Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22A(b) – Public Utility Services – Imposition of tax by transport department – Jurisdiction of PLA --  At what rate, the tax will be imposed on the particular vehicle cannot be brought into the net of Public Utility Services -- Merely because transport vehicle for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water has been mentioned in the definition of Section 22A(b) of the Act of 1987, it will not bring the subject matter of imposition of tax within the jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat for adjudication.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 70 – Inquiry – Summons – Nature of -- A summons is not the culmination of an investigation, but merely a step in its course -- It is in this context that the legislature has used the term “inquiry” in Section 70, as at the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is primarily engaged in gathering information regarding a possible contravention of law, which may subsequently form the basis for proceedings against an assessee.

(Para 57)

B. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b), 67, 70, 74 – Initiation of proceedings -- Mere issuance of summons does not imply that the Department has decided to proceed against the taxpayer for recovery of liability – At that stage Department still retains the discretion not to initiate any proceedings -- A mere contemplation or possibility of initiating action cannot be equated with “proceedings”, as doing so would undermine the framework of cross-empowerment under the Act.

Even when a discovery is made during the search proceedings under Section 67 of the CGST Act, the Department is required to bring such proceedings to a definitive conclusion, either by issuing a show cause notice under Section 74 or by dropping the matter altogether.

(Para 74)

C. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b) – Prohibition of Parallel proceedings -- Under Section 6(2)(b), the “subject matter” is intrinsically tied to the determination of the specific violation under scrutiny or the liability alleged to be unpaid -- Statutory bar is triggered only when the two proceedings against the same taxpayer are, in substance, directed towards the very same or overlapping deficiency in tax discharge or the identical contravention alleged -- Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, each Department is entitled to proceed within its respective statutory remit without infringing the prohibition.

(Para 87)

D. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b) – Bar under Section 6(2)(b) of CGSAT Act, 2017 -- Central and State tax authorities -- Parallel proceedings – Legality of – Inquiry or gathering information – Applicability of : 

i. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the CGST Act and the equivalent State enactments bars the “initiation of any proceedings” on the “same subject matter”.

ii. Any action arising from the audit of accounts or detailed scrutiny of returns must be initiated by the tax administration to which the taxpayer is assigned.

iii. Intelligence based enforcement action can be initiated by any one of the Central or the State tax administrations despite the taxpayer having been assigned to the other administration.

iv. Parallel proceedings should not be initiated by other tax administration when one of the tax administrations has already initiated intelligence-based enforcement action.

v. All actions that are initiated as a measure for probing an inquiry or gathering of evidence or information do not constitute “proceedings” within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

vi. The expression “initiation of any proceedings” occurring in Section 6(2)(b) refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings by way of issuance of a show cause notice, and does not encompass the issuance of summons, or the conduct of any search, or seizure etc.

vii. The expression “subject matter” refers to any tax liability, deficiency, or obligation arising from any particular contravention which the Department seeks to assess or recover.

viii. Where any two proceedings initiated by the Department seek to assess or recover an identical or a partial overlap in the tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from any particular contravention, the bar of Section 6(2)(b) would be immediately attracted.

ix. Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, the same would not constitute a “same subject matter” even if the tax liability, deficiency, or obligation is same or similar, and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) would not be attracted.

x. The twofold test for determining whether a subject matter is “same” entails, first, determining if an authority has already proceeded on an identical liability of tax or alleged offence by the assessee on the same facts, and secondly, if the demand or relief sought is identical.

(Para 96)

E. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 6(2)(b), 70, 73, 74, 146 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bar under Section 6(2)(b) of CGSAT Act, 2017 -- Central and State tax authorities -- Parallel proceedings – Legality of – Inquiry or investigation by a different authority – Applicability of -- Writ jurisdiction -- Guidelines issued :

a. Where a summons or a show cause notice is issued by either the Central or the State tax authority to an assessee, the assessee is, in the first instance, obliged to comply by appearing and furnishing the requisite response, as the case may be -- Because, mere issuance of a summons does not enable either the issuing authority or the recipient to ascertain that proceedings have been initiated.

