A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for Specific performance -- Termination of contract – Effect of -- A contract may give right to the parties, or any one of the parties, to terminate the contract on existence of certain conditions -- In terms thereof, the contract is terminated, a doubt over subsistence of the contract is created and, therefore, without seeking a declaration that termination is bad in law, a decree for specific performance may not be available -- However, where there is no such right conferred on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conferred is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such termination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggrieved may, by treating the contract as subsisting, sue for specific performance without seeking a declaratory relief qua validity of such termination.

(Para 32)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for specific performance – Termination of contract – Effect of – Declaration that termination of contract was invalid – Requirement of -- By accepting Rs.1,95,000 after expiry of six months, D-1 and D-2, firstly, waived their right, as available to them under the contract, to forfeit the advance consideration/ earnest money,

Secondly, by such acceptance and endorsement on the back of the agreement they treated the contract as subsisting and,

thirdly, by transferring part of the subject matter of the agreement in favour of D-3, even before serving a forfeiture notice, they committed a breach of the contract.

In such circumstances, the plaintiff had an option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance more so when termination was a void act, no longer permissible under the varied contract -- Suit for specific performance was maintainable even without seeking a declaration that termination of the contract was invalid in law.

(Para 33)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 – Suit for specific performance -- Evidence on record that the Tehsildar had reported regarding possession of the plaintiff over the suit property though that report was subject to final adjudication in the suit – In such circumstances, merely because plaintiff’s claim that property was in his possession was not accepted, the relief of specific performance cannot be declined, particularly, when the plaintiff had already paid over 90% of the agreed consideration and paid additional amount also as demanded by D-1 and D-2 -- Further, D-3 was a related party of D-1 and D-2 and, therefore, not a bona fide purchaser -- Not a fit case where discretionary relief of specific performance should have been denied – High Court erred in law by interfering with the decree of specific performance passed by the first appellate court -- Judgment and decree(s) of the High Court is/are set aside and that of the first appellate court is/are restored.

(Para 39, 40)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37, 38 -- Permanent injunction – Plaintiff paying Betai -- Rent agreement of tenancy – Requirements of – Suit decreed by both the Courts Trial Court as well First Appellate Court -- Plaintiff duly proved his possession over the suit land by producing extensive revenue record in the form of Jamabandis, Khasra Girdawaris from which it is evident that the plaintiff is in cultivating possession of the suit property -- In the Jamabandi it is also recorded that plaintiff is paying ‘Batai’ – Held, if plaintiff is paying Batai, there is no requirement for the plaintiff to produce rent slip or any Agreement in respect of his tenancy -- From the revenue record, it is also established that the plaintiff is in possession of suit property as Gair Marusi -- Plaintiff has shown his possession over the suit property since 1970 -- Defendants have not only been unable to dispute or controvert the above said comprehensive evidence by way of revenue record produced by the plaintiff – No ground made out to interfere in the impugned judgments and decrees – RSA dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, Section 195(1)(b)(i), 340 -- Threatening Witness – Offence u/s 195A IPC – FIR  by police -- Permissibility of -- Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as an offence distinct and different from those u/ss 193 IPC, 194 IPC, 195 IPC and 196 IPC -- Those offences require a complaint to be made only by those named in Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC and they were all non-cognizable offences -- However, an offence u/s 195A IPC was a cognizable offence -- Threatened witness or other person may take immediate steps by either giving oral information of the commission of this cognizable offence to the concerned police officer, u/s 154 CrPC, or by making a complaint to a jurisdictional Magistrate, u/s 195A CrPC, so as to set the process of criminal law in motion.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 386 -- Appeal against acquittal – Power of Appellate Court -- Appellate Court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal u/s 378 and 386 of the Cr.P.C. -- However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited -- If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed -- Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice -- Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own.

(Para 12)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 20 – Corruption case -- Demand of illegal gratification and acceptance – Presumption -- Statutory presumption u/s 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 20 – Corruption case -- Acquittal by Trial Court – Conviction in appeal by High Court -- Demand of illegal gratification and acceptance – Proof of – Sole basis of the prosecution to prove demand and acceptance is the narration of the complainant, a close scrutiny of which reveals serious infirmities -- Both, the DSP and the Inspector of ACB, admit they did not question the complainant on this point, and till date no explanation has ever been offered for keeping Mediator/ R out of the room -- They also admit that they did not question any of the other office staff or visitors -- Other mediator B was not examined by the prosecution at all -- These circumstances are nowhere addressed by the High Court -- Such omissions cannot be brushed aside lightly, as they strike at the root of the prosecution version and cast serious doubt on whether demand and acceptance were proved beyond reasonable doubt – Order of acquittal restored.

(Para 20-22, 35)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 59 -- Injured eye witness version -- Ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it -- Testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a special status in law -- As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be doubted -- Deposition by the injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies -- Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical evidence, testimony does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants.

(Para 33-37)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons -- Motive even in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the prosecution’s case -- Fact of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available -- Fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 4, 302 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Nature and extent of injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted -- Use of the sharp edges of spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder -- Thus, the circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC do not exist.

(Para 45)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay in FIR -- It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the delay in filing the FIR is well explained.

(Para 46)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular evidence.

(Para 49)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 -- Omission by Investigation officer – Effect of -- Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution’s case -- Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors such omission by the investigating agency -- Otherwise, it would shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice.

(Para 50)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- For conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the chain should be completed and a missing link shall prove fatal to the case of prosecution.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Last seen theory is a weak piece of evidence – PW-1 husband of the deceased had seen the deceased going with the appellant -- There was a gap of thirty five days in recovery of remains of the deceased -- Blood smeared clothes of the deceased were not sent for Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) examination -- Recovery of skeleton of the deceased at instance of appellant in itself cannot lead to only one logical conclusion that the appellant had killed the deceased -- Circumstantial evidence dented by following missing links thereby leaving the chain incomplete;

(i) recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant from an open space had not enhance the case of the prosecution and there were no blood stains on the knife; no fingerprints were taken and in absence of determination of cause of death there was no link of the knife being used in the incident;

(ii) the kadiya recovered concealed in the floor of the room of the appellant were easily available in the market as per deposition of PW-2 and PW-4. Further PW-4 in cross-examination admitted that the kadiya at the first instance was shown to him in the police station prior to identification;

(iii) the blood smeared clothes recovered from the spot of recovery of the skeleton of the deceased were not sent for FSL and there was no proof that the clothes having human blood stains or that of the deceased. The recovery of the blood smeared clothes is of no help to the case of the prosecution;

(iv) the evidence of last seen set up by the prosecution remained uncorroborated with other evidence and there was a time gap of thirty five days between the appellant being last seen with the deceased and recovery of the skeleton and lastly;

(v) recovery of the skeleton of the deceased does not prove the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, moreso, in absence of the cause of death having not been determined in the post-mortem report.

