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Posted On: 28-12-2024
152. (SC) (Decided on: 20.12.2024)

A. Guarantee – Title of document -- Name of the document is not a decisive factor -- Only because the title of the document contains the word hypothecation, cannot conclude that guarantee is not a part of this document.

(Para 53)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 3(6)(12), 5(8), 7(1), 15(1) -- ‘default’ – Corporate Insolvency Resolution process -- Financial creditor – Corporate Debtor -- Definition of ‘default’ becomes relevant only while invoking the provisions of Section 7(1) of the IBC when the CIRP is sought to be initiated by the Financial Creditor -- There is no requirement u/s 5(8) of the IBC that there can be a debt only when there is a default -- The moment it is established that the financial debt is owed to any person, he/she becomes a Financial Creditor -- A public announcement of CIRP under Section 15(1) must contain the last date of submission of claims as may be specified -- Thus, if a person has a claim within the meaning of Section 3(6), he can submit it on public announcement contemplated by Section 15 being made -- A Financial Creditor has a claim as explained earlier -- For submitting the claim by a Financial Creditor, there is no requirement of actual default.

(Para 62)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 3(6) -- Claim -- If the right to payment exists or if a breach of contract gives rise to a right to payment, the definition of ‘claim’ is attracted -- Whether the cause of action for invoking the guarantee has arisen or not is not relevant for considering the definition of ‘claim’.

(Para 65)

Posted On: 27-12-2024
154. (Delhi HC) (Date of Decision: 10.12.2024)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 397 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357C – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 124(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326A, 376, 376AB, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB, 376E – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6, 8, 10 – Rape – Grievous hurt by use of acid -- POCSO -- Treatment of victims – Directions issued:

(i) Whenever any victim/survivor of any of the said offences  approaches a medical facility, diagnostic facility, diagnostic lab, nursing home, hospital, health clinic etc., whether private and public/Government, such victim/survivor shall not be turned away without providing FREE medical treatment, including first aid, diagnostic tests, lab tests, surgery and any other required medical intervention;

ii. Such victim/survivor shall be immediately examined and if required, be given treatment even for sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV etc.;

iii. Such victim/survivor shall be provided physical and mental counselling as may be required;

iv. Such victim/survivor shall be checked for pregnancy, and provided with contraception, if required;

v. Further, if any tests are required to be conducted including ultrasound, etc., the same shall also be conducted. Proper medical advice shall be given to such victim/survivor by the concerned gynaecologist who shall also counsel the victim/ survivor and her family members;

vi. If the victim/ survivor has been brought in an emergent situation, the concerned medical establishment that is approached by or on behalf of such victim/survivor, shall not insist on ID proofs in order to admit the said victim/survivor and administer immediate treatment to the same;

vii. If such a victim/survivor requires in-patient medical treatment, no payment shall be demanded and admission shall be provided to the said victim/survivor;

viii. Every medical facility shall put up a board in the following terms:

“Free out-patient and in-patient medical treatment is available for victims/ survivors of sexual assault, rape, gang rape, acid attacks, etc.”.

The above board shall be put up at the- entrance, the reception, counters and all prominent places with in the medical establishment, in both English and vernacular language;

ix. All doctors, nurses, paramedical personnel, administrative staff of a medical establishment shall be sensitized about the relevant provisions being Section 397 BNSS (Section 357C of CrPC), Section 200 of BNS (Section 166B of IPC) and Rule 6(4) of POCSO Rules, 2020. Specific circulars shall be issued by the management of the medical establishments informing that anyone violating the above provisions would be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a period of one year or with fine or with both. Thus, non-providing such victim/survivor with required medical treatment is a criminal offence and all doctors, administration, officers, nurses, paramedical personnel etc., shall be informed of the same;

x. If any victim/survivor is required to be transferred from one hospital establishment or medical establishment to another, the transition shall also be made smooth and hassle free by providing ambulance, if required, along with certificate to the effect that the victim/survivor is entitled to free medical treatment as per law;

xi. If the police finds that any medical professional, para-medical professional, medical establishment, whether public or private, refuses to provide necessary medical treatment to such victims/survivors, then a complaint shall be immediately registered under Section 200 of BNS, 2023 (Section 166B of IPC) as the same is a punishable offence. The police may also inform the concerned DLSA or DSLSA to enable assistance to the victim/survivor;

xii. The concerned Police Station approached by or on behalf of such victim/survivor shall take the said victim/survivor to the nearest hospital, whether public or private, for obtaining the above medical treatment without any delay and in an expeditious manner;

