Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part I, 304A -- Culpable homicide – Causing death due to negligence -- Appellant/ qualified medical practitioner conveyed/ instructed  staff nurse to administer an injection over telephone which injection when administered to the patient, apparently reacted, resulting into his death – Registration of the FIR u/s 304 Part I IPC and the subsequent submission of police report u/s 173 (2) CrPC also u/s 304 Part I IPC cannot be sustained – Appeal allowed, Trial Court to waive the accusation under 304 Part I IPC and to proceed after reading over accusation under Section 304-A, IPC.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Quashing of FIR -- Whether demand of dowry is pre-requisite – Held, an unlawful demand for dowry is not a pre-requisite element to constitute "cruelty" under Section 498A IPC -- High Court's decision to quash the proceedings primarily influenced by the lack of a dowry-related demand in the case -- Allegations made by the Appellant, which detail instances of physical abuse and harassment, fall within the scope of "cruelty" as defined under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC – Appeal allowed, decision of High Court set aside.

(Para 13-18)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37, 21, 22, 29, 61, 85  -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Commercial quantity -- Recovery of 261 grams of Tramadol Hydrochloride, marginal above the commercial quantity (250 grams) -- Petitioner is a first time offender with no other case under the NDPS Act registered against him -- Provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be relaxed – Petitioner in custody since 13.09.2023 but none of the 13 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far and a co-accused has already been granted the similar relief – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Deceased 16 year old -- Multiplier -- Deceased was studying in 11th standard at the time of the accident on 27.05.2013 -- Notional income of the deceased is assessed as Rs.15,000/- per month -- Future prospects 40% given -- Deceased was unmarried, 50% deduction would be applicable -- Claimants would be entitled to Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses and Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) towards loss of consortium – Total compensation comes to Rs.24,00,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount awarded.

(Para 9-11)

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 401, 402 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 – Grievous hurt – Probation to accused – Compensation to complainant -- Keeping in view the antecedents of the petitioner and the fact that he is not a previous convict, it is obligatory upon the Court to extend the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the convict – Petitioner ordered to be released on probation – To balance the rights of the complainant with the benefit of probation extended to the petitioner, Court directed the petitioner-accused to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the complainant.

(Para 7-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Rule of evidence -- Under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 it is established that in compensation cases, the strict rules of evidence used in criminal trials do not apply -- Instead, the standard of proof is based on the preponderance of probability.

(Para 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- When the Presiding officer's opinion is sought, the Presiding Officer must submit his opinion at the earliest considering the fact that the issue of liberty of the convict is involved.

(Para 20)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- Duty of Government -- It is the obligation of the appropriate Government to consider cases of all convicts for grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the policy -- It is not necessary for the convict or his relatives to make a specific application for grant of permanent remission -- District Legal Services Authorities shall maintain the relevant date of the convicts and as and when they become eligible to a consideration for grant of premature release, they shall do the needful -- The State Legal Services Authorities shall endeavour to create a portal on which the data as aforesaid can be uploaded on real time basis.

(Para 21(a)(g))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Policy for -- States and Union Territories that do not have a policy dealing with the grant of remission in terms of Section 432 of the CrPC or Section 473 of the BNSS to formulate a policy within two months.

(Para 21(b))

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Speaking order -- Communication of -- Order granting or refusing the relief of permanent remission must contain brief reasons -- The order containing reasons should be immediately communicated to the convict through the office of the concerned prison -- The copies thereof should be forwarded to the Secretaries of the concerned District Legal Services Authorities -- It is the duty of the prison authorities to inform the convict that he has the right to challenge the order of rejection of the prayer for the grant of remission.

(Para 21(d))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Remission – Cancellation of – Opportunity of hearing -- An order granting permanent remission cannot be withdrawn or cancelled without giving an opportunity of being heard to the convict -- An order of cancellation of permanent remission must contain brief reasons.

