A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- In Trial Court’s judgment, Not an iota of discussion about the validity of the Will as contemplated under Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and yet, the validity of the Will has been upheld -- This is contrary to law -- Even the High Court, while evaluating the validity of the Will, has gone on a different tangent and has erroneously held that the requirement of examining the attesting witnesses springs into action only in cases of disputes between legal heirs. Such an observation is quite contrary to law, for Section 68 of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory to examine at least one of the attesting witnesses of the Will -- Mere fact that the Will was registered will not grant validity to the document

(Para 27)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- Suspicious circumstances -- Not even a whisper of reasoning as to why the propounder of the Will choose to exclude other three children from the bequest, and whether any other properties or assets were given to them -- It is highly unlikely that a father would grant his entire property to one of his children, at the cost of three others, without there being any evidence of estrangement between the father and the children -- This suspicious circumstance surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff either -- Hence, for these cumulative reasons, the Will propounded by plaintiff though registered would not confer any valid title on the plaintiff either.

(Para 27)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A – Agreement to sell -- Part-performance – Benefit of -- One of the main ingredients for taking shelter u/s 53A is the factum of possession -- Unless the transferee in the instrument of agreement to sale is able to prove that he has been in possession of the suit property, no benefit u/s 53A will be given -- Very fact that plaintiff has filed the present suit for possession, along with other reliefs, shows that on the date of filing of the suit, plaintiff was not in possession of the entire suit property -- Since there was no possession with the plaintiff, he cannot derive any benefit under the doctrine of part-possession.

(Para 31)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Appellant 20 years aged was a final year B.Com student who had also enrolled with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India rendered immobile with paraplegia for reason of the fracture of C4-5 -- Tribunal adopted an income of Rs.3,339/- per month being the minimum wages -- Court not convinced that the Minimum wages would be determined on the basis of the educational qualification alone without reference to the nature of work carried on – Held, even if he had not obtained the certificate as a Chartered Accountant, upon graduation, he could have been employed as an Accountant, who would have, on any reasonable estimate, received an amount of Rs.5,000/- as monthly income in the year 2001 -- 40% future prospects given with multiplier of 18 -- Loss of income for the 100% disabled paraplegic would be Rs.15,12,000/- (Rs.5,000/- x 140% x 12 x 18) – With medical expenses of Rs.11,22,356/- compensation totalling to Rs.40,34,356/- -- Total award carrying interest @ 9% per annum from the filing of the petition till realisation -- In addition, Rs.20 lakhs as future medical expenses incurred by the parents awarded.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Parameters -- If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 498A, 506, 34 – Quashing of FIR for father/ mother/ sister-in-law --  Cruelty -- Statements of a general nature against the present appellants  that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery -- When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members -- Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars -- Cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself -- Such allegations are absent in the present case – For offence punishable u/s 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants --  Proceedings against appellants deserve to be quashed in their entirety -- High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants – FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Motive -- Disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- For drawing an inference pertaining to motive, the trial Court relied upon the document which was a disclosure made by respondents -- Manifestly, the use of the said document was limited to the extent permitted u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Inculpatory narrative recited therein could not have been used to draw any inference regarding motive, which was required to be established from substantive evidence.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65B – Cal details – Proof of -- Both the circumstances, i.e., non-production of the certificate u/s 65-B of the Evidence Act, and the call detail records being presented through a handwritten note without examining the scribe thereof would lead to an inescapable conclusion that the call details were not proved as per law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 302 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Mere threat to inflict harm may constitute an incriminating circumstance but in isolation, the said circumstance would fall woefully short of proof of conspiracy to commit murder.

(Para 37)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 --  Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Plaintiff asserted that his land is situated adjoining the disputed rasta (pathway), which is duly recorded as a rasta in the revenue records and defendants are restraining him from using the said rasta seeking decree of mandatory and permanent injunction – Defendants’ case is that the suit rasta forms part of their private property and no public pathway exists at the spot and entries in the revenue record were erroneous and have since been rightly rectified – Appointment of a Local Commissioner is sought solely for the purpose of collecting evidence, such an appointment is impermissible and ought to be dis-allowed -- Appointment of the Local Commissioner was made with the limited objective of ascertaining the existing status of the property on the spot, and not for the purpose of collecting evidence – Learned Court of first instance has recorded its due satisfaction while appointing the Local Commissioner -- Order, upheld.

(Para 5-10)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Hereditary claim -- Sarbraha Lambardar -- Only argument that the petitioner is son of previous deceased Lambardar (SC) and also remained Sarbraha Lambardar and therefore, he deserves preference for appointment to the post of Lambardar -- Held, hereditary claim in the matter of appointment of Lambardar is ultra vires of the Constitution and preference to a candidate on the ground that he has remained a Sarbarah Lambardar would tantamount to give preference to hereditary claim – All the courts below concurrently found respondent No. 6 as a better and suitable candidate for appointment to the post of Lambardar inasmuch as that he is younger in age and more educated than the petitioner --  No compelling reasons to interfere in the impugned orders and finding no merit, the instant civil writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

(Para 5-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 419, 420, 468, 471 -- Sale deed by impersonation – Conspiracy – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced -- Prime accused in conspiracy with the petitioners secured attestation and registration of the sale deed -- Role of Petitioners as Lambardar and co-villager was not passive but active in facilitating the fraudulent transaction – Principal beneficiary expired does not exonerate the petitioners of liability -- Criminal conspiracy u/s 120-B of the IPC is an independent offence, and once participation is proved, conviction can stand irrespective of the status of other conspirators -- Held, both the Courts below rightly held the petitioners guilty u/s 120-B of the IPC -- Petitioners have been facing trial since 1998 and are not involved in any other case -- Considering the protracted proceedings, their age, and the fact that they have already suffered the ordeal of litigation for more than two decades, sentence reduced to the period already undergone by them.