xiii. Such victim/ survivor shall also be referred by the Police to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) /District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) for providing legal assistance including appointment of a lawyer for the complaint to be filed in respect of the offence committed upon the said victim/survivor;

xiv. In the city of Delhi, if such victims/survivors approach the DSLSA/DLSA for seeking assistance for availing free medical treatment, then the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme (DVCS), requires the DSLSA/DLSA to forward cases of such victims/survivors to Government of NCT of Delhi, to ensure free of cost treatment from any Government hospital, if the need so arises. However, the DSLSA/DLSA is also free to refer such cases to private hospitals, nursing home, laboratories, etc.;

xv. It is clarified that availing of free medical treatment by such victims/survivors from either Government/Public or Private hospitals is not dependent upon a referral by the DSLSA/DLSA under the DVCS, as the same is a statutory right of such victims/survivors under Section 357C of CrPC, Section 397 of BNSS and Rule 6 (4) of POCSO Rules, 2020.

xvi. The DSLSA upon receiving information on its “Sampark” email-id i.e., sampark.dslsa@gov.in regarding registration of an FIR in respect of any offence mentioned hereinabove, shall take necessary action and follow-up with the concerned victim/survivor in respect of receiving free medical aid. Further, the DSLSA shall take urgent steps to process such FIRs and communicate/circulate the same to the concerned DLSAs for taking appropriate steps in terms of the directions herein.

(Para 21)

Posted On: 21-12-2024
160. (SC) (Decided on: 13.12.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3),376AB, 376DA, 376DB – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 15A(3) -- Rape – Regular Bail -- Victim’s right of hearing – SC/ST victim -- As per Section 439(1A) of Cr.P.C., the presence of the informant or any person authorised by him or her is obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under sub-section (3) of Section 376 or Section 376AB or Section 376DA or Section 376DB of the IPC -- It is also mandatory on the part of the Special Public Prosecutor of the State Government to inform the victim about the court proceedings, including bail proceedings as contemplated in sub-section (3) of Section 15A of the SC/ ST Act, 1989.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 363, 376DA, 506, 392 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 6 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3(2), 15(5A) – POCSO -- Regular Bail -- Victim’s right of hearing – SC/ST victim -- In gross violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 439(1A) of Cr.P.C. and Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act, High Court granted bail in a very casual and cursory manner and without assigning any cogent reasons, though the concerned respondents are prima facie involved in a very serious offences -- Impugned orders in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions contained in the Cr.P.C. as well as in the SC/ST Act, set aside.

(Para 7)

Posted On: 21-12-2024
163. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 10.12.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(c), 2(d), 156 (1), 156(3), 200, 202 – Cognizable offence -- Non-registration of FIR -- Complaint to Magistrate – Procedure of -- When a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he has the option either to order an investigation as provided u/s 156(1) of Code or to proceed u/s 200 of Code, examine the complainant and his witnesses and then proceed further under the provision of Section 202 of Code -- An order u/s 156(3) of Code which is the second option is in fact in the nature of reminder to the police to perform its duty and reinvestigate into the alleged cognizable offence u/s 156(1) of Code.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(c), 156(3) – Cognizable offence – Complaint u/s 156(3) of CR.P.C. -- Duty of Magistrate -- While disposing of a complaint moved u/s 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the bare contents of the application regarding disclosure of cognizable offence, though he is not bound to proceed to decide whether or not there are sufficient grounds for proceeding further to satisfy himself regarding commission of cognizable offence.

(Para 5)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 2(g), 156(1), 156(3) – Cognizable offence -- Complaint -- Complaint u/s 156(3) of CR.P.C. -- Duty of Magistrate -- The Magistrate may treat an application under Section 156(3) of the Code as a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Code and is not bound to pass an order for registration of FIR -- He can also dismiss the complaint if no cognizable offence is made out and can also pass an order after going through the contents of the complaint and on analyzing the preliminary evidence appended with the complaint, by recording a finding that a prima facie cognizable offence appears to have been committed or not.

(Para 5)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 2(g), 156(1), 156(3) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Cognizable offence -- Complaint u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Treated as private complaint – Quashing of -- Though in the complaint, a specific prayer made for sending the same u/s 156(3) of the Code for registration of FIR but after receipt of action taken report, instead of applying its mind on the question as to whether a case for sending the case for registration of FIR was made out or not or that it was a case, which was to be treated as a private complaint, the learned trial Court straightway proceeded to pass the order for recording preliminary evidence and adjourned the case for that purpose -- Impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as it has not been passed in consonance of the well-established principles of law -- Order set aside, matter remanded to the learned trial Court for hearing the arguments on the question as to whether the prayer made by him for sending the complaint to SHO concerned for registration of an FIR deserves to be allowed or not and to pass an order afresh by recording reasons thereof.

