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Posted On: 06-08-2025
363. (SC) (Decided on: 01.08.2025)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 147, 149, 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – No fault liability/ claim -- Whether claim u/s 163A MV Act restricted to third party? -- Supreme Court Refers the Issue to Larger Bench.

--   A claim under Section 163A, as per the words employed in the provision, covers every claim and is not restricted to a third party claim; without any requirement of establishing the negligence, if death or permanent disability is caused by reason of the motor accident -- This would also take in the liability with respect to the death of an owner or a driver who stepped into the shoes of the owner, if the claim is made under Section 163A dehors the statutory liability under Section 147 or the contractual liability as reduced to writing in an insurance policy -- It would override the provisions under Sections 147 & 149 along with the other provisions of the M.V. Act and the law regulating insurance as also the terms of the policy confining the claim with respect to an owner-driver to a fixed sum.

--   Dictum arising from the various decisions of different benches of two Judges is that the claim under Section 163A is restricted to third party risks – Section 163A, appears under the Chapter with the heading ‘Insurance of Vehicles Against Third Party Risks’ – But the non-obstante clause is in suppression of the entire Act, the other laws in force and any instrument valid in law – Court doubted, the decisions of co-ordinate Benches of two Judges which now will have to be placed before a larger Bench -- Registry directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

(Para 16, 17)

Posted On: 06-08-2025
366. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 30.04.2025 Decided on: 28.07.2025)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- It is well settled that a landlord is the best judge of his own requirements and a tenant is no one to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord.

(Para 20)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- Eviction of Shops on three sides of the premises of the Gurudwara Sahib -- Landlord instituted the eviction petition on the ground that the shops were to be got vacated and then the building was to be renovated in a manner that the Shri Guru Granth Sahib (holy book) could be shifted to the ground floor which would make it convenient for the devotees, especially those in advanced age, to pay obeisance – Held, said need, under no circumstances, can be said to be not bona fide.

(Para 4, 22)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Pleading of ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i)  of 1949 Act -- It is well settled that in case such ingredients are not pleaded and no objection is raised in the written statement, the petition cannot be said to be not maintainable.

(Para 10, 23)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (4 of 1998), Section 12 – Eviction petition under Rent Act -- Religious Institution – Bar of jurisdiction -- Eviction petition instituted under the Rent Act would not be barred in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1998 Act.

(Para 26, 27)

E. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (31 of 1973), Section 2(e) -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib – Applicability of Rent Act -- Whether Public premises ? – Argument that in case of public premises, the Rent Act would not be applicable -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib, cannot, in any manner, be stated to be a public premises, as a result of which, the said argument would be devoid of merit.

(Para 30)

Posted On: 05-08-2025
368. (SC) (Decided on: 25.07.2025)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

Posted On: 05-08-2025
372. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 27.05.2025 Decided on: 06.06.2025)

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

Posted On: 03-08-2025
378. (SC) (Decided on: 19.05.2025)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Quashing of proceedings u/s 12 (1) of the D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC is not available to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV Act, 2005 are primarily based on the premise that proceedings u/s 12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature -- Said view is not correct -- High Courts can exercise power u/s 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings, however, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application u/s 12(1) -- Normally, interference u/s 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

(Para 35-39)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 23(1) – Interim/ Ex-parte order in DV Act case -- Power has been conferred on the learned Magistrate to pass interim and ex-parte orders.

(Para 20)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13, 23, 28 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Application/ complaint under DV Act – Procedure of -- An application u/s 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS) -- As provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section 13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on the application -- Sub-section (2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to lay down its own procedure for the disposal of an application u/s 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.

(Para 21, 22)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26 – Jurisdiction -- In a given case, in any legal proceedings pending before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved person, the reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought -- Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate, reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought.

(Para 24, 24.1)

D. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31, 33 -- Nature of proceedings u/s 12 of the D.V Act -- Notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.

(Para 28)

E. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1), 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of proceedings under D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Abuse of process -- High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- High Court can quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

(Para 29-31)

Posted On: 01-08-2025
384. (SC) (Decided on: 23.07.2025)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of – Failure of the accused to raise a pertinent ground/ plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material -- No sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case -- Onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition.

(Para 11-13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of -- No change in circumstances and no new grounds/ pleas became available to the accused after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition -- Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error -- High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers.

(Para 14, 15)

Posted On: 31-07-2025
385. (SC) (Decided on: 14.07.2025)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4 -- However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant -- Plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality -- Entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature -- No civil suit has been filed for recovery of money -- By filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police amounts to abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR quashed.

(Para 9-14, 17)

B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Cheating -- To constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception.

(Para 10)

C. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR – Duty of High Court -- Instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent for settlement – What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any -- High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out.

(Para 10, 11, 17)

Posted On: 31-07-2025
387. (SC) (Decided on: 23.07.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape – Sole statement of prosecutrix -- Statement of the prosecutrix, if worthy of credence, requires no corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 --  Rape – Conviction -- Juvenile declaration later -- Appellant’s age at the time of commission of the offence has been returned as 16 years 2 months and 3 days – Appellant held to be juvenile on the date of commission of the crime -- Sentence imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court will have to be set aside, as the same cannot sustain -- Case referred to the Board for passing appropriate orders in light of Sections 15 and 16 of the 2000 Act.

