Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment of plaint – Delayed application – Ground of -- No doubt the plaintiff-petitioner has been remiss in not filing the application for amendment earlier, however, the same cannot be a ground for denying the amendment especially in view of the fact that the evidence is yet to be started -- Application allowed subject to payment of ?10,000/- as costs.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Multiple Appointments challenged -- Doctrine of severability – Detailed analysis – Requirements of -- Validity of an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the appointee's own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable rules -- Courts must resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations of entire batches of appointments merely on the basis of procedural infirmities that affect only a portion of the appointments – Principles of fairness, proportionality, and individual justice are foundational to administrative law and demand that a case-by-case analysis be undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of cancellation -- Where multiple appointments are challenged on general grounds, authorities and courts must undertake a detailed fact-specific analysis before concluding that all such appointments are void -- Doctrine of severability must not remain a mere theoretical doctrine but must guide real administrative action and judicial reasoning in service matters.

(Para 26, 49)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16 – Employment – Irregular appointment – Illegal appointment – Challenge to -- Right to employment, though not a fundamental right, is nevertheless protected under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution insofar as it requires fair, just, and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly situated individuals -- Appellants' dismissal, without issuing a show cause or opportunity of hearing, is a clear violation of principles of natural justice -- The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments must not be blurred -- An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the post is sanctioned -- An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the post does not exist -- When appointments are questioned on grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those whose appointments are unimpeachable -- Justice demands separation, not erasure.

(Para 30, 31)

Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 -- Transfer of petition from one Bench to other Bench of same High Court or any other High court – Jurisdiction of – Held, the Court is not vested with any such power; the petitioner for this purpose is free to approach the appropriate Forum -- Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to assess the legality and validity of orders passed by the State or an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 by seeking one of the writs or for performance of any public function -- Remedy against an order passed by learned Single Judge in civil or criminal jurisdiction is either by filing an LPA by demonstrating that the Single Bench passed the order over-stepping the jurisdictional purviews, or by approaching the Higher Court i.e. the Apex Court.

(Para 3 to 3.3)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 379, 401 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 --  Criminal Revision against conviction without surrender – Maintainability of – Suspension of sentence – Consideration of :

I. A criminal revision petition against the judgments of conviction (as also an application for suspension of sentence, etc.) is maintainable before this High Court, without the petitioner-accused having surrendered or being in custody, in the absence of any rule in the extant Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules/Orders proscribing such maintainability.

II (i) The mere maintainability of a revision petition (as also an accompanying application for suspension of sentence) does not, ipso facto, translate into its desirability; the latter is a matter of judicial discretion –– which is inexorably linked to the bona fides and overall conduct of the petitioner-accused, including the sufficiency of reasons proffered for nonappearance before the Appellate Court.

(ii) Where the conduct of the petitioner-accused reflects evasion or contumacious disregard of process of law, the Court must lean against the grant of suspension of sentence, lest, it may tantamount to condoning inexplicable defiance of judicial process.

(iii) No universal guidelines or parameters can possibly be enumerated for exercise of this judicial discretion by this High Court while considering such an application for suspension of sentence.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 379, 401 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 -- Revisional jurisdiction – Nature of – Interlucatory order – Maintainability of revision -- High Court wields a crucial revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C./ Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS -- This jurisdiction is fundamentally supervisory in nature, empowering the superior courts to scrutinize the records of any subordinate criminal court -- Primary objective thereof is to ascertain the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order passed by the subordinate court, and to ensure the regularity of its proceedings -- Revisional jurisdiction, much like a carefully calibrated instrument, is explicitly unavailable against interlocutory orders and, crucially, against orders which are appealable in nature -- When the legislature, in its deliberative wisdom, has chosen not to impose any specific restriction or condition on the exercise of a particular remedy, it is demonstrably inappropriate for the court to engraft such a restriction before the remedy can be availed -- This judicial insertion would not only be an act of judicial overreach, but it would also amount to ‘reading into the statute’ something that is not there.