Appellant given benefit of doubt and acquitted.

(Para 13-20)

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (25 of 1987), Section 2(d)(j), 14 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Landlord-tenant relationship – Agreement to sell/ Lease -- Agreement to Sell does not create any title in favour of the purchaser -- Nothing on record that JD or his successor-in-interest ever took any step, including filing a suit for specific performance, in furtherance to Agreement to Sell -- Not proved that Agreement to Sell was pertaining to the entire premises in reference -- Agreement was not exclusively an Agreement to Sell but it was having alternative either to sell out or lease out the property -- In the agreement, it is nowhere stated that tenancy had come to an end -- It would be wrong to construe that, for execution of agreement, relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end -- Objections preferred by respondent (JD) allowed by Ld. Executive Court, with finding that at the time of filing the Rent Petition, status of parties stood changed in view of Agreement to sell – Impugned order set aside.

(Para 1, 17-30)

A. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Appeal beyond the statutory period of limitation of 30 days – Condonation of delay – Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act -- General provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked -- Payment of Wages Act, being a beneficial and self-contained legislation, prescribes not only the manner and mode of appeal but also the conditions precedent for its maintainability, including the mandatory requirement u/s 17(1A) of furnishing a certificate of deposit of the amount payable under the direction appealed against -- This requirement is not directory but mandatory in nature, as it seeks to protect the rights of the workman and ensure that the employer does not frustrate the benefit of the award by filing dilatory appeals.

(Para 19-22)

B. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Appeal -- Certificate of deposit of the amount – Requirement of -- Respondent did not file any such certificate – Ld. Appellate Court, proceeded to entertain the appeal on the strength of a mere receipt of a cheque issued by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, which by no stretch of interpretation can be equated with the statutory requirement of a certificate of deposit -- Failure to comply with such mandatory statutory precondition renders the appeal itself non-maintainable in the eyes of law, and consequently, the entire proceedings before the Appellate Court stand vitiated.

(Para 24)

C. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Appeal – Condonation of delay – Rule of natural justice – Opportunity of hearing -- Ld. Appellate Court, while allowing the application for condonation of delay, also proceeded to decide the main appeal on merits in a single composite order  without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard -- Such a course of action is contrary to the fundamental principles of natural justice -- Petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to contest the appeal on merits, and the ld. Appellate Court acted in undue haste by deciding both matters together, which amounts to a gross procedural irregularity.

(Para 27)

D. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Appeal – Condonation of delay – Violation of Rule of natural justice – Finding of fact without calling records – Effect of -- Learned Appellate Court has misdirected itself both on law and facts:

Firstly, it wrongly invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act despite clear statutory exclusion under the Payment of Wages Act.

Secondly, it entertained the appeal without compliance of the mandatory deposit certificate requirement under Section 17(1A).

Thirdly, it decided the condonation and the appeal together without hearing the petitioner, thereby violating natural justice.

Fourthly, Ld. Appellate Court recorded findings of fact without calling for the original record, thus acting beyond jurisdiction.

These cumulative infirmities render the impugned judgment legally unsustainable.

(Para 28, 29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part 2 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sentence – Appellant rushed to a nearby house, picked up an axe and struck a blow on the neck of deceased -- Sessions court ordered imprisonment of the appellant for 10 (ten) years -- High Court has been indulgent towards the appellant and granted relief to him by reducing the term sentence by 8 (eight) years – Appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of the incident and that there may have been some exasperation in his mind -- Nevertheless, the courts are obligated to adopt a balanced and principled approach in matters of sentencing -- Undue leniency can cause public confidence in the justice system to plummet, while excessive severity may lead to injustice – Held, sentence imposed by the High Court does not call for any interference and that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

(Para 8, 27-28)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Threatening the police officer to get him transfer – Whether attract Section 186 of IPC -- Allegations are that S.H.O. advised the servant of accused not to waste water or open the gate -- Accused arrived at the scene -- Complainant requested that the accused refrain from throwing rubbish into the police station compound and from opening the police station gate, as cattle entered the compound through the open gate -- Accused became angry and threatened the informant with transfer – Held, accused had only threatened the S.H.O. to get him transferred and not stated that the SHO should not supervise the cleanliness; hence, the act of the accused would not constitute any obstruction, and the ingredients of Section 186 of the IPC were not satisfied – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17 -- Translated version of Exhibited documents to be on record – Procedure of -- Ld. Appellate Court misdirected itself by construing as if the prayer of the petitioner was to be construed on the parameters of Order XVIII, Rule 17 of the CPC -- In a case where a document already stands exhibited and a prayer is to place on record a translated copy thereof, there is no requirement of filing any application to place on record the translated version of the document and all that the Court has to ensure is that the translated version is the true translated version of the document concerned -- Opportunity should be given to both the parties to file translated version of the document and/or to agree on a correct translation filed by a party -- Alternatively, the Court can also get the translation done on the expense of the party through the official Translator.

(Para 6, 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 349 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) -- Voice sample – Ritesh Sinha’s case (2019) 8 SCC 1 and Kathi Kalu Oghad’s case AIR 1961 SC 1808 permit furnishing of handwriting, signature and finger impressions – Mere furnishing of a sample of the fingerprint, signature or handwriting would not incriminate the person as such – It would have to be compared with the material discovered on investigation, which alone could incriminate the person giving the sample, which would not fall under a testimonial compulsion, thus not falling foul of the rule against self-incrimination – Said sampling is similar to voice sampling, as now possible by reason of the advancing technology – Magistrate allowed voice sample, High Court reversed the order – Appeal allowed reversing the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Magistrate.

