Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 – Termination of service --  Involvement in FIR u/s 376/342 RPC -- Rule of natural justice – Opportunity of hearing -- Respondents without affording any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner have terminated/dis-engaged the petitioner from the service which is palpably bad in the eyes of law as the order impugned has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice -- Otherwise also, the petitioner in the instant case stands acquitted of the charges on the basis of which he was disengaged -- Order disengaging the petitioner as SPO set aside – Services restored with all consequential benefits excluding the payment of emoluments for the period from disengagement till the date of restoration of service.

(Para 11-13)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3k(i), 29(1)(a)(i), 33 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Complaint – Company not arrayed as party -- Once the company has not been arrayed as accused, the petitioners who are employees of the company, cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the alleged offence -- Complaint quashed.

(Para 3, 8, 13)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), 3k(i), 24(3)(4), 29(1)(a)(i) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Complaint -- Re-analysing of sample – Delay by trial court -- Ld. trial court did not decide the application of the petitioners for re-analyzing the samples within the period of shelf life of the product  -- Right of the petitioners for getting the samples reanalysed under section 24(3)&(4) of the Act, has been violated – Complaint quashed.

(Para 2, 9-13)

A. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 420 -- Cheating -- Pre-requisite -- Investigating agency or the prosecuting agency, as the case may be, is obliged to show the existence of dishonest intention right from the inception when a person alleged to be deceived is induced to deliver the property etc.

(Para 9)

B. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 561A -- Cheating -- Supply of plant sapling – Plantation perished – Whether cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Plant or a sapling may perish due to multiple factors, may be with the intervention of weather, due to quality of soil or inadequate supply of water -- Negligence on the part of a farmer may also contribute for the destruction of a plant -- Complainants lodged the FIR without specific material to infer the existence of dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner-accused from the inception – Conversion of a purely civil dispute into a criminal offence is not permissible -- FIR quashed.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Obscene, act and songs -- Quashing of charge-sheet – Vague allegations – Compromise -- Filthy and unparliamentarily language used not mentioned in the FIR as well as statements of the witnesses -- No offence u/s 294 IPC is made out against the petitioner No. 2 as the allegations are vague and bereft of necessary details – For other offences, since the parties have entered into a compromise, the continuance of the criminal proceedings pending before the learned trial court shall be nothing but an abuse of process of law – Petition allowed, charge sheet quashed.

(Para 1-6)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Show cause notice – Non-service of – Effect of – Rule of natural justice -- In the absence of any material to show that the Show Cause Notice was served on the respondent at all, it has to be presumed that the action of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in setting the respondent ex parte and proceeding to assess damages and interest, is arbitrary, illegal and violative of principles of natural justice.

(Para 23)

B. Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), Section 7I, 7Q, 14B – Quantum of damages – Power of -- Contention that under 2nd Proviso to Section 14-B of the Act, only the Board of Trustees was empowered to reduce the quantum of damages and that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-I, Chandigarh, had no such power – Court disagreed with said plea – Held, as an Appellate Authority, the said Tribunal acting u/s 7-I of the Act, can exercise all the powers of the Primary Authority/ Adjudicating Authority.

(Para 30, 31)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Circumstances related to death -- Victim did not give any history of the consumption of the poison and the Medical Officer could not find any symptom of the poisoning --  Therefore, he did not treat the victim for poisoning --  Statement made by the victim nowhere states that the accused had forced her to consume the poison -- She stated that one black pill was taken from the bag of accused, which was consumed -- She fell asleep thereafter -- She has not specifically stated whether the victim had herself taken the medicine or it was administered to her -- There is no proof that the pill consumed by the victim was aluminium phosphide -- Statement made by the victim cannot constitute the circumstances relating to her death and the same cannot be admitted as a dying declaration.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) – Rape with  minor – Acquittal -- Medical evidence does not show that the victim was subjected to recent sexual intercourse -- Heavy reliance was placed upon the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- However, the same was not subjected to further examination to find out whether it belonged to accused or not -- Further, no semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the accused -- Therefore, nothing much can be made out of the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view by holding that no case of commission of an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of IPC was made out.

