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Posted On: 19-07-2025
251. (SC) (Decided on: 14.05.2025)

A. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(h), 10, 16, 23 -- Standard form of employment Contract -- Interpretation of -- Unequal bargaining power – Onus of prove -- Legal principles relating to interpretation of standard form employment contracts summarized:-

(i) Standard form employment contracts prima facie evidence unequal bargaining power.

(ii) Whenever the weaker party to such a contract pleads undue influence/ coercion or alleges that the contract or any term thereof is opposed to public policy, the Court shall examine such plea keeping in mind the unequal status of the parties and the context in which the contractual obligations were created.

(iii) The onus to prove that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is not in restraint of lawful employment or is not opposed to public policy, is on the covenantee i.e. the employer and not on the employee.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(h), 10, 16, 23 -- Standard form of employment Contract -- Unequal bargaining power – From the prism of employer-employee relationship, technological advancements impacting nature and character of work, re-skilling and preservation of scarce specialized workforce in a free market are emerging heads in the public policy domain which need to be factored when terms of an employment contract is tested on the anvil of public policy.

-- Ensuring retention of an efficient and experienced staff contributing to managerial skills was one of the tools inalienable to the interest of such undertakings including the appellant-bank.

-- This prompted the appellant-bank to incorporate a minimum service tenure for employees, to reduce attrition and improve efficiency.

Viewed from this perspective, the restrictive covenant prescribing a minimum term cannot be said to be unconscionable, unfair or unreasonable and thereby in contravention of public policy -- Imposition of liquidated damages to the tune of Rs.2 Lakhs in the event of pre-mature resignation, upheld.

(Para 25-35)

Posted On: 16-07-2025
254. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 09.07.2025)

A. Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 1 -- Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 1 – Parole/ Temporary release – Object of – The very object of the Act is humanitarian in nature -- Providing opportunities for temporary release ensures that the ties between the prisoner and the society are not severed -- Ensuring that the incarcerated have healthy roots in the society greatly assists in their rehabilitation and reintegration -- It also incentivizes the inmates to maintain good conduct while in custody, that aids the jail authorities in administration as well.

(Para 7)

B. Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 3(1)(d) -- Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 3 – Constitution of India, Article 215 -- Parole/ Temporary release – Delay in disposal – Contempt against competent authority -- The incarcerated cannot be expected to live at the whims and fancies of the State and neither does their incarceration entitle the administration to jeopardize their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Since the statute itself bestows the convict with the right to be considered for temporary release and enlists circumstances therefor, it is all the more vital to decide such applications expeditiously. Directions issued :

All applications pertaining to temporary release on parole shall be decided by the concerned authority within a period of 04 months from receipt of such application -- In case, these directions are not adhered to without any justifiable cause, the convicts would be at liberty to move an appropriate application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India seeking initiation of contempt of Court proceedings against the officials concerned – Copy of judgment ordered to be supplied to States of Punjab and Haryana as well as U.T. Chandigarh for compliance thereof.

 

(Para 8-13)

Posted On: 16-07-2025
256. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 02.07.2025)

A. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 65, 68C – Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Jurisdiction of -- State Police Complaint Authority has power to inquire into complaints against officers holding rank of DSP or above whereas District Police Complaint Authority has power to inquire complaints against personnel upto the rank of Inspector – As per notification dated 24.09.2021 SPCA was competent authority to inquire into complaints -- In view notification, contention of petitioners that State Authority was incompetent to conduct inquiry is mis-conceived.

(Para 8-10)

B. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 68(c)(2)(i) -- Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. -- Effect of -- There is substance in the argument of petitioners while they assert that police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been filed with respect to incident occurred -- Trial Court is seized of the matter -- As per Section 68C(2)(i), Authority could not enquire into any matter because report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been filed.

(Para 10)

C. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 65, 68C – Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (As applicable to Haryana) -- Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA  against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Finding of SPCA – Disciplinary proceedings on recommendation -- Disciplinary Authority is not bound by recommendations of State or District Police Complaint Authority -- Disciplinary Authority may act upon any complaint received from any source -- Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as made applicable to the State of Haryana) specifically permit Disciplinary Authority to initiate proceedings either suo moto or on the basis of complaint lodged by anyone -- Thus, proceedings initiated by Disciplinary Authority cannot be set at naught on the ground that proceedings were initiated on the basis of recommendations of State Authority --  Held, the Disciplinary Authority would be at liberty to proceed against petitioners without being influenced by observations/ recommendations of State Police Complaint Authority.

