Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63, 64, 65, 85 -- Notarised photocopy of POA – Presumption – Secondary evidence -- The 1st Defendant is obligated to follow the procedure for adducing secondary evidence, and thereafter, claim presumption, if any, available to a document so adduced in evidence -- In the absence of an original or at least a secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act to conclude the execution and extent of authority given by the plaintiff to the 1^st defendant -- Exh. B-2/photocopy is no evidence.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Construction of contract / deed -- If the words in a contract/deed are clear, there is very little the courts must do in the construction of the contract in determining the intention of the parties -- In furtherance of determining the intention, the deed must be read as a whole to ascertain the true meaning of its clauses, and the words of each clause should be interpreted harmoniously -- This intention must be derived directly from the plain and ordinary meaning of the text itself -- Furthermore, these words should be understood exactly as the intended parties would commonly use them -- The covenants must be applied precisely as written, neither diluted into irrelevance nor stretched beyond their original scope -- If the construction of the contract/deed, through its words and context, does not provide the court with the parties’ intention, the court may have regard to the circumstances surrounding its creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended to apply.

(Para 19)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52, 106, 111 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 62 -- Unilateral Termination of lease – Permissibility of – Subsequent purchaser’ right -- Construction of contract / deed -- Nomenclature alone of the document is not the decisive factor of the nature of a document; it is the text and the context that point to the obligations undertaken by the parties to a written document – Document’s nomenclature, text and context lead to only one conclusion: that Defendant No. 1 entered into a 99-year lease deed -- Thus, the unilateral cancellation is illegal, and it should be understood as having interfered with the right of the Plaintiff to remain in possession of the Plaint Schedule Property for 99 years – Rights which are preserved and protected in favour of the lessor are allowed to be enjoyed by subsequent purchasers. 

(Para 21, 22)

Constitution of India, Article 141, 309 -- Service Jurisprudence -- Conflict between State Rules and AICTE Regulations -- Finality of Supreme Court Judgment – Effect of High Court Judgment on Non-Parties -- Rule 6A of Kerala Technical Education Service Rules granting exemption from Ph.D. qualification challenged – Earlier provision upheld by Supreme Court – Promotions granted accordingly -- High Court later held that AICTE Regulations override State Rules and made Ph.D. mandatory – Appellants, not parties before High Court, adversely affected despite earlier Supreme Court relief – Held, nothing said in the impugned order of the High Court will affect their career prospects -- Non-parties affected by judgments are not remediless and may seek review or initiate independent proceedings before appropriate forum.

(Para 5, 6, 13-20)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Power of State -- While it is settled law that mere participation in a selection process does not vest an indefeasible right to appointment, the State’s power to cancel such a process is not absolute and must be grounded in justifiable reasons -- Constitutional Courts, in the exercise of judicial review, are empowered to scrutinize an employer's decision to abandon a recruitment process, particularly when it has reached an advanced stage of conclusion -- If such a decision is found to be arbitrary or lacks a rational nexus with the intended objective, the Court may issue appropriate directions to provide relief.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Selection process cancelled at an advanced stage -- Communication indicates that the selection process was scrapped solely to facilitate a transition to online recruitment -- Abandoning a nearly-concluded selection for a mere procedural change, without any allegation of irregularity, constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power -- Decision is legally flawed and lacks a rational nexus to the objective of fair recruitment -- Cancellation is both unreasonable and unsustainable in the eyes of law – Four posts are presently lying vacant, the appellants can conveniently be accommodated against those vacancies, which would effectively resolve the controversy without causing prejudice to the respondents – Writ petition disposed of.

(Para 13-24)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Income tax return – Proof of source of income – Requirements of -- Plea of Insurance Company that the respondent-claimant has proved the income of the deceased by placing on record and proving the Income Tax Return for the relevant year, yet he failed to demonstrate the source of income earned by the deceased – Held, plea taken is without substance and cannot be accepted – Held, neither High Court hearing appeal nor the tribunal could have gone into the source of income of the deceased, which was duly recorded in the ITR filed by her with the Income Tax authorities.

