Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title dispute -- Long pendency – Direction for expeditious disposal -- Petition u/s 11 of the 1961 Act pending before Additional Deputy Commissioner/ respondent No.3 for the last about eight years -- Decision thereupon has been unnecessarily delayed -- Respondent No.3 directed to dispose of the petition within four months in accordance with law.

(Para 3)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 28A, 54 -- Acquisition of land – Award – Some co-owner challenged the same – Rights of other co-sharer, who did not challenge – Held, being ignorant of prosecuting the cause, appellant/ land-loosers did not challenge the award passed either by filing an application u/s 18 of the Act or no application was filed u/s 28A of the Act after the appeal came to be disposed of in favour of one of the co-owners enhancing the compensation they cannot be denied compensation for the lands lost by them to which they are legitimately entitled to and same cannot be denied on hyper technical grounds -- Appellants held entitled for the interest for a period of five years to be reckoned from today backwards and they would be entitled to all other consequential benefits which flow from award of compensation and the respondent(s) authorities shall compute the compensation as has been determined by the award passed u/s 18 of the Act and/or modified by the High Court or Supreme Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 8, 12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 9 -- Necessary parties -- Partition proceedings involved more than 177 kanals of land distributed among all village proprietors -- Certain proprietors were allotted portions of the suit land now claimed by the plaintiffs as part of the bachat land -- All proprietors who were parties to the original partition proceedings constitute necessary parties to the present suit -- If the partition is flawed qua any of the proprietors, it is flawed in its entirety and must be re-conducted, thereby directly impacting the rights of those not impleaded herein -- Consequently, the finding of the learned Civil Judge that all proprietors were not necessary parties is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.

(Para 12-12.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 -- Suit against dead person – Maintainability of -- A suit cannot be instituted against a dead person, for such a proceeding is a nullity, being void ab initio -- A dead person is a juridical non-entity, and the law does not recognize the institution of a suit either by or against a party who ceased to exist prior to its filing -- The only legally permissible course in such a situation is to implead, the legal heirs or successors-in-interest in their own independent capacity, failing which the suit suffers from a foundational defect -- Order XXII is wholly inapplicable -- Principle actus curiae neminem gravabit has no application, because the defect is inherent and incurable -- Suit having been instituted against a deceased defendant, was inherently defective and non-maintainable, and any decree founded thereon is inexorably rendered coram non judice and unenforceable.

(Para 13-14.5)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158(1)(xvii) – Partition proceedings -- If the plaintiffs were genuinely aggrieved, the statutory route under the Act was the ‘sine qua non’ for redress, and their failure to adopt it is fatal to the suit -- Their attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in conscious disregard of the statutory framework, amounts to a clear circumvention of the legislative scheme -- A suit instituted in violation of such a statutory bar is not merely irregular but fundamentally unsustainable.

(Para 15.1)

D. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158 – Partition proceedings – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Maintainability of suit -- When a statute expressly creates rights, prescribes obligations, and provides a special forum for adjudication, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts stands ousted by necessary implication -- In such a scenario, the principle of ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ operates only within the contours of the statutory framework, and parties must exhaust the remedies provided therein -- Any decree passed by a Civil Court in derogation of such statutory bar is ‘void ab initio’, attracting the maxim ‘coram non judice’ an act done by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law -- Plaintiffs’ conscious awareness of the statutory mechanism, coupled with their deliberate omission to invoke it, renders the suit inherently non-maintainable under Section 158 of the Act -- A party aggrieved by an order passed by a Revenue Officer must avail the statutory remedy of appeal or revision under the Act, and a civil suit challenging such proceedings is not maintainable.

(Para 15.2, 15.3)

E. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz – Presumption -- Wazib-ul-Arz constitutes an integral component of the record-of-rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 -- Consequently, a statutory presumption of truth attaches to it under Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz produced on the record stands duly proved, and the contention that it required further formal proof, or that any interpolation had occurred, is devoid of substance. Gram Panchayat of Village Tulewal’ case 2014(11) RCR (Civil) 2674 relied.

(Para 16.4)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6, 10, 51 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Proposal of Acting Sarpanch passed in favour of petitioner -- No-confidence motion – Requirements of – BDPO directed the petitioner to handover the charge to some other Panch -- Petitioner cannot be held to be a duly elected Sarpanch as envisaged u/s 6 of the 1994 Act read with Rule 4 of 1995 Rules; therefore the provisions contained under Section 10 of the 1994 Act which provides for ‘No Confidence Motion’ against a duly elected Sarpanch, is not attracted -- Contention of the petitioner that he cannot be removed from post of Acting Sarpanch without following process/procedure as envisaged under Section 10 of 1994 Act rejected – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 2, 8-11)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Casual filling of vacancy – Sarpanch/ Panch -- If a casual vacancy has arisen, then in that eventuality, the authorities are required to elect a Sarpanch, panch, etc., in the manner as may be prescribed and any person elected to fill up a vacancy under Section 6 of 1994 Act, is to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term for which the person in whose place he is elected would have otherwise continued in office -- Manner prescribed for filling of a casual vacancy is envisaged under Rule 4 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995.