b. Where an assessee becomes aware that the matter being inquired into or investigated is already the subject of an inquiry or investigation by another authority, the assessee shall forthwith inform, in writing, the authority that has initiated the subsequent inquiry or investigation.

c. Upon receipt of such intimation from the assessee, the respective tax authorities shall communicate with each other to verify the veracity of the assessee’s claim -- As this course of action would obviate needless duplication of proceedings and ensure optimal utilization of the Department’s time, effort, and resources, bearing in mind that action initiated by one authority enures to benefit of all.

d. If the claim of the taxable person regarding the overlap of inquiries is found untenable, and the investigations of the two authorities pertain to different “subject matters”, an intimation to this effect, along with the reasons and a specification of the distinct subject matters, shall be immediately conveyed in writing to the taxable person.

e. The taxing authorities are well within their rights to conduct an inquiry or investigation until it is ascertained that both authorities are examining the identical liability to be discharged, the same contravention alleged, or the issuance of a show cause notice -- Any show cause notice issued in respect of a liability already covered by an existing show cause notice shall be quashed.

f. However, if the Central or the State tax authority, as the case may be finds that the matter being inquired into or investigated by it is already the subject of inquiry or investigation by another authority, both authorities shall decide inter-se which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation. In such a scenario the other authority shall duly forward all material and information relating to its inquiry or investigation into the matter to the authority designated to carry the inquiry or investigation to its logical conclusion -- Because, the taxable person except for being afforded the statutory protection from duplication of proceedings, otherwise has no locus to claim which authority should proceed with the inquiry or investigation in a particular matter.

g. However, where the authorities are unable to reach a decision as to which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation, then in such circumstances, the authority that first initiated the inquiry or investigation shall be empowered to carry it to its logical conclusion, and the courts in such a case would be competent to pass an order for transferring the inquiry or investigation to that authority.

h. If it is found that the authorities are not complying with these aforementioned guidelines, it shall be open to the taxable person to file a writ petition before the concerned High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

i. At the same time, taxable persons shall ensure complete cooperation with the authorities. It is incumbent upon them to appear in response to a summons and/or reply to a notice.

It is imperative that the Departments act in harmony and maintain heightened vigilance with respect to intelligence inputs received by them, so as to give full effect to the legislative intent underlying the GST regime.

(Para 97, 98)

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Dowry case – Quashing of FIR by High Court – Challenge to -- Whether or not there has been misrepresentation is entirely a question of fact which cannot be decided at the stage when the inherent powers of the High Court are invoked for quashing of an FIR/criminal proceedings -- Mala fide must be manifest on the face of the FIR -- High Court committed a serious error in entertaining the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. PC -- Criminal proceedings arising out of the subject FIR shall be taken to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law – Impugned order set aside.

(Para 9-14)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Foundation for the plea of adverse possession must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried -- A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of trial would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

(Para 19)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Plea of adverse possession is not always a legal plea -- It is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved -- A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued -- He must also show whether his possession was open and undisturbed -- These are all questions of fact and unless they are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them -- Therefore, in normal cases an appellate Court will not allow the plea of adverse possession to be raised before it.

(Para 20)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 – Adverse possession – Nature of -- Ordinarily, the question of adverse possession is one of fact, resting upon proof of numerous circumstances which go to establish the several elements, indicating adverse character of the possession -- In certain cases, it may be a question of law, or, a mixed question of law and facts as, where the decision rests upon inferences to be drawn from facts which are admitted or established.

(Para 27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal – Benefit of doubt -- Body of the deceased, was found in the courtyard of his own house; when the scene of occurrence, as per the prosecution, was elsewhere -- There is also no clarity as to the time when the death was occasioned, so as to garner support from the medical evidence -- All the witnesses are related and are residing in the same neighbourhood and their presence cannot at all be doubted -- However, the fact that the body was found in a different place from the scene of occurrence; at the house of the deceased, the unexplained injuries on the body of the father and mother of the deceased, the admitted dispute on partition in the family of the deceased and the lack of clarity on the exact time of death creates a reasonable doubt – Appellant should be given the benefit of doubt -- Order of conviction entered into by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Civil imprisonment – Recovery of decreetal amount – Sufficient funds with Judgment debtor – Requirement of -- Executing Court has nowhere recorded a finding that the revisionist is possessed of sufficient means and is intentionally avoiding to pay the decreetal amount – Held, unless and until, it is found that the JD inspite of having been in possession of sufficient means is not intentionally paying the decreetal amount, arrest warrant cannot be issued and he cannot be put behind bars due to his poverty -- Revision petition allowed and the impugned order set aside.