(Para 11, 12)

Uttarakhand Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 2003, Rule 3 (b) (ii), 7 -- Reversion after promotion – Legality of – Petitioners were granted promotion on 29.01.2021 to the post of Sahayak Nideshak/Lekha Parikshak Adhikari on the recommendation made by duly constituted Departmental Promotion Committee – Rendered satisfactory service for a period of more than four years on the promotional post – Reduction to a lower post, grade, or time scale is a major penalty – Held, procedure for imposing major penalties can be imposed only after following procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules, 2003 – No such procedure followed -- Impugned order set aside.

(Para 6-8)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 75 -- GST -- Show cause notice – Opportunity for hearing – On the date given for personal hearing, the petitioner intimated the respondent that he was travelling out of the country -- Respondent authority failed to grant any adjournment – Adverse order passed – Matter remitted back to the authority to recommence from the stage of personal hearing.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 17 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – POCSO – Kidnapping – Regular bail -- Age of victim as 17 years -- Applicants being relatives of the main accused not directly involved, and are stated to have abetted sexual offences, committed by the main accused who is their relative – Considering the nature of the charges framed against the applicants in the case and their continued incarceration since their arrest, without reference to the prosecution evidence, regular bail allowed.

(Para 11-15)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 309 – Airman in Airforce -- Appointment in State Administrative Service – Petitioner participated in the selection process for selection to the J&K Administrative Services and at the time of applying for the same, he had sought permission from the relevant authorities of the Air Force, however, the said permission was rejected on the ground that the post for which he had applied did not fall in Group-A :

-- Petitioner belongs to a far flung village, that was militancy infested at the time when he was undergoing schooling – Pleaded that both his parents were uneducated hailing from an economically weaker background as such he has undergone studies after facing acute hardships and difficulties -- It is because of these adverse conditions that the petitioner could not continue the studies in a college in a regular mode and instead he had to join employment with Indian Air Force so as to feed himself and his family -- Due to his brilliance, the petitioner without any formal coaching and without any regular studies, obtained the requisite merit in the Combined Competitive Examination and made it to J&K Administrative Service -- This attitude of the petitioner and his urge to attain higher goals and excellence in his career is required to be appreciated and encouraged.

-- Even while performing his duties with Air Force, the petitioner had shown great dedication -- Petitioner had no disciplinary violations in his service meaning thereby that while performing the job as an Airman, he has not given scope for any complaints.

-- Petitioner has potential to attain great heights in his career, denying him permission to continue his service as an Officer of the J&K Administrative Service would work very harshly against him and in fact would discourage and dishearten him immensely, that would lead to wastage of a great talent.

Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondents to issue NOC and discharge certificate in favour of the petitioner subject to deposition of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) with the Air Force authorities within two months.

(Para 11-24)

Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016), Section 5, 15 -- Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Rules, 2016 -- Contractual engagement of Deputy Advocate Generals (DAGs) and Assistant Advocate Generals (AAGs) -- Entitlement of medical reimbursement, LTC facility and other pensionary benefits including the earned leave -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation :

Whether the petitioners, in light of the nature of their duties and conditions of service, can be denied core service benefits solely on the nomenclature of “contractual engagement” ?

To restrict their entitlements on the basis of nomenclature alone would be arbitrary, undermine the dignity of the profession, and contravene the principles of equality, consistency, and legitimate expectation inherent in constitutional governance -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation comes into play -- Petitioners as AAG/DAG are performing duties with higher responsibility and quantum of work than the other Law Officers working in various departments of the State Government -- Being deprived of their private practice, the denial of such benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other emoluments tantamount to putting them at discrimination with the Law Officers such as ADAs, DDAs and DAs deputed in Government Departments -- Respondents directed to release benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other benefits/emoluments to the officers appointed as AAG/DAG including the petitioners.