(Para 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(g), 202, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499 -- Complaint for defamation – Re-tweet by accused – Report regarding tweet made or not awaiting – Effect of – Summoning of accused – Challenge to -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Summoning of – Nature of enquiry -- Inquiry, as defined u/s 2(g) of the Code means, ‘every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court’ -- No particular mode of inquiry has been provided; the inquiry, therefore, refers to application of judicial mind by the Magistrate to the allegations in the complaint along with the statements recorded and material brought on record by way of preliminary evidence, as also to the outcome of investigation ordered or the report called for, with a view to ascertaining the offences alleged are prima facie made -- The requirement in law is an inquiry by the Magistrate into the complaint to be satisfied that the offences alleged are prima facie made out; receipt or non-receipt of a report called for after recording the evidence, cannot be the sole ground to issue or not to issue the process – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7.1, 7.2, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, Exception 9, 10 – Complaint for defamation – Consideration of Exception 9 & 10 – Requirement of -- Summoning of accused – Challenge to -- No substance in the submission that the retweet was in good faith and in the absence of mens rea petitioner/ acused was entitled to the benefit of Ninth and Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC; and that failure of the Magistrate to examine the issue rendered the impugned order unsustainable -- Petitioner’s case is that the Magistrate was mandatorily required to consider whether these Exceptions were attracted in her case -- As per the settled law, there is no explicit bar on the Magistrate precluding him from considering whether any of the Exceptions protect the person to be summoned; however, such non-consideration by itself would not render the order issuing process illegal -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8, 8.1, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499 – Complaint for defamation – Summoning order – Challenge to – Wrong mentioning of fact -- Merely because the Magistrate wrongly mentioned the petitioner’s retweet as tweet in the impugned order, it cannot be said that the order is a result of non-application of mind -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 9, 11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Demand and acceptance -- To convict a person under the aforesaid provision demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non -- It is no one’s case that A-2 ever demanded any illegal gratification -- He  accepted the money on the directions of A-1 and kept the same with him -- So, there was no demand of illegal gratification on his part -- Demand made by A-1 cannot be attributed to A-2 as no evidence was adduced which could establish that A-2 was a habitual offender working in aid with A-1 or was facilitating A-1 in demanding and receiving illegal gratification -- Accordingly, in the absence of any allegation or evidence that A-2 demanded bribe from the complainant or he was acting in connivence with A-1, he cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the crime of demanding and receiving illegal gratification.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Acquittal -- Abatement – Connivance -- A-2 was not charged with the abetment of the aforesaid crime -- He had accepted the money on the direction of A-1 only -- He could have received the money innocently on the direction of A-1 or he may have received it knowingly -- Both the views are possible -- However, as no evidence was adduced to prove that both of them have connived to demand and accept the bribe, even if a fair trial may have been given to the A-2, it cannot be said with any certainty that he was an accomplice to the crime -- In the absence of charge of abetment and the proof of connivance between A-1 and A-2, A-2 could not have been convicted.

(Para 16, 17)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Demand and acceptance -- Evidence on record amply proves that A-1/he demanded bribe from the complainant not only once but twice, and thereafter when the trap was laid -- The bribe on his behalf was accepted by A-2 -- Evidence proves that A-2 accepted the money on the dictates of A-1 -- Therefore, both the ingredients of demand and receipt stand duly proved against A-1 -- Evidence in this regard of PW-1 and PW-2, despite some minor contradictions stand unshaken -- Therefore, his (A-1) conviction as held by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is not liable to be interfered with.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Non-existence of cause of action – Ground of -- A plaint can never be rejected for non-existence of cause of action, but, a plaint can be rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action -- Non-disclosure of cause of action in a plaint would fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint, but, whereas, non-existence of cause of action would not fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of plaint.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Quashing of FIR -- It is not a case where the accused were entrusted with the subject property -- The subject property belongs to them and they had rights over it as owners with title -- Thus, the very foundation for invoking Section 406 of the IPC falls to the ground – FIR quashed.

(Para 35, 39, 47)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust – Quashing of FIR -- Simultaneous charge u/s 406 and 420 IPC – Legality of -- Same person cannot be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC with regard to one particular transaction. FIR quashed.

(Para 37, 47)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Civil and criminal proceedings – Quashing of FIR -- Whether civil and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings -- If the element of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the same facts -- Fact that a civil remedy has already been availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to quash an FIR.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156 (3) – Affidavit in support of complaint/ application – Non-filing of – Effect of – Quashing of order -- Non-filing of the supporting affidavit is a curable defect, but must be cured before the Magistrate passes any substantive order on the complaint/application -- If the Magistrate proceeds without the requisite affidavit, such order/any consequential orders/proceedings can be quashed on the sole ground of non-compliance with Priyanka Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287.

(Para 45)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 – Recalling the order and providing opportunity to lead evidence -- Inherent powers -- Civil Court has inherent powers to do justice as per provision of Section 151 CPC – By impugned order defendants allowed two effective opportunities to lead evidence after recalling order -- Detailed order passed spelling out the reasons -- No merit in the revision petition, dismissed.

