Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 -- Divorce -- Permanent alimony of Rs. 15,000/- per month -- Obligation of the husband to ensure that the wife is able to live with dignity does not come to an end merely on the ground that she is educated or has parental support – Post-divorce, the wife is entitled to live a life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage – Husband has sufficient earning capacity and financial means to pay more than Rs. 15,000/- per month -- On mutual consent amount enhanced to Rs. 30,000/- per month

(Para 10-14)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 7A, 17A – Corruption case u/s 7, 7A of PC Act -- Demand of illegal gratification – Enquiry / Investigation -- Approval from Government – Requirement of -- Section 17-A talks about enquiry or inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties -- Section 17-A by any stretch of imagination cannot be applied to cases of demand of illegal gratification – Benefit of Section 17-A of the PC Act, 1988 rejected.

(Para 4-8)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 2(1)(c)(vii) – Transfer of case to commercial court -- Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Commercial dispute would mean a dispute arising out of agreements relating to immoveable property used exclusively in trade or commerce -- No such pleading to the effect that the immovable property is being used exclusively in trade or commerce – Plaintiff and defendant No.1 had led their respective evidence in support of their case and thus, apparently the suit has also made much progress -- Trial Court rejected the application filed by the petitioner for transfer -- Impugned order does not call for any interference.

 (Para 6, 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 – Revision Power of High Court -- High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it -- Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of court or tribunal subordinate to it -- A statutory amendment with respect to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227 but at the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 -- Power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court -- Power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. Observations made in Shalini Shyam Shetty’s case (2010) 8 SCC 329 relied.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 25 – Transfer of maintenance case -- Rajpura to Kolkata – On husband’s behest -- Wife abandoned two sons of the parties when they were minors and the petitioner has been taking care of both the sons since 2021 -- Being a single father, it is difficult for the petitioner to travel to Rajpura, Punjab for contesting the proceedings of maintenance application -- Transfer Petition allowed, Maintenance Case transferred  to Family Court at Kolkata, West Bengal.

(Para 2, 3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961) -- Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (XVIII of 2000), Section 16(1)(g), (n) -- No instruction from client – Not a withdrawal of Vakaltnama – Ex-parte decree -- Counsel who represented the defendant had not withdrawn the Vakalatnama but had only claimed no instructions and along with the pursis had annexed letter sent to his client -- As per the appellate court finding there was no claim of the defendants that the letter sent by their counsel was not served upon them -- In such circumstances, if no instructions are provided by a litigant to his advocate, it is the fault of the litigant not of the advocate -- Further, there is nothing on record that any proceedings were initiated against the advocate for his misconduct -- Neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal -- Defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a plausible view based on materials available on record.

(Para 5, 15, 23)

Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994), Section 15, 210 – Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 (19 of 1994), Section 76, 80, 81 – Punjab Panchayat Election Rules, 1994, Rule 50 – Election petition challenging election of Sarpanch -- Procedure before Tribunal – Framing of issues -- Neither the response has been called for nor issues have been framed – No evidence was recorded -- Tribunal proceeded to decide the election petition as if he was resolving a trivial dispute without realizing that he was dealing with democratic rights of the parties -- Order is bereft of application of mind -- Election petition has been adjudicated by passing a callous order – Impugned order not sustainable, quashed – Matter remanded back to Tribunal to decide in accordance  with law.

(Para 10-12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32(5) -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 37 -- Execution -- Decree for permanent injunction – Subsequent dispossession – Restoration of possession – Permissibility of -- Finding of fact was recorded that decree holder was in possession of the suit property, the same carried presumption of her possession as on the date of filing of suit till the date of its adjudication -- In any subsequent execution based on dispossession at the hands of judgment debtor, the non-mentioning of specific particulars in the shape of date or month of forcible dispossession was not of much relevance – Order for warrant of possession, upheld.

(Para 6, 10-16)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96, 100 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Interim protection in Appeal – Permissibility of -- Just because the original suit came to be dismissed, that does not mean that in the pending appeal, the appellate court cannot grant appropriate relief -- Application seeking to maintain the status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed -- Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5, while declining to grant status quo, is grossly misplaced.

-- appeal is considered a continuation of the original suit, and the appellate court has co-extensive power to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending the final disposal of the appeal.

-- interim relief is designed to aid the main relief and ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous. It aims to prevent irreparable harm that might be caused while the case is pending final determination.

-- grant of appropriate relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court, and the same must be exercised judicially based on the well-settled principles of a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience.

(Para 14-20)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96 -- First Appeal – Interim protection -- First appellate court can re-examine both questions of fact and law and may re-appreciate the evidence on record -- Its powers are as extensive as the original court’s, meaning it can reconsider the need for interim protection.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Issue of limitation/ resjudicata/  Order II Rule 2 of the CPC -- High Court restored the suit dismissing the application for rejection of plaint -- Contention that High Court observed that Trial Court should proceed with the case on merits, thereby implying that the issues concerning limitation, res judicata and those arising under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC ought not to be considered at all – Held, this is not an implication of the judgment of the High Court, nor can such a construction be given to its observations -- All that the High Court meant was that the suit is restored on the file of the Trial Court and that it has to be decided in accordance with law, which would include all the above issues apart from the issues on the merits of the case.

(Para 4, 12, 13)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 17 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Age – Educational qualification – Non-consideration of – Effect of -- Factors like age, educational qualification etc. are required to be seen in terms of Rule 15 read with Rule 17 of Punjab Land Revenue Rules, which have not been taken into consideration by the Ld. Collector -- Learned Divisional Commissioner as well as learned Financial Commissioner have rightly appreciated the matter and set aside learned Collector's order and remanded the matter back to learned Collector for deciding the matter afresh after taking into consideration the relevant factors for appointment of Lambardar – No compelling reasons to interfere -- Civil writ petition dismissed.