(Para 6, 7)

Posted On: 10-12-2024
181. (SC) (Decided on: 09.12.2024)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 32, 72, 61, 226 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 413, 414 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 453, 454 -- Death sentence -- Undue delay in execution – Life and liberty of accused :

(i) Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the convict to approach this Court under Article 32. However, this Court will only examine the nature of the delay caused and circumstances that ensued after the judicial process finally confirmed the sentence and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be commuted to imprisonment for life;

(ii) Keeping a convict in suspense while considering his mercy petitions by the Governor or the President for an inordinately long time will certainly cause agony to him/her. It creates adverse physical conditions and psychological stress on the convict. Therefore, this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article 21 of the Constitution, must consider the effect of inordinate delay in disposal of the clemency petition by the highest Constitutional authorities and cannot excuse the agonising delay caused only on the basis of the gravity of the crime;

(iii) It is well established that Article 21 of the Constitution does not end with the pronouncement of the sentence but extends to the stage of execution of that sentence. An inordinate delay in the execution of the sentence of death has a dehumanising effect on the accused. An inordinate and unexplained delay caused by circumstances beyond the prisoners' control mandates the commutation of a death sentence;

(iv) The above principles will also apply to a case where there is a long and unexplained delay on the part of the Sessions Court in issuing the warrant of execution in accordance with Section 413 or Section 414 of CrPC. After the order of rejection of mercy petitions is communicated to a convict, the sword of Damocles cannot be kept hanging on him for an inordinately long time. This can be very agonising, both mentally and physically. Such inordinate delay will violate his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. In such a case, this Court will be justified in commuting the death penalty into life imprisonment;

(v) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the length of delay, which can be said to be inordinate. It all depends on the facts of the case. The terms “undue” or “inordinate” cannot be interpreted by applying the rules of mathematics. The Courts, in such cases, deal with human issues and the effect of the delay on individual convicts. What delay is inordinate must depend on the facts of the case;

(vi) A convict can invoke even the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the event there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in the execution of the death sentence, post-confirmation of the sentence. The same principles will be applied by the High Court, which are summarised above; and,

(vii) It is the duty of the Executive to promptly process the mercy petitions invoking Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution and forward the petitions along with requisite documents to the concerned constitutional functionary without undue delay.

(Para 42)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 32, 72, 61, 226 -- Death sentence – Mercy petition – Right of accused : Following directions to all the State Governments and Union Territories:

A. A dedicated cell shall be constituted by the Home Department or the Prison Department of the State Governments/Union Territories for dealing with mercy petitions. The dedicated cell shall be responsible for the prompt processing of the mercy petitions within the time frame laid down by the respective governments. An officer-incharge of the dedicated cell shall be nominated by designation who shall receive and issue communications on behalf of the dedicated cell;

B. An official of the Law and Judiciary or Justice Department of the State Governments/Union Territories should be attached to the dedicated cell so constituted;

C. All the prisons shall be informed about the designation of the officer-in-charge of the dedicated cell and his address and email ID;

D. As soon as the Superintendent of Prison/officer-in-charge receives the mercy petitions, he shall immediately forward the copies thereof to the dedicated cell and call for the following details/information from the officer-in-charge of the concerned Police Station and/or the concerned investigation agency;

a. The criminal antecedents of the convict;

b. Information about family members of the convict;

c. Economic condition of the convict and his/her family;

d. The date of arrest of the convict and the period of incarceration as an undertrial; and,

e. The date of filing charge sheet and a copy of the committal order, if any.

On receipt of the request made by the jail authorities, the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station shall be under an obligation to furnish the said information to the jail authorities immediately;

E. On receipt of the said information, without any delay, the jail authorities shall forward the following documents to the officer-in-charge of the dedicated cell and the Secretary of the Home Department of the State Government:

a. Information furnished as aforesaid by the concerned Police Station with its English translation;

b. Copy of the First Information Report with its English translation;

c. Details, such as date of arrest of the convict, date of filing of chargesheet and actual period of incarceration undergone by the convict;

d. A copy of the committal order, if any, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate;

e. A copy of charge-sheet with its English translation;

f. Report about the conduct of the convict in prison;

g. Copies of the notes of evidence, all exhibited documents in the trial and copies of statements of convicts under Section 313 of the CrPC with its English translation;

h. Copies of the judgments of the Sessions Court with its English translation, if it is in vernacular language), High Court and this Court;

F. As soon as mercy petitions are received by the dedicated cell, copies of the mercy petitions shall be forwarded to the Secretariats of the Hon’ble Governor of the State or the Hon’ble President of India, as the case may be so that the Secretariat can initiate action at their end;

G. All correspondence, as far as possible, be made by email, unless confidentiality is involved; and,

H. The State Government shall issue office orders/executive orders containing guidelines for dealing with the mercy petitions in terms of this judgment.

