Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 302 -- Common intention in free fight case – Incident occurred after Panchayat proceedings -- Manner of occurrence and the number of injured on both sides makes it apparently a case of ‘free fight’ or spontaneous rather than pre-meditated crime – Nothing on record to show that the accused other than “S” had any knowledge or intention that “S” was going to cause death --  “S” was not carrying any gun when the Panchayat proceedings were going on – Other accused can be held liable for their individual act and cannot be held vicariously liable.

(Para 2, 34, 37)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 41, 42, 43 -- NDPS -- Private conveyance – Search of vehicle – Compliance of Section 41(1) and 42(2) of NDPS Act – Requirement of -- Where secret information is received in terms of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, then the search of a private conveyance even in a public place/ transit would require compliance of Sections 41(1) and 42(2) of the NDPS Act i.e. the information so received must be taken down in writing and conveyed to the immediate superior officer within 72 hours -- However, where the search of a public conveyance is to be conducted in a public place/transit, no such compliance is required -- Whether a vehicle is a private conveyance or a public conveyance would be a question of fact in each case.

(Para 35)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 42, 43 – NDPS – Search of vehicle -- ‘private public’ and a ‘public conveyance’ -- In the case of the former, Section 42 of the Act would apply and in the case of the latter, Section 43 of the NDPS Act would apply.

(Para 36)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Jump of bail – Proclaimed person – Primary object of every Court is only to examine the commission of crime in question before it viz-a-viz the person/ accused, who is subjected to such proceedings, and if possible justice be imparted at the earliest without unnecessary delay -- Not expected that undue time would be devoted in securing the presence of absconded accused and also to waste energy by enforcing the special mechanism to arrest such accused -- When the petitioner came to know about passing of the impugned order, the petitioner immediately moved the petition, showing his inclination to submit himself before the trial Court – Impugned order set aside to the extent of declaring the petitioner as ‘proclaimed person’ -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 6-8)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Age – Land holding -- Appointed candidate/ Respondent No.4 has the land in the village of which he has been appointed as Lambardar and his name was recommended by the Tehsildar as well as by the Sub Division Magistrate, which was accepted by the all the authorities, whereas no land is owned by the appellant in the village -- Appellant is 24 years of age and respondent No.4 is 30 years of age -- Six years difference between the age is not such that it will tilt the pendulum in favour of the appellant -- No ground made out for interference – LPA dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Ld. Single Judge by giving details of both the candidates has found that the respondent No.4 was better suited than the appellant coupled with the fact that respondent No.4 has been working for the last 28 years, it will not be in the interest to dislodge the respondent No.4 from the said post -- No perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge -- Mere passage of time can, on occasion, give rise to judicial discretion to be exercised by the Courts, which has rightly been exercised by the learned Single Judge – Respondent No.4 is more educated than the appellant and both almost are having same land holding in the village and respondent No.4 has worked as Sarbara Lambardar at the time when he was appointed -- LPA dismissed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time – Rescinding of contract -- Contract between the parties not extinguished by passing of a decree for specific performance and it subsists despite the decree -- Court does not become a functus officio after the grant of the decree for specific performance and it retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the sale deed is executed -- Court does not adjudge the same like an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, where each day's delay must be explained -- Court is given the discretion to extend the time -- It also enables the judgment debtor to seek for rescinding the contract for non-compliance of the directions given in the decree and while considering this application, the Court is given the discretion to rescind the contract or in an appropriate case to even extend the time for paying the purchase money.

(Para 45, 46)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time by Appellate court -- Appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the power of the Court to extend the time for depositing the amount can be exercised even in the appellate stage by the Court.

(Para 48)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Decree in appeal -- Time to make payment – Extension of time -- What is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court -- The appellate court owes a duty to specify the time period -- If during the specified time period the decree holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale consideration or fails to deposit the balance sale consideration and later upon expiry of the specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then it would be within the discretion of the trial court to grant further time to deposit the balance sale consideration or decline.

(Para 49, 50)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time – Discretion of Court – Discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in mind various factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the length of delay and also the equities that might have been created during the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor -- It is the cumulative effect and considerations of such factors that should weigh with the court concerned while permitting the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration beyond the time period that might have been prescribed by the trial court in its final decree.

(Para 50)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Execution of – Limitation -- Just because a decree of specific performance can be executed within 12 years from the date of original decree or from the date the appellate court affirms such decree that, by itself, does not mean that a decree holder deposits the balance sale consideration at his own sweet will -- If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any particular time period then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period of time.

