Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Appellate court suspended the sentence of petitioner, subject to his depositing 20% of the compensation amount with the trial Court -- Appellate Court was firstly required to consider as to whether the instant case falls within the exceptions warranting grant of suspension of sentence without imposing condition of deposit of 20% of compensation amount/fine – Matter remanded back for deciding the same afresh after re-examining the case by granting an opportunity to the petitioner to make submissions regarding exceptional circumstances warranting waiver of requirement of depositing 20% of the compensation. Jamboo Bhandari’s case (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 90 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509.

(Para 3-5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – In M/s Coromandel International Limited v. Shri Ambica Sales Corporation, (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750, the Larger Bench/Division Bench has given cumulative answers, which summarized law as under :

*The offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is bailable, and after summoning of the accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, bail is a right subject to the furnishing of bonds.

*In the event of conviction and sentence, fine, and compensation, it is for the convict to decide whether to undergo the sentence or to challenge it before the Appellate Court by filing an Appeal.

*In the cases of juristic persons, these can only be fined, and in the absence of a substantive sentence of imprisonment, there is no need for these entities to seek suspension of sentence.

*Section 148 of the NI Act neither restricts right of the convict to challenge the conviction, sentence, or compensation by filing an appeal, nor does it permit the Appellate Court to impose any prerequisites for the appeal to be admitted or decided.

*Section 148 of the NI Act, due to its non-compliance, does not explicitly prohibit the suspension of sentence or the hearing of the appeal.

*Neither Section 148 nor any other provision of the NI Act prescribes any provisions for the suspension of sentence. Therefore, Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023 shall apply.

*Neither Section 148 of the NI Act nor Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023 places any specific restrictions on suspension of sentence. Instead, Section 430 of the BNSS has carved out a separate, most lenient category, and in cases where the sentence prescribed is up to three years of imprisonment, or when the offences in which an accused is convicted are bailable offences, the sentence is suspended by the trial Court/convicting Court.

*The very purpose of Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023, which corresponds to Section 389 Cr.P.C., is to restore the liberty curtailed post-conviction until the decision of the appeal challenging such conviction and sentence.

*Appellate Court assumes the jurisdiction to order a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act only if the convict files an appeal before it, challenging the conviction and sentence, and the jurisdiction stays only during the pendency of such an appeal, and jurisdiction of the Appellate Court would eclipse on the decision of the appeal.

*In the absence of specific provision in the language of Section 148 of the NI Act, that in the absence of deposit of 20% of compensation, neither shall any appeal be entertained nor the sentence shall be suspended, it shall be re-writing Section 148 of NI Act and Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023, to treat the deposit of 20% as a prerequisite for filing an appeal or for suspending the sentence.

*During pendency of an appeal, the Appellate Court is also competent to direct a deposit upon the filing of an application by the complainant.

*The words, “(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.”, used in Section 148(2) of the NI Act are significant, because sixty days extendable by another thirty days, are granted to a convict to deposit only if the appeal is pending, because of the words, “in an appeal by the drawer against conviction” used in Section 148 of the NI Act. In case, before the expiry of said period (sixty days + thirty days), the appeal itself is decided, then the Appellate Court shall also lose its jurisdiction to order such deposit.

*If the appeal is not decided within 60 days, with a possible extension of 30 days, then the convict must comply with the directions, if any, to deposit the compensation amount.

*When the convict challenges the conviction, sentence, or compensation by filing an appeal, the requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra), it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

*When a convict challenges the judgment of conviction by filing an appeal, then during the pendency of appeal, i.e. if the appeal is not decided within 60 days, extendable by 30 days, then the convict might be compelled to deposit the amount as was directed, by taking recourse to Section 395 BNSS, 2023.

*Deposit of a minimum 20% amount is not an absolute rule.

*Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided, the Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions under Section 148 NI Act and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions. However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

In view above, matters sent back to the Appellate Courts, for decision afresh on the application(s) for suspension of sentence of the appellant(s)/petitioner(s) herein, in consonance with the order passed by the Larger Bench/Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Coromandel International Limited.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Appellate Courts must make efforts to decide the appeal within 60 days of the filing and not later than 90 days, where the appellant is not in a position to deposit the compensation amount as ordered by the Appellate Court -- Petition disposed of with direction to the learned Appellate Court concerned to hear the appeal of the petitioner and decide the same within a period of 60 days and not later than 90 days. M/s Coromandel International Limited, (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750 (P&H HC) D.B. relied.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 --  Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Bail cancelled due to non-appearance – Petitioner suffering from HIV+ (AIDS) -- When the petitioner came to know about passing of the impugned order, he immediately moved the petition, showing his inclination to submit himself before the trial Court -- Petitioner can be given one chance to appear before the trial Court, so that proceedings may restart and continue in smooth manner --  Impugned order set aside, petitioner directed to be released on bail, in the eventuality of surrender by him before the trial Court on or before 09.01.2026.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528, 491 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Jump of bail – Cancellation – Warrant of arrest issued -- As per, the petitioner, he had instructed his counsel to move an application for exemption, but he forgot to move the same – Held, learned trial Court was left with no option but to cancel the bail order, forfeit the bail bonds and issue warrant of arrest against the petitioner -- No illegality -- Petition disposed of with a direction to petitioner to surrender before the learned trial Court and if he surrenders and moves an application for bail, the learned trial Court to dispose of the bail application on the same day -- Learned trial Court in the exercise of its discretion shall be at liberty to impose penalty u/s 491 of BNSS.