(Para 18-34)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 121 -- Sanad takseem issued – Jurisdiction of Collector thereafter -- Naksha 'Bey' challenged by the petitioners by filing an appeal before learned Collector, however; during the pendency of appeal, partition proceedings concluded with the drawing of sanad takseem – Thereafter, learned Collector had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

(Para 5)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 – Eviction petition – Application for amendment of written statement – Expedite disposal of same advisable -- Application for amendment on 10.01.2025, to which, reply was filed on 30.05.2025 -- Grievance of the petitioner/ landlord is that hearing in the application is being deliberately delayed by the respondent – Held, though the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller on the application show it was adjourned on a joint request, it is always advisable that such applications are decided at the earliest -- Revision petition disposed of with a direction to the Court concerned to make efforts to hear arguments on the application, preferably on the date and thereafter to decide the said application expeditiously.

(Para 4, 5)

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title dispute -- Long pendency – Direction for expeditious disposal -- Petition u/s 11 of the 1961 Act pending before Additional Deputy Commissioner/ respondent No.3 for the last about eight years -- Decision thereupon has been unnecessarily delayed -- Respondent No.3 directed to dispose of the petition within four months in accordance with law.

(Para 3)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 28A, 54 -- Acquisition of land – Award – Some co-owner challenged the same – Rights of other co-sharer, who did not challenge – Held, being ignorant of prosecuting the cause, appellant/ land-loosers did not challenge the award passed either by filing an application u/s 18 of the Act or no application was filed u/s 28A of the Act after the appeal came to be disposed of in favour of one of the co-owners enhancing the compensation they cannot be denied compensation for the lands lost by them to which they are legitimately entitled to and same cannot be denied on hyper technical grounds -- Appellants held entitled for the interest for a period of five years to be reckoned from today backwards and they would be entitled to all other consequential benefits which flow from award of compensation and the respondent(s) authorities shall compute the compensation as has been determined by the award passed u/s 18 of the Act and/or modified by the High Court or Supreme Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 8, 12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 9 -- Necessary parties -- Partition proceedings involved more than 177 kanals of land distributed among all village proprietors -- Certain proprietors were allotted portions of the suit land now claimed by the plaintiffs as part of the bachat land -- All proprietors who were parties to the original partition proceedings constitute necessary parties to the present suit -- If the partition is flawed qua any of the proprietors, it is flawed in its entirety and must be re-conducted, thereby directly impacting the rights of those not impleaded herein -- Consequently, the finding of the learned Civil Judge that all proprietors were not necessary parties is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.

(Para 12-12.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 -- Suit against dead person – Maintainability of -- A suit cannot be instituted against a dead person, for such a proceeding is a nullity, being void ab initio -- A dead person is a juridical non-entity, and the law does not recognize the institution of a suit either by or against a party who ceased to exist prior to its filing -- The only legally permissible course in such a situation is to implead, the legal heirs or successors-in-interest in their own independent capacity, failing which the suit suffers from a foundational defect -- Order XXII is wholly inapplicable -- Principle actus curiae neminem gravabit has no application, because the defect is inherent and incurable -- Suit having been instituted against a deceased defendant, was inherently defective and non-maintainable, and any decree founded thereon is inexorably rendered coram non judice and unenforceable.

(Para 13-14.5)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158(1)(xvii) – Partition proceedings -- If the plaintiffs were genuinely aggrieved, the statutory route under the Act was the ‘sine qua non’ for redress, and their failure to adopt it is fatal to the suit -- Their attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in conscious disregard of the statutory framework, amounts to a clear circumvention of the legislative scheme -- A suit instituted in violation of such a statutory bar is not merely irregular but fundamentally unsustainable.

(Para 15.1)

D. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158 – Partition proceedings – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Maintainability of suit -- When a statute expressly creates rights, prescribes obligations, and provides a special forum for adjudication, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts stands ousted by necessary implication -- In such a scenario, the principle of ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ operates only within the contours of the statutory framework, and parties must exhaust the remedies provided therein -- Any decree passed by a Civil Court in derogation of such statutory bar is ‘void ab initio’, attracting the maxim ‘coram non judice’ an act done by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law -- Plaintiffs’ conscious awareness of the statutory mechanism, coupled with their deliberate omission to invoke it, renders the suit inherently non-maintainable under Section 158 of the Act -- A party aggrieved by an order passed by a Revenue Officer must avail the statutory remedy of appeal or revision under the Act, and a civil suit challenging such proceedings is not maintainable.