(Para 1, 5-14)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – JBT Teacher – Candidature of – Contention that that respondent No.6 is working as a JBT Teacher and is not available to perform his functions as Lambardar, which should have been treated as a disqualification – Held, once, the said pleaded ‘disqualification’ is not pre-requisite under governing the Rules, merely on the asking of the appellant, the same cannot be treated as disqualification -- For the last 15 years, respondent No.6 has been performing the duties of the post of Lambardar, no complaint has been received that he was not available to discharge the duties of the post as and when required -- Contention of the appellant cannot be accepted – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Civil suit pending – Maintainability of Writ petition -- Writ petition is not maintainable, dismissed -- Dismissal would have no bearing on the pending civil suit.

(Para 4-7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Partition of land – Change of land use – Chahi to Gair Mumkin -- Licence to develop residential colony -- Grant of license by itself merely indicated an intention to develop a colony and could not ipso-facto alter the revenue character of the land from Chahi to Gair Mumkin -- Since the occupation certificate dated 15.12.2017 did not concern the suit land, there was in fact no material to justify the conclusion that the land had ceased to be Chahi and had become Gair Mumkin -- An injunction being an equitable relief, the party seeking it must approach the Court with clean hands -- As the appellant-plaintiff is guilty of misrepresenting a material fact, the learned First Appellate Court rightly declined to grant the injunction.

(Para 10.1-10.5)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 108 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Deceased is husband of the petitioner -- No suicide note had been recovered -- Petitioner was having matrimonial discord and was residing separately from the deceased husband since the last about one year -- Deceased tried to commit suicide about six months ago also -- No such allegation that the deceased immediately consumed poisonous substance after alleged quarrel at his in-laws’ house at Kathua itself -- Custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required for any purpose and nothing is to be recovered from her -- No useful purpose would be served by sending the petitioner behind the bars – Bail allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 --  Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Proof of accident -- Registration of FIR -- It is on preponderance of probabilities that the proof of accident is looked at in a motor accidents claim -- An FIR registered as against the driver of the offending vehicle can be relied on to find the accident having been caused by the driver of the offending vehicle, that too by his rash and negligent driving as reported at the first instance --  However, the preponderance of probabilities that arise from such an FIR registered would not have the same probity if there is a valid suspicion raised on the registration of the FIR and the falsity of the claim being clearly discernible from the evidence led itself.

(Para 6)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 167(5) – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case – Death of injured – Right of Legal Heirs – Right to claim compensation for the injuries caused in a motor vehicle accident survives on the legal representatives of the injured even if the injured dies in the course of the proceedings for reasons not relatable to or having any nexus with the injuries sustained.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 167(5) – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case – 100 % disability – Multiplier of actual life span given – Future prospects given – Interest -- Tribunal and the High Court gave multiplier of 14 for the 45 year old claimant -- Injured lived only for 11 years -- Probably; his life span having been reduced by the injuries which rendered him 100% disabled, ultimately resulting in his demise -- Multiplier adopted of 14 cannot be applied which will have to be reduced to 11, the actual life span -- Victim not being engaged in a regular employment still is entitled to 25% for future prospects especially since his functional disability was 100%, totally disabled from carrying on any work or generate any income -- Interest on the total award of Rs.20,30,095/- at the rate of 9% would run from the date of the filing of the claim petition till the payment is made.

(Para 11-14)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 -- Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Not permissible in law for the High Court to apply the parameters under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 regarding fixing of income when the compensation was assessed and fixed by the Tribunal in a claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act by applying principles under the said Act.

(Para 5.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Evidence of PW-1 reveal that even though the accused appellants were having sharp weapons (pike, spear, etc.), they had only used the blunt side of the said weapons -- PW-2 son of deceased turned hostile -- Medical evidence would also show that all the three deceased persons had lacerated and contused wounds only and there were no incised wounds -- No material on record to show that they had the intention to kill them -- There was prior enmity over the measurement of agricultural fields -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be tenable and is liable to be converted to one under Section 304 Part I of IPC – Accused/ appellants have already undergone sentence of more than 12 years – Sentence reduced to already undergone.

(Para 8-16)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Consideration of -- For the purpose of decision of an application moved under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, only the averments in the plaint and the documents attached therewith are to be considered -- Averments made in the written statement or in the reply to the application for rejection of plaint are not required to be taken into consideration -- Rejection of plaint is a drastic power and must be exercised only when the plaint, on its face, discloses no cause of action or is barred by law.

