A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Temporary labelled employees – Long-term extraction of labour – Equal protection – Financial stringency/  Budget – Excuse of -- Duty of Government -- “Ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque – State (Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer -- It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions -- Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices -- Long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection -- Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 --  Temporary labelled employees – Creation of supernumerary posts -- Regularization of -- As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit -- Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers -- Creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 20)

Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), Section 7(A), 11(2) – Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 35 -- Provident Fund dues  -- Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) -- Bank Charge over property – Priority of -- It would be appropriate that the High Court first deals with the issues raised by Axis Bank that it has first charge and priority over and above the EPFO to satisfy its dues from the secured property in view of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act -- High Court will examine the priority of first charge amongst the EPFO and the secured creditors i.e. the Axis Bank and other two Banks, namely, State Bank of India and the State Bank of Travancore (now taken over by SBI) in view of Section 11(2) of the PF Act – Matter remanded back.

(Para 11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Order 30 Rule 10 – Suit against Proprietor -- Rejection of plaint -- Proprietorship concern as party – Mandate of -- A proprietorship concern is not a juristic person -- Proprietorship concern cannot be equated either with a company or with a partnership firm – Order XXX deals with partnership basically, however, Rule 10 thereof refers to proprietorship – It makes very clear that proprietorship concern cannot sue but it can be sued – Whether proprietorship concern is sued in its name or through its proprietor representing the concerned is one of the same thing -- Order XXX Rule 10 CPC does not in any manner debar a suit being filed against the proprietor – Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law to decide the suit on its own merits.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 35(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- POCSO – Regular bail -- Challan filed on 18.04.2024 and supplementary Challan was filed on 29.06.2024 -- Trial was required to be concluded before 30.06.2025, in terms of Section 35 of the POCSO Act -- Charge-sheet was framed on 25.10.2024 -- After framing of charge, though dates repeatedly came to be fixed for recording the statement of prosecution witnesses, but not even a single prosecution witness has been examined -- Continued incarceration of bail petitioner during trial would not only amount to pre-trial conviction, but would also be violative of Article 21 – Bail allowed.

(Para 10-12)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012),  Section 35 -- POCSO -- Statement of child victim -- Some dispute with regard to age of the accused, but there was no bar, if any, for the trial Court to record the statement of child-victim within the specified period of thirty days, from the date it took cognizance of the offence.

(Para 12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- A plaint can be rejected if it does not disclose a cause of action, if the relief claimed is under-valued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped and plaintiff on being required by Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law etc.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Pleadings -- Court is not to step out of the pleadings as are contained in the plaint and the documents appended therewith -- Defence of the other party is not to be taken into consideration at the time of deciding the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- In terms of the averments made in the plaint, the cause of action is stated to have lastly accrued on 11.01.2016 and the suit was filed in the year 2016 itself, prima facie, it cannot be said from the perusal of the plaint that the suit is barred by limitation -- Trial Court dismisses the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC, call for no interference.

(Para 11)

A. Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (6 of 1954), Section 128, 133 – Mode of partition -- Instrument of partition -- Mode of partition not assailed by the petitioner and challenge was laid only to the final partition -- It is settled law that until and unless the mode of partition is assailed by a party, it is precluded from assailing the same subsequently as well as the instrument of partition on the said ground.

(Para 8)

B. Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (6 of 1954), Section 133 – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Instrument of partition – Writ jurisdiction -- High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, is not to act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence – The Court has to look into procedural infirmities, if any, coupled with perversity, if any, that can be demonstrated by the parties concerned.

(Para 10)

Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 69(2) -- Suit by un-registered partnership firm – Maintainability of suit – Objection as to non-compliance of Section 69 (2) of Partnership Act -- Stage of -- It is settled that the provisions of Section 69 (2) of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 bear mandatory character -- Registration of a firm is to be a sine-qua-non for institution of suit falling within the mischief of Section 69 (2) of the Act  -- Non-compliance has been held to be a jurisdictional defect -- It has also been held that the objection as to noncompliance of Section 69 (2) of Indian Partnership Act can be taken even at the stage of execution -- Non-compliance of Section 69 (2), if established, will go to the root of the controversy having effect on the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain the suit.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 200 – Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. without approaching police – Description of complainant -- Legality of -- A complainant has the option either to approach the Police agency with an application for registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C or he/she has option to approach the Magistrate with a complaint u/s 200 of the Cr.P.C. -- Discretion entirely lies with the complainant -- No bar to approach the Magistrate with a criminal complaint instead of approaching the Police even in cases where cognizable offences are disclosed from the contents of the criminal complaint.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating -- Summoning of accused – Enquiry/ investigation u/s 202 Cr.P.C. – Requirement of -- Where the allegations made in the complaint supported by the preliminary evidence clearly disclose commission of offence u/s 420 of IPC, it was not at all necessary for the learned Magistrate to direct investigation in terms of Section 202 of Cr.P.C before issuing process against the petitioner – It is only in the cases, where the Magistrate is unable to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding that he is required to direct investigation of a case in terms of section 202 of Cr.P.C and postpone the issue of process against the accused.

