Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19(1) – Cognizance by trail court – Sanction from competent authority – Requirement of -- Trial Court was not justified and correct in law in taking cognizance in the absence of sanction by the competent authority -- Order taking cognizance set aside qua the appellant.

(Para 2, 3)

A. Haryana Registration and Regulation of Societies Act, 2012 (Haryana Act No. 1 of 2012), Section 22, 39, 40 – Ousting the membership -- Non-production of documents by Society – Effect of -- Society cannot be permitted to take benefit of its own lapse in not producing its own record in relation to the claim made by the petitioners – Impugned orders passed disregards the evidence adduced by the petitioners, finding that said record was not produced by the Society -- Same, is not a valid ground to defeat the rights of any person or to disregard its evidence in entirety and to oust him from membership -- Matter remanded back to District Registrar of Societies.

(Para 31-37)

B. Haryana Registration and Regulation of Societies Act, 2012 (Haryana Act No. 1 of 2012), Section 80 – Election of governing body under challenge -- Induction of 278 persons as members of the Society – Effect upon -- Unless any defect is pointed out at the outset as regards the eligibility of 278 members to be inducted as members or that they had not deposited the requisite charges or fulfill the eligibility conditions required under bye-laws, their induction cannot be said to be invalid merely on account of any subsequent defect as may be noticed in the election of the governing body.

(Para 36)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 141, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company -- Interpretation of -- High Court's interpretation accurately identified the "drawer" as the individual who issues the cheque -- Drawer u/s 143A refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized signatories -- Primary liability rests on the drawer, emphasizing the drawer's responsibility for maintaining sufficient funds -- Section 141 of the NI Act extending liability to the company's officers for the dishonour of a cheque -- Appellants' attempt to extend this principle to Section 143A, to hold directors or other individuals personally liable for interim compensation, is unfounded -- Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume the company's legal identity.

(Para 28-30)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company – Interpretation of -- When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its natural and ordinary meaning -- Legislative intent, as discerned from the plain language of the statute, aims to hold the drawer accountable -- Appellants' argument for a broader interpretation to include authorized signatories u/s 143A contradicts this principle and would lead to an unjust extension of liability not supported by the statutory text.

(Para 31)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Right to challenge – Compliance of impugned order passed in writ – Effect of -- Judgment sought to be challenged in the Writ Appeal was already complied with under threat of contempt – Held, compliance of an order under threat cannot take away the right of a party as available to challenge the same.

(Para 14, 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 – Bail – Anticipatory bail – Basic essentials required in order -- In bail/anticipatory bail matters, High Courts should endeavour to ensure that all basic essentials (i.e. FIR No., Date, the concerned police station and the offences allegedly committed etc.) are duly recorded or reflected in the format of the order.

(Para 3)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 323 -- Committal of case to Session Court – Application by prosecution seeking FSL report before Sessions Court -- Sessions court fell in grave error in observing that the application ought to have been filed before the learned Magistrate at the time of the committal of the trial -- To deny the application without seeking the report would result in a miscarriage of justice -- Application allowed.

(Para 8-12)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Transfer of employee – Right of employee -- Transfer is an incidence of service and any employee can be transferred on administrative reasons and there is no vested right of an employee to seek posting of his own choice -- However, the aforesaid is not an absolute Rule and is subjected to various exceptions which cannot be put in any straight jacket formula -- Every case has to be seen according to its own facts and circumstances -- Petitioner is 70% handicapped and his wife is suffering from last stage of Lung Cancer -- Impugned order set aside, respondent-Nigam is at liberty to pass a fresh order after considering posting the petitioner near his house at Kaithal which may be a Non-Public Dealing Office.

(Para 7-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(b) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- NDPS Case -- Suspension of sentence -- Recovery of 18.17 grams of heroin – Conviction for 4 years – Appeal against conviction – Appeal raises arguable issues -- The applicant has undergone an actual sentence of 06 months and 10 days and there is no other case registered against him -- Hearing of the appeal is likely to take some time -- Sentence suspended.

