Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 33(5) – POCSO case -- Recalling of victim/ child witness repeatedly -- There is no absolute bar u/s 33(5) of the POCSO Act to recall a victim witness, every case has to be weighed on the strength of its own evidence and necessity of recalling the child victim.

(Para 4)

A. Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 59(5)(28) – Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959, Rule 19 -- Parole -- Son going abroad – A happy occasion like this, son secured an admission in a prestigious University in Australia, who is going to depart from the country for a period of two years -- If for the purpose of celebration of marriage parole can be granted, Court failed to understand why merely because the rule do not contemplate such a contingency, the benefit of this rule shall not be extended to the petitioner – 10 days parole granted.

(Para 8-10)

B. Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 59(5)(28) – Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959, Rule 19 -- Parole – Furlough -- Provisions of Parole and Furlough have been time and again looked towards as a humanistic approach towards the convicts lodged in Jail for an act purely attributed to them. -- In order to afford an opportunity to them to be in touch with the outside world and to arrange for their family affairs as though behind bars, the convict continue to be someone’s son, husband, father, brother and upon being released, though for temporary period on Furlough or in an emergency situation on parole, like death of a member of family or to attend to a member on account of his illness, the Furlough and Parole have received approval as conditional release of a prisoner.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) -- Reinvestigation/ Further investigation -- Right of an accused at the stage of investigation – Accused has no right -- Charge sheet submitted before the Court concerned -- Discrepancies related to date(s) and time would be considered by the trial Court at the stage of trial and the same are not required for seeking re-investigation/ further investigation in present case.

(Para 40)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B – NRI landlord – Bonafide need -- Multiple ejectment petition for different shops forming part of one unit – Permissibility of -- Landlord has got possession of two shops, one shop is lying vacant for seven years and another shop from three months -- Rent petition filed in 2006, there is specific pleading as well as evidence on the part of the landlord that his wife has already retire and that he was also going to retire within a year in 2007 – After coming back to India, landlord intends to convert the entire building into one unit, which he requires for his residence as well as occupation -- It has been testified that he has four sons who are married and has also the grandchildren and they can be able to visit him only once if he settles here permanently -- Said testimony of landlord cannot disputed by the tenant, once he had deposed about his bonafide necessity – Ejectment order, upheld.

(Para 1, 4.2, 10-12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 4 – Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), Section 25 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 106 -- Termination of lease – Suit for eviction, and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation -- Ex-parte proceedings -- In ex-parte proceedings the Court is required to test the case of the plaintiff and not merely believe whatever has been stated in the plaint.

-- Impugned order records that the Defendants/Revisionists had filed written statement however, at the stage of evidence did not file any evidence in support of his written statement or in rebuttal of the plaint nor examined the plaintiff witnesses.

-- Defendants/ Revisionists also did not appear at the time of arguments and the case in such circumstances proceeded ex-parte against the Defendants/ Revisionists.

– Plaintiff/ Respondent filed the certified copy of the registered Lease Agreement executed between the parties.

-- Notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, Postal receipts showing service of the Notice upon the Defendants/ Revisionists, photocopies of the cheques along with the Bank return memos showing insufficient funds in the Bank account of the Defendants/ Revisionists.

Evidence of the Plaintiff/ Respondent stood unrebutted -- Taking note of the above in the absence of any contest from the Defendants/ Revisionists learned Judge Small Causes Court proceeded to decree the suit of the Plaintiff/Respondent -- No illegality in the procedure adopted by the learned Judge Small Causes Court in decreeing the Suit of the Plaintiff/Respondent -- Findings recorded by the learned JSCC calls for no interference.

(Para 25-28, 39-41)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63(2)(3), 65, 74 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 57 -- Certified copy of registered lease deed – Admissibility in evidence –  Certified copy of the Lease Agreement will fall under the category of secondary evidence – Certified copy of the Lease Agreement is a Public Document, as contemplated u/s 74 and in terms of the 3rd Proviso to Section 65(e) or 65(f) the certified copy is admissible in evidence -- Sub Section 5 of Section 57 of the Registration Act provides that certified copy given u/s 57 of the Registration Act shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of its original document -- Rightly relied while decreeing the Suit.

