Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased was minor/ 16 years of age – Multiplier – Future prospects -- Claimants are deceased’s parents – Income assessed as per the minimum wage for a skilled worker @ Rs. 10,382/- per month and a multiplier of ‘18’ would be applicable -- Future prospects added at 40% -- Keeping in view the age of the child, 50% deduction would also be applicable – Loss of estate Rs.18,000/-, Funeral expenses Rs.18,000/-, Loss of consortium Filial [Rs.48,000/- x 2] = Rs.96,000/- -- Total compensation comes to Rs.17,01,762/- -- Will attract interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount.

(Para 9-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 61, 85  -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS -- Commercial quantity – Petitioner arrayed as an accused on the basis of disclosure statement of coaccused -- No recovery effected from the petitioner, however the recovery of 200 Kgs of Doda Post effected from co-accused -- Co-accused are on bail and the case of the petitioner is stated to be at par with them -- Custody certificate produced would show that the petitioner has suffered incarceration of 01 year, 08 months & 06 days as on 04.12.2025 -- Petitioner is involved in 02 more cases, however in 01 case, he has been acquitted – Petitioner is covered by the ratio of law in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain’s case, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 260 – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 61, 85  -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS -- Commercial quantity – Delay in trial – Regular bail -- Petitioner was found in possession of 610 capsules of Tramadol Hydrochloride of heroin which falls within commercial quantity -- Custody since 22.06.2024 -- Challan presented but the trial has not been concluded till date and there is also no likelihood of the same being concluded soon -- As such, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo created u/s 37 of the NDPS Act – Bail allowed.

(Para 8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Petitioner nominated as an accused only on the confession of the co-accused to the effect that he had purchased the contraband from the petitioner, which, such confession is not corroborated by any recovery from the petitioner -- Investigation in the case is complete -- Other case registered against the petitioner pertained to intermediate quantity of contraband and are not in relation to any commercial quantity – Bail allowed.

(Para 6)

Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.3 – Acquittal in NDPS Case –Departmental punishment – Sustainability of -- Acquittal by trial Court is not absolute bar and Authorities are duty bound to examine whether case of delinquent falls within exceptions carved out in aforesaid Rule or not – There is no finding that Opium was planted by Investigating Officer of Deputy Superintendent of Police -- There is no finding that there was no recovery of 1 Kg Opium -- Findings recorded by trial Court disclose that petitioner was acquitted by trial Court on the ground of benefit of doubt -- It was a case of non-compliance of mandate of Section 50 of NDPS Act as well as discrepancies in the statements -- It cannot be concluded that case of petitioner does not fall within the exceptions carved out under Rule 16.3 of PPR -- He was liable to be punished -- Punishment of forfeiture of 05 years regular service for increments, upheld.

(Para 2, 8-11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 2(47), 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – License to drive transport vehicle -- Accident by Tanker – Recovery rights -- Once there is an endorsement on the licence to include T.V. (Transport Vehicle), it clearly proves that the appellant no.2/ driver was entitled to drive transport vehicles, which included a tanker – Recovery rights given by the Tribunal to the insurance company from the appellants set aside.

(Para 13-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Compromise acquittal/ quashing of FIR in POCSO – Challenge by private party – Locus standi -- A private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution if the judgment of acquittal led to serious miscarriage of justice -- Such right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) – POCSO – Compromise quashing of FIR – Quashing by High Court – Challenge to -- Before exercising the power u/s 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime -- Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society -- Allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the same -- Order passed by High Court quashed -- Consequently, the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law.

(Para 25-33)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Cancellation of allotment -- Forfeiture of amount – Suit for declaration that cancellation was null and void -- HUDCO was in breach of several obligations as contemplated in the Allotment Letter, viz. failure to execute documents for securing approval under the ULCR Act and the IT Act; failure to execute the sub lease agreement in favour of the Appellant and; failure to secure the approval of the revised layout plan for the construction of the hotel -- It is a settled position of law that a commercial document ought not to be interpreted in a manner that arrives at a complete variance with what may originally have been the intention of the parties -- Respondent No. 1/HUDCO, was in breach of its reciprocal contractual obligations, thereby disentitling them from forfeiting the monies already paid by the Appellant towards the first instalment as enshrined in Clause 5 (iii) of the Allotment Letter – Appellant has blatantly engaged in forum shopping, and considering that their overall conduct does not in any manner reflect an approach aligning with the clean hands doctrine, they are not entitled to grant of any discretionary relief of interest in their favour -- Appellant held entitled to a refund of the principal amount, without any interest.

(Para 42-47, 60)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 34 – Interest -- It is trite law that u/s 34 of the CPC, the award of interest is a discretionary exercise steeped in equitable considerations.

(Para 49)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust -- Sale of partnership property by accused -- Cheating – Inducement – Dishonest intention -- There is a clear absence of material on record to attribute any dishonest and fraudulent intention to the appellant-accused at the time of creation of partnership agreement -- No allegation in the complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellant-accused right from the time of formation of the partnership deed -- Mere allegations that the appellant-accused dishonestly induced the complainant to part with the property of the partnership firm and subsequently sold the property to a third party does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 of the IPC – Complainant failed to place any material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted the subject property to the appellant-accused -- Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the appellant-accused, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust – Complainant has an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit to set aside the sale deed and claim damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which he is already pursuing against the appellant-accused which is currently pending adjudication – Held, criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas – Appellant-accused could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant-accused are unsustainable – Criminal complaint quashed.