(Para 4)

A. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2, 20 – Disability during service -- Supernumerary post with all consequential benefits till retirement – Right of employee -- Petitioner suffered a brain haemorrhage, assessed as 70% disabled -- Petitioner clearly falls within this definition, as he is unable to perform the duties of his post of Painter, cannot walk or stand properly, and is severely restricted in daily activities -- Certificate issued by the competent Medical Board clearly records 70% disability and specifies its validity up to 29.04.2029 --  Contention of the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to benefits due to the absence of a “permanent” disability certificate rejected -- Petitioner will attain the age of 60 years in 2029, validity of the certificate, for the entire remaining period of his service – Petitioner held entitled to accommodation on a supernumerary post with all consequential benefits -- Respondents directed to release all consequential monetary benefits, including arrears of salary, along with interest @ 6% per annum.

(Para 12-14, 20)

B. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2, 20 – Disability during service -- Supernumerary post with all consequential benefits till retirement – Right of employee -- An employee who acquires disability during service deserves empathy, institutional support, and reasonable accommodation, and not suspicion, indifference, or punitive action -- State, being a model employer, is expected to rise above technicalities and to act with compassion, sensitivity, and a sense of moral responsibility by making genuine efforts to adjust such an employee within the department rather than marginalising him or pushing him out of service -- Any approach that treats disability as a ground for denial of service protection would undermine human dignity and would erode the very letter and spirit of the Act, 2016.

(Para 16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided -- Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions -- However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

(Para 76)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – The words, “Whether sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants to persuade the Sessions Court not to order any deposit is left entirely to its discretion and satisfaction.”, used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, would include a reduction of the amount below 20%, because if the Appellate Court can exempt the entire 20%, it can also reduce the deposit below 20% depending upon the convict’s financial capacity -- Any other interpretation would imply that even if a convict is willing to pay some amount, e.g., 15%, 10%, or 5%, and the Appellate Court exempts the entire amount, thereby preventing the complainant from collecting whatever the convict can afford to pay.

(Para 22)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation :

First proposition -- “Whether imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable or not, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation?”

Answer to the first proposition is that the imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation.

(Para 16-36)

Second proposition -- “Whether the right of the convict-appellant being on bail in pending appeal, can be subjected to the compliance of direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act?

Answer to the second proposition was once addressed by Surinder Singh Deswal supra [Second case] (2020) 2 SCC 514, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when an Appellate Court suspends the sentence on a condition, then the failure to comply with that condition adversely affects the continuation of the suspension.

The Appellate Court that has suspended the sentence on a condition, after observing non-compliance, could reasonably hold that the suspension stood vacated due to the non-compliance, and it is the responsibility of the said Appellate Court, which granted the suspension, to consider the non-compliance and make an appropriate decision. Nonetheless, non-compliance with the suspension condition is enough to declare that the suspension has been vacated.

(Para 37-41)

Third proposition -- “Whether the right of bail can be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance of the direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act, for any justifiable or un-justifiable reason, as discussed in the cases of Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises ?

Answer to the third proposition is that the right of bail cannot be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance with the direction of paying 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act. Whenever an Appellate Court directs a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act and imposes conditions on the suspension of sentence, such conditions must be just conditions.

Here it requires to be understood that once the issue regarding deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount, payable under Section 148 of NI Act, is decided by the concerned Appellate Court by following the spirit of the observations made in the judgments of Jamboo Bhandari (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, and condition, if any, is imposed while suspending the sentence, the same would be deemed to be just and fair, and undoubtedly such condition requires its fulfillment at the end of the appellant, who seeks suspension of sentence.

(Para 42-52)

Fourth proposition -- “Whether it is a pre-condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, for getting an appeal decided?

From the judgments of Noor Mohammed (2002) 9 SCC 23: 2022 and Vijay D. Salvi (2007) 5 SCC 741), it is clear that non-deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount would not disentitle the accused from availing any of his substantive rights, including the right of appeal. The case of Vijay D. Salvi, (2007) 5 SCC 741, clearly answers the fourth proposition of law. Thus, to get the appeal decided, there cannot be any precondition for depositing the amount ordered under Section 148 of the NI Act by the Appellate Court. The fourth question is answered accordingly.