(Para 18)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint in part – Permissibility of -- Plaint cannot be rejected in part.

(Para 19)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint in part – Plaintiffs prayed for a number of declarations and injunction -- Details of properties, their ownerships thereof, the date of the Will and its details were not given -- However an application for amendment is also pending, which was not decided -- One of the defendants has not filed any application for rejection of plaint -- Important rights of parties are involved and to reject the plaint at the threshold would be a very drastic action, which should be resorted to only in case the Court is of the firm opinion that the ingredients laid down in Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are fulfilled – Application was dismissed by Trial Court -- No illegality in the impugned orders warranting interference – Revision dismissed.

(Para 3, 3.1, 21-23)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29, 61, 85 – NDPS – Regular bail -- Recovery of 1400 intoxicant tablets containing Tramadol and 1200 intoxicant tablets containing Alprazolam from the co-accused of the petitioner – HS was arrested on disclosure statement – On his disclosure statement, the petitioner was arrested -- Petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of about 04 months & is not shown to be involved in any other FIR(s) -- Further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case – Bail allowed.

(Para 2, 6, 7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Six year old child with 70% permanent disability – Multiplier method applied – Expenses for two attendants with multiplier method -- Appellant has suffered right side hemiparesis leading to 70% disability – Minimum wages for a skilled worker prevalent at the time of the accident in the State of Haryana were Rs.2,620/- per month -- Appellant held entitled to two attendant Rs.11,31,840/- [Rs.2,620 x 2 x 12 x 18 (multiplier)] towards attendant charges – Loss of dependency at 70% [Rs.2,620- 786] Rs.1,834/- + (40% future prospects) = Rs.2568 x 12 x 18 = Rs.5,54,688/- -- Rs.5,00,000/- towards pain and suffering; Rs.50,000/- towards special diet; Rs.3,00,000/- towards loss of amenities of life and loss of marriage prospects – Rs. 65,000/- awarded towards medical expenses -- Total Compensation assessed at Rs.26,51,528/- alongwith 7.5 interest from the date of filing claim petition.

(Para 8-16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20, 118 -- Suit for recovery – Pronote & Receipt – Proof of -- Plaintiff-respondent himself duly appeared in support of his case -- Both the attesting witnesses examined as PW2 and PW3 -- Scribe of pronote and receipt who is an Advocate as PW4, who duly asserted that on the instance of defendant he had scribed the original pronote and receipt and got it typed in the presence of the parties -- He further asserted that the same was read over to defendant and after admitting the same to be correct, he had signed in his presence as well as in presence of witnesses after receiving Rs. 12,00,000/- – Appellant-defendant not denying his signatures over the pronote and receipt – His claim is that plaintiff has forged the pronote and receipt – Mere oral self-serving statement of appellant-defendant is not sufficient to conclude and throw the evidence of plaintiff-respondent, attesting witnesses and scribe who in a consistent manner had asserted due execution of pronote and receipt by appellant-defendant.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 (3 of 1938), Section 8 – Recovery suit -- Personal loan – Friendly loan – Money lending Licence – Requirement of -- One single act of personal loan to friend, relatives or known person does not amount to money lending and no licence is required.

(Para 19)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will – Ignoring natural heirs – Effect of -- While deciding validity of Will, Courts cannot ignore fact that Will is generally executed by testator either to distribute his properties fairly or to disturb natural succession and make provisions of succession of his estate according to his wishes -- Merely, because natural heirs have been ignored from succession by itself is no ground to conclude the Will to be doubtful.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will in favour of one natural heir --  Whether makes Will doubtful ? -- Merely, because testator of Will has chosen to repose faith in one of his natural heirs on account of love and affection or for any other reasons on account of services rendered and after considering other natural heirs has executed Will in favour of one of them would not make the Will doubtful -- This by itself is not a suspicious circumstance and learned Appellate Court has erred in concluding so.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Un-registered Will – Death within 5 months – Testator himself scribe – Effect of -- Non-registration of Will merely because Testator himself was scribe cannot lead to conclusion against due execution -- Death within 5 months cannot be held to be suspicious circumstance itself unless signatures of Testator are held to be forged or it is shown that he was not of sound deposing mind or that Will was not executed in accordance with law.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Forged and fabricated Will – Fraud -- Onus of proof --  Duty to prove signatures is upon a person who denies it on the ground of fraud -- It was defendants who had challenged and asserted that Will is forged and fabricated -- It was duty of defendant to prove that Will was forged and fabricated once onus to prove Will stood discharged by examination of both the attesting witnesses.

(Para 23)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 --  Appointment of Lambardar – Knowledge of revenue terms – Requirement of -- Appellant failed to answer the questions of District Collector relating to the revenue, the said reason can be a sole good ground to oust the appellant from the zone of selection and to appoint respondent No. 5 as a Lambardar of the village concerned – Good knowledge of revenue proceedings is very essential to perform the duty on the post of Lambardar and the Financial Commissioner, has ignored the said fact while remanding the case back to the District Collector – Ld. Single Judge rightly set-aside the order passed by the Financial Commissioner, so as to uphold the appointment of respondent No. 5 as a lambardar.