(Para 28-30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 305 -- Abetment of suicide of child -- No evidence to show when the poison was taken by the deceased -- Her statement does not show that the accused had created any circumstance forcing her to consume poison -- There is no evidence that the deceased had consumed poison while she was with the accused -- Hence, the offence punishable u/s 305 of IPC is not made out against the accused.

(Para 31)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Birth certificate – Age of victim -- Mere fact that the entry was not made immediately but was made subsequently as per the order of the SDM will not take away their effect -- The entries were made ante litem mortem and are to be treated as correct -- Entry was based on the Panchayat certificate, which was not brought will not take away the effect of the entry which was made before the dispute had arisen – Age of victim was about 14 years on the date of the incident, proved.

(Para 33)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Victim was going to Nahan from where she was taken to the house of SR -- No evidence that the consent of her guardian was taken -- Hence, the offence of kidnapping was duly established.

(Para 37)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Kidnapping – Charge u/s 366 of IPC – Punishment u/s 363 IPC – Permissibility of -- Accused was not charged with the commission of an offence punishable u/ 363 of the IPC but with Section 366 of the IPC, which is an aggravated form of Section 363 of the IPC -- Hence, the accused can be convicted of the commission of offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC despite the absence of charge as no prejudice has been caused to him.

(Para 38)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Acquittal by trial court – Scope of appeal -- Scope of intervention in a criminal appeal -- It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty -- Presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal -- Presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal -- Higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Acquittal by trial court – Scope of appeal -- There is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record -- However, the power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal.

-- The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence

-- The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact

-- If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view.

A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion -- What is required is an illegality or perversity -- When two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action -- Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 –  Acquittal by trial court – Scope of appeal -- Criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty -- All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice -- The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive – inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.

(Para 36)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4) – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- SARFAESI proceedings – Writ jurisdiction – Interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to be minimal and it is only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that intervention should be there.

(Para 5)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4) – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- SARFAESI proceedings – One time Settlement/ OTS -- Writ jurisdiction – A Borrower/ guarantor does not have a vested right to seek OTS -- There can be no positive direction to the Bank/ financial institutions for sanctioning OTS.

(Para 6)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Victim’s age – Birth and death register of Gram Panchayat -- Proof of -- Victim’s date of birth was recorded as 28.10.2002 -- During cross-examination of the victim, on the suggestion given to her, she had specifically stated that her date of birth was 28.10.2002, which corroborates the entry in the birth and death register of the concerned Gram Panchayat – Held,  the evidence led by the prosecution is conclusive to prove that the date of birth of the victim was 28.10.2002.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Sole witness of prosecutrix -- Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence -- If the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.

(Para 14)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape – Victim travelled a long distance in the company of accused persons throughout the night and had many opportunities to disclose her fate to the world at large --  As per her statement recorded u/s 164, Cr.PC, a police man met her at some place at Una-Hoshiarpur road, however, she had not disclosed anything to the police man also -- This conduct of the victim is unusual -- Statement of victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. is not in consistence with her deposition before the Court -- Her deposition does not inspire confidence.

(Para 21, 39)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- It is not a substantive piece of evidence and such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency in order to ensure that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction -- The Test Identification Parade is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used in corroboration of the statements in Court

(Para 32)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- When the accused persons were produced before the ACJM, the photographs of the accused persons were annexed to the conviction slip -- Thus the possibility of the victim having seen the photographs of accused persons during their custody with the police and also subsequently before the TIP cannot be ruled out -- There is no record to suggest that non-suspected selected for the parade were of the same age, height, general appearance and position as that of the accused persons -- Moreover, there is a delay in conducting the TIP as the accused persons were taken in custody on 13.02.2018, but the application for conducting of TIP was moved by the Investigating Officer on 16.02.2018, which delay the prosecution has failed to explain -- Father of the victim, in his cross-examination, admitted that a lady police having two stars on her shoulders, was also present at the time of TIP -- Thus, it cannot be said the TIP was conducted in accordance with the guidelines -- As such, it cannot be held to be sustainable in the eyes of law and no reliance could be placed upon the Test Identification Parades.