(Para 11, 12)

Posted On: 16-07-2025
259. (SC) (Decided on: 23.04.2025)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Suit for declaration – Further relief – Nature of -- Section 34 entitles a person to approach the appropriate court for a declaration, if that person is entitled to (i) any legal character or (ii) any right as to any property -- “Legal character” and “right to property” are used disjunctively so that either of them, exclusively, may be the basis of a suit -- The disjunctive ‘or’ cannot be read as a conjunctive ‘and’.

-- Object of the proviso to Section 34 is to obviate the necessity for multiple suits by preventing a person from getting a mere declaration of right in one suit and then subsequently seeking another remedy without which the declaration granted in the former suit would be rendered otiose.

-- However, the answer to the question whether it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to ask for further relief must depend on the facts of each case and such relief must be appropriate to and consequent upon the right or title asserted.

“Further relief” must be a relief flowing directly or necessarily from the declaration sought, i.e., the relief should not only be capable of being granted but of being enforced by the court and such relief should be necessary to make the declaration fruitful -- The relief must also be such that it is not automatically granted to the plaintiff by virtue of the declaration already sought for.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Simplicitor suit for declaration – Maintainability of -- The words used in proviso to Section 34 are “further relief” and “no other relief” -- Since, a further relief must flow necessarily from the relief of declaration, if such further relief is remote and is not connected in any way with the cause of action which has accrued in favour of the plaintiffs, then there is no need to claim a further relief and the proviso to Section 34 will not be a bar -- All that the proviso forbids is a suit for pure declaration without necessary relief where the plaintiff being able to seek such a relief, has omitted to do so -- The proviso must not be construed in a manner which compels the plaintiff to sue for any and all the reliefs which could possibly be granted to him -- The plaintiff must not be debarred from obtaining a relief that he wants for the reason that he has failed to seek a relief which is not directly flowing from the relief of declaration already sought for.

(Para 28)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 31, 34 – Declaratory relief -- Cancellation of deed – Nature of -- Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed u/s 31 of the Act, 1963 -- But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or nonest, or illegal or that it is not binding on him -- Plaintiff who is not a party to a decree or a document, is not obligated to sue for its cancellation -- This is because such an instrument would neither be likely to affect the title of the plaintiff nor be binding on him – Declaration of title is as good as a relief of cancellation of the sale deed or at least, a declaration that the sale deed is not binding on the plaintiff being void and thus non est.

(Para 29-36)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 1, Section 151 – Frame of suit -- Grant of relief -- Inherent power of Court -- Plaint must be read as a whole and the actual relief sought can also be culled out from the averments of the plaint -- Those reliefs can be granted, if there is evidence and circumstances justifying the grant of such relief, though not directly or specifically claimed, or asked as a relief -- Plaintiff had averred in his plaint that the original defendant nos. 1 to 6 had no title or saleable rights over the suit property -- This reflects the intention of the plaintiff to not be bound by any instrument which they may have executed in favour of another party -- Courts have ample inherent powers and indeed it is their duty to shape their declaration in such a way that they may operate to afford the relief which the justice of the case requires.

(Para 37, 38)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Declaratory decree/ relief – Power of -- Section 34 of the Act, 1963 is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section -- Section 34 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 34 -- Circumstances in which a declaratory decree under Section 34 should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case.

(Para 38)

Posted On: 10-07-2025
272. (H.P. HC) (Reserved on: 26.3.2025 Decided on: 25.04.2025)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(o), 2(k), 18, 19, 21, 22, 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Breach of Residence / Monetary/ Custody order – FIR for non-compliance – Quashing of FIR -- Penalty for breach of protection order – Mandate of -- The words in Section 31 are plain and ambiguous -- They only mention the protection and interim protection order -- Applying the literal rules of interpretation, Section 31 applies only to the breach of protection orders mentioned in Section 18 and not to residence orders mentioned in Section 19, monetary reliefs mentioned in section 20, custody orders mentioned in Section 21, and compensation orders mentioned in Section 22 -- Had the legislature intended to apply Section 31 to these orders, it would have mentioned them specifically.

– Section 31 of the DV Act creates an offence. It is the rule of interpretation of the statute that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed because they deprive a citizen of his life and liberty, and no act, which does not fall within the purview of the criminal statute, can be added to it by way of interpretation.

Monetary relief which is separately provided in Section 2 (k) of the DV Act cannot be added to the protection order separately provided in Sections 2 (o) and 18 of the DV Act -- Learned Magistrate erred in referring the application to the police under Section 156(3) of Cr.PC -- Police could not have registered the FIR for the breach of the monetary order -- Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR quashed.

