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Posted On: 01-09-2025
256. (SC) (Decided on: 29.08.2025)

A. Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.2 -- Absence from duty – Dismissal of Constable from service -- Absence of the respondent from the duty on various occasions in a short tenure of service of around 7 years, is a gross indiscipline on the part of the respondent – No illegality in the order passed by the disciplinary authority whereby the services of the respondent have been dismissed.

(Para 25)

B. Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.2(1) – Dismissal of constable from service – In the first part of Rule 16.2, punishment of dismissal can be awarded to the delinquent for the gravest act of misconduct -- In the second part, the punishment can be awarded as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service – Respondent/ employee was dealt by the department earlier on three occasions having remained absent from duty and the penalties were inflicted for the same -- It is the fourth time when he remained absent to which, a chargesheet was issued and his guilt was found proved – Disciplinary authority, while imposing the penalty, had merely referred the past conduct and also given weight to the gravest act of misconduct -- Order of dismissal is not based on the charge of “cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service” -- Therefore, mere reference of the past conduct would not amount to constitute dismissal of the respondent based on the second limb of Rule 16.2(1)  -- Held, dismissal of the respondent was based on gravest act of misconduct, for which he was dealt with by the disciplinary authority following the procedure as prescribed and in due observance of principles of natural justice, hence, not find any fault in the same.

(Para 25-33)

Posted On: 31-08-2025
259. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 27.08.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interlocutory injunction -- Call has to be taken by the Courts for issuance of interlocutory injunction, at the time, when the existence of legal right is asserted by the plaintiff and there is alleged contest, qua the violation of this legal right and the same, as such remains uncertain, before the Court, till the evidence adduced, is to be appraised by the Court -- The purpose of interim injunction is to mitigate the risk of injustice to a person, knocking the door of the Court, during the interregnum period of resolvement of uncertainty, vis-a-vis, violation of legal right.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interlocutory injunction -- Court ought to consider three ingredients i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss -- Considering the existence of these three conditions, the need for such protection has to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against the injury, resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights, for which, he could not be adequately compensated -- Thus, the Courts are supposed to weigh one need against another and determine, where the balance of convenience lies.

(Para 10, 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interim injunction  -- Existing of tubewells/ borings is not disputed by the defendants -- Plaintiff No.2 asserts himself to be the co-owner in the suit land -- On account of tubewell, not being put to use, will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs also, if the defendants are not restrained from destroying the tubewells as well as PVC pipes or from creating hindrance in the running of the tubewells/boring -- Defendants cannot be allowed to take law in their own hands and cause damage to the tubewells/borings or PVC pipes -- Learned trial Court appropriately allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC further correctly affirmed by learned Appellate Court warrant no interference.

(Para 12-16)

Posted On: 30-08-2025
268. (SC) (Decided on: 19.08.2025)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Stolen cash – Presumption -- Cash so recovered had no special or distinct identification characteristics and thus, the same could not be linked to amount allegedly stolen from the deceased even if such allegation was proved by tangible evidence -- To base a conviction u/s 411 IPC solely on the ground that both the accused were unable to account for being in possession of such huge amount of cash is both incorrect and untenable.

(Para 14, 14.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 102 – Criminal Trial – Burdon of proof -- In a criminal prosecution, the initial burden is always on the prosecution to discharge, whereby the allegations raised by it against the accused person are preliminarily satisfied -- If the prosecution is unable to do so, by virtue of Section 102 of Evidence Act, the criminal trial initiated against the accused deserves to be dismissed without asking the accused to lead any evidence from the side of defence.

(Para 14.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Acquittal for offence of theft – Conviction for possession of Stolen goods – Legality of -- Trial Court acquitted both accused u/s 379 IPC -- In order to uphold conviction u/s 411 IPC, it is sine qua non that the property in the possession of accused is a stolen property -- If the property is not a stolen property, the charge u/s 411 IPC cannot be sustained -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-19)

Posted On: 30-08-2025
269. (SC) (Decided on: 19.08.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Temporary labelled employees – Long-term extraction of labour – Equal protection – Financial stringency/  Budget – Excuse of -- Duty of Government -- “Ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque – State (Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer -- It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions -- Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices -- Long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection -- Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 --  Temporary labelled employees – Creation of supernumerary posts -- Regularization of -- As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit -- Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers -- Creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 20)

Posted On: 26-08-2025
273. (H.P. HC) (Decided on: 20.08.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- A plaint can be rejected if it does not disclose a cause of action, if the relief claimed is under-valued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped and plaintiff on being required by Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law etc.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Pleadings -- Court is not to step out of the pleadings as are contained in the plaint and the documents appended therewith -- Defence of the other party is not to be taken into consideration at the time of deciding the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- In terms of the averments made in the plaint, the cause of action is stated to have lastly accrued on 11.01.2016 and the suit was filed in the year 2016 itself, prima facie, it cannot be said from the perusal of the plaint that the suit is barred by limitation -- Trial Court dismisses the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC, call for no interference.

