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Posted On: 06-10-2024
104. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 11.09.2024 Decided on: 17.09.2024)

A. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 4(3)(5)(6) – Landlord -- Tenant -- Gair marusi tenant -- Merely because appellant is recorded as ‘Gair Maurusi’ in the revenue record, does not mean that he is a tenant over the suit property – There can be no tenancy unless there is a condition of payment of rent, though the rent may be payable in cash, kind or service etc. -- Held, it is inconceivable that there can be any tenancy without the condition of payment of rent, unless there is a contract to the contrary, absolving the tenant the liability to pay rent.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 4(3)(5)(6) – Gair marusi tenant – Trespasser -- Adverse possession -- A party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take contrary stands to suit his convenience -- When in the earlier two litigations, it was ordered by the courts that appellant could be dispossessed in due course of law, he changed the stand in next litigations taking contrary plea that he had become owner of suit property by adverse possession -- In none of the earlier litigations decided earlier, he has been held to be tenant in the suit land, though his plea of possession has been upheld with further direction that he cannot be dispossessed except in due course of law – No evidence that tenancy was ever created and as such, his possession over the suit land is nothing less than that of a stranger / trespasser.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 4(3)(5)(6) – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 9 --  Tenant of land – Eviction -- Jurisdiction of civil court --  When the person is inducted as a tenant on payment of rent and the rent is not paid --  Civil Court will not have jurisdiction and the landlord will have to seek his remedy before the Revenue Authorities to seek ejectment of such tenant or a tenant holding over, under the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 to be read with the provisions Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act.

(Para 22)

D. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 4(3)(5)(6) – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 9 --  Gair marusi tenant – Suit for possession – Jurisdiction of civil court --  When the possession of person concerned on the suit land is without payment of rent, such as person is no more than a stranger or trespasser over the suit property -- In such a situation, his possession, howsoever long it may be, cannot be considered in the capacity of tenant in view of the definition of ‘landlord’, ‘tenant’ and ‘rent’ -- In this eventuality, it is only the Civil Court, which will have the jurisdiction to pass the decree of possession in favour of the landlord – Suit for possession decreed.

(Para 22, 23)

Posted On: 04-10-2024
108. (SC) (Decided on: 25.09.2024)

A. Evidence law -- Injured eye-witnesses -- Sworn testimonies provided by injured witnesses generally carry significant evidentiary weight -- Such testimonies cannot be dismissed as unreliable unless there are pellucid and substantial discrepancies or contradictions that undermine their credibility -- If there is any exaggeration in the deposition that is immaterial to the case, such exaggeration should be disregarded; however, it does not warrant the rejection of the entire evidence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- There cannot be a fixed timeframe for formation of common intention -- It is not essential for the perpetrators to have had prior meetings to conspire or make preparations for the crime -- Common intention to commit murder can arise even moments before the commission of the act -- Since common intention is a mental state of the perpetrators, it is inherently challenging to substantiate directly -- Instead, it can be inferred from the conduct of the perpetrators immediately before, during, and after the commission of the act.

(Para 19)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 302 – Murder -- Common intention -- Appellants are related by blood, arrived at the crime scene armed with a 12 bore double-barrel gun, dangs, and lathis within 15 minutes of the initial altercation, and subsequently attacked P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5, and the victims -- During this attack, A-4, the father of A-1, raged by the incident of P.W.3 slapping his adult son A-1 and the pursuant altercation, fired with his gun at P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5 and the victims -- Thereafter, all the appellants fled together carrying their weapons -- It is evident that the appellants acted with a common intention to kill, seeking to avenge the slapping incident.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Common intention – Common object -- Determination of common intention or common object should primarily be within the domain of the trial courts, and at the most the high courts -- It should not be the role of Supreme Court to directly adjudicate issues of common intention and common object.

(Para 21)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216, 464 – Non-framing of charge -- Failure of justice -- No finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

-- Law is well-settled that in order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.

(Para 24, 25)

F. Evidence law – Independent witness -- It is settled law that examination of independent witness is not an indispensable requisite if the testimonies of other witnesses are deemed trustworthy and reliable --  Prosecution's case cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of the absence of independent witness.

