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Posted On: 04-06-2025
101. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 05.05.2025)

A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(g)(s) -- Master-servant relationship – Proof of -- Factum of master and servant relationship has to be proved on the basis the documentary evidence – No appointment order issued in favour of the respondent No.1-workman -- No salary slip issued by the petitioner-school in favour of the respondent No.1-workman has also been brought on record -- Merely that the respondent No.1-workman was working under the supervision of the Head Master, who is appointed by Government, is no ground to assert that there existed master and servant relationship between respondent No.1-workman and petitioner-school so as to claim benefit -- Mere supervisory control over the workman and working of the workman under the Principal employer will not create a master and servant relationship between both.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(g)(s), 17B, 25F – Termination of employee -- Master-servant relationship – Proof of -- Workman was appointed as Peon-cum-Chowkidar by Parents Teacher Association and was paid his salary out of the funds of the Parents Teacher Association -- Merely that the respondent No.1-workman working in the school is not good enough to hold that there existed master and servant relationship between respondent No.1-workman and petitioner-school -- Respondent No.1-workman never agitated his claim qua termination against the Parents Teacher Association, which was the employer -- Award against School passed by the Industrial Tribunal set aside -- Financial benefit already given to the respondent No.1-workman u/s 17-B of the 1947 Act will not be recovered.

(Para 1, 8-12)

Posted On: 04-06-2025
102. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 24.04.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Acquittal -- Delay of 5 days in FIR – Non providing of ownership of mobile -- Appellants were not named in the FIR – No Test identification parade/ TIP – If no test identification parade is held, then it will be totally unsafe to rely upon the bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court -- Small recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- -- Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police -- Recovery of money is not sufficient to prove the allegations of snatching -- Held, the trial Court had committed a grave error in convicting the appellants-accused – Conviction and sentence u/s 379-A read with Section 34 of IPC set aside.

(Para 11-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case -- Identity of snatchers – Proof of -- PW-2, stated that accused present in the Court were the persons who had snatched his mobile phone, but he had not given details of physical description of the snatchers like their complexion, height or features or about the clothing as worn by them in the complaint -- Occurrence took place at 11 PM and it was dark at the time -- It was not explained by this witness as to what was the basis on which he could identify the accused persons -- Possibility of this witness having seen the miscreants and identifying them in dark seems very remote -- Identification of the accused persons not established beyond doubt and this fact has created a serious dent in the story of the prosecution with regard to the involvement of the accused in the subject crime.

(Para 17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Recovery of small amount – Identity of currency notes -- Recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- at instance of accused --  Not proved to be having any specific identification mark -- Small amount could easily be planted -- Alleged recovery was effected on 28.07.2020 whereas the occurrence had taken place on 09.07.2019 -- It does not appeal to reason that the appellants would keep such small amounts of money for such a long time with them fully knowing that the same being incriminating piece of evidence could be used against them for proving commission of the subject crime -- Such like currency notes could be easily available in market -- Recovery of money at the instance of the accused could not be considered to be a circumstance sufficient to prove that the appellants had snatched any mobile phone.

(Para 18, 19)

Posted On: 01-06-2025
104. (SC) (Decided on: 20.05.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 2(8)(9), 4 – Rejection of plaint -- Benami properties -- Whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception -- It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred -- However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint -- Defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 27-29)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Absolute property of hindu female -- Plea that plaint is hit by Section 14 of the Act -- No such specific plea was taken by the defendants in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- Such a plea was never raised and argued before either of the courts below -- There is no finding by any court on the above aspect -- Defendants cannot be permitted to raise such a plea for the first time in the Special Leave Petition without there being any foundation to that effect.

(Para 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Absolute property of hindu female -- Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner -- It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property -- Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.