(Para 2, 5)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 -- Daily wagers – Regularisation of services – Natural justice -- If the competent authority takes a policy decision within the permissible framework, its benefit must be extended to all those who fall within the parameters of such a policy -- Authorities cannot be permitted to pick and choose in such circumstances -- Eligibility of respondent no.1 for the post he holds has not been controverted -- The fact that he initially entered through the process in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is not a serious issue – High Court directed the petitioners to confer the status of a regular employee on respondent No.1 – No reason to interfere, SLP dismissed -- Petitioners/ State directed to grant all the benefits, including arrears of pay and seniority, to respondent No.1 from the due date.

(Para 5-8)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 16, 21, 309 -- Appointment as constable – Denial of appointment due to pregnancy – Legality of – Now non-availability of post – Ground of -- Motherhood should never and can never be the basis for denying public employment opportunities to women – Maternity should not be seen as a barrier but as a fundamental human right of every woman -- Respondent’s plea that the vacancies of Constable in 2016 and 2018 already stand filled and therefore, the petitioner cannot now be appointed – Held, respondents having acted in a most illegal and arbitrary manner in rejecting the petitioner’s request for deferment of PET cannot now be permitted to urge that she cannot be appointed – Writ petition allowed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- -- Arrears of backwages will however, as volunteered by the petitioner, restricted to 50%.

(Para 10-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482, 401 -- Outraging modesty of women – Female accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A female cannot be an accused under Section 354A of the IPC -- This offence is gender specific and only a male can be prosecuted under this offence – Proceedings against petitioner quashed.

(Para 2a, 20, 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test identification parade (TIP) – TIP not done during investigation -- All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court were not known to the appellant -- They had not seen the appellant prior to the said incident -- TIP had become necessary particularly when both the accused, who are alleged to have committed this murder were arrested within two days -- Inspite of being questioned as to what the reasons were for not holding TIP in this case, no satisfactory reply was given by him -- Identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP which has not been done -- Appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a very doubtful evidence as to the appellant’s identity -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test identification parade (TIP) – TIP is only a part of Police investigation -- The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Not conducting TIP in a given case may prove fatal for the prosecution.

(Para 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148A -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence – Condition to deposit 20% of compensation amount -- Appellate Court was required to consider whether the case falls under exception or not – Impugned order set aside, Ld. Appellate Court directed to pass the order afresh, after granting opportunity to the parties with regard to, whether the petitioner is able to make out a ground that his case falls under exceptional category which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount or whether the petitioner is liable to pay less amount of compensation.

(Para 6-8)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Age of candidate -- Respondent No.4 (24 years old) had an edge over the petitioner (39 years old) inasmuch as that he is younger in age than the petitioner -- Age of a candidate is a relevant factor.

(Para 3, 3.1, 12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8 and Rule 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Dismissed in default – Delay in Restoration application supported by affidavit – Condonation of delay without application – Ld. trial Court, after considering the averments of the parties and guided by the basic tenets of law that the rights of the parties should be examined on merits and not fettered by technicalities, and to advance the cause of justice, allowed the application and restored the suit – Held, Ld. trial Court adopted a correct and judicious approach, by permitting the parties to have their rival claims decided on merits.

(Para 9-15)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction -- Before granting injunction, the court is required to apply three well known tests namely;

a) prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs

b) balance of convenience

c) irreparable loss and injury which the party may suffer if the injunction is not granted.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Joint owner -- Property is situated in an area which is being used for running a small scale industry -- No dispute that previously the defendants were utilising the area by constructing a shed with iron sheets -- Defendants have installed their machinery to carry out work of laundry and steam press -- Even if the defendants are permitted to put new iron or cemented sheets over the pillars, there will be no permanent change in the nature of the property -- Defendants stated that if suit is decreed and suit property falls in the share of the plaintiffs, they will not claim any compensation for the construction.

-- Decision of the suit is likely to take a long time and if the parties are not permitted to use the property, it will lead to wastage of resources.

-- If the plaintiffs succeed they will get the property with construction.

-- Parties are yet to lead evidence.

Held, Courts below have erred in obstructing the defendants from completing the renovation/ re-construction of the shed by granting injunction.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Suit for specific performance – Impleadment as defendant -- Rights or interest of petitioners to the extent of their shares in suit land, are neither the subject matter of suit nor of the agreement to sell – Petitioners are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit --  Petitioner cannot claim to be impleaded as party in the suit, where no relief is claimed against them – Law is settled that any decree against a stranger is nullity, therefore, any decree passed in the suit will have no effect on the rights of the petitioners.