(Para 29-34)

A. Constitution of  India, Article 226 -- Custody of children -- Writ of habeas corpus – Maintainability of -- Effort to secure temporary custody of the children through a Writ of Habeas Corpus, especially when both the children are girls and are living with their mother, can neither be entertained nor appreciated.

(Para 1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 13(f) -- Custody of children – Order of Foreign court – Compliance of -- Compliance to an order claimed to have obtained from the District Court, Family Court Division, State of Minnesota, U.S.A -- A foreign judgment violative of Indian law is not conclusive between the parties and thus, Indian Courts are not bound to follow it -- This principle is also statutorily recognized by Section 13(f) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Hence, the aforesaid order is not binding on the respondents or the children.

(Para 3)

A. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 124, 124A -- Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (54 of 1987), Section 16 -- Compensation in railway accident case – Death by fall from train – Presumption -- Burden of proof -- Appellant had duly filed an affidavit stating the facts and adverting to the report arising from the investigation conducted by the respondent, which showed that the deceased was travelling on the train and that his death was caused by a fall during the course of his travel -- Burden of proof then shifted to the Railways, which has not discharged its burden -- Therefore, the presumption that the deceased was a bona fide passenger on the train in question was not rebutted.

(Para 14)

B. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 124, 124A -- Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (54 of 1987), Section 16 -- Compensation in railway accident case – Death by fall from train – Post-mortem report – Reliance upon -- Conclusions in post-mortem reports as to the time of death are approximations -- Estimation as to the time of death in the post-mortem report differs from the time at which the IO stated that the deceased fell off the train by about half a day -- Report of the IO otherwise corroborated that the deceased fell from the train -- Post-mortem report also stated that the deceased sustained antemortem injuries due to blunt force impact -- Hence, deceased was a bona fide passenger on the train in question and that he sustained grave injuries leading to his death, due to his fall from the train -- Compensation is therefore due to the appellant.

(Para 15-17)

C. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 124, 124A -- Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (54 of 1987), Section 16 -- Railway Accidents (Compensation) Rules 1990, Schedule I -- Compensation in railway accident case – Death by fall from train – Accident on 5 September 2003 – Revised compensation – Permissibility of --  In 2003, the compensation payable for the death of a passenger was Rs 4,00,000 --  The compensation payable for the death of a passenger as on date is Rs 8,00,000, which was enhanced by a notification bearing GSR 1165(E) dated 22 December 2016 -- Appellant is entitled to compensation quantified at Rs 8,00,000.

(Para 20, 21)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Interference in appeal – Permissibility of -- Relief of injunction is an equitable and discretionary relief, based on well-established principles of prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience -- At the same time, once discretion is exercised by the trial judge of the first instance, the interference by the Appellate Court is not justified, unless the exercise is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse or ignoring the settled principles of law.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20A -- Temporary injunction – Stalling Infrastructure project – Permissibility of – A person, who seeks equity must do equity -- Defendant No.2 after paying huge consideration has purchased the suit land from the two brothers i.e. plaintiff & defendant and their sister -- Ultimately after trial, if it is found that plaintiff was entitled to the entire suit land, he would be entitled to the proportionate sale consideration, but for that reason, the infrastructure project worth Rs.100 crore cannot be stalled -- No prohibitory injunction can be granted involving such a project as per Section 20A of the Specific Relief Act – Application for temporary injunction dismissed.

(Para 17-19)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 2(1)(e), 11(6), 20, 31, 42 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Jurisdiction – Cause of action -- Definition of ‘Court’ -- High Court does not fall within definition of Court as defined under Section 2 (1) (e) of 1996 Act -- High Court gets jurisdiction u/s 11(6) where principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration, had the same been the subject matter of suit -- Cause of action has arisen within jurisdiction of principal Civil Court at Karnal (Haryana) --  Contention of respondent that as per arbitration agreement, Mumbai Court has exclusive jurisdiction – Held, Court at Karnal (Haryana) as well as Mumbai has jurisdiction in term of Section 2(1)(e) read with Section 20 of 1996 Act -- As Civil Court at Karnal (Haryana) has jurisdiction to entertain dispute in question, Punjab and Haryana High Court has jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 11 (6) of 1996 Act.