(Para 51, 52)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Registration of FIR – Cognizable offence -- Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- In Lalita Kumari, case (2014) 2 SCC 1 it was categorically held that the registration of an FIR is mandatory u/s 154 CrPC if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence – Scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification -- However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR -- Decision in Lalita Kumari’s case does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR -- Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR – Petitioner seeking a blanket direction for non-registration of FIR or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases – Permissibility of – Held, Supreme Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him -- Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would also amount to judicial overreach -- Courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A 376 (3) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3 (a), 4 (ii) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- POCSO – Rape -- Regular bail -- According to the FIR, the applicant enticed the victim a young girl -- FIR records that the applicant has established physical relations with the victim -- Applicant and the victim, both are young and they were in romantic relationship -- Victim admitted that she was known to the applicant and they wanted to marry -- Father of the victim has also stated that the applicant and the victim both were in romantic relationship -- Bail allowed.

(Para 1-7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus by mother – Maintainability of -- Custody of girl child with grandparents -- Girl child stated that she is happy with her grand-parents, who are taking good care of her -- However, she stated that she wants that her mother may join their company so that the entire family stays together -- Since the custody of the minor girl with the father and grand-parents cannot be termed as unlawful, no scope for interference in this Habeas Corpus Petition – Writ dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 7, 8)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 303(2), 3(5), 317(2) -- Electricity Act, 2003 (No.36 of 2003), Section 136(1) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Theft – Common intention – Anticipatory bail -- Three co-accused were arrested -- Stolen property was recovered from arrested co-accused -- They told that applicant was also involved in the said offence -- Two arrested persons have already been granted bail -- Applicant is not a convicted person -- Personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2 (xxiii-a), 2 (vii-a), 8, 21, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – NDPS – Regular bail -- Applicant was sitting on a cot in a hut -- Police recovered 24.10 gm. smack (heroin) in the polythene from the spot -- Applicant fled from the spot -- FIR registered on 17.07.2025 and the applicant surrendered before the Magistrate on 02.08.2025 -- 5 gm of heroin is small quantity and greater than 250 gm is commercial quantity -- Object of keeping the accused in detention during the investigation is not punishment -- Main purpose is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused – Bail allowed.

(Para 2-9)

A. Goa Children’s Act, 2003 (18 of 2003), Section 2(m), 8(2) – Child abuse – Acquittal -- Appellant/ accused hit child with the school bag belonging to his own son – Held, it would still not be sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of “child abuse” punishable under Section 8 of the Act of 2003 -- Offence of child abuse necessarily presupposes an intention to cause harm, cruelty, exploitation, or ill-treatment directed towards a child in a manner that exceeds a mere incidental or momentary act during a quarrel -- A simple blow with a school bag, without any evidence of deliberate or sustained maltreatment, does not satisfy the essential ingredients of child abuse -- Medical officer in his cross-examination stated that the possibility of the injuries being caused due to a fall cannot be ruled out – Held, ex-facie the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/s 8 of the Act of 2003 is unsustainable – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-18, 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504 – Provoke breach of peace -- Appellant/ accused hit child with the school bag belonging to his own son – Alleged act of the appellant in abusing the child could not be construed to be such which was intended to provoke breach of peace -- Hence, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 504 IPC is also unsustainable in facts as well as in law -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18, 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 352 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 -- Conviction – Probation -- Offence punishable u/s 323 IPC carries maximum punishment of simple imprisonment for one year whereas offence punishable u/s 352 IPC carries maximum punishment of imprisonment for three months -- Thus, the mandatory provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 would apply and the appellant deserves to be given benefit thereof -- Appellant ordered to be released on probation.

(Para 21)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- In Trial Court’s judgment, Not an iota of discussion about the validity of the Will as contemplated under Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and yet, the validity of the Will has been upheld -- This is contrary to law -- Even the High Court, while evaluating the validity of the Will, has gone on a different tangent and has erroneously held that the requirement of examining the attesting witnesses springs into action only in cases of disputes between legal heirs. Such an observation is quite contrary to law, for Section 68 of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory to examine at least one of the attesting witnesses of the Will -- Mere fact that the Will was registered will not grant validity to the document

(Para 27)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- Suspicious circumstances -- Not even a whisper of reasoning as to why the propounder of the Will choose to exclude other three children from the bequest, and whether any other properties or assets were given to them -- It is highly unlikely that a father would grant his entire property to one of his children, at the cost of three others, without there being any evidence of estrangement between the father and the children -- This suspicious circumstance surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff either -- Hence, for these cumulative reasons, the Will propounded by plaintiff though registered would not confer any valid title on the plaintiff either.