(Para 20, 22, 24, 29)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 -- Criminal breach of trust  -- Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of a property entrusted to him -- In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of contract, then the question whether such retention is with dishonest intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

(Para 21)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust – Cannot co-exist together -- In case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same -- Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property -- In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously -- Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct -- Said offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

(Para 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge of accused -- At the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices -- However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341, 354C, 506 -- Discharge of accused -- Allegation by complainant that by clicking her photographs without her consent accused intruded her privacy and obstructed her entry into premises -- FIR and charge sheet silent about the manner in which complainant was threatened or was watched or captured by the accused while she was engaging in a 'private act' to attract Section 354C -- Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and charge-sheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property -- The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR -- Complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations -- Ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted -- Ingredients of wrongful restraint u/s 341 not made out, in absence of material on record to show that complainant was a tenant in the property at any point of time -- On the date of the alleged offence, complainant had no right to enter the property - Accused enforce bonafidely thought was his lawful right over property in terms of injunction order -- Accused discharged.

(Para No. 20-30)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Recovery of weapons – Acquittal in revision -- Grounds :

i) that the weapon of offence was never test fired. Thus, the report of Arms Act Expert (PW-5) could not have been believed with regard to the fact that the weapon was in working condition;

ii) that the sanction order was defective as the weapon was never produced before the sanctioning authority;

iii) that the link evidence was missing as the storekeeper in whose custody the weapon was kept had not been examined;

iv) that the weapon was not produced in sealed condition before the arms expert, which shows that it was not sealed on the spot. Thus, the tampering of case property in this case cannot be ruled out;

v) that despite the fact that recovery had taken place at a crowded place, any independent witness has not been joined;

vi) that the testimony of witnesses of recovery i.e. PW-2 and PW-4 were contrary with regard to material witnesses;

If the cumulative effect of all the above mentioned factors is taken into consideration, it leads to a conclusion that the story set-out by the prosecution, with regard to recovery of country-made pistol from the possession of petitioner, fails to inspire confidence – Held, there is sufficient scope for indulgence and interference in the findings returned by the learned trial Court -- Charge for the commission of offence punishable u/s 25 of Arms Act was not proved against the petitioner – Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Service law -- Change of category – Sports SC (M&B) to SC (M&B) -- Permissibility of -- At the time of filling the application form for the post of Multipurpose Health Worker, the petitioner has applied under Sports SC (M&B) category -- At fag end, when the selection process for the said post(s) is over, the petitioner cannot be allowed to change her category from Sports SC (M&B) to SC (M&B).

(Para 6)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Adjournment request in civil suit -- Adverse remarks against advocate – Legality of -- Serious personal findings recorded against the counsel, attributing to her conduct which the order-sheet itself does not substantiate -- Remarks were not essential for adjudicating the request for adjournment and were made without affording any opportunity to the counsel to clarify the circumstances -- Adverse remarks affecting the professional standing of an advocate must be avoided unless absolutely necessary for the decision of the case and only after due notice and opportunity -- Nevertheless, the language employed in the impugned order was avoidable -- A more measured and temperate approach would have sufficed, particularly when the record itself reflected the earlier presence and bona fide conduct of counsel -- Civil revision allowed, adverse and stigmatic remarks recorded against the counsel, as well as the direction imposing costs of ?30,000 on the judgment-debtor for the alleged conduct of counsel, ordered to be expunged.

(Para 4-8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Expedite disposal of civil suit -- Revision petition seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) to decide Civil Suit within a time-bound manner -- Revision petition disposed of, with a direction to learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) to decide the Civil Suit as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law.

(Para 1-4)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 90(3) -- Auction sale in execution -- Challenge to – Right of -- Given the insertion of Order XXI Rule 90(3) in the statute book with effect from 01.02.1977, it would be incumbent upon a judgment debtor or any other interested person who applies for setting aside an execution sale, held thereafter, to satisfy the executing Court that the ground upon which the application was made could not have been taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up – Held, if such a ground could have been taken by that applicant who seeks setting aside of the sale but he failed to do so at the appropriate stage, he would stand barred, by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, from doing so at a subsequent stage.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 66(2)(a), 90(3) -- Auction sale in execution -- Challenge to – Right of -- Having failed to raise a material irregularity in the context of Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC at the appropriate stage, i.e., with regard to sale of a part of the property being sufficient to satisfy the decree, it is not open to them to now raise such a belated plea and blithely place the burden on the executing Court, so as to seek setting aside of a sale held as long back as in the year 2002.

(Para 18)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Incorporate company -- Definition of “person” in Section 2(1)(m) is inclusive and not exhaustive --  Therefore, there can be no doubt that even an incorporated company could be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) read with Section 2(1)(m) of the 1986 Act.