(Para 11-22)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6), 20, 31, 42 -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Place of Arbitration -- High Court at Chandigarh makes appointment of an Arbitrator -- Both the parties are having their offices at Delhi -- Arbitrator, after his appointment by High Court, may fix place of arbitration at New Delhi because said place may be convenient to both the parties -- In this situation, despite appointment of arbitrator by Punjab and Haryana High Court, the place of arbitration would be ‘New Delhi’.

(Para 13)

National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics in India by Indian Council of Medical Research, 2005, Guideline No.3.12.1, 3.16.1 -- Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (47 of 2021), Section 2(r), 2(zd), 2(zg), 3, 4, 53 -- Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) ACT, 2021 (42 of 2021), Section 31 -- Birth by surrogacy in 2019 – Altruistic surrogacy through an egg donor --   Right of Donor -- Guidelines of 2005 are applicable --  Under Guideline No.3.12.1 and the Surrogacy Agreement dated 30.11.2018, it is clearly stated that a child born through ART shall be presumed to be the legitimate child of the couple as having been born from the wedlock and with the consent of both the spouses -- Though the younger sister of Petitioner is the oocyte  donor, she has no legitimate right to claim that she is the biological parent/ mother of the twin daughters -- She may qualify to be a genetic mother and nothing more, but by such qualification she would have no intending legal right whatsoever to claim to be the biological mother of the twin daughters as the law clearly does not recognise so.

(Para 7.7, 9.2, 9.9, 9.10, 12, 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – Ingredients -- Consent of the opposite sex -- If there is an element of consent available or is apparently made out from allegations, it cannot be termed to be a rape -- It is only when the ingredient of Section 375 of the IPC is satisfied in the FIR registered by the complainant, that a person could be punished for the penal provisions provided under Section 376 of the IPC, and not otherwise.

(Para 4, 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal case -- Consensual sex on pretext of marriage -- For over the last 1-1/2 decades, prosecutrix was in an intimate relationship with the applicant -- Physical relationship was established at the residence of both the parties and even after, when the applicant had even got married with some other lady -- When the complainant had voluntarily established a relationship even after knowing the fact, that the applicant is already a married person, the element of consent itself imbibes in it -- Falsity of an assurance of marriage is to be tested at its initial stage of inception, and not at a subsequent stage -- Initial stage, cannot be said to have been prolonged for 15 years, and even continued after the marriage of the applicant – Criminal case quashed.

(Para 6-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 Part-I -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained by both the accused persons as well as the deceased, the possibility of the incident taking place in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out -- No evidence that the appellant has taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- Weapon used is a pocketknife -- Injury caused by the said knife is a single injury -- Appellant held entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC altered to the one under Part-I of Section 304 IPC -- Appellant sentenced to suffer R.I. for 8 years.

(Para 16-20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cruelty -- Matrimonial dispute – Anticipatory bail – Enormous conditions -- Purpose of putting conditions while granting pre-arrest bail is to secure the presence of the accused to ensure a fair trial and also for the smooth flow of the investigating process – Courts have to be very cautious in imposing conditions while granting bail upon finding pre-arrest bail to be grantable – Condition for release of petitioner on the provisional bail to give undertaking that the appellant would fulfil all physical and financial requirements by way of an affidavit set aside.

(Para 4-9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Registration of FIR – Requirement of -- There is no mandatory requirement of law that the FIR should be lodged before filing a petition under Section 166 of the Act -- Claimants approaching the Tribunal have to prove the case before the Tribunal in accordance with law and irrespective of whether the FIR has been lodged or not.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Employee of insured – Whether third party -- Argument that the deceased was employed with the insured and hence would not be covered under third party insurance, deserves to be rejected.