(Para 15.2, 15.3)

E. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz – Presumption -- Wazib-ul-Arz constitutes an integral component of the record-of-rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 -- Consequently, a statutory presumption of truth attaches to it under Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz produced on the record stands duly proved, and the contention that it required further formal proof, or that any interpolation had occurred, is devoid of substance. Gram Panchayat of Village Tulewal’ case 2014(11) RCR (Civil) 2674 relied.

(Para 16.4)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6, 10, 51 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Proposal of Acting Sarpanch passed in favour of petitioner -- No-confidence motion – Requirements of – BDPO directed the petitioner to handover the charge to some other Panch -- Petitioner cannot be held to be a duly elected Sarpanch as envisaged u/s 6 of the 1994 Act read with Rule 4 of 1995 Rules; therefore the provisions contained under Section 10 of the 1994 Act which provides for ‘No Confidence Motion’ against a duly elected Sarpanch, is not attracted -- Contention of the petitioner that he cannot be removed from post of Acting Sarpanch without following process/procedure as envisaged under Section 10 of 1994 Act rejected – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 2, 8-11)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Casual filling of vacancy – Sarpanch/ Panch -- If a casual vacancy has arisen, then in that eventuality, the authorities are required to elect a Sarpanch, panch, etc., in the manner as may be prescribed and any person elected to fill up a vacancy under Section 6 of 1994 Act, is to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term for which the person in whose place he is elected would have otherwise continued in office -- Manner prescribed for filling of a casual vacancy is envisaged under Rule 4 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995.

(Para 12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 376(2) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO – Rape – Conviction for 20 years – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence -- Debatable issues would arise, in particular, absence of injuries in the alleged victim’s MLR -- Absence of semen on any of the exhibits of the alleged victim, especially when such exhibits were collected on the day of the alleged occurrence and that prior to their collection, as per the alleged victim’s MLR, she had neither bathed nor washed -- Applicant is a first-time offender who has already undergone actual custody of 07 years, 06 months and 01 day, which includes nearly 04 years after his conviction -- Appeal not likely to be heard in the near future -- Sentence suspended.

(Para 1, 6)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 – Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Power of appellate authority – Collector is appointing authority -- Divisional Commissioner set aside appointment -- Divisional Commissioner should not have appointed the appellant instead the matter ought to have been remanded back to the Collector – Held, in case, the initially selected candidate is found to be ineligible or not suitable, then the claim of all the who have applied is to be considered afresh.

(Para 5)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent disqualification – Effect of -- Eligibility and disqualification is to be seen upto the date of appointment as Lambardar -- In case any such disqualification is adapt prior to the appointment, the same will invalidate the appointment itself but in case any disqualification is suffered after the appointment that can only lead to taking action against the Lambardar, in accordance with law.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent conviction – Effect of -- Appointment in February, 2014 – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act was field in June, 2014, which resulted into his conviction on 09.02.2015 -- Thereafter, on an appeal preferred, on 18.01.2019, the appellant acquitted – Held, on the date when the appointment was made, there was no conviction rather there was no proceeding even pending on such date – Remanding the case for fresh consideration is not correct appreciation of the facts on record – Order set aside.

(Para 7)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Eviction proceedings u/s 7 of PVCL Act, 1961 pending against appointed candidate/ petitioner -- Held, comparative merits/demerits of candidates indeed require re-look at the hands of learned Collector, therefore, order passed by learned Divisional Commissioner and further affirmed by learned Financial Commissioner, remanding the matter regarding appointment of Lambardar to learned Collector for afresh decision, does not call for any interference.