(Para 12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 376(2) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO – Rape – Conviction for 20 years – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence -- Debatable issues would arise, in particular, absence of injuries in the alleged victim’s MLR -- Absence of semen on any of the exhibits of the alleged victim, especially when such exhibits were collected on the day of the alleged occurrence and that prior to their collection, as per the alleged victim’s MLR, she had neither bathed nor washed -- Applicant is a first-time offender who has already undergone actual custody of 07 years, 06 months and 01 day, which includes nearly 04 years after his conviction -- Appeal not likely to be heard in the near future -- Sentence suspended.

(Para 1, 6)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 – Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Power of appellate authority – Collector is appointing authority -- Divisional Commissioner set aside appointment -- Divisional Commissioner should not have appointed the appellant instead the matter ought to have been remanded back to the Collector – Held, in case, the initially selected candidate is found to be ineligible or not suitable, then the claim of all the who have applied is to be considered afresh.

(Para 5)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent disqualification – Effect of -- Eligibility and disqualification is to be seen upto the date of appointment as Lambardar -- In case any such disqualification is adapt prior to the appointment, the same will invalidate the appointment itself but in case any disqualification is suffered after the appointment that can only lead to taking action against the Lambardar, in accordance with law.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent conviction – Effect of -- Appointment in February, 2014 – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act was field in June, 2014, which resulted into his conviction on 09.02.2015 -- Thereafter, on an appeal preferred, on 18.01.2019, the appellant acquitted – Held, on the date when the appointment was made, there was no conviction rather there was no proceeding even pending on such date – Remanding the case for fresh consideration is not correct appreciation of the facts on record – Order set aside.

(Para 7)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Eviction proceedings u/s 7 of PVCL Act, 1961 pending against appointed candidate/ petitioner -- Held, comparative merits/demerits of candidates indeed require re-look at the hands of learned Collector, therefore, order passed by learned Divisional Commissioner and further affirmed by learned Financial Commissioner, remanding the matter regarding appointment of Lambardar to learned Collector for afresh decision, does not call for any interference.

(Para 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need -- Premises alleged to be available to the landlord is situated on the first floor, whereas evidence on record demonstrates that the demised shop is commercially more advantageous and suitable for running a boutique business -- Landlord is the best judge of his or her bona fide requirement -- Tenant or the Rent Controller cannot compel the landlord to adjust in an alternative premises or to reorganize his/ her affairs in a manner suggested by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 8, 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of lambardar by authorities -- Interference in -- Once the revenue authorities, on the basis of the record, preferred respondent No.4 to the post of a Lambardar of the village concerned, the same need not to be interfered merely on the basis that the appellant thinks that he is a better suited candidate than respondent No.4.

(Para 4)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – FIR against candidate – Effect of -- At the time of the consideration, there was an FIR registered against the appellant, though he was acquitted later on – Held, once at the time of consideration, respondent No.4 had clean record as compared to the appellant, appointing respondent No.4 as Lambardar, cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.

(Para 4)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Re-consideration on remand -- Once the case has been remanded back, the Collector will decide as to who is the best candidate for the appointment to the post of Lambardar on the basis of the facts before him without being influenced by any observation made either by the revenue authorities or by High Court.

(Para 3)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent ex-parte enquiry – Effect of -- Ld. Single Judge set aside the order only on the ground that there was a false document qua his passing of 7th class submitted by the appellant -- Said opinion is based upon an ex parte inquiry report submitted before the learned Single Judge -- Said ex parte report was obtained, firstly, without associating the appellant and secondly, after the appointment of the appellant as Lambardar -- Reliance upon subsequent fact to change the candidate is not correct.

(Para 7)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – Nature of -- Once the appointment is made by the Collector, the filing of an appeal does not mean that the appointment is not final.

(Para 9)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent enquiry – Effect of -- Document subsequent to the appointment can only be taken into consideration for the purpose of setting aside of the appointment, whereas the Commissioner treated the same for substitution of the candidate, which was impermissible.

(Para 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Literate candidate – Requirement of -- Appellant is not literate as he has passed only 6th standard -- Once, under the notification dated 02.06.2008 of the Government of Haryana, the Lambardar should be literate and preferably middle pass; the same has to be followed and candidates are to be adjudged accordingly – Respondent No.4 is 9th pass – Appointment of respondent no. 4 cannot be treated as arbitrary, illegal or perverse to the facts or the law.

