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Posted On: 15-09-2024
301. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 20.08.2024)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 15, 16 -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Less educated candidate – Less land holding – Effect of – Choice of Collector :

-- Respondent no. 4 recommended by Assistant Collector Ist Grade and Assistant Collector IInd Grade. Although, the Collector is not bound by the recommendation made by the Revenue Authorities in favour of a candidate; however, due consideration is to be accorded to such recommendations as they are in a position to assess the suitability of a candidate and such recommendation would have some persuasive value.

-- Respondent No. 4 has about 7 acres of land, which is sufficient to be taken into consideration for the purpose of security of revenue, collected by the Lambardar -- Moreover, land revenue stood abolished in both the State of Punjab and Haryana, long back, thus owning land by the candidates for the post of Lambardar would not be of much significance any further.

-- Respondent no. 4 acquitted in criminal case under Section 170 and 420 IPC.

Learned Collector is the main authority for appointment of the Lambardar -- It is the Collector, who not only appreciates the antecedents of all the candidates in the fray but also personally interacts with them -- Merely because the petitioner is more educated or holds slightly more land than respondent No. 4, it cannot be said that the choice made by learned Collector, keeping in view all the relevant considerations, is illegal or perverse – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 7-9)

Posted On: 15-09-2024
302. (SC) (Decided on: 06.09.2024)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18, 19 -- Offer of possession made on 04.02.2014 -- ADA issued reminders to the appellant on 22.09.2014, 21.11.2014 and 17.01.2018 -- Additionally, ADA accepted the appellant's payment of Rs. 3,43,178/- on 20.06.2019 without any reservations -- NCDRC correctly applied Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which extend the limitation period where part payments or acknowledgments are made -- Consequently, the cause of action continued to exist, and the filing of the complaint in July 2020 is within the limitation period.

(Para 16)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Pecuniary jurisdiction -- Respondent ADA challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the NCDRC, contending that the total payment made by the appellant amounted to Rs. 59,97,178/-, which was less than Rs. 1 crore -- Claim made by the appellant also included compensation for mental agony, harassment, and loss of income, which brought the total claim well above Rs. 1 crore -- In consumer disputes, the value of the claim is determined not just by the amount deposited but by the aggregate relief sought, which includes compensation and other claims -- NCDRC rightly held that it had the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and this Court affirms that finding.

(Para 18, 19)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 19(10) -- Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 (U.P. Act No. 16 of 2010), Section 4(5) -- Offer of possession -- Completion certificate -- Firefighting clearance certificate – Requirement of -- A developer must obtain these certificates before offering possession -- Possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances -- ADA’s failure to provide the required certificates justifies the appellant’s refusal to take possession --  Entire amount deposited by the appellant ordered to be refunded with interest 9% per annum from the date of complaint till the date of refund, the ADA is directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) to the appellant.

(Para 20-23)

Posted On: 14-09-2024
304. (P&H HC) (Reserved on : 05.07.2024 Decided on: 12.07.2024)

A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6, 8 -- Coparcenary property -- Mutation was sanctioned in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -- The property can no longer be claimed to be a coparcenary.

(Para 4.5)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Drafting of Will -- Attestation of Will – Presence of witnesses – Knowledge of contents – Requirement of -- Will is required to be executed in the presence of witnesses or they should receive acknowledgment from the testator that he has signed it.

-- Drafting of the Will and the typing of the Will in the presence of witnesses is not necessary.

-- Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has either seen the testator’s sign or affixed his mark to the Will or has received acknowledgment from the testator that he has signed the Will.

-- Both the witnesses are not required to be simultaneously present at one place.

-- Witnesses are not required to know the contents of the Will -- They are required to attest the signatures of the testator.

(Para 4.17)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6, 8 -- Coparcenary property – The property not come through male lineal descendants -- In between, there was a civil court decree, transfer deed of some property – The Property was inherited u/s 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and not as a coparcenary property – The property received from different sources including ownership by way of adverse possession as well as receipt of the property from aunt – Held, the property is not coparcenary.

(Para 4.21, 4.22)

Posted On: 11-09-2024
309. (SC) (Decided on: 22.08.2024)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 -- RGPSM’s General Service Conditions, Clause 4 -- Appointment in Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan / SSA -- Termination of service/ contract – Non-renewal of contract -- Appellant topped the revised Merit List, leading to her appointment -- While serving complaint(s) against her : (i) not punctual in attending to her duties, and; (ii) not correctly reported with regard to the events in the hostel -- She, inter alia, frankly admits to being late on occasion, but to compensate for her late-coming, she used to sit till late evening in the office for completion of work.

-- Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one month’s notice is sufficient -- The Clause also makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in “undesirable activities”, the Mission Director was competent to terminate such person’s services “with immediate effect”.

-- Ld. Single Judge of High Court quashed the order holding that the termination orders being stigmatic in nature, relating to alleged misconduct involving moral turpitude, the same could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry.

Respondents have placed themselves in a Catch-22 situation – If it is a case of termination simpliciter and non-stigmatic, then one month’s notice was required to be issued to the appellant, which was not done – If impugned order to be seen as falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be stigmatic -- Impugned order does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment – Order of Ld. Single Judge, upheld, appellant held entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly-situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50% -- In view of the long passage of time, liberty denied to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge.

(Para 12, 30-36)

Posted On: 08-09-2024
319. (SC) (Decided on: 23.08.2024)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 18 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 438 -- Anticipatory bail under SC/ST Act – Maintainability of -- Whether Section 18 of the Act, 1989 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the said Act? -- The term ‘arrest’ appearing in the text of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 should be construed and understood in the larger context of the powers of police to effect an arrest and the restrictions imposed by the statute and the courts on the exercise of such power -- Bar u/s 18 of the Act, 1989 would apply only to those cases where prima facie materials exist pointing towards the commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 -- Because it is only when a prima facie case is made out that the pre-arrest requirements as stipulated u/s 41 of CrPC could be said to be satisfied.

(Para 13, 46)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 18 – Anticipatory bail under SC/ST Act -- Mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 -- Offence must have been committed against the person on the ground or for the reason that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe – While considering,  whether prima facie materials exist, warranting arrest of the appellant, there is nothing to indicate that the allegations/ statements alleged to have been made by the appellant were for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste -- Appeal succeeds, in the event of arrest of the appellant, he shall be released on bail.

(Para 80-89)

Posted On: 08-09-2024
320. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 07.03.2024 Decided on: 29.05.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 10, 12 -- Anticipatory bail by minor/ juvenile – Maintainability of -- In the absence of any exclusion as such that the provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. would not apply, Court do not see any valid reason as to why any restrictive view is to be taken -- Bail is the rule and denial is the exception and for a child to be placed under disadvantage on account of the fact that the word “arrest” has not been mentioned in the Act does not do any justice to the purpose of the Act -- Omission as such has been made and it would not debar the children from the benefit of the provisions of Section 438 of the Act. View taken in CRM-M-19907-2020, Krishan Kumar (minor) through his mother vs. State of Haryana decided on 24.07.2020 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15162 approved.

(Para 39, 49-51)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 10, 12 – Anticipatory bail to Child in conflict with law/ CCIL – Nature and gravity of the accusation, the antecedents of the applicant and the possibility of fleeing from justice etc. are the factors which are to be kept in mind under Section 438 Cr.P.C. in case of a normal accused which would not stand in the way of CICL.

(Para 45)

Posted On: 08-09-2024
322. (Allahabad HC) (Reserved on: 04.06.2024 Decided on: 02.08.2024)

A. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), Section 18, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 7 -- Maintenance -- Family court has jurisdiction for trying cases both under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as under Section 20 of the Act of 1956.

(Para 50)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), Section 20 – Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 7 -- Maintenance to major daughter u/s 125 Cr.P.c. granted by Family court – Challenge to – Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 makes it statutory obligation of a Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority -- Held, since the order has been passed by the family court which has jurisdiction to entertain the application u/s 125 Cr.P.C. as well as application under Sub-clause (3) of Section 20 of Act of 1956, no purpose will be served in interfering with the revision and relegating the daughter to move a fresh application before the same court under different provision of law i.e. Section 20(3) of Act of 1956 -- No interference is required with the order impugned.

(Para 36, 51-53)

Posted On: 04-09-2024
333. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 14.08.2024)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Rash and negligent driving – Proof of – Requirement of -- In the eventuality of the persons knocking the door of the Court, by way of filing of the petition u/s 166 of the Act, it is incumbent upon the claimants to establish, rashness and negligence, on the part of driver of the offending vehicle -- Proof of imputation of rashness and negligence, on the part of driver of offending vehicle, is a sine quo non, for sustaining the plea for grant of compensation, while assessing the loss of dependency etc.