(Para 31)

Posted On: 01-06-2025
108. (SC) (Decided on: 20.05.2025)

A. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) --  Disciplinary proceedings -- Vagueness of charge-sheet – Ground of -- Chargesheet contain the charges against the Appellant supported by documents -- Charge against the Appellant was that she managed to get herself transferred from Kendriya Vidyalaya, Bangalore to Kendriya Vidyalaya, Bombay under a fake transfer order -- In this respect, the language of the said chargesheet is very clear and specific -- A common man on going through the same, would understand as to what were the charges which an employee was called upon to face and defend -- She was the sole beneficiary of the said transfer order -- Plea with regard to the vagueness of the chargesheet cannot be sustained.

(Para 18)

B. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Non-supply of the copy of the Preliminary Inquiry Report – Ground of – It was never made the basis for coming to a conclusion in the regular Departmental Inquiry with regard to the guilt of the Appellant -- After the preliminary Inquiry, chargesheet was issued to the Appellant and thereafter a regular Departmental Inquiry was held where both the parties had led their respective evidence and on that basis the Inquiry Officer has returned his findings -- The principles of natural justice are founded on three fundamental rules that ensure fairness in legal and administrative proceedings.

-- Firstly, the Hearing Rule (Audi Alteram Partem) which mandates that no person should be judged without being given a fair opportunity to present his case.

-- Secondly, the Bias Rule (Nemo Judex in Causa Sua) which asserts that no one should act as a judge in its own case, thereby safeguarding impartiality and preventing any form of bias.

-- Lastly, the principle of Reasoned Decision, also known as Speaking Orders, requires every decision to be supported by valid and clearly stated reasons to promote transparency and accountability in the decision-making process.

Nothing on record which would indicate that the Appellant had ever sought for the Preliminary Inquiry Report after the issuance of the chargesheet -- No prejudice having been caused because of the non-supply of the preliminary Inquiry Report to the Appellant, the plea of violation of the principles of natural justice would not be available to the Appellant -- Court is not bound to simply accept an assertion of a delinquent employee and proceed to question the disciplinary proceedings without being satisfied with regard to any prejudice having been caused to the employee.

(Para 19-23)

C. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) --  Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Delay in conclusion -- Plea of prolongation of the Inquiry for 9 years – Held, mere delay during the inquiry proceedings, when it is explained with regard to the time taken for the inquiry to conclude and that too justifying the same with no prejudice having been caused, cannot be made the basis for vitiating the departmental proceedings -- Inordinate or unexplained delay in the departmental proceedings may be a justifiable ground if tampered with prejudice having been established to have been caused to the delinquent employee in the said process for interference by the Court -- Same is absent and therefore the said plea of delay fails.

(Para 25, 25)

Posted On: 31-05-2025
110. (SC) (Decided on: 29.05.2025)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Cancellation of bail – Parameters -- Law is well-settled that the considerations for grant of bail and cancellation thereof are entirely different -- Bail once granted to the accused should normally not be interfered with/cancelled unless there exist circumstances giving rise to an inference that the bail has been procured by practicing fraud or mis-representation; that the allegations against the accused are so grave that the same have an adverse impact on the society at large and shake the conscience of the Court; that releasing the accused respondents on bail is likely to create a sense of fear and terror amongst the society or that the accused while on bail may abscond or tamper with the prosecution evidence.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 148, 149, 326, 354, 511 read with 376D, 450 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cancellation of bail -- Concerted attack on the complainant’s house was launched on the day of election results with the sole objective of wreaking vengeance because he had supported the saffron party --  Complainant’s wife was viciously pulled by the hair and was disrobed -- Accused persons were about to assault her sexually when the lady gathered courage to pour kerosene on her body and gave a threat of self-immolation on which the accused persons including the respondents herein fled away from the complainant’s house -- Charge-sheet filed way back in the year 2022 and till date, the trial has not budged an inch -- Prosecution has alleged that this delay is mostly attributable to non-cooperation by the accused persons including the respondents -- On both counts, i.e., (i) the nature and gravity of the offence which is nothing short of an attack on the roots of democracy and (ii) the imminent likelihood of the accused adversely affecting a fair trial, the bail granted to the accused respondents has to be cancelled -- Bail cancelled.