(Para 1, 2)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 Rule 3 – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 8 -- Legal representatives of plaintiff – Class-II heirs impleaded as LR’s on the basis of Will – Ground that as per Section 8 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1956, after the death of a tenant/ plaintiff no.1, only his wife and son are entitled to inherit the tenancy rights -- Held, no illegality in the said order since the application was allowed only for the purpose of continuation of the suit -- The issue as to whether in terms of the provisions of Section 8 of the 1956 Act, plaintiff No.2 would be entitled to inherit the tenancy rights or not, would be determined by the trial Court when the suit is decided on merits -- No occasion for the trial Court to hold so at the time of dealing with an application for bringing on record the legal representative – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 2(b), 17, 18,9,  31 -- Merger of Non-banking entity with Bank – Jurisdiction of Commercial court -- – Jurisdiction of DRT -- Section 31 cannot be interpreted in a vacuum -- Section 31 emphasizes that the bar u/s 18 is absolute and on and from the appointed day, no Court other than DRT shall have jurisdiction to deal with any matter, which falls under the jurisdiction of DRT -- Section 18 is couched in negative terms, which implies that it is absolutely mandatory -- On merger of original plaintiff (HDFC Limited) with respondent no.1 (HDFC Bank Limited), jurisdiction of Commercial Court will be barred to decide the, "application" -- After amalgamation, the suit answers description of the term "application" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act and is of the nature of a proceeding referred u/s 19 of the Act -- Therefore, DRT will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit and jurisdiction of other Courts will be barred in view of Section 18 of RDB Act.

(Para 19-24)

B. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 17, 18, 19, 31 -- Harmonious construction -- Dominant purpose of the Statute -- It is a well settled legal principle that attempt shall be made to harmonise two different provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other -- However, when they cannot be reconciled attempt should be made to identify the dominant purpose of the Statute and find out which provision should override the other.

(Para 21)

C. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 2(g) -- Debt – Assignment of rights -- A monetary claim, which is assigned to a Bank will also be a debt within the meaning of Section 2(g) of RDB Act.

(Para 28)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 – Onerous condition for bail – Deposit of original title deed --  Surety be close relative – Legality of -- Condition requiring one of the sureties to be a close relative cannot be sustained as there cannot be any geographical discrimination in the matter of bail -- When the sureties are directed to produce the original document, after ascertaining the solvency of the surety, the original document should be returned, if necessary, by substituting it with a certified copy – Condition requiring one among the sureties to be a close relative deleted, Court below directed to return the original document produced by the surety on production of a certified copy.

(Para 1-3)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 2(28), 39 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 497, 503 -- Interim custody of the Excavator JCB Machine – Magistrate declined custody for want of registration certificate -- Machine was seized in connection with Crime alleging commission of the offence in relation to an incident, in which the operator of the machine died, when the machine accidentally fell from a height while engaged in the process of removing pieces of rubber wood from a property -- Seizure is of a machine and not a vehicle -- As such, there cannot be an insistence on production of registration certificate along with the application seeking its release -- Magistrate shall reconsider.

(Para 1, 3-5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Appeal against High Court order reducing the compensation -- Death of child aged 9 years – Multiplier -- Income taken as Rs. 5,000/- per month -- No question of any deduction for personal expenses and hence even if the multiplier adopted is 15, considering the mother’s age of 36, the total compensation for loss of dependency would be Rs.7,50,000/- -- Funeral expenses Rs.15,000/-, loss of estate Rs.15000/-, Rs.80,000 fixed as loss of filial consortium as applicable to both the parents -- Transportation expenses Rs.5,000/- -- Loss of dress, ornaments and cycle, Rs.5,000/- assessed -- Total compensation assessed as Rs.8,70,000/- -- No appeal from the quantum filed by the claimants, hence the order of the Tribunal restored -- Appeal allowed setting aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Insurance policy -- Cheque towards premium was dishonoured – Third party liability -- 50% compensation awarded with intertest already paid by Insurance company pursuant to order passed by the court -- In larger interest of justice to all parties, no recovery deserves to be permitted for the said amount deposited and withdrawn from the claimants -- Appellant-Insurance Company, shall be at liberty to recover the said 50% amount along with interest deposited by it as above and received by the claimants from the owner of the offending vehicle in accordance with law -- Claimants shall be entitled to recover the balance of 50% amount along with interest from the owner of the offending vehicle.

(Para 5-6)

Constitution of India, Article 342, 366(25) -- Scheduled Tribe -- Caste certificate -- Held, while dealing with documentary evidence, greater reliance may be placed on pre-Independence documents because they furnish a higher degree of probative value to the declaration of status of a caste, as compared to post-Independence documents -- Merely because the applicant does not match the tribe’s peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc., it cannot be solely taken into consideration for rejecting the claim of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe -- Pre-Independence document certifies that the appellant’s grandfather’s belongs to Tribe, a greater probative value ought to have been given to the said document -- Appeal allowed, Scrutiny Committee directed to issue Caste Validity Certificate to the appellant.