(Para 14)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Self use/ Commercial purpose -- Generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not – Consideration of – What is to be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction i.e. whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser(s) and/or its/ their beneficiary – If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing goods or services is for personal use and consumption of the purchaser, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, the question whether such purchase is for generating a livelihood by means of self-employment need not be looked into – However, where the transaction is for a commercial purpose then it might have to be considered whether it is for generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not.

(Para 16)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Incorporate company – Purchase of software – Object of purchase – Whether Generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not -- Goods purchased by a self-employed individual for self-use for generating livelihood would fall within the explanation even if activity of that person is to generate profits for the purpose of its livelihood -- But where a company purchases a software for automating its processes, the object is to maximise profits and, therefore, it would not fall within the explanation of Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act -- Object of the purchase was not to generate self-employment but to organize its operations with a view to maximise profits -- Case of the complainant does not fall within the Explanation to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act -- If upon consideration of all relevant factors the picture that emerges is one which reflects that the object of the purchase of goods/ services is to generate or augment profit, the same would be treated as for a commercial purpose -- qua that transaction the appellant cannot be considered a consumer as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act.

(Para 18-27)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Change in the selection criteria – Permissibly of -- Weightage points allotted to a B.Sc. Degree in Forestry was 25 points was altered only after interviews were held, that is, when all the stages of participation by a candidate in the selection process were over -- Evaluation procedure was altered on representation of candidates -- Such alteration, cannot be termed transparent and does not have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved in as much as the academic qualification required for the post was barely 10+2 with science and stress was more on physical attributes of a candidate including viva voce --  Held, a change in the selection criteria, after interviews were held, was rightly not countenanced by the High Court – No merit in appeal, dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), Section 2(e)(ii) -- Temporary Safaikarmi -- Honorarium of Rs.1200/- per month – Legality of – Schedule employment -- Petitioners say that they are working as Safaikarmi with their respective police stations on a temporary basis -- They receive for their services an honorarium of Rs.1200/- per month from the State Government -- SP replied that they work for one every day and for that they are compensated by an honorarium of Rs.1200/- a month – Since, they are men, whose service and labour is hired as outsiders, the protection of the Act of 1948 would be available to them -- Petitioners are part-time wagers and working as such in the Police Stations, they held entitled to be remunerated according to the minimum wages notified from time to time under the Act of 1948 and not in accordance with Government Order.

(Para 1, 2, 6, 24)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Expiry of Driving licence – Effect of -- Licence expired on 05.05.2016 and the accident occurred on 20.08.2016 -- No evidence on the record to show that an application for renewal was filed within thirty days of expiry; on the contrary, statement of PW-3 (Criminal Ahlamd) confirms the absence of such timely renewal -- Driving Licence similarly corroborate that the licence was not valid for driving a transport vehicle on the date of the accident – Held, learned Tribunal, after a proper appreciation of the entire evidence, rightly concluded that there was a violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased, was a minor aged merely 12 years -- A minor, by virtue of tender age, is not engaged in employment, and therefore rigidly categorizing him as a “non-earner” would defeat the object of awarding just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- Proper method of determining compensation under the head “loss of income” is to adopt, at the very least, the minimum wages notified for a skilled worker in the relevant State at the relevant time -- Notional monthly income of the deceased assessed at Rs.10,300, being the minimum wages of a highly skilled worker notified for the relevant period in the State of Haryana – Future prospects 40%, multiplier of 18 applied – 50 deduction towards personal expenses -- Loss of Estate Rs.18,150/- -- Funeral Expenses Rs.18,150/- -- Loss of Consortium Filial :  Rs. 48,400 x 2 Rs.96,800/- -- Total comes to Rs.16,90,460/- -- Interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition allowed.

(Para 21-29)

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23, 25 -- Senior Citizens case -- defect of coram non judice – Issue not raised earlier – Effect of -- Once an order is found to have been passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction or lawful coram, it is a nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be sustained, irrespective of whether such a plea was initially taken -- Matter remanded to the Maintenance Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

(Para 7)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 152 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Raising slogan ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ when the war was going on between India and Pakistan – Regular  bail -- Petitioner was arrested on 10.05.2025 has suffered incarceration of 06 months and 11 days as on 24.11.2025 -- Petitioner is not involved in any other case -- Challan has already been presented and charges are yet to be framed -- Veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after the conclusion of the trial and on the appreciation of evidence to be led by both the parties before the trial Court – Bail allowed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 310(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395 – Dacoity -- To sustain a charge of dacoity under Section 310(2) of the BNS [Section 395 of the IPC], the offence of robbery [Section 309 of the BNS/Section 392 of the IPC] must first be established -- Robbery, in turn, is an aggravated form of theft or extortion -- A foundational element of ‘theft’ as defined under Section 303 of the BNS [Section 378 of the IPC] is ‘dishonest intention’, i.e., the intention to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another.