(Para 21(e))

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Recoveries were made after several days of the incident and no bloodstains etc. were found on the weapons -- PW-15, the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination, deposed that the seized weapons were not shown to him -- Knives etc. were also not produced in court -- All the seizure witnesses turned hostile -- Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot come to the aid of the prosecution -- Clothes of the accused were not seized and sent for forensic examination to find out whether there were any bloodstains --  Medical evidence confirmed multiple stab injuries on his body leading to profuse bleeding and death -- It is for the prosecution to connect the accused to the murder of the deceased by producing credible and legally admissible evidence -- However, no credible evidence at all to connect the accused persons with the homicidal death of deceased -- Appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence of the appellants set aside.

(Para 21-25)

A. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 58, 100 -- Equitable mortgage – Rights in personam -- Where ‘equitable mortgages’ have been created based on deposit of part-deeds or documents purporting title or evincing intention of parties to create an interest, all such deposits will be a valid mortgage in equity and the charge that might have been created prior in time will assume priority over any subsequent charges or mortgagors --  However, since such a mortgage is an ‘equitable mortgage’ any rights flowing from such mortgages are only of personal character and only rights in personam and as such will not operate against any strangers or subsequent incumbrancers unaware of such equitable mortgage -- Right of the lender to apportion or appropriate the subject property for repayment of loan only a right to take such an action rather than a right in the property itself.

(Para 43)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 58, 100 -- Equitable mortgage – Legal mortgage – Right of --  Legal mortgage would have assumed priority in charge, yet an equitable mortgage may still be enforceable as secondary charge, provided the other considerations such as notice of such mortgage is fulfilled.

(Para 53)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 58, 100 -- Equitable mortgage – Charge -- ‘equitable mortgages’ are very much recognized in India under the nomenclature of “charge” in terms of Section 100 of the Act, 1882, and the same will be enforceable as far as possible in terms of the procedure and provisions application to a simple mortgage except those without notice of such charge.

(Para 56)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 397, 401, 482 -- Discharge by Trial Court – Revision -- Ex-parte stay by High Court – Permissibility of -- Ex-parte order of stay of the order of discharge should not have been passed by the High Court -- Ex-parte order of stay is entirely illegal --  Impugned order set aside.

(Para 22-25)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31 -- Arbitration award – Legal heirs – Right and liability -- The term ‘partners’ extends to and would include their legal heirs, representatives, assigns or legatees, etc. -- Persons claiming under the rights of a deceased person are the representatives of the deceased party, and therefore, both the parties to the agreement and their legal heirs are entitled to enforce an arbitral award and are bound by it.

(Para 10)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 7, 40 – Arbitration agreement – Death of party – Effect of -- Existence of an arbitration agreement is not affected by the death of a party to the arbitration agreement.

(Para 10)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(d) – Consumer – Project loan from Bank -- Dominant purpose behind brand-building itself is to attract more customers and consequently generate profits or increase revenue for the business -- What is to be seen is that whether the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction was to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the person who has availed the service – Held, respondent No.1 is not a ‘consumer’ in terms of Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act.

(Para 16-21)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 108 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail -- No incriminating material put forth by the prosecution to connect the petitioner with the commissioning of offence except that his name has been mentioned in the FIR -- Ingredients of Section 108 of BNS i.e., the abetment or the instigation at the part of the petitioner is missing, therefore, prima facie offence u/s 108 of BNS cannot be made out at this stage -- He is a person of clean antecedents – Petitioner has bona fide intentions and is ready and willing to join the investigation and cooperate for furtherance of the same so that the final report can be submitted by the Investigating Agency in time – Anticipatory bail allowed.

(Para 4, 5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased 20 year old was a student of B.A. Final Year -- Date of the accident was 25.07.2004, the notional income of the deceased assessed as Rs.10,000/- per month -- Loss of future prospects 40% -- Multiplier of 18 applied – 50% deduction -- Claimant-appellant would be entitled to Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses – Rs.50,000/- awarded for Loss of love and affection -- Total compensation assessed at Rs.15,98,000/- -- Interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating – Acquittal – Money taken for sending abroad -- Incident happened in the year 2001, however, written complaint made after two years -- In the complaint, nowhere, mentioned that complainant or his father had arranged an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- by taking loan or by arranging the same from their relatives -- Nothing brought on record to show that any travel agency is being run by the accused persons -- Prosecution has neither proved source of amount nor the fact that who induced the complainant to pay the amount and to whom the payment was made -- As such, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 5, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- Power of the Appellate Court to unsettle the order of acquittal on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidence is subject to the settled law that where two views are possible and out of the two, one points towards the innocence of the accused, the view which favours the accused should prevail over the other pointing towards his guilt -- Presumption of innocence further gets entrenched on the acquittal of accused by the trial Court.