(Para 8-17)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1, 2 & 3 – Ex-parte injunction -- Ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte -- The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted -- Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay -- Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso -- Both the provisions are mandatory.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1, 2 & 3 – Ex-parte injunction – No-compliance of clause (a) and (b) of the Proviso – Effect of -- Applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) – Held, if the court is satisfied of non-compliance by the applicant with the provisions contained in the proviso, it would simply vacate the ex parte order of injunction without expressing any opinion of the merits of the case leaving it open to the parties to have a hearing on the grant or otherwise on the order of injunction but bipartite only.

(Para 7)

Constitution of India, Article 233 -- Appointment of District Judges – Bar Vacancy – Eligibility of judicial officer, who completed seven year in Bar – Actual date of eligibility -- Two issues are substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution:

(i) Whether a judicial officer who has already completed seven years in Bar being recruited for subordinate judicial services would be entitled for appointment as Additional District Judge against the Bar vacancy?

(ii) Whether the eligibility for appointment as a District Judge is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application or both?

Court refer the aforesaid issues for consideration of a Constitution Bench of five Judges.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cognizance in complaint – Opportunity of hearing to accused -- Section 223 provides an added safeguard that no cognizance shall be taken without affording the accused an opportunity of being heard.

(Para 7)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Complaint under PMLA – Cognizance by Magistrate – Opportunity of hearing to accused – Requirements of -- Since the complaint has been filed after 01.07.2024, cognizance cannot be taken without conferring an opportunity of hearing to the accused – Ld. Special Judge, dismissed the application of the petitioner u/s 223 of BNSS, 2023, seeking hearing at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint -- Petition allowed -- Trial Court directed to afford the petitioner an opportunity to be heard before taking cognizance.

(Para 8-10)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – Maintainability of – Main case dismissed in default -- Restoration application – Effect of -- Proceedings u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are maintainable during the pendency of the proceedings as contemplated under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the liability to pay the amount will not come to an end merely because the proceedings are pending at the revisional stage, appellate stage or even in cases where the proceedings have been dismissed for want of prosecution and the restoration of the same is pending.

(Para 18)

B. A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – An order u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been passed finally by the Hon'ble Supreme Court -- Said order has neither been recalled nor been set aside and therefore, the liability to make payment in terms of the order continues unless the same is set aside, varied or modified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

(Para 19)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Transfer proceedings -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – Maintainability of -- Stay of proceedings in transfer petition – Effect of -- Mere stay of proceedings by this Court will not amount to termination of the proceedings -- Even the proceedings for transfer of matrimonial case from Pilibhit to Bareilly would amount to the proceedings contemplated under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 -- Wife is entitled for maintenance during the continuance of transfer proceedings.

(Para 21)

A. Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (18 of 1969), Section 15 -- Kerala Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999, Rule 11 – Power of Registrar – Correct or cancel entry in the Register -- Registrar is empowered to correct or cancel an entry in the Register, if there is a clerical or formal error in the Register or if any entry has been fraudulently or improperly made, by making a suitable entry in the margin, without alteration of the original entry.

(Para 10)

B. Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (18 of 1969), Section 15 -- Kerala Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999, Rule 11 – Power of Registrar – Correct or cancel entry in the Register -- No allegation that the initial entry made in the birth records, recording the petitioner as the father of the child, was fraudulently or improperly made -- Marriage between the petitioner and the 7th respondent was in subsistence when the child was born -- Recital in Ext.P3 agreement, wherein it is stated that the 8th respondent is the biological father of the child -- This recital is seriously disputed by the petitioner, who states that the said recital is a unilateral statement of the 7th respondent -- Above fact is a seriously disputed question, which is beyond the adjudicatory powers of a Registrar in summary proceedings under Section 15, read with Rule 11.

(Para 11)

C. Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (18 of 1969), Section 15 -- Kerala Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999, Rule 11 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 -- Power of Registrar – Correct or cancel entry in the Register – Opportunity of hearing to biological father -- Registrar substituted the names solely on a joint application and certain documents submitted by the respondents 7 and 8, and without comprehending the conclusive proof of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act and circular issued by the Local Self Government Department -- Circular mandates that, if the father’s name has to be changed in the birth records, a DNA test report, an agreement attested before a Notary Public and an order from a competent Court are to be produced -- Without following the above procedures that the 4th respondent has carried out the substitution -- Writ petition allowed, Exts.P16 birth report and P17 birth certificate quashed -- 4th respondent directed to reconsider the application in accordance with law, with notice to the petitioner and affording him and the respondents 7 and 8 an opportunity of being heard.

(Para 12)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22A(b) – Public Utility Services – Imposition of tax by transport department – Jurisdiction of PLA --  At what rate, the tax will be imposed on the particular vehicle cannot be brought into the net of Public Utility Services -- Merely because transport vehicle for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water has been mentioned in the definition of Section 22A(b) of the Act of 1987, it will not bring the subject matter of imposition of tax within the jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat for adjudication.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 70 – Inquiry – Summons – Nature of -- A summons is not the culmination of an investigation, but merely a step in its course -- It is in this context that the legislature has used the term “inquiry” in Section 70, as at the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is primarily engaged in gathering information regarding a possible contravention of law, which may subsequently form the basis for proceedings against an assessee.

