Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery of weapon --  Investigating Officer neither proved nor exhibited the disclosure statement of the appellant accused during his deposition -- Investigating Officer did not distinctly identify the accused persons at whose instance, the particular weapon, i.e., axe (kulhari) or dagger (katari), was recovered -- No indication in the testimony that he took the signatures of the accused persons on the recovery memos -- Not even this, the said witness did not even state that he signed and attested the memorandums under which the recoveries were effected -- Therefore, the substratum of the prosecution case regarding the disclosure statements rendered by the appellant-accused and the recoveries allegedly made in furtherance thereof remains unproved for want of proper evidence.

(Para 32)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Murder of six innocent persons -- Investigating Officer did not examine even a single of the villagers living adjacent to the crime scene for establishing the presence of the appellant-accused at or around the crime scene, corresponding to the time of the incident -- Investigating Officer failed to collect any evidence regarding the safe keeping of the recovered articles/ material objects, till the same reached the Forensic Science Laboratory -- Prosecution failed to prove even one of the three so-called incriminating circumstances i.e., ‘motive’, ‘last seen’ and ‘recoveries’ in its quest to bring home the guilt of the appellant-accused -- Even if, for the sake of arguments the evidence of recovery of weapons were to be accepted, the fact remains that the FSL report does not give any indication regarding the grouping of the blood found on the weapons and hence, the recoveries are of no avail to the prosecution -- The fabric of the prosecution case is full of holes and holes which are impossible to mend -- Conviction of the appellant-accused and death sentence handed down to him can also not be sustained -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 33-39)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 4, 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- PMLA case – Regular bail – Accused not produced before magistrate in 24 hours -- Violation of fundamental right – Right to bail -- Arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in custody – Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds that the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India have been violated while arresting the accused or after arresting him, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the bail application to release the accused on bail – Bail cannot be denied on the grounds of non-fulfilment of twin tests under clause (ii) of sub-section 1 of Section 45 of PMLA – High Court granted bail – No error in judgment, appeal dismissed.

(Para 3-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception-4, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sudden fight -- From the evidence, as placed on record, it is difficult to come to a finding that the appellant had come with a premeditated mind to kill the deceased -- Possibility of an altercation taking place between the appellant and the deceased for some reason and the appellant assaulting the deceased in the heat of passion on account of a sudden fight, cannot be ruled out -- Appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC -- As such, the conviction of the appellant under Part I of Section 304 IPC would meet the ends of justice.

(Para 10-12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173, 175(3) – Registration of FIR -- Investigation by Police – Power of Judicial Magistrate – Hearing to Police officer – Mandate of -- By requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions u/s 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs u/s 173 -- Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

(Para 34, 35)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- M.P. Veterinary Department Contingency Paid Employees Recruitment & Conditions of Service Rules, 1979 -- Part time sweeper – Regular pay scale -- Appellants were appointed on the ground of recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted by Collector, against the vacant posts as part time sweepers at Collector’s prescribed rates -- Appellants were appointed for posts reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes under Special Recruitment Drive -- They are covered under Clause 6 of the Circular dated 10.05.1984 since they have completed three years and fulfil all the conditions stipulated in the Circular to grant revised pay-scale -- Designation as ‘part-time’ sweepers does not affect the validity of their appointment since they were appointed against sanctioned posts nevertheless -- Appellants fighting this battle for regular pay-scale since 2016 and they have extended their service to the State for substantial years -- But more importantly they have proven that their situation is covered under the State issued Circular and Rules – Held, it confers upon them a legal right to avail regular pay-scale.

(Para 13-18)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Appellant acted upon clause 49.5 and sought an extension of time on three occasions – Claim in the letter dated 25th January, 2017 was made by the appellant after giving solemn undertaking on 14th January, 2015 not to make any claim other than escalation in respect of delays in the completion of work, the claim made was contrary to the undertakings -- By the undertakings, the appellant agreed not to make a claim contrary to what is provided in clause 49.5; and therefore, by conduct, the appellant was estopped from challenging the validity of clause 49.5.

(Para 19)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Limitation of six months – Minor claimant – Effect upon -- Date of the accident 20.07.2020 -- Respondent/ claimant had attained the age of majority on 06.03.2023 and that the petition was filed on 25.04.2023 i.e. within one and a half month after attaining the age of majority – Tribunal allowed the claim as the claim petition cannot be stated to be time barred.