(Para 33-37)

F. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Acquittal of accused – Disciplinary action against Investigation Agency -- Investigation in the case was conducted in a casual and perfunctory manner -- Prosecution has withheld the CCTV footage, SFSL reports with respect to the medical examinations of the victim as well as the accused persons and also with respect to the articles which were seized from the vehicles allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in order to connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence -- Director General of Police directed to take appropriate disciplinary and departmental inquiry against the erring police officials for having conducted a shoddy investigation, that eventually led to the acquittal of the appellants herein.

(Para 46)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29(c), 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS Case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity – Petitioner involved on disclosure statement of co-accused -- No recovery from petitioner, admissibility of the disclosure statement suffered by the co-accused would be debatable – No other case, petitioner in custody since 06.05.2024 -- Quantity of Tramadol recovered from the co-accused is a commercial quantity but this alone would not be sufficient to deny the concession of regular bail to the petitioner – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 5)

Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), Section 7A, 7-I, 7Q, 14B – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Appeal -- Writ by Adjudicating Authority/ Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner – Maintainability of -- Held, Adjudicating Authority, though an Officer of the Government cannot prefer any appeal – To challenge orders passed under Section 7-I of the Act, 1952 by the Tribunal, the Writ petition filed by the Adjudicating Authority/ Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner is not maintainable.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Deficiency in court fee – Civil Suit fixed for arguments -- Learned Trial Court, taking into consideration a period of about seven years at the stage when the matter was fixed for arguments, justifiably held that the question raised can be examined during the course of appreciation of evidence on the basis of material on record, dismissed the application – Order dismissing the application, upheld.

(Para 1-3)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 29A -- National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3G – Lapse of time for arbitration award – Extension of time -- Section 3G of the National Highways Act is pending adjudication before the learned Arbitrator -- Period of 12 months in terms of Section 29A(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 stands elapsed -- Period specified u/s 29A(3) of the Act is also over, hence, the ld. Arbitrator has closed the proceedings in view of termination of his mandate – Time extended for six months for passing the award by taking recourse of Section 29A(4).

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have married each other, the petition is allowed -- FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 188, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty – Quashing of police report -- Entire allegations, which would attract offences u/s 498A of IPC alleged to be committed by the 1st accused is outside India -- Matter would come with the ambit of Section 188 of Cr.P.C -- Therefore, proceedings without obtaining prior sanction as contemplated u/s 188 Cr.P.C. is vitiated -- Petition allowed, criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 1, 12, 13)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 18(3) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) Section 5(j)(ii), 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3), 506 -- POCSO – Rape -- Child in conflict with law – Bail under juvenile law – Even if a CIL is transferred for trial as an adult under Section 18(3) of the Act, his bail application shall be entertained under Section 12 of the Act -- Bail to a CIL may be denied if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that his release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to any moral, physical or psychological danger, or his release would defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 18(3) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) Section 5(j)(ii), 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3), 506 -- POCSO – Rape -- Child in conflict with law – Bail – Both the CIL and the victim were neighbours -- Both were young, the CIL was 17 years of age, whereas, the victim has stated her age as 15 years -- Victim has already been examined at trial -- After 6 months of pregnancy, the incident could be revealed -- FIR records that 4/5 times, the relationship were established -- Various questions would find deliberation during trial, which includes whether the relationship were consensual? Whether the parties were in relationship? If for the first time the offence was done, why the victim did not raise any alarm? Where the incident took place? etc. -- Social Investigation Report does not reveal anything adverse against the CIL -- The CIL was a student at the relevant time studying in class XII -- His conduct was good with everyone -- Fit case for bail and the CIL deserves to be enlarged on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 14-16)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS Case – Commercial quantity -- Regular bail -- According to the FIR, narcotic substance in commercial quantity was recovered from the possession of the co-accused on 28.04.2023 -- It is he who revealed that he had purchased narcotic substance from the applicant – Contention that applicant at the relevant time was in jail – Bail allowed.