(Para 3, 4, 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 354, 354B, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 10 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Regular bail – POCSO – Rape -- Appellant is presently seventy two years of age and has been in custody since 05.07.2024 -- Charges have not yet been framed – Contended that there are seventeen witness to be examined and the trial would inevitably be delayed – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(5) – Evidence law -- CDs containing call records not produced with report u/s 173 Cr.P.C -- Production of the CDs by invoking Section 173(5) of Cr.P.C. -- CDs were seized and referred for forensic analysis to the CFSL along with voice samples of the accused -- The CDs were referred to in the supplementary chargesheet -- After the report of the CFSL was received, the supplementary chargesheet was filed for placing on record the said report -- Therefore, when the CDs were sought to be produced, in a sense, they were not new articles; the CDs were very much referred to in the supplementary chargesheet -- There was only an omission on the part of the respondent-CBI to produce the CDs --  Learned Special Judge allowed the application of the respondent-CBI to place the two CDs on record affirmed by High Court -- However, the issue of whether the CDs produced were the same which were seized on 4th May 2013 and 10th May 2013, the issue regarding the validity of the certificate u/s 65B of the Evidence Act and the issue of the authenticity of the CDs kept open.

(Para 6, 15-17)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- It is mandatory that the demand in the statutory notice has to be the very amount of the cheque -- After mentioning the exact cheque amount, the sender of the service may claim in the notice amounts such as legal charges, notice charges, interest and such other additional amounts, provided the cheque amount is specified to be demanded for payment -- When the cheque amount is not mentioned in the Proviso (b) notice or the amount different than the actual cheque amount is mentioned, in the notice, such notice would stand invalid in eye of law -- In the event of the main ingredient not being satisfied on account of discrepancy in the amount of cheque and one mentioned in the notice, all proceedings u/s 138 of the NI Act would fall flat as bad in law.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- Cheque which was drawn by the respondent was for Rs.1,00,000/- whereas in the notice issued under Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act against the respondent, appellant mentions the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- -- Rigours of law on this score being strict, the defence would not hold good that the different amount mentioned in the notice was out of inadvertence -- Even if the cheque number was mentioned in the notice, since the amount was different, it created an ambiguity and differentiation about the ‘said amount’ -- Any elasticity cannot be adopted in the interpretation -- It has to be given technical interpretation -- Typographical error can be no defence -- Notice stood invalid and bad in law -- Order of quashment of notice was eminently proper and legal.

(Para 8.1, 8.2, 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- When the provision is penal and the offence is technical, there is no escape from holding that the ‘said amount’ in proviso (b) cannot be the amount other than mentioned in the cheque in question for dishonour of which the notice is received, nor the mentioning of omnibus amount in the notice would fulfil the requirement -- It has to be held that in order to make a valid notice under the Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act, it is mandatory that ‘said amount’ to be mentioned therein is the very amount of cheque, and none other.

(Para 9)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Issuance of Passport – Procedure of -- Trial in FIR case pending – Keeping in view the Government Instructions issued vide GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993, the writ petition disposed of by relegating the petitioner to approach the concerned Court where the trial in FIR is pending against him, in order to seek permission to depart from India, and further submit the same to the Passport Authorities so as to enable them to process the passport application submitted by him, in accordance with law.

(Para 7)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 25(a), 32(2) – Termination of arbitration proceedings – Whether such order can  be considered as an award -- An order u/s 25(a) does not and cannot amount to an Award as it does not deal with the rights of the parties before the Arbitrator -- Such an order merely terminates the arbitral proceedings on account of the claimant’s default in filing the statement of claim and does not involve any adjudication or determination of the rights or obligations of the parties -- For an order to qualify as an Award, it must decide, either finally or on an interim, an issue forming part of the dispute referred to arbitration -- An order under Section 25(a), being procedural in nature and not addressing the substantive lis between the parties, lacks the essential attributes of an Arbitral Award -- Order terminating the proceedings for non-filing of a statement of claim cannot be considered an award under Sub-section 2 of Section 32.

(Para 16, 19)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Rejection of plaint – Suit barred by law -- While considering rejection of the plaint thereunder only the averments made in the plaint and nothing else is to be considered to find out whether the suit is barred by law -- At this stage, the defense is not to be considered -- Thus, whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint.

(Para 15)

B. Mutation entries -- It is well settled that mutation entries do not confer title -- They serve a fiscal purpose, that is, to realize tax from the person whose name is recorded in the revenue records.

(Para 16)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 – Suit for declaration and possession – Limitation -- Suit was not for a mere declaration of the Will being null and void but for possession as well -- Plaintiff claimed title over the suit land by natural succession and sought possession based on title – Where a suit is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title, the limitation period is 12 years when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

(Para 17)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 65 – Rejection of plaint -- Limitation – Adverse possession -- When a suit is instituted for possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on the ground of adverse possession, the burden is on the defendant to prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period -- This, therefore, cannot be an issue on which the plaint could be rejected at the threshold.

(Para 18)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Partial rejection of plaint – Permissibility of -- Where several reliefs are sought in suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

(Para 19)

F. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Rejection of plaint -- Suit barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC – Plea of -- First suit instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was not tried -- In fact, the plaint of that suit was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC as not being properly framed -- In such circumstances, a fresh suit with appropriate relief cannot be, prima facie, barred by Rule 2 of Order 2 of CPC -- Therefore, the trial court was justified in directing that the issue, whether the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC, shall be considered and decided during trial.

(Para 22)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Recovery from retired employee – Permissibility of -- Petitioner had already retired and there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner qua fixation of his salary, which was re-fixed after his retirement – Held, excess amount paid to him during service period could not have been recovered and therefore, any recovery made from the petitioner out of his pensionary benefits cannot be sustained and the same is, accordingly, set aside -- Sum recovered from the petitioner ordered to be refunded back to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks.