(Para 53-57)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari, (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

(65-72)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Income Tax Return – Reliance upon latest ITR – Deceased aged 46 years as on date of accident i.e. 22.03.2010 -- Last three income tax returns, show income of Rs. 1,06,961.88, Rs. 1,08,745 and Rs. 1,48,974, respectively -- When the income tax returns themselves disclosed that the deceased did not maintain regular books of account, insistence upon balance sheets and other business documents was unnecessary -- Tribunal’s finding that the income of the deceased was to be assessed on the basis of minimum wages of an unskilled worker set aside -- Loss of dependency should, be computed on the basis of the declared income of Rs.1,48,974/- in the deceased’s ITR for the Assessment Year 2009-10 -- Impugned award enhanced by a sum of Rs.9,97,369/-, from Rs. 7,78,182/- to Rs. 17,75,551/- -- Entire award will carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum.

(Para 8-27, 34)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Harassment -- Mens-rea -- To attract offence of abetment to suicide, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish proof of direct or indirect act(s) of instigation or incitement of suicide, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide -- Such instigation or incitement should be reflective of clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide -- Act of abetment must be explicitly demonstrated through action or behaviour of the accused and it should also be brought on record that such conduct directly contributed to the victim’s decision to take his or her own life -- Harassment, in itself, does not suffice unless it is accompanied by deliberate acts of incitement or facilitation.

(Para 20-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Extra-marital affair of husband -- Mere existence of extramarital affair is not sufficient to attract Section 306 IPC -- There is no material indicating any immediate or direct instigation or conduct of a nature, compelling wife to commit suicide – Appeal against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 36-38)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22(1)(2) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Suit for specific performance – Amendment in prayer clause to seek refund of earnest money at Appellate Stage – Limitation taken as ground – Ld. Appellate Court allowed the amendment -- Held, as per provisions of Section 22 (1) and (2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963, the application for amendment of the plaint seeking a relief regarding the refund of earnest money or deposit made has to be allowed at any stage of the proceedings -- In original plaint, plaintiff has specifically sought the decree for recovery of Rs.20,00,000/- double the amount of earnest money in the alternative though inadvertently, the same could not be sought in the prayer clause -- No illegality or perversity committed by learned First Appellate Court  -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 2-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439(2) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Settlement/ compromise between parties – Terms of compromise not complied with – It is nowhere mentioned in the order that if respondent No.2 failed to comply with the terms of the settlement, his bail order was liable to be cancelled -- Petitioner himself had given no objection despite the fact that some terms of the settlement were not complied with -- Once bail granted, should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner – Petition dismissed.

(Para 9, 10)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 14 -- Divorce -- Adultery -- Reliance upon photographs – Divorce by Family court -- Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Wife not denying that she was not there on photographs, stated that said photographs have been created by using some trick; who has created these false photographs and by what method, has not been stated, only a general statement has been made to avoid confrontation with said photographs – Husband had evidence of wife's adultery on her mobile phone -- He transferred said pictures in his mobile phone -- Photographer who developed photographs was also examined in Court -- No error in the judgment passed by Family Court by placing reliance on the photographs.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 438, 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 148, 149, 302 – Murder – Summoning of additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Regular bail – Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Three accused summoned, two are on anticipatory bail -- While considering bail, Court should weigh factors like the nature of the offence, the quality of the evidence against the new accused and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence -- Court must be satisfied that there is strong and cogent evidence of the person’s complicity at the threshold i.e. much higher than that required for framing charges against the original accused -- Other two co-accused appearing before the trial court on all dates – No case made out for cancellation of anticipatory bail of two accused – Bail allowed to third accused.

(Para 13-19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint -- High Court must avoid usurping the function of a Trial Court or conducting a mini trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint -- Power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, and only where the complaint, even if accepted in full, discloses no offence or continuation would amount to abuse of process of law -- Though the powers u/s 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent -- While examining any complaint or FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made -- Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not.

(Para 26-28)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Multiple cheques – Multiple complaints – Maintainability of – Inherent powers of High Court for quashing of Complaints – Under section 138 of the NI Act, a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque -- Multiple cheques arise from one transaction will not merge them into a single cause of action -- Scheme of Section 138 of the NI Act does not bar prosecution in such circumstances -- Whether those cheques were issued as alternative or supplementary instruments, or represented fresh undertakings, is a disputed question of fact requiring evidence at the time of trial and cannot be resolved at the threshold -- Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 482 of the Cr.PC cannot be used to decide such disputed issues.

(Para 33, 34)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Presumption of liability – Disputing the liability – Inherent powers of High Court for quashing of Complaints – Burden of proving whether there exists any debt or liability is something which must be discharged in trial -- Where the accused approaches the Court seeking quashing of proceedings even before the commencement of trial, the Court must exercise circumspection and refrain from prematurely stifling the prosecution at the threshold, particularly by overlooking the legal presumption that operates in favour of the complainant – Complaints prima facie discloses the ingredients of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and must proceed to trial.