(Para 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Affidavit in support of complaint – Mandate of -- Complaint filed u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., not being supported by a duly sworn affidavit of the complainant, suffers from a fatal procedural defect -- In the absence of such an affidavit, the complaint could not have been acted upon, and the order of the learned Magistrate directing registration of the FIR suffers from a jurisdictional error -- Rejection of the Petitioner’s discharge application, which is rooted in such procedurally defective initiation, cannot be sustained in law – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 20 -- Maintenance to wife – Domestic Incident Report (DIR) – Requirements of -- Financial liabilities of husband – Effect of -- Trial Court taking into consideration gross salary as Rs.43,874/- of petitioner/ husband granted Rs.12,000/- per month as interim relief/ maintenance.

-- Appellate Court said that in absence of DIR a Magistrate empowered to pass ex parte or interim relief as well as final order under D. V. Act -- Under Section 20 of the D.V. Act, an aggrieved wife is entitled to monetary relief, including maintenance, to ensure that she does not suffer from deprivation or financial distress.

-- Appellate Court also said that aggrieved person/ respondent no.1 cannot be left to struggle for survival merely because the appellant/petitioner claims financial liabilities, like repaying of loan -- He has a wife and he is liable to take care of her -- Court is required to balance the needs of the wife with the financial capacity of the husband.

Interim relief/ maintenance do not call for any interference -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-11)

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Contempt of Court – Delayed payments – As per order dated 17.01.2018 outstanding amount was be paid within a period of three months -- Payments commenced in 2019, well beyond the timeline fixed – Explanation tendered refers to administrative hurdles post-merger of bank and retrieval of records dating back over three decades --  While such circumstances cannot justify laxity -- Element of mens rea, essential for sustaining a charge of civil contempt, cannot be inferred merely from the factum of delay – Petitioner was dismissed in 1985 and secured favourable orders as early as 2004, attained the age of superannuation in or around 2006 -- A reasonable lump sum payment is warranted -- Rule discharged --  Petitioner compensated, respondent-Bank directed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- within a period of eight weeks, failing which interest at the rate of 8% will be payable till the date of disbursement.

(Para 14-21)

B. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Contempt jurisdiction – New claims -- Contempt jurisdiction is not a forum for asserting new claims or seeking substantive reliefs which were neither raised nor granted earlier.

(Para 19)

Employees’ Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 2(dd)(iii)(viii), 30(1)(a) – Repair and paint work – Death of employee/ causal worker – Compensation -- Employees Compensation Commissioner accepted the employment of the deceased as casual worker on daily wages, but had rejected the claim petition as it is not maintainable under the Employees Compensation Act – Held, any person engaged in construction, maintenance, repairing or demolition of any building, which is more than one story in height above the ground is treated as employee -- Deceased was engaged for repairing/painting work and was fell down from third story – Deceased held to be an employee under the ambit of Employees Compensation Act -- Appeal allowed, order of Commissioner set aside -- Matter remanded back to the Employees Compensation Commissioner to decide the claim petition as fresh.

(Para 11-17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment of written statement -- Amendment qua the detailing of the khasra numbers regarding a passage -- Application allowed, defendant-petitioners permitted to give the khasra numbers of the passage which already stands mentioned in the unamended written statement.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2  -- Temporary injunction – Finding on merit – Permissibility of – While dismissing the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC a categoric finding has been given by the Trial Court that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction which would amount to rejecting the suit at the stage of deciding the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC – Appeal also dismissed -- Held, impugned orders cannot be sustained, accordingly set aside.

(Para 1, 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8, 9 – Suit dismissed in default – Restoration of suit --  Dead bodies of the applicant’s relatives recovered, due to which he could not appear on the date fixed -- Trial Court ought to have considered the matter from the right perspective and should have restored the suit -- Matters should always, as far as possible, be decided on merits and petitions should not be rejected on mere technicalities -- Application for restoration filed by the petitioner/plaintiff/applicant allowed, and the suit is ordered to be restored to its original number.

(Para 9-13)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7(iv)(c), Article 17(iii) of Schedule II – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Ad-valorem court fee -- Sale deed – Challenge to – Plaintiff-respondent Nos.1 and 2 are owners in possession of 50% share of the property -- Challenge is to the sale deed and transfer letter executed by defendant Nos.2 and 3 in favour of defendant No.6-petitioner -- Plaintiff-respondent Nos.1 and 2 are neither the executant of the said documents nor they are seeking possession of the suit property as they are already in joint possession -- In the case of a non-executant of deed, who is already in possession of the property and seeks to get the document annulled then he would be required to pay court fees as applicable under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870 – Held, there would be no requirement to affix ad valorem court fees – Application dismissed.