(Para 7-10)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Authorities are better suited to know which candidate is a right candidate to be appointed as Lambardar -- Unless and until, any disqualification is pointed out towards the selected candidate, the interference should be minimum --  Interference is only warranted when the process involves manifest illegality, gross arbitrariness or violation of the principles of natural justice.

(Para 5)

B. Letters Patent Appeal -- In the Letters Patent Appeal, the judgment is to be proved perverse either on facts or law.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Execution of -- Allegation of forgery – Proof of – Suit for recovery decreed by learned Courts below -- Marginal witnesses PW2 and PW3 had duly proved that after taking the amount, the defendant had executed Pronote Ex.P1 in favour of the plaintiff and Receipt Ex.P2 -- Defendant has not even denied his signatures on the Pronote and Receipt -- Defendant had not moved any complaint before any police authorities or any other higher authorities against the plaintiff for the alleged forgery and fabrication of the Pronote -- Very fact that the cousin of the appellant/ defendant is deposing against the appellant, would prove the case against the appellant -- Defendant led no evidence to prove the alleged forgery -- No ground is made out to interfere in the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below -- Regular Second Appeal dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39(1) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote -- Forged and fabricated – Expert examination -- Defendant has taken twin stand that stamp paper as well as receipt stamp are forged one and had not been issued since 2009 and their use in year 2016 goes to prove that pronote is false and fabricated -- Petitioner has also disputed his signatures over agreement -- At the stage of collection of evidence, finding given by the learned trial Court that age of stamp paper and receipt stamp is of no consequence cannot be accepted – Entire evidence as desired by defendant be allowed at this stage and its effect shall be taken in consideration at the time of passing of final judgement.

(Para 3, 4)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 2(k) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Juvenile – Determination of age -- Delayed application – School leaving certificate -- Entire case of the petitioner claiming to be a minor is based on a School Leaving Certificate making him out to be a juvenile on the date when the FIR was registered --  Other than the said document, there is nothing on record to establish his date of birth as 05.05.2000 -- Neither his birth certificate nor the record of the Chowkidar or Lambardar been brought on record to establish the fact that the date of birth of the petitioner is 05.05.2000 – Petitioner moved his application claiming to be a minor when the case was listed for recording of defence evidence -- Delay in raising the plea of juvenility also creates a significant doubt in the claim of the petitioner -- Held, an entry relating to the date of birth made in a school register is relevant only when there is a primary evidence with respect to the date of birth available on the record – Application to declare minor dismissed.

(Para 1, 7-11)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Released deed – Proof of – Challenge to -- Suit for declaration -- To prove the execution of Release Deed, the defendants had examined the attesting witness as DW1, who had categorically stated that he knew both the parties personally; the Release Deed was written on the instructions of the plaintiff by Deed Writer at Rewari; and that after reading over and explaining the contents of the Release Deed to both the parties, they had affixed their thumb impressions/signatures -- Defendants had further examined Deed Writer as DW5, who had proved the execution of Release Deed; and had deposed that the Release Deed was typed on the instructions of the plaintiff; which was then entered into the register of DW5 Deed Writer at Sr. No. 152 -- Defendants had also examined Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert, who had tendered her report Ex.DW4/B, wherein she gave opinion that thumb impressions marked D2 to D5 on the Release Deed were tallying with the admitted thumb impressions of the plaintiff, Mark S1 to S9 – Release Deed stood proven on record beyond doubt -- Oral statement of the plaintiff that she did not know the meaning of Release Deed or her denial of her thumb impressions on Release Deed, do not hold weightage.

(Para 2, 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34, 120-B –  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Murder -- Regular bail -- Petitioner behind the bars since 19.06.2024 -- Investigation is complete -- Final report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the concerned Court -- Charges were framed and trial of the case has not made much progress -- Out of 22 prosecution witnesses, no PW has been examined so far – Culpability, if any, would be determined at the time of trial and as such, no useful purpose will be served by further detention of the petitioner-accused -- Keeping the petitioner in further detention without the prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future, would be violative of his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Proof of – Plaintiff/ PW-1 reiterated the facts stated in the plaint -- PW-2 deposed that the pronote and receipt were written by him at the request of the defendant and further stated that the documents were duly read over and explained to the defendant, who, after understanding and acknowledging the contents to be correct and upon receiving Rs. 3,00,000/- in cash, affixed his signatures thereon -- Attesting witness to the pronote and receipt was also examined as PW-3, his testimony is in line with the assertions made by PW-1 and PW-2 --  PW-3 further affirmed that the defendant signed the documents in his presence and that he could identify the signatures of both the plaintiff and the scribe -- Defendant has not denied his signatures on the pronote and receipt, he merely pleaded that the documents were blank at the time of signing and that his signatures were obtained under a false pretext -- Plaintiff examined a handwriting and finger print expert as PW-5, who confirmed that the signatures on the pronote and receipt (Ex. P-1 and P-2) were indeed those of the defendant -- Both the Courts below have rightly found the execution of the pronote and receipt to be duly proved

(Para 7-10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Presumption -- Fraud -- Burdon of proof -- Once the due execution of the pronote and receipt is proved through the consistent and credible evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant admits his signatures thereon, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the allegations of forgery or the claim that the documents were signed under a false pretext -- It is a settled principle that the person alleging fraud must prove it -- Self-serving testimony of the defendant as DW-1 is insufficient to dislodge the otherwise consistent and credible evidence of the plaintiff, PW-2 (scribe), and PW-3 (attesting witness), especially in light of the defendant’s admission regarding his signatures on the pronote note and receipt -- In view of the provisions of Section 118 & 121 of the N.I. Act, the defendant cannot deny receipt of consideration or question the paying capacity of the plaintiff, as the plaintiff is claiming under a pronote, which is promissory note.