(Para 1-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise compounding/ quashing after conviction – 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- by Trial court, appeal pending since 2015 -- Compounding application moved by the appellant as well as by the informant -- Respondent No.2/informant contended that he does not want to press the criminal proceedings further against the applicant/accused as the grievances of the informant have settled outside the Court -- Compounding application allowed -- Impugned judgment and order by which the appellant/accused was convicted set aside -- Appellant/accused acquitted of the charges of Section 307 of I.P.C. on the basis of the compromise.

(Para 2-8)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 436A – PMLA case – Bail -- Appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024, half of the prescribed sentence -- Trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed -- Section 436A of Cr.PC will apply even to a case under the PMLA -- But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused -- No occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed -- Appellant order to be enlarged on bail on 27th May, 2024 u/s 436A of the Cr.PC.

(Para 3-6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200, 482 -- Criminal  breach of trust – Criminal intimidation – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence u/s 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients -- Dispute pertains to the revision of rate per unit in an ongoing commercial transaction -- A commercial dispute, which ought to have been resolved through the forum of Civil Court has been given criminal colour by lifting from the penal code certain words or phrases and implanting them in a criminal complaint – There is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation, this would constitute a mere bald allegation -- Criminal complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 19-21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200 -- At the stage of issuing summons a magistrate only needs to be satisfied with a prima facie case for taking cognizance, the duty of the magistrate is also to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

(Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376, 376 (2n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO -- Rape with minor – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Complainant and the victim (19 year old) on oath stated that the FIR sought to be quashed, is the result of misunderstanding same the was lodged in a hot haste, without realizing the consequences of the same -- Both victim and the petitioner were in touch with each other, but there is no allegation of sexual assault, if any -- At the time of alleged offence, the victim was 17 and ½ years old – Victim in her statement recorded u/s 161 CrPC specifically denied factum with regard to her abduction and kidnapping by petitioner, coupled with the fact that she does not want to pursue the criminal proceedings – Since the matter stands compromised and they are no more interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings against each other, no fruitful purpose would be served in case criminal proceedings are allowed to continue – FIR as well as consequent proceedings ordered to be quashed and set-aside.

(Para 4-7, 13, 14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise – Acquittal --  Entire amount of compensation agreed to be paid to the respondent-complainant and respondent has no objection in compounding the offence -- No impediment in accepting the prayer for compounding of offence while exercising power u/s 147 of the Act even after recording of conviction by the courts below – Matter compounded, impugned judgments of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside. Damodar S. Prabhu’s case (2010) 5 SCC 663 = (2010) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15231 relied.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300-Part 1, Exception 4, 302 -- Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- No premeditation,  incident occurred since the appellant believed that the utterances by deceased  were aimed at him and, therefore, he retaliated by abusing the deceased -- This was followed by a heated exchange between them -- They grappled out of the building of the Dhaba -- Accused-Appellant rushed to his car, pulled out a bottle from the driver’s seat side, broke it on the bumper of the car and attacked the deceased -- It is thus clear that the incident occurred without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel -- Case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC -- Conviction of the accused-Appellant u/s 302 of the IPC altered to one under Part I of Section 304 of the IPC.

(Para 13-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 200, Chapter XV – Cancellation report by police -- Protest petition – Private complaint – Right of complainant -- Magistrate had the liberty to reject the Protest Petition along with all other material which may have been filed in support of the same -- In that event the Complainant would be at liberty to file a fresh complaint -- The right of the Complainant to file a petition u/s 200 Cr.P.C. is not taken away even if the Magistrate does not direct that such a Protest Petition be treated as a complaint -- Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions and the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C..