-- No law cited to show that in case a person is a minor at the time of the accident and is therefore incompetent to file a claim petition, then, he/she cannot file the same within a period of six months of his/her attaining the age of majority.

-- Additionally, Section 166(3) of the MV Act made applicable from 01.04.2022 and were not in force on the date when the accident took place i.e. 20.07.2020 -- No judgment cited to show that the said provisions would also apply to a case where the accident had taken place prior to the date when the said provisions had come into force.

Impugned order is in accordance with law and deserves to be upheld.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375(2), Exception 2, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape with wife – Quashing of FIR -- As per Exception 2 u/s 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant -- The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant -- No prima facie case constituting any offence is made out against the appellant and—FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed – Appeal allowed.

(Para 17)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Divorce -- Dispute between the parties remains only concerning the maintenance amount and both the parties have agreed to the grant of divorce – Husband has already remarried, the present parties stayed together for only about two months after the marriage, have no intention to continue their marital relationship, the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband has evidently broken down irretrievably – No interfere with the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court and confirmed by the High Court.

(Para 15)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 -- Divorce -- Permanent alimony -- Husband has not been forthright in disclosure of his income and assets and is clearly attempting to escape his liability to support the appellant post-divorce -- In pursuance of the affidavit filed by the appellant, it can be plainly inferred that the respondent has multiple sources of income including the rental income from tenanted premises -- There is no issue out of the wedlock -- Considering the total facts and circumstances of the case, the financial status of the parties, their standards of living, the fact that the respondent has already remarried and also bears the financial responsibility of his new family, Rs. 10,00,000/- awarded as a one-time settlement in favour of the appellant-wife shall serve the purpose of equity and meet the ends of justice.

(Para 19)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 37, 38 -- Suit for simpliciter injunction – Maintainability of -- Plaintiffs failed to pray for any declaration and their suit simpliciter for injunction -- High Court dismissed the suit being maintainable -- Held, if the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs then the suit should not fail only on the ground that the matter has been filed only for injunction simpliciter and no main relief in the form of declaration has been prayed for -- Judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with law.

(Para 13-23)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Agreement to sell – Whether, it is transfer of title? -- Agreement for sale in respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in favour of the purchaser under the agreement -- An agreement for sale does not create any interest in the property -- The only mode by which an immovable property worth more than Rs.100/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a sale deed duly registered in accordance with the Indian Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Kidnapping -- Procuration of minor girl – Acquittal -- Age of girl -- Prosecutrix herself indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant -- Age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out -- Evidence of the prosecutrix not supported the case of the prosecution -- Independent eye-witness (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution’s case on recovery -- Prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Contradiction in statements – Disclosure statement -- Recovery of knife – Value of -- Difficult to believe the testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 for the following reasons:

a. The statement made by both the eyewitnesses that the appellant inflicted two to three stab wounds on the back of the deceased with a knife are omissions;

b. The version of PW-4 that he was standing at a distance of fifteen feet from the scene of occurrence is also an omission;

c. The statement of PW-5 that PW-4 was present at the time of the incident is an omission. His statement that the deceased fell on his chest is an omission.

d. Both the witnesses did not report the incident to the Police. According to PW-4, he informed the incident to one Sumesh, who has not been examined;

e. Both the witnesses did not take the deceased to a hospital; and

f. Though other persons were present at the time of the incident, the said witnesses have not been examined.

Once evidence of two witnesses is disbelieved, the only remaining evidence against the appellant is of the recovery of the knife at his instance – It is not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction set aside. Manoj Kumar Soni’s case 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 relied.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 24 -- Duty of Public Prosecutor -- A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case -- The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well -- If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it -- On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused -- Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

(Para 96)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Murder – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction in revision – Power of -- Sub-section (3) of Section 401 CrPC prohibits/ bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Defence counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to correct the Court if the Court is falling in some error and for all this, the State Government is responsible -- It is the State Government who appointed the concerned Public Prosecutor -- High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants -- Appeals allowed -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside -- State Government directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the three appellants towards compensation within a period of four weeks.