(Para 1, 5-7)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Rs.9,000/- per month assessed by the Ld. Tribunal – Deceased left behind his widow, three minor children and old aged parents -- Minor children have their entire life ahead of them -- Their education has to be taken care of as well as the living expenses of all the claimants -- Compensation should at least be sufficient to mitigate the financial difficulties the family is likely to face – Keeping in view the rising prices as well as the fact that the education of the minor children is still at the threshold, Court deemed it appropriate not to interfere in the income of the deceased as assessed by the Tribunal -- Argument that the income ought to have been assessed as per the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 33 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Power of Court of Appeal – Appeal of Insurance Company – No cross-appeal by claimants – Just compensation -- Claimants relied upon Surekha & Ors. vs. Santosh & Ors., 2021 (16) SCC 467 to contend that even though no cross appeal was filed, the claimants would be entitled to enhanced compensation by addition towards loss of future prospects, which ought to have been 40% keeping in view the age of the deceased, who was 30 years of age at the time of his death -- Argument of the claimants accepted -- An addition of 40% made towards loss of future prospects -- Claimants held entitled to (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses as also to Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) towards loss of consortium – Total compensation assessed at Rs.22,51,800/- -- Interest @ 7.5% per annum awarded on enhanced amount from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount awarded.

(Para 5, 11, 9-13)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Revision petition for issuance of direction to Trial Court for pronouncing the judgment and decree in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC -- Contends that the deliberate delay on the part of the respondents-plaintiffs is causing constant emotional disturbance and relentless anxiety to the petitioner, apart from paving the way for multiplicity of proceedings in the interregnum – Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) directed to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible.

(Para 1-6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rules 7, 13, Section 151 -- Stay of execution of ex-parte decree -- Application for setting aside ex-parte judgment and decree pending -- Proceedings before the executing Court stayed until the application filed by the revisionist-petitioner under Order IX Rules 7 and 13, read with Section 151 of the CPC is adjudicated upon by the Court --  The learned lower Court directed to expedite the proceedings in the said application and dispose of the same within a period of two months from the next date of hearing fixed before it.

(Para 1, 7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3A – Party to appear before other witnesses – Only exception is that the Court may permit him for reasons to be recorded in writing that he may appear as his own witness at a later stage – Application is bereft of any details as to who are the summoned witnesses required to step into the witness-box before he can appear as his own witness -- Reasons why these witnesses are to be examined before the plaintiff-petitioner steps into the witness-box are also woefully missing – Application under Order XVIII Rule 3A dismissed by Trial Court -- In the absence of any details regarding which witness and for what reason the said witness needs to be examined, no fault can be found with the order.

(Para 1, 6, 7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-impleadment of Partnership firm as accused – Maintainability of Complaint against Partner – Vicarious liability/ Joint and several – Since the liability is joint and several, even in the absence of a partnership firm being proceeded against by the complainant by issuance of legal notice as mandated u/s 138 of the Act or being made an accused specifically in a complaint filed under Section 200 of CrPC, (equivalent to Section 223 of the BNSS), such a complaint is maintainable.

(Para 7.21, 9.9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Offence by partnership firm – Partners personally, jointly and severally liable in the case of a partnership firm, when the offence has been proved against a partnership firm -- Partnership firm is only a compendious name for the partners of the firm, any offence committed u/s 138 read with Section 141 of the Act would make the partners of the firm jointly and severally liable with the firm.

(Para 9.10, 9.11)

C. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 4, 5 -- Partnership firm – Whether a Separate Legal Personality -- A partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Companies Act, does not possess a separate legal personality and the firm’s name is only a compendious reference for describing its partners -- This fundamental distinction between a firm and a company rests on the premise that the company is separate from its shareholders -- Even the registration of a firm does not mean that it becomes a distinct legal entity like a company -- Hence, the partners of a firm are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in a company who are not co-owners of the property of the company.

(Para 7.9, 7.10, 8)

D. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 42 (c) -- Partnership firm and partners – Death of partner -- Perpetual Succession -- A partnership firm’s fundamental identity is contingent on the partners and undergoes a change with a change in partners, subject to contract -- Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act provides that subject to contract between the partners, a firm is dissolved by the death of a partner.

(Para 7.17)

E. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners -- Liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm --  Any liability of a firm has the same effect of a liability against the partners -- Debt of the firm is the personal debt of a partner and the debt of the firm has to be incurred by each partner as a financial personal liability -- The liability of the firm for acts done by the partner would arise when such acts are done in the ordinary course of the business of the firm.

(Para 7.18-7.20, 7.22)

F. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners – Penalty -- Since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable -- Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.

