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Posted On: 29-03-2026
102. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 11.03.2026 Decided on: 12.03.2026)

Quashing of FIR -- Agreement to sell -- Dispute arising from non-execution of sale deed and subsequent sale during pendency of specific performance suit -- Unexplained delay of 11 years in lodging FIR and absence of allegations of forgery or dishonest intention at inception -- FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Cheating – Forgery -- Agreement to Sell -- Quashing of FIR -- Dispute between the parties arose out of an agreement to sell executed in 2004, and during the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance the accused sold a portion of the land to a third party -- Matter was already subject matter of adjudication before civil courts, and the decree passed therein had been challenged in second appeal where execution proceedings stood stayed -- FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of about 11 years -- Not the case of the complainant that the petitioner had dishonestly induced him to part with property or money by making false representations at the very inception -- No allegations of fabrication or forgery of documents so as to attract offences u/ss 467, 468 or 471 IPC -- Allegations essentially pertained to non-execution of the sale deed and subsequent transfer of property, which would be governed by civil remedies and the doctrine of lis pendens -- Dispute is predominantly civil in nature and criminal proceedings are initiated merely to pressurize the opposite party -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-13)

Posted On: 26-03-2026
103. (SC) (Decided on: 25.02.2026)

Quashing of FIR --  While exercising inherent powers, the High Court may look beyond the FIR to admitted facts and documents to determine whether the dispute is essentially civil and the criminal proceedings are a cloak to abuse the process of law

Quashing of FIR -- Dispute arising from Joint Venture Agreement regarding title, contractual obligations and security deposit held to be purely civil – FIR after 10 years -- Mere non-traceability of document not constitute forgery  -- FIR quashed

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 – Cheating – Forgery – Civil dispute -- Quashing – Inherent powers of High Court -- While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, ordinarily the allegations made therein are to be taken at their face value to assess whether prima facie commission of a cognizable offence is made out or not -- Where the cause espoused in the FIR is essentially of a civil nature, while addressing a quashing petition, the Court must have regard to the attending circumstances and assess whether it has been given cloak of criminal offence and whether proceeding further on the FIR would amount to the abuse of the process of the court/ law -- In making such assessment, the Court may consider not only the contents of the FIR but also the admitted facts / documents recited therein.

(Para 15)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 – Cheating – Forgery – Civil dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- Parties had entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for development of property -- Disputes regarding title to the property/land including suppression of litigation pending in respect thereof, non-fulfilment of contractual obligations, non-refund of security money and furnishing false document arose -- If there was something stark about the dishonest intention on part of one of the parties to the agreement, it would have been reported promptly and not after 10 years -- Merely because a document is not traceable in the office records after several years of its issuance, it cannot be said that the document is forged -- Recourse to appropriate civil remedy was required -- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law -- FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 16-30)

Posted On: 26-03-2026
106. (All. H.C.) (Decided on: 17.11.2025)

Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- It is well settled that maintenance may be granted up to 25% of the husband’s net income – Order granting Rs.18,000 per month out of Rs.65,000/-, upheld

Maintenance proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Trial Court must frame points for determination while deciding application u/s 125 Cr.P.C.; absence thereof makes the basis of the order unclear -- Directions issued to circulate the order to District Judges and Principal Judges, Family Courts for compliance

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife -- Quantum -- It is well settled that maintenance may be granted up to 25% of the husband’s net income – On Rs. 65,000/- as considered by the Trial Court, 25% comes to Rs. 16,250/- per month, which substantially aligns with the maintenance of Rs.18,000/- per month awarded by the learned Trial Court -- Revisionist/husband is an able-bodied person and, therefore, cannot shirk his legal obligation to maintain his wife and child -- Impugned order passed by the Trial Court does not warrant interference -- Order granting maintenance upheld.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 397, 401 – Maintenance – Revision -- Trial Court decided the Section 125 Cr.P.C. application without framing any points for determination, which is mandatory as per Section 354(6) Cr.P.C. -- In the absence of framing any points for determination, it is difficult to ascertain the basis on which the Trial Court passed the order or awarded the maintenance amount -- Copy of order to be circulated to all the District Judges and to all Principal Judges, Family Courts, for communication and necessary compliance.