(Para 1-3, 40-46, 97-99)

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Writ jurisdiction -- Instrumentality of State -- For issuing writ against a legal entity, it would have to be an instrumentality or agency of a State or should have been entrusted with such functions as are Governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence Governmental.

-- A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State Government; (ii) Authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any Statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.

(Para 10 (1)(2))

B. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Writ against Non-Banking Companies – Maintainability of -- Although a non-banking finance company like the Muthoot Finance Ltd. is duty bound to follow and abide by the guidelines provided by the Reserve Bank of India for smooth conduct of its affairs in carrying on its business, yet those are of regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guideline and not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the company -- Writ petition rejected on the ground of maintainability .

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder -- Common intention -- For convicting the accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds -- It must be established that all the accused had preplanned and shared a common intention to commit the crime with the accused who has actually committed the crime -- It must be established that the criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused -- Prosecution failed to show that the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4/ appellants had common intention with accused No.1-JS prior to the accused No.1-JS’s shooting at the deceased resulting in her death – Conviction set aside.

(Para 1, 2, 18-20)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation  in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Carpenter – 74% disability -- It would be unfair to classify a carpenter as an unskilled worker -- Minimum wages as applied to skilled persons is to be taken for the purpose of calculation of compensation, as on the relevant date would be Rs.8337.10 -- Loss of future earnings at 74% disability Rs.8337 x 74% = Rs.6,169.45, Annual loss of earning Rs. 6,169.45 x 12 = Rs.74,033.4 and applying multiplier of 14 Rs.74,033.4 x 14 = Rs.10,36,467.6 -- Future prospect 25% = Rs.3,50,158 – Treatment and Medical charges = 60,000/-, Pain and Suffering = 60,000/-, Loss of Income during treatment = 15,000/-, Attendant Charges = 15,000/-, Special Diet and Nursing = 10,000/-, Transportation Charges = 15,000/-, Loss of Amenities = 30,000/- -- Total compensation of Rs. 15,91, 625/- alongwith 7.5% p.a awarded.

(Para 7, 9)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Conviction of accused -- It is a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the possibility of guilt -- The gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations from definitive conclusions -- Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder –Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and trustworthy --  In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person’s guilt -- The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt -- Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend -- Chain of circumstantial evidences in the case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally inconsistent with their innocence – Conviction set aside.

(Para 22-27)

Service matter – Promotion exercise from Scale-II to Scale-III -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Fundamental defect in enquiry -- Appellant’s result was kept in abeyance in view of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings -- Defect was accepted by the Bank when they did not press the appeal -- Appellant should be granted all monetary benefits since the fundamental defect in the enquiry was due to no fault of the appellant – Monetary benefits granted with 6% interest p.a.

(Para 5, 6, 30, 32)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (3 of 2021), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Conversion from one religion to another religion by misrepresentation, force, fraud, undue influence, coercion, allurement  -- Regular bail – Discretion of Court -- The offence alleged is not that serious or grave like murder, dacoity, rape etc. -- Trial court declined bail as trial courts seldom muster the courage of granting bail, be it any offence -- However, at least, it was expected of the High Court to muster the courage and exercise its discretion judiciously -- Grant of bail is a matter of discretion, but discretion has to be exercised judicially keeping in mind the well settled principles of grant of bail -- Discretion does not mean that the judge on his own whims and fancy declines bail saying conversion is something very serious -- Petitioner is going to be put to trial and ultimately if the prosecution succeeds in establishing its case, he would be punished – Bail allowed.

(Para 10-13, 21)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988)Section 166 -- Compensation in Motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case -- Mason -- From the nature of the head injuries, it cannot be held that the first appellant would have returned to complete normalcy and is entitled to loss of income only at Rs.100/- per day -- Appellant continued to suffer from disability such as memory loss, defective speech, etc. -- Tribunal concluded that the first appellant was earning Rs.450/- per day, then applied the multiplier for 70% disability loss -- Employability of a person with serious head injuries is a circumstance which ought to have been kept in the perspective for determining the loss of income of the first appellant -- Age of the first appellant, even assuming as 50 years, as contended by the Insurance Company, the compensation for loss of income and also loss for future earnings can be determined at Rs.7,50,000/ (lumpsum) – Total compensation works out to Rs. 12,09,017/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of payment.