(Para 7.23)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Liability of Directors, manager, Secretary and other officer -- Director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company cannot be proceeded against per se by virtue of the position they hold in the company but can be proceeded against only when there is proof that the offence u/s 138 was committed by the company with their consent or connivance or due to negligence on their part -- Standard of proof is higher under sub-section (2) of Section 141 vis-à-vis the category of persons mentioned therein with regard to their specific role in the commission of the offence u/s 138 of the Act.

(Para 9.4)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 115 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 11 – Acquisition of land  -- Compensation for land acquired – Long pendency of Execution petition -- Execution application filed by the petitioners on 14.09.2022 is still pending and the petitioners are waiting to get their amount of compensation on the basis of order dated 16.03.2022 passed by this Court – The Court of Addl. District and Sessions Judge requested to dispose of the Executing Petition as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of next 04 months, as any further delay is going to cause serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioners/land owners.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 66 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Notice to Judgment debtor – Service through wife – Permissibility of -- It is argued that the petitioner was not personally served and, therefore, he deserves an opportunity to contest the execution proceedings by raising objections on the application under Order XXI Rule 66 CPC – Held, notice had been duly served upon the petitioner through his wife -- Despite such service, the petitioner failed to appear before the executing Court, and was rightly proceeded against ex parte -- No illegality or infirmity in the impugned order -- Civil Revision Petition dismissed.

(Para 7, 8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence  by Court order – Setting aside of -- Petitioners-plaintiffs did not lead any evidence inspite last opportunities -- Submission that the omission on their part in not examining witnesses or leading evidence cannot be construed as deliberate or intentional, inasmuch as compromise talks were in progress between the parties -- Further submitted that the respondent-defendant had failed to disclose that his mother and sisters also have a share in the suit property, and upon the petitioners-plaintiffs coming to know of the same, the respondent-defendant had assured that he would clear the title in all respects, but failed to do so -- Impugned order set aside, learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), directed to give two effective opportunities to the petitioners-plaintiffs to conclude their entire evidence.

(Para 3-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 290, 341, 171F -- Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861), Section 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Public nuisance – Dharna – Quashing of FIR -- Even if the case of the respondent-State is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the appellants, while conducting the rally and dharna, engaged in any form of obstruction of the road in a manner that led to the offences alleged -- Appellants were exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully – No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution -- It would have been appropriate for the High Court to have exercised the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the court’s process – Appeal allowed, FIR and the proceedings quashed.

(Para 16-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Medical disability of employee -- Pre-mature retirement – Sustainability of -- Appellant was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without any meaningful effort by the Respondent–Corporation to explore his suitability for alternate employment – Corporation’s omission to consider redeployment violates both statutory and constitutional obligations -- Duty to reasonably accommodate such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in Articles 14 and 21 -- Respondent–Corporation directed to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016 – Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement -- Intervening period shall be reckoned as continuous service for all purposes.

(Para 40, 42)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Removal from service -- Pre-mature retirement of employee -- Judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become an excuse for disengagement from injustice -- When an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself -- The employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins.

(Para 41)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- National of United States – Future prospects – Deceased was self-employed in U.S. -- Future prospects of a person self-employed in a foreign country like United States, compared to a person in this country, would become difficult for the simple reason that the socio-economic-political conditions in any foreign country would be different -- In order to determine the just compensation to a person who died in an accident occurred in India, the dictum of law in Pranay Sethi’s case (2017) 16 SCC 680 = (2017) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 10002 = 2018(1) L.A.R. 1 shall have to be followed and applied specially when no material evidence is offered to determine the future prospects in the foreign country -- Accordingly, the Court is inclined to extend the benefit of future prospects’ component for the compensation payable as per the principles in Pranay Sethi’s case – Total compensation comes to 1,60,15,280/- alongwith 5% interest p.a.

(Para 5.4)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Conventional heads -- Deceased was aged 31 years, 40% addition made in the established income towards future prospects -- Under the conventional heads namely loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses made at Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively -- Dependent of the deceased are wife, the daughter and the parents, therefore, for each of them Rs.40,000/- will be the part of compensation towards loss of consortium amounting to Rs.1,60,000/-.

(Para 5.5., 5.6)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 6, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Acquisition of land – Title dispute – Restitution of compensation -- Jurisdiction of civil Court -- Once the ownership and wrongful enrichment were proved, the Trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to grant full and effective relief, including restitution -- Denial of consequential reliefs despite a declaration of ownership has resulted in manifest injustice.

(Para 16)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 11, 30 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Acquisition of land – Entitlement of compensation -- Title dispute – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- It is settled law that where title and ownership are in question, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction, even in matters of compensation related to acquisition -- Suit is not barred by Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act -- Section 30 only applies where a dispute regarding apportionment of compensation is pending before the Land Acquisition Officer.