(Para 10)

B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 310(2), 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), 352  – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 326, 506, 504 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Dacoity – Partial quashing of FIR by High Court – Permissibility of -- Compromise quashing -- FIR itself discloses that the accused persons were primarily seeking access to specific institutional records viz. Engineering and B.A.M.S. files, and had no intention to steal cash or property belonging to the institution -- There is no allegation that the accused persons were armed with weapons or that they caused any serious injury to anyone -- Taking of cash, cheque books, and the computer appears incidental to this main purpose and not the primary object of the intrusion -- All money, files, and other materials were subsequently returned and that there was no harm or injury caused to anyone and that an amicable settlement has been reached -- This complete restitution and amicable settlement completely dilutes the allegation of ‘dishonest intention’ required to constitute theft, and by extension, robbery or dacoity -- High Court erred in sustaining the objection raised by the school and in proceeding on the premise that the offence of dacoity was not personal to complainant, who had already settled the dispute with the accused persons -- Once the High Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR with respect to the offences punishable u/s 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), and 352 of the BNS [Sections 326, 506 and 504 of the IPC], on the basis of the voluntary affidavit of respondent No.2-complainant, there was no justification whatsoever to sustain the same FIR for the offence punishable under Section 310(2) of the BNS [Section 395 of the IPC] -- Impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken in furtherance thereof in entirety, quashed – Powers under Article 142 of the Constitution exercised

(Para 9-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.c. – Mandate of -- Statements given by all three persons are carbon copies of each other -- How such statements can pass muster at the hands of the learned Trial Judge is understandable -- Out of the four questions asked, directly related to the sequence of events, were only two -- The second question was as general as can be, with reference to only the bare allegations, to which an omnibus denial was issued -- The third was also of similar nature, saying that it has been alleged and evidenced, and nothing further -- This cannot be said to be the putting of every material circumstance -- Desire to secure a conviction for the accused persons, the prosecutor also let their duty of assisting the Court in conducting the examination of the accused under this section fall by the wayside -- Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and holds a solemn duty to act in the interest of justice -- Appeals allowed and the matter sent back to the concerned Trial Court to recommence from the state of the recording of the Section 313 CrPC statements.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 506 – Murder -- Regular bail – Parity as a ground -- Bail has often been stated to be the rule, and jail, the exception -- At the same time, this, however, does not mean that the relief of bail is to be granted without due regard to the circumstances involved in the alleged offence for which the accused person has been arrested – High Court erroneously granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only common factor between the accused persons -- Parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted – Bail cancelled.

(Para 10-16)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 506 – Murder -- Regular bail – High Court granted bail, in the impugned order unable to assign reasons, even briefly – Matter remanded to the High Court to be considered afresh, keeping in view the gravity of the offence, the role of the instant accused and all other relevant factors, as delineated time and again in various judgments of Supreme Court.

(Para 17-20)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29,  33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469, 470, 473, 482 – Offence under Insecticides Act – Limitation – Period of limitation begins from the date of the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst – Period of limitation is 03 years from the said date – However, the time spent in obtaining sanction is to be excluded – Sample was taken on 26.08.2011 – Report of the Public Analyst was made available is dated 28.09.2011 – Sanction for prosecution was applied on 06.08.2012 and was granted on 05.10.2012 – Sanction was received by the CAO on 15.10.2012 – Approximately 02 months elapsed between when sanction was sought and when it was granted – Complaint was instituted only on 23.04.2018 after a gap of 06 years, 06 months and 25 days from the date of the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst – Complaint case is hopelessly barred by time – Complaint and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9-14)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C – Belated claim – Limitation -- Claimant discharged from the hospital on 12.07.2016, he repeatedly visited the hospital over the next six months for follow-up -- Claiming compensation of Rs.1 crore, petitioner approached the Lok Adalat by filing an application under Section 22-C of the Act of 1987 on 10.08.2022 -- Cause of action arose to the petitioner in the year 2016, however, he has invoked the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat in the year 2022 -- Limitation for filing a petition under the Act of 1987 is three years and any petition filed thereafter is barred by time.

(Para 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Presumption of innocence -- An order of acquittal is not to be interfered with lightly because presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal -- Interference is called for only under compelling circumstances, where impugned findings are perverse, unreasonable and convincing material on record has been ignored unjustifiably by the trial Court.

(Para 12)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 57 -- NDPS – 7 KG Charas – Acquittal -- CFSL Form was not prepared at the spot and sample seal impressions were not preserved and were not deposited with the MHC of the Police Station with case property and not transported to Director CFSL Madhuban, with samples for comparison of the seal -- The seal was not handed over to independent witness/Ex-Sarpanch, who was allegedly present at the time of recovery -- Even documents prepared on the spot were having FIR number with same pen and ink which shows that FIR was lodged first and thereafter, investigation was conducted -- Hence, the investigation appears to be tainted – As per ruqa Ex.PB and recovery memo Ex.PD, three seals of 'WS' and two seals of 'SY' were affixed on the sample parcels, whereas as per FSL report Ex.PJ, there were four seals of 'WS' and one seal of 'SY' on the parcels – Only independent witness joined by the prosecution had not supported the prosecution version – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 15-22)

A. Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4 – Compensation to employee – Injury – Negligence of employee – Effect of -- Commissioner erred in dismissing the application holding that the claimant suffered injuries on account of his own negligence -- Trite it is that the 1923 enactment deals with accidents arising out of and during the course of employment -- The concept is based upon ‘strict liability’ -- There is no room for assessing contributory negligence -- Order passed by the Commissioner, cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside.