(Para 6-10)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 16 – Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21 – Award of Lok Adalat – Refund of Court fee – Right of -- Once a settlement has been arrived at between the parties to the lis before the Permanent Lok Adalat, the entire Court Fee needs to be refunded.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372 -- Acquittal – Cheque bounce complaint dismissed in default -- Appeal against an order of acquittal in a proceeding u/s of the N. I. Act preferred by the complainant squarely falls within the ambit of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. -- Petition along with the accompanying application ordered to be remitted to the Court of learned Sessions Judge.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 18 Rule 3 -- Additional evidence – Expert-examination by Plaintiff in rebuttal – Permissibility of -- Once defendant-respondent No.1 had not denied her signatures/ thumb impression in the written statement and for the first time denied the same in her cross-examination, the plaintiff-petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to lead additional evidence to counter the same – In the absence of any such stand having been taken, there was no question of the plaintiff-petitioner leading any evidence to prove that the signatures were hers – Plaintiff-petitioner granted one effective opportunity to lead his evidence.

(Para 7, 8)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C -- Insurance Policy, Condition No. 1 -- Insurance claim for stolen vehicle – Late intimation to Insurance company – Repudiation of claim -- Vehicle was stolen on 18.11.2016 and respondent No.2/ claimant intimated the police to register an FIR, but vehicle could not be recovered -- Intimation was given to the insurance company on 06.12.2016, but claim was repudiated on the ground that there had been a violation of Condition No.1 of the insurance policy, which required the insured to intimate the insurance company in writing immediately upon the occurrence of any loss or damage to the vehicle – Police authorities investigated the FIR, but could not trace the vehicle and Untraced Report submitted by them was accepted by the learned Magistrate -- Insofar as the delay in the intimation to the insurance company is concerned, it is immaterial -- Repudiation of the claim is therefore unjustified -- No interference is called for in the award of PLA – Insured/ respondent No.2 held entitled to an amount of Rs.7,99,892/-.

(Para 6-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437(3) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Bail conditions – Surrender of passport – Permissibility of -- When a person is made to surrender his passport, it curtails his right of movement beyond the country -- Power to impound a passport is given to the passport authority under the Passport Act – Criminal courts have to take extreme care in imposing such condition – It cannot mechanically, and in every case where an accused has a passport impose a condition for its surrender – Court has to strike a balance between personal liberty of the accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, investigation rights of the police and the interest of the society -- If necessary, it is open to the criminal court direct the accused to execute bond in case he has to go abroad for any purpose, for appropriate amount with sureties.

(Para 14)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(e) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1), 104 – Impounding of Passport – Power of -- Section 10(3)(e) of the Passport Act specifically deals with impounding of passport whereas Section 104 Cr.P.C., allows the Court to impound the document to produce before the Court -- The Passport Act overrides the provision of Cr.P.C., for the purpose of impounding passport -- Order directing to surrender the passport indefinitely amounts to impounding of the passport itself -- As per Section 102(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, the power of police officer is there to seize certain property -- Police may have the power to seize a passport under Section 102(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code but it does not have the power to impound the same.

(Para 15, 16)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1), 104 – Seizure – Impounding of document -- There is a difference between seizing of a document and impounding a document -- A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his/her possession -- Thus, seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, the said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts to impounding of the property or document -- The word “impounding” really means retention of possession of a good or a document which has been seized.

(Para 17)

D. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(e) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1), 104 – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Seizure of passport – Impounding of passport – Duty of Police -- Doctrine of natural justice --  If the police seizes a passport, thereafter the police must send it along with a letter to the passport authority clearly stating that the seized passport deserves to be impounded for one of the reasons mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act -- It is thereafter the passport authority to decide whether to impound the passport or not -- Since impounding of a passport has civil consequences, the passport authority must give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before impounding his passport.

(Para 18)

E. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(e) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1), 104 – Impounding of passport – Power of Trial Court -- Trial Court cannot impound a passport -- Section 104 Criminal Procedure Code states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it but this provision will only enable the Court to impound any document or thing other than a passport as impounding a “passport” is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act – Special law prevails over the general law -- Passports Act is a special law while the Criminal Procedure Code is a general law -- Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court u/s 104 of Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

(Para 18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (Act No. 28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Cruelty – Dowry demand -- An act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards -- Demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made by the husband or his family members -- In order to meet the threshold of the offences u/s 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (Act No. 28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Cruelty – Acquittal -- Allegations that appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred -- It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations -- It cannot be ignored that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 was registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorce Petition u/s 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999 -- Complainant had cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of about a year -- FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine -- High Court while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record, which reveals nothing incriminatory against the Appellant to sustain a conviction u/s 498A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 – Marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law -- Appellant acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Civil / Commercial liability -- Cheating – Forgery – Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet -- Complainant’s claim is for reimbursement of the remaining amount claimed by him towards the works executed in furtherance of a contract -- Allegations, made in the complaint, present a dispute which is purely commercial and civil in nature -- It seems that the complainant has contrived to somehow or the other, involve the police machinery to act as recovery agents on his behalf -- Complaint, on the face of record, did not disclose any offence whatsoever and no FIR should have been registered based thereupon -- Allegation regarding forging the signatures of two Engineers, the Investigating Officer has already got comparison of the questioned signatures done through the handwriting expert and the report, received is inconclusive -- Hence, ex facie, the allegations of forging the signatures of the Engineers, employed by the complainant, are not substantiated from the investigation conducted in the case -- Impugned-FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken in furtherance thereof including the chargesheet quashed.

(Para 18-22)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 – SARFAESI -- Arbitration – Dispute between two banks – Common security interest -- Where such enforcement of security interest, by either bank is sought to be undertaken in terms of the SARFAESI Act, the statutory arbitration provided under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act would immediately be attracted, as soon as there is a dispute in respect to the same with another bank, financial institution, ARC etc, as enumerated in the said provision -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, statutorily empowers such parties mentioned therein, to seek resolution of their dispute by way of arbitration, and their right cannot be curtailed or confined to any executive guideline or memorandum.

(Para 12,2, 123)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 – SARFAESI -- Arbitration -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act deals with resolution of disputes relating to securitisation, reconstruction or non-payment of any amount due between the bank or financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer -- In order to attract the provision of Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, twin conditions have to be fulfilled being;

first, the dispute must be between any bank or financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer and

secondly, the dispute must relate to securitisation or reconstruction or non-payment of any amount due including interest.