Registry of the Court shall forward copies of this judgment to the Secretaries of the Home Department of the respective State Governments/Union Territories for its implementation. The Secretaries shall report compliance within three months from today to the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court;

(Para 43)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21, 32, 72, 61, 226 -- Death sentence – Right of accused : Sessions Court shall endeavour to follow the following guidelines:

a. As soon as the order of the High Court confirming or imposing the death sentence is received by the Sessions Court, a note thereof must be taken, and the disposed of case shall be listed on the cause list. The proceedings can be numbered as Misc. Application depending upon the applicable Rules of the procedure. The Sessions Court shall immediately issue notice to the State Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency calling upon them to state whether any appeal or special leave petition has been preferred before this Court and what is the outcome of the said petition/appeal;

b. If the State Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency reports that the appeal is pending, as soon as the order of this Court confirming or restoring the death sentence is received by the Sessions Court, again, the disposed of case or miscellaneous applications should be listed on the cause list and notice be issued to the State Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency to ascertain whether any review/curative petitions or mercy petitions are pending. If information is received regarding the pendency of review/curative petitions or mercy petitions, the Sessions Court shall keep on listing the disposed of case after intervals of one month so that it gets the information about the status of the pending petitions. This will enable the Sessions Court to issue a warrant for the execution of the death sentence as soon as all the proceedings culminate;

c. However, before issuing the warrant, notice should be issued to the convict, and the directions issued by the Allahabad High Court in the case of People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), 2015 SCC OnLine All 143, and as elaborated above, shall be implemented by the Sessions Court;

d. The Sessions Courts shall consider what is held in Paragraph 25 above;

e. Copies of the order issuing the warrant and the warrant shall be immediately provided to the convicts, and the Prison authorities must explain the implications thereof to the convicts. If the convict so desires, legal aid be immediately provided to the convicts by the Prison authorities for challenging the warrant. There shall be a gap of fifteen clear days between the date of the receipt of the order as well as warrant by the convict and the actual date of the execution; and,

f. It shall also be the responsibility of the concerned State Government or the Union Territory administration to apply to the Sessions Court for the issuance of a warrant immediately after the death penalty attains finality and becomes enforceable.

(Para 43)

Posted On: 10-12-2024
184. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on 15.10.2024 Decided on: 29.11.2024)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Validity of license -- DHR endorsement on license – Accident by Tipper -- Driver of the offending vehicle was possessing a license having a valid DHR endorsement -- That was sufficient for the owner of the offending vehicle to satisfy himself with regard to the validity of the license of the driver.

(Para 7, 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Attendant’s chares (two) -- Injury case -- 100% permanent disability – Doctor stated that at least two to three attendants are required to take care of such a patient and the patient is bedridden – Compensation for requirement of two attendants assessed as Rs. 17,28,000/.

(Para 12)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Government employee – Future loss of income – 100% permanent disability -- No compensation could be awarded for the future loss of earnings as there was no loss of income to the respondent No.1/ claimant because he continued to be in service and after retirement, he would get his retiral benefits including pension.

(Para 13)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- 100% permanent disability – Pain and suffering – Loss of amenities of life -- Injured would not improve and would require attendant for personal care for whole of his life -- Respondent No. 1/ claimant would require Ryle’s tube feeding (feeding through a pipe through nose) for rest of his life -- Patient is bedridden and special beds with air mattress are required to prevent bed sores and subsequent sepsis -- Rs. 10,00,000/-each awarded as compensation under the heads of ‘Pain and Suffering’ and ‘Loss of Amenities of Life.

(Para 14)

Posted On: 05-12-2024
192. (SC) (Decided on: 19.11.2024)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908), Order 8 Rule 5 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Pleadings – Plea of Adverse possession – Admission of title -- Appellants did not specifically deny the plaintiffs' ownership of the suit property -- Instead, they primarily relied on the plea of adverse possession -- Allegations of fact not denied specifically are deemed to be admitted -- By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs' title.

(Para 8.1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 – Presumption of revenue record -- Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness -- While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.

(Para 8.2)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Onus of proof -- In a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership -- Plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries – Appellants/ defendants failed to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically and instead relied on adverse possession, the burden has shifted to the appellants/ defendant to prove their adverse possession.