(Para 5.1, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Whether Moral turpitude -- Not justifiable to categorize a matter involving dishonor of a cheque, issued in a personal capacity, as an offence involving moral turpitude.

(Para 12(i))

B. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4(6) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Not an moral turpitude – Withholding of gratuity – Permissibility of -- Deceased employee was denied gratuity and leave encashment owing to his conviction u/s 138, NI Act -- Cheques qua which criminal complaints had been filed against the deceased were not issued by him in an official capacity to make unlawful gains for himself or cause unlawful loss to respondent-Corporation -- No moral turpitude can be attributed to the deceased – Deceased would be deemed to be in service till his death on 15.06.2022 -- Respondent-Corporation directed to release all the admissible service benefits, including gratuity and leave encashment, accrued to the deceased till the date of his death with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. -- Respondent-Corporation further directed to consider the case of petitioner No.2 for compassionate appointment.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 175(v), 176 – Removal of Women Sarpanch – Qualification-Minimum Middle pass -- Educational qualification neither verified nor proved by the concerned school from which petitioner claims to have passed the 8th class examination -- Petitioner also not made any effort to establish the authenticity or genuineness of the School Leaving Certificate relied upon by her -- Mark-sheet of the 8th class examination, which the petitioner claims to have passed, has not been placed on record of with writ petition – Held, petitioner does not possess the minimum educational qualification (middle class pass for woman candidate) prescribed for contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch and, therefore, she has been rightly removed from the said post.

(Para 10)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 175(v), 176 – Election of Sarpanch – Election petition – Removal of Sarpanch on complaint – Permissibility of -- Contention that since respondent No.6 has also filed an election petition, the complaint filed by her before the District Authorities could not be entertained under Section 51 of the 1994 Act – Held, if the petitioner had any objection as regards the maintainability of the complaint u/s 51 of the 1994 Act, then she should have availed her appropriate remedies before the competent Court at the relevant stage by challenging such proceedings -- However, no such recourse appears to have been taken by the petitioner – Held, once the petitioner had duly participated in the proceedings initiated against her under Section 51 of the 1994 Act and also suffered an adverse order, she cannot now be permitted to turn around and raise an objection to the maintainability of such proceedings merely on the ground that an election petition had also been filed against her – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 11-13)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 20 -- Agreement to sell of year 1990 – Suit for specific performance decreed – 35 year delayed payment of balance sale consideration – Equitable/ Discretionary relief :

-- Equitable answer does not lie either in denying specific performance altogether, or in enforcing the contract mechanically at the 1990 price – Where there is a long passage of time and substantial rise in prices, the Court, while upholding the decree for specific performance, may mould the relief by directing the purchaser to pay an enhanced amount so that the enforcement of the contract does not operate harshly against the vendor nor confer an unfair bonanza upon the purchaser.

 -- Discretion u/s 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (pre-amendment) is meant precisely to address such situations and to secure what is substantive justice between the parties.

-- An amount equal to seventy times (double the time gap between date of agreement and order) balance sale consideration under the agreement is payable by plaintiff/ buyer within three months -- In case the plaintiff fails to deposit the aforesaid amount within the time stipulated, the decree for specific performance shall stand vacated.

(Para 57-59)

Constitution of India, Article 23 -- Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari -- Samagra Shiksha Scheme -- Shiksha Pariyojna Parishad -- Continuously for over ten years in a row are deemed to be employed permanently -- A fixed honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month amounts to ‘Begar’ and unfair practice which is violative of Article 23 of the Constitution – Amount enhanced to Rs.17,000/- per month payable : Held,

i) The appointment of the part time or contractual instructors/teachers in fact no longer remains contractual in nature once the contract period of eleven months for which they were initially appointed or the extended contract period stood expired;

ii) They were not even part time instructors/teachers as they were specifically prohibited for taking any job or part time employment elsewhere during their spare time;

iii) In fact, these instructors/teachers having continued continuously for over ten years in a row are deemed to be employed permanently against deemed substantive posts, as with the passage of time and keeping in mind the continuity of the work, such posts stand automatically created;

iv) The Project Approval Board is the sole central authority to manage budget and finances under the Act and the scheme and to fix honorarium for the instructors/teachers appointed thereunder. No other authority has any say in the matter concerning finance and budget consequently in the fixation of honorarium;

v) The Project Approval Board having once approved the proposal for fixing Rs.17,000/- per month as honorarium to these instructors/teachers, no authority can sit over such a decision and pass orders contrary to it;

vi) The initial burden to pay honorarium to the instructors/teachers is upon the State Government who is free to recover the contribution of the Central Government from the Union of India on the principle of “pay & recover”;

vii) The honorarium payable to these instructors/teachers cannot be permitted to remain stagnant and the same is revisable periodically at least once in three years by the Project Approval Board or any other authority as may be determined by the Central Government/State Government under the scheme or the modified scheme;

viii) Any action of the State/Union Government to employ instructors/teachers on a fixed honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month as was initially fixed in 2013-14 amounts to ‘Begar’ and unfair practice which is violative of Article 23 of the Constitution;

ix) The Project Approval Board having fixed honorarium to these instructors/teachers at the rate of Rs.17,000/- per month with effect from the year 2017-18, the State Government/Central Government is not justified in paying them at a lesser rate of either Rs.8,470/- or Rs.9,800/- or at the basic rate of Rs.7,000/- per month.