(Para 7)

Posted On: 24-03-2026
107. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 09.03.2026 Decided on: 18.03.2026)

Compromise decree – Compulsory Registration -- Family settlement arrived at even between persons standing in remote familial relationships having even a semblance of claim in the property, when acknowledged through a compromise decree, does not require compulsory registration under the Registration Act

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(2) – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Spes successionis -- Compromise decree -- Compulsory registration – Requirements of -- A family settlement may be arrived at even between persons standing in remote familial relationships -- A family arrangement entered into between parties having even a possible or semblance of claim in the property, when acknowledged and recognized in a decree subsequently passed by a Court, does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and, therefore, does not require compulsory registration.

(Para 13-15)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(2) – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Compromise decree -- Compulsory registration – Requirements of -- Judgment and decree merely recognized a pre-existing right arising out of a family settlement between defendant Nos.1 and 2 -- Decree, therefore, did not itself create any new right, title or interest in the immovable property but merely acknowledged and affirmed an already existing arrangement between the parties -- Consequently, such a decree does not attract the requirement of compulsory registration.

(Para 17)

Posted On: 23-03-2026
110. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 13.03.2026)

 

Scope of S. 528 BNSS -- Inherent powers u/s 528 BNSS are to be exercised sparingly and cannot be used unless the order reflects patent illegality or miscarriage of justice

Evidence law -- Exhibiting a document does not amount to its proof; its execution and admissibility must still be established, failing which the Court may disregard it at final adjudication

Evidence law -- Attorney of complainant can tender documents, subject to the accused’s right to challenge their admissibility and proof and evidential value during cross-examination and at the stage of final arguments

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Inherent power u/s 528 of BNSS -- Scope of – Cane be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice -- Jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution and interference is warranted only where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or results in manifest miscarriage of justice -- Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible or to re-appreciate the factual aspects which have already been considered by the trial Court.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Marking or exhibiting of a document does not dispense with the requirement of proving the same in accordance with law -- Party relying upon the document still carries the burden to establish its execution, authenticity and admissibility -- If such proof is not forthcoming, the Court is always competent to eschew the document from consideration at the stage of final adjudication.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint  – Evidence by attorney -- Once the attorney had been duly substituted to prosecute the complaint on behalf of the complainant and the complainant’s evidence was still continuing, the tendering of documents during the course of such evidence cannot be said to be wholly impermissible – Contention that the documents could not have been tendered by the Special Power of Attorney without prior permission of the Court does not merit acceptance -- Other party retains full liberty to challenge the admissibility, mode of proof and evidentiary value of such documents during cross-examination and at the stage of final arguments.

(Para 11)

Posted On: 23-03-2026
111. (SC) (Decided on: 02.02.2026)

Appointment of Arbitrator – Fraud -- Where the High Court in proceedings u/s 9 of the Act recorded prima facie that the existence of the document itself doubtful and such finding attained finality, appointment of an Arbitrator would be premature and legally impermissible -- High Court rightly dismissed application u/s 11 of the Act

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 8, 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Arbitration agreement -- Fraud alleged -- When an allegation of fraud is made with regard to arbitration agreement itself, such a dispute is generally recognised as a dispute, which is in the realm of non-arbitrability and the court will examine it, as a jurisdictional issue only to enquire whether the dispute has become non-arbitrable due to one or the other reason.

(Para 15)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 8, 9, 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Fraud alleged -- In proceedings u/s 9 of the Act, the High Court, by order had recorded a prima facie finding that the existence of the Admission Deed was doubtful and declined to grant interim protection – SLP against that order dismissed, thereby lending finality to the said prima facie assessment between the parties -- Prima facie satisfaction recorded by the High Court, therefore, a relevant consideration while examining applications under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act -- When the existence of the arbitration agreement itself is in serious dispute and requires adjudication, appointment of an arbitrator would be premature and legally impermissible -- High Court rightly dismissed application u/s 11 of the Act.