(Para 27)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A – Agreement to sell -- Part-performance – Benefit of -- One of the main ingredients for taking shelter u/s 53A is the factum of possession -- Unless the transferee in the instrument of agreement to sale is able to prove that he has been in possession of the suit property, no benefit u/s 53A will be given -- Very fact that plaintiff has filed the present suit for possession, along with other reliefs, shows that on the date of filing of the suit, plaintiff was not in possession of the entire suit property -- Since there was no possession with the plaintiff, he cannot derive any benefit under the doctrine of part-possession.

(Para 31)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Appellant 20 years aged was a final year B.Com student who had also enrolled with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India rendered immobile with paraplegia for reason of the fracture of C4-5 -- Tribunal adopted an income of Rs.3,339/- per month being the minimum wages -- Court not convinced that the Minimum wages would be determined on the basis of the educational qualification alone without reference to the nature of work carried on – Held, even if he had not obtained the certificate as a Chartered Accountant, upon graduation, he could have been employed as an Accountant, who would have, on any reasonable estimate, received an amount of Rs.5,000/- as monthly income in the year 2001 -- 40% future prospects given with multiplier of 18 -- Loss of income for the 100% disabled paraplegic would be Rs.15,12,000/- (Rs.5,000/- x 140% x 12 x 18) – With medical expenses of Rs.11,22,356/- compensation totalling to Rs.40,34,356/- -- Total award carrying interest @ 9% per annum from the filing of the petition till realisation -- In addition, Rs.20 lakhs as future medical expenses incurred by the parents awarded.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Parameters -- If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 498A, 506, 34 – Quashing of FIR for father/ mother/ sister-in-law --  Cruelty -- Statements of a general nature against the present appellants  that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery -- When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members -- Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars -- Cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself -- Such allegations are absent in the present case – For offence punishable u/s 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants --  Proceedings against appellants deserve to be quashed in their entirety -- High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants – FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Motive -- Disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- For drawing an inference pertaining to motive, the trial Court relied upon the document which was a disclosure made by respondents -- Manifestly, the use of the said document was limited to the extent permitted u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Inculpatory narrative recited therein could not have been used to draw any inference regarding motive, which was required to be established from substantive evidence.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65B – Cal details – Proof of -- Both the circumstances, i.e., non-production of the certificate u/s 65-B of the Evidence Act, and the call detail records being presented through a handwritten note without examining the scribe thereof would lead to an inescapable conclusion that the call details were not proved as per law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 302 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Mere threat to inflict harm may constitute an incriminating circumstance but in isolation, the said circumstance would fall woefully short of proof of conspiracy to commit murder.

(Para 37)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 --  Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Plaintiff asserted that his land is situated adjoining the disputed rasta (pathway), which is duly recorded as a rasta in the revenue records and defendants are restraining him from using the said rasta seeking decree of mandatory and permanent injunction – Defendants’ case is that the suit rasta forms part of their private property and no public pathway exists at the spot and entries in the revenue record were erroneous and have since been rightly rectified – Appointment of a Local Commissioner is sought solely for the purpose of collecting evidence, such an appointment is impermissible and ought to be dis-allowed -- Appointment of the Local Commissioner was made with the limited objective of ascertaining the existing status of the property on the spot, and not for the purpose of collecting evidence – Learned Court of first instance has recorded its due satisfaction while appointing the Local Commissioner -- Order, upheld.

(Para 5-10)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Hereditary claim -- Sarbraha Lambardar -- Only argument that the petitioner is son of previous deceased Lambardar (SC) and also remained Sarbraha Lambardar and therefore, he deserves preference for appointment to the post of Lambardar -- Held, hereditary claim in the matter of appointment of Lambardar is ultra vires of the Constitution and preference to a candidate on the ground that he has remained a Sarbarah Lambardar would tantamount to give preference to hereditary claim – All the courts below concurrently found respondent No. 6 as a better and suitable candidate for appointment to the post of Lambardar inasmuch as that he is younger in age and more educated than the petitioner --  No compelling reasons to interfere in the impugned orders and finding no merit, the instant civil writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

(Para 5-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 419, 420, 468, 471 -- Sale deed by impersonation – Conspiracy – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced -- Prime accused in conspiracy with the petitioners secured attestation and registration of the sale deed -- Role of Petitioners as Lambardar and co-villager was not passive but active in facilitating the fraudulent transaction – Principal beneficiary expired does not exonerate the petitioners of liability -- Criminal conspiracy u/s 120-B of the IPC is an independent offence, and once participation is proved, conviction can stand irrespective of the status of other conspirators -- Held, both the Courts below rightly held the petitioners guilty u/s 120-B of the IPC -- Petitioners have been facing trial since 1998 and are not involved in any other case -- Considering the protracted proceedings, their age, and the fact that they have already suffered the ordeal of litigation for more than two decades, sentence reduced to the period already undergone by them.