(Para 43)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part II – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Convict 80 year old – Sentenced to already undergone -- Appellant was arrested on 19.12.1992, High Court granted bail to him on 05.08.1998 – Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant on 05.08.2011 -- Appellant underwent total period of incarceration of the appellant comes to six years and three months -- Appellant is more than 80 years of age at present --  Held, the appellant is an old and aged person, and in the December of his life, it would be harsh and inadvisable to send him behind the bars again at this stage -- Courts are not supposed to be insensitive -- In view of the advanced age of the appellant and considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, while upholding the conviction of the appellant u/s 304, Part II, IPC, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to what is already undergone.

(Para 6)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Memorandum of family settlement / family arrangement – Registration of – Requirement of -- Document produced by the plaintiff, as a memorandum of family settlement / family arrangement does not require mandatory registration and payment of stamp duty. Kale’s case AIR 1976 SC 807 relied.

(Para 9)

Mutation – Scope of -- Mutation of name in revenue records is done for fiscal purposes, i.e. for collection of land revenue, and mutation neither creates nor extinguishes title.

(Para 2)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 -- Notice for arbitration – Mandate of -- Section 21 is concerned only with determining the commencement of the dispute for the purpose of reckoning limitation -- There is no mandatory prerequisite for issuance of a Section 21 notice prior to the commencement of Arbitration -- Issuance of a Section 21 notice may come to the aid of parties and the arbitrator in determining the limitation for the claim -- Failure to issue a Section 21 notice would not be fatal to a party in Arbitration if the claim is otherwise valid and the disputes arbitrable.

(Para 16)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 --– Non-giving of notice for arbitration -- Scope of Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction – Arbitral Tribunal was appointed at the request of the respondent-State to adjudicate on dispute no. (1) alone out of (4) -- By conduct of parties, the entire dispute have been thrown at large before the Arbitral Tribunal – No reason to set aside the award on the basis that the appointment of the Tribunal was only to adjudicate dispute No.1 -- Non-issuance of notice under Section 21 of the A&C Act by the appellant with regard to dispute no. 2 to 4 not fatal – Arbitral Tribunal not exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the entire dispute.

(Para 14, 16)

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (25 of 1987), Section 2(j), 14, 24 -- Death of tenant – Subsequently death of Successor – Right of other Legal heirs -- Wife is alive and living with her husband upto the date of his death and therefore, she was only entitled for succession of tenancy -- On the death of said successor/ wife tenancy will not devolve upon his any legal heirs -- Other respondents have no justifiable claim for continuing in possession of the property under the garb of tenancy created in favour of Tenant, which was succeeded by his wife after his death -- Respondents are liable not only to be evicted and also to pay use and occupation charges for their unauthorized possession on the prevailing market rate.

(Para 43, 44)

Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (4 of 1994), Section 28(1) -- Constitution of Inida, Article 243E -- Election of Panchayat -- Term of Panchayat to expire on 31.01.2026 – Deemed dissolution after 5 years -- On expiry of duration Panchayati Raj Institutions shall be deemed to have been dissolved -- Reconstitution of Panchayat shall be completed before expiry of period of 6 months from the date of dissolution -- Rule is to conduct election/ reconstitution of Panchayati Raj Institutions before expiry of tenure of 5 years and the reconstitution of Gram Panchayat after expiry of duration, but within six months thereafter, is an exception -- It cannot be claimed as a matter of right, by the Government to decide to reconstitute the Panchayat after the expiry of duration, but within six months thereafter -- Claim of the respondent-State that it has a right and authority to defer reconstitution of election for one or other reason within six months after expiry of duration, is not legal, justified, and sustainable – Election of Panchayati Raj Institutions cannot be deferred on account of pendency of creation or re-organization of Panchayats as well as Urban Local Bodies in small pockets, in two or three Districts -- Connectivity problem can also not be a reason to defer the election in entire State --  Election directed to be conducted on or before 30.04.2026.

(Para 57, 61, 71)

Multi-State Co-Operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002), Section 5, 10, 22, 103 -- Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (29 of 2000) – Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (XI of 1966) -- Co-operative Societies -- State Reorganisation (Uttar Pradesh - Uttarakhand) -- Deemed conversion into Multi-State Co-operative Society -- Scope and limits -- No automatic or blanket conversion of every co-operative society registered under a State Act into a multi-State co-operative society -- Deeming fiction u/s 103 applies only where, consequent upon reorganisation, the objects of the society extend to more than one State – Where objects remain confined to one State, the society continues to be governed by the State Co-operative Societies Act.