(Para 16-19, 23)

Posted On: 21-03-2026
113. (SC) (Decided on: 19.03.2026)

Cheating – Quashing -- Offence is made out only when dishonest or fraudulent intention to deceive exists at the time of making the promise or inducement; mere subsequent failure to fulfil the promise does not by itself establish cheating -- High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers may quash the criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Cheating – Intention to deceive – Inducement -- In order to constitute an offence of cheating the intention to deceive should be in existence when the inducement was made -- It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise -- Mere failure to keep the promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume that dishonest intention existed from the very beginning.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Cheating – Quashing -- Inherent powers of High Court -- High Court may, in exercise of its inherent powers under the Code, or under Article 226 of the Constitution, upon consideration of the attending circumstances, take a decision whether the dishonest intention existed or not at the time of making the promise -- And, if it comes to the conclusion that the alleged conduct of the parties does not reflect a dishonest intention of the accused from the very beginning, it may quash the criminal complaint/ proceedings and relegate the aggrieved party to civil remedies.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 415, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Cheating -- Breach of contract -- Money invested for making a movie on promise of sharing profits – Failure to pay returns/profits – No allegations that the movie earned profits and the accused had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the inception of transaction – Mere non-fulfilment of promise or breach of contractual obligation does not constitute cheating – By issuance of post-dated cheques, the de facto complainant was led to vacate his objection to movie’s release, even then an offence of cheating would not be made out for two reasons; First, those cheques were post-dated therefore, did not carry a representation of sufficient funds in the bank account at the time of its issuance, Second, initial agreement, as per the allegations, was to share profit on release of the movie – Allegations only disclosed a civil cause of action and the High Court fell in error in not quashing the criminal proceedings -- Impugned criminal proceedings u/s 420 IPC quashed.

(Para 16-21)

Posted On: 21-03-2026
114. (SC) (Decided on: 19.03.2026)

Company as Consumer -- A body corporate can be a consumer because the determining factor is the dominant purpose of the transaction not the legal status of the purchaser

Consumer – Commercial transaction -- Burden of proof lies with the respondent not on complainant to demonstrate that the goods or services were acquired for a commercial purpose

Consumer – Commercial transaction -- Merely because a fixed deposit receipt earns interest does not mean that the banking service availed is for a commercial purpose

Consumer – Commercial transaction -- If an FDR is pledged to leverage credit for business growth, it has a direct nexus with profit-making and could be classified as a commercial service

Deficiency in service -- Complaint involving criminal or tortious allegations not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) -- Body corporate/ Company – Whether body corporate can be Consumer – Commercial purpose -- To determine whether the purchasing of goods, or availing of services, is for a commercial purpose or not, one has to look at the dominant object or purpose with which those goods are purchased or services are availed -- Status of the purchaser or recipient of goods or services, that is, whether it is an individual or a body corporate, is not the determining factor for holding whether the transaction is, or is not, for a commercial purpose.

(Para 18)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) -- Consumer -- Commercial transaction -- Burdon of proof -- Burden to prove that the goods purchased, or services availed, as the case may be, is for a commercial purpose is on the respondent and not the complainant.

(Para 19)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(o) – Service – FDR in Bank – Interest – Whether commercial transaction -- Merely because a fixed deposit receipt earns interest does not mean that the banking service availed is for a commercial purpose.

(Para 21)

D. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) -- FDR was pledged for availing credit facility -- If the deposit is made to leverage credit facilities for augmenting business, it would have a direct nexus with revenue generation/ profits -- In such a case, it could be said that the banking service was availed for a commercial purpose -- In that scenario, the service recipient may not fall in the category of a consumer unless he brings his case within the four corners of the Explanation to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act.