(Para 1, 5-14)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – JBT Teacher – Candidature of – Contention that that respondent No.6 is working as a JBT Teacher and is not available to perform his functions as Lambardar, which should have been treated as a disqualification – Held, once, the said pleaded ‘disqualification’ is not pre-requisite under governing the Rules, merely on the asking of the appellant, the same cannot be treated as disqualification -- For the last 15 years, respondent No.6 has been performing the duties of the post of Lambardar, no complaint has been received that he was not available to discharge the duties of the post as and when required -- Contention of the appellant cannot be accepted – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Civil suit pending – Maintainability of Writ petition -- Writ petition is not maintainable, dismissed -- Dismissal would have no bearing on the pending civil suit.

(Para 4-7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Partition of land – Change of land use – Chahi to Gair Mumkin -- Licence to develop residential colony -- Grant of license by itself merely indicated an intention to develop a colony and could not ipso-facto alter the revenue character of the land from Chahi to Gair Mumkin -- Since the occupation certificate dated 15.12.2017 did not concern the suit land, there was in fact no material to justify the conclusion that the land had ceased to be Chahi and had become Gair Mumkin -- An injunction being an equitable relief, the party seeking it must approach the Court with clean hands -- As the appellant-plaintiff is guilty of misrepresenting a material fact, the learned First Appellate Court rightly declined to grant the injunction.

(Para 10.1-10.5)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 108 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Deceased is husband of the petitioner -- No suicide note had been recovered -- Petitioner was having matrimonial discord and was residing separately from the deceased husband since the last about one year -- Deceased tried to commit suicide about six months ago also -- No such allegation that the deceased immediately consumed poisonous substance after alleged quarrel at his in-laws’ house at Kathua itself -- Custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required for any purpose and nothing is to be recovered from her -- No useful purpose would be served by sending the petitioner behind the bars – Bail allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 --  Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Proof of accident -- Registration of FIR -- It is on preponderance of probabilities that the proof of accident is looked at in a motor accidents claim -- An FIR registered as against the driver of the offending vehicle can be relied on to find the accident having been caused by the driver of the offending vehicle, that too by his rash and negligent driving as reported at the first instance --  However, the preponderance of probabilities that arise from such an FIR registered would not have the same probity if there is a valid suspicion raised on the registration of the FIR and the falsity of the claim being clearly discernible from the evidence led itself.

(Para 6)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 167(5) – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case – Death of injured – Right of Legal Heirs – Right to claim compensation for the injuries caused in a motor vehicle accident survives on the legal representatives of the injured even if the injured dies in the course of the proceedings for reasons not relatable to or having any nexus with the injuries sustained.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 167(5) – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case – 100 % disability – Multiplier of actual life span given – Future prospects given – Interest -- Tribunal and the High Court gave multiplier of 14 for the 45 year old claimant -- Injured lived only for 11 years -- Probably; his life span having been reduced by the injuries which rendered him 100% disabled, ultimately resulting in his demise -- Multiplier adopted of 14 cannot be applied which will have to be reduced to 11, the actual life span -- Victim not being engaged in a regular employment still is entitled to 25% for future prospects especially since his functional disability was 100%, totally disabled from carrying on any work or generate any income -- Interest on the total award of Rs.20,30,095/- at the rate of 9% would run from the date of the filing of the claim petition till the payment is made.

(Para 11-14)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 -- Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Not permissible in law for the High Court to apply the parameters under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 regarding fixing of income when the compensation was assessed and fixed by the Tribunal in a claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act by applying principles under the said Act.

(Para 5.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Evidence of PW-1 reveal that even though the accused appellants were having sharp weapons (pike, spear, etc.), they had only used the blunt side of the said weapons -- PW-2 son of deceased turned hostile -- Medical evidence would also show that all the three deceased persons had lacerated and contused wounds only and there were no incised wounds -- No material on record to show that they had the intention to kill them -- There was prior enmity over the measurement of agricultural fields -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be tenable and is liable to be converted to one under Section 304 Part I of IPC – Accused/ appellants have already undergone sentence of more than 12 years – Sentence reduced to already undergone.