(Para 1, 2)

Code of Civil Procedure, Code, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1 -- Defence struck off – Non-filing of written statement – Held, although the period prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC should generally be adhered to but the provisions contained in the same are directory in nature -- Court should, therefore, not be too harsh in not allowing the filing of written statement by striking of the defence -- Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that the case is at initial stage wherein plaintiffs/respondents are yet to lead the evidence and in the interest of justice, the revision petition allowed -- One effective opportunity granted to file the written statement subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Status quo -- Impleadment as party – Application dismissed by Trial Court -- Status quo qua the transfer of property by way of alienation, mortgaging or creating charge -- Injunction order, if any, passed is binding upon the parties to that litigation and the revisionist is not a party to the litigation – Revision disposed of with the observation that order would be binding upon the parties to the litigation.

(Para 1-3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6, Rule 17 -- Amendment of suit -- Mandatory injunction to suit for possession --  Earlier suit for mandatory injunction for direction to deliver the possession – After the amendment, it will be a suit for possession – Nature of the suit and the relief sought therein, will be same, but only its form would be different – Amendment allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i), (3), 15, 17 -- Eviction of tenant – Appeal pending – Warrant of possession by Executing Court -- Eviction order on 28.05.2025 -- Two months’ granted time to handover the vacant physical possession by 27.07.2025 -- Execution application by the respondent-landlord on 11.07.2025 -- Learned Executing Court vide order dated 23.07.2025, ordered issuance of warrant for possession, before the expiry of the time granted by the learned Rent Controller – Held, learned Executing Court illegally proceeded to issue warrant for possession -- Institution of the execution proceedings prior to 28.07.2025 was premature – Warrant of possession set aside.

(Para 9, 10)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 31 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Complaint before HRERA – Interim order by HRERA – Stay of interim order by High Court --  HRERA after noticing the factum of interim stay by this Court had dismissed the complaint with liberty to file a fresh complaint when CWP is decided – Held, impugned order passed by the HRERA is wholly unsustainable -- Proper course ought to have been adopted by the HRERA was to adjourn the complaint sine die to await the outcome of the writ -- Petition allowed, impugned order set aside and the complaint restored to its original number and ordered to adjourned sine die.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430, 528 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal / Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% compensation – Mandate of -- Convict bears the onus of demonstrating exceptional circumstances to persuade the appellate court to waive the mandatory deposit of compensation -- It is generally appropriate for the appellate court to impose this condition when an appeal is filed against a conviction u/s 138 -- U/s 148 of the N.I.Act, the requirement to deposit the compensation amount as a condition for appeal is generally mandatory, emphasizing its status as a rule -- Ground of facing financial difficulty by appellant cannot be said to be a ground sufficient enough for carving out an exception from the mandate contained in Section 148 of the N.I.Act, 1881.

(Para 1, 5, 5.1)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 397, 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Copromise/ Acquittal -- Matter stands settled between the parties --  Fit case for compounding of the offence -- Revision petition allowed subject to payment of Rs.15,000/-, the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge as well as the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class set aside -- Petitioner acquitted of the charge u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(Para 9-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 457 -- NDPS – Superdari -- Petitioner was apprehended, while travelling in the vehicle registered in his name from which the contraband came to be recovered -- Almost 3½ years have elapsed ever since then and the Innova vehicle is currently parked in the police station -- It is subjected to the vagaries of the weather and its disuse will lead to its value being diminished causing irreparable loss to the petitioner – Vehicle ordered to be released on superdari.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 459, 324, 323, 326, 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Although case pertains to an offence u/s Section 307 IPC & 326 IPC yet good sense has prevailed upon the parties and they have settled the dispute and this Court accepts the settlement just to enhance the spirit of brotherhood, peace and harmony between the parties -- Allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the case would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 528 of B.N.S.S. – FIR/ Charges along with all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21C, 27A, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Disclosure statement -- Recovery of 3.534 kgs of heroin from main accused and 2 kgs from other co-accused – Nothing recovered, when the petitioner was arrested -- State submits that petitioner is involved in five other cases, three of which are under the provisions of NDPS Act – Held, petitioner is in custody for the period of last one year, the recording of statements of 22 prosecution witnesses has yet to commence, and charges are still to be framed -- In view of the slow pace of the trial, coupled with the fact that the personal liberty of the petitioner cannot be curtailed indefinitely, merits petitioner’s prayer.