(Para 22)

E. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(g) -- Deficiency in service – Criminal and tortious acts – Maintainability of complaint -- FDR was pledged for availing credit facility -- Deficiency in service is different from criminal or tortious acts of the service provider -- Objects of the 1986 Act is not to deal with complex factual issues pertaining to criminal or tortious liability in a summary manner -- According to the appellant the pledge is a fraudulent act and amounts to an offence -- In such circumstances, the complaint allegations as they stand cannot be adjudicated upon in a proceeding under the 1986 Act as those allegations could appropriately be addressed in a regular criminal or civil proceeding -- Hence, the complaint as framed is not maintainable.

(Para 28-32)

Posted On: 20-03-2026
119. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 11.03.2026 Decided on: 18.03.2026)

S. 319 Cr.P.C -- Summoning of additional accused -- Mere naming of a person by a witness in his deposition, without the support of strong and cogent evidence, cannot by itself justify the exercise of the extraordinary power u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

S. 319 Cr.P.C -- Summoning of additional accused -- At advanced stage when prosecution evidence stands concluded, summoning permissible only on compelling evidence clearly indicating active and direct involvement

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- Scope -- Allegations against the proposed accused are general and omnibus in nature -- Evidence sought to be relied, substantially corresponds to the material which had already been examined during investigation -- No new or compelling circumstance has emerged during trial which could justify the summoning of the proposed accused as additional accused -- Mere naming of a person by a witness in his deposition, without the support of strong and cogent evidence, cannot by itself justify the exercise of the extraordinary power u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Dowry death -- Proposed accused are relatives of the husband of the deceased and the allegations against them are general in nature – Courts are required to exercise caution and circumspection before summoning additional persons to face trial, particularly when the evidence does not disclose specific and convincing material against them.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Trial in the case has already reached its culmination and the entire prosecution evidence stands concluded -- At such an advanced stage of the proceedings, the summoning of additional accused can be justified only when the evidence on record unmistakably points towards their active and direct involvement in the commission of the offence -- In the absence of such compelling material, the extraordinary jurisdiction u/s 319 Cr.P.C. ought not to be exercised.

(Para 13, 14)

Posted On: 19-03-2026
122. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 12.11.2025)

Senior citizen case -- Provisions of Senior Citizens Act, 2007 must be interpreted to achieve the legislative intent, while ensuring that the Act is not misused for the resolution of ordinary civil or property disputes within families

Senior citizen case -- Transfer deed contains no recital or stipulation making the transfer conditional upon maintenance – Mere assertions in pleading without evidence, invocation of Section 23 of the Act is unjustified.

A. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 – Senior citizen case – Misuse -- The Act of 2007 was enacted to uphold the traditional norms of Indian Society emphasizing the duty of children and relatives to provide for senior citizens -- Accordingly, its provisions must be interpreted to achieve the legislative intent, while ensuring that the Act is not misused for the resolution of ordinary civil or property disputes within families.

(Para 6)

B. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 – Senior citizen case -- Maintenance Tribunal declined the petitioner’s prayer for cancellation of the transfer deed and directed respondent No.3 to pay a monthly maintenance allowance of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner – No recital or stipulation in Transfer deed making the transfer conditional for maintaining the petitioner – In pleadings and evidence, mere assertions have been made that the property was transferred by the petitioner on an express/implied condition of maintenance, but no efforts were made to establish such assertion by leading cogent evidence – No justification for invocation of Section 23 of the Act -- Respondent No. 3 is providing care and maintenance to the petitioner, including engaging a domestic helper at his own expense – Held, no infirmity in the orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Posted On: 17-03-2026
125. (SC) (Decided on: 05.01.2026)

O 1 R 10 CPC – Impleadment – Necessary/proper party – Dominus litis: Where no relief is claimed against the appellant and no legal interest or successorship is established, he is neither a necessary nor proper party; plaintiff being dominus litis cannot be compelled to implead such party, and any decree binds only the parties to the suit

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment -- Necessary and proper party – Dominus litis -- Suit for recovery of service charges – Respondent Nos.1 and 2/ Plaintiffs are not claiming any relief against the appellant :

-- No material to indicate that the relief, as claimed in the suit against respondent No.3, if granted, would be implemented against the appellant – Held, appellant is not a necessary party to the suit.