(Para 11-15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Compromise -- Acquittal – Non-appearance of complainant – Compounding of offence -- Dispute resolved before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre and the report submitted by the Mediator -- Matter was adjourned on numerous occasions mostly on account of non-appearance on behalf of respondent No.1 -- Amount of Rs.1,10,000/-, as agreed between them, already stands paid to respondent No.1- complainant -- Non-appearance on behalf of the respondent No.1- complainant is nothing but delaying tactics for finalization of proceedings  -- Offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 permitted to be compounded under Section 147 of the Act -- Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 6-11)

A. Legal Metrology Act 2009 (1 of 2010), Section 15 -- Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, Rule 18(2), 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 100(5), 165 – Search, inspection and seizure – Warrants – Mandate of -- Entire proceedings from search to seizure are illegal and unsustainable, as neither a warrant was obtained nor reasons recorded for search, inspection, or seizure -- Mandatory safeguards u/s 15 of the 2009 Act, and Sections 165, 100(4) and 100(5) Cr.P.C were disregarded -- The 2009 Act itself contemplates action against officials violating its provisions u/s 42 and 43 – Compliance with statutory procedures, including recording “reasons to believe” before initiating search or seizure, is incumbent upon officials; non-compliance renders the action futile and results in arbitrary excise of authority.

(Para 23)

B. Legal Metrology Act 2009 (1 of 2010), Section 15, 29, 36(1), 36(2), 48 -- Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, Rule 18(2), 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 100(5), 165 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of compounding notice -- Search, inspection and seizure – Respondents not only violated Section 15 of the 2009 Act, but also failed to comply with Sections 100(4) and 165 Cr.P.C -- Nothing on record to show that the search was so imminent as to justify dispensing with a warrant -- On the same day as the inspection, search, and seizure, a notice u/s 48 of the 2009 Act was issued, specifying a compounding fee for contraventions of Sections 29, 36(1), and 36(2) of the Act, and Rules 18(2) and 27 of the 2011 Rules, and directing the appellant to respond within 15 days, failing which further legal action would follow – Notices set aside.

(Para 23)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Limitation – Pleadings -- Where the pleadings are silent, then it becomes the duty of the Court to ascertain from the evidence and the overall facts of the case, as pleaded by either party, and to render a finding on limitation where the question of limitation is to be treated as a question of law, since the Court cannot entertain frivolous or stale claims -- Question of law can be raised at any stage.

(Para 20)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Limitation – Strict enforcement -- Auction purchaser's title was confirmed by court orders, and subsequent transfers were properly registered and recorded -- Respondent Nos.1 to 3, who have knowingly slept over their right to challenge the sale and allowed further rights to flow, cannot later question the sale of larger extent of share in an unpartitioned property -- Limitation is a matter of statute and must be strictly enforced, more so when the earlier transaction or sale is well within the knowledge of the parties -- Delay extends to seventeen years for filing the suit, despite the fact that they were arrayed as respondents/ Judgment Debtors in the execution proceedings -- Protection of bona fide purchasers for value is a significant consideration, and any disturbance to their rights or titles after such a long period, would create uncertainty in property transactions and undermine the sanctity of court sale -- Suit was barred by limitation and Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are not entitled for any relief.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (8 of 1939), Section 2 – Writ seeking direction to decide proceedings u/s 2 of 1939 Act expeditiously -- Additional Judge, Family Court  directed to expedite the said case and conclude the proceedings as per law and as expeditiously as possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to the parties.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 11(iv), 12 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – POCSO – Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Applicant and the respondent no.3/ victim  solemnized marriage on 15.07.2023 and their marriage has been registered -- A male child, aged about one year three months, is born out of their wedlock -- Though this Court would normally be hesitant to quash the proceedings under Section 363 of the IPC and the proceedings under the provisions of the Act, 2012, but the applicant and the victim got married and they are living happily -- In case, the proceedings are allowed to continue, it would amount to denial of complete justice to the parties -- Inherent jurisdiction of this Court should be exercised to do real and substantial justice -- Entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 (1-B)(a) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Fire arm case -- Anticipatory bail – After seeing the police, three persons ran away from the spot while the co-accused was arrested by the police and recovered eight pistols and sixteen magazines from his possession – Disclosure statement that applicant was also among those who fled from the spot and he also had pistol -- Co-accused granted regular bail by the Ld. Sessions Judge – Held, personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case – Anticipatory bail allowed.