(Para 2-4)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Conventional heads -- Loss of consortium – Loss of Estate -- Funeral expenses – Claimant-appellants held entitled to Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses -- Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) totalling Rs. 1,48,000/- (Parental and Spousal)  towards loss of consortium awarded.

(Para 8,9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 164 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – No fault claim -- In the case of grievous hurt due to any accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, the maximum compensation that can be paid would be Rs.2,50,000/- -- Claimant is not required to plead or establish any wrongful act or neglect or the fault of the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle concerned or of any other person – Required to prove that the accident had occurred while using the motor vehicle -- Rs.2,50,000/- along with interest awarded by the Tribunal – No law shown that the appellant/ claimant/ injured is entitled to any further amount – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 147, 149, 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – No fault liability/ claim -- Whether claim u/s 163A MV Act restricted to third party? -- Supreme Court Refers the Issue to Larger Bench.

--   A claim under Section 163A, as per the words employed in the provision, covers every claim and is not restricted to a third party claim; without any requirement of establishing the negligence, if death or permanent disability is caused by reason of the motor accident -- This would also take in the liability with respect to the death of an owner or a driver who stepped into the shoes of the owner, if the claim is made under Section 163A dehors the statutory liability under Section 147 or the contractual liability as reduced to writing in an insurance policy -- It would override the provisions under Sections 147 & 149 along with the other provisions of the M.V. Act and the law regulating insurance as also the terms of the policy confining the claim with respect to an owner-driver to a fixed sum.

--   Dictum arising from the various decisions of different benches of two Judges is that the claim under Section 163A is restricted to third party risks – Section 163A, appears under the Chapter with the heading ‘Insurance of Vehicles Against Third Party Risks’ – But the non-obstante clause is in suppression of the entire Act, the other laws in force and any instrument valid in law – Court doubted, the decisions of co-ordinate Benches of two Judges which now will have to be placed before a larger Bench -- Registry directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

(Para 16, 17)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 2(k) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35, 74 – Juvenile -- Determination of Age – Public servant – Public record -- Public documents -- Public School-the first attended school is not a Government School -- Held, neither the Headmaster/ Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively -- Deposition of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable -- Other school certificates were issued following this and therefore, meet the same fate inasmuch as they cannot be treated as correct, in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also the Medical Report which state to the contrary -- Respondent No.2 cannot be said to have been a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the unfortunate incident.

(Para 22-25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in prayer of suit – Petitioner/ Plaintiff dispossessed during the pendency of suit -- Petitioner earlier sought relief of injunction, but now, by way of the proposed amendment, he is seeking restoration of possession in his favour, on the basis of tenancy -- Such a relief sought by the petitioner would require detailed pleadings and independent evidence – Held, proposed amendment would fundamentally change the character and nature of the case -- Civil Judge has rightly declined the application for amendment of the civil suit.

(Para 10)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- It is well settled that a landlord is the best judge of his own requirements and a tenant is no one to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord.

(Para 20)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- Eviction of Shops on three sides of the premises of the Gurudwara Sahib -- Landlord instituted the eviction petition on the ground that the shops were to be got vacated and then the building was to be renovated in a manner that the Shri Guru Granth Sahib (holy book) could be shifted to the ground floor which would make it convenient for the devotees, especially those in advanced age, to pay obeisance – Held, said need, under no circumstances, can be said to be not bona fide.

(Para 4, 22)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Pleading of ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i)  of 1949 Act -- It is well settled that in case such ingredients are not pleaded and no objection is raised in the written statement, the petition cannot be said to be not maintainable.