(Para 3, 10, 11)

Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (III of 1978), Section 7 – Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, Rule 40 -- Resignation by employee -- Acceptance of resignation – Non-communication thereof -- Withdrawal of resignation – Effect of -- As per service jurisprudence, the employment is terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority -- Appellant, tendered his resignation letter on 10.10.2017 and this resignation letter came be accepted on 14.10.2017 – Resignation was withdrawn vide letter dated 25.10.2017 by posting said letter on 03.11.2017 -- Non-communication of the acceptance does not make the resignation inoperative provided, there is, in fact, an acceptance before the withdrawal -- It is not open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority -- Section 7 of the MEPS Act and Rule 40 of the Rules does not impose any guidelines for acceptance of the resignation upon the management – Therefore, the contention raised by the appellant about withdrawal of resignation before communication of its acceptance does not hold water – Appeal dismissed. North Zone Cultural Centre’s case, (2003) 5 SCC 455 relied.

(Para 4, 21-24)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 – Ceremonies of Hindu marriage -- Saptapadi -- Marriage certificate -- The word “solemnised” means to perform the marriage with ceremonies in proper form -- Unless and until the marriage is performed with appropriate ceremonies and in due form, it cannot be said to be “solemnised” -- Requisite ceremonies for the solemnisation of the Hindu marriage must be in accordance with the applicable customs or usage and where saptapadi has been adopted, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken -- Unless the parties have undergone such ceremony, there would be no Hindu marriage according to Section 7 of the Act  -- Mere issuance of a certificate by an entity in the absence of the requisite ceremonies having been performed, would neither confirm any marital status to the parties nor establish a marriage under Hindu law.

(Para 16)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Ceremonies of Hindu marriage – Marriage certificate – Contents of -- Marriage certificate states that ‘marriage’ between the parties has been solemnised according to Hindu Vedic rites and customs -- Certificate issued by Vadik Jankalyan Samiti (Regd.) in the absence of any indication as to the rites and customs that were performed and as to whether the requirements u/s 7 of the Act was complied with would not be a certificate evidencing a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act.

(Para 17)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7, 8 – Registration of marriage -- Legitimacy to the marriage -- If there has been no marriage in accordance with Section 7, the registration would not confer legitimacy to the marriage -- A certificate of marriage is a proof of validity of Hindu marriage only when such a marriage has taken place and not in a case where there is no marriage ceremony performed at all.

(Para 19)

D. Hindu Law – Hindu marriage -- Hindu marriage is a sacrament and has a sacred character -- Saptapadi in a Hindu marriage, according to Rig Veda, after completing the seventh step (saptapadi) the bridegroom says to his bride, “With seven steps we have become friends (sakha) -- May I attain to friendship with thee; may I not be separated from thy friendship” -- A wife is considered to be half of oneself (ardhangini) but to be accepted with an identity of her own and to be a co-equal partner in the marriage -- There is nothing like a “better-half” in a marriage but the spouses are equal halves in a marriage -- In Hindu Law, marriage is a sacrament or a samskara -- It is the foundation for a new family.

(Para 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Offences, for which the petitioner/accused has been charged, are not of grave in nature – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 1-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 506, 148, 149, 336 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 438 – Anticipatory bail -- Attempt to murder – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Petitioners were found innocent during investigation -- Petition allowed, petitioners directed to appear before the trial Court on or before the date already fixed thereat -- On their such appearance, they shall be admitted to bail by the Court concerned on usual terms and conditions -- In the meantime, in case, petitioners are sought to be arrested, they shall be admitted to interim bail to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer.

(Para 6-8)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 14(2), 18 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail – SC/ST Case – Cheating -- It has not been specifically stated IN FIR that the appellants had any knowledge that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste and even no specific words have been attributed by the appellants – Prima facie, the ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act are not made out and thus, the appeal is allowed and in the event of arrest, the appellants shall be released on bail subject to furnishing personal bonds and surety to the satisfaction of Arresting/Investigating Officer.