(Para 6)

Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973),  Section 13, 15 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 111 – Eviction of tenant – Appeal -- Mesne profit -- Determination of lease – Tenant purchased 50% share in tenanted premises – Merger of lessee’s estate in that of larger estate of ownership shall came into effect only when tenant acquires full ownership of the estate and not merely part thereof -- Thus, mere acquisition of share of the property cannot absolve the petitioner from his liability to pay use and occupation charges.

(Para 5-8)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Suit for specific performance – Readiness and willingness – Financial capacity -- There is a distinction between the terms ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ -- ‘Readiness’ is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration -- ‘Willingness’ is the conduct of the party.

(Para 14)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Suit for specific performance – Readiness and willingness – Suit at fag end of expiry of limitation -- Agreement of sale (Ex.A1) was executed on 07.06.1993 and the date fixed for execution of the sale deed was one year from the date of measurement of the suit schedule property -- No such measurement was carried out and plaintiff has not raised his little finger in this regard till he got issued legal notice dated 30.05.1996 that is almost for a period of 3 years and suit came to be filed only on 09.06.1997 at the fag end of the expiration of the limitation -- Long unexplained delay in not taking any reasonable steps as is expected from a reasonable person is itself sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff to an equitable relief.

(Para 15)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in written statement -- Due diligence -- All the averments which are sought to be pleaded in the amended written statement are with respect to events which were in the knowledge of the petitioner-defendant on the date of filing the written statement -- No due diligence on the part of the petitioner-defendant and thus, the amendment sought is hit by the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in written statement – After evidence -- Issues framed on 27.01.2021 and the plaintiff has examined as many as 7 witnesses and has closed his evidence on 12.09.2023 -- To rebut the plea taken in the original written statement that the agreement to sell did not bear the signatures of the defendant, the plaintiff has examined PW-7 Handwriting and Finger Print Expert -- Thereafter application for amendment of the written statement moved in which one of the plea sought to be raised is that the agreement to sell is “an anti dated agreement” – Application dismissed, order upheld.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Suit for declaration – Challenge to sae deed -- Advalorem court fee – Petitioner/ plaintiff was one of the executants of the sale deed sought to be challenged -- Although the petitioner has couched the suit as being suit for declaration but in fact the petitioner is seeking cancellation of the sale deed  -- It would be incumbent upon the petitioner to pay the ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in plaint – Due diligence -- All the averments which are sought to be made in the amendment applications are with respect to the facts which were in the knowledge of the petitioner prior to filing of the original plaint/ written statement in the counter claim -- The only reason given for not incorporating the said pleas in the applications was that the petitioner is a layman and could not convey all the facts to the previous counsel -- Plea taken would clearly show that there was no due diligence on the part of the petitioner and thus, the amendment sought is hit by the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in plaint – Contradictory plea -- Plea sought to be raised by the petitioner in the amendment is contradictory to the plea raised in the original plaint/ written statement -- Amendment cannot be allowed.

(Para 13)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 -- Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Choice of Collector -- Land-holding – Requirement of -- Ld. Collector recorded in his order that the petitioner has land in another village, which is enough for the land revenue security purpose – Ld. Collector is the main authority for appointment of the Lambardar -- It is the Collector, who not only appreciates the antecedents of all the candidates in the fray but also personally interacts with them – Ld. Financial Commissioner has erred in upsetting the choice of the Collector – As land revenue stood abolished in both the State of Punjab and Haryana, long back, thus owning land by the candidates for the post of Lambardar would not be of much significance any further – Petitioner’s appointment was set aside only on the ground that he did not own any land in the revenue estate – Financial Commissioner order set aside.