(Para 8-16)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Consideration of -- For the purpose of decision of an application moved under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, only the averments in the plaint and the documents attached therewith are to be considered -- Averments made in the written statement or in the reply to the application for rejection of plaint are not required to be taken into consideration -- Rejection of plaint is a drastic power and must be exercised only when the plaint, on its face, discloses no cause of action or is barred by law.

(Para 18)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint in part – Permissibility of -- Plaint cannot be rejected in part.

(Para 19)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint in part – Plaintiffs prayed for a number of declarations and injunction -- Details of properties, their ownerships thereof, the date of the Will and its details were not given -- However an application for amendment is also pending, which was not decided -- One of the defendants has not filed any application for rejection of plaint -- Important rights of parties are involved and to reject the plaint at the threshold would be a very drastic action, which should be resorted to only in case the Court is of the firm opinion that the ingredients laid down in Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are fulfilled – Application was dismissed by Trial Court -- No illegality in the impugned orders warranting interference – Revision dismissed.

(Para 3, 3.1, 21-23)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29, 61, 85 – NDPS – Regular bail -- Recovery of 1400 intoxicant tablets containing Tramadol and 1200 intoxicant tablets containing Alprazolam from the co-accused of the petitioner – HS was arrested on disclosure statement – On his disclosure statement, the petitioner was arrested -- Petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of about 04 months & is not shown to be involved in any other FIR(s) -- Further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case – Bail allowed.

(Para 2, 6, 7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Six year old child with 70% permanent disability – Multiplier method applied – Expenses for two attendants with multiplier method -- Appellant has suffered right side hemiparesis leading to 70% disability – Minimum wages for a skilled worker prevalent at the time of the accident in the State of Haryana were Rs.2,620/- per month -- Appellant held entitled to two attendant Rs.11,31,840/- [Rs.2,620 x 2 x 12 x 18 (multiplier)] towards attendant charges – Loss of dependency at 70% [Rs.2,620- 786] Rs.1,834/- + (40% future prospects) = Rs.2568 x 12 x 18 = Rs.5,54,688/- -- Rs.5,00,000/- towards pain and suffering; Rs.50,000/- towards special diet; Rs.3,00,000/- towards loss of amenities of life and loss of marriage prospects – Rs. 65,000/- awarded towards medical expenses -- Total Compensation assessed at Rs.26,51,528/- alongwith 7.5 interest from the date of filing claim petition.

(Para 8-16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20, 118 -- Suit for recovery – Pronote & Receipt – Proof of -- Plaintiff-respondent himself duly appeared in support of his case -- Both the attesting witnesses examined as PW2 and PW3 -- Scribe of pronote and receipt who is an Advocate as PW4, who duly asserted that on the instance of defendant he had scribed the original pronote and receipt and got it typed in the presence of the parties -- He further asserted that the same was read over to defendant and after admitting the same to be correct, he had signed in his presence as well as in presence of witnesses after receiving Rs. 12,00,000/- – Appellant-defendant not denying his signatures over the pronote and receipt – His claim is that plaintiff has forged the pronote and receipt – Mere oral self-serving statement of appellant-defendant is not sufficient to conclude and throw the evidence of plaintiff-respondent, attesting witnesses and scribe who in a consistent manner had asserted due execution of pronote and receipt by appellant-defendant.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 (3 of 1938), Section 8 – Recovery suit -- Personal loan – Friendly loan – Money lending Licence – Requirement of -- One single act of personal loan to friend, relatives or known person does not amount to money lending and no licence is required.

(Para 19)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will – Ignoring natural heirs – Effect of -- While deciding validity of Will, Courts cannot ignore fact that Will is generally executed by testator either to distribute his properties fairly or to disturb natural succession and make provisions of succession of his estate according to his wishes -- Merely, because natural heirs have been ignored from succession by itself is no ground to conclude the Will to be doubtful.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will in favour of one natural heir --  Whether makes Will doubtful ? -- Merely, because testator of Will has chosen to repose faith in one of his natural heirs on account of love and affection or for any other reasons on account of services rendered and after considering other natural heirs has executed Will in favour of one of them would not make the Will doubtful -- This by itself is not a suspicious circumstance and learned Appellate Court has erred in concluding so.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Un-registered Will – Death within 5 months – Testator himself scribe – Effect of -- Non-registration of Will merely because Testator himself was scribe cannot lead to conclusion against due execution -- Death within 5 months cannot be held to be suspicious circumstance itself unless signatures of Testator are held to be forged or it is shown that he was not of sound deposing mind or that Will was not executed in accordance with law.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Forged and fabricated Will – Fraud -- Onus of proof --  Duty to prove signatures is upon a person who denies it on the ground of fraud -- It was defendants who had challenged and asserted that Will is forged and fabricated -- It was duty of defendant to prove that Will was forged and fabricated once onus to prove Will stood discharged by examination of both the attesting witnesses.