(Para 4)

B. Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4, 4A – Compensation to employee/ Lineman – Injury – Disability of 30% -- Functional disability assessed at 100% -- Injuries assessed to have caused 30% permanent disability -- It is the functional disability that has to be assessed -- Appellant was serving as Lineman -- Claimant having lost grip power of both the hands, the same is assessed as 100% -- He was 45 years of age at time of accident -- Date of accident is 05.02.1995 -- Claimant shall also be entitled for 12% interest on the awarded compensation in terms of Section 4A of 1923 Act, for the period commencing from 30 days after the date of accident i.e., 30 days after 05.02.1995 till the date of actual realization -- He will also be entitled for penalty @ 50% of the awarded compensation along with interest @ 7% per annum from the date i.e. 30 days after the accident till the date of actual realization.

(Para 5-9)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 28A -- Acquisition of land – Market value of land – Limitation for section 28A of LAC Act -- Award is dated 01.03.2006 -- Appellants seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the judgment and order of the High Court in First Appeal dated 2nd May 2016 -- Application of the appellants u/s 28-A of the 1894 Act is within a period of three months from 2nd May 2016 -- Case of the appellants is fully covered by the judgment in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others, (1995) 2 SCC 736 : 1995 INSC 180

-- Said provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court u/s 18 of the Act -- Same benefit would be available to the other landholders u/s Section 28-A -- Section 28-A being a beneficent legislation enacted in order to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people, the principle of interpretation which would be required to be adopted is the one which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it.

(Para 3.1, 16, 17, 24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Binding precedent -- Earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of judges.

(Para 21)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 17, 34 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 37 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 rule 11 – SARFAESI proceedings – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Rejection of plaint -- Plaintiff has neither raised any loan from the bank nor the plaintiff is a guarantor in the issue which has led to the action having been initiated by the bank under the 2002 Act -- Plaintiff approached the Civil Court seeking a declaration that gift deed alleged to be executed and registered by the GPA holder and thereafter mortgage deed, in the year 2015 are void abinitio, false and fictitious documents and a result of fraud committed by defendants No.1 to 3 in connivance with each other -- In light of this prayer of declaration, a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant-bank to misuse the process of law to take the possession of the suit premises has also been prayed for -- Invoking jurisdiction under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC and throwing out the plaint at the very initial stage, would be a very-very dangerous step as it would take away the right of the plaintiff to agitate the cause before the appropriate For a -- The issues raised in the suit, cannot be decided under Section 17 of the 2002 Act – Trial Court dismissed application under order VII Rule 11 -- Revision dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of the Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006, Rule 5, 6 – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Death of dismissed employee -- Compassionate assistance to family – Dismissal on 04.12.1989, during the pendency of writ, he passed away on 22.02.1995 and writ was allowed on 22.02.2010 quashing the dismissal and directing release of all retiral benefits  -- Legal fiction is that the employee was never dismissed, unless the Court restricts relief --  Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules clarify that all the pending cases, such as that of the petitioner shall be covered under the 2006 Rules – Claim denied on the ground that petitioner applied belatedly – Order does not consider the effect of the 2010 judgment, the retrospective restoration of service, the settled law on compassionate claims, or the humanitarian object underlying the scheme -- An administrative authority exercising statutory discretion is required to record reasons that demonstrate meaningful application of mind -- Failure to do so renders the action of the respondents arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Impugned order set aside, respondents directed to extend financial assistance within a period of 4 weeks.

(Para 2-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Blanket anticipatory  bail – Permissibility of -- When no criminal case or FIR is registered against a person, the grant of anticipatory bail is impermissible as doing so would amount to issuing a blanket protection against all possible future accusations -- Law does not contemplate granting such omnibus relief u/s 482 of the BNSS nor can a blanket order be passed to restrain the authorities from arresting an individual in the absence of a specific and existing criminal case.

(Para 6)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Prima-facie existence of arbitration clause -- High Court at the time of reference u/s 11 of the Act is only to see prima facie the existence of an arbitration clause and is not to conduct any mini-trial -- Since neither the arbitration clause nor the terms and conditions of the auction are in dispute, Court deems it fit and proper to allow the present petition and appoint a Sole Arbitrator.

(Para 6)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 – Additional evidence -- Video footage and photographs -- Placing on record – On application moved by complainant, the learned trial Court permitted the complainant to place certain documents on record, i.e. the video footage and photographs of the incident – Claimed by the complainant that in the video footage and photographs, the incident has been recorded and given to the Investigating Officer also, but the Investigating Officer having been under the influence of accused-petitioners, has not collected the above mentioned evidence – Held, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court in permitting the complainant to bring the above mentioned documents on record -- At this stage, when permission to produce the above mentioned documents has been accorded, the admissibility of the above mentioned documents cannot be looked into -- Appreciation of above mentioned point can take place at the time of final adjudication of the trial.

(Para 12, 13)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304B, 328 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Dowry death – Presumption – Regular bail by High Court – Cancellation of -- Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage – Dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC -- Consequently, the presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1/ husband -- High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles -- Courts has to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail – Held, such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society -- Judicial passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice -- A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative, not only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry -- Bail cancelled.