(Para 10, 23)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (4 of 1998), Section 12 – Eviction petition under Rent Act -- Religious Institution – Bar of jurisdiction -- Eviction petition instituted under the Rent Act would not be barred in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1998 Act.

(Para 26, 27)

E. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (31 of 1973), Section 2(e) -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib – Applicability of Rent Act -- Whether Public premises ? – Argument that in case of public premises, the Rent Act would not be applicable -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib, cannot, in any manner, be stated to be a public premises, as a result of which, the said argument would be devoid of merit.

(Para 30)

A. Karewa marriage – Void marriage -- At the time of alleged Karewa Mariage between S and SR, wife of SR namely L was still alive -- It is settled law that second marriage, during subsistence of first marriage, is null and void.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Application for additional evidence by way of DNA test to establish paternity of the defendants No.3 to 6 -- Plaintiff had moved the said application three-and-a-half years after initiation of appeal -- Plaintiff had failed to explain as to why the said application for producing evidence in question was not moved during trial; and why the said evidence was not produced before the learned trial Court -- Needless to say, the said facts were in the knowledge of the plaintiff during trial -- However, he failed to exercise due diligence -- No error in the dismissal of the said application of the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence -- Dismissal of application to lead and conclude evidence – Challenge to -- No cogent reason given by the petitioner to explain as to why in a period of 3½ years, petitioner has been unable to conclude his evidence – Very valuable public time of the Court has been expended in affording 26-27 opportunities to the petitioner -- However, the same cannot be misused to endlessly drag the matter to the unfair advantage or disadvantage of either party -- No ground to interfere in the impugned order – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 12-16)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 69, 84 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Sexual intercourse through deceitful means with promise to marry -- Regular  bail -- De facto complainant is a married lady -- Prima facie, it is doubtful whether the offence u/s can be attracted -- If both of the parties are aware about a subsistent marriage it cannot be alleged that the sexual intercourse between them was with a promise to marry – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation -- Already sold property – Appropriate remedy -- Revenue authorities refused to record name of the appellants after noticing the fact that the original person, through whom appellants-vendor claim right, had already sold his share and was not left with any land which could be transferred – Issues sought to be raised by the appellants cannot be examined in summary proceedings of mutation -- Remedy of the appellants would be to seek appropriate declaration from the competent Civil Court.

(Para 2-4)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation Proceeding – Nature of -- Any order passed in summary proceedings of mutation remain subservient to a declaration granted by the competent Civil Court.

(Para 4)

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37, 38 – National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3D, 3E, 4 -- Acquisition of land by NHAI – Suit for demarcation and permanent injunction -- Demarcation of land – It was averred that in the garb of the said acquisition, a portion of the house of the petitioner was being sought to be included whereas actually, it had not been acquired -- Direction to Naib Tehsildar to demarcate the suit property but no such demarcation was carried out in compliance thereof -- Reliance was placed upon the signs put on the land by the NHAI, as also on the revenue record – Fresh demarcation of the property ordered to be carried out in accordance with law.

(Para 2, 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (DB) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 5(j)(iii)(m), Section 5(r) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Gang rape of woman under twelve years of age – Fair opportunity of hearing to accused – DNA profiling – Deposition of scientific experts – Requirement of -- Case involves capital punishment and thus, providing a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself is absolutely imperative and non-negotiable – Trial concluded within a period of less than two months from the date of registration of the case, which is reflective of undue haste -- Failure of the trial Court to ensure the deposition of the scientific experts while relying upon the DNA report, has definitely led to the failure of justice thereby, vitiating the trial -- Case remanded to the trial Court, who shall summon the scientific experts associated with the preparation and issuance of the DNA report with the entire supporting material and shall be examined as Court witnesses with a proper opportunity of examination to the prosecution and the defence in that order -- In case the accused are not represented by a counsel of their choice, a defence counsel having substantial experience in terms of the guidelines laid down by this Court in Anokhilal’s case (2019) 20 SCC 196 shall be appointed to defend the accused.