Where the aforesaid two conditions are found to be prima-facie satisfied, there the DRT will have no jurisdiction and the proper recourse would only be through Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act read with the Act, 1996.

(Para 124(i)(ii))

C. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 --   SARFAESI -- Arbitration -- Amount -- The expression “non-payment of any amount due, including interest” used in Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act is of wide import and would include a various range of scenarios of ‘disputes’ connected to unpaid amounts including those arising due to third-party defaults, such as indirect defaults of the borrowers.

(Para 124(iii))

D. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 2(f), 11 --  SARFAESI – Arbitration – Borrower-Lendor relationship – Effect of -- Any dispute between two banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies or qualified buyers etc., where the jural relation between the two is of a lender and borrower, then Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act will have no application whatsoever -- The use of the phrase “any person” in the definition of ‘borrower’ in Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, makes it abundantly clear that even a bank, financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer can be considered a borrower, if they receive financial assistance from a bank or financial institution etc by providing or creating a security interest -- Thus, a lender-turned-borrower would also fall within the scope of a “borrower” under the SARFAESI Act and shall be governed by the same statutory framework as any ordinary borrower.

(Para 124(iv))

E. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 -- SARFAESI  -- Arbitration agreement  -- Requirement of -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, provides for a statutory arbitration for any dispute mentioned therein between any of the parties enumerated thereunder -- There is no need for an explicit written agreement to arbitrate between such parties in order to attract Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act -- Said provision creates a legal fiction as regards the existence of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding whether such agreement exists or not in actuality.

(Para 124(v))

F. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 -- SARFAESI  -- Arbitration – Nature of -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act is mandatory in nature -- The use of the word “shall” therein, the mandate of the said provision cannot be bypassed or subverted by the parties by seeking recourse elsewhere.

(Para 124(vi))

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 5(5), 13, 17, 19, 34 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Section 9  -- Rejection of plaint -- SARFAESI proceedings – Title/ mortgage documents – Challenge to – Jurisdiction of civil court/ DRT -- From Section 17, it is clear that it is only the Tribunal that has the jurisdiction to determine whether “any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor” are in accordance with the Act or Rules thereunder -- The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs:

a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by SCJ in favour of PDP.

b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by PDP in favour of the bank.

c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property.

So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act -- Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act -- DRT does not have the jurisdiction to grant a declaration with respect to the mortgage deed or the sale deed as sought by the Plaintiff -- The jurisdiction to declare a sale deed or a mortgage deed being illegal is vested with the Civil Court u/s 9 of the CPC – Held, the civil Court has the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs -- Even if the Court take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC -- Even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.

(Para 12-18, 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Section 9  -- Rejection of plaint – Partial relief not barred by law – Duty of Court -- If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application -- Because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B.

(Para 25)

C. Loan by Banks -- Title clearance report -- Guidelines -- Banks should remain very careful with inadequate title clearance reports, more particularly, when such reports are obtained cheaply and at times for external reasons -- This concerns the protection of public money and is in the larger public interest -- Therefore, it is essential for the Reserve Bank of India and other stakeholders to collaborate in developing a standardized and practical approach for preparing title search report before sanctioning loans and also for the purpose of determining liability (including potential criminal action) of the Officer who approves loan -- Additionally, there should be standard guidelines for fees and costs associated with title search reports so as to ensure that they maintain high quality.

(Para 44)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (1 of 1914), Section 61(1)(a) --  Recovery of 240 bottles of 750 ML each of Indian Made Foreign Liquor -- Sentenced to period already undergone -- Mere non joining of independent witness cannot wash away the evidence of the remaining PWS -- Evidence of the official witnesses is consistent in material particulars regarding search and seizure -- Accused have not led any defence evidence -- Moreover, a heavy quantity of liquor was recovered and it is difficult to expect that liquor of such high value has been planted by the officials, particularly, when no ill will or enmity has either been alleged or proved by the accused – Conviction upheld, occurrence pertains to the year 2001 and as many as 23 years have passed ever since then -- Sentence of the accused/petitioners reduced to the period already undergone by them -- Fine amount and the sentence in default of payment of the kept intact.

(Para 15-19)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 21, 186 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 195(1)(a)(i), 200 –Quashing of FIR u/s 186 of IPC -- Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions -- Joint Deputy Director merely forwarded a letter to the local police, directing them to take appropriate legal action on the basis of the complaint, which effectively led to the registration of the impugned FIR -- Given the mandatory nature and scope of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., such an approach is in clear violation of its provisions -- FIR u/s 186 of the IPC stands contrary to the procedural safeguards enshrined in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. – FIR quashed.

(Para 8-11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 353 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty -- Only allegation qua the petitioners is that they declared that if the demolition operation continued, their entire family would die by suicide by consuming poison -- Threat to die by suicide can by no means come under the ambit of use of criminal force or assault -- As such the ingredients of offence u/s 353 of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR – Petition allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Vicarious liability – Proclaimed person – Quashing of proceedings -- Complaints are silent qua any active role of the petitioner in the business of the company -- Petitioner was merely an Independent Director, had resigned prior to the issuance of most cheques, and was not a signatory to any of them -- Even for the limited period during which he rejoined the Board, there is no material brought forth or any material to suggest his involvement in the financial decisions of the company -- Complaints, summoning orders, and subsequent proceedings, including the declaration of the petitioner as a ‘Proclaimed Offender’/‘Proclaimed Person’ in the criminal complaints cannot be sustained in the absence of the foundational ingredients required u/s 141 of the Act – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 13, 17, 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Cheque bounce complaint – Vicarious liability of Manager of company – Cheques were signed and issued by one of the directors -- Petitioner is neither signatory to the cheques in question nor he is drawer of the said cheques -- It is settled position of law that merely being a director or manager of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141 of NI Act -- It is necessary to specifically aver in the complaint that the director or the concerned manager was incharge of, or responsible for the conduct of business of company -- In the absence of such averments, he cannot be vicariously held liable for the act/omission committed by the company --  Cheques in question were issued after the resignation of the petitioner was accepted by the Company -- Petitioner was having no connection with the affairs of the Company -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 153A, 505(2) – Mens rea -- Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes -- Mens rea is a necessary ingredient for the offence u/s 153A -- Mens rea is an equally necessary postulate for the offence u/s 505(2) also -- Balwant Singh and another vs. State of Punjab (1995 3 SCC 214) relied -- Main distinction between the two offences is that publication of the word or representation is not necessary under the former, such publication is sine qua non u/s 505 IPC -- The words "whoever makes, publishes or circulates" used in the setting of Section 505(2) cannot be interpreted disjunctively but only as supplementary to each other.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 153A, 505(2) – Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes – FIR against Film Producer -- Two communities/ Groups required -- It is necessary that atleast two such groups or communities should be involved -- Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections -- Petitioner who has not done anything as against any religious, racial or linguistic or regional group or community cannot be held guilty of either the offence under Section 153A or under Section 505(2) of IPC.