(Para 7-11)

Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 13A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 -- Finalisation of eviction proceedings – Title dispute – Constructive resjudicata -- Issue of constructive res judicata stands in the way of the petitioners -- It was always open to them to have specifically filed an application u/s 13-A of the Act, and having failed to do so, could not, now as such start a new round of litigation for deciding their unauthorized claim, as such is not permissible.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Abetment of suicide – Quashing of proceedings -- Charge-sheet, as it stands, appears to have proceeded in an unidimensional manner by accepting the version of the complainant and his family members as the gospel truth – Whether any investigation to explore any other angle was pursued, a stoic silence of State -- None of the ingredients required in law to make out a case u/s 306 IPC to be even remotely mentioned in the charge-sheet or are being borne out from the material on record – Held, charge-sheet filed by the police and the cryptic order of cognizance, the proceedings cannot be allowed to be carried on against the appellants -- Proceedings quashed – SIT constituted for re-investigation.

(Para 15-24)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Second bail application -- There is no prohibition in filing a fresh bail application after the earlier was rejected or cancelled, if granted.

(Para 4)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Second bail application – Filing of a fresh bail application, once an earlier bail application has been rejected or if granted and thereafter cancelled is a matter of right and solely on the ground that the Apex Court had not permitted filing of the fresh bail application, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the bail application.

(Para 5)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11, 25 -- Void marriage – Maintenance to spouse – Permanent alimony – Right of -- A spouse whose marriage has been declared void u/s 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act -- Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties -- Grant of relief u/s 25 is always discretionary.

(Para 28 a)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11, 12, 24 -- Void marriage – Voidable marriage – Maintenance pendente -- Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied -- While deciding the prayer for interim relief u/s 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief u/s 24 is always discretionary.

(Para 28 b)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23 – ‘decree in proceedings’ (Sec. 23) -- Interpretation of -- ‘decrees in proceedings’ will not include the decisions dismissing the petitions seeking reliefs u/s 9 to 13 -- Decrees passed u/s 11 to 13 bring about a change of status of the parties to the marriage -- Even a decree of restitution of conjugal rights brings about a change of status of the parties in case there is no restitution of conjugal rights within one year of a decree -- Even a decree of judicial separation u/s 10 brings about a change of status in the sense that a spouse who has got such a decree is no longer under an obligation to cohabit with his or her spouse.

(Para 17)

D. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 – Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), Section 18 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 144 -- Decline of decree under Hindu Marriage Act -- Remedy for maintenance -- When a decree is sought u/s 9 to 13 and is declined by the court, the remedy u/s 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, remains available to the wife -- Even the remedy u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 144 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 continues to be available.

(Para 19)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 144 -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. / 144 of BNSS – Nature of proceedings -- Proceedings u/s 125 of the CrPC are of a summary nature -- While deciding the applications u/s 125 of the CrPC, a summary procedure is required to be followed, and a detailed adjudication of the rights of the parties cannot be made -- The same is the legal position as regards the corresponding remedy u/s 144 of the BNSS.

(Para 21)

F. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 – Maintenance pendentelite -- Conditions for applicability of Section 24 are: (i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and (ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.

(Para 25)

Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005), Section 8(1) (j) – Exemption to disclose personal information -- Disclosure of marks of other candidate in an examination – Held, disclosure of the marks though may fall in the category of personal information, yet the disclosure of this personal information is presently necessary in public interest, and therefore, it is not an information which cannot be given by the Information Officer under the RTI Act, 2005 -- To the contrary, such an information must be disclosed in order to maintain transparency in the process.

(Para 2)

Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 271AAA, Explanation (a) -- Undisclosed income – Penalty -- Section 271AAA is a penalty provision, it has to be strictly construed -- The fact that the assessee has surrendered some undisclosed income during the course of search or that the surrender is emerging out of the statements recorded during the course of search is not sufficient to fasten the levy of penalty -- The onus is on the Assessing Officer to satisfy the condition precedent stipulated in the said Explanation, before the charge for levy of penalty is fastened on the assessee -- Appellant admitted Rs.2,27,65,580/- as income for AY 2011-12 during the search before DDIT (Inv.) as well as substantiated the manner in which the said undisclosed income was derived and paid tax together with interest thereon, albeit belatedly -- Consequently, all the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 271AAA(2) stand satisfied and, therefore, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) is not attracted on the said amount of Rs.2,27,65,580/-.