(Para 11, 12)

Constitution of India, Article 141 -- Domestic worker – Rights of –  Despite their growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the most vulnerable to exploitation and abuse -- Direction given to the Ministry of Labour and Employment in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending a legal framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of the rights of domestic workers -- The composition of the Expert Committee is left to the wisdom of the Government of India and its concerned Ministries -- It will be appreciated if the Committee submits a Report within a period of 6 months, whereupon the Government of India may consider the necessity of introducing a legal framework which may effectively address the cause and concern of domestic workers.

(Para 39, 55 (iv, v))

Criminal jurisprudence – Contradiction in statement/ prosecution story -- ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ -- Principle of ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ does not apply to the Indian criminal jurisprudence and only because there are some contradictions which in the opinion of this Court are not even that material, the entire story of the prosecution cannot be discarded as false -- It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff -- In a given case, it is also open to the Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted where there are a number of accused persons.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Dowry case – Cruelty – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Appellant sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence u/s 498-A of IPC and one year imprisonment for the offence u/s 4 of DP Act, sentence to run concurrently -- Appellant has undergone approximately 3 months in custody – Incident pertains to the year 2006, marriage was solemnized on 31.03.2006 and the couple lived together exactly for three days -- Complainant is married and settled abroad -- Case prolonged for a period of nearly 19 years -- Sentence set aside, substituted for the period already undergone and Rs. 3,00,000/- payable as compensation.

(Para 13-16)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Condonation of delay – Challenge to -- Discussion on merit in appeal – Scope of -- Scope of the appeal before the High Court was limited to examining the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, declining condonation of delay -- When merits of the orders impugned in the appeal was not touched upon by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court ought not to have commented on the merits -- Merits of the order could be examined by the Appellate Court.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Evidence -- In order to render any witnesses’ testimony as unreliable, the inconsistencies shall be material ones and of such a nature that they create substantive doubts in the mind of the court towards the story or the chain of events as sought to be established by the prosecution -- Mere conjectures or hypothetical inconsistencies cannot form the basis for acquittal when the evidence, viewed as a whole, points to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 38)

Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (60 of 1958), Section 48(1) -- Revenue authority – Power of review – Waiver of parties – Permissibility of -- Cannot concur with the High Court’s reasoning that the Appellants “submitted themselves” to the authority’s review process or somehow acquiesced in the second decision -- Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver -- The law does not permit a statutory functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of how the parties engage in subsequent litigation.

(Para 13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323 – Hurt – Complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences – Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused – Ingredients of offence u/s 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie.

(Para 17-19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 509 – Insult the modesty of woman – Appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in a “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment -- Following the complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) was initially registered and later converted into an FIR after two months later -- The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC -- Prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC not disclosed.

(Para 4, 5, 28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323, 504, 506, 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings – Criminal intimidation -- Insult the modesty of woman – After the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered, indicated that no cognizable offence -- Subsequently, an FIR was lodged (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was filed, u/s 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC -- Only Section 509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are noncognizable offences -- FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge u/s 509 of the IPC -- Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of "filthy language" by the appellants in scolding the complainant -- Discrepancies and variations, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 40-45)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- The provocation must be both grave and sudden -- In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-control -- If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception -- Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not grave.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following conditions must be complied with:

(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused;

(ii) The provocation must be grave;

(iii) The provocation must be sudden;

(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;

(v) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control; and

(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- Accused must establish the following circumstances:

(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and sudden;

(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power of self-control; and

(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Burden of proof -- It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be attributed to it.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1, 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant -- However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation -- The incident occurred at a spur of a moment -- The act was not pre-planned or pre-meditated -- What is important to note is that the appellant had no weapon in his hands -- He picked up a cement stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the head of the deceased -- Therefore, it could be said that the appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner – Conviction u/s 304 Part 1 of the IPC, upheld – Sentence reduced to already  undergone.

(Para 30-33)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 -- Extra-judicial confession before Village Police Patil – Admissibility of – Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer – Same is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act -- However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.

(Para 36, 42)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 154 -- Discovery panchnama – Proof of -- Witness turned hostile -- If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama through the evidence of the Investigating Officer -- Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved -- From the plain reading of the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.