(Para 9)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession of State -- It is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens -- Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government -- Therefore, the State/ appellants' plea of adverse possession is untenable in law.

(Para 10, 11)

E. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- Placing bitumen drums, erecting temporary structures, and constructing a boundary wall in 1980 do not constitute adverse possession -- Adverse possession requires possession that is continuous, open, peaceful, and hostile to the true owner for the statutory period.

(Para 12)

Posted On: 01-12-2024
197. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 11.11.2024 Date of Decision: 27.11.2024)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Recovery of currency note from accused -- Nothing on record to show that the money belonged to the deceased -- Currency notes are commonly available and there is nothing in the statement of the witness to show that the currency notes shown to him during his examination had any distinguishing mark which would enable him to identify them; hence, his testimony that the currency notes handed over by him to the deceased were the same currency notes, which were shown to him in the Court is not acceptable.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Recovery on disclosure statement – Exclusive knowledge – Requirements of -- Disclosure statement shows that the stone was not concealed anywhere and was lying in the open -- Where the recoveries were effected from a place accessible, the same cannot be relied upon -- Since, there is no evidence of the exclusive knowledge of the accused, therefore, the stone cannot be connected to the accused.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Other articles and stick was recovered from the spot at a distance of 200 metre from the dead body by I.O. -- As per the statement of the accused recorded u/s 27, he had thrown the stone and the stick at the same place -- It is difficult to believe that the investigating officer would not have discovered the stone when he had inspected the spot and found other articles on the spot – These circumstances cast reasonable doubt on the recovery of the stone at the instance of accused.

(Para 27-29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Disclosure statement -- Statement u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be used to prove that the accused had killed the deceased.

(Para 39)

Posted On: 30-11-2024
199. (SC) (Decided on: 29.11.2024)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Instigation – Mens rea -- ‘instigation’ to do a particular thing is necessary for charging a person with abetment -- ‘Instigation’ is to provoke, incite or encourage a person to do an act -- Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a particular thing and without the positive act on part of the accused there would be no instigation -- To convict a person for abetment of suicide u/s 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea on the part of the accused to abet such a crime and it requires an active act or a direct act leading to the commission of suicide.

(Para 21-23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Discord and differences in domestic life are quite common in society -- Until and unless some guilty intention on the part of the accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible to convict him for an offence u/s 306 IPC.

(Para 25)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Refusal to marry – Mens rea – Acquittal -- Accused-appellant simply refused to marry the deceased and thus, even assuming there was love between the parties, it is only a case of broken relationship which by itself would not amount to abetment to suicide -- Accused-appellant had not provoked the deceased in any manner to kill herself; rather the deceased herself carried poison in a bottle from her village with a predetermined mind to positively get an affirmation from the accused-appellant to marry her, failing which she would commit suicide -- No guilty intention or mens rea on the part of the accused-appellant had been established – Conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 29-32)

Posted On: 30-11-2024
200. (SC) (Decided on: 28.11.2024)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- Motive on its own cannot make or break the prosecution case.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Time gap – Relevant factor – It is a vital link in the chain of other circumstances but on its own strength it is insufficient to sustain conviction unless the time-gap between the deceased being last seen alive with the accused and recovery of dead body of the deceased is so small that possibility of any other person being the author of the crime is just about impossible -- Where the time-gap is large, intervening circumstances including act by some third person cannot be ruled out -- In such a case, adverse inference cannot be drawn against the accused merely because he has failed to prove as to when he parted company of the deceased.

(Para 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Walking in public street -- Time gap – Effect of -- No evidence led by the prosecution to demonstrate that the place where the deceased was last seen alive with the accused was near the place from where deceased’s body was recovered -- Further, the time gap between 4.30 PM of 2.2.1997 and 8.30 AM of 3.2.1997 (i.e., when the dead body was recovered) is so large that third party hand in the crime cannot be ruled out -- If two or more persons are seen walking on a public street, either side by side, or behind one another, it is not such a circumstance from which it may be inferred with a degree of certainty that those were together or in company of each other -- Likewise, a person may exchange pleasantries with another person walking on the path, but that by itself is not sufficient to infer that the two are in company of each other – Last seen circumstance not of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused-appellants – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 27, 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Disclosure Statement – Recovery -- Disclosure statement not admissible in evidence because the alleged discovery was not made pursuant to that statement -- Disclosure statement was recorded at the police station whereas recovery was made from the place pointed out by the accused enroute to the police station -- It was, therefore, a case of recovery from the place allegedly pointed out by the accused and not based on a disclosure statement.

(Para 37)