(Para 2-7)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13 -- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 19 -- One Time Settlement Scheme, 2020 -- Whether the High Court erred in its interference with the order of rejection of the respondent’s application under the OTS 2020 Scheme and directing reconsideration thereof – Held, the High Court was not justified in its interference with the order of rejection :

-- every borrower in default, to have his application under the OTS 2020 Scheme considered, was required to apply together with an up-front payment of 5% of the OTS amount.

-- in terms of clause 4(i) of the OTS 2020 Scheme, any application received without up-front payment is not required to be processed even. Thus, in the first place, the respondent’s application was incomplete and it did not have any right in law to claim that such application should be processed.

-- Neither omission to make upfront payment assigned as a ground for rejection of the respondent’s application by the first appellant nor clause 4(i) of the OTS 2020 Scheme was brought to the notice of the relevant courts.

-- Crossing the hurdle of eligibility per se would not entitle a defaulting borrower to claim consideration of his/its application unless the application itself satisfies the other stipulated conditions.

From whichever angle one looks at the issue, the conclusion is irresistible that the respondent’s conduct disabled itself to have a fair and objection consideration of its application for OTS.

(Para 23-43)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Termination of service after conviction u/s 195A, 305, 506B IPC – Later acquittal in graver offence – Re-consideration of terminal benefits -- High Court set aside the conviction u/s 305 IPC and conviction under section 195-A now set aside -- Only the conviction for the offence u/s 506-B IPC survives – Held, in such circumstances, interests of justice would be best served if the respondent-State considers the matter of termination of service of “A” de novo and decides, whether for his conviction only u/s 506-B IPC, the right to terminal benefits accruing for rendering three decades of service would stand forfeited for all times to come -- Government to consider the matter upon taking into account the financial status of the appellant no.1 and her liability, if any, adopting a humanitarian approach preferably within three months from date.

(Para 32, 33)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Long pendency of cheque bounce complaint – Petition seeking direction to decide expeditiously – Complaint is pending since 2020 – Petition allowed, Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate directed to expedite the proceedings and conclude the proceedings as per law as expeditiously as possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to the parties. Indian Bank Association’ case (2014) 5 SCC 590 relied.

(Para 1-5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(3) -- POCSO -- Rape – Sexual assault – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Applicant and the respondent no.2/ victim solemnized their marriage and their marriage has been registered – Held, though High Court would normally be hesitant to quash the proceedings u/s 376(3) of IPC and Section 3(a) read with Section 4 of POCSO,  but, it is noticed that the applicant and the informant got married and they are living happily – if the proceedings are allowed to continue, it would amount to denial of complete justice to the parties -- Inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to do real and substantial justice – Application allowed and the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-10

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 65(1), 137(2) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – POCSO – Rape – Sexual assault -- Regular bail -- Applicant is in judicial custody since 02.06.2025 -- Alleged victim and the informant, the father of the alleged victim, have not supported the case of the prosecution – Held, bail is the rule and committal to jail is an exception -- Refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Object of keeping the accused person in detention during the trial is not punishment -- Main purpose is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused -- No reason found to keep the applicant behind the bars for an indefinite period – Bail allowed.

(Para 3-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating – Delay in lodging FIR for about 5 years -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ criminal proceedings -- No allegation in the First Information Report or the chargesheet indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/ dishonest intention on the part of the appellants right from the time of making the promise or misrepresentation -- Mere vague allegations that the appellants failed to provide a product of a particular specification and failed to replace the faulty machines -- Delay in lodging of the FIR, coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire the confidence of the Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against the appellants -- Complainant had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit claiming damages -- Criminal law ought not become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas -- Prosecution against the appellants are unsustainable -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside and consequently, the FIR, the chargesheet and all consequent proceedings initiated pursuant thereto quashed.

(Para 16-23)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Transfer of petition u/s 12 DV Act petition – Jalandhar to Hoshiarpur -- Generally the Courts take into consideration the convenience of the wife, while considering the transfer application relating to the matrimonial dispute, but however, it is not a thumb rule -- Respondent No.1/ wife residing in the matrimonial house at Hoshiarpur -- Applicant is facing trial in the criminal case, registered at the instance of respondent No.1, in the Courts at Hoshiarpur -- Considering these circumstances, petition transferred from the Jalandhar to Hoshiarpur.

(Para 8, 9)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 38, 39(e), 41 -- Beggars’ Homes require a paradigm shift, from being perceived as instruments of social control to being recognised as spaces of social justice -- Directive Principles of State Policy, particularly Article 38 (promoting welfare of the people), Article 39(e) (protecting workers’ health and strength), Article 41 (right to work, education, and public assistance), and Article 47 (raising the level of nutrition and public health) -- Together, these provisions articulate the constitutional expectation of a compassionate State, one that acts as a trustee of the well-being of the poor, the sick, and the destitute -- In this constitutional context, beggars’ homes cannot be conceived as quasi-penal facilities -- Their role must be restorative, not retributive, places of recovery, skill-building, and reintegration into society -- Failure to ensure humane conditions in such Homes does not merely amount to maladministration; it constitutes a constitutional breach of the fundamental right to life with dignity – Following directions issued, in respect of all Beggars’ Homes across the country to ensure improved conditions are continuously maintained:

I. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation

(1) Every individual admitted to a Beggars’ Home shall mandatorily undergo a medical screening by a qualified medical officer within 24 hours of admission.