(Para 57)

B. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b), 67, 70, 74 – Initiation of proceedings -- Mere issuance of summons does not imply that the Department has decided to proceed against the taxpayer for recovery of liability – At that stage Department still retains the discretion not to initiate any proceedings -- A mere contemplation or possibility of initiating action cannot be equated with “proceedings”, as doing so would undermine the framework of cross-empowerment under the Act.

Even when a discovery is made during the search proceedings under Section 67 of the CGST Act, the Department is required to bring such proceedings to a definitive conclusion, either by issuing a show cause notice under Section 74 or by dropping the matter altogether.

(Para 74)

C. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b) – Prohibition of Parallel proceedings -- Under Section 6(2)(b), the “subject matter” is intrinsically tied to the determination of the specific violation under scrutiny or the liability alleged to be unpaid -- Statutory bar is triggered only when the two proceedings against the same taxpayer are, in substance, directed towards the very same or overlapping deficiency in tax discharge or the identical contravention alleged -- Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, each Department is entitled to proceed within its respective statutory remit without infringing the prohibition.

(Para 87)

D. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b) – Bar under Section 6(2)(b) of CGSAT Act, 2017 -- Central and State tax authorities -- Parallel proceedings – Legality of – Inquiry or gathering information – Applicability of : 

i. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the CGST Act and the equivalent State enactments bars the “initiation of any proceedings” on the “same subject matter”.

ii. Any action arising from the audit of accounts or detailed scrutiny of returns must be initiated by the tax administration to which the taxpayer is assigned.

iii. Intelligence based enforcement action can be initiated by any one of the Central or the State tax administrations despite the taxpayer having been assigned to the other administration.

iv. Parallel proceedings should not be initiated by other tax administration when one of the tax administrations has already initiated intelligence-based enforcement action.

v. All actions that are initiated as a measure for probing an inquiry or gathering of evidence or information do not constitute “proceedings” within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

vi. The expression “initiation of any proceedings” occurring in Section 6(2)(b) refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings by way of issuance of a show cause notice, and does not encompass the issuance of summons, or the conduct of any search, or seizure etc.

vii. The expression “subject matter” refers to any tax liability, deficiency, or obligation arising from any particular contravention which the Department seeks to assess or recover.

viii. Where any two proceedings initiated by the Department seek to assess or recover an identical or a partial overlap in the tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from any particular contravention, the bar of Section 6(2)(b) would be immediately attracted.

ix. Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, the same would not constitute a “same subject matter” even if the tax liability, deficiency, or obligation is same or similar, and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) would not be attracted.

x. The twofold test for determining whether a subject matter is “same” entails, first, determining if an authority has already proceeded on an identical liability of tax or alleged offence by the assessee on the same facts, and secondly, if the demand or relief sought is identical.

(Para 96)

E. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b), 70, 73, 74, 146 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bar under Section 6(2)(b) of CGSAT Act, 2017 -- Central and State tax authorities -- Parallel proceedings – Legality of – Inquiry or investigation by a different authority – Applicability of -- Writ jurisdiction -- Guidelines issued :

a. Where a summons or a show cause notice is issued by either the Central or the State tax authority to an assessee, the assessee is, in the first instance, obliged to comply by appearing and furnishing the requisite response, as the case may be -- Because, mere issuance of a summons does not enable either the issuing authority or the recipient to ascertain that proceedings have been initiated.

b. Where an assessee becomes aware that the matter being inquired into or investigated is already the subject of an inquiry or investigation by another authority, the assessee shall forthwith inform, in writing, the authority that has initiated the subsequent inquiry or investigation.

c. Upon receipt of such intimation from the assessee, the respective tax authorities shall communicate with each other to verify the veracity of the assessee’s claim -- As this course of action would obviate needless duplication of proceedings and ensure optimal utilization of the Department’s time, effort, and resources, bearing in mind that action initiated by one authority enures to benefit of all.

d. If the claim of the taxable person regarding the overlap of inquiries is found untenable, and the investigations of the two authorities pertain to different “subject matters”, an intimation to this effect, along with the reasons and a specification of the distinct subject matters, shall be immediately conveyed in writing to the taxable person.

e. The taxing authorities are well within their rights to conduct an inquiry or investigation until it is ascertained that both authorities are examining the identical liability to be discharged, the same contravention alleged, or the issuance of a show cause notice -- Any show cause notice issued in respect of a liability already covered by an existing show cause notice shall be quashed.