A. Section 103 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 does not, by itself, confer an automatic or deemed status of a multi-State cooperative society upon every society registered under a State Cooperative Societies Act merely because the parent State has undergone reorganisation.

B. The applicability of Section 103 requires a factual enquiry in each case as to whether the objects of the society extend to more than one State. If the objects are found to span more than one State, the deeming fiction under Section 103 will operate and the society would be treated as a multi-State cooperative society. If the objects remain confined to only one State, the status of the society will remain unchanged.

C. It would be erroneous to undertake an enquiry into the area of operation of a society for the purposes of Section 103, when the provision itself mandates an examination only of the objects of the society. Read with Section 5, it becomes evident that Section 103 is attracted only where the objects of the society extend to more than one State. It is only in such situation that the society would, by operation of law, be treated as a multi-State cooperative society.

D. The residence or domicile of the members of the cooperative society has no bearing on determining whether the society is a multi-State cooperative society.

E. Section 5 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 mandates that a society may be registered as a multi-State cooperative society only when its principal objects, as reflected in its bye-laws, serve the interests of members in more than one State. It is, therefore, a pre-condition that the objects span more than one State.

(Para 15)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in pleadings – Typographical mistake -- At the time of deciding the application for amendment, the merits of the amendment are not to be seen -- Since there are typographical mistakes in the mentioning of khasra number and also on the mentioning of aspect of 'Hari 2016' instead of 'Hari 2017', the said amendments are necessarily required to be allowed.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in prayer – Alternate prayer for joint possession – Suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is owner in possession of the land --  Petitioner should be permitted to make an additional/ alternate prayer, as the case of the petitioner should not be rejected only on account of there being a lack of prayer made – Amendment allowed subject to cost of Rs.10,000/-

(Para 2, 5-7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 89, 100 – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 16 – Regular Second Appeal -- Amicable settlement – Refund of Court fee – Right of -- Appeal dismissed as withdrawn in terms of the compromise made part of the decree-sheet -- Compromise effected before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre -- Parties held entitled to refund of the court fee.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Municipal records – Ownership -- Municipal record cannot be treated as ownership.

(Para 10)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 – Suit for possession – Limitation -- Suit for possession of immovable property can be filed within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiff – No specific date and time of dispossession has been specified in the pleadings and no evidence regarding the same has been adduced – Plaintiff during his cross-examination stated that defendants are in possession of the suit property for the last 30-35 years – Suit held to be filed beyond the period of limitation.

(Para 11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 2(18)(28) -- Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Entry 57 of List II -- Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, Section 2(10), 3 -- Heavy Earth Moving Machinery -- Special services vehicles -- Construction equipment vehicles such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, Surface Miners, Dozers, Drills, Rock Breakers etc. -- Vehicles of special types, precisely construction equipment vehicles which are suitable and are meant for use for operation and use within the industrial area/ factory premises/ defined enclosed premises and are not meant for use on roads or public roads -- They are off-road equipments and as such stand excluded not only from the purview of the “motor vehicle” as defined under Section 2 (28) of the Act but also from tax as Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution only authorizes taxation of vehicles suitable for use on roads only -- They are not even chargeable to road tax in view of Schedule I to Section 3 (1) of the Gujarat Tax Act which do not prescribes any tax for such kind of vehicles i.e., construction equipment vehicles.

-- However, if any such kind of vehicles are found using roads, they would not be free from the rigors of Section 2 (28) of the Act and Section 3 of the Gujarat Tax Act and may also be subject to proceedings for seizure and penalty in accordance with the law.

(Para 55)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4)(8) -- Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002, Rule 9(6) -- Auction under SARFAESI law – Registration of Sale Certificate – Market Value -- Registration Authorities cannot insist on payment of stamp duty and registration fee basing on the value of the property as indicated in the market value register -- Sub-registrar has no other option, but to register the sale certificates by fixing the stamp duty based on the successful bid price which is fetched in the auction, as the same reflects the true market value as per the settled law.

(Para 9)

Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 14, 20 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section  5, 122 -- Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Section 43, 66, 72 -- Divorce petition -- WhatsApp messages – Privileged communication -- Learned Family Court permitted the respondent/ plaintiff/ husband to mark the exhibits on the WhatsApp chats produced by him in his evidence -- Being aggrieved by this order of the Family Court, the instant petition by wife -- Held that:

(a) the evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, irrespective of the fact how it is collected. The possible misuse of this rule of evidence, particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by the Family Court, not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using evidence at the stage of adjudication;

(b) merely admitting evidence on record is not proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact. Admitting evidence is not even reliance by the court on such evidence. Admitting evidence is mere inclusion of evidence in record, to be assessed on a comprehensive set of factors, parameters and aspects, in the discretion of the court;

(c) the test of ‘relevance’ ensures that the right of a party to bring evidence to court, and thereby to a fair trial, is not defeated. What weight is to be given to evidence so brought-in, and whether or not the court ultimately relies upon such evidence for proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact, is always in the discretion of the court.