(Para 29, 30)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 148, 149, 302, 201-- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Murder – Regular bail -- Custody of appellant is 03 years, 07 months and 15 days and co-accused has already been admitted on regular bail -- Investigation completed, challan presented to Court on 09.03.2023, charges have been framed on 03.05.2023 -- Out of total 40 prosecution  witnesses only 05 witnesses have been examined -- Suffice to infer that the conclusion of trial shall take considerable time -- Detaining the appellant behind the bars for an indefinite period would serve no purpose – Right to speedy trial is a part of  reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 -- Constitutional right cannot be denied -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4, 5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 11, 166 – Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rule 9 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Accident by Oil Tanker -- Driver did not have a licence to drive a vehicle carrying dangerous and hazardous goods – Training certificate under MV Rules – Requirement of – Additional evidence in appeal -- No explanation for non-production of the certificate before the Tribunal; which was produced at the appellate stage for the first time -- Driver did not have a claim that he had undergone a training as prescribed under the Rules; despite being cross-examined on the point of absence of a valid license -- This raises genuine suspicion on the veracity of the certificate produced at the appellate stage – Direction issued to the insurance company to pay the amounts to the claimants and recover it from the owner of the oil-tanker, upheld.

(Para 17-19)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18, 25, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail -- Commercial quantity – Speedy trial -- One petitioner has completed incarceration of 02 years, 02 months and 26 days and other completed incarceration of 11 months and 22 days -- Petitioners are not involved in any other case -- Out of 18 prosecution witnesses, 12 remain to be examined -- Contraband recovered falls under the category of commercial quantity – Case is covered by Mohd Muslim @ Hussain’s case 2023 Live Law (SC)260 – Veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after the conclusion of the trial – Bail allowed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Quashing of proceedings u/s 12 (1) of the D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC is not available to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV Act, 2005 are primarily based on the premise that proceedings u/s 12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature -- Said view is not correct -- High Courts can exercise power u/s 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings, however, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application u/s 12(1) -- Normally, interference u/s 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

(Para 35-39)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 23(1) – Interim/ Ex-parte order in DV Act case -- Power has been conferred on the learned Magistrate to pass interim and ex-parte orders.

(Para 20)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13, 23, 28 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Application/ complaint under DV Act – Procedure of -- An application u/s 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS) -- As provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section 13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on the application -- Sub-section (2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to lay down its own procedure for the disposal of an application u/s 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.

(Para 21, 22)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26 – Jurisdiction -- In a given case, in any legal proceedings pending before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved person, the reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought -- Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate, reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought.

(Para 24, 24.1)

D. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31, 33 -- Nature of proceedings u/s 12 of the D.V Act -- Notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.

(Para 28)

E. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1), 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of proceedings under D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Abuse of process -- High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- High Court can quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

(Para 29-31)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 – Acknowledgment of debt – Extension of limitation -- There must be an ‘acknowledgment of liability in respect of the property or right in question’ and even if such an acknowledgment is accompanied by refusal to pay, it would mean that the period of limitation would have to be computed from the time when such acknowledgment is signed.

(Para 7)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 – Acknowledgment of partial amount -- Extension of limitation – Interpretation of -- Stated that Rs. 27,874.10 was due and payable -- There was never an acknowledgment of the total suit claim of Rs.3,07,115.85 – Held, there was no acknowledgment of the full amount claimed by the appellant, in terms of the requirement prescribed in Section 18 of the Act of 1963, the question of extending the period of limitation for the entire suit claim of the appellant did not arise.

(Para 7-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Amendment in complaint -- According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned -- It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion – No prejudice would be caused to the accused/ respondents -- Actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial -- It was a curable irregularity -- It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint -- Trial Court directed to proceed expeditiously and the parties will be at liberty to apply for recall of witnesses already examined.

(Para 16-20)

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 13, 14 – Major penalties – Charge-sheet by officer empowered for minor penalty – Held, an authority empowered to inflict minor penalties (General Manager) can issue a charge-sheet even for imposition of major penalties – Held, issuance of charge-sheet by General Manager could not have been faulted -- Proceedings initiated are held to be validly initiated.