f. However, if the Central or the State tax authority, as the case may be finds that the matter being inquired into or investigated by it is already the subject of inquiry or investigation by another authority, both authorities shall decide inter-se which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation. In such a scenario the other authority shall duly forward all material and information relating to its inquiry or investigation into the matter to the authority designated to carry the inquiry or investigation to its logical conclusion -- Because, the taxable person except for being afforded the statutory protection from duplication of proceedings, otherwise has no locus to claim which authority should proceed with the inquiry or investigation in a particular matter.

g. However, where the authorities are unable to reach a decision as to which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation, then in such circumstances, the authority that first initiated the inquiry or investigation shall be empowered to carry it to its logical conclusion, and the courts in such a case would be competent to pass an order for transferring the inquiry or investigation to that authority.

h. If it is found that the authorities are not complying with these aforementioned guidelines, it shall be open to the taxable person to file a writ petition before the concerned High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

i. At the same time, taxable persons shall ensure complete cooperation with the authorities. It is incumbent upon them to appear in response to a summons and/or reply to a notice.

It is imperative that the Departments act in harmony and maintain heightened vigilance with respect to intelligence inputs received by them, so as to give full effect to the legislative intent underlying the GST regime.

(Para 97, 98)

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Dowry case – Quashing of FIR by High Court – Challenge to -- Whether or not there has been misrepresentation is entirely a question of fact which cannot be decided at the stage when the inherent powers of the High Court are invoked for quashing of an FIR/criminal proceedings -- Mala fide must be manifest on the face of the FIR -- High Court committed a serious error in entertaining the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. PC -- Criminal proceedings arising out of the subject FIR shall be taken to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law – Impugned order set aside.

(Para 9-14)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Foundation for the plea of adverse possession must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried -- A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of trial would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

(Para 19)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Plea of adverse possession is not always a legal plea -- It is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved -- A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued -- He must also show whether his possession was open and undisturbed -- These are all questions of fact and unless they are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them -- Therefore, in normal cases an appellate Court will not allow the plea of adverse possession to be raised before it.

(Para 20)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 – Adverse possession – Nature of -- Ordinarily, the question of adverse possession is one of fact, resting upon proof of numerous circumstances which go to establish the several elements, indicating adverse character of the possession -- In certain cases, it may be a question of law, or, a mixed question of law and facts as, where the decision rests upon inferences to be drawn from facts which are admitted or established.

(Para 27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal – Benefit of doubt -- Body of the deceased, was found in the courtyard of his own house; when the scene of occurrence, as per the prosecution, was elsewhere -- There is also no clarity as to the time when the death was occasioned, so as to garner support from the medical evidence -- All the witnesses are related and are residing in the same neighbourhood and their presence cannot at all be doubted -- However, the fact that the body was found in a different place from the scene of occurrence; at the house of the deceased, the unexplained injuries on the body of the father and mother of the deceased, the admitted dispute on partition in the family of the deceased and the lack of clarity on the exact time of death creates a reasonable doubt – Appellant should be given the benefit of doubt -- Order of conviction entered into by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Civil imprisonment – Recovery of decreetal amount – Sufficient funds with Judgment debtor – Requirement of -- Executing Court has nowhere recorded a finding that the revisionist is possessed of sufficient means and is intentionally avoiding to pay the decreetal amount – Held, unless and until, it is found that the JD inspite of having been in possession of sufficient means is not intentionally paying the decreetal amount, arrest warrant cannot be issued and he cannot be put behind bars due to his poverty -- Revision petition allowed and the impugned order set aside.

(Para 1, 2)

Code of Civil Procedure, Code, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1 -- Defence struck off – Non-filing of written statement – Held, although the period prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC should generally be adhered to but the provisions contained in the same are directory in nature -- Court should, therefore, not be too harsh in not allowing the filing of written statement by striking of the defence -- Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that the case is at initial stage wherein plaintiffs/respondents are yet to lead the evidence and in the interest of justice, the revision petition allowed -- One effective opportunity granted to file the written statement subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Status quo -- Impleadment as party – Application dismissed by Trial Court -- Status quo qua the transfer of property by way of alienation, mortgaging or creating charge -- Injunction order, if any, passed is binding upon the parties to that litigation and the revisionist is not a party to the litigation – Revision disposed of with the observation that order would be binding upon the parties to the litigation.

(Para 1-3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6, Rule 17 -- Amendment of suit -- Mandatory injunction to suit for possession --  Earlier suit for mandatory injunction for direction to deliver the possession – After the amendment, it will be a suit for possession – Nature of the suit and the relief sought therein, will be same, but only its form would be different – Amendment allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i), (3), 15, 17 -- Eviction of tenant – Appeal pending – Warrant of possession by Executing Court -- Eviction order on 28.05.2025 -- Two months’ granted time to handover the vacant physical possession by 27.07.2025 -- Execution application by the respondent-landlord on 11.07.2025 -- Learned Executing Court vide order dated 23.07.2025, ordered issuance of warrant for possession, before the expiry of the time granted by the learned Rent Controller – Held, learned Executing Court illegally proceeded to issue warrant for possession -- Institution of the execution proceedings prior to 28.07.2025 was premature – Warrant of possession set aside.