(Para 7, 12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 20, 27-A, 29, 60, 37 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS Case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity -- Petitioner is in custody since 08.09.2021 i.e. for the last more than 2 years and 10 months -- Out of 16 witnesses cited by the complainant, statement of only one witness has been concluded -- Charge framed way back on 18.07.2022 -- Conclusion of the trial is likely to take long time -- Petitioner is the first offender and has not been found to be involved in any other case -- Rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS is required to be balanced with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which provides fundamental right to life and liberty -- Right to speedy trial forms a facet of Article 21 -- Petitioner admitted to regular bail.

(Para 7-12)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 41 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 6 – Agreement to sell by brother/ attorney after death of Owner -- Plaintiffs asserted in the plaint, specifically that brother/ attorney of owner received payments from various vendees -- While filing the written statement there is no specific denial to the assertion -- In the absence of specific denial, the pleadings are deemed to have been admitted -- Moreover, two daughters of Owner while appearing in evidence, have not disputed the payment – Attorney died, children of attorney have not stepped into the witness box -- It will not be appropriate to hold that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the payment of the entire sale consideration.

-- Colony has already been carved out on the disputed property.

-- If specific performance of the agreement to sell is granted chances are that the plaintiffs would complete the colony by providing all the requisite facilities to the residents/ plot buyers.

-- Heirs of owner/ principal are settled in England and for the last 25 years, they have never bothered to take care of their property after their father passed away in the year 1991, hence, no equity lies in their favour.

-- From the testimony of both the daughters of owner, it is evident that they always treated agreement to sell to be the complete sale of the suit property.

Plaintiffs are not guilty of committing any default which may disentitle them the relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell as they being third parties unaware of the death of principal were bonafide purchasers -- Relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell granted.

(Para 1.5, 6-8.1)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Right to bail – Right to Life and liberty – Restrictions imposed by Statute – Effect on Constitutional Court -- Right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct -- A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed -- In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Right to bail – Right to Life and liberty – Restrictions imposed by Statute – Effect on Constitutional Court -- In the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to leError! Hyperlink reference not valid.an in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part -- In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail -- But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted --  It would run  counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence.

(Para 32)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27, Order 41 Rule 23A -- First appeal – Additional evidence – Remand of case -- First Appellate Court allowed the application for additional evidence and remanded the case back to the trial court for deciding afresh – No categoric appraisal of the reasons recorded by the trial court -- Appellate court to remand the case back to the lower court where re-trial of the case is considered necessary -- Order of Appellate Court’s remanding the case back to the trial Court set aside.

(Para 1, 3-5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 3, Order 7 Rule 11 -- Suit against dead person – Maintainability of – Rejection of plaint -- Suit against deceased dismissed with liberty to institute a fresh suit in accordance with law against the LRs.

(Para 6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Registered owner – Subsequent owner – Liability of -- Learned Tribunal did not commit any error in holding the registered owner to be responsible for paying the compensation, though he has been given liberty to take appropriate steps to effect the recovery from the subsequent owner concerned.

(Para 11)

Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Handwritten Will – Attesting witness is required to assert that the testator as well as another attesting witnesses have appended their thumb impressions on the Will in his presence -- No statement to this effect -- Will was produced in the First Appellate Court during the pendency of the suit after nearly 30 years from its execution – First Appellate Court found that propounder failed to prove the Will and it is surrounded by the suspicious circumstances – No error in finding -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 1(3), 4, 531 – Procedure in criminal cases after BNSS (w.e.f. 01.07.2024):

I. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands repealed w.e.f. 01.07.2024. Ergo; no new/fresh appeal or application or revision or petition can be filed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on or after 01.07.2024.

II. The provisions of Section 4 and Section 531 of BNSS, 2023 are mandatory in nature as a result whereof any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition/ trial/ inquiry or investigation pending before 01.07.2024 are required to be disposed of, continued, held or made (as the case may be) in accordance with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In other words; any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed on or after 01.07.2024, is required to be filed/ instituted under the provisions of BNSS, 2023.