(Para 13, 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153, 153-A, 153-B, 160, 107, 505 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes – FIR against Movie producer -- Certification by CBFC – Effect of -- Quashing of FIR – FIR registered on the basis of a trailer and the complainant had lodged the FIR, without even watching the movie and seeing the offending contents of the movie -- Even, there is no evidence to suggest that the petitioner had provoked any person with an intention that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting -- Law is well settled that the certification issued by the CBFC, i.e., statutory body, guarantees that movie in question satisfies the requirement of law and may be exhibited for the public watching -- Further, the statute itself provides the remedy of appeal and judicial review and any person can avail his remedy in accordance with law -- Neither the State of Punjab nor any other individual had challenged the ground of certification -- FIR in question is clearly an abuse of the process of the law.

(Para 16-19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438(2) -- Criminal trial -- Intermediate order – Interlucatory order – Revisional jurisdiction – Inherent powers -- All orders other than the final orders are not interlocutory ones -- Some of them are intermediate or quasi final orders -- Intermediate order is one which is passed at intermediate stage, but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order – Held, if the contention/ objection of the petitioner, who moves the superior Court in revision against the an impugned order, is upheld and the criminal proceeding as a whole gets concluded/ terminated, the impugned order is an intermediate and not interlocutory order, despite the fact that it was passed during an interlocutory stage -- It also implies that the order may be intermediate for accused but interlocutory for the complainant/ informant/ State.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 397(2), 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 210, 438(2), 528 -- Criminal trial -- Intermediate order – Interlucatory order – Revisional jurisdiction – Inherent powers -- Complainant preferred the criminal revision against the impugned order being aggrieved on the ground that out of 23 proposed accused persons, only one accused has been summoned by learned Judicial Magistrate, and only for the offences punishable u/ss 323 and 506 of the IPC and he is seeking cognizance of additional offences punishable u/s 119, 143, 147, 166, 167, 207, 209, 217, 218, 219, 220, 228, 120B, 448, 504 and 511 of the IPC – Held, if the petition is allowed, the Proceedings before the court below would not get terminated or concluded -- Impugned order is interlocutory and not intermediate one for the complainant -- Hence, the revision petition filed by him is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.PC/ 438(2) B.N.S.S. -- Remedy of the complainant lies in invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court as provided under Section 482 Cr.PC/ 528 B.N.S.S.

However, the impugned order would have been intermediate order for the accused and he could have preferred revision petition against the summoning order, because in case of setting aside the summoning order, the whole proceeding before the Court below would get terminated.

(Para 19-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ Summoning order -- An earlier complaint filed by the respondent No.2/ complainant with the same allegations against the appellant and bank officials came to be dismissed as withdrawn -- Second complaint was filed without disclosing the factum of the filing and withdrawal of the first complaint -- Even in the chargesheet filed in pursuance of the FIR in question, there is no mention of the filing and withdrawal of the first complaint for the same dispute -- Chargesheet did not elucidate as to how the case was made out against the appellant -- Even in the cognizance and summoning order passed by the Court below, no reasons have been assigned as to how a case is made out against the appellant, who was merely a guarantor to the loan, which, after the death of the husband of the appellant, stands settled – Held, no case for summoning the appellant in the complaint was made out -- Continuation of the proceedings will amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto, including the summoning order quashed.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012, Rule 4, 21, 21 A (ii)(A) –Termination – Violation of Natural justice -- Marks in vacation subject – Value of -- Three Intermediate Trained Teachers terminated after the authorities excluded marks obtained in vocational subjects while calculating their total percentage – Held, marks secured in the vocational subject is a way for a candidate to improve his/her overall percentage of marks -- A vocational subject, though optional, would place an additional burden on an examinee which he/she shoulders in the fervent hope of improving his/her overall percentage.

(i) the procedure that Rule 21 enshrined is only to be used for the purpose of preparation of merit list and Rule 4 does not provide for exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject; and

(ii) the termination order stands vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the respondents excluded the marks secured in the vocational subjects without affording the appellants notice or an opportunity to contest such exclusion.

Orders terminating the services of the appellants set aside.

(Para 23-43)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 149 (2)(a)(ii), 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Principle of Pay and recover – Invalid Driving licence -- On the date of accident, the driver had no valid license and the licence was not renewed -- Insurance company was entitled to take a valid defence in that regard u/s 149 (2)(a)(ii) as the driver of the offending vehicle was not duly licensed, to avoid its liability to pay the compensation -- Conditions in law are satisfied to absolve the insurance company from the payment of compensation -- It is only proper that the insurer be directed to satisfy the award, which however can be recovered by the insurer from the insured-owner of the vehicle -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 5-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 1 (1) Proviso -- Commercial suit – Written statement not filed – Right to cross-examine survives -- After the examination-in-chief of PW1 was closed, the cross-examination of Defendant no. 1 was taken as “Nil” by the Trial Court on the ground that defendant had failed to file their written statement within stipulated time -- Said reason is absolutely perverse and is contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant -- Purpose of cross-examination is to elicit the truth from the witness and impeach its credibility -- When the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, the denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away. Ranjit Singh’s case 2024 INSC 724 relied.