(Para 14)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Rash and negligent driving – Proof of – FIR against the unknown driver – Appellants-claimants, ought to have examined the Investigating Officer, who recorded the statements of witnesses and nominated respondent No.1, as accused in a criminal case – FIR and report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. simply tendered into evidence -- It is required on the part of the appellants-claimants to lead evidence of its own, with regard to the factum of accident and to establish the rashness and negligence, on the part of the offending vehicle -- No such, evidence has been led -- No sustenance, as such, can be drawn from the contents of the FIR and report under Section 173 Cr.P.C -- Claim petition dismissed.

(Para 18-21)

Posted On: 01-09-2024
345. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 02.05.2024 Decided on: 14.05.2024)

A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 25FF – Transfer of Undertaking/ Company – Retrenchment compensation – Requirement of -- In case service of the workman is not interrupted by such transfer and terms and conditions of service applicable after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the workman and new employer is legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment compensation on the basis his service has been continuous, there shall be no requirement of notice u/s 25-FF of the Act nor any compensation in lieu of retrenchment  -- Three conditions specified in the proviso are to be satisfied -- Employees can claim compensation against the transfer, if the three conditions remain unsatisfied.

(Para 16-20)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(k) – Industrial dispute – Transfer of Undertaking -- Petitioner-company while making its worker apprised of the factum with regard to proposed transfer/sale, specifically assured workmen of the petitioner-company that upon transfer they would become workmen/employees of HFL-transferee company with continuity of service on the conditions which in aggregate would be similar and in any case would not be less favourable to the existing conditions on which they are employed with the petitioner -- No dispute exist interse petitioner and its workers – Merely by submitting demand notice, respondent-union cannot be permitted to claim that “industrial dispute” exist interse petitioner and workmen.

(Para 25-28)

C. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(k), 10(1) -- Industrial dispute -- Demand Notice – Reference – Duty of Authority -- Appropriate Government, while considering/ making reference in terms of Section 10(1) of the Act, requires to apply its mind to ascertain whether industrial dispute, if any, exists or not – Firstly, authority needs to form an opinion that industrial dispute exist, only thereafter, it can proceed to make reference -- Authority cannot delve into the merits of the dispute, but before arriving at a conclusion that industrial dispute exist, if any, in the parties, authority needs to form an opinion on the basis of material adduced on record by the parties.

(Para 29-38)

Posted On: 29-08-2024
348. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 11.03.2024 Decided on: 02.04.2024)

East Punjab Evacuee’s (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 4, 6 -- East Punjab Displaced Persons Land Re-settlement Act, 1949 (Act 36 of 1949), Section 9 – Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (31 of 1950), Section 12 – Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 5(1)(a) -- Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 2(f), 3 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Lease by Muslims before independence of India – Occupancy rights – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Plaintiffs were already in possession of the suit property much prior to the 1947 Act -- It is not case of State/ defendants-appellants that they ever took possession of the property in dispute by following the procedure as laid down in Section 6 of the Act -- As possession was never taken from the plaintiffs by following the procedure as laid down in Section 6 of the 1947 Act, therefore, said possession cannot be held to have become unauthorised.

-- Nothing on record to suggest that lease in favour of the plaintiffs was ever terminated by the custodian, in whom the property had been vested by virtue of Section 4 of the 1947 Act, by following the procedure laid down in Section 9 (2) of the 1949 Act -- It is not the case of the defendants-appellants that the present case fails under any of the categories mentioned at (a), (b) and (c) of Section 12 of the 1950 Act and as such, it is held that Section 12 of the Central Act of 1950 or Section 9 of the 1949 East Punjab Act did not affect the rights of the plaintiffs/ respondents as tenants on the suit land.

-- Plaintiffs being in possession of the suit land at least since 1914-15, without paying any rent to the owners and paying only the land revenue and cesses and the entry in the revenue record being “Bashra Malkan Bewajah Derina Kast”, therefore, there can be no doubt in holding that plaintiffs had acquired the occupancy rights.

-- Plaintiffs having acquired the occupancy rights in the suit land vested with the ownership rights in view of the provisions of Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietory Rights) Act, 1952.

-- It is only the Civil Court alone, which would have jurisdiction over the issue as to whether a person had acquired occupancy rights or not, and consequent to the acquiring of the occupancy rights, whether the ownership rights had vested in him or not.

(Para 13-27)