(Para 12-19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142(2)(a) – Cheque bounce complaint – Territorial jurisdiction -- Appellant maintains his bank account in Mangalore – He merely deposited the respondent’s cheques at its Mumbai Branch for the purpose of crediting his account in Mangalore -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act should be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction, branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated -- Appellant was fully justified in filing his complaint cases before the jurisdictional Court at Mangalore.

(Para 6-8)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Contractual liability of a personal accident insurance cover -- Limited liability – Plea of – Death of driver due to tyre burst of car – Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.25,82,000/- -- High Court reduced the liability to Rs.2,00,000/- -- Contention of limited liability was neither taken before the Tribunal nor even in the memorandum of appeal filed, there was no reason for the High Court to look into the policy document to find limited liability – Guidelines issued by the Tariff Advisory Committee regulates the issuance of the policies by the insurers but unless it is specified in the insurance policy, it cannot bind the insured -- Trite is the principle that there can be no proof offered without specific pleadings -- High Court order, set aside -- Order of the Tribunal restored.

(Para 2, 10-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of – Failure of the accused to raise a pertinent ground/ plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material -- No sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case -- Onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition.

(Para 11-13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of -- No change in circumstances and no new grounds/ pleas became available to the accused after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition -- Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error -- High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4 -- However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant -- Plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality -- Entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature -- No civil suit has been filed for recovery of money -- By filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police amounts to abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR quashed.

(Para 9-14, 17)

B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Cheating -- To constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception.

(Para 10)

C. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR – Duty of High Court -- Instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent for settlement – What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any -- High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out.

(Para 10, 11, 17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Accident of 2002 – Injured was Mason -- Appellant suffered two fractures, one of which was a compound fracture, treatment of which required surgical intervention -- Income taken as Rs. 6,000/- per month -- 40% for future prospects given -- As far as disability is concerned, the doctor has assessed it at 35% and the Tribunal reduced it to 25% on mere conjectures – Disability assessed at 35% -- Total compensation assessed at Rs.7,19,480/-.

(Para 3-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape – Sole statement of prosecutrix -- Statement of the prosecutrix, if worthy of credence, requires no corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 --  Rape – Conviction -- Juvenile declaration later -- Appellant’s age at the time of commission of the offence has been returned as 16 years 2 months and 3 days – Appellant held to be juvenile on the date of commission of the crime -- Sentence imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court will have to be set aside, as the same cannot sustain -- Case referred to the Board for passing appropriate orders in light of Sections 15 and 16 of the 2000 Act.

(Para 12-17)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 -- Rape on 17.11.1988 -- Juvenile – Plea of – At  any stage – Plea of juvenility can be raised before any court and has to be recognized at any stage, even after disposal of the case --  Such a claim is required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, i.e., the 2007 Rules, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the 2000 Act -- Relevant factor, therefore, is that the accused, to be a juvenile, should have not completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offense, which entitles him to the benefit of the 2000 Act.

(Para 15)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Licence for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) – Driving Commercial Vehicle/ Tata 407 – Validity of -- No endorsement was required to drive a commercial vehicle of the type in question, by the driver who possesses a license to drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) -- Offending vehicle was TATA 407 Truck, having a gross total weight of around 4995 Kg., which does not exceed 7500 Kg – Held, although the offending vehicle is a commercial one and the driver of the said vehicle at the time of accident possessed a license to only drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) and, considering the gross weight of the vehicle in question is not in excess of 7500 Kg., the driver can be said to be holding a valid license to drive the same.

(Para 10)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” -- Deceased was travelling in offending vehicle – Liability only policy -- Vehicle in question was insured with “Liability Only Policy” and no premium was paid to cover the driver, owner, or a gratuitous passenger travelling therein -- Even then, the Courts below erred in holding that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation to the claimant-appellants -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” ought to have been invoked –Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal and recover the same only from the owner of the offending vehicle -- Driver of the offending vehicle is not liable as he was holding a valid driving license to drive the offending vehicle i.e., TATA 407 Truck.

(Para 13-19)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Right of tribal woman (or her legal heirs) for an equal share in her ancestral property – Customary law -- Right to equality – Unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out -- Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved -- That being the case, denying share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin -- Keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property.