(Para 8, 9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – NDPS Case – Jump of bail – Proclaimed offender -- Due to communication gap with his counsel, the petitioner could not appear in Court on 6.10.2023 and his bailable warrants were issued for 13.12.2023 -- On 13.12.2023 he was out of station due to some household work -- Resultantly, his bail and surety bonds were cancelled and warrants of arrest were issued and thereafter, proclamation was issued and he was declared proclaimed offender – Petitioner undertakes that he is ready and willing to surrender before the trial Court – Order declaring proclaimed offender set aside subject to surrendering of the petitioner within 7 days with cost of Rs.10,000/-

(Para 2-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 482 -- NDPS Case -- Interim bail – Birth of daughter – Recovery of 530 grams of Heroin – Without adverting to the merits of the case and considering the fact that a baby girl is born to the petitioner who has been in custody for more than 5 months deserved to be released on interim regular bail to enable him to share his love and affection to the newly born baby -- Petitioner ordered to be released on interim regular bail for a period of two weeks.

(Para 2-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 506, 285 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Murder -- Anticipatory bail – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Complainant as party -- No force in contention of State so as to implead the complainant as a party -- Petitioner not named in the FIR to be amongst the assailants and he has been named for the first time in supplementary statement of the complainant – On surrender by petitioner, the Trial court directed to release him on bail.

(Para 6-8)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of child -- Writ of Habeas Corpus – Maintainability of -- Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy -- Recourse to such a remedy should not be permitted unless the ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective -- In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody -- In child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law -- There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is summary in nature -- What is important is the welfare of the child -- Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court -- No hard and fast rule can be laid down insofar as the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition in the matters of custody of a minor child – It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 16)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of child -- Writ of Habeas Corpus – It is not a case that the appellant-grandmother had illegally kept the custody of the minor child -- It is the respondent-father who had placed the custody of the minor child with the appellant-grandmother -- High Court ought not to have entertained the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India -- Compelling a minor child at the tender age of 7 years to withdraw from the custody of his grandparents with whom he has been living for the last about 5 years may cause psychological disturbances – Paramount interest of the welfare of the minor child would be required to be done -- Such an exercise would not be permissible in the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order of High Court set aside.

(Para 18-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder – Acquittal – Last seen together theory -- The theory of last seen together is helpful to the prosecution if the deceased was seen in the company of the accused in the proximity of the time at which the dead body is found -- Deceased on the day he was found dead, after he was allegedly seen with the accused, attended a meeting of the Congress Party -- Involvement of other persons in the offence is not ruled out – Appellant no. 2 was found in the company of the deceased is not sufficient to link him with the commission of the offence of murder – Conviction of appellants u/s 302/ 149 of IPC set aside.

(Para 17, 18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- History sheet – Name of minor child -- Extra care and precaution, to be observed by a police officer while ensuring that the identity of a minor child is not disclosed -- It will prevent the undesirable exposure to the minor children.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- History sheet – Scope of -- Police authorities of States and Union Territories may consider the desirability of ensuring that no mechanical entries in History Sheet are made of innocent individuals, simply because they happen to hail from the socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, along with those belonging to Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes.

(Para 14)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- Life – Scope -- Expression ‘life’ unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and all that goes along with it –  Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one’s surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter.

(Para 15)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(b) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS – Regular bail -- Recovery of 10.9 grams of heroin -- Petitioner was apprehended on 15.03.2024 -- No other criminal case and she is a lady aged about 69 years -- Challan has already been presented and the petitioner is no more required for further investigation – Prosecution has cited 14 witnesses and it will take sufficient long time to examine them – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 4, 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13 -- Ex-parte decree -- Setting aside of -- Application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was filed after more than a year, dismissed by Ld. Trial Court – Nothing on the record to explain the delay -- Infact, the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC proceeds on the premise that it was being filed within time from the date of knowledge -- No application or even a prayer for condonation of delay -- Both the Courts had noticed that though the defendant No.1-petitioner claimed that he was not served at the address, however, in the execution proceedings, on the same very address, the defendant No.1-petitioner received the summons and put in appearance through his counsel – No merit in the revision petition, dismissed.