III. Any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed on or after 01.07.2024 under the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 is non-maintainable & hence would deserve dismissal/ rejection on this score alone. However, any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed upto 30.06.2024 under the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 is maintainable in law. To clarify; in case any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition is filed upto 30.06.2024 but there is defect (Registry objections, as referred to in common parlance) and such defect is cured/ removed on or after 01.07.2024, such appeal/ application/ revision/ petition shall be deemed to have been validly filed/ instituted on or after 01.07.2024 and, therefore, would be non- maintainable.

IV. Section 531 of BNSS shall apply to "revision", "petition" as also "petition of complaint" (ordinarily referred to as complaint before Magistrate) with the same vigour as it is statutorily mandated to apply to "appeal/ application/ trial/ inquiry or investigation" in terms of Section 531 of BNSS.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 20 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 1(3), 4, 531 – Procedure in criminal trial – Retrospective or Prospective -- Prohibition under Article 20 pertains to only conviction/ sentence under a law, which has been enacted later on, but not trial thereof -- There is no gainsaying that BNSS is essentially a criminal procedural law whereas BNS provides for substantive criminal law – It is trite law that the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts, even where the alteration which the statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of the parties -- No person has a vested right in any course of procedure -- He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the Court in which he sues, and, if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.

(Para 8.3, 8.4)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528, 531 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498A – Quashing of FIR/ Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. -- Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C on 03.07.2024 – Maintainability of -- The Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 stands repealed w.e.f. 01.07.2024 -- Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is non-maintainable, dismissed -- Petitioner shall be at liberty to file an appropriate petition invoking the provisions of BNSS, as and if permissible in law.

(Para 10)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Specific performance of contract -- Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief -- As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs -- The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract -- The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief -- The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate -- A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected -- Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract -- The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory.

(Para 22(i))

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 21, 22 – Amendment to add the plea of assessment of un-liquidated damages and to sue respondents/ defendants in individual capacity on attaining majority -- Plaintiff cannot be deprived of his right to incorporate the pleas, which are available to him under the law – Court should allow the parties to bring their plea on record, so that matter in controversy can be finally, completely and effectively decided -- Causing the delay, in raising the pleas at belated stage of the suit, the petitioner-plaintiff needs to be burdened with costs – Amendment in plaint allowed with cost of Rs. 30,000/-.

(Para 3, 14, 15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Injunction -- Relief of injunction is an equitable relief -- It is well known maxim of law that “he who seeks equity, must do equity’ -- Plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and as such, no prima facie case is made out in his favour.

(Para 14)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) – Arbitration – Deposit of amount as pre-condition – Legality of -- A clause which seeks deposit of a part of the claimed amount to avail of the remedy of arbitration is one which would be illegal and unlawful as it is barring a legal remedy from being invoked without deposit of money -- No remedy can be subjected to payment of money, unless authorised by law -- Such a clause in a contract lacks legitimacy and would not be enforceable.

(Para 76)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) --  Constitution of India, Article 19, 21 -- Employment agreement -- Lock-in period of three years -- Covenants in employment contracts -- Lawful and reasonable covenants which are operative during the term of employment are valid and enforceable -- Such covenants are not in violation of the fundamental rights as provided in the Constitution of India -- Reasonable lock-in periods in employment contracts that apply during the term of employment are valid in law and do not violate Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution of India -- Disputes relating to lock-in periods that apply during the subsistence of employment contracts, are arbitrable in terms of the Act, 1996.

(Para 78)

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 13, 226 -- Army Welfare Education Society / Private Educational  Institution – Service dispute – Maintainability of writ –

-- Whether the appellant Army Welfare Education Society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to make a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution maintainable against it?

-- Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving a private educational  institution and its employees can be adjudicated upon in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Held, High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution -- School run by the Appellant Society imparts education -- Relationship is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract -- If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element -- The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents.

(Para 42, 46)

B. Doctrine of legitimate expectation -- Features :

-- First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;

-- Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings;

-- Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation;

-- Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters;

-- Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

-- Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally.

The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case.

(Para 48, 49)

C. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Arbitrariness in State action -- It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action -- It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.

(Para 49)

D. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Schol run by Society – Applicability upon -- Even if the function being performed by a private educational institution in imparting education may be considered as a public function, the relationship between the administration of such an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law -- No statutory obligation on the appellant society which requires that the salaries and allowances of the respondents are to be kept at par with what is payable to teachers of Government institutions -- Appellant society, for the purposes of its relationship with its employees, cannot be regarded as a public or Government authority -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation will have no applicability to the facts of the case.