 (Para 17.1, 17.2, 25-26)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Review/ Appeal -- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, and whether such exercise of power was valid in law – Held, High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act -- Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled --  The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise -- Such an exercise cannot stand -- Issue is answered in the negative.

(Para11, 11.15)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 16, 29A -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Remedy against -- Once the Section 11 order had attained finality, the only remedies available were to approach Supreme Court under Article 136 or to raise objections u/s 16 before the arbitral tribunal -- Having chosen neither route, and having participated in the arbitral proceedings, including joint applications under Section 29A, they were estopped from reopening the matter through review.

(Para 11.13)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Unilateral power with one party -- Remedy -- Where a clause contains an otherwise defective unilateral appointment mechanism, the Court may sever the offending portion and exercise its power u/s 11(6) to appoint an independent arbitrator, thereby giving effect to the parties’ genuine intention to arbitrate -- Refusing to sever such clauses would effectively confer on the dominant party a “nuclear veto”, wholly inconsistent with the pro-arbitration policy of the Act and violative of Article 14 -- Court is empowered under Section 11(6) to cure the defect and appoint an independent arbitrator.

(Para 12.13, 12.16)

D. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 4, 12(5), 29A – Proceed with arbitration without objection – Waiver -- Whether the joint application filed by both parties, seeking extension of the arbitral mandate u/s 29A amounts to an express or implied waiver u/s 4 read with the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act – Held, a joint application u/s 29A amounts to a valid waiver u/s 4, save in cases of statutory ineligibility u/s 12(5) -- Any contrary view would render Section 4 redundant and distort the legislative design -- Where the disqualification u/s 12(5) is attracted, the language being plain and mandatory, a joint application merely seeking extension, without an informed written waiver, cannot cure ineligibility -- Conversely, where no such disqualification exists, the conduct of the parties, especially in jointly invoking Section 29A, constitutes waiver under Section 4.

(Para 13.11, 13.12)

E. Constitution of India, Article 136, 141 -- Binding precedent -- Doctrine of merger -- Dismissal of SLP – Effect of -- A non-speaking dismissal of an SLP signifies only that the Court, in its discretion under Article 136, has declined to interfere -- It does not amount to approval of the reasoning of the subordinate forum -- Doctrine of merger does not apply to such dismissals – A non-speaking dismissal of an SLP neither endorses the reasoning of the judgment challenged nor transforms it into binding precedent -- At best, such a decision has persuasive value; its only legal effect is to bring finality to the dispute between the parties in that particular case.

(Para 14.1-14.3)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Execution of money decree – Arrest and detention -- If a person has no means to pay, in absence of any mala fide or dishonest intention, the arrest and detention cannot be resorted to.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Execution of money decree – Arrest and detention – Physical disability -- If a person is incapable on account of physical disability and is able to show his inability to pay in a bona fide manner, then also detention cannot be justified.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37, 41 -- Execution of money decree -- Means to pay – Onus to prove -- Decree holder attached the schedule of properties which were known to be owned by petitioner/judgment debtor along with his execution petition -- Application under Order XXI Rule 41 CPC for seeking directions against petitioner/judgment debtor to file details of his properties duly moved -- From material placed by decree holder it is clearly made out that petitioner/judgment debtor was high worth individual who had got movable and immovable properties -- Further it is proved by decree holder that presently also petitioner/judgment debtor is residing in a leased accommodation in Gurugram and spending considerable amount on himself, therefore, the initial onus cast upon decree holder stands discharged -- It is the duty of petitioner/judgment debtor to rebut the evidence of decree holder and show that he has got no means to discharge the liability.

(Para 12)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Execution of money decree -- Means to pay – Onus to prove -- While appreciating evidence of judgment debtor in this regard, provisions of Section 106 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1972 needs to be kept in mind which mandates that facts which are in special knowledge of a person need to be established by said person -- It is duty of judgment debtor to come clean and disclose specifically all the particulars about his properties to show his bona fide -- Failure to come clean by taking plea of roving enquiry would be against his own case.

(Para 13)

Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (2 of 1864), Section 37A, 38 -- Auction sale – Challenge to -- Once a sale is confirmed by the competent authority, rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser which cannot be extinguished except in cases of proven fraud or substantial irregularity – Auction and its subsequent confirmation have not been shown to suffer from any material irregularity, mistake or fraud as contemplated u/s 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act -- Auction-purchaser paid the full purchase amount on the day of sale and the sale was confirmed only after due procedure and in the absence of any valid challenge -- Issuance of the sale certificate and registration of the property in the purchaser’s name, followed by subsequent transfers to bona fide purchasers, confer finality on the transaction.

(Para 20, 21)

A. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Re-determination of outstanding rent – Power of Appellate Rent Authority -- Rent Control Appellate Authority is not the Court of first instance, it only tests the exercise of jurisdiction and power by the Rent Control Court -- Appellate Authority is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent -- It has only to examine as to whether the Rent Control Court has erred in law or in facts and/or has exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law.