(Para 23)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 --  Appointment of Lambardar – Knowledge of revenue terms – Requirement of -- Appellant failed to answer the questions of District Collector relating to the revenue, the said reason can be a sole good ground to oust the appellant from the zone of selection and to appoint respondent No. 5 as a Lambardar of the village concerned – Good knowledge of revenue proceedings is very essential to perform the duty on the post of Lambardar and the Financial Commissioner, has ignored the said fact while remanding the case back to the District Collector – Ld. Single Judge rightly set-aside the order passed by the Financial Commissioner, so as to uphold the appointment of respondent No. 5 as a lambardar.

(Para 7-10)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Authorities are better suited to know which candidate is a right candidate to be appointed as Lambardar -- Unless and until, any disqualification is pointed out towards the selected candidate, the interference should be minimum --  Interference is only warranted when the process involves manifest illegality, gross arbitrariness or violation of the principles of natural justice.

(Para 5)

B. Letters Patent Appeal -- In the Letters Patent Appeal, the judgment is to be proved perverse either on facts or law.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Execution of -- Allegation of forgery – Proof of – Suit for recovery decreed by learned Courts below -- Marginal witnesses PW2 and PW3 had duly proved that after taking the amount, the defendant had executed Pronote Ex.P1 in favour of the plaintiff and Receipt Ex.P2 -- Defendant has not even denied his signatures on the Pronote and Receipt -- Defendant had not moved any complaint before any police authorities or any other higher authorities against the plaintiff for the alleged forgery and fabrication of the Pronote -- Very fact that the cousin of the appellant/ defendant is deposing against the appellant, would prove the case against the appellant -- Defendant led no evidence to prove the alleged forgery -- No ground is made out to interfere in the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below -- Regular Second Appeal dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39(1) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote -- Forged and fabricated – Expert examination -- Defendant has taken twin stand that stamp paper as well as receipt stamp are forged one and had not been issued since 2009 and their use in year 2016 goes to prove that pronote is false and fabricated -- Petitioner has also disputed his signatures over agreement -- At the stage of collection of evidence, finding given by the learned trial Court that age of stamp paper and receipt stamp is of no consequence cannot be accepted – Entire evidence as desired by defendant be allowed at this stage and its effect shall be taken in consideration at the time of passing of final judgement.

(Para 3, 4)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 2(k) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Juvenile – Determination of age -- Delayed application – School leaving certificate -- Entire case of the petitioner claiming to be a minor is based on a School Leaving Certificate making him out to be a juvenile on the date when the FIR was registered --  Other than the said document, there is nothing on record to establish his date of birth as 05.05.2000 -- Neither his birth certificate nor the record of the Chowkidar or Lambardar been brought on record to establish the fact that the date of birth of the petitioner is 05.05.2000 – Petitioner moved his application claiming to be a minor when the case was listed for recording of defence evidence -- Delay in raising the plea of juvenility also creates a significant doubt in the claim of the petitioner -- Held, an entry relating to the date of birth made in a school register is relevant only when there is a primary evidence with respect to the date of birth available on the record – Application to declare minor dismissed.

(Para 1, 7-11)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Released deed – Proof of – Challenge to -- Suit for declaration -- To prove the execution of Release Deed, the defendants had examined the attesting witness as DW1, who had categorically stated that he knew both the parties personally; the Release Deed was written on the instructions of the plaintiff by Deed Writer at Rewari; and that after reading over and explaining the contents of the Release Deed to both the parties, they had affixed their thumb impressions/signatures -- Defendants had further examined Deed Writer as DW5, who had proved the execution of Release Deed; and had deposed that the Release Deed was typed on the instructions of the plaintiff; which was then entered into the register of DW5 Deed Writer at Sr. No. 152 -- Defendants had also examined Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert, who had tendered her report Ex.DW4/B, wherein she gave opinion that thumb impressions marked D2 to D5 on the Release Deed were tallying with the admitted thumb impressions of the plaintiff, Mark S1 to S9 – Release Deed stood proven on record beyond doubt -- Oral statement of the plaintiff that she did not know the meaning of Release Deed or her denial of her thumb impressions on Release Deed, do not hold weightage.