(Para 47-49)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Motive -- Murder -- Motive is a double-edged weapon -- Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that too for a serious offence like murder -- Motive may be considered along with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating circumstances.

(Para 51)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden to establish innocence -- Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs -- The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution -- However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him -- However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is subject to one well-settled principle of law -- The prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- If the prosecution has not been able to lay the foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it cannot starightaway invoke the said Section and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.

(Para 55)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 16, 34, 37 -- Jurisdiction of Arbitrator – Objection to -- After submitting to the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator, the respondent could not have belatedly objected to the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 -- NDPS -- Conscious possession of contraband – Burden of proof -- It is the burden of the prosecution to establish that the contraband was seized from the conscious possession of the accused -- Only when that aspect has been successfully proved by the prosecution, the onus will shift to the accused to account for the possession legally and satisfactorily.

(Para 16)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 35 -- NDPS – Culpable mental state – Presumption of – In any prosecution under the NDPS Act, the court shall presume that the accused had the requisite mental state, including intention, knowledge, and motive, unless the accused can prove otherwise -- This shifts the burden of proof onto the accused to demonstrate that they lacked knowledge or intent regarding the possession of the drugs.

(Para 20)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 -- NDPS -- Conscious possession of contraband – Requirement of -- Conscious possession refers to a scenario where an individual not only physically possesses a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance but is also aware of its presence and nature -- It requires both physical control and mental awareness -- Conscious possession implies that the person knew that he had the illicit drug or psychotropic substance in his control and had the intent or knowledge of its illegal nature.

(Para 21)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Transfer of prisoner from one jail to another – Challenge to -- It is lucid that transfer of convict prisoner from one prison to another is purely an administrative decision and hence, the same cannot be interfered with by the court unless it is arbitrary and contrary to law.

(Para 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Right of prisoner – Dignify life -- It is imperative on the part of the prison authorities to rehabilitate the prisoners into law abiding citizen, besides maintaining security and rule of law in the prison -- Prison administration needs to be reformed for creating a better environment and prison culture to ensure the prisoners enjoy their right to dignified life under Article 21 -- It is essential to continuously monitor the physical conditions prevailing in the prison, compliance with basic and fundamental rights of the prisoners, etc. -- State recognizes that a prisoner loses his right to liberty but still maintains his right to be treated as a human being and as person -- His human dignity shall be maintained and all basic amenities should be made available to him -- Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life, with due regard to the maintenance of the rights of prisoners -- Thus, the objective of reforms and rehabilitation of the prisoners has to be pursued diligently.

(Para 3, 17.2)

A. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 80 – Order/ Award of Micro and Smal enterprises Facilitation (MSEFC) – Challenge to – Alternative remedy of arbitration – Writ jurisdiction :

Following questions referred to a larger Bench of five Judges, namely:

(i) Whether the ratio in M/s India Glycols Limited (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1852) that a writ petition could never be entertained against any order/award of the MSEFC, completely bars or prohibits maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court?

(ii) If the bar/prohibition is not absolute, when and under what circumstances will the principle/restriction of adequate alternative remedy not apply?

(iii) Whether the members of MSEFC who undertake conciliation proceedings, upon failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the MSMED Act read with Section 80 of the A&C Act?

The first and second question will subsume the question of when and in what situation a writ petition can be entertained against an order/award passed by MSEFC acting as an arbitral tribunal or conciliator.

(Para 2, 19)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Alternative remedy -- Existence of the statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ -- The writ jurisdiction being discretionary by policy, the writ courts generally insist that the parties adhere to alternative statutory remedies, as this reinforces the rule of law -- However, in exceptional cases, writ jurisdiction can still be exercised as a power to access the court for justice and relief.

(Para 15)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Promotion to Tracer -- Negative equality – Permissibility of – As per Rules, the post of Tracer is to be filled up to 100% by way of direct recruitment -- While referring to two communications appointing two as Tracer on promotion, the petitioner is claiming violation of Article 14, namely the discrimination – Held, Court cannot put a stamp on the illegalities committed by the department while perpetuating the same -- A litigant coming to the Court cannot claim negative discrimination seeking direction from the Court to the department to act in violation of the law or statutory Rules -- It is a settled proposition of law that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality.