(Para 20)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 39 – Mandatory injunction -- Relief under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (mandatory injunction) is permissible where:

I. A legal duty exists,

II. There is a breach,

III. Plaintiff is entitled to relief to prevent unjust gain/loss.

When the ownership is established and the revenue entries are proved to be erroneous, any benefit drawn from such illegal entries must be undone.

(Para 24)

D. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 6, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 11 – Acquisition of land – Restitution of compensation -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Issue of ownership was already settled in 1969 -- Cause of action arose only when compensation was wrongly disbursed in favour of respondents based on fraudulent revenue entries -- Suit was filed within limitation after appellants discovered the wrongful receipt of funds – Suit is also not barred by Res Judicata or Limitation.

(Para 25)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail by High Court – UAPA case -- High Court noticed that accused no. 11/ his connections with an organisation by the name of AL-Hind is not a banned organisation under the schedule to UAPA -- Apart from the above, impugned order by the High Court was passed on 21.04.2022 almost 3-1/2 years ago and as such, it may not be just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage -- Further, charges have not been framed so far and trial has not commenced – No justification to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court granting bail.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – UAPA Case – Regular Bail -- High Court has found accused no. 20/ his involvement with banned terrorist organisations, his active role in operating dark web and assisting the members of the banned terrorist organisations -- High Court further noticed the involvement of accused no.20 in another case under UAPA – Held, High Court was justified in not granting bail to accused no.20.

(Para 11, 12)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Speedy trial -- Life and liberty – Trial has not commenced despite lapse of 5-1/2 years -- Accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial -- Trial Court be directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same within a period of two years considering that there are more than 100 witnesses to be examined by the prosecution.

(Para 13)

Constitution of India, Article 136, 226 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Allegation of corruption – Removal from service with superannuation benefits -- Inquiry Officer appreciated the evidence led by five loanees who categorically deposed that they had paid money to the respondents for coordinating sanction of their loans despite their documents being deficit -- PW-6, Field Officer stated that all the accounts were irregular -- When respondent appeared in response to a show cause notice before imposition of penalty, points towards the direction where he apparently admitted his guilt and had sought mercy -- Leniency was shown by the Appellate Authority by reducing the penalty from ‘dismissal’ to ‘removal from service’ with superannuation benefits – High Court allowed the writ and respondent was directed to be reinstated with back wages – High Court order set aside, order passed by the Appellate Authority imposing punishment of ‘removal from service’ with superannuation benefits restored.

(Para 14, 15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment of plaint – Delayed application – Ground of -- No doubt the plaintiff-petitioner has been remiss in not filing the application for amendment earlier, however, the same cannot be a ground for denying the amendment especially in view of the fact that the evidence is yet to be started -- Application allowed subject to payment of ?10,000/- as costs.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Multiple Appointments challenged -- Doctrine of severability – Detailed analysis – Requirements of -- Validity of an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the appointee's own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable rules -- Courts must resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations of entire batches of appointments merely on the basis of procedural infirmities that affect only a portion of the appointments – Principles of fairness, proportionality, and individual justice are foundational to administrative law and demand that a case-by-case analysis be undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of cancellation -- Where multiple appointments are challenged on general grounds, authorities and courts must undertake a detailed fact-specific analysis before concluding that all such appointments are void -- Doctrine of severability must not remain a mere theoretical doctrine but must guide real administrative action and judicial reasoning in service matters.

(Para 26, 49)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16 – Employment – Irregular appointment – Illegal appointment – Challenge to -- Right to employment, though not a fundamental right, is nevertheless protected under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution insofar as it requires fair, just, and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly situated individuals -- Appellants' dismissal, without issuing a show cause or opportunity of hearing, is a clear violation of principles of natural justice -- The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments must not be blurred -- An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the post is sanctioned -- An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the post does not exist -- When appointments are questioned on grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those whose appointments are unimpeachable -- Justice demands separation, not erasure.

(Para 30, 31)

Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 -- Transfer of petition from one Bench to other Bench of same High Court or any other High court – Jurisdiction of – Held, the Court is not vested with any such power; the petitioner for this purpose is free to approach the appropriate Forum -- Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to assess the legality and validity of orders passed by the State or an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 by seeking one of the writs or for performance of any public function -- Remedy against an order passed by learned Single Judge in civil or criminal jurisdiction is either by filing an LPA by demonstrating that the Single Bench passed the order over-stepping the jurisdictional purviews, or by approaching the Higher Court i.e. the Apex Court.

(Para 3 to 3.3)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 379, 401 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 --  Criminal Revision against conviction without surrender – Maintainability of – Suspension of sentence – Consideration of :

I. A criminal revision petition against the judgments of conviction (as also an application for suspension of sentence, etc.) is maintainable before this High Court, without the petitioner-accused having surrendered or being in custody, in the absence of any rule in the extant Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules/Orders proscribing such maintainability.