(Para 11)

Posted On: 23-08-2025
285. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 18.08.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Rs.9,000/- per month assessed by the Ld. Tribunal – Deceased left behind his widow, three minor children and old aged parents -- Minor children have their entire life ahead of them -- Their education has to be taken care of as well as the living expenses of all the claimants -- Compensation should at least be sufficient to mitigate the financial difficulties the family is likely to face – Keeping in view the rising prices as well as the fact that the education of the minor children is still at the threshold, Court deemed it appropriate not to interfere in the income of the deceased as assessed by the Tribunal -- Argument that the income ought to have been assessed as per the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 33 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Power of Court of Appeal – Appeal of Insurance Company – No cross-appeal by claimants – Just compensation -- Claimants relied upon Surekha & Ors. vs. Santosh & Ors., 2021 (16) SCC 467 to contend that even though no cross appeal was filed, the claimants would be entitled to enhanced compensation by addition towards loss of future prospects, which ought to have been 40% keeping in view the age of the deceased, who was 30 years of age at the time of his death -- Argument of the claimants accepted -- An addition of 40% made towards loss of future prospects -- Claimants held entitled to (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses as also to Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) towards loss of consortium – Total compensation assessed at Rs.22,51,800/- -- Interest @ 7.5% per annum awarded on enhanced amount from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount awarded.

(Para 5, 11, 9-13)

Posted On: 23-08-2025
289. (SC) (Decided on: 14.07.2025)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-impleadment of Partnership firm as accused – Maintainability of Complaint against Partner – Vicarious liability/ Joint and several – Since the liability is joint and several, even in the absence of a partnership firm being proceeded against by the complainant by issuance of legal notice as mandated u/s 138 of the Act or being made an accused specifically in a complaint filed under Section 200 of CrPC, (equivalent to Section 223 of the BNSS), such a complaint is maintainable.

(Para 7.21, 9.9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Offence by partnership firm – Partners personally, jointly and severally liable in the case of a partnership firm, when the offence has been proved against a partnership firm -- Partnership firm is only a compendious name for the partners of the firm, any offence committed u/s 138 read with Section 141 of the Act would make the partners of the firm jointly and severally liable with the firm.

(Para 9.10, 9.11)

C. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 4, 5 -- Partnership firm – Whether a Separate Legal Personality -- A partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Companies Act, does not possess a separate legal personality and the firm’s name is only a compendious reference for describing its partners -- This fundamental distinction between a firm and a company rests on the premise that the company is separate from its shareholders -- Even the registration of a firm does not mean that it becomes a distinct legal entity like a company -- Hence, the partners of a firm are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in a company who are not co-owners of the property of the company.

(Para 7.9, 7.10, 8)

D. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 42 (c) -- Partnership firm and partners – Death of partner -- Perpetual Succession -- A partnership firm’s fundamental identity is contingent on the partners and undergoes a change with a change in partners, subject to contract -- Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act provides that subject to contract between the partners, a firm is dissolved by the death of a partner.

(Para 7.17)

E. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners -- Liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm --  Any liability of a firm has the same effect of a liability against the partners -- Debt of the firm is the personal debt of a partner and the debt of the firm has to be incurred by each partner as a financial personal liability -- The liability of the firm for acts done by the partner would arise when such acts are done in the ordinary course of the business of the firm.

(Para 7.18-7.20, 7.22)

F. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners – Penalty -- Since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable -- Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.

(Para 7.23)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Liability of Directors, manager, Secretary and other officer -- Director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company cannot be proceeded against per se by virtue of the position they hold in the company but can be proceeded against only when there is proof that the offence u/s 138 was committed by the company with their consent or connivance or due to negligence on their part -- Standard of proof is higher under sub-section (2) of Section 141 vis-à-vis the category of persons mentioned therein with regard to their specific role in the commission of the offence u/s 138 of the Act.

(Para 9.4)

Posted On: 22-08-2025
294. (SC) (Decided on: 01.08.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Medical disability of employee -- Pre-mature retirement – Sustainability of -- Appellant was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without any meaningful effort by the Respondent–Corporation to explore his suitability for alternate employment – Corporation’s omission to consider redeployment violates both statutory and constitutional obligations -- Duty to reasonably accommodate such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in Articles 14 and 21 -- Respondent–Corporation directed to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016 – Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement -- Intervening period shall be reckoned as continuous service for all purposes.

(Para 40, 42)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Removal from service -- Pre-mature retirement of employee -- Judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become an excuse for disengagement from injustice -- When an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself -- The employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins.