(Para 17-21)

Posted On: 29-05-2025
116. (Delhi HC) (Reserved on: 06.02.2025 Decided on: 22.05.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 173, 199 – FIR for defamation – Permissibility of -- Whether there can be a Chargesheet u/s 500 IPC -- Procedure for initiating any Complaint for defamation, has been specifically provided u/s 199 Cr.P.C – FIR could not have been registered u/s 500 IPC, in view of the express bar u/s 199 Cr.P.C. -- Cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC could have been undertaken only on a Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C filed by the “Person Aggrieved”; no cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC can be taken on an FIR -- Furthermore, even the contents of the Complaint do not prima facie establish any case of defamation -- Summoning Orders set aside.

(Para 38-43, 57, 58)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 199 – FIR for defamation – Offences under other Sections also – Permissibility of -- Irrespective of there being other Sections involved in the FIR or not, the cognizance u/s 500 could have been only on the Complaint and not on the FIR.

(Para 45)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Defamation -- In order to constitute “defamation? u/s 499, there must be an “imputation” with the “intention” to harm the reputation of the person about whom such imputation is made -- It would have to be shown that the accused intended or knew or had the reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant or that he would be directly or indirectly suffered by it.

(Para 52)

Posted On: 26-05-2025
120. (SC) (Decided on: 22.05.2025)

A. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, Rule 14 -- Appointment as judicial officer -- Employment by irregular or improper means -- Non-disclosure of former government service – Effect of -- Appellant submitted her resignation as teacher on 25.10.2018 much prior to her interview, which was conducted on 02.11.2018 -- Question of disclosing the past government service is certainly not a material irregularity or a serious misconduct for which she ought to be discharged from service especially when she has successfully completed her training without any blemish -- Not a case where the appellant has suppressed criminal antecedents, which may materially affect her commitment to the judiciary – Held, non-disclosure of past government service cannot be a ground for discharging the appellant -- Show cause notice as well as the order of discharge set aside.

(Para 17-21, 31)

B. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, Rule 44, 45, 46 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 16 – Appointment of judicial officer -- Discharge of probationer – Arbitrary or discriminatory discharge – Effect of -- Even though a probationer has no right to hold a post, it would not imply that the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution could be violated inasmuch as there cannot be any arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or an absence of application of mind in the matter of assessment of performance and consideration of relevant materials -- Thus, in deciding whether, in a given case, a termination was by way of punishment or not, the courts have to look into the substance of the matter and not the form.

(Para 26)

Posted On: 21-05-2025
128. (SC) (Decided on: 08.05.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

Posted On: 20-05-2025
132. (SC) (Decided on: 16.05.2025)

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, Section 38B(v) – Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (17 of 1960), Section 8 -- Allotment of land to Society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act – Plaintiff-ISKCON Bangalore is a society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act -- All the documents, from the application for allotment to the grant of exemption under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, indicate that the application for allotment was made on behalf of ISKCON Bangalore and that allotment was made to the said Society -- In the entire correspondence in relation to the allotment of Schedule ‘A’ property, the name of ISKCON Bangalore appears – No application was made by ISKCON Mumbai to correct the BDA record -- Even assuming that ISKCON Bangalore did not possess funds, and even if money came from ISKCON Mumbai, it cannot claim ownership -- Only because the existence of the Bangalore branch of ISKCON Mumbai was proved, one cannot jump to the conclusion that allotment of Schedule ‘A’ property was to ISKCON Mumbai through the Bangalore branch -- Sale deed was executed in favour of ISKCON Bangalore -- High Court's finding that ISKCON Mumbai, through its branch in Bangalore, was the owner of the schedule A property is completely erroneous and deserves to be set aside -- It is completely contrary to the documentary evidence – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside.

(Para 34, 46-58)

Posted On: 19-05-2025
138. (SC) (Decided on: 15.05.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 226 -- Reservation in Public appointment – Certificate of caste – Requirement of -- Irrespective of whether an aspirant for public employment belongs to a particular community like SC/ ST/ OBC, the status claimed by him for being accorded the benefit of reservation is per se not decisive -- Such status has to be certified by the competent authority upon following due process and identification that the aspirant is what he claims to be -- Requirement in question is no less mandatory and must be scrupulously followed -- Once a process of recruitment is set in motion, all aspirants are entitled in law to equal treatment -- There cannot be different yardsticks for different sets of aspirants -- Non-compliance with the terms of the advertisement/ notification is bound to trigger adverse consequences of rejection of the aspirant’s claimed status by the selecting body/ appointing authority, should he choose not to adhere to the same.