II (i) The mere maintainability of a revision petition (as also an accompanying application for suspension of sentence) does not, ipso facto, translate into its desirability; the latter is a matter of judicial discretion –– which is inexorably linked to the bona fides and overall conduct of the petitioner-accused, including the sufficiency of reasons proffered for nonappearance before the Appellate Court.

(ii) Where the conduct of the petitioner-accused reflects evasion or contumacious disregard of process of law, the Court must lean against the grant of suspension of sentence, lest, it may tantamount to condoning inexplicable defiance of judicial process.

(iii) No universal guidelines or parameters can possibly be enumerated for exercise of this judicial discretion by this High Court while considering such an application for suspension of sentence.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 379, 401 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 -- Revisional jurisdiction – Nature of – Interlucatory order – Maintainability of revision -- High Court wields a crucial revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C./ Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS -- This jurisdiction is fundamentally supervisory in nature, empowering the superior courts to scrutinize the records of any subordinate criminal court -- Primary objective thereof is to ascertain the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order passed by the subordinate court, and to ensure the regularity of its proceedings -- Revisional jurisdiction, much like a carefully calibrated instrument, is explicitly unavailable against interlocutory orders and, crucially, against orders which are appealable in nature -- When the legislature, in its deliberative wisdom, has chosen not to impose any specific restriction or condition on the exercise of a particular remedy, it is demonstrably inappropriate for the court to engraft such a restriction before the remedy can be availed -- This judicial insertion would not only be an act of judicial overreach, but it would also amount to ‘reading into the statute’ something that is not there.

(Para 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(g), 202, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499 -- Complaint for defamation – Re-tweet by accused – Report regarding tweet made or not awaiting – Effect of – Summoning of accused – Challenge to -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Summoning of – Nature of enquiry -- Inquiry, as defined u/s 2(g) of the Code means, ‘every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court’ -- No particular mode of inquiry has been provided; the inquiry, therefore, refers to application of judicial mind by the Magistrate to the allegations in the complaint along with the statements recorded and material brought on record by way of preliminary evidence, as also to the outcome of investigation ordered or the report called for, with a view to ascertaining the offences alleged are prima facie made -- The requirement in law is an inquiry by the Magistrate into the complaint to be satisfied that the offences alleged are prima facie made out; receipt or non-receipt of a report called for after recording the evidence, cannot be the sole ground to issue or not to issue the process – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7.1, 7.2, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, Exception 9, 10 – Complaint for defamation – Consideration of Exception 9 & 10 – Requirement of -- Summoning of accused – Challenge to -- No substance in the submission that the retweet was in good faith and in the absence of mens rea petitioner/ acused was entitled to the benefit of Ninth and Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC; and that failure of the Magistrate to examine the issue rendered the impugned order unsustainable -- Petitioner’s case is that the Magistrate was mandatorily required to consider whether these Exceptions were attracted in her case -- As per the settled law, there is no explicit bar on the Magistrate precluding him from considering whether any of the Exceptions protect the person to be summoned; however, such non-consideration by itself would not render the order issuing process illegal -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8, 8.1, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499 – Complaint for defamation – Summoning order – Challenge to – Wrong mentioning of fact -- Merely because the Magistrate wrongly mentioned the petitioner’s retweet as tweet in the impugned order, it cannot be said that the order is a result of non-application of mind -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 9, 11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Demand and acceptance -- To convict a person under the aforesaid provision demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non -- It is no one’s case that A-2 ever demanded any illegal gratification -- He  accepted the money on the directions of A-1 and kept the same with him -- So, there was no demand of illegal gratification on his part -- Demand made by A-1 cannot be attributed to A-2 as no evidence was adduced which could establish that A-2 was a habitual offender working in aid with A-1 or was facilitating A-1 in demanding and receiving illegal gratification -- Accordingly, in the absence of any allegation or evidence that A-2 demanded bribe from the complainant or he was acting in connivence with A-1, he cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the crime of demanding and receiving illegal gratification.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Acquittal -- Abatement – Connivance -- A-2 was not charged with the abetment of the aforesaid crime -- He had accepted the money on the direction of A-1 only -- He could have received the money innocently on the direction of A-1 or he may have received it knowingly -- Both the views are possible -- However, as no evidence was adduced to prove that both of them have connived to demand and accept the bribe, even if a fair trial may have been given to the A-2, it cannot be said with any certainty that he was an accomplice to the crime -- In the absence of charge of abetment and the proof of connivance between A-1 and A-2, A-2 could not have been convicted.