(Para 14, 15, 17, 23)

Posted On: 10-07-2025
274. (SC) (Decided on: 27.03.2025)

A. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 4, 5, 23 – Maintenance to Senior citizen – Eviction of son – Property already transferred to daughter/ son-in-law – Effect of -- Exfacie Senior citizen ceases to be the owner of the property and it is up to the purchasers to initiate eviction proceedings, if any, against the occupants of any part of it -- Senior citizens are simply entitled to maintenance rather than eviction of their son/ relatives -- It was only in the contingency of son not behaving properly or continuing to humiliate or torture the parents that the eviction proceedings would be necessary against him -- Tribunal was justified in permitting him to continue living therein with the rider of drawing eviction proceedings if he indulges in any untoward behavior or interferes with the life of others.

(Para 26-29)

B. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 4, 5, 23 – Eviction of son -- If son has been living in a small portion of the house, may be of his father, in which he has no share and is continuing with the family business from the shop on the ground floor without interfering with the life of others, it does not appear to be prudent to order for his eviction as after all being a son he also has an implied license to live therein – No necessity for the extreme step for ordering the eviction -- Purpose could have been served by ordering maintenance as provided under Section 4/5 of the Senior Citizens Act and by restraining him from harassing the parents and interfering in their day-to-day life.

(Para 29, 34)

C. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 -- Senior citizen case -- Eviction of person – Power of -- Provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior person -- It is only on account of the observations made by this Court in S. Vanitha vs. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors, (2021) 15 SCC 730 that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens -- The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act which otherwise provide for treating the sale of the property to be void if it is against the interest of the senior citizen.

(Para 31)

Posted On: 09-07-2025
280. (Kerala HC) (Decided on: 17.06.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A(1)(i) – Sexual harassment -- In order to attract Section 354A(1)(i) IPC, it has to be shown that the petitioner has resorted to physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures – Thus it is of prime importance to show that the offender had committed the act with sexual intention.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – POCSO – Sexual assault -- To establish the offence of sexual assault as envisaged u/s 7 of the POCSO Act, it has to be shown that the offender had done the act with sexual intent.

(Para 5)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO – Allegation of sexual assault against Doctor – Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Victim complained about chest pain and abdominal pain -- Medical examination of the victim was conducted by the petitioner in the presence of the mother of the victim on the first occasion, and in the presence of the elder sister of the victim on the second occasion -- It is too hard to believe that the petitioner would have resorted to sexual advances upon the victim in the close presence of the victim’s mother and elder sister -- Neither the statement given by the victim to the Police, nor her statements to the learned Magistrate u/s 164 Cr.PC, contained any indication that the alleged act committed by the petitioner was with sexual intent – Chances of that adolescent girl getting misunderstood about the act of the petitioner, cannot be ignored -- Section 41 of the POCSO Act assumes much relevancy -- Provisions of Sections 3 to 13 shall not apply in case of medical examination or medical treatment of a child when such medical examination or medical treatment is undertaken with the consent of his parents or guardian – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

Posted On: 09-07-2025
283. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 21.05.2025 Decided on: 02.06.2025)

A. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(d) – Consideration -- Past consideration is as good as present consideration --  Word ‘consideration’ has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which has a wider connotation and includes within its sweep not only the monetary consideration but even promises including promise to render future personal service.

(Para 13)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 201, 202 – Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 3, 4 -- Sale by Will/ Agreement to Sell/ General Power of attorney/ Affidavit -- PW-1/ S K deposed that her brother/ A.K. was only a Class IV employee and on her request and on her behalf he applied for the house in his name -- A.K/ Brother executed an agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, registered Will and an affidavit – Hence, Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 could not be invoked -- After the death of A.K. on 14.08.1984, his widow and children never made any attempt to pay the instalments -- All instalments were paid by S.K. and her daughter -- All the documents of the property have been produced by the plaintiff -- Hence, it is proved that there was sale of the house in favour of Ms. S.K. by A.K -- Likewise, the General Power of Attorney will not cease to have effect because Ms.SK has interest in the property in view of agreement and Will -- Case falls under Section 202 and not 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

(Para 13, 18)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 13 -- Agreement to sell of imperfect title – Effect of -- Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables the purchaser to claim specific performance against person with no title or imperfect title -- Clause (a) of Section 13 (1) provides that if the vendor has subsequent to any contract acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest -- If there was any defect in his ownership, the same stood rectified on payment of instalment.