(Para 30, 31)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 52A -- NDPS – Samples from contraband – Compliance/ Non-compliance/ Delayed compliance of Section 52A of NDPS Act – Effect of – Law summarised:

(I) Although Section 52A is primarily for the disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate context of drug disposal, as it serves a broader purpose of also introducing procedural safeguards in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure inasmuch as it provides for the preparation of inventories, taking of photographs of the seized substances and drawing samples therefrom in the presence and with the certification of a magistrate. Mere drawing of samples in presence of a gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient compliance of the mandate under Section 52A sub-section (2) of the NDPS Act.

(II) Although, there is no mandate that the drawing of samples from the seized substance must take place at the time of seizure as held in Mohanlal (2016) 3 SCC 379), yet we are of the opinion that the process of inventorying, photographing and drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far as possible, take place in the presence of the accused, though the same may not be done at the very spot of seizure.

(III) Any inventory, photographs or samples of seized substance prepared in substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act and the Rules / Standing Order(s) thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as primary evidence as per Section 52A subsection (4) of the NDPS Act, irrespective of whether the substance in original is actually produced before the court or not.

(IV) The procedure prescribed by the Standing Order(s) / Rules in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in-charge of the investigation, and as such what is required is substantial compliance of the procedure laid therein.

(V) Mere non-compliance of the procedure under Section 52A or the Standing Order(s) / Rules thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering the prosecution’s case doubtful, which may not have been there had such compliance been done. Courts should take a holistic and cumulative view of the discrepancies that may exist in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same more carefully keeping in mind the procedural lapses.

(VI) If the other material on record adduced by the prosecution, oral or documentary inspires confidence and satisfies the court as regards the recovery as-well as conscious possession of the contraband from the accused persons, then even in such cases, the courts can without hesitation proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding any procedural defect in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

(VII) Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the said provision or rules thereunder may lead the court to drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution, however no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when such inference may be drawn, and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

(VIII) Where there has been lapse on the part of the police in either following the procedure laid down in Section 52A of the NDPS Act or the prosecution in proving the same, it will not be appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory presumption of commission of an offence from the possession of illicit material under Section 54 of the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied as regards the seizure or recovery of such material from the accused persons from the other material on record.

(IX) The initial burden will lie on the accused to first lay the foundational facts to show that there was non-compliance of Section 52A, either by leading evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, and the standard required would only be preponderance of probabilities.

(X) Once the foundational facts laid indicate non-compliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the onus would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by cogent evidence that either (i) there was substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52A of the NDPS Act OR (ii) satisfy the court that such non-compliance does not affect its case against the accused, and the standard of proof required would be beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Para 50)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Annulment of decree – Power of -- A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed -- Decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree -- Power u/s 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it -- Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Decree of appellate Court – Execution of -- Once the High Court as an appellate court in second appeal renders its judgment it is a decree of the second appellate court which becomes executable.

(Para 34)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Modification of decree -- When time for payment of money is extended, it does not mean a modification of the decree -- Trial court has power to extend the time, and the expression “such further period as the court may allow” would mean the court which had passed the decree, or, where the application u/s 28 of the Act of 1963, is filed.

(Para 44, 45)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324, 326, 34 – Grievous hurt – Common intention -- Accused No.3 was armed with a knife and Accused No.2 had in his hand a chopper -- Merely for the reason that the injuries inflicted by Accused no.2 were less than what was inflicted by Accused no.3 and the injuries were not a grievous conviction u/s 326 cannot be converted to Section 324 -- Presence of Accused no.2 on the spot is as an accomplice of Accused no.3 and hence, Section 34 of the IPC is clearly made out –  Accused No.2 ordered to be convicted u/s 326 read with 34 of the IPC and sentenced for the same period as was given by the High Court to Accused No.3 i.e. two years RI along with the fine of ? 75,000/-.