(Para 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need -- Premises alleged to be available to the landlord is situated on the first floor, whereas evidence on record demonstrates that the demised shop is commercially more advantageous and suitable for running a boutique business -- Landlord is the best judge of his or her bona fide requirement -- Tenant or the Rent Controller cannot compel the landlord to adjust in an alternative premises or to reorganize his/ her affairs in a manner suggested by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 8, 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of lambardar by authorities -- Interference in -- Once the revenue authorities, on the basis of the record, preferred respondent No.4 to the post of a Lambardar of the village concerned, the same need not to be interfered merely on the basis that the appellant thinks that he is a better suited candidate than respondent No.4.

(Para 4)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – FIR against candidate – Effect of -- At the time of the consideration, there was an FIR registered against the appellant, though he was acquitted later on – Held, once at the time of consideration, respondent No.4 had clean record as compared to the appellant, appointing respondent No.4 as Lambardar, cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.

(Para 4)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Re-consideration on remand -- Once the case has been remanded back, the Collector will decide as to who is the best candidate for the appointment to the post of Lambardar on the basis of the facts before him without being influenced by any observation made either by the revenue authorities or by High Court.

(Para 3)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent ex-parte enquiry – Effect of -- Ld. Single Judge set aside the order only on the ground that there was a false document qua his passing of 7th class submitted by the appellant -- Said opinion is based upon an ex parte inquiry report submitted before the learned Single Judge -- Said ex parte report was obtained, firstly, without associating the appellant and secondly, after the appointment of the appellant as Lambardar -- Reliance upon subsequent fact to change the candidate is not correct.

(Para 7)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – Nature of -- Once the appointment is made by the Collector, the filing of an appeal does not mean that the appointment is not final.

(Para 9)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent enquiry – Effect of -- Document subsequent to the appointment can only be taken into consideration for the purpose of setting aside of the appointment, whereas the Commissioner treated the same for substitution of the candidate, which was impermissible.

(Para 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Literate candidate – Requirement of -- Appellant is not literate as he has passed only 6th standard -- Once, under the notification dated 02.06.2008 of the Government of Haryana, the Lambardar should be literate and preferably middle pass; the same has to be followed and candidates are to be adjudged accordingly – Respondent No.4 is 9th pass – Appointment of respondent no. 4 cannot be treated as arbitrary, illegal or perverse to the facts or the law.

(Para 5)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Preference of Revenue authorities – Choice of Collector -- Choice of Lambardar should be left to the discretion of the authorities -- Tehsildar and the SDM had recommended the case of respondent No.4 for appointment as Lambardar -- Once, the initial preference was given to the respondent No.4 and he was appointed by the Collector same position has been restored by the learned Single Judge, coupled with the fact that no disqualification has been attached with the candidate so appointed as Lambardar -- No interference is called for.

(Para 6)

C. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Hereditary claim -- Merely that the father and the grandfather of the appellant was Lambardar, the same cannot be a ground to appoint the appellant as Lambardar in case any better candidate suited for the job was available, as no hereditary right exists with the appellant.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence -- Suit for dissolution of partnership firm -- Accounts and records were in the hands of respondent/ defendant No.1 and his chartered accountant – However, while appearing as DW, respondent/ defendant No.1 failed to produce any record – All the records pertaining to the firm are with respondent/ defendant No.2-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., as the firm is licencee of respondent/ defendant No.2 – Held, production of records was necessitated on account of denial by respondents/ defendants, therefore, the application for additional evidence cannot be held to be delayed and having not filed after due diligence – Two effective opportunities given subject to cost of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Long pendency of suit – Expeditious adjudication -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Revision petition seeking a direction to the learned Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), to expeditiously adjudicate Civil Suit as almost 11 years have elapsed since the institution of the suit and the matter is still pending – Ld. ACJ (JD) directed to decide the suit at the earliest, preferably within a period of six months.

(Para 1-6)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need – Non-residential building -- Ejectment of tenant on bonafide ground can be made both in case of residential and non-residential building.