(2) Monthly health check-ups shall be conducted for all inmates by a designated medical team.

(3) A disease surveillance and early warning system shall be established in all Beggars’ Homes, with special protocols for the prevention, detection, and containment of communicable and waterborne diseases.

(4) All State Governments / UTs shall frame, notify, and strictly enforce minimum hygiene and sanitation standards in Beggars’ Homes, which shall mandatorily include:

(a) continuous access to potable drinking water

(b) functional toilets with proper drainage systems; and

(c) regular pest control and vector management measures.

II. Infrastructure and capacity

(5) All State Governments / UTs shall conduct an independent third-party infrastructure audit of every Beggars’ Home within their jurisdiction at least once every two years.

(6) Occupancy in each Beggars’ Home shall not exceed its sanctioned capacity, so as to prevent overcrowding and the spread of communicable diseases.

(7) Adequate provision shall be made for safe housing, ventilation, and access to open spaces, consistent with human dignity.

III. Nutrition and Food Safety

(8) Every Beggars’ Home shall appoint, or designate from an associated Government Hospital, a qualified Dietician to regularly verify the quality and nutritional standards of food served to inmates.

(9) Standardised dietary protocols shall be framed, ensuring nutritional adequacy.

IV. Vocational Training and Rehabilitation

(10) All Beggars’ Homes shall establish or expand vocational training facilities aimed at skill development and economic self-reliance of inmates.

(11) The State Governments / UTs shall explore partnerships with governmental agencies, NGOs, and private institutions to introduce diverse trades and employment-oriented training programmes.

(12) Periodic assessments shall be conducted to monitor the effectiveness of rehabilitation initiatives and to facilitate the reintegration of released inmates into society.

V. Legal Aid and Awareness

(13) Inmates shall be informed in a language they understand, of their legal rights, including the right to contest detention orders.

(14) State Legal Services Authorities shall designate panel lawyers to visit Beggars’ Homes at least once every three months, to provide free legal assistance and facilitate access to bail, release, or appeal remedies.

VI. Child and Gender Sensitivity

(15) Where women or children are housed in such Homes, the States / UTs shall provide separate facilities ensuring privacy, safety, and access to child care, education, and counselling.

(16) Children found begging shall not be detained in Beggars’ Homes but referred to child welfare institutions under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

VII. Accountability and Oversight

(17) Every State / UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars’ Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members, to:

(a) prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars’ Homes; and

(b) maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths, and remedial actions taken.

(18) In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care:

(a) the State / UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next of kin of the deceased; and

(b) initiate departmental and, where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible.

VIII. Implementation and Compliance

(19) State Governments / UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release, and follow-up.

(20) The above directions shall be implemented within six months from the date of this judgment,

The Union of India, through the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, shall, within three months, frame and notify model guidelines to facilitate uniform implementation of the aforesaid directions across all States and Union Territories.

(Para 16.2, 16.3, 23, 23.1)

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 (14 of 2025) – Challenge to entire Statute – Stay of provisions of law -- In the totality of the circumstances, Court do not find that any case is made out to stay the provisions of the entire statute. The prayer for stay of the impugned Act rejected -- While doing so, in order to protect the interest of all the parties and balance the equities during pendency of this batch of matters, following directions issued:

(i) Part of clause (r) of Section 3 of the Amended Waqf Act

“any person showing or demonstrating that he is professing Islam for at least five years”

shall stand stayed until the rules are framed by the  State Government for providing a mechanism for determining the question as to whether a person has been practicing Islam for at least five years or not.

(ii) Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3C of the Amended Waqf Act, which reads

“Provided that such property shall not be treated as waqf property till the designated officer submits his report.”

and the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3C of the Amended Waqf Act, which read thus:

“(3) In case the designated officer determines the property to be a Government property, he shall make necessary corrections in revenue records and submit a report in this regard to the State Government.

(4) The State Government shall, on receipt of the report of the designated officer, direct the Board to make appropriate correction in the records.”

shall stand stayed.

(iii) Unless the issue with regard to title of the waqf property in terms of Section 3C of the Amended Waqf Act is not finally decided in the proceedings initiated under Section 83 of the Amended Waqf Act by the Tribunal and subject to further orders by the High Court, neither the waqfs will be dispossessed of the property nor the entry in the revenue record and the records of the Board shall be affected. However, upon commencement of an inquiry under Section 3C of the Amended Waqf Act till the final determination by the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Amended Waqf Act, subject to further orders of the High Court in an appeal, no third-party rights would be created in respect of such properties.

(iv) Central Waqf Council constituted under Section 9 of the Amended Waqf Act is concerned, it shall not consist of more than 4 non-Muslim members out of 22. Equally, insofar as the Board constituted under Section 14 of the Amended Waqf Act is concerned, it is directed that it shall not consist of more than 3 non-Muslim members out of11.