(Para 50-52)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1, 2 & 3, Order 43 Rule 1 (r) -- Interim injunction – Maintainability of appeal – Whether the order is passed ex-parte on an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC or is passed after hearing the parties, then appeal is maintainable -- Any order granting or declining an injunction cannot be passed under Rule 3 of Order 39 independently of Rule 1 or 2 CPC -- If the Court just give notice of the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC to the other party without expressing any opinion declining the ad interim injunction, then appeal is not maintainable -- Order declining ad interim injunction was passed after hearing the parties, so appeal against said order is maintainable under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) CPC.

(Para 5.2)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 -- Additional evidence – Suit for specific performance – First Appellate Court dismissed application for permission to produce a copy of jamabandis on record on the ground that these documents have no relevance as the ownership is not in dispute – Submission that the application should have been decided only with the main case – Held, it is not necessary that all the applications for additional evidence must be decided with the main appeal – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1-6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13, Order 21 -- Ex-parte decree – Setting aside of – Stay of execution -- Summons sent at residential address received by brother -- Specific case of the petitioner that he is residing separately from his brother -- It is a question of evidence whether petitioner is residing in a separate house or both the brothers are residing in the same house – Amount of decree is going to be recovered by selling the property of the petitioner, it would definitely cause irreparable loss to the petitioner -- Execution of decree stayed subject to the condition that the petitioner shall deposit 50% of the amount of decree in the Executing Court within 15 days – Ld. trial Court directed to decide the application under Order 9 Rule 13 expeditiously.

(Para 6-8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- DNA test of defendant – Permissibility of -- Plaintiff has to stand on her own legs by producing cogent evidence to prove her assertions -- Defendant of the case, cannot be compelled by plaintiff to undergo the DNA test.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- DNA test -- The Court cannot order a DNA test as a matter of course and such a prayer cannot be granted so as to lead to a rowing inquiry so as to collect the evidence for the plaintiff.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 14 Rule 5 – Additional issues – Suit for possession by way of partition – During the proceedings, defendant moved an application for framing of an additional issue for raising the objection of partial partition – In the written statement preliminary objection No.4 has been taken stating therein that the partition is partial as plaintiff has not mentioned Khasra in which the plaintiff had raised construction of the residential house – Only because the word “partial” has been clerically mentioned as “parcel”, the trial Court has observed that no such objection was raised – Direction given to the trial Court to frame additional issue regarding the partial partition.

(Para 2, 3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, 100 – Issues not pressed in Trial court – Power of Appellate court – Before the First Appellate Court, no arguments have been raised qua the issue Nos.2 to 4 -- However, the First Appellate Court reversed the issues while deciding the appeal -- Having chosen to not press the issue Nos.2 to 4 before the Trial Court and in the absence of any challenge having been laid to the issues before the before the First Appellate Court, it is incomprehensible as to how the First Appellate Court reversed the findings -- Appeal allowed, judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court set aside and that of the Trial Court restored.

(Para 11-13)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 – Specific performance of contract -- Discretion of court -- Necessary condition is that contract in itself must be legally valid and capable of enforcement, otherwise the Court’s discretion in granting or refusing its specific performance will not arise.

(Para 13)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 – Contract by Guardian on behalf of the minor -- Specific performance of contract -- In order to specifically enforce a contract entered into by a guardian on behalf of the minor, it is necessary that:

(i) contract should be within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him; and

(ii) it is for the benefit of the minor.

If either of these two conditions are not satisfied, the Contract cannot be specifically enforced at all.

(Para 16)

C. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6, 8, 12 – Contract by Guardian on behalf of the minor -- Minor’s undivided share in joint family property -- Permission from Guardianship court to execute sale deed – Permissibility  of -- Application u/s 8 of the Guardianship Act for appointment of guardian in itself was not maintainable -- As such, the mother of defendant No.1 was not competent to sell the share of the minor in the joint Hindu family property.

(Para 3, 17-21)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 – Contract by Guardian on behalf of the minor -- Specific performance of contract – Price of property – Consideration of -- Price cannot be a reason to decline specific performance of the contract, but when the interest and benefit of the minor is involved, Court is certainly bound to see as to whether the proposed sale is in the interest and benefit of the minor or not.