(Para 34-38)

A. Constitution of India, Article 245 -- functus officio -- Rule-making power of the legislature cannot be curtailed or nullified by application of the concept of functus officio -- The principle of functus officio normally applies to a judicial forum or a quasi-judicial authority and would have no application to the rule-making authority which is within the domain of the State Government by virtue of Article 245 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 42)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226, 245 -- Statutory rules – Rule of natural justice – Opportunity of hearing – Requirement of -- It is a well-settled principle of law that while administrative actions and statutory rules that impact citizens’ rights are subject to judicial review, the notion that the State must provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making power is fundamentally flawed.

(Para 45)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Show cause notice – Challenge to -- Writ jurisdiction -- Writ Court should not entertain any petition, seeking to challenge a show cause notice unless the Court is convinced that the same has been issued by an authority having no jurisdiction, or the same is tainted with mala fides.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 74 -- Breach of contractual obligations -- Punitive measures – Blacklisting of contractor -- A mere allegation of breach of contractual obligations without anything more, per se, does not invite any such punitive action.

(Para 34)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Policy of regularization is applicable in rem and benefits admissible to each individual, who is similarly placed, had to be extended by the respondent-State without any discrimination -- Such employees ought not be forced to seek identical reliefs by way of filing separate writ petitions and that a holistic approach is required to be taken by the State Agencies as well as employer to extend the benefits to all similarly placed persons irrespective of the fact whether they have taken recourse to institution of a separate litigation or not.

(Para 23-25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Dealy and laches – Arrears of monetary benefits – Restriction upon -- Certain other persons approached this Court for seeking the benefit in the year 2014, which such writ petitions were allowed in the year 2022 -- The issue of delay and laches/ estoppel did not stand in the way of extending the said benefits, the monetary benefits restricted to a period of 38 months prior to filing of the writ petition(s) to balance the equities – Petitioners held entitled for all consequential benefits including notional fixation of pay and seniority -- However, the financial benefits restricted upto 38 months prior to the filing of the present writ petition.

(Para 24-29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437 – Right to bail u/s 437 (6) of Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Sub-section (2) of Section 437 of the Code can be divided in two parts -- The first part would indicate that it is mandatory, but in the next breath, the legislature has given discretion to the Magistrate not to grant bail by assigning reasons -- Provisions of Section 437(6) cannot be considered to be mandatory in nature and cannot be interpreted to grant an absolute and indefeasible right of bail in favour of accused -- Reasons for rejection of application under sub-section (6) have to be different and little more weighty than the reasons that may be relevant for rejection for bail at the initial stage. Following factors would be relevant:

1. Whether the reasons for being unable to conclude trial within sixty days from the first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the accused?

2. Whether there are any chances of the accused tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner?

3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the accused on being bailed out?

4. Whether accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period?

If the answer to any one of the above referred fact situations or similar fact situations is in affirmative then that would work as a fetter on the right that accrues to the accused under first part of sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code -- Right accrues to him only if he is in custody during the whole of the said period.

(Para 9-14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Age of prosecutrix -- There are two contradictory opinions given by two medical experts – Doctor/ PW-3 states that according to the X-ray reports, the age of the prosecutrix was around 14 years, however, Chief Medical Officer/ DW-2 opined that the age of the prosecutrix was around 18 years -- In view of the two conflicting medical opinions, we are of the opinion that the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant-accused.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping – Acquittal -- From the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun – Held, High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction for the offences punishable u/s 363 and 366 of the IPC – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Divorce – Permanent alimony -- Decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Permanent alimony of Rs. 50,00,000/- granted -- Once the lis between the parties was finally settled and permanent alimony of a lump sum amount was awarded, nothing further survives for consideration -- All pending matters inter se parties would stand closed -- Final order of maintenance shall be the full and final adjudication of any maintenance proceedings between the parties, leaving no scope for further claims in this regard.