(v) Court not inclined to stay the provision of Section 23 of the Amended Waqf Act – Direction given that as far as possible, an effort should be made to appoint the Chief Executive Officer of the Board who is the ex-officio Secretary from amongst the Muslim community;

Observation above is upon prima facie consideration for the purpose of examining as to whether an interim stay should be granted or not to the impugned Act or the provision(s) contained therein. The observations made hereinabove will not prevent the parties from making submissions with regard to the validity of the provisions contained in the Amended Waqf Act or any of the provision(s) therein.

(Para 209)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(b), 27(A) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – NDPS – Regular bail -- Recovery of 8 grams of Heroin and Rs. 600/- cash -- Contraband recovered falls within intermediate quantity -- Applicability of Section 27-A of the NDPS Act is seriously questionable as this provision has been invoked merely on the basis of the disclosure statement of the petitioner himself and the amount recovered is petty which can be found in the possession of a common man -- Petitioner is in custody since 08.06.2025 -- Trial is likely to take sufficiently long time to conclude – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 6-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(c), 25, 61, 85 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS – Regular bail -- Commercial quantity – Habitual offender -- Bail application of the petitioner cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the petitioner is involved in other/another cases -- Petitioner is in custody for the last more than 01 year and 06 months -- Trial may take a long time to conclude -- Prolonged detention without any likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, would amount to a violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Defence struck off -- Petitioner is appearing in person before the Ld. Tribunal and could not file the reply in time because of communication gap as well as lack of knowledge -- A lis should be decided on merits rather than on technicalities -- Justice demands that one last effective opportunity is required to be granted to the petitioner to file his written statement -- One last opportunity granted to the petitioner to file written statement subject to payment of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 4, 5)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Family pension – Excess payment – Recovery of -- Petitioner is a widow and she is getting family pension – Excess payment was made from July’ 2008 to 2019 and there was no connivance, misrepresentation, fraud or mischief on the part of the petitioner --  She further submits that it was lapse of the system which was introduced in 2006 -- Writ petition allowed, respondent-bank ordered to not effect further recovery.

(Para 3-8)

Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (26 of 1947), Section 12, 12A, 12C – Election of Pradhan -- Recounting of votes –  Disparity in the count of votes informed to the appellant and finally disclosed in the official form -- It relates to 19 votes, i.e., the difference between 1193 and 1213 -- Margin of victory of the respondent was 37 votes, and so, in a sense, victory of position would remain yet elusive of the appellant – Held, process has to be in accordance with constitutional principles and established norms  -- Each vote has its own value irrespective of its effect in the final outcome of the election, its sanctity has to be protected -- It was a four-sided election, i.e., four persons were contesting for the post of ‘Pradhan’ -- Three of the four persons submitted by way of affidavit that they had doubts regarding the propriety of the election, and they would support a recount of votes -- Deliberate attempts made to benefit the ultimate victor such as the use of police force to remove the appellant from the vicinity of the polling area – Diary of the Presiding Officer of the polling booths, which is an essential document recording the casting of votes, could not be found despite a concerted effort -- If the Presiding Officers’ records are missing and cannot be verified, it can be found that the final conclusion is within the realm of questionability -- Each and every document pertaining to an election is important and all efforts should be made to preserve the same – Recounting is held to be justified.

(Para 14-18)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 80 – Notice u/s 80 CPC – Importance of -- A statutory notice holds significance beyond mere formality -- Its purpose is to provide the Government or a public officer with an opportunity to reconsider the matter in light of established legal principles and make a decision in accordance with the law -- However, in practice, such notices have often become empty formalities -- Administration frequently remains unresponsive and fails to even inform the aggrieved party why their claim has been rejected – Held, Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all seriousness -- Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation -- They are expected to let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any case before he embarks upon the litigation -- In certain cases, courts may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought.

(Para 105, 106, 113)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(g), 31, 300A – Right to hold property -- Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law -- This Article has been inserted by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 -- Prior to this amendment, the right to property was guaranteed by Article 31 -- While Clause (1) of that Article has been shifted from Part III to Article 300-A, Clause (2) of that Article, which dealt with compulsory acquisition of property, has been repealed -- Sub-Clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 19, which guaranteed the right to acquire and hold property, has also been omitted by the same 44th Amendment Act, 1978 – The result of these changes, in short, is that the right to hold property has ceased to be a fundamental right under the Constitution and it has been left to the Legislature to deprive a person by the authority of law.

(Para 124)

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 100(1)(a)(d)(i), 116A – Election of Member Legislative Assembly / MLA –Seat reserved for Schedule Caste – Challenge to election -- Ground that the appellant/ wining candidate’s grandparents on the paternal side were persons who had migrated from Tamil Nadu, they and their successors were not entitled to claim that they belonged to ‘Hindu Parayan’ of Kerala State -- It was averred that hence, the Appellant is not entitled to contest from a Constituency reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes from Kerala – Held, a duly issued Caste/ Community Certificate would be amenable to challenge only under the provisions of the statute concerned, and not in an Election Petition – Election Petition dismissed.

(Para 2, 3, 59, 64)