life must adhere to high standard of propriety and probity, higher than those deemed acceptable for others.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Judicial Officer – Involvement/ Becoming party in litigation/ FIR – A Judge who himself wants to become a party in a proceeding then he must quit his office first, to maintain the standard of purity and unblemished character -- It is not possible that he remain as a sitting Judge on one hand and after using his power prevail upon his subordinate officer to affect arrest his adversary.

(Para 23)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of FIR -- F.I.R. does not disclose any offence -- Same has been procured by the C.J.M. after exerting threats upon the concerned S.I. – Taking into account the prima facie findings and the material collected by the S.I.T., F.I.R. is driven by malafides and in the colourable exercise of power -- F.I.R. quashed exercising the extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 26, 28)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- FIR -- Judicial Officer as first informant – Instructions given -- Except in the matter of grave and severe nature like murder, suicide, rape or other sexual offences, dowry death, dacoity and in rest of the remaining cases, if any, judicial officer or Judge wants to become the first informant in his personal capacity in any F.I.R., he must take his concerned District Judge into confidence and after having the assent from the District Judge, he can become an informant of any F.I.R.

(Para 27)

Posted On: 26-05-2024
427. (SC) (Decided on: 15.05.2024)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration -- Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration -- However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration -- Unless the evidence tendered is tested by cross-examination, it is not creditworthy -- Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to this general rule.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Murder -- Dying declaration -- Attending doctor certified that the deceased was capable of narrating her statement -- Substance of the dying declaration is also borne out by the medical history of the patient recorded by the doctor which has also been proved in evidence -- Though there are inconsistencies and improvements in the version of the prosecution witnesses, there is however convergence with the core of the narration of the deceased made in the dying declaration and the medical history recorded by the doctor -- No reason to doubt the correctness of the dying declaration -- Evidence on record, particularly Ex. 59/ dying declaration clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt -- Appellant held guilty.

(Para 35-37)

Posted On: 25-05-2024
429. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 26.04.2024 Decided on: 10.05.2024)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS Case -- Prior information – Search warrant – Independent witness -- Police received prior information but did not obtain the search warrant because the police apprehended that case property would be destroyed by the delay in procuring the warrant, therefore, it resorted to the provisions of Section 42(2) -- The fact that independent witnesses have not stated anything about preparing the rukka and information under Section 42(2) in their presence and sending the police official with the same shows that there was no compliance with Section 42(2) and the same is fatal to the prosecution case.

(Para 23)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Number of person present at the spot – Inconsistency in – Effect of – Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Inconsistency regarding the number of persons present on the spot is not minor because the presence of the persons is so intricately connected to the recovery that any inconsistency in the former would affect the latter – Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 2, 24, 26)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Number of seals – Inconsistency in – Effect of -- Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Inconsistency regarding the number of seals put on the parcel would show that the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the putting of the seals are not correct, which would affect the integrity of the case property adversely -- Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 2, 25, 26)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Date of arrest – Inconsistency in – Effect of -- Inconsistency regarding the date of the arrest of the accused will make the whole case of the prosecution suspect because if the accused was arrested on 06.07.2016 and was to be produced before the learned Court on 07.07.2016, the whole of the prosecution case that information was received on 07.07.2016 and recovery was effected on 07.07.2016 in the presence of the accused will become suspect -- Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 26)

E. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Photography of search – Evidential value -- Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Heavy reliance was placed upon photographs and video recorded the process of search -- Photographs and the video recording could have been used to lend corroboration to the testimonies of the witnesses but when the testimonies are themselves suspect, there can be no question of their corroboration -- Photographs and the video recording by themselves are not substantive pieces of evidence upon which, a conviction can be recorded.

(Para 27)

Posted On: 24-05-2024
433. (SC) (Decided on: 04.03.2024)

A. Will – Health of testator – Suspicious circumstances -- From the evidence of the witnesses with reference to the health of the testator Court do not find that he was not in good senses and was unable to understand his welfare or take correct decisions -- Hence, the Will cannot be held to be suspicious on the ground of the alleged ill-health of the testator at the time of the execution of the Will.

(Para 9.5)

B. Will – Genuineness of -- Testator left behind about 8 acres of land and three houses -- Respondent is bequeathed merely 3.5 Acres of land -- Meaning thereby the balance property is in possession of widow and daughter -- This is how the interest of the natural legal heirs has been taken care of -- Expenses for his last rites were borne by the husband of the respondent who was taking care of the land of the testator -- Nothing on record to suggest that the appellants were taking care of the property left by the testator immediately after his death or that any steps were taken by them to get the same mutated in their favour – Will found to be genuine – Judgment upheld.

(Para 2, 15)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 3, 5 -- Pleadings – Admission and denial in written statement -- Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 CPC clearly provides for specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the plaint -- A general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient -- Proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 CPC provides that even the admitted facts may not be treated to be admitted, still in its discretion the Court may require those facts to be proved -- This is an exception to the general rule --  General rule is that the facts admitted, are not required to be proved.

(Para 15.1)