-- Appellant cannot also be construed as a proper party once it has failed to establish that it is a successor to the respondent No.3.

-- Respondent Nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit against their wishes.

Decree, if any, passed in the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the appellant that is not a party to the suit.

(para 37-39)

Posted On: 16-03-2026
127. (SC) (Decided on: 26.03.2025)

Cheque bounce complaint – Suppression of material facts – Quashing -- Complainant suppressed the accused’s reply letters to statutory notice u/s 138 of NI Act seeking documents, in the complaint and statement on oath u/s 200 CrPC – It amounts to abuse of process of law, complaint and the order of cognizance quashed

Complaint u/s 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS) -- Learned Magistrate is duty bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing, required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses

Complaint – Summoning -- Magistrate must examine the complainant to ascertain the truth and apply his mind to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to issue process or not

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS), Section 482 (528 BNSS) – Complaint in cheque bounce case -- Suppression of facts -- Effect: Statutory notice u/s 138 NI Act was issued by the complainant’s advocate – Appellant/ accused’s advocate write twice within few days seeking supply of documents relied upon in the notice – Documents were not supplied – Complainant suppressed the reply letters sent by the accused in the complaint as well as in the statement on oath under Section 200 CrPC – As the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint – It is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – Held, High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside -- Complaint and the order of cognizance quashed and set aside.

(Para 13-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- After a complaint is filed u/s 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate is duty-bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing -- What is reduced into writing is required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses, if any.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- Recording the complainant's statement on oath u/s 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality, object is to ascertain the truth -- Learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth -- Learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused -- If he is satisfied, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC (227 BNSS) -- Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter.

(Para 10)

Posted On: 12-03-2026
132. (P&H HC) (Reserved on:19.02.2026 Decided on: 26.02.2026)

Registration of FIR cannot be treated as conclusive proof of negligence

Driver despite contesting negligence, did not step into the witness box to depose on oath, adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is liable to be drawn

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Negligence – Tribunal’s finding based primarily on the registration of FIR – Held, independent reassessment required on the basis of the material available on record -- Registration of FIR against the claimant cannot be treated as conclusive proof of negligence.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 -- Negligence --  Acquittal order -- Additional evidence in appeal allowed – Said judgment has direct bearing on the finding of negligence recorded by the learned Tribunal -- Though acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto establish negligence of the opposite party in civil proceedings, it certainly demolishes the foundation of the learned Tribunal’s reasoning which rested entirely upon the registration of FIR and pendency of trial.

(Para 8)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) -- Negligence – Non-examination of driver – Adverse inference -- Respondent No.1/ driver despite contesting negligence, did not step into the witness box to depose on oath -- In such circumstances, adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is liable to be drawn.

(Para 9)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Contributory negligence -- Accident occurred on hilly road and claimant was driving downhill, greater caution was expected from him – Failure to regulate speed and maintain adequate control contributed to accident – Principle of contributory negligence attracted – Respondent driver held primarily negligent but claimant held contributorily negligent to extent of 50%.

(Para 12)

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Contributory negligence – Injury case -- Claimant aged 23 years suffered 45% permanent disability in right leg – Functional disability assessed at 40% – Notional income assessed at Rs.2,000 per month – Applying multiplier of 18 with 40% future prospects, loss of future earning capacity assessed at Rs.2,41,920 – Additional compensation awarded towards pain and suffering, medical expenses, transportation, attendant and special diet totalling Rs.40,000 – Total compensation assessed at Rs.2,81,920 – After deduction of 50% on account of contributory negligence, claimant held entitled to Rs.1,40,960 with interest @ 7% per annum from date of claim petition – Insurance company liable to satisfy award.