(Para 5)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Preference of Revenue authorities – Choice of Collector -- Choice of Lambardar should be left to the discretion of the authorities -- Tehsildar and the SDM had recommended the case of respondent No.4 for appointment as Lambardar -- Once, the initial preference was given to the respondent No.4 and he was appointed by the Collector same position has been restored by the learned Single Judge, coupled with the fact that no disqualification has been attached with the candidate so appointed as Lambardar -- No interference is called for.

(Para 6)

C. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Hereditary claim -- Merely that the father and the grandfather of the appellant was Lambardar, the same cannot be a ground to appoint the appellant as Lambardar in case any better candidate suited for the job was available, as no hereditary right exists with the appellant.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence -- Suit for dissolution of partnership firm -- Accounts and records were in the hands of respondent/ defendant No.1 and his chartered accountant – However, while appearing as DW, respondent/ defendant No.1 failed to produce any record – All the records pertaining to the firm are with respondent/ defendant No.2-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., as the firm is licencee of respondent/ defendant No.2 – Held, production of records was necessitated on account of denial by respondents/ defendants, therefore, the application for additional evidence cannot be held to be delayed and having not filed after due diligence – Two effective opportunities given subject to cost of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Long pendency of suit – Expeditious adjudication -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Revision petition seeking a direction to the learned Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), to expeditiously adjudicate Civil Suit as almost 11 years have elapsed since the institution of the suit and the matter is still pending – Ld. ACJ (JD) directed to decide the suit at the earliest, preferably within a period of six months.

(Para 1-6)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need – Non-residential building -- Ejectment of tenant on bonafide ground can be made both in case of residential and non-residential building.

(Para 17)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Shop-cum-flat – Misuse of premises by tenant -- No permission from Rent controller for carrying on commercial activity in the residential portion taken by both the parties -- Residential portion given to the petitioner for store purposes, in which he is carrying on the tailoring business and by doing so, he has violated the condition laid down in Section 11 of the Act -- Landlord has shown number of show cause notices received by him for misuse of premises – Landlord should not suffer because of the misuse of the premises by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 18-25)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 122 – Non-implementation of Sanad Takseem/ Instrument of partition for 3 years – Second application of partition – Maintainability – Earlier sanad takseem is dated 08.04.1992 -- Partition is to be executed within a period of three years – Second partition application filled on the basis of jamabandi for the year 2015-16, wherein the entire land under partition has been shown under joint ownership -- Held, once the sanad takseem dated 08.04.1992 was never implemented/ executed at the spot nor the said sanad takseem was reflected/ implemented in the revenue records and the status of the partition continued to be recorded joint in the revenue records, it has to be taken that the parties by their conduct chose not to implement the partition in terms of sanad takseem and chose to keep their holdings joint – Fresh partition proceedings concluded with the drawing of sanad takseem dated 19.03.2023 -- No fault – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 4-9)

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3G -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23, 28 -- Solatium and interest -- District Revenue Officer-cum-Competent Authority vide its supplementary award, awarded the benefit of solatium as well as statutory interest payable under Sections 23 & 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in favour of similarly situated land-owners – Representation of the petitioner for similar relief denied – Held, respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to act in a discriminatory manner – Order set aside, respondent No.1 to pass a supplementary award in favour of petitioner with respect to solatium as well as statutory interest.

(Para 4-9)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 16(2), 122 – Sanad Takseem – Instrument of partition – Challenge to -- Whether the learned Collector can entertain, hear and decide the revision petition against Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition)? -- Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition) is to be given effect as if it were a decree of immovable property -- Held, learned Collector is not entitled to exercise revisional jurisdiction and at best he can only formulate an opinion and report the case along with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Commissioner, whose decision shall be final – Revision petition and order passed by learned Collector in revision quashed.

(Para 8-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In the criminal proceedings, it is the accused, which has the privilege to hide his defence or to open it, if so chosen, even at the last stage of the trial – Respondent/ accused had opened its defence during the cross-examination -- Complainant moved application to fill the lacuna, to deprive the accused from drawing any benefit out of the cross-examination of the complainant -- Held, after disclosing of the defence by the accused, complainant/ prosecution could not be permitted to fill the lacuna – Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. rightly dismissed.

(Para 1, 5-7)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 3 – Death of wife -- Emergency parole to hardcore prisoner -- A hardcore prisoner can be released on temporary basis or on furlough after completion of 5 years of imprisonment but he cannot be released on emergency parole in case he has not completed requisite 5 years period of his imprisonment after the date of his latest offence -- Fresh FIR under NDPS Act was registered against the petitioner on 04.06.2025 -- He cannot be released on emergency parole -- To enable him to perform the last rites/ rituals of his deceased wife, he is allowed to be taken to his place of residence at his own expenses, while under police escort guard.