(Para 12-17)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 -- Rape on 17.11.1988 -- Juvenile – Plea of – At  any stage – Plea of juvenility can be raised before any court and has to be recognized at any stage, even after disposal of the case --  Such a claim is required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, i.e., the 2007 Rules, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the 2000 Act -- Relevant factor, therefore, is that the accused, to be a juvenile, should have not completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offense, which entitles him to the benefit of the 2000 Act.

(Para 15)

Posted On: 30-07-2025
388. (SC) (Decided on: 17.07.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Licence for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) – Driving Commercial Vehicle/ Tata 407 – Validity of -- No endorsement was required to drive a commercial vehicle of the type in question, by the driver who possesses a license to drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) -- Offending vehicle was TATA 407 Truck, having a gross total weight of around 4995 Kg., which does not exceed 7500 Kg – Held, although the offending vehicle is a commercial one and the driver of the said vehicle at the time of accident possessed a license to only drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) and, considering the gross weight of the vehicle in question is not in excess of 7500 Kg., the driver can be said to be holding a valid license to drive the same.

(Para 10)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” -- Deceased was travelling in offending vehicle – Liability only policy -- Vehicle in question was insured with “Liability Only Policy” and no premium was paid to cover the driver, owner, or a gratuitous passenger travelling therein -- Even then, the Courts below erred in holding that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation to the claimant-appellants -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” ought to have been invoked –Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal and recover the same only from the owner of the offending vehicle -- Driver of the offending vehicle is not liable as he was holding a valid driving license to drive the offending vehicle i.e., TATA 407 Truck.

(Para 13-19)

Posted On: 30-07-2025
390. (SC) (Decided on: 14.07.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Negligence of offending vehicle – Requirement of proof -- While entertaining a claim petition u/s 163A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be looked into.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 -- Claim petition u/s 163A of the M.V. Act – Assessment u/s 166 of M.V. Act – Permissibility of -- Held, compensation cannot be determined as prescribed u/s 166 of the MV Act as sought for by the claimants -- It requires to be determined u/s 163A read with Second Schedule of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Deceased was working as a driver and his monthly income was Rs.3,000/- or Rs.36,000/- p.a. -- Having regard to the number of dependents being 6 the income of the deceased as prescribed in Second Schedule has to be held as Rs.40,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3 towards personal expense i.e. 13,333/- the annual loss of income to the claimant would be Rs.26,667/- -- Deceased was aged 35 years, hence the appropriate multiplier to be adopted as per Second Schedule is 17 -- General damages as prescribed under Second Schedule is Rs.2,000/-, Rs.5,000/- and Rs.2,500/- towards loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate -- Claimants have contended the amount spent towards medical expenses was around Rs.1,00,000/-, however, Second Schedule restricts the same to Rs.15,000/- and Rs.15,000/- awarded towards the same -- In all Claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,77,839/- which shall carry interest @ 8% p.a. from the date of petition till date of payment or deposit whichever is earlier.

(Para 14, 15)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Liability of Insurer/ Insured – Third party’s right -- In the absence of any positive evidence being placed by the insurer of the offending vehicle to prove the manner in which accident occurred, the deceased would be a ‘third party’ in so far as offending vehicle is concerned and thus the insurer and the insured of the offending vehicle would be liable to pay compensation jointly and severally -- Insurer of the offending vehicle would be liable to indemnify the award.

(Para 17)

Posted On: 26-07-2025
399. (SC) (Decided on: 09.05.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech – Contempt proceedings -- Postponement of publication – Reasonable restriction -- If a member of the public or a litigant or for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the court by making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or Judges who had passed a judicial order or had conducted the court proceedings, certainly the courts would be justified to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against such contemnors -- This would also be a ground to direct postponement of publication as contempt of court is a reasonable restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

(Para 28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech –  Judiciary and Media -- For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key -- That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court -- Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution -- For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other -- The above position has become more nuanced in the digital age.

-- By impugned order Division Bench of the High Court found prima facie that the comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, directed the Wikimedia Foundation Inc. to take down/delete the said pages within thirty six (36) hours.

Held, Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions – Impugned directions contained of the impugned order set aside.

(Para 2, 31-33)

Posted On: 26-07-2025
400. (SC) (Decided on: 15.07.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 105 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39, 102 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA evidence – Acquittal -- Despite the presence of DNA evidence, it has to be discarded for the reason that proper methods and procedures were not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment of the evidence in the course of the Appellant-convict's conviction -- DNA evidence is only of probative value, subject to the condition that it is properly dealt with – DNA evidence collected has been rendered unusable, it suffers from various shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay; the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out etc. -- None of the circumstances posited by the prosecution are found to be conclusively proved against the Appellant-convict -- Chain of circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular hypothesis, that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence or involvement of none else in the crime -- Conviction of the Appellant-convict vacated, he is directed to be released forthwith -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 35, 43, 45)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39 -- DNA Evidence – Procedure to be followed – Directions issued, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved:

1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record.

2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken.

3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial.

4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to  maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible for explaining such lapse.

The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary instruction as may be required -- States requested to examine the necessity of conducting training of the Investigating Officers to ensure full compliance.

(Para 44, 45)