(Para 24)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 – Specific performance of contract -- Earnest money of agreement to sell adjusted in another property – Effect of -- Once the entire earnest money stands adjusted towards the sale consideration of part of the property agreed to be sold, the agreement of sale will not survive in respect of the remaining part of the property and will become redundant -- Specific performance of such remaining part cannot be allowed.

(Para 30)

F. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 4, 5(b) – Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875), Section 3 – Repudiation of contract – Age of majority -- It is an undisputed legal proposition that a minor can repudiate the contract entered into by his guardian, on his attaining majority, as the agreement on behalf of minor is voidable -- In view of Section 5(b) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, it is held that the age of majority in this case shall be considered to be 18 years, as the contrary provision contained in Indian Majority Act, is inconsistent with Section 4 of Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act -- As such, defendant having repudiated the contract, plaintiffs-appellants cannot pray for enforcement of specific performance.

(Para 33-36)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 9 -- Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 51 – Civil suit for possession of agricultural land -- Ejectment of tenant -- Denying title of landlord – Effect of – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- If defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement by taking a specific plea to the effect, that will be sufficient to hold that they had denounced the title of the plaintiff -- Civil Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession.

(Para 10)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 9 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 51 – Tenancy of agricultural land – Adverse possession – Plea of -- Effect of – Finding beyond pleadings – Permissibility of -- At no point of time, defendants ever claimed to be tenants on the suit land -- Their consistent stand taken in the written statement is that they are in possession of the suit land and had perfected their title by way of adverse possession -- Their plea of adverse possession has not been found as correct -- The First Appellate Court on its own, made out a new case for the defendants by holding them to be tenants on the suit land -- The First Appellate Court could not travel beyond the pleadings of the parties -- Even the evidence, led beyond the pleadings of the parties, could not be appreciated in that direction -- Suit decreed.

(Para 11, 13)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17, 53A – Agreement to sell -- Transfer by way of affidavit with possession – Nature of -- Affidavit does not amount to plaintiff having relinquished his title -- Such document was required to be mandatorily registered u/s 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 -- However, such affidavit can be treated as agreement to sell with delivery of possession – Section 53-A of the Act, protects the possession of the proposed purchaser -- The ingredients of Section 53-A of the Act stands fulfilled because the total payment has been made and continuation of the defendant’s possession over the suit property is acknowledged -- Plaintiff infact relinquished his share -- Though, technically a relinquishment or a registered sale deed should have been executed in favour of the defendant, however, Section 53-A of the Act, which is based upon the rule of estoppel comes to the appellant’s rescue – Plaintiff held not entitled to the decree of possession of the suit property.

(Para 9, 10)

Customary law – In order to establish a valid custom, the following ingredients need to be established:-- (a) continuity (b) certainty (c) long  usage (d) reasonability -- Trite it is that the custom when pleaded needs to be strictly proved – Custom usually arise from the practices prompted by the society.

(Para 9, 10)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Eviction of tenant -- Bonafide need -- It is the landlord, who is the master of his needs -- The tenant or even the Court cannot direct the landlord about his requirement or tell him how much accommodation would be sufficient for him and his family.

(Para 35)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Eviction of tenant -- Bonafide need – Death of landlord – Long pendency of proceedings – Effect of -- Petition was filed by the landlord in 1980 – No merit in argument that now the requirement of the original petitioner i.e. the landlord must have ceased to exist as the said landlord has died – There is no doubt that the landlord is dead and a period of about 44 years has elapsed from the time of filing of the petition but at the same time the children of the landlord have acquired his rights and they have also been brought on record in the form of his LR, therefore the genuine requirement of the landlord to move out in 1980 still cannot be ignored.

(Para 36, 37)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS Case – Regular Bail -- Commercial quantity – Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Applicability on High Court/ Supreme Court -- Provisions of Sections 36-A and 37 have to be read together and interpreted harmoniously so that Section 36-A(3) does not become redundant or otiose -- Restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act were meant to be applicable to Courts other than the Constitutional Courts and in view of the provision contained in Section 36-A (3) of NDPS Act, those restrictions do not apply to the Constitutional Courts.