(Para 5, 6)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 22 -- Faulty haircut – Deficiency in service -- Compensation – Prosperous career derailed in Corporate job/ Modelling/ Role in movies – Claim for crores of rupees because of deficiency in service was required to be established -- This could not be established by merely producing photocopies of the documents with discrepancies -- Documents produced along with affidavit of complainant were in the form of photocopies, none of the authors of those documents examined -- Rs.2 Crores compensation cannot be justified – Compensation modified to the extent of Rs. 25 lacs.

(Para 4, 19-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(i) -- Special Marriage Act-1954 (43 of 1954), Section 4(i) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Rape -- Promise to marry – Prosecutrix already married – Effect of – Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ Trial – Complainant is a married lady with a ten years old child -- Divorce proceedings currently pending adjudication between her and her husband -- Such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR -- Said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and sub-clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 -- Law prohibits bigamous unions -- Complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman incapable of taking decisions for herself -- Offence alleged against the accused-appellant not made out at all – FIR, the Chargesheet and the consequent proceedings in Session case quashed.

(Para 19-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Rape repeatedly on the same woman -- Interpretation of -- The object of this provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the same victim -- Under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376(2)(n) – Promise to marry – Rape -- Mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case - An offence u/s 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.

(Para 18)

A. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b) -- Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (13 of 1955), Section 3 -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3), 26 -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – An order declaring surplus area is, generally not amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court, however, there are exceptions to this general rule -- To find out whether a civil court is barred under provisions of Section 26 of 1972 Act, the test would be whether there was a violation of 1972 Act/1953 Act/PEPSU Act committed by authorities or there was breach of natural justice -- Land was declared surplus vide orders dated 21.08.1956 and 09.06.1961 -- Possession of the land so declared surplus was never taken by the State -- In the absence of utilization, the orders declaring the land surplus in the hands of the landowner did not become operative against his rights prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- Rights of major sons of the landowner had come into force prior to the utilization of the land so declared surplus -- Plaintiffs are challenging the operation and effect of those orders on account of non-utilization of the surplus land till the appointed date and effect of section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Nature of the dispute raised by the plaintiff-appellants is, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court.

(Para 13, 14, 18)

B. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – Where land declared surplus in the hand of land-owner was not utilised by State prior to enforcement of 1972 Act, such land would not automatically vest in State – Surplus area is required to be re-determined under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Such re-determination shall be governed by the provisions of the 1953 Act only if any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- However, if the land stood utilized prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act by way of allotment and taking of possession, the same shall vest exclusively in the State -- Where the land has not been utilized and none of the conditions laid down under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act, such land shall also vest in the State from the appointed date, i.e., 24.01.1971.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) – Declaration of Surplus land – Non-utilisation of – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – State was duty-bound to determine whether the surplus area was liable to be re-determined on account of the existence of any of the conditions enumerated under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- No such exercise undertaken by the State -- Appeal allowed, competent authority directed to determine whether any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen in favour of the landowner prior to the appointed date under the 1972 Act -- If such conditions are found to exist, the surplus area shall be re-determined accordingly under the 1953 Act -- In case none of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) are made out, the surplus land shall vest in the State.

(Para 19)

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1991, Rule 20 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Unauthorised absence – Dismissal – Forged Medical certificate -- Doctor appeared and gave a statement/ Ex.P-9 to the effect that the medical certificate in question was not issued by him; that he was not authorized to issue such certificate and Medical Certificate might have been fabricated by using his old letter pad -- Two undisputed signatures of Doctor, one in exhibit P-9 and the other while acknowledging receipt of notice are themselves not identical, though broadly similar -- Signature on the Ex. P-7 Medical Certificate is also not identical though broadly similar to what is in the acknowledgement and what is on Ex. P-9 – Inquiry officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert, before recording a finding of fabrication and forgery -- Failure to do so,  charge of forgery has not been proved – Dismissal order set aside -- Appellant ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including all arrears of salary and emoluments since the non-employment was not due to the appellant’s fault.

(Para 10, 16, 40-45)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) -- Criminal jurisprudence – Police complaint against public servant by Gram Pradhan – Maintainability of -- No provision in the Cr.P.C., which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence -- No specific provision in the 1984 Act which limits the eligibility of the person making the complaint – Held, High Court manifestly erred in law in holding that since the Gram Pradhan was not the competent authority to lodge an FIR, the action of the Special Judge in taking cognizance and summoning the accused is bad in law -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 7-11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Deduction of family pension -- Since, the deceased was a pensioner and there was no evidence of any independent source of income, the High Court has rightly held that the amount being received by the widow as family pension had to be deducted.