(Para 1-4)

Employees’ Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4A -- Compensation to employee – Interest thereupon -- Interest liability arises on default of the employer, in paying the admitted compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due and if there is such default, necessarily interest shall run at the rate provided -- Interest runs from the date of the accident -- 12% simple interest per annum necessarily has to be applied.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4, 5 -- Forfeiture of gratuity – Initial appointment by fraud – Conviction in criminal proceedings not necessary -- Petitioner supressed his actual date of birth -- Failure of the employer to initiate a criminal proceeding on the fraud employed by way of the fabricated/ forged certificate produced for the purpose of employment, does not militate against the forfeiture -- No conviction in a criminal proceeding is necessitated, if the misconduct alleged & proved constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude -- Appointment itself being illegal, there is no question of the terminated employee seeking fruits of his employment by way of gratuity – Decision of the PSU forfeiting entire gratuity, upheld.

(Para 13-15)

B. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4, 5 -- Forfeiture of gratuity -- Misappropriation of meagre amounts -- It is trite that even if minimal amounts are misappropriated it would constitute a misconduct warranting termination -- However, on the question of forfeiture of gratuity, Appointing Authority should have taken a more sympathetic approach -- Appointing Authority directed to limit the forfeiture to 25% of the gratuity payable and release the balance amounts.

(Para 15)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Withdrawal of NOC to commence Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital – Held, there can be no indefeasible right claimed on the basis of the grant issued, which is illegal -- There is no promise offered by the State or the Government by reason of the invalid order issued by the Department -- When officers of the government acts outside the scope of authority, the plea of promissory estoppel would not be available, especially since the doctrine of ultra vires comes into operation and the government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised actions of its officers – Withdrawal of NOC, upheld.

(Para 1, 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 225 – Cheque bounce complaint – Enquiry u/s 225 BNSS – Requirement of -- Drill of Section 225 BNSS (erstwhile Section 202 Cr.P.C.) was not followed before issuance of process -- Intention is to ensure that sufficient grounds exist in order to proceed against an accused in a private complaint -- It is pertinent that the concerned Court passes an order indicating substantial compliance of the aforementioned provision, in view of the directions issued in In re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 NI Act 1881 2021(2) L.A.R. 366 = (2021) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16184 -- Matter remanded back to concerned Court to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law, by taking recourse to Section 225 BNSS.

(Para 4-10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- Petitioners/ convicts directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by trial Court by the Appellate Court -- No reason given by the Court while issuing directions -- Condition of depositing of 20% of compensation amount awarded by the trial Court imposed for the purpose of suspension of sentence, set aside -- Appellate Court directed to re-consider the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties and then to pass appropriate order in accordance with the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case (SC) 2024(2) L.A.R. 323 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and till then not to take any coercive action against the petitioners.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- According to Section 148 NI Act, the requirement to deposit a minimum 20% of the fine or compensation during an appeal is not mandatory, instead, it is discretionary power vested with the appellate Court meaning the said Court can choose to waive the said deposit in certain exceptional circumstances depending on the facts of the case.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Expedite decision on appeal – Suspension of sentence -- On joint request of the parties, petitioners exempted from depositing an amount of Rs.43,65,125/- i.e. 20% of the amount of compensation during the pendency of the appeal, before the Appellate Court -- Since the complaint was initially filed on 11.01.2018 and a period of 7 years has lapsed, after the institution of the complaint, the Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal within a period of 04 months.

(Para 6)

Constitution of India Article 14, 16, 309 – Appointment of teachers -- Change in eligibility criteria – Permissibility of -- Advertisement was issued on 19.07.2023 and the eligibility criteria was set out as per 2022 Recruitment Rules -- By which the candidates must have passed Teachers Eligibility Test conducted by the State of Jharkhand – By notice dated 10.01.2024, applications were called from the residents of Jharkhand possessing CTET and STET qualification between 19.01.2024 to 23.01.2024 -- Amendments in 2022 Recruitment Rules were brought on 29.01.2024 with intent to give statutory backing for changing the eligibility in the on-going recruitment process -- Later, the amendment in the advertisement was made --  Held, this amount to change the rules of game after the game has begun – Therefore, the entire action on the part of the State Government is arbitrary and contrary to the law -- Revised eligibility criteria introduced cannot be applied to the ongoing recruitment process.