(Para 17)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Shop-cum-flat – Misuse of premises by tenant -- No permission from Rent controller for carrying on commercial activity in the residential portion taken by both the parties -- Residential portion given to the petitioner for store purposes, in which he is carrying on the tailoring business and by doing so, he has violated the condition laid down in Section 11 of the Act -- Landlord has shown number of show cause notices received by him for misuse of premises – Landlord should not suffer because of the misuse of the premises by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 18-25)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 122 – Non-implementation of Sanad Takseem/ Instrument of partition for 3 years – Second application of partition – Maintainability – Earlier sanad takseem is dated 08.04.1992 -- Partition is to be executed within a period of three years – Second partition application filled on the basis of jamabandi for the year 2015-16, wherein the entire land under partition has been shown under joint ownership -- Held, once the sanad takseem dated 08.04.1992 was never implemented/ executed at the spot nor the said sanad takseem was reflected/ implemented in the revenue records and the status of the partition continued to be recorded joint in the revenue records, it has to be taken that the parties by their conduct chose not to implement the partition in terms of sanad takseem and chose to keep their holdings joint – Fresh partition proceedings concluded with the drawing of sanad takseem dated 19.03.2023 -- No fault – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 4-9)

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3G -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23, 28 -- Solatium and interest -- District Revenue Officer-cum-Competent Authority vide its supplementary award, awarded the benefit of solatium as well as statutory interest payable under Sections 23 & 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in favour of similarly situated land-owners – Representation of the petitioner for similar relief denied – Held, respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to act in a discriminatory manner – Order set aside, respondent No.1 to pass a supplementary award in favour of petitioner with respect to solatium as well as statutory interest.

(Para 4-9)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 16(2), 122 – Sanad Takseem – Instrument of partition – Challenge to -- Whether the learned Collector can entertain, hear and decide the revision petition against Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition)? -- Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition) is to be given effect as if it were a decree of immovable property -- Held, learned Collector is not entitled to exercise revisional jurisdiction and at best he can only formulate an opinion and report the case along with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Commissioner, whose decision shall be final – Revision petition and order passed by learned Collector in revision quashed.

(Para 8-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In the criminal proceedings, it is the accused, which has the privilege to hide his defence or to open it, if so chosen, even at the last stage of the trial – Respondent/ accused had opened its defence during the cross-examination -- Complainant moved application to fill the lacuna, to deprive the accused from drawing any benefit out of the cross-examination of the complainant -- Held, after disclosing of the defence by the accused, complainant/ prosecution could not be permitted to fill the lacuna – Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. rightly dismissed.

(Para 1, 5-7)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 3 – Death of wife -- Emergency parole to hardcore prisoner -- A hardcore prisoner can be released on temporary basis or on furlough after completion of 5 years of imprisonment but he cannot be released on emergency parole in case he has not completed requisite 5 years period of his imprisonment after the date of his latest offence -- Fresh FIR under NDPS Act was registered against the petitioner on 04.06.2025 -- He cannot be released on emergency parole -- To enable him to perform the last rites/ rituals of his deceased wife, he is allowed to be taken to his place of residence at his own expenses, while under police escort guard.

(Para 5, 6)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 22 -- Faulty haircut – Deficiency in service -- Compensation – Prosperous career derailed in Corporate job/ Modelling/ Role in movies – Claim for crores of rupees because of deficiency in service was required to be established -- This could not be established by merely producing photocopies of the documents with discrepancies -- Documents produced along with affidavit of complainant were in the form of photocopies, none of the authors of those documents examined -- Rs.2 Crores compensation cannot be justified – Compensation modified to the extent of Rs. 25 lacs.

(Para 4, 19-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(i) -- Special Marriage Act-1954 (43 of 1954), Section 4(i) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Rape -- Promise to marry – Prosecutrix already married – Effect of – Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ Trial – Complainant is a married lady with a ten years old child -- Divorce proceedings currently pending adjudication between her and her husband -- Such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR -- Said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and sub-clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 -- Law prohibits bigamous unions -- Complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman incapable of taking decisions for herself -- Offence alleged against the accused-appellant not made out at all – FIR, the Chargesheet and the consequent proceedings in Session case quashed.