(Para 31)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 1 (1) Proviso -- Commercial suit – Written statement after 120 days – Second Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V CPC as amended by the Special Amendment under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 impose an absolute embargo upon the courts to accept the written statement after the expiry of one hundred twenty (120) days’ -- Timeline of 120 days’ fixed by the statute is not directory but rather mandatory, therefore, commercial courts cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days in filing the WS -- SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd.’s case (2019) 12 SCC 210 relied.

(Para 26, 27)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1 – Commercial suit – Written statement after 120 days – Exclusionof Covid-19 period -- Statutory period of 120 days commenced from date of service of summons on 17.07.2021 and as per section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the date of service had to be excluded therefore, from 18.07.2021, the 120 days’ period commenced and it ended on 14.11.2021 -- In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 by exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India passed series of orders to exclude the period commencing from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for the purpose of computing the limitation period under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings -- Both the dates fell within the sweep of period between 15.02.2020 to 28.02.2022 -- High Court ought to have excluded the aforesaid period for the purpose of filing the written statement and ought to have permitted the defendant No.1 to file written statement on record and contest the suit on merits rather than dismissing the appeal – Written statement allowed subject to payment of Rs.1 lac as cost.

(Para 28-32)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41(1)(ba) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 35(1)(c) -- Cognizable offence – Punishable with more than 7 years – Arrest of accused -- Police officer can arrest a person without an order of a Magistrate or warrant subject to the following conditions:

a) Credible information has been received against the person that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years and

b) The police officer has reason to believe on the basis of the information received that such a person has committed the offence.

Hence, a police officer cannot casually arrest a person against whom the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years is alleged -- He can arrest provided twin conditions in clause (ba) are satisfied. The emphasis is on “credible information” -- He cannot arrest a person under clause (ba) unless credible information is received.

(Para 8)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 19(1) -- Under Section 19(1) of PMLA, there is a requirement to inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.

(Para 10)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21, 22(1) – Life and liberty – Ground of arrest – Communication of – Burden to prove -- Fundamental right of accused – Duty of Magistrate – Violation of Article 21, 22 -- Entitlement of accused for bail :

a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);

b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;

c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);

d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);

e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and

f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.

(Para 21)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Hand-cuffing/ Tying accused with hospital bed -- State of Haryana directed to issue guidelines/ departmental instructions to the police :

(i) to ensure that the act of handcuffing an accused while he is on a hospital bed and tying him to the hospital bed is not committed again.

(ii) to ensure that the constitutional safeguards under Article 22 are strictly followed. If necessary, the State Government shall amend the existing Rules/guidelines.

(Para 33)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 32 – Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 7A, 15(1)(g) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 -- Release of murder convict / child after completion of three year custody – Writ jurisdiction – Incident of 2nd November, 1981 -- Petitioner was 12 years 5 months old on the date of the incident -- Sessions Court recorded conviction against the petitioner by taking aid of Section 149 of the IPC -- Purpose for which the Sessions Court directed the petitioner to be kept in a children’s home is no longer feasible now – Petitioner absconded and could be arrested only on 19th May, 2022, and is still in custody -- On the plain terms of Section 7-A, the courts are under an obligation to consider the plea of juvenility and to grant appropriate relief if, at all, in an enquiry it is found that the convict was a juvenile on the date of offence -- Petitioner’s date of birth and his age as on date of the offence are not disputed by the respondent and, thus, no enquiry is needed to ascertain his age -- Petitioner having been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty has been curtailed not in accordance with procedure established by law -- Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 is writ large and, hence, the benefit of release from detention ought to be extended -- Petitioner ordered to be released, if not wanted in any other case – Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) – Police report – Further invitation – Power of -- Magistrate can exercise the powers for directing further investigation only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances when there is a serious defect or deficiency in the investigation which is likely to result in miscarriage of justice -- There is no other way to remedy such deficiency or defect in primary investigation.

(Para 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) – Police report – Further invitation – Reasoning – Requirement of -- Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by observing that since the complainant was not satisfied with the cancellation report, therefore, the matter was being sent for further investigation -- It is apparent that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate did not apply her judicious mind as no observation whatsoever had been given that there was any serious defect or deficiency in the investigation conducted by the investigating agency which was likely to result in miscarriage of justice or she was not satisfied with any important aspect of investigation already conducted – Held, impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside -- Ordered accordingly.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Inherent powers of High Court – No need to analyze all facts -- In exercise of inherent powers, the High Court is not expected to analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court -- Power conferred under this section is very specific and to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court.

(Para 15)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Quashing of FIR -- Cancellation report – Further investigation -- Allegations in the FIR against the petitioner are that on 06.10.2022, he had wrongfully restrained and confined the respondent No.2 when he was passing through the backside gate of the Court building of District Court, Ludhiana by forcibly making him sit in an Innova car and pressurizing him to purchase the property of the petitioner on the exaggerated price with threat to otherwise kidnap his children – Location of phone did not show his presence at the place from where the alleged occurrence had taken place -- Matter was reported to the police 24 days after the alleged incident -- It cannot be believed by any dint of imagination that the petitioner had pressurized the respondent No.2 to purchase the same property qua which he was fighting to tooth and nail and had also lodged an another FIR bearing No.151 -- Ingredients for commission of offences punishable u/s 341, 342 and 347 of IPC are not established at all -- Empty threats do not mean that case u/s 506 of IPC is made out – Challan report says that the police/ investigating agency left it to the trial Court to decide as to whether alleged incident had taken place or not? -- Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction at this stage also -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would certainly be an abuse of process and these proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment -- FIR and the proceedings arising out of the same quashed.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) –Cancellation of bail -- Denying bail – Parameters for denying bail and cancelling bail are quite varied -- Denial of bail is a matter of discretion and can be decided upon without inspecting the details of the matter -- If the Court is of the opinion that the accused is likely to misuse the liberty granted to him, it can deny bail simply on the basis of gravity of the offence -- However, cancellation would amount to curtailment of the liberty already granted to an under trial accused, which cannot be embarked upon in a cursory fashion -- Only if a grave error is highlighted in the order granted bail or it is evident that the accused is misusing the concession, can the Court consider cancellation.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 325, 323, 506, 34 -- Cancellation of bail – Version and cross version case -- The veracity of the prosecution case against accused/ respondent no.2 and co-accused shall be adjudicated upon during the course of the trial -- The challan having been presented and the case now is fixed for framing of charges, require no interference -- Petition dismissed, being devoid of merits.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Departmental punishment – Writ jurisdiction -- Scope of interference while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary proceedings is very limited -- Court has no power to look into quantum of sentence/punishment unless and until Court finds that sentence awarded is disproportionate to alleged offence -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India can look into the procedure followed by authorities, in case, it is found that enquiry officer or disciplinary authority has not considered any evidence on record or misread the evidence or procedure as prescribed by law has not been followed, the Court can interfere.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Departmental punishment – Writ jurisdiction -- A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals -- Error of jurisdiction includes order by inferior court or tribunal without jurisdiction or in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction -- A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice -- There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court.