(Para 7)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Non-mentioning of the name of the driver in the FIR -- Merely because the name of the driver was not mentioned in the FIR by itself would not entail dismissal of the claim petition -- FIR had the complete details of the vehicle involved and hence mere non-mentioning of the name of the driver cannot be in any way be held against the claimants.

(Para 7)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Unmarried major sister claimant – It is not a case where the sister is stated to be staying separately -- Sister, though major, was admittedly staying with her brother and in the claim petition it has specifically been mentioned that the deceased was the sole breadwinner of the family -- No evidence to the contrary has been produced by the appellant/ Insurance company -- Argument that unmarried sister of deceased could not be treated as a dependent on the deceased deserves to be rejected.

(Para 7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 168 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Award beyond claim amount -- There is no restriction upon the court to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed -- It is the duty of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to award just compensation -- Since the Act is a beneficial legislation a “just compensation” is one which is fair and reasonable on the basis of the evidence adduced irrespective of the amount claimed.

(Para 6)

Constitution of India, Article 142 – Civil Services examination of 2014 – Re-medical test in 2024 -- Petitioner qualified in Prelims, Mains and also the Interview -- Though the petitioner was declared to be ‘temporarily unfit’ after the medical examination dated 29.04.2015 -- Petitioner assumed that he had lost out and overlooked the chance that was provided to him on 14.07.2015, when he was called for re-examination – Court considered it appropriate to grant a limited relief, directing the respondents to re-schedule the re-medical test -- Almost a decade has passed, in the event the petitioner qualifies, he shall neither claim appointment in the 2014 Batch, nor will he be entitled to seniority in the Batch -- If he is to be given appointment, his services shall commence from the date of the appointment – Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice, as such shall not be treated as a precedent in any case.

(Para 1, 11-15)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Future prospects -- Perquisites/ allowances -- House rent -- Flexible benefit plan -- Company contribution to provident fund -- Components of house rent allowance, flexible benefit plan and company contribution to provident fund have to be included in the salary of the deceased while applying the component of rise in income by future prospects to determine the dependency factor.

(Para 6-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Censure to employee -- Delay in retiral benefits – Interest thereupon – Promotion – Right of -- Since in the said disciplinary proceedings, the charges levelled against the petitioner in the chargesheet have not been proved and the petitioner has only been ordered to be censure, therefore, the petitioner is held entitled for the grant of interest @ 6% per annum for the delayed payment of retiral dues and his case is liable to be considered by the respondents for grant of promotional increment on completion of 23 years of service and also for promotion from the date, when persons junior to him were promoted with all consequential benefits.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail – Principles – Court observed, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment -- On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, Supreme Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency -- Trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail -- Trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.

(Para 53)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 7A, 8, 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 201, 120B -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Corruption case -- Regular bail – Bar contained in Section 45 of PMLA – Prolonged incarnation – Speedy trial – Right of -- Long incarceration running for around 17 months, trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial – Right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights – 493 witnesses have been named, the case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents -- Not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future – Keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail allowed, stringent conditions imposed.

(Para 49-58)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Cheque bounce complaint – Production of Bank Account statement of complainant from Bank – Locus standi of accused -- Trial Court dismissed the application by observing that power to summon any document on file is vested with the Court or the Officer In-charge of the Police Station and thus, the application moved at the instance of petitioner-accused could not be entertained -- Held, power u/s 91 of CrPC can be exercised either by the Court on its own or even on an application moved by either of the parties to the trial – Impugned order set aside, matter remanded back to trial court to adjudicate afresh.

(Para 3-6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act are not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt -- Mere fact that the dead body of the deceased was found two kilometers back from place where the appellant had left him, could not be a ground to doubt the statement -- False explanation cannot be used as an additional link to fortify the prosecution case -- Suspicion, howsoever strong, it may be, cannot take the place of proof -- A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law -- The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in a case can be stated to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction – Findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and do not in any manner re-concile with the evidence on record -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17, 19-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence -- If the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established and that those circumstances must be conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused -- Moreover all the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence -- Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 23)

Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004, Rule 5(c) – Constitution of India, Article 233 -- Appointment of Additional District and Sessions Judge – Eligibility criteria -- Continuous practice as an advocate – Minimum period of 7 year of practice – Exclusion of judicial service period – Practicing Advocate at the Bar of a minimum period of seven years as on the last date fixed for receipt of the applications -- There is no requirement that such practice as an Advocate must be continuous as on the date of making application for the said post -- Respondent no. 4 has cumulatively more than 7 years of active practice, thus he is eligible to be considered for appointment to the post of Additional District Judge as per Rule 5 (c) – Rule 5(c) upheld, “Note” below clause (c) of Rule 5 (permitting counting of Judicial service of a candidate towards counting of 7 years practice as Advocate for being eligible to be appointed as Additional District Judge), declared unenforceable and struck down.

(Para 42-68)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Recommendation by Revenue authorities – Land ownership – Consideration of -- Not much difference in the age of petitioner (24 years) and respondent No.4 (30 years) and both are equally educated -- Respondent No.4 (appointed by Collector) owns land in his own name and his name was recommended by Tehsildar as well as Sub Divisional Magistrate – Although, the recommendation made by the lower Revenue Authorities may not be binding on the District Collector, however, due consideration is to be accorded to such recommendation as they are in a position to assess the suitability of a candidate and such recommendation would have some persuasive value – Order of Collector restored.

(Para 10-14)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Choice of Collector -- Learned Collector is the main authority for appointment of the lambardar -- It is the Collector, who not only appreciates the antecedents of all the candidates in the fray but also personally interacts with them -- Thus, the subjective satisfaction of the Collector, should have been respected.

(Para 12)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37 -- Suit for permanent injunction – Co-sharer in possession -- Exclusive possession of the defendants since the time of their forefathers, is made out on the suit land -- Evidence does not establish that plaintiff had planted the trees in question on the suit land and nurtured them -- Plaintiff cannot be said to be clothed with the legal right to restrain the defendants from using or cutting the trees, standing on their land --  It is well established principle of law that where a co sharer who is in possession of the separate parcels of the property is entitled to the enjoyment of its possession, and it is not open to anyone to disturb the possession – Suit dismissed.

(Para 17)

B. Co-sharer in possession – Remedy to other co-sharer -- Remedy of a co-sharer not in possession of the joint property is by way of filing a suit for possession or actual possession but not for ejectment.

(Para 17)

C. Concealment of facts – Effect of -- Plaintiffs non-suited for concealing the earlier litigation -- Law is settled that who seeks equity, must do equity -- A litigant who conceals material facts from the Court is not entitled for relief.

(Para 18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 325, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Summoning to husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law – Quashing of :

-- Complainant alleged that she was beaten up and a fracture was caused in her hand, no medical documents were produced by her either before the Magistrate or with the counter affidavit filed in this Court to support this contention.

-- Stated in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. that she was treated with great affection and respect by the grandfather of the applicant no.1 and her ill treatment and harassment started after his death, in the statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C., the opposite party no.2/complainant stated that she was harassed for demanding dowry from the day following the date of her marriage.

-- At the same time, in the counter affidavit filed before this court, she stated that after the marriage, she had gone with her husband for honeymoon to Dubai and both of them had a very pleasant trip.

-- Complaint application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C filed after receipt of summon of the suit and after the suit filed under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act and after the Family Court had granted last opportunity to the opposite party no.2 to file her written statement and even after the date of that last opportunity had expired.

The learned Magistrate erred in summoning the applicants to face the trial without there being any specific allegation of commission of any act by the applicant nos. 2 and 3 which may amount to an offence -- Moreover, there is absolutely no material to support the allegations against the applicant no. 1 – Summoning order/ complaint quashed.

(Para 19-33

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Restitution of conjugal rights – Criminal proceedings – Opposite party no.2/ complainant/ wife filed the application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. merely to put pressure on the applicants and other members of their family for restitution of her matrimonial relationship with the applicant no.1/ husband -- However, she had filed a suit u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act with the same objective, which has been dismissed by the Family Court -- Criminal prosecution cannot be allowed to be misused for ulterior objective to put undue pressure on the husband, his family members and relatives for restitution of conjugal rights.

