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Posted On: 12-08-2024
404. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 12.07.2024)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

Posted On: 11-08-2024
406. (SC) (Decided on: 08.08.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)

Posted On: 11-08-2024
407. (SC) (Decided on: 09.08.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail – Principles – Court observed, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment -- On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, Supreme Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency -- Trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail -- Trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.

(Para 53)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 7A, 8, 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 201, 120B -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Corruption case -- Regular bail – Bar contained in Section 45 of PMLA – Prolonged incarnation – Speedy trial – Right of -- Long incarceration running for around 17 months, trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial – Right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights – 493 witnesses have been named, the case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents -- Not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future – Keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail allowed, stringent conditions imposed.

(Para 49-58)

Posted On: 11-08-2024
409. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 14.06.2024 Decided on: 18.06.2024)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act are not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt -- Mere fact that the dead body of the deceased was found two kilometers back from place where the appellant had left him, could not be a ground to doubt the statement -- False explanation cannot be used as an additional link to fortify the prosecution case -- Suspicion, howsoever strong, it may be, cannot take the place of proof -- A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law -- The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in a case can be stated to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction – Findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and do not in any manner re-concile with the evidence on record -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17, 19-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence -- If the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established and that those circumstances must be conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused -- Moreover all the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence -- Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 23)

Posted On: 10-08-2024
413. (Allahabad HC) (Decided on: 31.01.2024)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 325, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Summoning to husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law – Quashing of :

-- Complainant alleged that she was beaten up and a fracture was caused in her hand, no medical documents were produced by her either before the Magistrate or with the counter affidavit filed in this Court to support this contention.

-- Stated in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. that she was treated with great affection and respect by the grandfather of the applicant no.1 and her ill treatment and harassment started after his death, in the statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C., the opposite party no.2/complainant stated that she was harassed for demanding dowry from the day following the date of her marriage.

-- At the same time, in the counter affidavit filed before this court, she stated that after the marriage, she had gone with her husband for honeymoon to Dubai and both of them had a very pleasant trip.

-- Complaint application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C filed after receipt of summon of the suit and after the suit filed under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act and after the Family Court had granted last opportunity to the opposite party no.2 to file her written statement and even after the date of that last opportunity had expired.

The learned Magistrate erred in summoning the applicants to face the trial without there being any specific allegation of commission of any act by the applicant nos. 2 and 3 which may amount to an offence -- Moreover, there is absolutely no material to support the allegations against the applicant no. 1 – Summoning order/ complaint quashed.

(Para 19-33

 

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Restitution of conjugal rights – Criminal proceedings – Opposite party no.2/ complainant/ wife filed the application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. merely to put pressure on the applicants and other members of their family for restitution of her matrimonial relationship with the applicant no.1/ husband -- However, she had filed a suit u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act with the same objective, which has been dismissed by the Family Court -- Criminal prosecution cannot be allowed to be misused for ulterior objective to put undue pressure on the husband, his family members and relatives for restitution of conjugal rights.

(Para 30)

Posted On: 07-08-2024
416. (SC) (Decided on: 01.08.2024)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 2 (zd), 13, 35 -- Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 9 -- Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), Section 21, 35A – Reserve Bank of India [Lending to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Sector] Directions, 2016, Direction 4, 4.8 – Secured creditors -- SARFAESI proceedings -- MSME – Rehabilitation of – Non-Performing Assets – Procedure of -- Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs -- Section 21 and Section 35A of Banking Regulation Act empower the RBI to frame the policy and give directions to the banking companies in relation to the advances to be followed by the banking companies -- Such directions have got to be read as supplement to the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act and accordingly are required to be construed as having statutory force and mandatory.

-- Entire exercise as contained in the “Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs” is required to be carried out by the banking companies before the accounts of MSMEs turn into Non-Performing Asset.

-- Whole process of enforcement of security interest as contained in Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act, could be initiated only when the borrower makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, in view of Section 13(2) of the said Act.

-- Banking companies though may be ‘Secured creditors’ as per the definition contained in Section 2 (zd) of the SARFAESI Act, are bound to follow the same,  before classifying the loan account of MSME as NPA.

The Instructions/ Directions issued by the Central Government under Section 9 of the MSMED Act and by the RBI under Section 21 and Section 35A have statutory force and are binding to all the Banking companies.

(Para 12-18)

Posted On: 29-07-2024
439. (SC) (Decided on: 24.07.2024)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 141, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company -- Interpretation of -- High Court's interpretation accurately identified the "drawer" as the individual who issues the cheque -- Drawer u/s 143A refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized signatories -- Primary liability rests on the drawer, emphasizing the drawer's responsibility for maintaining sufficient funds -- Section 141 of the NI Act extending liability to the company's officers for the dishonour of a cheque -- Appellants' attempt to extend this principle to Section 143A, to hold directors or other individuals personally liable for interim compensation, is unfounded -- Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume the company's legal identity.

(Para 28-30)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company – Interpretation of -- When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its natural and ordinary meaning -- Legislative intent, as discerned from the plain language of the statute, aims to hold the drawer accountable -- Appellants' argument for a broader interpretation to include authorized signatories u/s 143A contradicts this principle and would lead to an unjust extension of liability not supported by the statutory text.

(Para 31)