(Para 8)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Punishment of forfeiture of five increments with permanent effect -- Writ jurisdiction – No evidence on record proving that accused could not be arrested on account of help of petitioner/ ASI -- Respondent in the departmental proceedings has miserably failed to connect the petitioner with allegations made in the chargesheet -- There was a team of six police officials in whose presence accused escaped from the spot -- It was not duty of the petitioner to arrest accused -- It appears that respondent has attributed entire responsibility to petitioner and held him guilty -- Impugned orders set aside.

(Para 11, 12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 – Additional evidence -- Documents which respondent-plaintiff is allowed to be proved by way of additional evidence are mutations and copy of amended site plan along with mutation which is official record and cannot be manipulated and as regards site plan is concerned, the same is also on record and it will definitely help the Court in arriving at the just conclusion and to effectively dispose of the litigation between the parties – Held, the learned Civil Judge has not exercised the jurisdiction in perverse manner and has not committed any material illegality or irregularity warranting interference by this Court -- Finding no merits, revision petition dismissed.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise at revision stage – Setting aside of conviction/ sentence -- Acquittal -- In case of dishonour of cheque, accused convicted, there is no stage prescribed for compounding of offence -- Petitioner permitted to compound the offence -- Considering the mitigating circumstances of the petitioner cost reduced to Rs.5,000/- -- Judgment of conviction/ order of sentence recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 11)

Constitution of India, Article 233 (2) – Appointment of Additional District Judge – Direct recruitment process/ Advocate Quota – Eligibility of Judicial officer – Reference answered:

(i)    Judicial Officers who have already completed seven years in Bar before they were recruited in the subordinate judicial service would be entitled for being appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge in the selection process for the post of District Judges in the direct recruitment process;

(ii)   The eligibility for appointment as a District Judge/Additional District Judge is to be seen at the time of application;

(iii) Though there is no eligibility prescribed under Article 233(2) for a person already in judicial service of the Union or of the State for being appointed as District Judge, in order to provide a level playing field, direction given that a candidate applying as an in-service candidate should have seven years’ combined experience as a Judicial Officer and an advocate;

(iv) A person who has been or who is in judicial service and has a combined experience of seven years or more as an advocate or a Judicial Officer would be eligible for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge under Article 233 of the Constitution;

(v)   In order to ensure level playing field, further direction given that the minimum age for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge for both advocates and Judicial Officers would be 35 years of age as on the date of application.

(vi) It is held that the view taken in the judgments of this Court right from Satya Narain Singh (1985) 1 SCC 225 till Dheeraj Mor (2020) 7 SCC 401, which take a view contrary to what has been held hereinabove do not lay down the correct proposition of law.

The reference answered accordingly

All rules framed by the State Governments in consultation with the High Courts which are not in accordance with the aforesaid answers quashed and set aside – Direction given that all the State Governments in consultation with the High Courts shall frame/ amend the rules in accordance with what has been held, within a period of three months.

(Para 171-173)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 337 – Conviction for causing death by rash and negligent driving – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced (1 Month 4 days) -- Occurrence pertains to the year 2000 and as many as more than 24 ½ years have passed ever since then – Petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents and is a first time offender -- Subject to the payment of the fine as imposed and payment of Rs.1 Lac as compensation to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased, the sentence of the accused/ petitioner reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. 01 month and 04 days.

(Para 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Petitioner faced trial in a criminal case and during pendency of the same, he was declared a proclaimed person and as a result thereof, FIR was registered u/s 174-A IPC -- Ultimately, the petitioner was acquitted in the main case but the case arising out of his absence in pursuance to the said FIR remained pending and in this case also he was declared as proclaimed person due to his absence – Held, as the root cause of the controversy i.e. main criminal trial stands concluded wherein the petitioner has been acquitted, so the continuation of the proceedings to the above detailed FIR are nothing but an abuse of process of the Court – FIR quashed subject to payment of Rs.35,000/- as costs.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Policy dated 13.08.2008 for pre-mature release -- Murder convict – Life imprisonment -- Pre-mature release – Right of -- State level committee declined the premature release by stating that the petitioner is involved in 9 other criminal offences, his conduct is required to be further evaluate – Held, once a duly enacted policy is in existence, it must be honored and applied to each case in its letter and spirit -- In a civilized society like ours, it would be truly unfortunate, if an offender is not given the opportunity to realize and fully fathom his mistake and channel that awareness into making fruitful contributions in society -- Policy does not indicate any provision allowing deferment of the case of an applicant -- Impugned order set aside -- Official respondents directed to consider the case of the petitioner afresh, strictly in accordance with the policy applicable at the time of his conviction, preferably within a period of 08 weeks -- Any deviation from the policy or the guidelines/ directions given by this Court would entitle the petitioner to file an appropriate petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, seeking initiation of Contempt of Court proceedings against the official concerned.

(Para 4-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 25, 37 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS – Commercial quantity – Regular Bail – Rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Petitioner in custody for the last 01 year 11 months and 09 days and only 04 of the 12 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far – Petitioner is first-time offender with no other case registered against him -- Rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted to an extent in view of the salutary provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which provides for the right to a speedy trial -- Case of the petitioner can be considered for the grant of bail, moreso as the co-accused has already been granted the same concession – Bail allowed.

(Para 9, 10)