Part time contractual instructors/ teachers appointed in the Upper Primary School in the State of U.P. are entitled to revision of their honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month which was initially fixed for the contract period of eleven months in the year 2013 -- All these instructors/teachers held entitled to receive honorarium at the rate of Rs.17,000/- per month with effect from 2017-18 -- The State Government shall start paying honorarium to them at the rate of Rs. 17,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.04.2026 and the arrears of which shall be paid to them by the State Government within a period of six months from today -- State Government may recover the contribution of the Central Government from the Union of India.

(Para 70-72)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty -- Prosecution u/s 498-A should not be initiated in a routine manner and is warranted only where the complaint discloses a coercive dowry demand or life-endangering cruelty, not where the parties are locked in an acrimonious but civilly resolvable conflict over assets or marital breakdown.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty -- ‘cruelty’ alone is not enough to constitute the offence -- It must be done with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 482 -- Cruelty -- Summoning of accused – Sustainability --  Vague allegations of cruelty, demand for dowry and harassment at the hands of the petitioners -- Only specific allegation against the petitioners/ accused (husband & father-in-law) was that they, along with sister-in-law and sister of father-in-law, assaulted the complainant in the kitchen with brick bats while raising objections to her entry, without attribution of any specific or individual role to any of the four accused -- No injury, no medical evidence, no complaint was lodged with any authority at the earliest point of time – On identical allegations, two other persons were not summoned by the trial Court -- Summoning of the petitioners was not justified.

(Para 12-18)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 482 -- Cruelty -- Summoning of accused (husband and father-in-law) – Quashing --  Complaint, after 21 years of marriage and 03 grown up children is merely a result of failure of marriage, intended to secure suitable settlement with respect to civil rights of complainant and her children -- Civil suit against husband regarding his properties pending – Complaint was filed to be used as a weapon in the personal discord -- Vague and generic allegations of cruelty amidst matrimonial conflict, if not nipped at the initial stage, lead to misuse of legal process and encourage unscrupulous persons to use arm-twisting tactics to seek compliance of unreasonable demands –  Prima facie, no case of cruelty or dowry demand made -- Complaint along with all subsequent proceedings including summoning quashed.

(Para 19-21)

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preventive detention -- Constitutional and statutory requirements -- Petitioner already on bail in five NDPS cases -- Consideration of bail orders and bail conditions is a mandatory requirement and failure to do so reflects non-application of mind and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority -- No finding as to how the conditions imposed in bail orders by the criminal Courts were inadequate or ineffective to prevent the alleged activities -- Merely describing the petitioner as a “habitual offender” or stating that he is “likely to resume trafficking” is not sufficient in law unless supported by credible and proximate material showing an immediate threat -- Detention order set aside.

(Para 6-12)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preventive detention -- Constitutional and statutory requirements – Petitioner already on bail in five NDPS cases -- Last case against the petitioner was registered on 20.01.2025, whereas the detention order was passed only on 05.08.2025, after a gap of more than six months, without any satisfactory explanation -- Such unexplained delay breaks the live and proximate link between the alleged past activities and the need for immediate preventive action – Impugned detention is based more on past history and assumptions rather than on any real and urgent necessity -- Detention, therefore, assumes a punitive character instead of a preventive one, unreasonable and unjustified curtailment of the petitioner’s fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution – Detention order set aside.

(Para 12)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Interest -- Notional income of the deceased taken at Rs.2100 per month -- Deceased being about 40 years of age after adding 40% as future prospects, the annual income works out to be Rs.35,280/- -- There being three claimants, 1/3rd deduction made for self-expenses -- Annual loss of dependency comes to Rs.23,500/-.  -- Applicable multiplier will be 15, having regard to the age of the deceased and so compensation works to be Rs.3,52,800/- -- Accident in 1996, an amount of Rs.10,000/- each i.e. Rs.30,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium/parental consortium -- Whereas, Rs.5,000/- each is awarded under the heads of loss of estate and funeral expenses -- Total compensation works out to be Rs.3,92,800/- -- Enhanced compensation of Rs.1,48,800/- payable along with interest @ 7.5% per month from the date of filing of the petition till its realisation.

(Para 3-4)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Interest -- Assessment of income – Deceased is salaried employee/ agriculturist also -- Salary of one skilled labourer added for agricultural income loss in his salary to assess dependency -- Deceased 31 years old was working as a Cluster officer in a Pvt Ltd company -- PW 1 (wife of the deceased) deposed that the deceased was drawing a gross salary of Rs.29447/- per month -- Attested photocopies of jamabandi for year 2016-17 Ex.C-10 were produced on record and income tax return for assessment year 2019-20 (Ex.C-6) was also placed on record which showed the agricultural income to be Rs1,25,000/- -- CW-4 from Income Tax Department proved the attested copy of ITR (Ex.C-6) -- Skilled person is required for the supervising and cultivation of the Agriculture land of the deceased -- Minimum wages applicable to skilled workers in Punjab during the relevant period is Rs 11219.18/- which reasonably rounded off as Rs.11,220/- -- Monthly income of the Deceased should be assessed as Rs. 40667/- (by adding Rs.11,220/- into his gross salary) – After adding 50% for future prospects and multiplier of 16, loss of Estate, funeral expenses and consortium total compensation assessed at Rs.78,92,764/- -- Enhanced amount payable with interest @ 9% (excluding the period of delay of 57 days in filing the appeal) to be deposited with the Tribunal within a period of two months.