(Para 1, 6)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Co-parcenery property – No son – Right to alienate -- Suit for declaration challenging the consent decree dated 22.07.1981 -- In the absence of any fraud having being played, the power to alienate the suit property despite being ancestral property could not be challenged as the property in his hand would be treated as separate property in the absence of a son.

(Para 1, 10-14)

Will – Suspicious circumstances -- Testator of the Will died issueless on 23.07.1977 and his wife had predeceased him -- Will did not see the light of the day till the filing of the suit for almost 8 years -- No explanation is forthcoming for the plaintiff-respondent to have kept quiet for so long and not getting the mutation entered in his favour on the basis of the Will – Ld. Appellate Court held that the Will in favour of the plaintiff-respondent was duly proved – Held, Judgement and decree passed by the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside.

(Para 4, 5, 8-13)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 10 – Local Commissioner’s report – Evidential value -- Commissioners’ reports are non-adjudicatory in nature and the Court adjudicate upon the rights of the parties -- It is only an opinion or noting -- Such a report does not automatically form part of the court’s opinion, as the Court has the power to confirm, vary or set aside the report.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 10 – Possession over property – Local Commissioner’s report -- Except the report of the Local commissioner, the appellant-plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to show his possession over the suit property and therefore, the Courts below have rightly drawn an adverse inference against the appellant/ plaintiff.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural sex by husband – Quashing of FIR/ charge -- Consent -- Respondent no.2/wife was residing with her husband during the subsistence of their marriage and as per amended definition of "rape" u/s 375 of IPC by which insertion of penis in the mouth of a woman has also been included in the definition of "rape" and any sexual intercourse or act, by the husband with his wife not below the age of fifteen years is not a rape, therefore, consent is immaterial – Held, allegations made in the FIR does not constitute offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioner no.1 -- Offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 5, 15, 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Obscene act in any public place -- Prima facie, there is no evidence available on record by which it can be ascertained that the accused persons have committed any obscene act in any public place – Said incidents have been occurred in the premises of the house which is surrounded by walls, hence offence u/s 294 of IPC is not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 294 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 16, 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation – Quashing of FIR -- An omnibus statement regarding threatening to kill, which is not sufficient to establish the charge of offence u/s 506 of IPC because the said threaten must consist the ingredients of fear and frightening -- Allegations not containing any date, time and place -- Respondent no.2 had never stated that she was frightened by said threatening, hence offence u/s 506 of IPC not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 506 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 17, 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty – Dowry case -- To make out an offence u/s 498A IPC complainant has not only to allege demand for dowry but also that she was subjected to cruelty by her husband or relatives of the husband for non-fulfilment of their unlawful demand.

(Para 18)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Objections against award of Arbitration -- Condonation of delay – Whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to objections filed under the Act of 1996 – Held, application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, is ousted by proviso to Sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction – Service matter -- Interference in finding in Enquiry report -- In writ jurisdiction, Court cannot go into the sufficiency of evidence on the basis of which the Inquiry Officer has given his findings, yet, it is open to the Court to interfere in the findings of the Inquiry Officer if the same are based upon no evidence or if the said findings are based upon irrelevant material.

(Para 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal case against employee – Termination of services -- Acquittal in criminal case – Mere acquittal will not confer on an employee a right to claim any benefit including reinstatement -- However, if the charges in the departmental inquiry and the criminal Court are identical or similar, then the matter acquires a different dimension -- Acquittal in the criminal proceedings was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, it would be open to the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and interfere in the findings of the disciplinary inquiry.

(Para 19)

C. Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, Rule 27 (2) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal case against employee – Termination of services – “tried and acquitted” -- Discharge by Criminal Court – Charges in the criminal case and the departmental proceedings are similar in nature -- Sanction from Inspector General not sought -- Petitioner may not have been tried by the criminal Court, but he has been discharged and exonerated of criminal charges so his case stands at the higher pedestal than acquittal, particularly when the petitioner has been discharged on merits and not on technicalities -- Dismissal of petitioner from service becomes unsustainable in law -- Termination order set aside, with back wages of 50%.