(Para 14-19)

Posted On: 10-03-2026
135. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 17.02.2026)

Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation – Migration of reserved category candidate to unreserved category – Relaxation at screening stage – Effect – Reserved category candidate qualified by availing relaxed cut-off applicable to BC-B category – Thereafter migration to General category on the basis of performance in subsequent stages -- Permissibility :

(i) A reserved category candidate who avails relaxation at any stage of the examination process, including the preliminary/screening stage, cannot thereafter claim allocation against an unreserved vacancy.

(ii) The expression "any relaxation at any stage of the examination" includes relaxation in qualifying marks at the screening stage, even though such stage is qualifying in nature and marks obtained therein are not counted for final merit.

(iii) When a relaxed standard is applied in selecting a reserved category candidate, such candidate shall be counted against reserved vacancies and shall be deemed unavailable for consideration against unreserved vacancies.

(iv) The distinction sought to be drawn between preliminary and final examination for the purpose of migration is totally misconceived. A person who avails relaxation at the initial stage will necessarily avail the same relaxation even at the final stage.

(v) An advertisement has the force of law and binds the parties.

(vi) A candidate who participates in the selection process without protest and is unsuccessful cannot subsequently challenge the process.

(vii) A candidate has no vested right to appointment. Selection confers only a right of consideration, not appointment.

Candidate availed relaxation at the Screening Test stage by securing “56.86” marks against the General category cut-off of “61.8132” -- Having availed such relaxation, he was rightly treated as a BC-B candidate throughout the selection process and could not have been migrated to the General category.

(Para 20, 21)

Posted On: 09-03-2026
140. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 24.02.2026 Decided on: 07.03.2026)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Report of fake license – Admissibility of -- Legal Manager, in his cross examination, stated that he had never visited the office of RTO to verify the driving licence and the person who had visited was working in their office -- He further stated that he had not brought any application sent to verify the record -- Said report (Ex.RW3/B) is based on some verbal information having been received -- Nothing in writing which was produced from the RTO to even remotely suggest that the driving licence was fake – Contentions to exonerate Insurance Company rejected.

(Para 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Future prospects – Deceased aged 46 years -- Appointment letter of the deceased (Ex.P4) clearly states that he was being appointed in the establishment in Officer’s Cadre on permanent basis -- In the absence of any contrary evidence having been led, no fault can be found with the addition of 30% made by the Tribunal towards future prospects.

(Para 9)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Age of the deceased – Reliance upon Post Mortem report -- In the absence of any evidence regarding the age of the deceased, the same has rightly been taken to be 46 years as per the post-mortem report.

(Para 10)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Loss of consortium -- Widow, three children and father of the deceased – Entitlement -- Parental [Rs.48,000/- x 3], Filial [Rs.48,000/- x 1], Spousal Rs.48,000/- (Total Rs.2,40,000/-) awarded.

(Para 14)

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Widow, three children and father -- Deceased 46 years old – Permanent employee – Annual income Rs.3,39,280/- [Rs.28,273 x 12] -- Tribunal awarded total compensation of Rs.30,26,600/- -- High Court enhanced it to Rs.45,76,374/- -- Enhanced amount shall also attract interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount.

(Para 3, 14, 15)

Posted On: 09-03-2026
141. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 07.03.2026)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 34 -- Cancellation of bail -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail by learned Sessions Judge – Allegations are primarily based upon the suicide note and the version of the complainant, which are matters to be examined during the course of investigation and trial -- At this stage, it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge has ignored any material fact or considered irrelevant material while granting anticipatory bail to the private respondents -- Mere fact that the respondents are also involved in another FIR, by itself, cannot be treated as a sufficient ground for cancellation of the concession of bail already granted.

(Para 8)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 34 -- Cancellation of bail -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail by learned Sessions Judge – Parameters for cancellation of bail are different and much stricter than those applicable for grant of bail -- Once bail has been granted, the same can be cancelled only if the order granting bail suffers from patent illegality or if the accused has misused the concession by interfering with the investigation, influencing witnesses, or otherwise obstructing the course of justice – Except for a bald allegation that the respondents are extending threats, no specific material has been placed on record to substantiate such assertion – No material to show that the impugned order suffers from serious infirmity or that the private respondents have misused the concession of anticipatory bail – No justification to exercise powers u/s 483(3) of the BNSS for cancellation of bail --  Petition dismissed.