(Para 30)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Acquittal in criminal case – Appellant/ ex-serviceman acquitted in criminal case -- Private respondent, who was aged 32 years and passed BA-II was having 5 acres of agricultural land found more suitable -- It is settled principle of law that though a person might have been acquitted but he is supposed to have clean antecedents should be no taint – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order 22 Rule 3, 4, Order 5 Rule 1(19)  – Special Leave Petition (SLP) Civil/ Criminal -- Certified copy of impugned order – Requirement of – Exemption of -- Petitions shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed from -- If the certified copy is not available on the date of presentation of a special leave petition, proof of application for such copy has to be adduced for the court to consider the prayer for exemption -- This practice direction has to be observed by all litigants who propose to file special leave petitions both on the civil side as well as on the criminal side with effect from 20th August, 2024.

(Para 12-17)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 2 (zd), 13, 35 -- Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 9 -- Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), Section 21, 35A – Reserve Bank of India [Lending to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Sector] Directions, 2016, Direction 4, 4.8 – Secured creditors -- SARFAESI proceedings -- MSME – Rehabilitation of – Non-Performing Assets – Procedure of -- Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs -- Section 21 and Section 35A of Banking Regulation Act empower the RBI to frame the policy and give directions to the banking companies in relation to the advances to be followed by the banking companies -- Such directions have got to be read as supplement to the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act and accordingly are required to be construed as having statutory force and mandatory.

-- Entire exercise as contained in the “Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs” is required to be carried out by the banking companies before the accounts of MSMEs turn into Non-Performing Asset.

-- Whole process of enforcement of security interest as contained in Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act, could be initiated only when the borrower makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, in view of Section 13(2) of the said Act.

-- Banking companies though may be ‘Secured creditors’ as per the definition contained in Section 2 (zd) of the SARFAESI Act, are bound to follow the same,  before classifying the loan account of MSME as NPA.

The Instructions/ Directions issued by the Central Government under Section 9 of the MSMED Act and by the RBI under Section 21 and Section 35A have statutory force and are binding to all the Banking companies.

(Para 12-18)

National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (53 of 1987), Section 29A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cognizance in complaint -- Vicarious liability of Directors of Company – Role of -- In the absence of the averments as contemplated by sub-section (1) of Section 50 in the complaint, the Trial Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence against the third to seventh accused, who are allegedly the directors of the first accused company -- Complaint stand quashed against the third to seventh accused.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Compassionate appointment -- Principle of compassionate appointment has been put in place to ameliorate suffering that is cast upon members of a family upon the sudden death of the earning member -- Compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right -- A person, claiming an appointment on such ground, has to demonstrate his relationship to the deceased person and eligibility for appointment -- Same cannot be done without placing all relevant documents before the competent authority.

(Para 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Compassionate appointment by fraud – Termination from service -- Protection under Constitution of India – Availability of -- Fraud vitiates all proceedings -- Respondent-employees having obtained their position by fraud, would not be considered to be holding a post for the purpose of the protections under the Constitution.

(Para 2.2, 14)

A. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (53 of  1961), Section 9, 10 -- Contractual employee -- Maternity leave -- A contractual employee, is entitled to avail the benefit of maternity leave under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and she is entitled for full salary during the period she availed the benefit of maternity leave.

(Para 6)

B. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (53 of  1961), Section 9, 10 -- Probation -- Maternity leave -- Once, an employee completes the period of probation during the maternity leave, she is entitled for fixation of actual salary, which she gets upon confirmation.

(Para 6)

C. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (53 of  1961), Section 9, 10 -- Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume-I, Rule 8.127 -- Order which has been passed on the basis of Rule 8.127 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume-I cannot be made applicable where a female employee has available benefit of maternity leave under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 -- Where there is a conflict between the Rules and Act, the Act will prevail -- A female employee, who availed the benefit of maternity leave will entitle for the service benefits, the same will include the actual salary in case, she is confirmed on the post in question during the period she availed the benefit of maternity leave.