(Para 20-29)

D. Termination form service -- Re-instatement – Backwages – Even if an employee has succeeded in establishing that his dismissal from service is illegal, he may be entitled to reinstatement, but it is not necessary that he should be given full back wages.

(Para 27)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39, Rule 3A -- Ex parte interim injunction – Where ex parte injunction granted, the injunction application has to be decided within a period of 30 days -- Direction given to the Commercial Court to hear arguments on the injunction application on the date fixed and decide the same preferably on the same day -- If for some reasons, the Court is not in a position to hear arguments and decide the application, it may defer the hearing while complying with the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC.

(Para 12-14)

A. Haryana Civil Services (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 2016, Rule 5 -- Suspension of employee -- Disciplinary proceedings -- In case the disciplinary proceedings are not initiated before expiry of ninety days from the date of suspension, the suspension shall not be valid -- However,  in special circumstances, the period of suspension can be extended beyond ninety days but not beyond one hundred and eighty days -- Such extension has to be for reasons recorded in writing and after seeking approval of the next higher authority -- In the absence of disciplinary proceedings the order becomes invalid as it loses all justification.

(Para 7)

B. Haryana Civil Services (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 2016, Rule 5 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Suspension of employee – Revocation of -- Petitioner placed under suspension vide office order dated 27.07.2017, with immediate effect -- Period of suspension not extended beyond ninety days -- In the light of clear provisions of Rule 5 of the 2016 Rules, impugned suspension order being invalid stands revoked on expiry of ninety days and being bereft of any legal force, it can have no effect on the petitioner’s service.

(Para 8)

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (XXXVII of 1997), Section 6 -- Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2(12), Order 20 Rule 12 -- Eviction of tenant – Mesne profit -- Contention that there is no stay awarded, the question of such payment does not arise – It is also within the bounds of law, tenant who once entered the property in question lawfully, continues in possession after his right to do so stands extinguished, is liable to compensate the landlord for such time period after the right of occupancy expires -- Mesne profit assessed and ordered to be deposited in the registry of the Court.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to commit suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Power to quash the FIR depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case -- It is required to be seen by the High Court as to whether Section 306 IPC is even made out from the contents of FIR or not before coming to the conclusion that quashing of proceedings u/s 306 IPC on the basis of compromise should be allowed or not by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. -- Merely by blaming the petitioners to be responsible for commission of suicide by the deceased in the suicide note, cannot be sufficient to invoke Section 306 IPC – FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-15, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to commit suicide – No details are given as to when and in what manner, petitioners harassed the deceased -- Simply by mentioning in the suicide note that accused-petitioner  harassed the deceased and is responsible for the commission of suicide by deceased, cannot be sufficient to invoke Section 306 IPC.

(Para 19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- Witness very categorically stated that the documents had been executed by the petitioner and identified the signatures of the petitioner on the documents – Petitioner was at liberty to get her signatures compared through some handwriting & finger print expert, however, she did not do so – Held, cheque has been issued by the petitioner in discharge of her legal liability and she has failed to rebut the presumption as exists as per Section 118 read with Section 139 of the N.I. Act – Revision against conviction dismissed.

(Para 1, 16-18)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 – Suit of specific performance – Limitation – Long delay – Plaintiff not appeared for cross-examination -- Effect of -- Plaintiff/appellant failed to enter into the witness box and subject himself to cross-examination, he has not been able to prove the prerequisites of Section 12 of the Act,1963 -- Suit was filed on the last date of limitation calculated on the basis of the last extended time -- Plaintiff entered into an agreement with only one of the co-owners -- Suit dismissed.

(Para 13-18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Trial Court passed the impugned order and awarded maximum of the permissible compensation of 20% of the cheque amount by invoking provisions of Section 143-A under the impression that the said provision is mandatory in nature -- Impugned order set aside, direction given to learned trial Court to decide the matter afresh in consonance with the provision of Section 143-A NI Act as is explained and clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., 2024(2) RCR(Crl.) 279 =  2024 INSC 205 = (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19277.

(Para 6, 7)