(Para 8)

Posted On: 08-03-2026
147. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 27.11.2025 Decided on: 13.02.2026)

A. Constitution of India, Article 12 – Panchayat Samiti -- Instrumentality of State -- Panchayat Samiti, constituted under statutory enactments governing Panchayati Raj institutions and functioning under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, performs governmental and public functions at the grass-root level, operates under deep and pervasive control of the State Government and is substantially funded through State and Central grants – In view of the overwhelming financial dependence and dominant State funding, the financial control test unequivocally stands fulfilled – Held, Panchayat Samiti is an instrumentality of the State and falls within the meaning of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 20-33)

B. Constitution of India, Article 12 – Employee of Panchayat Samiti – Whether Government employee -- Once it has been held that the Panchayat Samiti is an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the principal foundation of the respondents’ defence that the petitioner was not a Government employee stands substantially eroded.

(Para 3)

C. Constitution of India, Article 12, 14, 16 – Service Law – Daily wager in Panchayat Samiti – Regularisation under Government policy – De-regularisation after three years -- Petitioner appointed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar through Employment Exchange in 1991 under Panchayat Samiti – State Government framed regularisation policy dated 18.03.1996 for daily wage employees completing three years continuous service with 240 days each year – Petitioner’s services regularised w.e.f. 01.02.1996 and regular pay scale, increments and GPF benefits granted – After more than three years, State passed order de-regularising petitioner on ground that he was not a Government employee but employee of Panchayat Samiti -- Held: Reasoning is legally untenable :

-- it is impermissible for the respondents to subsequently withdraw the regularisation on the plea of lack of authority in the initial appointment. Any alleged defect in the appointment of 12.03.1991 cannot be used to unsettle a valid regularisation effected on 01.02.1996, particularly when no fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment is attributed to the petitioner.

-- de-regularisation order suffers from the vice of arbitrariness on account of inordinate delay. For over three years after regularisation, the petitioner was treated as a regular employee in all respects. Such prolonged acquiescence by the State creates a legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioner that his service status would not be disturbed. Administrative fairness does not permit the State to undo a settled position after such a lapse of time.

-- the action of the respondents is ex facie discriminatory. Other similarly situated employees were regularised under the same or similar policies. Though notices for de-regularisation were issued to some of them, their cases either remained protected by interim orders of this Court or became infructuous upon retirement. Singling out the petitioner for de-regularisation in 1999, while extending protection or continued service to others similarly placed, amounts to hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

-- in view of the finding that the Panchayat Samiti is “State” under Article 12, the distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents between a Government employee and an employee of the Panchayat Samiti is artificial and unsustainable.

Impugned order quashed, and the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in regular service w.e.f. 01.02.1996 with full continuity of service -- Petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing therefrom, including pay fixation, grant of increments, and retiral benefits, if any -- Arrears arising on account of such refixation shall be paid to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, calculated from the date the amounts became due till the date of actual payment.

(Para 34-46)

Posted On: 08-03-2026
150. (SC) (Decided on: 18.11.2025)

A. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Challenge – Maintainability of writ petition -- Every award of a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court -- It shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and that no appeal shall lie against it – Award cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding -- Writ petition challenging the award was maintainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Objection in Execution – Writ -- Maintainability -- Treating the filing of objections in such execution as an “efficacious alternative remedy” for challenging the award is inconsistent with the statutory scheme -- Decree in such a case owes its force not merely to the CPC but to the special statute which deems the award to be a decree only for the limited purpose of execution -- Statutory structure is the same whether the aggrieved person is a party to the award or is a third party who claims to be affected by it -- In either case, if the validity of the award is to be examined at all, it is to be tested in writ proceedings before the High Court and not by expanding the scope of execution or by encouraging independent civil suits.

(Para 11-13)