(Para 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 226 -- Advertisement for public appointment – Challenge to – Scope of -- Terms of an advertisement issued in connection with a selection process are normally not open to challenge unless the challenge is founded on the ground of breach of Article 16 of the Constitution or, for that matter, Article 14 -- Once an advertisement is issued inviting applications for public employment, it is the responsibility, nay duty, of an aspirant to read and note the terms and understand what its requirements are -- If any aspirant finds any of the terms ambiguous and there is scope for an inquiry inbuilt in the advertisement or is provided by any rule/regulation, an effort ought to be first made to obtain clarity for understanding the requirements accurately.

(Para 19)

Posted On: 17-05-2025
140. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 03.05.2025)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Corruption case -- In a case of alleged criminal conspiracy, the prosecution is duty bound to prove by cogent, credible, and admissible evidence that the accused persons had a meeting of minds and participated in a common design.

(Para 14)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Corruption case – Demand and acceptance of bribe -- In the absence of demand and acceptance, the presumption u/s 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise and conviction cannot be thus sustained.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B – Corruption case – Conspiracy – Presumption – Reversal of burden -- Tehsildar, who employed co-accused BK and was shown to be one of the primary beneficiaries, was not accorded sanction and therefore, did not face trial -- Appellants, despite not being shown to be actual beneficiaries or participants, were convicted on a generalized theory of “connivance” – Held, mere association or presence of a person in a place where a crime is committed does not ipso facto establish participation or conspiracy -- Reversal of burden, in a trial u/s 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and Section 120-B of the IPC, where prosecution has not discharged its primary burden is certainly not permissible in law – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

Posted On: 15-05-2025
146. (SC) (Decided on: 13.05.2025)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- UAPA Case – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence -- The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable -- Rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive -- However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case

(Para 23, 24)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS/ UAPA Case – Regular bail – Despite no direct recovery of contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of narcotics concealed as talc -- Investigative narrative does not rest solely on physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and facilitation – Absence of direct seizure is not dispositive, particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious entities, and barter-based compensation – Bail declined.

(Para 25-27, 35)

Posted On: 14-05-2025
150. (SC) (Decided on: 17.04.2025)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 21 – Notice for arbitration – Impleadment of parties to whom notice not issued – Power of Arbitration Tribunal – Summary of Conclusions:

I. A notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the ACA is mandatory as it fixes the date of commencement of arbitration, which is essential for determining limitation periods and the applicable law, and it is a prerequisite to filing an application under Section 11. However, merely because such a notice was not issued to certain persons who are parties to the arbitration agreement does not denude the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to implead them as parties during the arbitral proceedings.

II. The purpose of an application under Section 11 is for the court to appoint an arbitrator, so as to enable dispute resolution through arbitration when the appointment procedure in the agreement fails. The court only undertakes a limited and prima facie examination into the existence of the arbitration agreement and its parties at this stage. Hence, merely because a court does not refer a certain party to arbitration in its order does not denude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal from impleading them during the arbitral proceedings as the referral court’s view does not finally determine this issue.

III. The relevant consideration to determine whether a person can be made a party before the arbitral tribunal is if such a person is a party to the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal must determine this jurisdictional issue in an application under Section 16 by examining whether a non-signatory is a party to the arbitration agreement as per Section 7 of the ACA.

IV. In the facts of the present appeal, respondent nos. 2 and 3 are parties to the arbitration agreement in Clause 40 of the LLP Agreement despite being non-signatories. Their conduct is in accordance with and in pursuance of the terms of the LLP Agreement, and hence, they can be made parties to the arbitral proceedings.

(Para 40)