(Para 2, 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34, 120-B –  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Murder -- Regular bail -- Petitioner behind the bars since 19.06.2024 -- Investigation is complete -- Final report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the concerned Court -- Charges were framed and trial of the case has not made much progress -- Out of 22 prosecution witnesses, no PW has been examined so far – Culpability, if any, would be determined at the time of trial and as such, no useful purpose will be served by further detention of the petitioner-accused -- Keeping the petitioner in further detention without the prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future, would be violative of his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Proof of – Plaintiff/ PW-1 reiterated the facts stated in the plaint -- PW-2 deposed that the pronote and receipt were written by him at the request of the defendant and further stated that the documents were duly read over and explained to the defendant, who, after understanding and acknowledging the contents to be correct and upon receiving Rs. 3,00,000/- in cash, affixed his signatures thereon -- Attesting witness to the pronote and receipt was also examined as PW-3, his testimony is in line with the assertions made by PW-1 and PW-2 --  PW-3 further affirmed that the defendant signed the documents in his presence and that he could identify the signatures of both the plaintiff and the scribe -- Defendant has not denied his signatures on the pronote and receipt, he merely pleaded that the documents were blank at the time of signing and that his signatures were obtained under a false pretext -- Plaintiff examined a handwriting and finger print expert as PW-5, who confirmed that the signatures on the pronote and receipt (Ex. P-1 and P-2) were indeed those of the defendant -- Both the Courts below have rightly found the execution of the pronote and receipt to be duly proved

(Para 7-10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 121 – Pronote – Presumption -- Fraud -- Burdon of proof -- Once the due execution of the pronote and receipt is proved through the consistent and credible evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant admits his signatures thereon, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the allegations of forgery or the claim that the documents were signed under a false pretext -- It is a settled principle that the person alleging fraud must prove it -- Self-serving testimony of the defendant as DW-1 is insufficient to dislodge the otherwise consistent and credible evidence of the plaintiff, PW-2 (scribe), and PW-3 (attesting witness), especially in light of the defendant’s admission regarding his signatures on the pronote note and receipt -- In view of the provisions of Section 118 & 121 of the N.I. Act, the defendant cannot deny receipt of consideration or question the paying capacity of the plaintiff, as the plaintiff is claiming under a pronote, which is promissory note.

(Para 11-15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Compromise -- Acquittal – Non-appearance of complainant – Compounding of offence -- Dispute resolved before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre and the report submitted by the Mediator -- Matter was adjourned on numerous occasions mostly on account of non-appearance on behalf of respondent No.1 -- Amount of Rs.1,10,000/-, as agreed between them, already stands paid to respondent No.1- complainant -- Non-appearance on behalf of the respondent No.1- complainant is nothing but delaying tactics for finalization of proceedings  -- Offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 permitted to be compounded under Section 147 of the Act -- Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 6-11)

A. Legal Metrology Act 2009 (1 of 2010), Section 15 -- Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, Rule 18(2), 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 100(5), 165 – Search, inspection and seizure – Warrants – Mandate of -- Entire proceedings from search to seizure are illegal and unsustainable, as neither a warrant was obtained nor reasons recorded for search, inspection, or seizure -- Mandatory safeguards u/s 15 of the 2009 Act, and Sections 165, 100(4) and 100(5) Cr.P.C were disregarded -- The 2009 Act itself contemplates action against officials violating its provisions u/s 42 and 43 – Compliance with statutory procedures, including recording “reasons to believe” before initiating search or seizure, is incumbent upon officials; non-compliance renders the action futile and results in arbitrary excise of authority.

(Para 23)

B. Legal Metrology Act 2009 (1 of 2010), Section 15, 29, 36(1), 36(2), 48 -- Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, Rule 18(2), 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 100(5), 165 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of compounding notice -- Search, inspection and seizure – Respondents not only violated Section 15 of the 2009 Act, but also failed to comply with Sections 100(4) and 165 Cr.P.C -- Nothing on record to show that the search was so imminent as to justify dispensing with a warrant -- On the same day as the inspection, search, and seizure, a notice u/s 48 of the 2009 Act was issued, specifying a compounding fee for contraventions of Sections 29, 36(1), and 36(2) of the Act, and Rules 18(2) and 27 of the 2011 Rules, and directing the appellant to respond within 15 days, failing which further legal action would follow – Notices set aside.

(Para 23)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Limitation – Pleadings -- Where the pleadings are silent, then it becomes the duty of the Court to ascertain from the evidence and the overall facts of the case, as pleaded by either party, and to render a finding on limitation where the question of limitation is to be treated as a question of law, since the Court cannot entertain frivolous or stale claims -- Question of law can be raised at any stage.