(Para 30)

B. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Arrears of rent -- Power of Appellate Rent Authority -- While hearing the appeal, the Appellate Authority has full discretion to pass any order in accordance with law, including an order dismissing the Appeal and/or extending the time to deposit/pay the arrears of rent, or if it finds substantial merit in the Appeal, it may issue notice and unconditionally stay the impugned order of eviction, or if it finds that the Appeal raises an argument which is plausible but improbable, it may direct the Appellant to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller pending the hearing of the Appeal -- Though the power of the Appellate Authority cannot be put in a straitjacket, yet normally speaking, a tenant must be directed to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller before an Appeal is heard by the Appellate Authority and that too when a money decree has been passed by a Civil Court which has not been stayed by the Appellate Court.

(Para 31)

C. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Pendency of appeal -- Application u/s 12 of Act, 1965 – Not mandatory -- Respondent-tenant’s submission that in an Appeal challenging an eviction order under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1965 a fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act, 1965 is mandatory, is contrary to the explicit language of Sections 12 and 18 of the Act, 1965.

(Para 32)

D. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12 -- Eviction of tenant – Pendency of appeal -- Application u/s 12 of Act, 1965 – Held, Sections 12(1) and 12(3) procedure is to be primarily followed by the Rent Controller -- It is essentially in cases where supervening events have taken place during the pendency of Appeal, that the parties have the liberty to file an application u/s 12 of the Act, 1965 once again before the Appellate Authority like where rent has been paid till the date of filing of the Appeal, but by the time the Appeal has matured for hearing, further rent has accrued, which has not been paid -- In such a case, it would be open to the Appellate Authority to entertain a fresh application u/s 12(1) by the landlord and decide the same in accordance with the procedure stipulated u/s 12 of the Act, 1965.

(Para 32)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19(4) – Failure of justice – Special Judge held that the sanction was invalid as it had been issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction – Held, Explanation to Section 19(4) would become relevant and come into play only when the question of validity or otherwise of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate or the revisional forum as provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 19.

(Para 37, 38)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 13(1)(d), read with 13(2) -- Corruption case -- Exoneration in departmental proceedings – Effect of -- Contention advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant that he is entitled to be discharged on account of his exoneration in the departmental proceedings does not merit acceptance, rejected.

(Para 41)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case -- Sanction by Competent authority -- In case the trial Court finds that the sanction has been issued by a competent authority, the trial shall proceed -- However, in case the conclusion is otherwise, the trial Court shall return the chargesheet to the investigating agency for procuring fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.

(Para 37, 43)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 143(2), 316(2), 318(4), 351(2) -- Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of1983), Section 24 -- Anticipatory bail – Visa by illegal means -- Rs. 50 lacs paid for sending son to USA  directly -- Donkey method adopted -- Although the complainant also knew that they were paying money to obtain a Visa through illegal means, and undoubtedly later cried foul, it is akin to the kettle calling the pot black -- However, a con cannot seek bail because of the victim’s stupidity or cunningness and shrewdness -- A perusal of the bail petition and the documents attached primafacie points towards the petitioner’s involvement and does not make out a case for anticipatory bail -- Impact of crime would also not justify anticipatory bail – Bail declined.

(Para 3, 8-10)

A. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Landlord – Execution of decree – Issue of ownership – Effect of -- A landlord need not be the owner of the property -- Subsequent events would not come in the way of the petitioner from getting the judgment and decree executed against the respondents, who are admittedly tenants of the petitioner.

(Para 11)

B. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11, 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Execution of decree -- Principle of res judicata/ constructive res judicata -- Judgment debtor not allowed to file any objections -- Warrant of possession issued – Recalling application and further objections -- Maintainability of -- Application filed for recalling the warrant of possession and the objections raised by the respondents/ judgment debtors required to be summarily rejected -- Principle of res judicata/ constructive res judicata applies to orders passed at different stages in a proceeding -- Once the Executing Court had not given any further opportunity to the respondents/ judgment debtors to file objections and had issued warrants of possession, then, the subsequent entertaining of the objections filed by the respondents was in violation of the said principle.

(Para 12)

C. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Execution of decree – Purchase of part of property by tenant – Effect of – Purchase from other co-sharers, the respondents-judgment debtors cannot hold on to the possession of the property and cannot stall the execution proceedings -- Further it is a matter of settled law that mere agreement to sell in favour of a party does not give any right to the said party in the property and the only right that the respondents have is to seek specific performance of the said agreement -- Even in case the sale deed, then also, the respondents would have no right to object to the execution proceedings and thus, the question of framing issues and seeking evidence on the same is a completely futile exercise and would result in delaying the execution proceedings endlessly – Impugned order set aside, the Executing Court directed to proceed further in the case to execute the judgment and decree, in accordance with law.

(Para 17-19)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence by Court order – Setting aside of -- Evidence of the petitioner was closed by the Court order was not in any way illegal or suffers from any material illegality or irregularity -- Considering the pace at which the learned Civil Judge is proceeding and the fact that even after closing the evidence of the petitioner, respondent/plaintiff has been granted 07 opportunities for rebuttal evidence -- Interest of justice requires, one opportunity to be granted to the petitioner to conclude his evidence at his own responsibility -- Petitioner allowed one effective opportunity subject to the payment of cost of Rs.50,000/-.