(Para 29)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Negligence of offending vehicle – Requirement of proof -- While entertaining a claim petition u/s 163A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be looked into.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 -- Claim petition u/s 163A of the M.V. Act – Assessment u/s 166 of M.V. Act – Permissibility of -- Held, compensation cannot be determined as prescribed u/s 166 of the MV Act as sought for by the claimants -- It requires to be determined u/s 163A read with Second Schedule of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Deceased was working as a driver and his monthly income was Rs.3,000/- or Rs.36,000/- p.a. -- Having regard to the number of dependents being 6 the income of the deceased as prescribed in Second Schedule has to be held as Rs.40,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3 towards personal expense i.e. 13,333/- the annual loss of income to the claimant would be Rs.26,667/- -- Deceased was aged 35 years, hence the appropriate multiplier to be adopted as per Second Schedule is 17 -- General damages as prescribed under Second Schedule is Rs.2,000/-, Rs.5,000/- and Rs.2,500/- towards loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate -- Claimants have contended the amount spent towards medical expenses was around Rs.1,00,000/-, however, Second Schedule restricts the same to Rs.15,000/- and Rs.15,000/- awarded towards the same -- In all Claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,77,839/- which shall carry interest @ 8% p.a. from the date of petition till date of payment or deposit whichever is earlier.

(Para 14, 15)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Liability of Insurer/ Insured – Third party’s right -- In the absence of any positive evidence being placed by the insurer of the offending vehicle to prove the manner in which accident occurred, the deceased would be a ‘third party’ in so far as offending vehicle is concerned and thus the insurer and the insured of the offending vehicle would be liable to pay compensation jointly and severally -- Insurer of the offending vehicle would be liable to indemnify the award.

(Para 17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Death of injured during pendency of appeal – Legal heir’s right -- If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of death, there is no reason to prohibit the legal representatives to pursue claims for loss of a property, akin to estate of the injured, if the injured dies subsequently – Enhancement sought by the original applicant, which if granted before her death would have accrued to her estate or rather compensated the loss of her estate; caused by reason of the accident, which the legal heirs are entitled to succeed to – Compensation enhanced to Rs. 12,53,770/- from Rs.8,56,970/- awarded by Tribunal.

(Para 5-8)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 106 – General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 27 – Notice of termination of lease – Registered post – Presumption of service -- Notice was sent to the respondent by Registered Post in compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act -- High Court held that since the endorsement on the notice read “ND”, the notice was not delivered and, therefore, any and all proceedings arising therefrom would be bad in law and, hence, the decree of ejectment was set aside – Held, High Court was plainly in error in coming to this conclusion -- Impugned order was passed without consideration of Section 27 of GC Act, which provides that if services are made through Registered Post, it is deemed to have been made in accordance with law -- Appeal allowed, ejectment decree passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 15-17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Permanent functional disability – Functional disability -- 48% permanent disability to the right lower limb -- Assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earning would depend upon the affected impact of such disability on the earning capacity of the claimant – It is not forthcoming from the award of the tribunal or the impugned judgment as to the corresponding functional disability – As per almanco manual, the whole body disability when compared to the particular limb disability would be 1/4th in respect of that of the lower limb -- Lower limb disability 48% and 1/4th of the same would be 12% -- Considering the income of the claimant at Rs.18,972/-, compensation that becomes payable to the claimant for loss of future earnings would be 18,972 x 12 x 17 x 12% = Rs.4,64,434.56/- -- Total compensation assessed at Rs. 9,06,100/- with interest of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings -- After investigation, a chargesheet was laid and cognizance was taken by the Court -- In such circumstances, before taking a decision to quash the proceedings arising from FIR, incumbent upon the High Court, exercising powers u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., to advert to the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation so as to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not to proceed against the accused.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings – Arbitration clause – Ground of -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the singular ground that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties where they can resolve their differences amicably -- It is well-settled that mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties is not a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings if the necessary ingredients of a criminal offence are made out from the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation or inquiry – Held, order of the High Court cannot be sustained – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

(Para 8)