(Para 9-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 200, 482 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Proclaimed person -- Original complaint withdrawn -- Quashing of FIR u/s 17A IPC – -- Since the original complaint related to the dishonoured cheque has been withdrawn, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings u/s 174-A IPC against the petitioner – FIR quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 341(1), 342(1) -- Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe -- Power to specify a caste or tribe as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is conferred upon the President of India, in relation to each State or Union Territory -- Once such specification is made, only Parliament, by law, may include or exclude any caste or tribe from the notified list -- Neither the executive nor the judiciary has any authority to modify or extend the scope of the Presidential Order.

(Para 9.4)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 9, 161 -- Constitution of India, Article 341(1), 342(1) -- Election of Sarpanch – Reserved seat for Scheduled Caste -- Scheduled Caste Certificate of father from other State -- The words “in relation to that State or Union Territory” occurring in Articles 341(1) and 342(1) are of decisive significance; they indicate that the recognition of a caste or tribe is confined to the particular State or Union Territory for which it is so notified -- Since the petitioner does not belong to any caste notified as Scheduled Caste in the State of Haryana, she had no legal right to hold the office of Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes -- Petitioner’s reliance on a certificate obtained from the authorities in Haryana on the basis of Scheduled Caste Certificate of her father issued by the State of Bihar, would not entitle the petitioner to contest election as a Scheduled Caste candidate in Gram Panchayat elections in the State of Haryana.

(Para 9.4, 12, 13)

C. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 161, 176 – Election of Sarpanch/ Panch – Challenge to -- Election of a candidate to the post of Sarpanch or Panch (as the case may be), could be questioned either by filing an election petition under Section 176 of the 1994 Act or by submitting a complaint to the concerned authority under Section 51 of the 1994 Act.

(Para 14, 14.1)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 14 -- Unilateral termination of the agreement to sell – Scope of –

(i) Unilateral termination of the agreement to sell by one party is impermissible in law except in cases where the agreement itself is determinable in nature in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 1963;

(ii) If such unilateral termination of a non-determinable agreement to sell is permitted as a defence, then virtually every suit for specific performance can be frustrated by the defendant by placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff, who despite performing his part of the obligations and having showcased readiness and willingness, would require to also seek a separate declaration that the termination was bad in law. In such cases, the burden cannot be casted upon the plaintiff to challenge the alleged termination of agreement;

iii) Where a party claims to have valid reasons to terminate or rescind a non-determinable agreement to sell, with a view to err on the side of caution, it should be such terminating party, if at all, who ideally should approach the court and obtain a declaration as to the validity of such termination or rescission, and not the non-terminating party. However, this must not mean that the defendant (the terminating party) in such cases would mandatorily be required to seek a declaration because Sections 27 and 31 of the Act of 1963 respectively, while using the phrase “may sue” merely give an option to any person to have the contract rescinded or adjudged as void or voidable;

(iv) Once the alleged termination of a non-determinable agreement in question is found to be not for bona fide reasons and being done in a unilateral manner on part of the defendant, it cannot be said that any declaration challenging the alleged termination was required on part of plaintiff;

(v) If a contract itself gives no right to unilaterally terminate the contract, or such right has been waived, and a party still terminates the contract unilaterally then that termination would amount to a breach by repudiation, and the nonterminating party can directly seek specific performance without first seeking a declaration; and

(vi) In the event it is found that the termination of agreement to sell by the defendant was not valid, then such an agreement to sell will remain subsisting and executable.

(Para 43)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 19(b) -- Bonafide purchaser – Failure to make enquiry – Effect of -- Subsequent purchasers had sufficient notice of the facts that an ATS dated 28.04.2000 existed; the names and addresses of the original vendees; that an earnest money amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/- had been paid by the original vendees to the original vendors; that the original vendors had sought to terminate the ATS due to their inability to execute the sale deed in favour of the original vendees on account of a status quo order; that the date of actual termination could not have coincided with the date of notice; and that deemed termination would have arose only if the original vendees had failed to claim the earnest money within one month; and that despite the issuance of the notice of termination in 2003, the original vendees continued to contest the impleadment application in the Original Suit No. 30 of 2001 until 2005 -- These circumstances should have reasonably aroused suspicion or at the very least prompted further inquiry by any prudent bona fide purchaser -- Yet the subsequent purchasers despite having ample opportunity to become aware of these facts abstained from making any such inquiries -- It is therefore beyond cavil that the subsequent purchasers cannot take shelter under Section 19(b) of the Act of 1963.

(Para 81)

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3(A to G) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Acquisition of land by NHAI -- Alteration of award in Execution petition – Permissibility of -- Award passed by the Arbitrator clearly reveals that a specific finding was given by the Arbitrator stating that one marla was equivalent to 207 sq. ft. -- Said finding has been given in bold in the award hence it is not a case where the same could have been missed by either of the parties -- It does not now lie in the mouth of judgment debtors i.e. petitioners herein to say that one marla is equivalent to 272 sq. ft.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13, Order 21 Rule 26 -- Execution of ex-parte decree – Application for stay of execution declined -- Application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC pending consideration -- Application for setting aside ex parte as well as the execution application is to be heard by the same Court and same Presiding Judge – Revision petition disposed of with the direction to learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) to decide the application moved by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC within a period of two months and then proceed further with execution proceedings.