(Para 16, 17)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) – Corruption case – Demand and acceptance -- Evidence on record amply proves that A-1/he demanded bribe from the complainant not only once but twice, and thereafter when the trap was laid -- The bribe on his behalf was accepted by A-2 -- Evidence proves that A-2 accepted the money on the dictates of A-1 -- Therefore, both the ingredients of demand and receipt stand duly proved against A-1 -- Evidence in this regard of PW-1 and PW-2, despite some minor contradictions stand unshaken -- Therefore, his (A-1) conviction as held by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is not liable to be interfered with.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Non-existence of cause of action – Ground of -- A plaint can never be rejected for non-existence of cause of action, but, a plaint can be rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action -- Non-disclosure of cause of action in a plaint would fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint, but, whereas, non-existence of cause of action would not fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of plaint.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Quashing of FIR -- It is not a case where the accused were entrusted with the subject property -- The subject property belongs to them and they had rights over it as owners with title -- Thus, the very foundation for invoking Section 406 of the IPC falls to the ground – FIR quashed.

(Para 35, 39, 47)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust – Quashing of FIR -- Simultaneous charge u/s 406 and 420 IPC – Legality of -- Same person cannot be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC with regard to one particular transaction. FIR quashed.

(Para 37, 47)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Civil and criminal proceedings – Quashing of FIR -- Whether civil and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings -- If the element of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the same facts -- Fact that a civil remedy has already been availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to quash an FIR.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156 (3) – Affidavit in support of complaint/ application – Non-filing of – Effect of – Quashing of order -- Non-filing of the supporting affidavit is a curable defect, but must be cured before the Magistrate passes any substantive order on the complaint/application -- If the Magistrate proceeds without the requisite affidavit, such order/any consequential orders/proceedings can be quashed on the sole ground of non-compliance with Priyanka Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287.

(Para 45)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 – Recalling the order and providing opportunity to lead evidence -- Inherent powers -- Civil Court has inherent powers to do justice as per provision of Section 151 CPC – By impugned order defendants allowed two effective opportunities to lead evidence after recalling order -- Detailed order passed spelling out the reasons -- No merit in the revision petition, dismissed.

(Para 1, 2)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 Rule 3 – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 8 -- Legal representatives of plaintiff – Class-II heirs impleaded as LR’s on the basis of Will – Ground that as per Section 8 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1956, after the death of a tenant/ plaintiff no.1, only his wife and son are entitled to inherit the tenancy rights -- Held, no illegality in the said order since the application was allowed only for the purpose of continuation of the suit -- The issue as to whether in terms of the provisions of Section 8 of the 1956 Act, plaintiff No.2 would be entitled to inherit the tenancy rights or not, would be determined by the trial Court when the suit is decided on merits -- No occasion for the trial Court to hold so at the time of dealing with an application for bringing on record the legal representative – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 2(b), 17, 18,9,  31 -- Merger of Non-banking entity with Bank – Jurisdiction of Commercial court -- – Jurisdiction of DRT -- Section 31 cannot be interpreted in a vacuum -- Section 31 emphasizes that the bar u/s 18 is absolute and on and from the appointed day, no Court other than DRT shall have jurisdiction to deal with any matter, which falls under the jurisdiction of DRT -- Section 18 is couched in negative terms, which implies that it is absolutely mandatory -- On merger of original plaintiff (HDFC Limited) with respondent no.1 (HDFC Bank Limited), jurisdiction of Commercial Court will be barred to decide the, "application" -- After amalgamation, the suit answers description of the term "application" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act and is of the nature of a proceeding referred u/s 19 of the Act -- Therefore, DRT will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit and jurisdiction of other Courts will be barred in view of Section 18 of RDB Act.

(Para 19-24)

B. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 17, 18, 19, 31 -- Harmonious construction -- Dominant purpose of the Statute -- It is a well settled legal principle that attempt shall be made to harmonise two different provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other -- However, when they cannot be reconciled attempt should be made to identify the dominant purpose of the Statute and find out which provision should override the other.

(Para 21)

C. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 2(g) -- Debt – Assignment of rights -- A monetary claim, which is assigned to a Bank will also be a debt within the meaning of Section 2(g) of RDB Act.

(Para 28)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 – Onerous condition for bail – Deposit of original title deed --  Surety be close relative – Legality of -- Condition requiring one of the sureties to be a close relative cannot be sustained as there cannot be any geographical discrimination in the matter of bail -- When the sureties are directed to produce the original document, after ascertaining the solvency of the surety, the original document should be returned, if necessary, by substituting it with a certified copy – Condition requiring one among the sureties to be a close relative deleted, Court below directed to return the original document produced by the surety on production of a certified copy.

(Para 1-3)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 2(28), 39 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 497, 503 -- Interim custody of the Excavator JCB Machine – Magistrate declined custody for want of registration certificate -- Machine was seized in connection with Crime alleging commission of the offence in relation to an incident, in which the operator of the machine died, when the machine accidentally fell from a height while engaged in the process of removing pieces of rubber wood from a property -- Seizure is of a machine and not a vehicle -- As such, there cannot be an insistence on production of registration certificate along with the application seeking its release -- Magistrate shall reconsider.