(Para 9)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Juvenile – Juvenile/ child in conflict with law – Bail -- Seriousness of the alleged offence or the age of the juvenile are not relevant consideration for denial of bail above 16 years of age -- There is no classification provided in Section 12 of the Act, 2015 with regard to grant of bail -- Section 12 of the Act is applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature.

(Para 6)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 1 -- Object of the Juvenile Justice Act – It is based on belief that children are the future of the society and in case they go into conflict with law under some circumstances, they should be reformed and rehabilitated and not punished -- No society can afford to punish its children -- Punitive approach towards children in conflict with law would be self-destructive for the society -- At the same time if the keeping of the child in custody is helpful in his development and rehabilitation or protection, only then it could be said that release of the child would defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 7)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 115, 126(2),117, 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 303(2), 3(5) – Attempt to murder/ theft -- Juvenile/ child in conflict with law – Aged about 16 years -- Bail -- In absence of any material or evidence of reasonable grounds, it cannot be said that his release would defeat the ends of justice -- Findings recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board as well as appellate court declining bail are based on heinousness of the offence -- Both the judgment and order set-aside -- Criminal revision allowed -- Revisionist ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 2, 9, 10)

Constitution of India, 300A – Retiral benefits – Denial of -- Pension and gratuity are not bounty, but, property and hard earned benefit of the employee – Encashment of earned leave, Unearned leave, Gratuity, constitutes property under Article 300-A of Constitution of India same cannot be withheld without following due process of law -- Third respondent directed to pass appropriate orders with regard to disbursement of admissible benefits viz., General Provident Fund amount, Special Provident Fund, Encashment of Earned Leave and Unearned Leave on Private Affairs to the petitioner within a period of four weeks.

(Para 14-21)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348, 438(2), 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397(2), 482 – Dismissal of application u/s 311 CR.P.C/ 348 BNSS – Maintainability of revision -- Ordinarily revision not maintainable being an interlocutory order – What is explicitly barred, cannot be granted backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers -- But this bar on the inherent powers is subject to a rider, whereby the High Court must examine if any gross injustice has been done -- If interlocutory order caused gross injustice, it would not only be justified for the High Court, but also it would be a duty of the High Court to invoke inherent powers and prevent injustice.

(Para 4)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Cross-examination of witness – Closing of same -- Duty of Trial court – Amicus curiae/ legal aid should have been given --  Petitioners/ accused filed an application u/s 311 CrPC, explaining the reason for inability of the defence counsel to appear -- Although, learned trial court was not convinced, even then, the learned trial court could have invoked the power on its own to ensure no injustice was caused – It is not just the accused who suffers injustice, it is the entire trial gets vitiated -- Presence of legal assistance for the accused facing a trial is the core element of fair trial -- Court should either appoint an amicus curiae or should direct the local legal services authority to send some legal aid counsel -- In the name of expeditious trial, fairness of the trial cannot be allowed to become a casualty – Matter remanded back to trial court.

(Para 7, 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 531 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) -- Maintainability of Anticipatory bail  after BNSS, 2023.

-- The Sanhita, 2023 is upholding the importance of protecting personal liberty -- The restrictions on granting anticipatory bail under Section 438(6) of the Code (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) are no longer in effect -- When the Parliament enacts more liberal provisions, the benefit thereof should be available to all persons who may be affected, regardless of when their cases originated -- Accused held entitled to the benefit of the more liberal provisions introduced by the Sanhita, 2023.

Matter referred to a larger Bench by formulating the following question:-

“Whether the provision of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 would prevail over the Uttarakhand State Amendment under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and since the provisions of the Sanhita, 2023 are beneficial to the accused, can it be applied with respect to earlier cases (regardless of when the case of the accused originated)?”

(Para 19-26)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 425 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 384 – Criminal appeal against conviction – Dismissed in default – Permissibility of -- Dismissal of Criminal Appeal in default on account of absence of learned counsel for the appellant is contrary to law and is not in consonance with Section 425 of the B.N.S.S. (corresponding to Section 384 Cr.P.C.) -- Criminal Appeal restored to its original number.

(Para 6-9)

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 – Criminal Contempt – Punishment – Apology -- The proviso and the Explanation to Section 12 recognise that where the contemnor expresses genuine remorse and tenders an apology to the satisfaction of the Court, he may be discharged, or the sentence awarded may be remitted -- Even after a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment, the Court retains the discretion to exercise such power -- Once repentance is demonstrated, the Court may act with magnanimity -- However, the apology must be bona fide and must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court, which is required to exercise this discretion judiciously.