(d) merely because a court allows evidence to be admitted, does not mean that the person who has illegally collected such evidence is absolved of liability that may arise, whether in civil or criminal law or both;

(e) such evidence must be received and treated with caution and circumspection and to rule-out the possibility of any kind of tampering, the standard of proof applied by a court for the authenticity and accuracy of a such evidence should be more stringent as compared to other evidence.

(Para 1, 5, 6, 9, 13, 38)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 12(1)(i-d), 13(1)(i-a) – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38 -- Divorce – Voidable marriage -- DNA test to assess  paternity of child – Marriage on 17.02.2022 – On medical check-up on 30.07.2022 wife was found pregnant for 8 month s – Petitioner filed a petition for declaration that the petitioner is not at all the father of daughter born to the respondent on 30.07.2022 -- Petitioner has filed a petition u/s 13(1)(i-a) read with Section 12(1) (i-d) of the Hindu Marriage Act as well as he has raised the question of paternity of the child -- His case is based on premarital pregnancy of the respondent -- Even on perusal of dates, there is prima facie reason to suspect the paternity -- As such the issue can be resolved by directing to conduct a DNA test as prayed -- Petitioner, respondent and her child directed to undertake a DNA test at Government Medical College, Nagpur within one month

(Para 18)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) -- Divorce – Desertion -- Cruelty -- False criminal case – Respondent-husband was subjected to cruelty at the hands of the appellant-wife due to registration of false criminal case – Appellant-wife lived with respondent-husband for around ten days after marriage -- Respondent-husband averred that appellant-wife deserted him and was residing separately for last almost ten years -- Appellant-wife admitted in her cross-examination that much time had passed since their marriage; they were not in touch with each other and their marriage was at the verge of broken down; she and her family did not go to mediate or hold any meeting and nor she filed a case u/s 9 of the HM Act -- Three years has passed since passing of the decree of dissolution of marriage also -- At this stage, there is no chance of reunion of the parties – Decree of divorce passed by the Additional District Judge affirmed.

(Para 15, 20-24)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 123 -- Cancellation of gift deed – Permissibility of -- Donor executed the gift deed voluntarily and the donee accepted the same and the donor has absolutely transferred the title and possession of the gifted properties through that gift deed – Cancellation of the deed of gift unilaterally by the donor is nonest under law.

(Para 26)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 1 – Withdrawal of suit for declaration -- Abandonment of claim – Plaintiff seeking same relief without seeking permission to file fresh one at the time of withdrawal earlier not maintainable – Having abandoned the main claim, plaintiff cannot maintain suit for consequential relief of possession – Plaintiff rightly non-suited by invoking Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC.

(Para 12-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Regular bail – Stringent conditions imposed -- Modification in a condition restricting the movement of an accused – Permissibility of -- Judicial orders which determine issues arising between the parties to the lis bind them and its conclusive nature ensures resolution of disputes so that justice is served -- If any modification of such condition is made now and thereby the stringency relaxed, that would not only amount to overstepping the order of this Court granting bail but would send a wrong message of this Court being unconcerned with the principle of finality of judicial decisions -- Stringent condition imposed by the bench while granting bail being justified on facts and in the circumstances, and there being no significant change in circumstances, court see no reason to interfere.

(Para 25, 26, 47, 51)

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (25 of 1986), Section 3 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Muslim women -- Post divorce rights – Whether goods given to a daughter at the time of her marriage by her father, or to the bridegroom, can be by application of law, returned to the daughter, appellant herein, given that their marriage had ended in divorce – Petition seeking the return of total of Rs. 17,67,980/- -- Held, Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved -- Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication -- To put it in context, the scope and object of 1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Amount ordered to be deposited in the Bank account of the appellant.

(Para 3, 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 200 – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Non-filing of protest petition – Maintainability of complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of proceedings -- Double jeopardy -- Charge-sheet by police in FIR, and negative report against appellant – Respondent no.2/ complainant failed to file protest petition, chose to file a private complaint invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. after a lapse of two and a half years -- Question of double jeopardy would arise -- Appellants have made out a case for quashing of the proceedings -- High Court ought to have invoked its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. by quashing the proceedings, which are nothing but vexatious -- Proceedings pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, qua the appellants quashed.

(Para 5, 11-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summoning of given-up witness -- By virtue of application any new witness has not been introduced by the prosecution -- Rather a witness, whose name already found mentioned in the list of witnesses, and was given up, has been sought to be examined and this necessity arose due to death of police official – Held, in change circumstances mala fide cannot be attributed to the prosecution -- Purpose of any trial is to do justice -- Application rightly allowed.