(Para 1-6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Permanent disability of 10% – Functional disability -- Future loss of income – A malunited fracture of the foot -- Permanent physical disability is not synonymous with loss of earning capacity -- Appellant unable to demonstrate that the 10% permanent disability of the foot has translated into any functional disability so as to impair the claimant’s earning capacity as a Manager – Rs.1,71,000/- has been awarded towards permanent disability by the Ld. Tribunal -- Assessment does not suffer from any perversity or misapplication of law warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 4-9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  No fault in DDR – Effect of -- Contention raised by the appellant–Insurance Company regarding the effect of the Daily Diary Report (DDR), wherein it was mentioned that no one was at fault, is concerned, the same does not hold any merit in the eyes of law -- The learned Tribunal has rightly and correctly observed that the contents of the DDR are not conclusive so as to dislodge the otherwise cogent oral and documentary evidence adduced before it.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Standard of proof -- It is well-settled law that the standard of proof applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal trials.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Father of the deceased – Dependency -- Ld. Tribunal rightly concluded that the father of the deceased was financially dependent upon him -- In view of the number of dependents, the deduction of one-fifth (1/5) of the income of the deceased towards personal expenses has been correctly applied while computing the loss of dependency -- Said approach is in consonance with the settled principles governing assessment of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Para 14)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Father as dependent -- In a case of aged father, it cannot be held that he was not dependent upon deceased accordingly, father is to be taken as dependent of deceased.

(Para 9)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased was 23 years old at the time of his death and working as driver on the truck thereby earning Rs.6,000/-+100/- per day as diet money, however no evidence led – In absence of any cogent evidence, monthly salary of deceased taken as Rs.2,400/- taking him to be driver on the basis of minimum wages payable to driver -- Since deceased was 28 years old, multiplier of 17 would be applicable -- 40% of monthly income added to the income of the deceased as future prospects -- Since, there are 4 claimants including 60 years old father, claimants-appellants are entitled to compensation after applying 1/4^th deduction – Compensation made as Rs.5,89,080 (Assessed by Tribunal Rs.2,30,400/-) – Enhanced compensation of Rs.3,58,680/- payable with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing of claim petition till realization.

(Para 6-12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 209 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174A IPC/ 209 BNS – Quashing -- When the petitioner came to know about the fact he surrendered before the learned trial Court and got the benefit of bail in the case -- Complaint has already been disposed of -- Once the main case stands decided, the FIR u/s 209 BNS (Section 174-A) amounts to abuse of process of law and deserves to be quashed – FIR quashed.

(Para 9-11)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Non-bailable warrants – Anticipatory bail – Maintainability of -- Since the petitioner has been summoned in a bailable offence, therefore, the provisions of Section 482 of BNSS are not attracted  -- Petition disposed of -- Petitioner on his surrender before the learned trial Court will be admitted to bail subject to the conditions being imposed upon him by the learned trial Court.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing – Cheque from Joint account -- In the complaint there is no specific allegation that the petitioner was signatory to the cheque or that she had been instrumental or responsible for the day to day business of the firm on whose behalf the cheques were issued by the husband of the petitioner -- Taking into consideration the fact that the respondent has failed to aver and lead preliminary evidence qua the fact that the petitioner was in any way responsible for the day to day affairs of the company, on whose behalf the cheques were issued or that she had signed the same, order for her summoning to face trial for the commission of offence punishable u/s 138 of NI Act is perverse and deserves to be quashed -- Impugned order quashed, qua petitioner.

(Para 13-20)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence – Jump of bail -- Due to non-appearance of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court, his bail order was cancelled -- Warrant of arrest issued -- Reason for his absence is that his father was seriously ill and got hospitalized on the same day -- Petition disposed of, impugned order set aside subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Divorce petition through attorney – Transfer of petition -- Tarantaran to Gurdaspur -- Balancing of convenience/ inconvenience of the parties is required to be done -- Amicable settlement, earlier reached forms the basis of the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, which is still pending in the Courts at Gurdaspur -- 7 years old child is in the care and custody of the applicant, who herself is not having any source of earning -- Respondent is residing at Malaysia -- Convenience of his attorney-holder cannot be placed, above the convenience of the applicant – Petition transferred from Tarn Taran to Gurdaspur.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Cybercrime complaint – Freezing of Bank Account – Permissibility of -- Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Bank to keep the disputed amount (the amount which was transferred illegally in the bank account of the petitioner) frozen and allow the petitioner to make transactions from his bank account from the remaining balance – The bank directed to send a communication to the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police, to indicate the amount to be earmarked for lien -- In case, the respondent-Bank does not receive any reply from the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police within the stipulated period, then Bank directed to de-freeze the bank account of petitioner.

(Para 1-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37, 50, 52A – NDPS – Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Judicial Magistrate who issued the certificate u/s 52-A was not made a witness -- Gazetted Officer was not produced during trial -- As the prosecution is unable to show that the said 80 packets seized by them during raid were properly classified weighed and sampled and as the said drugs appear to have been mixed up without the order of the competent authority -- Rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act cannot stand in the way in view of such materials on record in favour of the appellants – Sentence suspended.

(Para 18-20)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 31, 32 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Fee waiver to disabled student  -- 5% quota earmarked for persons with disabilities has already been filled, and the fee waiver has been pre-approved, only in respect of those candidates – Held, when the intention of the State is to provide fee waiver to persons with disabilities, its implementation cannot be clubbed with reservation -- Persons with disabilities require both reservation and welfare measures so as to provide them with equal opportunities to complete their education along with other candidates -- Petitioner held eligible for the waiver of fees.

(Para 7-9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 (1) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- There shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e. at the pre-cognizance stage -- Trial Court proceeded to issue notice to accused at the pre-cognizance stage in purported adherence to the first proviso to sub-section [1] of Section 223, BNSS – Impugned Order passed by the Trial Court set aside and quashed to the afore-stated extent -- Learned Trial Court directed to take a fresh decision on the matter of cognizance and issuance of process to the accused persons. Sanjabij Tari’s case 2025 INSC 1158 = (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20758 relied.