(Para 41)

Posted On: 22-08-2025
295. (SC) (Decided on: 08.08.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- National of United States – Future prospects – Deceased was self-employed in U.S. -- Future prospects of a person self-employed in a foreign country like United States, compared to a person in this country, would become difficult for the simple reason that the socio-economic-political conditions in any foreign country would be different -- In order to determine the just compensation to a person who died in an accident occurred in India, the dictum of law in Pranay Sethi’s case (2017) 16 SCC 680 = (2017) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 10002 = 2018(1) L.A.R. 1 shall have to be followed and applied specially when no material evidence is offered to determine the future prospects in the foreign country -- Accordingly, the Court is inclined to extend the benefit of future prospects’ component for the compensation payable as per the principles in Pranay Sethi’s case – Total compensation comes to 1,60,15,280/- alongwith 5% interest p.a.

(Para 5.4)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Conventional heads -- Deceased was aged 31 years, 40% addition made in the established income towards future prospects -- Under the conventional heads namely loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses made at Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively -- Dependent of the deceased are wife, the daughter and the parents, therefore, for each of them Rs.40,000/- will be the part of compensation towards loss of consortium amounting to Rs.1,60,000/-.

(Para 5.5., 5.6)

Posted On: 22-08-2025
296. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 31.07.2025)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 6, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Acquisition of land – Title dispute – Restitution of compensation -- Jurisdiction of civil Court -- Once the ownership and wrongful enrichment were proved, the Trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to grant full and effective relief, including restitution -- Denial of consequential reliefs despite a declaration of ownership has resulted in manifest injustice.

(Para 16)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 11, 30 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Acquisition of land – Entitlement of compensation -- Title dispute – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- It is settled law that where title and ownership are in question, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction, even in matters of compensation related to acquisition -- Suit is not barred by Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act -- Section 30 only applies where a dispute regarding apportionment of compensation is pending before the Land Acquisition Officer.

(Para 20)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 39 – Mandatory injunction -- Relief under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (mandatory injunction) is permissible where:

I. A legal duty exists,

II. There is a breach,

III. Plaintiff is entitled to relief to prevent unjust gain/loss.

When the ownership is established and the revenue entries are proved to be erroneous, any benefit drawn from such illegal entries must be undone.

(Para 24)

D. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 6, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 11 – Acquisition of land – Restitution of compensation -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Issue of ownership was already settled in 1969 -- Cause of action arose only when compensation was wrongly disbursed in favour of respondents based on fraudulent revenue entries -- Suit was filed within limitation after appellants discovered the wrongful receipt of funds – Suit is also not barred by Res Judicata or Limitation.

(Para 25)

Posted On: 22-08-2025
297. (SC) (Decided on: 20.08.2025)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail by High Court – UAPA case -- High Court noticed that accused no. 11/ his connections with an organisation by the name of AL-Hind is not a banned organisation under the schedule to UAPA -- Apart from the above, impugned order by the High Court was passed on 21.04.2022 almost 3-1/2 years ago and as such, it may not be just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage -- Further, charges have not been framed so far and trial has not commenced – No justification to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court granting bail.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – UAPA Case – Regular Bail -- High Court has found accused no. 20/ his involvement with banned terrorist organisations, his active role in operating dark web and assisting the members of the banned terrorist organisations -- High Court further noticed the involvement of accused no.20 in another case under UAPA – Held, High Court was justified in not granting bail to accused no.20.

(Para 11, 12)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Speedy trial -- Life and liberty – Trial has not commenced despite lapse of 5-1/2 years -- Accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial -- Trial Court be directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same within a period of two years considering that there are more than 100 witnesses to be examined by the prosecution.

(Para 13)

Posted On: 22-08-2025
300. (SC) (Decided on: 19.08.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Multiple Appointments challenged -- Doctrine of severability – Detailed analysis – Requirements of -- Validity of an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the appointee's own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable rules -- Courts must resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations of entire batches of appointments merely on the basis of procedural infirmities that affect only a portion of the appointments – Principles of fairness, proportionality, and individual justice are foundational to administrative law and demand that a case-by-case analysis be undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of cancellation -- Where multiple appointments are challenged on general grounds, authorities and courts must undertake a detailed fact-specific analysis before concluding that all such appointments are void -- Doctrine of severability must not remain a mere theoretical doctrine but must guide real administrative action and judicial reasoning in service matters.

(Para 26, 49)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16 – Employment – Irregular appointment – Illegal appointment – Challenge to -- Right to employment, though not a fundamental right, is nevertheless protected under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution insofar as it requires fair, just, and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly situated individuals -- Appellants' dismissal, without issuing a show cause or opportunity of hearing, is a clear violation of principles of natural justice -- The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments must not be blurred -- An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the post is sanctioned -- An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the post does not exist -- When appointments are questioned on grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those whose appointments are unimpeachable -- Justice demands separation, not erasure.

(Para 30, 31)