(Para 7-11)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3, 4, 18 – Offence under SC/ST Act – Anticipatory bail -- Essential ingredient for attracting Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act is that such statement must be made within public view -- If a prima facie case is not made out, anticipatory bail can be granted -- Bar of Section 18 of the SC & ST Act does not apply where any prima facie case is not made out -- Appellant held entitled for the benefit of doubt, as prima facie the allegations contained in the FIR with regard to commission of any offence u/s 3 & 4 of the SC & ST Act, are not established -- Appeal allowed, directions given that in the event of arrest, the appellant shall be released on anticipatory bail to the satisfaction of Arresting Officer -- Appellant will join the investigation as and when called by the Investigating Officer.

(Para 17-20)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injuries -- Petitioner suffered various serious injuries including injuries to head, jaws, legs, knees, chest and ribs for which the petitioner was operated on three occasions -- On account of his serious injuries, the petitioner was rendered 60% permanently disabled -- Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that victim has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and court must take care to give him full and fair compensation for that he had suffered -- In some cases for personal injury, the claim could be in respect of lifetime's earnings lost because, though he will live, he cannot earn his living -- In others, the claim may be made for partial loss of earnings -- Each case has to be considered in the light of its own facts and at the end, one must ask whether the sum awarded is a fair and reasonable sum – Compensation assessed at Rs. 48,00,000/- in toto.

(Para 3, 35, 36)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Divorce – Desertion -- Cruelty – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Parties got married on 20.05.2009 -- A male child was born from wedlock on 07.03.2010 -- High Court granted divorce primarily on the strength of the reasons, accepting the oral narratives of the respondent/ husband with respect to the alleged mental cruelty suffered by him -- High Court not adverted to the wife/ appellant’s plea that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home and was forced to live separately -- Child is in custody of the appellant from the very beginning -- In the light of such a plea, which she duly supported in her deposition, it was imperative upon the High Court firstly to determine as to:

(i) Whether the appellant was thrown out of the matrimonial home or she herself voluntarily deserted the respondent?

(ii) Whether the withdrawal of the first divorce petition wherein also the divorce was sought on the ground of cruelty, would bar the filing of second petition on the same cause of action?

(iii) Whether cruelty was committed by the respondent in not allowing the appellant to join the matrimonial home and/or by denying any maintenance, love, affection, and care to the minor child of the parties?

It is imperative upon the Family Court or the High Court to determine as to who out of the two is responsible for breaking the marital tie and forcing the other to live separately -- Unless there is cogent evidence for willful desertion or refusal to cohabit and/or look after the other spouse, the finding of marriage having been broken irretrievably is likely to have devastating effects, especially on the children -- Appeal allowed in part, impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law.

(Para 4-7)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52, 58, 60 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 61(a) -- Redemption of usufructuary mortgage – Limitation -- When there is a usufructuary mortgage, the period of limitation does not run from the date of creation of the mortgage but from the date of payment of mortgage, either out of the usufructuary or partly out of the usufructuary or partly on payment of deposit by mortgager as provided u/s 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -- Till then the period of limitation would not start under Section 61(a) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act -- As such mere expiry of the period prescribed thereunder could not extinguish the mortgager’s right of redemption and thereby the right of mortgagee to seek declaration of title and ownership over the mortgage property stands untouched.

(Para 9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased 48 years old – Homemaker – Notional income – Accident, occurred on 24.02.2015 -- Notional income of the deceased assessed at Rs.15,000/- per month – Since housewives fall under the category of self-employed and considering the age of the deceased (48 years), the correct addition to the income of the deceased will be 25% (future prospects) -- Total Compensation assessed at Rs.21,38,350/- -- Amount shall carry an interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, till the date of realization.

(Para 10-19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 397(2) – Order u/s 156(3) CR.P.C. to investigate -- Interlocutory order – Maintainability of revision -- An order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued -- An order made u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. directing a police officer to investigate a cognizable case is an interlocutory order and the remedy of revision against such order is barred u/s 397 (2) Cr.P.C. – Revision held to be not maintainable.

(Para 9)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38 -- Rejection of plaint – Suit for permanent injunction -- Maintainability of suit -- At the preliminary stage of the proceedings, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Court to determine whether specific performance is the sole available remedy, or whether the suit for permanent injunction is maintainable, based solely on the averments contained in the plaint -- The issues raised pertain to questions of fact and law which require trial and cannot be resolved by a summary adjudication at the outset.

(Para 11.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 7 Rule 11 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38, 41(h) -- Rejection of plaint – Suit for permanent injunction -- Respondent-plaintiff has already filed an application along with the plaint under Order II Rule 2 CPC, seeking the Court’s permission to reserve the right to subsequently initiate proceedings for specific performance of the contract -- That application is yet to be adjudicated -- It would be wholly inappropriate at this stage to conclude that the suit for permanent injunction is barred, particularly in view of the statutory scheme under Section 41(h).