(Para 9, 10)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 31 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Complaint before HRERA – Interim order by HRERA – Stay of interim order by High Court --  HRERA after noticing the factum of interim stay by this Court had dismissed the complaint with liberty to file a fresh complaint when CWP is decided – Held, impugned order passed by the HRERA is wholly unsustainable -- Proper course ought to have been adopted by the HRERA was to adjourn the complaint sine die to await the outcome of the writ -- Petition allowed, impugned order set aside and the complaint restored to its original number and ordered to adjourned sine die.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430, 528 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal / Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% compensation – Mandate of -- Convict bears the onus of demonstrating exceptional circumstances to persuade the appellate court to waive the mandatory deposit of compensation -- It is generally appropriate for the appellate court to impose this condition when an appeal is filed against a conviction u/s 138 -- U/s 148 of the N.I.Act, the requirement to deposit the compensation amount as a condition for appeal is generally mandatory, emphasizing its status as a rule -- Ground of facing financial difficulty by appellant cannot be said to be a ground sufficient enough for carving out an exception from the mandate contained in Section 148 of the N.I.Act, 1881.

(Para 1, 5, 5.1)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 397, 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Copromise/ Acquittal -- Matter stands settled between the parties --  Fit case for compounding of the offence -- Revision petition allowed subject to payment of Rs.15,000/-, the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge as well as the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class set aside -- Petitioner acquitted of the charge u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(Para 9-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 457 -- NDPS – Superdari -- Petitioner was apprehended, while travelling in the vehicle registered in his name from which the contraband came to be recovered -- Almost 3½ years have elapsed ever since then and the Innova vehicle is currently parked in the police station -- It is subjected to the vagaries of the weather and its disuse will lead to its value being diminished causing irreparable loss to the petitioner – Vehicle ordered to be released on superdari.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 459, 324, 323, 326, 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Although case pertains to an offence u/s Section 307 IPC & 326 IPC yet good sense has prevailed upon the parties and they have settled the dispute and this Court accepts the settlement just to enhance the spirit of brotherhood, peace and harmony between the parties -- Allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the case would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 528 of B.N.S.S. – FIR/ Charges along with all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21C, 27A, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Disclosure statement -- Recovery of 3.534 kgs of heroin from main accused and 2 kgs from other co-accused – Nothing recovered, when the petitioner was arrested -- State submits that petitioner is involved in five other cases, three of which are under the provisions of NDPS Act – Held, petitioner is in custody for the period of last one year, the recording of statements of 22 prosecution witnesses has yet to commence, and charges are still to be framed -- In view of the slow pace of the trial, coupled with the fact that the personal liberty of the petitioner cannot be curtailed indefinitely, merits petitioner’s prayer.

(Para 2-4)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Conventional heads -- Loss of consortium – Loss of Estate -- Funeral expenses – Claimant-appellants held entitled to Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses -- Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) totalling Rs. 1,48,000/- (Parental and Spousal)  towards loss of consortium awarded.

(Para 8,9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 164 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – No fault claim -- In the case of grievous hurt due to any accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, the maximum compensation that can be paid would be Rs.2,50,000/- -- Claimant is not required to plead or establish any wrongful act or neglect or the fault of the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle concerned or of any other person – Required to prove that the accident had occurred while using the motor vehicle -- Rs.2,50,000/- along with interest awarded by the Tribunal – No law shown that the appellant/ claimant/ injured is entitled to any further amount – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 147, 149, 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – No fault liability/ claim -- Whether claim u/s 163A MV Act restricted to third party? -- Supreme Court Refers the Issue to Larger Bench.

--   A claim under Section 163A, as per the words employed in the provision, covers every claim and is not restricted to a third party claim; without any requirement of establishing the negligence, if death or permanent disability is caused by reason of the motor accident -- This would also take in the liability with respect to the death of an owner or a driver who stepped into the shoes of the owner, if the claim is made under Section 163A dehors the statutory liability under Section 147 or the contractual liability as reduced to writing in an insurance policy -- It would override the provisions under Sections 147 & 149 along with the other provisions of the M.V. Act and the law regulating insurance as also the terms of the policy confining the claim with respect to an owner-driver to a fixed sum.