(Para 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Withdrawal of complaint -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Proceedings u/s 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act read with Section 420 IPC have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the aforesaid complaint -- Petition allowed subject to a deposit of Rs.25,000/- as costs -- FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 12, 13)

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (57 of 1994), Section 3, 4, 5, 6, 23, 25, 29 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 419, 420, 120-B, 201, 34  -- Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (34 of 1971), Section 3, 4 -- National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (30 of 2019), Section 34, 54 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Sex-determination – Regular bail -- Petitioner acted as a mediator between the decoy witness and the co-accused for the purpose of sex determination test -- Petitioner nominated on the basis of disclosure statement made by co-accused, who has been granted concession of regular bail -- Petitioner was arrested in this case on 27.03.2024, challan has already been presented -- Prosecution has cited 28 witnesses and none of them has been examined -- Conclusion of trial will take sufficient long time – Bail allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200, 482 -- Complaint against doctor – Death by rash and negligent act of doctor -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Opinion of another doctor – Requirement of -- A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence in the form of credible opinion given by another doctor to support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor -- To allow the proceeding to continue, will amount to an abuse of the process of law -- Entire criminal proceeding u/s 304-A of IPC quashed.

(Para 10,11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 52A – NDPS case – Suspension of sentence – Appeal against conviction – Sample of contraband – Non-compliance of procedure -- Appellant sentenced to undergo 15 years’ R.I. with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- with default stipulation of six months’ R.I. -- Appellant has already undergone almost three years and is in custody since the date of judgment and order i.e. 30.08.2022 continuously -- Court prima facie satisfied that provisions of Section 52A (2) of the Act were not complied with --  Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 5, 11-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397(2) – Examination of witness u/s 311 Cr.P.C. -- Interlocutory Order – Maintainability of revision -- Order rejecting the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order -- Revision petition is not maintainable against the dismissal order.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397(2) – Examination of witness u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Locus standi -- Petitioners are neither complainants nor were they cited as witnesses in the original complaint filed by their brother in the year 2012 -- Petitioners were not examined during preliminary, pre-charge, or post-charge evidence stages and therefore, had no locus-standi to file the application u/s 311 Cr.PC.

(Para 8)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Eviction petition – Amendment of written statement -- Amendment sought is to clarify the location and the area of the demised premises -- Court should assist the parties in bringing on record the complete facts than to prevent them from exercising their rights on rigid technicalities -- Rent Controller, directed to provide one effective opportunity to the petitioners/ defendants to file their amended written statement.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal -- Prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence as there is no eye witness – Statement of PW2/ mother of the deceased is based on suspicion --  She has not seen the deceased going to the house of the accused – No other evidence available on the file connecting the accused with the offence -- Dead body of deceased was recovered from the house of the accused which is not sufficient to connect all the accused with the offence -- Prosecution case is also doubtful as the prosecution has withheld the best evidence -- No reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal – Revision dismissed.

(Para 13, 14)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Agreement to sell – Registration of – Requirement of – Suit for specific performance -- First Appellate Court held that for the purpose of filing the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell, the registration of the agreement to sell is not necessary – No ground to interfere is made out – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 3-9)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- First Appeal – Stay of decree – Right of -- Suit for specific performance decreed – Appeal was filed, but no order relating to the stay was granted and after about a period of 11 months, the application was dismissed -- The Court, ought to take into consideration that it is the statutory right exercised by the petitioner-defendant, by filing appeal -- Creation of third party rights, may lead to multiplicity of litigation – Revision allowed, impugned order set aside -- Operation of the judgment and decree stayed, till the decision of First Appeal.

(Para 7-12)

Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Article 1, Schedule 1 -- Ad-valorem court fee – Transfer of property in favour of family members by registered instruments -- Suit for cancellation of document -- Trial court directed the plaintiff to pay ad-valorem court fee – Held, suit will be governed by Article-I, Schedule-I of the 1870 Act, which provides for payment of ad valorem court fee on the value of the subject matter in dispute -- There is no error in the impugned orders of the trial Court -- Revision dismissed.