(Para 20)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Limitation – Strict enforcement -- Auction purchaser's title was confirmed by court orders, and subsequent transfers were properly registered and recorded -- Respondent Nos.1 to 3, who have knowingly slept over their right to challenge the sale and allowed further rights to flow, cannot later question the sale of larger extent of share in an unpartitioned property -- Limitation is a matter of statute and must be strictly enforced, more so when the earlier transaction or sale is well within the knowledge of the parties -- Delay extends to seventeen years for filing the suit, despite the fact that they were arrayed as respondents/ Judgment Debtors in the execution proceedings -- Protection of bona fide purchasers for value is a significant consideration, and any disturbance to their rights or titles after such a long period, would create uncertainty in property transactions and undermine the sanctity of court sale -- Suit was barred by limitation and Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are not entitled for any relief.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (8 of 1939), Section 2 – Writ seeking direction to decide proceedings u/s 2 of 1939 Act expeditiously -- Additional Judge, Family Court  directed to expedite the said case and conclude the proceedings as per law and as expeditiously as possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to the parties.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 11(iv), 12 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – POCSO – Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Applicant and the respondent no.3/ victim  solemnized marriage on 15.07.2023 and their marriage has been registered -- A male child, aged about one year three months, is born out of their wedlock -- Though this Court would normally be hesitant to quash the proceedings under Section 363 of the IPC and the proceedings under the provisions of the Act, 2012, but the applicant and the victim got married and they are living happily -- In case, the proceedings are allowed to continue, it would amount to denial of complete justice to the parties -- Inherent jurisdiction of this Court should be exercised to do real and substantial justice -- Entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 (1-B)(a) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Fire arm case -- Anticipatory bail – After seeing the police, three persons ran away from the spot while the co-accused was arrested by the police and recovered eight pistols and sixteen magazines from his possession – Disclosure statement that applicant was also among those who fled from the spot and he also had pistol -- Co-accused granted regular bail by the Ld. Sessions Judge – Held, personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case – Anticipatory bail allowed.

(Para 2-7)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13 -- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 19 -- One Time Settlement Scheme, 2020 -- Whether the High Court erred in its interference with the order of rejection of the respondent’s application under the OTS 2020 Scheme and directing reconsideration thereof – Held, the High Court was not justified in its interference with the order of rejection :

-- every borrower in default, to have his application under the OTS 2020 Scheme considered, was required to apply together with an up-front payment of 5% of the OTS amount.

-- in terms of clause 4(i) of the OTS 2020 Scheme, any application received without up-front payment is not required to be processed even. Thus, in the first place, the respondent’s application was incomplete and it did not have any right in law to claim that such application should be processed.

-- Neither omission to make upfront payment assigned as a ground for rejection of the respondent’s application by the first appellant nor clause 4(i) of the OTS 2020 Scheme was brought to the notice of the relevant courts.

-- Crossing the hurdle of eligibility per se would not entitle a defaulting borrower to claim consideration of his/its application unless the application itself satisfies the other stipulated conditions.

From whichever angle one looks at the issue, the conclusion is irresistible that the respondent’s conduct disabled itself to have a fair and objection consideration of its application for OTS.

(Para 23-43)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Termination of service after conviction u/s 195A, 305, 506B IPC – Later acquittal in graver offence – Re-consideration of terminal benefits -- High Court set aside the conviction u/s 305 IPC and conviction under section 195-A now set aside -- Only the conviction for the offence u/s 506-B IPC survives – Held, in such circumstances, interests of justice would be best served if the respondent-State considers the matter of termination of service of “A” de novo and decides, whether for his conviction only u/s 506-B IPC, the right to terminal benefits accruing for rendering three decades of service would stand forfeited for all times to come -- Government to consider the matter upon taking into account the financial status of the appellant no.1 and her liability, if any, adopting a humanitarian approach preferably within three months from date.

(Para 32, 33)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Long pendency of cheque bounce complaint – Petition seeking direction to decide expeditiously – Complaint is pending since 2020 – Petition allowed, Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate directed to expedite the proceedings and conclude the proceedings as per law as expeditiously as possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to the parties. Indian Bank Association’ case (2014) 5 SCC 590 relied.

(Para 1-5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(3) -- POCSO -- Rape – Sexual assault – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Applicant and the respondent no.2/ victim solemnized their marriage and their marriage has been registered – Held, though High Court would normally be hesitant to quash the proceedings u/s 376(3) of IPC and Section 3(a) read with Section 4 of POCSO,  but, it is noticed that the applicant and the informant got married and they are living happily – if the proceedings are allowed to continue, it would amount to denial of complete justice to the parties -- Inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to do real and substantial justice – Application allowed and the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-10