(Para 8-12)

A. Insurance policy/ claim – Repudiation -- Subsequent discovery of damage or corrosion cannot be used to repudiate claim -- Boiler in question was certified and registered; the insurance policy was issued after the certificate of registration was provided; and the accident occurred while the certificate of registration was subsisting -- Burden was heavy on the insurer to prove that the boiler was not worthy of insurance cover or that such cover was obtained by misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or by playing fraud -- Nothing of the kind has been pleaded or proved by the insurer -- Cannot  repudiate the claim as it would defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract.

(Para 39)

B. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A contract of insurance is a contract based on utmost good faith, and if utmost good faith is not observed by either party the contract may be avoided by the other party -- This principle is of universal application to all types of insurance contracts -- The principle of utmost good faith imposes positive obligations of disclosure -- In its practical application the principle permits either party to avoid the contract altogether if it is established against the other party either that: (1) there has been a failure by the other party to disclose a material fact; or (2) the other party has made an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact, since statements made in a contract must be true in fact -- Further, the onus of proving that the insured has failed to perform the duty of disclosure or has broken a condition relating to disclosure lies on the insurer.

(Para 24)

C. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A proposer is under a duty to disclose to the insurer all material facts as they are within its knowledge -- The proposer is presumed to know all the facts and circumstances concerning the proposed insurance -- Whilst the proposer can only disclose what is known to him the proposer’s duty of disclosure is not confined to his actual knowledge -- Rather, it also extends to those material facts which, in the ordinary course of business, he ought to know -- However, the proposer is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time.

(Para 25)

D. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A fact is material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take risk -- Whether a fact is material will depend on the circumstances, as proved in evidence, of the case -- If a fact, although material, is one which the proposer did not and could not in the circumstances have been expected to know, or if its materiality would not have been apparent to a reasonable man, his failure to disclose it is not a breach of his duty -- The proposer need not disclose matters already known to the insurer or matters as to which the insurer has waived information -- An insurer is deemed to know of matters of common knowledge and matters of which he ought to be aware as an insurer in that line of business -- Further, if the insurer while accepting the proposal form does not ask the insured to clarify any ambiguities then the insurer after accepting the premium cannot urge that there was a wrong declaration made by the insured.

(Para 26, 27)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cognizance without condoning delay – Quashing of complaint -- Power to take cognisance of a belated complaint is subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within time -- The satisfaction in that regard, resulting in condonation of the delay, must therefore precede the act of taking cognizance -- Respondent made a categorical statement in her complaint that it was filed within time, when it was not – Held, Ld. Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the respondent’s complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, even before the delay of two days in its presentation was condoned – Complaint quashed.

(Para 14, 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of complaint -- It cannot be said that merely because the relative of the wife is a Head Constable and another is working in the District Court, there would be a bias against the husband, especially when the adjudication is carried out by the Judge – No bias found on the Judge – Transfer order set aside – Complaint restored back.

(Para 8, 10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 403, 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 362, 482 – Cheque bounce complaints -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act – Compounding of offence can be at any stage/ after conviction also – Not amounting to review/ alteration of judgment -- Act of permitting compounding u/s 147 does not partake the character of a “review” or “alteration” of the judgment on merits, as contemplated by Section 362 CrPC -- Cases under of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would not strictly fall under the restriction provided as per Section 362 Cr.P.C. -- Offence punishable u/s 138 of the NI Act is amenable to compounding at any stage of the proceedings, including after conviction, during appeal or revision and even subsequent to the dismissal thereof, provided the settlement between the parties is voluntary, lawful and bona fide.

(Para 24-26, 31)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 403, 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 362, 482 – Cheque bounce complaints -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act – Nature of – Compounding of -- Cheque dishonour cases are predominantly compensatory in nature -- The penal provision is intended as a deterrent to ensure the credibility of negotiable instruments and the smooth functioning of commercial transactions and not as a means of retributive incarceration -- Once the monetary liability stands discharged, the continuation of criminal proceedings would neither advance public interest nor subserve the ends of justice -- On the contrary, it would frustrate the very legislative policy of de-clogging courts and encouraging early resolution of commercial disputes.

(Para 32)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Earlier the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 18,000/- per month but now she claims to be earning only Rs. 12,200/- per month, which appears highly improbable -- This conduct clearly reflects an attempt to abuse the process of law merely to keep the respondent-husband entangled in continuous litigation and to extract money at her own convenience by misusing the judicial process.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Dire need of financial assistance/ maintenance must – Otherwise held to be misuse of process of law -- Concept of grant of maintenance has been introduced to protect the dignity of women; however, it can’t be permitted to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment -- Petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court and abuse the process of law -- In the absence of any material to demonstrate that the petitioner is in dire need of financial assistance or maintenance, the very filing of the petition amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Nature of -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. is payable only when the wife is unable to maintain herself -- A wife having sufficient independent income or means is not entitled to maintenance -- Full disclosure of income and assets is must -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure to prevent destitution and not a source of unjust enrichment -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been enacted with a specific purpose to protect women and children and to prevent vagrancy and destitution among them -- It provides speedy remedy to the destituted and helpless women to establish their claim, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that she is unable to maintain herself and her child.

(Para 12, 13)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Concealment of income -- Petitioner/ wife concealed her employment and claimed his husband is earning handsome amount – She suppressing relevant information from the Court and she is not only qualified but is capable of earning good money -- When a person approaches a Court, he/ she should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective -- Petitioner also failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to demonstrate that she was living separately from her husband on account of any situation created by the respondent-husband – Order of Ld. Family Court dismissing the maintenance application, upheld.