(Para 3, 11, 12)

Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (M.P. Act No. 20 of 1959), Section 257(f), (m) – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Dispute is to the effect as to whether the plaintiff is bhumiswami or the defendant 1 is bhumiswami of the land in question -- Suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction or for restoration of possession is maintainable before Civil Court only – Provisions of section 257 (f) & (m) have no relevance to the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376-D, 320, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Gang rape – POCSO case -- Regular bail -- In the FIR, the applicants are named, and according to the victim, she was taken from her house -- In her statement u/s 164 of the Code, the victim tells that she was forcibly taken from a public road, when the applicants introduced themselves to her -- In her medical examination, she did not name the applicants and told that unknown persons took her -- Prior to the medical examination of the victim, the FIR had already been lodged – If the victim did not know the name of the applicants when she was medically examine, how could she name the applicants in the FIR -- Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 365, 143, 201, 364, 147, 148, 149, 323, 342, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Regular bail – Extrajudicial confession -- Only one eye-witness to depose against the petitioner, but he has turned hostile and has not supported the story -- In the charge-sheet, two other witnesses projected by prosecution to depose against the petitioner in respect of alleged extra judicial confession – Incident took place on 19.07.2023, however, the statements of these two witnesses got recorded by Police on 30.08.2023 -- Inordinate delay casts a serious doubt over the credibility of the investigation – In any wildest imagination, an accused shall not make confession before a person having connection with the opposite party -- High probability that the trial may take long time to conclude – Bail allowed.

(Para 4, 5)

Uttar Pradesh Excise Act, 1910 (IV of 1910), Section 72 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 457 – Excise matter – Confiscation proceedings before Collector – Power of Judicial Magistrate -- If a vehicle is seized under the provisions of the Excise Act and confiscation proceedings in respect thereof are going on before the Collector, a Judicial Magistrate has got no jurisdiction to release the aforesaid vehicle.

(Para 21-24)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Scope and object of the Section 311 Cr.P.C. – Provision is to enable the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts to arrive at a just decision of the case -- Power is to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily -- Such a power is to be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be adduced by the concerned witness is relevant to the issue involved -- Application could not be rejected on the sole ground that the case has been pending since long.

(Para 5)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Re-examination of complainant/ witness – FIR by complainant for same transaction as well -- Complainant’s cross-examination was completed on 21.11.2019 -- However, challan in criminal case was filed in year 2022 – It is the case of the petitioner that certain new facts having bearing on the present case, surfaced in the said report submitted by the police u/s 173 Cr.P.C and it is necessary to put the said new facts to the complainant in his cross examination -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed subject to cost of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 3, 6, 7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS Case – Commercial quantity – Regular bail -- Petitioner has already incarcerated 2 years and 11 days in custody and not involved in any other case -- Probability of his false implication cannot be ruled out particularly in the light of the fact that police party was in a private vehicle, details of which have not been mentioned – Charges framed on 13.2.2023, wherein out of 9 prosecution witnesses, only 2 have been examined so far, meaning thereby the trial will take long time which tantamount to violation of right to life and liberty as has been enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India even including the right to speedy trial -- “Bail is a rule, jail is an exception” is the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence – Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 5-9)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 -- Res-judicata -- General policy behind the principle of res judicata as enshrined u/s 11 CPC is to avoid parties to litigate on the same issue which has already been adjudicated upon and settled -- This is in consonance with the public policy so as to bring to an end the conflict of interest on the same issue between the same parties -- One of the basic essential ingredients for applying the principle of res judicata, is that the matter which is directly and substantially in issue in the previous litigation ought not to be permitted to be raised and adjudicated upon in the subsequent suit.

(Para 23)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 -- Res-judicata between co-defendants -- Principle of res judicata is applicable not only between the plaintiff and the defendants but also between the co-defendants -- In applying the principle of res judicata between the co-defendants, primarily three conditions are necessary to be fulfilled, namely, (i) there must be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants; (ii) there is necessity to decide the said conflict in order to give relief to plaintiff; and (iii) there is final decision adjudicating the said conflict -- Once all these conditions are satisfied, the principle of res judicata can be applied inter se the co-defendants.

(Para 23)