(Para 3-5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Summons not received back – Decision of appeal on merit – Permissibility of -- Court, duly noticed in the first paragraph of the impugned order that the notice issued to the respondent/ judgment debtor had not been received back -- It further went to notice that as per learned counsel representing the appellant/ decree-holder, the respondent-judgment debtor was sitting outside the Court room, but despite calls having been made, no one appeared on behalf of the respondent/ judgment debtor -- Court then proceeded to hear and allow the appeal -- Held, Court of Additional District Judge adopted a procedure unknown to law -- Once the respondent therein had not been served, there was no occasion for the Court to make calls and then proceed to decide the appeal without service having been effected -- Impugned order not sustainable, set aside.

(Para 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 – Suit for permanent injunction -- Amendment in name of defendant -- Typographical mistake -- Amendment is only for correction of a typographical mistake -- Application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for amendment allowed subject to payment of ?30,000 as costs to be paid to the defendant-respondent -- Payment of costs shall be a condition precedent.

(Para 2, 8)

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 35 -- Photocopy of document – Validation of – Permissibility of -- Ld. Civil Judge proceeded to validate the photocopy of the agreement to sell on the condition that the petitioner deposits the deficient stamp duty along with a penalty quantified at ten times the sale consideration -- One page of the original document is available while the remaining page is only a photocopy – Held, even if a portion of the document exists in its original form, the instrument as a whole cannot thereby be deemed an original document -- In such circumstances, the composite document must necessarily be treated as a copy -- A copy whether partial or complete cannot be validated for the purposes of stamping -- Impugned order suffers from a manifest and material illegality, as the learned Civil Judge has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him under the law – Order set aside.

(Para 9, 9.1)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 37 – Scope u/s 37 of Arbitration Act -- Objection u/s 34 of Arbitration Act, dismissed – Award of the Arbitrator contains an elaborate examination of the terms of contract and a plausible view is taken by way of a reasoned award after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties -- Limited scope available to High Court u/s 37 of the Act -- View taken by the Arbitrator is clearly a permissible view and is in consonance with the Clauses of the NITs/contract – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 23, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 376(2)(n), 507 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Rape -- False promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married -- FIR also states that in September 2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and I will live my life” -- At that time, the appellant assured her that they would get married and asked for some time from respondent No.2, to which she refused -- However, despite her refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet him at Hotel and engaged in physical relations with him – Held, not a case where the appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished -- Relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time -- They remained close and emotionally involved -- In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage – FIR quashed.

(Para 24-28, 41)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 26, 27 – Recovery on disclosure – Relevancy -- Section 27 is an exception to the preceding Sections 25 and 26 -- Language further indicates that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person who is in custody of the Police in connection of an offence, it must relate distinctly to the fact so discovered -- For relevancy, the “facts thereby discovered” is preceded with the words “so much of such information, whether it amounts to confession or not as relates distinctly” -- “distinctly” indicates directly, indubitably, strictly and unmistakably, apparently, used in Section 27 to limit and define the scope of probable information -- Only that much information as is clearly connected with the fact discovered can be treated as relevant under the phrase ‘facts discovered’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder -- Last seen – Motive not proved – Conviction based upon recovery and FSL – Sustainability of -- When the eye-witness has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case and no evidence of ‘last seen’ has been adduced, and the alleged motive against the appellant remains unproved, however, mere recovery and the FSL report can, by itself, sustain the conviction of the appellant, more particularly when other co-accused having motive has been acquitted -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 16, 25)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Recovery of pistol – Reliance upon FSL -- Prosecution has not established that the recovery distinctly relates to the commission of the offence or that the weapon so recovered was the same which was used to commit murder so as to constitute a relevant fact distinctively related to the disclosure -- Recovery was effected from an iron box lying in a room accessible to other family members, wherein various household articles were kept, which were neither seized nor proved examining any independent witness from neighborhood -- After the recovery, the pistol and cartridges were kept in the Malkhana, but the record does not indicate on which date these were handed over to PW-6 for deposit to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and the same article was sent for forensic examination -- Chain of recovery linking the seizure, storage, and deposit of the material exhibits thus remains incomplete and was not duly proved -- Though the FSL report indicates that the pistol and cartridges recovered correlate with the bullets found in the body of the deceased, such evidence by itself is not sufficient to establish the appellant’s guilt in the absence of any proof that the recovered pistol was indeed used in the commission of the offence -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 22-25)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7 – Advalorem Court fees – Executant of Sale deed – Role of -- Legal position is well settled that where a person, who is not a party to a sale deed, seeks to avoid the same, he may pay a fixed court fee under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 -- However, when the executant of the document himself seeks its cancellation, he must pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the property or consideration mentioned in the document -- This principle is based on the reasoning that an executant, having executed the document, cannot claim it to be void without first paying the fee on the transaction he himself created -- Plea that the sale deeds were obtained by fraud or that full consideration was not paid does not alter their status as executants -- Court Fee Act does not make any distinction between voluntary execution and execution allegedly induced by fraud.

(Para 7, 8)