(Para 1, 13, 14)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Service matter -- Disproportionate punishment -- If punishment is disproportionate to alleged offence, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226, 227 – Disciplinary action – Enquiry officer found petitioner innocent – Without disagreement note, major penalty of forfeiture of 5 increment imposed -- Two charges, misbehaving with HC and taking away motorcycle from Police Station despite being transferred -- Inquiry Officer found him innocent qua both the charges -- Without recording disagreement note, show cause notice proposing punishment was issued -- Petitioner was having service of 14 years to his credit -- There was no bad entry in his character role or service record -- In the absence of disagreement note, there was no occasion to punish the petitioner -- It is a case of casualty and miscarriage of justice on the part of departmental authorities – Punishment order set aside -- Costs of Rs.1,10,000/- imposed upon respondent  -- Petitioner held entitle to arrears alongwith interest @ 6% per annum.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- No income proof – Accident occurred on 11.06.2016 – Tribunal assessed income @ Rs. 9,258/- per month considering deceased as an unskilled labourer -- Minimum wages can be yardstick but not absolute, some guess work also required -- Deceased 30 years of age at the time of accident -- Social status of the deceased needs to be kept in mind -- A person working as electrician who had acquired his requisite technical qualification from ITI, Hisar would have a reasonable and steady source of income, sufficient to maintain himself and contribute to his family -- Monthly income of the deceased assessed at (Rs. 400 x 30) Rs. 12,000 per month.

(Para 6-6.2)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Bachelor deceased aged 30 years – ITI qualified – Rs.12000/- taken as monthly income -- Deduction of 50% not absolute (1/3 deducted) – Deceased survived by aged parents -- Being the sole earning member of the family, the deceased was under moral and social obligation to contribute some amount towards the maintenance of his aged parents, in discharge of his filial and pious obligation -- Though, as per the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case, (2009) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 12247, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased comes out to be half (1/2nd), but keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case, the deduction assessed at one-third (1/3rd) of the income – Total compensation assessed as Rs. 24,16,800/-.

(Para 7)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Loss of consortium – Parents -- Rs. 96,000/- (Rs. 48,000 x 2) assessed -- Parents of deceased are also entitled for filial consortium.

(Para 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Settlement in cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Quashing -- Original offence u/s 138 of NI Act, alleged to have been committed in the year 2019 -- Subject matter of the original offence settled amicably between the parties and the criminal complaint withdrawn -- Impugned FIR u/s 174A IPC, as also all proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Application filed u/s 163A of the MV Act, however, the compensation claimed was Rs.7,40,000/- and the averments itself indicates that the accident occurred because of the rash and negligent manner in which the bus of the Corporation was being driven – Held, though Section 163A of the MV Act was mentioned in the application, the claim is held to field u/s 166 of the MV Act.

(Para 5)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case -- 60% disability -- Income of a Coolie at Rs.4,500/- per month in the year 2004 -- Computing a nominal increase, even a Coolie would be entitled to an income of Rs.5,000/- per month in the year 2005 when the accident occurred -- Income of the appellant computed at Rs.5,000/- per month and the appellant being of the age of 27 years, the multiplier applicable would be 17 -- Future prospects of an addition of 40% -- Tribunal taken disability at 50% -- High Court without any appeal by the Insurance Company reduced the disability to 40%, which was improper -- Loss of income assessed as Rs.5000 x 12 x 17 x 140% x 50% = Rs.7,14,000/- -- Interest at the rate of 7.5% payable.

(Para 5-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Matter remanded back – If, the Ld. Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the convict is not in a position to deposit and likely to forego his liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided, the Appellate Court must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeal and decide the same preferably within next sixty days of passing of fresh order, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions – Till the time application for suspension of sentence is decided afresh, the condition of deposit of 20% of the compensation amount, as directed by the Appellate Court in its earlier order, shall remain inoperative and the bail shall not be cancelled in consequence thereof.

(Para 7-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Inherent power u./s 482 of Cr.P.C. -- Nature of -- High Court must avoid usurping the function of a trial court or conducting a mini-trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint --  While examining any FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made -- High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.

(Para 22, 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 417, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B --  Cheating/ Forgery -- Quashing of FIR – Civil liability as well as criminal liability -- It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed -- Adjudication in civil matters and criminal prosecution proceed on different principles -- Decree passed by the Civil Court neither records findings on criminal intent nor on the existence of offences such as forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents -- Therefore, civil adjudication cannot always be treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment.

(Para 26, 27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Quashing -- Appellant acquitted in main case which means that there is no case for which his presence is required to be secured -- Original offence pertains to the year 2010; the money subject matter of dispute stands paid -- All criminal proceedings, inclusive of the FIR u/s 174A IPC, closed -- Appellant’s status, as a ‘proclaimed person’ stands quashed.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Nature of -- Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished -- It is a stand-alone offence.

(Para 8)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 16(c), 22(1)(2) – Suit for specific performance -- Readiness and willingness -- Appellant could not demonstrate necessary financial wherewithal to make the balance payment of Rs. 5.21 crores on 10.05.2008, the due date -- In addition to that, he did not even visit the office of the Sub-Registrar on the above date -- Respondents too did not fulfil their contractual obligations, particularly with respect to obtaining mutation and securing conversion of the suit property from leasehold to freehold – Appellant failed to prove his readiness and willingness -- In light of the facts of the case, and bearing in mind the passage of more than seventeen years since the execution of agreement, grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief at this stage -- To do complete justice and adjust the equities between the parties, respondents directed to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores only) to the appellant, within four weeks.