(Para 14)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will – Proof of -- Suspicious circumstances -- Execution of the Will proved by examining both the attesting witnesses – Despite lengthy cross examination, the defendants failed to impeach their credibility – Will is not surrounded by suspicious circumstances because of various documents executed by A.K. including agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, affidavit, apart from the Will.

(Para 15, 16)

Posted On: 01-07-2025
293. (SC) (Decided on: 05.06.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388 – Extortion – Stage before committing an extortion -- Section 383 defines extortion, the punishment therefor is given in Section 384 -- Sections 386 and 388 provide for an aggravated form of extortion -- These sections deal with the actual commission of an act of extortion, whereas Sections 385, 387 and 389 IPC seek to punish for an act committed for the purpose of extortion even though the act of extortion may not be complete and property not delivered -- It is in the process of committing an offence that a person is put in fear of injury, death or grievous hurt.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 387 – Stage before committing an extortion -- Commission of an offence of extortion is not sine qua non for an offence under this Section -- It is safe to deduce that for prosecution u/s 387 IPC, the delivery of property is not necessary.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 387 – Stage before committing an extortion -- Penal law – Strict interpretation -- It is a well-settled principle of law that penal statutes must be given strict interpretation -- The Court ought not to read anything into a statutory provision that imposes penal liability -- Scope of the provision cannot be extended by reading into it words which are not there -- Section 387 IPC, being a penal provision, has to be strictly interpreted, and no condition/ essential ingredient can be read into it that the Statute/ Section does not prescribe.

(Para 19, 24)

Posted On: 30-06-2025
296. (P&H HC) (Reserved on 19.11.2024 Decided on: 07.01.2025)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 -- Commencement of arbitral proceedings – Notice for arbitration -- Proceedings are deemed to have been initiated from the date the notice invoking the arbitration clause “is received by the respondent” -- The clause does not require the notice to be served by all the parties to the agreement -- Notice by one of the parties to the agreement would be a sufficient compliance of the statutory provision.

(Para 6)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 – Notice for arbitration – Nature of -- Giving of such a notice is purely procedural and not a decisive step -- Its form and terms do not call for a strict scrutiny -- Technicality cannot be attached with a notice served under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act as that would defeat the objective of the statute, which provides for a speedy resolution of the disputes.

(Para 6)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 -- Appointment of Arbitrator -- Accounts of firm -- Dissolution of partnership firm – Pendency of civil and criminal case – Effect of -- On the dissolution of a partnership firm, the arbitration clause does not come to an end -- Dispute relating to the accounts of a partnership firm is a dispute, which touches the affairs of the firm and is clearly referable to an Arbitrator and the parties cannot be compelled to take a recourse to the civil courts -- Pendency of a civil and criminal litigation inter se partners, cannot estop one of the partners from invoking the arbitration clause or bar the reference of dispute for adjudication to an arbitrator for determination – Arbitrator appointed.

(Para 7-9)

Posted On: 30-06-2025
297. (SC) (Decided on: 13.05.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 140, 166, 168 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Married daughter – Legal heir -- Dependency of -- Once a daughter is married, logical presumption is that she now has rights on her matrimonial household and is also financially supported by her husband or his family, unless proven otherwise -- Sections 166 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 focus on the financial relationship between the deceased and the Claimant -- A married daughter may be considered a legal representative but she will not be eligible for loss of dependency compensation unless it is proven by the daughter that she was financially dependent on the deceased -- Appellant No. 1 failed to prove that she was being financially supported by her mother post marriage and hence cannot be said to be a dependent of her mother, the deceased -- High Court rightly hold that Appellant No.1, as the legal representative of the deceased, will only be entitled to compensation envisaged in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 as liability under the same does not cease to exist in the absence of dependency.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 140, 166, 168 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Death of daughter -- Dependency of aged mother of about 70 years  – Possibility of future dependency – Consideration of -- She was solely dependent on the deceased as she lived with her and had no independent income, there is no evidence on record to rebut the same – Held, obligation of a child to maintain their parent in old age is as much of a duty as the obligation of a parent to maintain their child during minority --  Even if it is assumed that Appellant No. 2/ mother was not dependent on the deceased at the time of the accident, the possibility of future dependency cannot be disregarded -- Appellant No. 2/ mother held entitled to compensation of Rs.19,22,356/-.

(Para 15-20)