(Para 1, 3-5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Appeal against High Court order reducing the compensation -- Death of child aged 9 years – Multiplier -- Income taken as Rs. 5,000/- per month -- No question of any deduction for personal expenses and hence even if the multiplier adopted is 15, considering the mother’s age of 36, the total compensation for loss of dependency would be Rs.7,50,000/- -- Funeral expenses Rs.15,000/-, loss of estate Rs.15000/-, Rs.80,000 fixed as loss of filial consortium as applicable to both the parents -- Transportation expenses Rs.5,000/- -- Loss of dress, ornaments and cycle, Rs.5,000/- assessed -- Total compensation assessed as Rs.8,70,000/- -- No appeal from the quantum filed by the claimants, hence the order of the Tribunal restored -- Appeal allowed setting aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Insurance policy -- Cheque towards premium was dishonoured – Third party liability -- 50% compensation awarded with intertest already paid by Insurance company pursuant to order passed by the court -- In larger interest of justice to all parties, no recovery deserves to be permitted for the said amount deposited and withdrawn from the claimants -- Appellant-Insurance Company, shall be at liberty to recover the said 50% amount along with interest deposited by it as above and received by the claimants from the owner of the offending vehicle in accordance with law -- Claimants shall be entitled to recover the balance of 50% amount along with interest from the owner of the offending vehicle.

(Para 5-6)

Constitution of India, Article 342, 366(25) -- Scheduled Tribe -- Caste certificate -- Held, while dealing with documentary evidence, greater reliance may be placed on pre-Independence documents because they furnish a higher degree of probative value to the declaration of status of a caste, as compared to post-Independence documents -- Merely because the applicant does not match the tribe’s peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc., it cannot be solely taken into consideration for rejecting the claim of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe -- Pre-Independence document certifies that the appellant’s grandfather’s belongs to Tribe, a greater probative value ought to have been given to the said document -- Appeal allowed, Scrutiny Committee directed to issue Caste Validity Certificate to the appellant.

(Para 8-17)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1, 2 & 3 – Ex-parte injunction -- Ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte -- The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted -- Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay -- Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso -- Both the provisions are mandatory.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1, 2 & 3 – Ex-parte injunction – No-compliance of clause (a) and (b) of the Proviso – Effect of -- Applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) – Held, if the court is satisfied of non-compliance by the applicant with the provisions contained in the proviso, it would simply vacate the ex parte order of injunction without expressing any opinion of the merits of the case leaving it open to the parties to have a hearing on the grant or otherwise on the order of injunction but bipartite only.

(Para 7)

Constitution of India, Article 233 -- Appointment of District Judges – Bar Vacancy – Eligibility of judicial officer, who completed seven year in Bar – Actual date of eligibility -- Two issues are substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution:

(i) Whether a judicial officer who has already completed seven years in Bar being recruited for subordinate judicial services would be entitled for appointment as Additional District Judge against the Bar vacancy?

(ii) Whether the eligibility for appointment as a District Judge is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application or both?

Court refer the aforesaid issues for consideration of a Constitution Bench of five Judges.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cognizance in complaint – Opportunity of hearing to accused -- Section 223 provides an added safeguard that no cognizance shall be taken without affording the accused an opportunity of being heard.

(Para 7)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Complaint under PMLA – Cognizance by Magistrate – Opportunity of hearing to accused – Requirements of -- Since the complaint has been filed after 01.07.2024, cognizance cannot be taken without conferring an opportunity of hearing to the accused – Ld. Special Judge, dismissed the application of the petitioner u/s 223 of BNSS, 2023, seeking hearing at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint -- Petition allowed -- Trial Court directed to afford the petitioner an opportunity to be heard before taking cognizance.

(Para 8-10)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – Maintainability of – Main case dismissed in default -- Restoration application – Effect of -- Proceedings u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are maintainable during the pendency of the proceedings as contemplated under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the liability to pay the amount will not come to an end merely because the proceedings are pending at the revisional stage, appellate stage or even in cases where the proceedings have been dismissed for want of prosecution and the restoration of the same is pending.

(Para 18)

B. A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – An order u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been passed finally by the Hon'ble Supreme Court -- Said order has neither been recalled nor been set aside and therefore, the liability to make payment in terms of the order continues unless the same is set aside, varied or modified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

(Para 19)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Transfer proceedings -- Maintenance pendentelite proceedings – Maintainability of -- Stay of proceedings in transfer petition – Effect of -- Mere stay of proceedings by this Court will not amount to termination of the proceedings -- Even the proceedings for transfer of matrimonial case from Pilibhit to Bareilly would amount to the proceedings contemplated under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 -- Wife is entitled for maintenance during the continuance of transfer proceedings.

(Para 21)