(Para 19-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Rape repeatedly on the same woman -- Interpretation of -- The object of this provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the same victim -- Under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376(2)(n) – Promise to marry – Rape -- Mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case - An offence u/s 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.

(Para 18)

A. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b) -- Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (13 of 1955), Section 3 -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3), 26 -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – An order declaring surplus area is, generally not amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court, however, there are exceptions to this general rule -- To find out whether a civil court is barred under provisions of Section 26 of 1972 Act, the test would be whether there was a violation of 1972 Act/1953 Act/PEPSU Act committed by authorities or there was breach of natural justice -- Land was declared surplus vide orders dated 21.08.1956 and 09.06.1961 -- Possession of the land so declared surplus was never taken by the State -- In the absence of utilization, the orders declaring the land surplus in the hands of the landowner did not become operative against his rights prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- Rights of major sons of the landowner had come into force prior to the utilization of the land so declared surplus -- Plaintiffs are challenging the operation and effect of those orders on account of non-utilization of the surplus land till the appointed date and effect of section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Nature of the dispute raised by the plaintiff-appellants is, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court.

(Para 13, 14, 18)

B. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – Where land declared surplus in the hand of land-owner was not utilised by State prior to enforcement of 1972 Act, such land would not automatically vest in State – Surplus area is required to be re-determined under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Such re-determination shall be governed by the provisions of the 1953 Act only if any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- However, if the land stood utilized prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act by way of allotment and taking of possession, the same shall vest exclusively in the State -- Where the land has not been utilized and none of the conditions laid down under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act, such land shall also vest in the State from the appointed date, i.e., 24.01.1971.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) – Declaration of Surplus land – Non-utilisation of – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – State was duty-bound to determine whether the surplus area was liable to be re-determined on account of the existence of any of the conditions enumerated under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- No such exercise undertaken by the State -- Appeal allowed, competent authority directed to determine whether any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen in favour of the landowner prior to the appointed date under the 1972 Act -- If such conditions are found to exist, the surplus area shall be re-determined accordingly under the 1953 Act -- In case none of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) are made out, the surplus land shall vest in the State.

(Para 19)

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1991, Rule 20 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Unauthorised absence – Dismissal – Forged Medical certificate -- Doctor appeared and gave a statement/ Ex.P-9 to the effect that the medical certificate in question was not issued by him; that he was not authorized to issue such certificate and Medical Certificate might have been fabricated by using his old letter pad -- Two undisputed signatures of Doctor, one in exhibit P-9 and the other while acknowledging receipt of notice are themselves not identical, though broadly similar -- Signature on the Ex. P-7 Medical Certificate is also not identical though broadly similar to what is in the acknowledgement and what is on Ex. P-9 – Inquiry officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert, before recording a finding of fabrication and forgery -- Failure to do so,  charge of forgery has not been proved – Dismissal order set aside -- Appellant ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including all arrears of salary and emoluments since the non-employment was not due to the appellant’s fault.

(Para 10, 16, 40-45)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) -- Criminal jurisprudence – Police complaint against public servant by Gram Pradhan – Maintainability of -- No provision in the Cr.P.C., which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence -- No specific provision in the 1984 Act which limits the eligibility of the person making the complaint – Held, High Court manifestly erred in law in holding that since the Gram Pradhan was not the competent authority to lodge an FIR, the action of the Special Judge in taking cognizance and summoning the accused is bad in law -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 7-11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Deduction of family pension -- Since, the deceased was a pensioner and there was no evidence of any independent source of income, the High Court has rightly held that the amount being received by the widow as family pension had to be deducted.

(Para 9)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Juvenile – Juvenile/ child in conflict with law – Bail -- Seriousness of the alleged offence or the age of the juvenile are not relevant consideration for denial of bail above 16 years of age -- There is no classification provided in Section 12 of the Act, 2015 with regard to grant of bail -- Section 12 of the Act is applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature.