(Para 36)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 20, 23, 29, 37, 52A, 68, 76 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal), Rules, 2022, Rule 3, 9, 10, 11 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity -- Samples in presence of Magistrate – Non-compliance of – In recovery memo, packets recovered were not numbered serially for the purpose of identification, as provided in Rule 3 (2) of the 2022 Rules -- Samples were not drawn in presence of a Magistrate, as provided in Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and Rule 9 of the 2022 Rules -- Although 14 packages are claimed to have been seized from the applicant, samples have not been drawn from all the packets and a single sample has been drawn, that too not in duplicate and thus the authorities have violated Rule 10 of the 2022 Rules -- Authorities themselves have violated the mandatory provisions contained in Rules of 2022 -- Applicant has no previous criminal history and he is languishing in jail since 28.01.2024 -- Bail application allowed.

(Para 46-51)

Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 2(5-a) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 14(1) -- Surplus land – Permissible area – Non-utilisation of – Effect of – Land declared as surplus not utilized till date as per Section 14 (1) of the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 1972 -- Since the holding of the plaintiff, her father and other co-sharers is still joint and the permissible area & surplus area of the plaintiff has not been separated and distinctively identified till date, so the defendant-State cannot utilize the area declared as surplus in any manner whatsoever.

-- Land declared as surplus of the plaintiff had not been allotted to any eligible tenants and thus, the proceedings have not been completed till date nor the possession has been taken from the plaintiff till date.

-- Direction given to the defendants/ State to first complete proceedings under 1953 Act regarding the declaration of the land as surplus and it is only thereafter that land of the plaintiff is to be declared as surplus or permissible as per 1972 Act by giving her the benefit of the fact that she has become an independent unit being a married lady and cannot be included as a unit of family of her father/ landowner

-- Till all these proceedings are completed, decree of injunction passed, restraining the defendant/ respondent State from dispossessing the plaintiff from any part of the suit land held by her, as was transferred to her by her father, except in due course of law.

(Para 14-17)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Arbitration award – Challenge to – Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act -- Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to challenging an arbitral award u/s 34 of the Act – It can be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days -- The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days.

(Para 4)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 50 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS Case -- Regular bail -- Recovery of 400 grams smack – Recovery Memo not signed by Gazetted officer – Provisions of Section 42 of NDPS Act not complied with – Applicant deserves to be enlarged on bail – Bail  application allowed.

(Para 5-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(c), 29 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Interim regular bail -- Bhog ceremony of father -- Petitioner is involved in two NDPS cases including the present one -- Superintendent, Central Jail, directed to make all necessary arrangements for taking the petitioner, in custody, to attend the Bhog ceremony with police escort.

(Para 3,4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise thereafter – Quashing of conviction/ sentence – Trial court convicted and sentenced the petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of eight months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.2,25,000/- to the complainant – Appellate court affirmed the same -- Matter ordered to be compounded and impugned judgments of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside -- Petitioner-accused acquitted subject to deposit of 10% of the Cheque amount with the HPSLSA.

(Para 1, 8, 9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22, 37 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS Case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity – Bail in such cases may not be granted, unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail -- But, denial of bail does not give unfettered liberty to the prosecution to keep a person in custody without conducting a trial -- Applicant is in custody for more than a year -- In between, for more than six months, no progress was made in the case, the trial has yet not concluded -- Bail allowed.

(Para 5-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 121A, 122, 153(A), 505(1)(b),(c),(2) -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 13, 18, 18A, 18(B), 43D – Bail in UAPA case by High Court – Setting aside of -- Court satisfied from the chargesheet as also the other material/ documents relied upon by the appellant that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true and that the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43(D)(5) would be applicable for not releasing the respondents on bail -- Having regard to the seriousness and gravity of the alleged offences, previous criminal history, the period of custody undergone by the respondents being hardly one and half years, the severity of punishment prescribed for the alleged offences and prima facie material collected during the course of investigation, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and set aside.

(Para 4, 22-24)

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Petitioner continued to indulge in sexual relationship with prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage for the last 3-4 years -- She lodged the FIR only because the petitioner had betrayed and left her -- Prosecutrix was 26 years of age when her statement u/s 164 Cr. P. C. was recorded -- She is a grown-up and mature lady capable of understanding the consequences of the acts in which she had indulged with the petitioner – No offence u/s 376 IPC is made out against the petitioner and if the investigation in the FIR impugned is allowed to be continued, it would amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-18)