(Para 8.3)

B. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 – Criminal Contempt – Punishment – Apology -- In reply-affidavit, the appellant-contemnor tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology, which stands duly recorded by the High Court -- However, the High Court declined to accept the apology -- It concluded that the apology was merely perfunctory, tendered for the sake of formality, and that the expression of remorse appeared borrowed rather than borne out of sincere repentance -- High Court sentenced the appellant-contemnor to simple imprisonment for a period of one week and imposed a fine of Rs.2,000/- -- Held, High Court failed to exercise its contempt jurisdiction with due circumspection -- Once the appellant-contemnor had, from the very first day of her appearance in the suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse and tendered an unconditional apology, the High Court was required to examine whether such apology satisfied the statutory parameters u/s 12 of the Contempt Act -- In the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law -- Ends of justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by the High Court – Appeal allowed.

(Para 2, 9-11)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce – Cruelty – Marriage broken down irretrievably -- Parties have been residing separately since 2012 which is more than thirteen years now, and no substantial or meaningful effort has been made in restoring their matrimonial relationship -- High Court also interacted with the parties in person and found the marriage to have broken down irretrievably -- Relationship has become deeply embittered and acrimonious over the years -- They have a seventeen-year old daughter whose wellbeing, care, and future stability must remain paramount -- No purpose in perpetuating a legal bond that has long ceased to have any substance -- Continuing the marital tie would serve neither the spouses nor their child -- Divorce granted by High Court, affirmed.

(Para 4-7)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia), 25 -- Divorce – Permanent alimony -- Respondent-husband is a serving judicial officer holding a responsible public position and is, therefore, under a heightened obligation to ensure fair, adequate, and dignified financial security for his wife and daughter -- Appellant-wife, who is presently not engaged in legal practice, is entitled to maintain a standard of living broadly commensurate with what she enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage -- Child, now seventeen years of age and soon to pursue higher education, will also require continued financial support and stability -- Rs.50,00,000/- awarded -- LIC policy purchased by the respondent-husband, the amount of Rs.41,00,000/- shall be deposited in the account of the daughter and a sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be deposited by the respondent-husband in his daughter’s account until she is able to maintain herself; bearing all expenses towards her marriage; and that the prohibition against disinheriting the daughter are upheld and shall continue to operate -- All pending proceedings, whether civil or criminal, instituted by either party against the other and arising from the marriage shall stand closed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While invoking power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. trial court should consider the statements of the witnesses adduced before it and it should not place reliance upon the material available in the charge-sheet or the case diary.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While passing the summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. court must consider whether more than prima-facie case is made out, or not -- Mere prima-facie case is not sufficient -- It is to analyze, whether before the trial court material was sufficient to summon the revisionists u/s 319 Cr.P.C. or not.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife/ child – Education of wife will not come in way to claim maintenance – No evidence to establish that the revisionist No.1/ wife is presently employed or earning -- Mere fact that she is a post graduate and has done ITI Diploma in tailoring by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that revisionist No.1/wife is working for gain -- Revisionist No.1/ wife staying at her parental home and taking care of her child without any financial or emotional support from the opposite party No.2/husband -- Complete responsibility of meeting the daily need, education and medical expenses of a minor child lies upon both the parents -- Held that both the revisionist No.1/ wife as well as the minor son are equally entitled to maintenance from the opposite party No.2 and he is legally liable to maintain both his wife and minor son – Matter remanded back to the learned Family Court for fresh determination of maintenance.

(Para 15-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial Evidence – Last seen together theory – Failure to establish proximity and reliable identification – Effect – No clear-cut time specified on which the death occurred, when it is trite that the last seen together theory projected by the prosecution should be proximate to the death of the victim – It is the roommates of the deceased who informed PW1 that they were told by a friend of the deceased that he was going to meet A1 in the evening -- The roommates of the deceased were not examined -- Identification of the accused by a witness for the first time in the police station, without holding a Test Identification Parade -- Nothing on record to indicate ownership of auto rickshaw, who was alleged to be driver of auto rickshaw, who had picked up three persons and dropped them near scene of occurrence --   Ransom calls hence remained an unsolved puzzle – Last scene theory not proved -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 13-16, 31)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Confession statement -- Confession can form a legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made -- Confession allegedly made by the appellants is of no use in bringing home a conviction, especially when there was no corroboration available, of the statements made, from other valid evidence -- Admissions were only that made in the confessional statements, of the death having occurred in the presence of the accused, on the day the deceased was found missing, which is not worthy of acceptance – Conviction set aside.

(Para 29-31)

A. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Occupancy tenant recorded as owner in revenue record/ Jamabandi – No question of getting a declaration from the Court to the effect that he had become the owner by virtue of the 1952 Act.

(Para 15)

B. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Death of occupancy tenant -- After getting ownership, he died without leaving behind legal heirs -- Effect of -- Occupancy tenant was already recorded as an owner well before his death -- As such, the defendants-appellants, the erstwhile landlords were left with no right, title or interest whatsoever in the suit land so as to seek redemption of the same – Trial Court rightly set aside mutation re-entered in the name of erstwhile owner.