(Para 5-8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 --  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 278 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Cheque bounce complaints -- Compounding of offence – Release on probation -- Not only a voluntary compromise can bring the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act to an end, but the accused under the said offence are entitled to benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Guidelines of compounding given in Damodar S. Prabhu’s case (2010) 5 SCC 663 modified :-

(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the accused.

(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may compound the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 10% of the cheque amount.

If the Accused is willing to pay in accordance with the aforesaid guidelines, the Court may suggest to the parties to go for compounding. If for any reason, the financial institutions/complainant asks for payment other than the cheque amount or settlement of entire loan or other outstanding dues, then the Magistrate may suggest to the Accused to plead guilty and exercise the power under Section 255(2) and/or 255(3) of the Cr.P.C. or 278 of the BNSS, 2023 and/or give the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the Accused.

(Para 35-39)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 --  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 278 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Cheque bounce complaints -- Compounding of offence – Massive backlog – Directions issued :-

-- In all cases filed under Section 138 of the NI Act, service of summons shall not be confined through prescribed usual modes but shall also be issued dasti i.e. summons shall be served upon the accused by the complainant in addition -- Trial Courts shall further resort to service of summons by electronic means  -- Complainant shall, at the time of filing the complaint, provide the requisite particulars including e-mail address, mobile number and/or WhatsApp number/messaging application details of the accused, duly supported by an affidavit verifying that the said particulars pertain to the accused/respondent.

-- The complainant shall file an affidavit of service before the Court. In the event such affidavit is found to be false, the Court shall be at liberty to take appropriate action against the complainant in accordance with law.

-- In order to facilitate expeditious settlement of cases under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Principal District and Sessions Judge of each District Court shall create and operationalise dedicated online payment facilities through secure QR codes or UPI links. The summons shall expressly mention that the Respondent/Accused has the option to make payment of the cheque amount at the initial stage itself, directly through the said online link. The complainant shall also be informed of such payment and upon confirmation of receipt, appropriate orders regarding release of such money and compounding/closure of proceedings under Section 147 of the NI Act and/or Section 255 of Cr.P.C./278 BNSS, 2023 may be passed by the Court in accordance with law. This measure shall promote settlement at the threshold stage and/or ensure speedy disposal of cases.

-- Each and every complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act shall contain a synopsis in the given format.

-- There shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage.

-- Since the object of Section 143 of the NI Act is quick disposal of the complaints under Section 138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code, the Court reiterated the direction given in In Re: Expeditious Trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act (supra) that the Trial Courts shall record cogent and sufficient reasons before converting a summary trial to summons trial. To facilitate this process, the Trial Court shall be at liberty (at the initial post cognizance stage) to ask questions, it deems appropriate, under Section 251 Cr.P.C. / Section 274 BNSS, 2023 including the following questions:-

(i) Do you admit that the cheque belongs to your account? Yes/No

(ii) Do you admit that the signature on the cheque is yours? Yes/No

(iii) Did you issue/deliver this cheque to the complainant? Yes/No

(iv) Do you admit that you owed liability to the complainant at the time of issuance? Yes/No

(v) If you deny liability, state clearly the defence:

(a) Security cheque only;

(b) Loan repaid already;

(c) Cheque altered/misused;

(d) Other (specify).

(vi) Do you wish to compound the case at this stage? Yes/No

-- The Court shall record the responses to the questions in the order-sheet in the presence of the accused and his/her counsel and thereafter determine whether the case is fit to be tried summarily under Chapter XXI of the Cr.P.C. / Chapter XXII of the BNSS, 2023.

-- Wherever, the Trial Court deems it appropriate, it shall use its power to order payment of interim deposit as early as possible under Section 143A of the NI Act.

-- Since physical courtrooms create a conducive environment for direct and informal interactions encouraging early resolution, the High Courts shall ensure that after service of summons, the matters are placed before the physical Courts. Exemptions from personal appearances should be granted only when facts so warrant. Clarified that prior to the service of summons the matters may be listed before the digital Courts.

-- Wherever cases under Section 138 of the NI Act are permitted to be heard and disposed of by evening courts, the High Courts should ensure that pecuniary limit of the cheque amount is realistic. For instance, in Delhi, the jurisdiction of the evening courts to hear and decide cases of cheque amount is not exceeding Rs.25,000/-. Said limit is too low. The High Courts should forthwith issue practice directions and set up realistic pecuniary benchmarks for evening Courts.

-- Each District and Sessions Judge in Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta shall maintain a dedicated dashboard reflecting the pendency and progress of cases under Section 138 of the NI Act. The dashboard shall include, inter alia, details regarding total pendency, monthly disposal rates, percentage of cases settled/compounded, average number of adjournments per case and the stage-wise breakup of pending matters. The District and Sessions Judges in aforesaid jurisdictions shall conduct monthly reviews of the functioning of Magistrates handling NI Act matters. A consolidated quarterly report shall be forwarded to the High Court.

-- The Chief Justices of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta requested to form Committee on the Administrative side to monitor pendency and to ensure expeditious disposal of Section 138 of the NI Act cases. These Committees should meet at least once a month and explore the option of appointing experienced Magistrates to deal with Section 138 of the NI Act cases as well as promoting mediation, holding of Lok Adalats and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Section 138 NI Act cases.

(Para 36)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Matter required to be sent back to the Appellate Court, for decision afresh on the application for suspension of sentence of the appellant/ petitioner in consonance with the order passed by the Larger Bench/Division Bench (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750 (P&H HC) (DB) in the case of M/s Coromandel International Limited &  Shivam Jindal (supra) cases relied.

(Para 5)