(Para 15.1)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Suit for permanent injunction -- During the pendency of the proceedings, the plaintiff transferred his interest in the suit property to his sons -- Transferees, though not necessary parties, would constitute proper parties, as the adjudication in the suit would be binding upon them in view of the principles of lis pendens – Ld. trial court, exercising the discretion vested in it, permitted the impleadment of the plaintiff’s sons as co-plaintiffs -- Such exercise of discretion cannot be characterized as arbitrary, illegal, or perverse, and therefore does not warrant interference in the revisional jurisdiction – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 7-7.2)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 22(1)(2) – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Execution within 2 years -- Notice to Judgement debtor – Later dispense with the service – Legality of -- In terms of the proviso to Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 22 of Order XXI CPC, the Executing Court was fully competent to dispense with the service of notice upon the Judgment-Debtor when the execution petition was filed within the prescribed period -- Execution petition falls within the ambit of the proviso to Sub-Rule 1, Sub-Rule 2 does not apply -- Court’s exercise of such discretion does not warrant interference under the revisional jurisdiction of High Court.

(Para 5-5.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 22(1) – Execution within 2 years -- Notice to Judgement debtor – Later service dispensed with – functus officio -- Court continues to have jurisdiction over the execution proceedings until the decree is either satisfied or the execution petition is dismissed -- A Civil Court retains the power to review its own orders -- When service upon the petitioners could not be effected on two consecutive occasions, the Court validly exercised its discretion to dispense with service to prevent undue delay in execution.

(Para 5.3)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Appellate Authority -- Power of -- Once, the Collector had appointed respondent No.1 as Lambardar, the Commissioner should not have appointed the appellant after setting aside the respondent’s appointment in appeal, rather, he should have directed the filling up of the vacancy in the manner required by law.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent FIR – Effect of -- FIR against the appointed respondent was lodged at a subsequent stage and the same could not have been a ground to deny the respondent his appointment as Lambardar.

(Para 5)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Theft of electricity -- Allegations of theft of the electricity is not proved against the respondent No.4/ appointed candidate as he had no concern with the said premises and the electricity meter was in the name of father of respondent No.4 -- Even the Electricity Department has already exonerated the respondent No.4 – Further no ineligibility attached to respondent No.4 has been brought to the notice -- Respondent No.4 is working as Lambardar for the last so many years -- In the absence of any perversity pointed out to the order passed by the Financial Commissioner, which order has already been upheld by the learned Single Judge, no ground is made out for any interference – LPA dismissed.

(Para 2-5)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Constitution of India, Article  226, 227 – Appointment of Lambardar – Once, the authorities after evaluating the claims of all eligible, found respondent No.1 as a better suited for the post of Lambardar, unless and until, the respondent No.1 is ineligible to hold the said post or, the said appointment is causing prejudice to the residents of the area in any manner, no interference can be done – LPA dismissed.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar -- Non-resident Indian – Non-availability in the village -- Merely on the ground that in the year 2006 i.e, 3 years prior to the appointment as a Lambardar, respondent No.1 was issued an Indian passport in a foreign country, will not make him a non-resident Indian -- 16 years have passed and not even a single complaint has been brought to the notice of this Court that there is mis-performance of a duty by respondent No.1 due to his absence from the village -- Argument that the respondent No.1 is a non-resident Indian and will not be available in village to perform the duty, cannot be accepted – LPA dismissed.

(Para 7-10)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Mutation on the basis of Will – Non-challenge to Will – Effect of -- Will by the father of the parties litigating -- After the year 2009, no effort has been made by the appellants to challenge the said Will despite knowledge -- Rather, the effort is that the other side should prove the Will before getting the mutation entered – Held, once despite knowledge, the Will has not been challenged, mutation entry, which does not depict the ownership but only the certain facts qua the land in question, have rightly not been interferred by the Court.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13 – Ex-parte judgment/ decree – Setting aside of -- Record clearly establishes that the judgment and decree had been produced and relied upon in legal proceedings on 16.04.2018, which was more than fourteen months prior to the filing of the application seeking setting aside of the ex parte judgment and decree -- Plea taken by the petitioner that he had acquired knowledge of the judgment and decree only a few days prior to filing the application, allegedly through a bank official, has rightly been disbelieved and rejected -- Application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is thus demonstrably based upon falsehood, concealment of material facts, and suppression of the true date of knowledge – No interference in revision.

(Para 10.3-10.5)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Mutation on the basis of sale deed -- Locus standi to challenge --  There is no challenge to the said sale deed at the hands of the appellants -- Once, there is a sale deed and the Revenue Authorities have accepted the said sale deed so as to enter the mutation, the appellant cannot raise any grievance qua the mutation -- Revenue Authorities have raised no objection qua the aspect of entering into the mutation -- Existence of the sale deed dated 24.06.1966 in favour of respondent No.5/ Society not disputed – Held, appellant has no locus to challenge the same.

(Para 5, 9, 10)