--   Dictum arising from the various decisions of different benches of two Judges is that the claim under Section 163A is restricted to third party risks – Section 163A, appears under the Chapter with the heading ‘Insurance of Vehicles Against Third Party Risks’ – But the non-obstante clause is in suppression of the entire Act, the other laws in force and any instrument valid in law – Court doubted, the decisions of co-ordinate Benches of two Judges which now will have to be placed before a larger Bench -- Registry directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

(Para 16, 17)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 2(k) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35, 74 – Juvenile -- Determination of Age – Public servant – Public record -- Public documents -- Public School-the first attended school is not a Government School -- Held, neither the Headmaster/ Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively -- Deposition of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable -- Other school certificates were issued following this and therefore, meet the same fate inasmuch as they cannot be treated as correct, in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also the Medical Report which state to the contrary -- Respondent No.2 cannot be said to have been a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the unfortunate incident.

(Para 22-25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in prayer of suit – Petitioner/ Plaintiff dispossessed during the pendency of suit -- Petitioner earlier sought relief of injunction, but now, by way of the proposed amendment, he is seeking restoration of possession in his favour, on the basis of tenancy -- Such a relief sought by the petitioner would require detailed pleadings and independent evidence – Held, proposed amendment would fundamentally change the character and nature of the case -- Civil Judge has rightly declined the application for amendment of the civil suit.

(Para 10)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- It is well settled that a landlord is the best judge of his own requirements and a tenant is no one to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord.

(Para 20)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- Eviction of Shops on three sides of the premises of the Gurudwara Sahib -- Landlord instituted the eviction petition on the ground that the shops were to be got vacated and then the building was to be renovated in a manner that the Shri Guru Granth Sahib (holy book) could be shifted to the ground floor which would make it convenient for the devotees, especially those in advanced age, to pay obeisance – Held, said need, under no circumstances, can be said to be not bona fide.

(Para 4, 22)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Pleading of ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i)  of 1949 Act -- It is well settled that in case such ingredients are not pleaded and no objection is raised in the written statement, the petition cannot be said to be not maintainable.

(Para 10, 23)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (4 of 1998), Section 12 – Eviction petition under Rent Act -- Religious Institution – Bar of jurisdiction -- Eviction petition instituted under the Rent Act would not be barred in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1998 Act.

(Para 26, 27)

E. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (31 of 1973), Section 2(e) -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib – Applicability of Rent Act -- Whether Public premises ? – Argument that in case of public premises, the Rent Act would not be applicable -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib, cannot, in any manner, be stated to be a public premises, as a result of which, the said argument would be devoid of merit.

(Para 30)

A. Karewa marriage – Void marriage -- At the time of alleged Karewa Mariage between S and SR, wife of SR namely L was still alive -- It is settled law that second marriage, during subsistence of first marriage, is null and void.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Application for additional evidence by way of DNA test to establish paternity of the defendants No.3 to 6 -- Plaintiff had moved the said application three-and-a-half years after initiation of appeal -- Plaintiff had failed to explain as to why the said application for producing evidence in question was not moved during trial; and why the said evidence was not produced before the learned trial Court -- Needless to say, the said facts were in the knowledge of the plaintiff during trial -- However, he failed to exercise due diligence -- No error in the dismissal of the said application of the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence -- Dismissal of application to lead and conclude evidence – Challenge to -- No cogent reason given by the petitioner to explain as to why in a period of 3½ years, petitioner has been unable to conclude his evidence – Very valuable public time of the Court has been expended in affording 26-27 opportunities to the petitioner -- However, the same cannot be misused to endlessly drag the matter to the unfair advantage or disadvantage of either party -- No ground to interfere in the impugned order – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 12-16)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 69, 84 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Sexual intercourse through deceitful means with promise to marry -- Regular  bail -- De facto complainant is a married lady -- Prima facie, it is doubtful whether the offence u/s can be attracted -- If both of the parties are aware about a subsistent marriage it cannot be alleged that the sexual intercourse between them was with a promise to marry – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation -- Already sold property – Appropriate remedy -- Revenue authorities refused to record name of the appellants after noticing the fact that the original person, through whom appellants-vendor claim right, had already sold his share and was not left with any land which could be transferred – Issues sought to be raised by the appellants cannot be examined in summary proceedings of mutation -- Remedy of the appellants would be to seek appropriate declaration from the competent Civil Court.

(Para 2-4)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation Proceeding – Nature of -- Any order passed in summary proceedings of mutation remain subservient to a declaration granted by the competent Civil Court.

(Para 4)

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37, 38 – National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3D, 3E, 4 -- Acquisition of land by NHAI – Suit for demarcation and permanent injunction -- Demarcation of land – It was averred that in the garb of the said acquisition, a portion of the house of the petitioner was being sought to be included whereas actually, it had not been acquired -- Direction to Naib Tehsildar to demarcate the suit property but no such demarcation was carried out in compliance thereof -- Reliance was placed upon the signs put on the land by the NHAI, as also on the revenue record – Fresh demarcation of the property ordered to be carried out in accordance with law.

(Para 2, 9-12)