(Para 57, 58)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Split method of dependency – Deceased was to retire after 2 year of date of death -- Normally Courts and Tribunals have to apply the multiplier as per the judgement of this Court in Sarla Verma case (2009) 6 SCC 121 : 2009 INSC 506 -- Any deviation from the same warrants special reasons to be recorded -- Deceased was a technically qualified person and people are generally healthy at that age and continue working even after retirement --  Compensation on account of loss of income while applying the multiplier of 9 by the Tribunal without applying the split method is the correct calculation on that account -- Future prospects @ 15% awarded -- Loss of estate and funeral expenses, the amount of ?15,000/- each -- Consortium, there are three claimants, namely, the widow, one son and one daughter, they would be entitled to compensation on account of loss of consortium @ ?40,000/- each.

(Para 2, 8-12)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case – Consented compensation – Enhancement – Permissibility of -- Claimant-Appellant had agreed on the additional consolidated sum granted by the High Court -- Despite such consent, the objective when granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is to ensure just and fair compensation is paid to the aggrieved party – Compensation enhanced to Rs.17,82,825/-.

(Para 9-11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 309 -- Recruitment process -- Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies.

(Para 42(1))

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 -- Eligibility criteria – Change in midway – Permissibility of -- Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit -- Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness.

(Para 42(2))

C. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Select list – Right to be appointed -- Decision in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220  -- Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree deals with the right to be placed in the Select List -- The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues.

(Para 42(3))

D. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 – Recruitment rules/ procedure – Deviation from – Permissibility of -- Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved -- Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility -- However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps.

(Para 42(4(5))

E. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 –  Select list – Right to be appointment -- Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment -- State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies -- However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.

(Para 42(6)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 37 – Arbitration award – Interference in – When it comes to scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, jurisdiction of the appellate court in examining an order passed under Section 34, either setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is all the more circumscribed -- A great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act – Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act -- High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction u/s 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’ – Judgment and order passed by High Court set aside and the arbitral award restored.

(Para 39-43)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Onus on accused -- Onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused – If the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Onus on accused -- One of son of deceased’s testimony remotely suggest that any or all of the three accused persons were present in the house or that they had quarrelled with his mother when he left for school -- None of the neighbours had seen the accused present with deceased or that they were seen fleeing away on the fateful morning – Prosecution has not explained as to where the girl child was on the date of the incident -- Likewise, the prosecution also failed to provide any explanation, as to why the other son was not examined in evidence -- Failure to examine them in evidence calls for drawing of adverse inference thereby, further denting the credibility of the prosecution case -- Prosecution failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellants by convincing evidence and beyond the shadow of doubt, so as to affirm their guilt -- Accused-appellants acquitted of the charges by giving them the benefit of doubt – Appeal allowed.

(Para 18-38)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 -- Legitimacy/ Paternity of child – Presumption – DNA Test -- Issue hinges on two primary prongs requiring detailed analysis: (i) the difference between legitimacy and paternity, and consequently, the circumstances under which the presumption of legitimacy is displaced to permit an enquiry into paternity; and (ii) the exercise of ‘balancing of interests’ and evaluating the eminent need for a DNA test -- Legitimacy determines paternity u/s 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted  by proving ‘non-access’.

(Para 9, 70(i))

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Death sentence – Life imprisonment – Murder of Wife & 4 Minor Daughters – Must scrutinize not only the nature of the offence but also the totality of the offender’s circumstances -- Certain mitigating factors, especially the Appellant’s lack of criminal antecedents and his reported conduct in prison, tilt the scales in favour of commutation -- There is no material demonstrating that he would remain a perpetual threat to society or that he is beyond reform -- Indeed, the Probation Officer’s input and the Superintendent of District Jail’s report show a potentially reformable individual -- Imposition of capital punishment is an exception and not the rule -- Even where multiple murders have been committed, if there is evidence or at least a reasonable possibility of reform, a lesser sentence must be preferred – Case does not meet the threshold of “the rarest of rare” so as to irrevocably foreclose the option of life imprisonment – Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment till his last breath.

(Para 21-24)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)