(Para 16, 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 41(h) – Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 408C -- Rejection of plaint -- Suit for restraining the defendant-respondent from demolishing or taking any coercive action against the property of the plaintiff-appellant – Remedy available with the plaintiff-appellant is to prefer an appeal before the Commissioner -- Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred u/s 408C of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 -- Once the challenge is to the demolition order qua which efficacious remedy is available to the plaintiff-appellant, he ought to have resorted to the same rather than filing the present suit – Rejection of plaint by Trial Court, upheld in appeal – No question of law much less substantial question of law arises – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1-5)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22 – Suit for specific performance -- Respondent-defendant duly placed reliance on Ex.D2, suit which was filed by brother of appellant-plaintiff for recovery of Rs.6,100/-, which goes to show that respondent-defendant had borrowed Rs.4,000/- from brother and executed a pronote and receipt -- It is highly improbable that respondent-defendant would have agreed to sell his property and receive just Rs.5000/- as earnest money and by different transaction on same day, he would go for loan from the brother of appellant-plaintiff -- Evidence points out that agreement to sell was got executed from respondent-defendant by way of misrepresentation by representing it as pronote taking benefit of illiteracy of respondent-defendant – Suit and first appeal dismissed – Second appeal also dismissed.

(Para 6-10)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22, 24 – Suit for specific performance -- Agreement to sell – Not proved – Alternative relief of damages – Alternative relief of damages liable to be rejected for a simple reason that once appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove agreement to sell to be a genuine document, he is not entitled to any damages for non-execution of sale deed.

(Para 10)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(b)(e) – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 15 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 16 -- Assignment of Decree for Specific Performance -- Does not require Registration -- When the decree itself which is for specific performance does not create or purport to create any right, title or interest in any immovable property, the question of registering an instrument assigning such a decree cannot arise -- Section 17(1)(b) would also not be applicable -- Assignment deed assigning the decree of specific performance did not require registration.

(Para 26-34)

A. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4-24, 29(2) -- Appeal u/s 74 of  Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion -- Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law -- The 2013 Act does not take away from its purview the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act – The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview – Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act.

(Para 62, 76, 77)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 11, 54 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 24(1)(a), 74 -- Acquisition of land under 1894 Act – Award after commencement of 2013 Act – Appeal u/s 74 of 2013 Act will lie -- Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applicable to all those cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act -- For passing the award under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the 2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements -- The first appeals before the High Courts should be treated as ones under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

(Para 97 (i)-(iii))

C. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74, 103 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5, 29(2) – Appeal u/s 74 of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Limitation – Condonation of delay -- Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act -- Consequently, all the applications seeking condonation of delay in preferring the first appeals before the High Courts u/s 74 of the 2013 Act stand allowed -- High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.

(Para 97 (iv)-(viii))

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Financial capacity of Complainant --   Burden of proof -- Loan of Rs.22,00,000/- to accused – Cheque is dated 17.03.2010 -- Complainant is not required, at threshold, to prove his financial capacity unless accused specifically disputes it -- Complainant clearly stated that he had withdrawn amount from bank, accused did not seriously contest said claim – Presumption of High Court that it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal of the said amount and also the date and time of the payment made to the accused, including the date and time of receiving of the cheque is erroneous -- High Court erred in overturning the concurrent findings of guilt and consequential conviction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court – Conviction restored -- Considering age, the accused may be only subjected to fine and not imprisonment – Sentence modified to only payment of a fine restricted to Rs.32,00,000/-

(Para 22, 23, 24)

A. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Custody of child -- Paramount consideration is the welfare of the children but nonetheless there are a host of other factors which weigh before the court while passing the final order of custody -- Host of factors may include the conduct of the parties, their financial capacity, their standard of living, as well as the comfort and education of the children.

(Para 22)

B. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Custody of child -- Respondent-wife travelled and moved the minors to India without the consent of the appellant-father, who was guardian and without obtaining the original passports from him but rather by procuring fake or duplicate or fresh passports while original already existed for travel purposes -- Qatar Court revoked the custody of respondent wife for the reason that she misconducted herself by removing the children from the jurisdiction of the Court, without the permission of the Court -- Revocation of the order of custody was a crucial material for the purpose of determining the custody of the children -- Regarding abuse and assault filed against the appellant-husband the Qatar Court had given a clean chit to him -- As per the mediation report, both children expressed an inclination towards joining their father – High Court has completely ignored the aforesaid material -- While these aspects may not, by themselves, be the sole reason for determining custody, they are nevertheless necessary and relevant factors --  Order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on its own merits in accordance with the law.