(Para 29, 30)

Posted On: 02-10-2024
115. (SC) (Decided on: 25.09.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

Posted On: 30-09-2024
117. (SC) (Decided on: 24.09.2024)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Promotion during pendency of criminal case -- DPC – Charge-sheet thereafter – Putting the result in sealed cover – Legality of -- Disciplinary/ criminal proceedings can be said to be initiated against the employee only when a charge memo is issued to the employee in a disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet for a criminal prosecution is filed in the competent Court -- Sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after issuance of the charge-memo/ charge-sheet -- Pendency of investigation and grant of prosecution sanction will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure.

-- Charge sheet was filed by CBI, after completion of investigation on 25th October, 2008, whereas the DPC to consider the promotion of Additional Commissioners of Income Tax was convened on 22nd February, 2007, wherein the sealed cover procedure was adopted qua the respondent.

-- It is thus clear that the charge sheet against the respondent was filed well after the meeting of the DPC was convened.

Hence, it could not be said that the prosecution for a criminal charge was pending against the respondent when the DPC was convened -- Therefore, the move on the part of DPC to resort to the sealed cover procedure was unjustified and unsustainable on facts and in law -- The ‘Sealed Cover’ wherein the assessment of the respondent was considered by the DPC was opened in court -- Letter shows that the DPC assessed the respondent to be ‘FIT’ for promotion -- Consequential steps in light of the above recommendations shall follow.

(Para 24-29)

Posted On: 24-09-2024
134. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 17.09.2024 Decided on: 20.09.2024)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 311 -- Additional evidence/ witness -- Summoning u/s 311 of Cr.P.C. – Object of – There may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side -- Determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case -- The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and in this section, the significant expression that occurs is "at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code".

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 311 – Re-examination of evidence/ witness -- In the extract of Parivar Register, Ext. PW-10/B, the date of birth of the child victim “N” has been mentioned as 20.01.2006 and the date of birth of her eldest sister “R” has been mentioned as 10.12.1998 -- However, in Birth Certificate, Ext. PW-10/C, the name of child victim has wrongly been mentioned as “R”, who is the eldest sister of the child victim “N”, but her date of birth has been mentioned as 20.01.2006 -- Prima facie it appears that birth certificate, Ext. PW-10/C has been issued contrary to the record -- In order to clear the ambiguity and also to arrive at the just decision of the case, evidence of then Secretary, Gram Panchayat, is essential for just decision of the case and it cannot be said to amount to filling up of the lacuna or the abuse of process of law.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 173, 311 -- Additional evidence – Examination of witness not cited in challan -- Although the name of the witness proposed to be examined, has not been cited by the prosecution in the chargesheet, however, in order to clear the ambiguity and that there may not be failure of justice on account of some mistake in bringing the valuable evidence on record and also to arrive at just decision of the case, his evidence is essential to ascertain the age of the child victim -- Hence, the application filed by the State/prosecution allowed.

(Para 16)

Posted On: 23-09-2024
137. (HP HC) (Reserved on: 28.08.2024 Decided on: 10.09.2024)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand -- However as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record -- It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable -- The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because he/she is susceptible to tutoring.

(Para 23)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- Incident taken place on 13.10.2014 whereas the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2014 -- Delay in lodging the FIR could not be explained by the prosecution which creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution -- Since the evidence of the parents of the victim has been discredited by the defence in their cross- examination and there is no corroboration to the evidence of the child victim (PW12), therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of the child victim to convict the appellants.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Medical evidence – Acquittal -- Doctor had given the opinion that the possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled-out, but on that day the victim was not produced before her -- As per the FSL report, no blood and semen were detected on the shirt, pajama/ slacks, underwear, brassiere, vests, perineal swab and vaginal swab of the victim --  As there is no medical evidence on record to support the theory of the prosecution that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it becomes difficult to uphold the conviction granted by the trial Court.

(Para 30)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 29 – POCSO – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- It cannot be countenanced that the presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute -- Unless the prosecution is able to prove foundational facts in the context of the allegations made against the accused under the POCSO Act, the presumption u/s 29 of the said Act would not operate against the accused -- Statutory presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of our criminal jurisprudence system that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 33-35)

E. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(xii) &3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Offence u/s 3(1) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing an individual member -- An offence u/s 3(1) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

(Para 37, 38)