(Para 7-11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 – Common intention -- Common intention and the pre-meeting of minds can take place at the spur of the moment itself during the course of the incident.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Dowry death – Acquittal -- For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv) the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry -- Both the witnesses have not deposed about the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating that there was a demand for dowry -- Version regarding the demand for dowry is an omission -- No legally admissible evidence of the demand for dowry  -- There is no specific evidence of any cruelty – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Dismissal of judicial officer – Probation -- Opportunity of hearing -- Foundation of the order dispensing with petitioner's service is the complaint filed by his former wife and the report submitted by the Administrative Judge --  Committee relied upon the report of the Administrative Judge -- Petitioner was never issued any charge sheet – Petitioner claims that he was not even supplied copy of the complaint or the statement of his former wife recorded by the Registrar General, he was called in the office of the Registrar General and was asked to give his response there and then -- In the Annual Confidential Reports with respect to years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, he was rated as 'Good Officer' -- District Judge also rated the petitioner as a 'Good Officer' -- Report of Administrative Judge with regard to work and conduct of the petitioner is also without granting him an opportunity of being heard --  Substantially, it can be concluded, the report of the Administrative Judge is based on the complaint filed by the petitioner's former wife – Petitioner ordered to be reinstatement with continuity of service, back wages and seniority -- However, the respondent shall have the liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

(Para 4.1)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 31 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 – Proceedings under DV Act – Inherent Powers of High Court :

Questions referred to Larger Bench for adjudication:

(i) Once Section 28(1) prescribes that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can it be held that application of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is ousted?

(ii) In case Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not applicable, can an aggrieved person invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

(iii) In case the aggrieved person is entitled to invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can it be said that the same is limited only qua the issue of jurisdiction as held by Madras High Court?

Questions referred by the Ld. Single Bech answered as under:

i) Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 B.N.S.S. is applicable qua proceedings arising out of complaint under Section 12 of the Act of 2005. The only exception is the cases where provisions of the Act of 2005 have been invoked in proceedings pending before Civil Court or Family Court.

ii) In view of answer to question No.(i), there is no need to answer question No.(ii).

iii) The power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are subject to self-restraint. The same can neither be curtailed by statute nor by judicial order. In terms of dictum of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar's case (1997) 3 SCC 261 and Surya Dev Rai's case  (2003) 6 SCC 675, Article 227 is part of basic structure of the Constitution of India and is even beyond Constitutional amendment.

(Para 3, 32)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 -- Specific performance of contract – Hardship -- Rise in price – Inadequacy of price -- Mere rise in price subsequent to the date of the contract or inadequacy of price is not to be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of specific performance of the contract -- Hardship involved should be one not foreseen by the party and should be collateral to the contract -- Issue of hardship would come into play only if it is established by cogent evidence that, who executed the Agreement of Sale was unable to foresee the hardship at the time of entering into the contract.

(Para 29-34)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law – Interim order – Power of -- Second appeal will be maintainable before the High Court, if the case involves a substantial question of law -- High Court, without formulating substantial questions of law, granted the interim relief by directing the parties to maintain status quo, till the next date of hearing – Held, High Court could not have passed the interim order without satisfying itself of the existence of a substantial question of law, as mandated u/s 100 CPC – Interim order passed by High Court set aside.

(Para 10.4, 11, 13)

Constitution of India, Article 32, 136 – Judgment of High Court – Whether can be declared illegal -- Writ jurisdiction -- Judgment of the High Court cannot be declared as illegal -- If the petitioners have not been heard and are affected by the said judgment, the remedy available to them is to either file a petition/application for recall of the said order/judgment or to challenge the same by way of a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 3)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 136 – Right to access court -- Right to access the courts is a cornerstone of our democracy -- However, this right is not absolute and must be exercised responsibly -- When litigants engage in forum shopping, file repetitive and meritless pleas, and deliberately delay proceedings, they erode the very foundation of our legal system -- Petitioner’s repeated and frivolous litigation has wasted the court’s valuable time and resources -- These types of litigants are choking the system of the court, which is resulting in delays in decision of other cases -- It is also the duty of the Courts at different levels to curb such type of litigation so that more time is available for dealing with genuine litigation – SLP dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-

(Para 3, 18-23)

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 8, 18 – Arbitration u/s 18 of MSME Act, 2006 -- MSME Registration – Requirement of -- Section 18 is not restrictive and is a remedy for the resolution of disputes, and as such, it is kept open-ended to enable ‘any party’ to refer the dispute to seek redressal -- Submission rejected that ‘any party to a dispute’ is confined to a ‘supplier’ who has filed a memorandum under Section 8 of the Act – However, for clarity and legal certainty, matter referred to a bench of three Judges for an authoritative pronouncement.

(Para 1.2)