(Para 23-33)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 -- Freezing of bank accounts – Permissibility of -- Section 106 of the BNSS empowers the police only to seize property for evidentiary purposes and does not confer any authority to attach or debit-freeze bank accounts -- Attachment or freezing of bank accounts, being measures directed at securing alleged proceeds of crime, can be undertaken only u/s 107 of the BNSS and strictly upon orders of a competent Magistrate, after following the prescribed procedural safeguards.

(Para 18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(g), 21 -- Blanket or disproportionate freezing of bank accounts – Violates fundamental rights u/s 19, 21 of the Constitution, particularly where the account holder is neither an accused nor even a suspect in the offence under investigation, is manifestly arbitrary, and in the teeth of the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and 21 and of the Constitution of India.

(Para 19)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 – Freezing of bank accounts of non-accused – Permissibility of --  In the absence of any complicity of the petitioners, the continued freezing and withholding of various amounts have caused prejudice to the petitioners and have disabled  the petitioner No. 1 from using its funds for paying requisite salaries of employees and meeting their other day-to-day expenses to ensure the smooth running of their business. Directions issued :

(i) Respondent No. 4 shall forthwith issue appropriate directions to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to defreeze the petitioners’ bank accounts.

(ii) If any enforcement or investigating agency proposes to initiate or is conducting an investigation against the petitioners, it shall be at liberty to do so in accordance with the provisions of the BNSS, and the petitioners undertake to fully cooperate with such investigation.

(iii) In the event of finding a positive and specific material indicating the  petitioners’ complicity, Respondent No. 4 shall be at liberty to issue fresh directions, in accordance with law.

(Para 23-27)

Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51(1)(b), 51(3)(e) -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Threat of self-immolation by Sarpanch -- Resorting to self-harm as a means of protest is neither a recognised form of legal redress nor can it be countenanced in a constitutional democracy -- Prima facie, this amounts to mis-conduct in the discharge of her duties and her continuance in the office is un-desirable in the public interest in terms of Section 51(3)(e) of the 1994 Act -- In terms of Section 51(1)(b) of the 1994 Act, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in ordering suspension of petitioner from the post of Sarpanch – Suspension order upheld.

(Para 8, 9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 (2) Cancellation of Bail – Murder -- Accused not named in the FIR and was arrested subsequently on the basis of the oral dying declaration of the deceased and disclosure statement of the co-accused – Suffered incarceration for about six and a half years when the impugned order was passed by the High Court a year ago -- No allegation that, during this period, accused misused the liberty granted to him -- Considering long pre-trial incarceration of respondent No.2 and the evidence against him, not a case where the discretion of grant of bail exercised by the High Court in favour of respondent No.2 should be interfered. Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10, 12)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 243-O -- Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 (11 of 2016), Section 131H -- Nomination for election to the post of Zila Panchayat Member -- Rejection of nomination -- Judicial interference -- Whether permissible :

I. By virtue of the express constitutional embargo contained in Article 243-O of the Constitution of India, the High Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where a law enacted by the State Legislature provides for the remedy of an election petition to redress grievances arising during the course of an election.

II. The election process cannot be lightly interdicted or stalled at the behest of an individual grievance. The right to contest or question an election being statutory in nature, must be strictly construed and exercised in accordance with the statute governing the field. The High Court must, therefore, eschew the grant of liberal interim reliefs in favour of individuals and instead remain mindful of the overarching public interest in ensuring the smooth and uninterrupted conduct of elections across the State.

III. In respect of individual grievances, the ultimate and exclusive remedy lies by way of an election petition. Given the non-obstante nature of Article 243-O of the Constitution, its mandate is required to be adhered to in both letter and spirit. Where the statute provides a complete and efficacious mechanism for redressal, the extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would defeat the very object for which Article 243-O was enacted as a non-obstante provision.

(Para 10, 12)

A. Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) – Consumer -- Purchase of multiple flats – Leasing out the flat -- Whether commercial activity -- Mere factum of leasing out the flat does not, by itself, demonstrate that the appellants purchased the property with the dominant purpose of engaging in commercial activity.

(Para 17)

B. Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) – Consumer -- Purchase of multiple flats – Whether commercial activity -- Mere act of purchasing immovable property, even multiple units, cannot ipso facto attract the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act unless and until it is proved that the dominant purpose behind such purchase was commercial in nature -- In absence of such proof, the appellants cannot be excluded from the definition of ‘consumer’ under the 1986 Act.

(Para 17)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 -- Divorce -- Permanent alimony of Rs. 15,000/- per month -- Obligation of the husband to ensure that the wife is able to live with dignity does not come to an end merely on the ground that she is educated or has parental support – Post-divorce, the wife is entitled to live a life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage – Husband has sufficient earning capacity and financial means to pay more than Rs. 15,000/- per month -- On mutual consent amount enhanced to Rs. 30,000/- per month

(Para 10-14)