(Para 6)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 1 -- Object of the Juvenile Justice Act – It is based on belief that children are the future of the society and in case they go into conflict with law under some circumstances, they should be reformed and rehabilitated and not punished -- No society can afford to punish its children -- Punitive approach towards children in conflict with law would be self-destructive for the society -- At the same time if the keeping of the child in custody is helpful in his development and rehabilitation or protection, only then it could be said that release of the child would defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 7)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 115, 126(2),117, 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 303(2), 3(5) – Attempt to murder/ theft -- Juvenile/ child in conflict with law – Aged about 16 years -- Bail -- In absence of any material or evidence of reasonable grounds, it cannot be said that his release would defeat the ends of justice -- Findings recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board as well as appellate court declining bail are based on heinousness of the offence -- Both the judgment and order set-aside -- Criminal revision allowed -- Revisionist ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 2, 9, 10)

Constitution of India, 300A – Retiral benefits – Denial of -- Pension and gratuity are not bounty, but, property and hard earned benefit of the employee – Encashment of earned leave, Unearned leave, Gratuity, constitutes property under Article 300-A of Constitution of India same cannot be withheld without following due process of law -- Third respondent directed to pass appropriate orders with regard to disbursement of admissible benefits viz., General Provident Fund amount, Special Provident Fund, Encashment of Earned Leave and Unearned Leave on Private Affairs to the petitioner within a period of four weeks.

(Para 14-21)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348, 438(2), 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397(2), 482 – Dismissal of application u/s 311 CR.P.C/ 348 BNSS – Maintainability of revision -- Ordinarily revision not maintainable being an interlocutory order – What is explicitly barred, cannot be granted backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers -- But this bar on the inherent powers is subject to a rider, whereby the High Court must examine if any gross injustice has been done -- If interlocutory order caused gross injustice, it would not only be justified for the High Court, but also it would be a duty of the High Court to invoke inherent powers and prevent injustice.

(Para 4)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Cross-examination of witness – Closing of same -- Duty of Trial court – Amicus curiae/ legal aid should have been given --  Petitioners/ accused filed an application u/s 311 CrPC, explaining the reason for inability of the defence counsel to appear -- Although, learned trial court was not convinced, even then, the learned trial court could have invoked the power on its own to ensure no injustice was caused – It is not just the accused who suffers injustice, it is the entire trial gets vitiated -- Presence of legal assistance for the accused facing a trial is the core element of fair trial -- Court should either appoint an amicus curiae or should direct the local legal services authority to send some legal aid counsel -- In the name of expeditious trial, fairness of the trial cannot be allowed to become a casualty – Matter remanded back to trial court.

(Para 7, 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 531 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) -- Maintainability of Anticipatory bail  after BNSS, 2023.

-- The Sanhita, 2023 is upholding the importance of protecting personal liberty -- The restrictions on granting anticipatory bail under Section 438(6) of the Code (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) are no longer in effect -- When the Parliament enacts more liberal provisions, the benefit thereof should be available to all persons who may be affected, regardless of when their cases originated -- Accused held entitled to the benefit of the more liberal provisions introduced by the Sanhita, 2023.

Matter referred to a larger Bench by formulating the following question:-

“Whether the provision of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 would prevail over the Uttarakhand State Amendment under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and since the provisions of the Sanhita, 2023 are beneficial to the accused, can it be applied with respect to earlier cases (regardless of when the case of the accused originated)?”

(Para 19-26)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 425 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 384 – Criminal appeal against conviction – Dismissed in default – Permissibility of -- Dismissal of Criminal Appeal in default on account of absence of learned counsel for the appellant is contrary to law and is not in consonance with Section 425 of the B.N.S.S. (corresponding to Section 384 Cr.P.C.) -- Criminal Appeal restored to its original number.

(Para 6-9)

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 – Criminal Contempt – Punishment – Apology -- The proviso and the Explanation to Section 12 recognise that where the contemnor expresses genuine remorse and tenders an apology to the satisfaction of the Court, he may be discharged, or the sentence awarded may be remitted -- Even after a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment, the Court retains the discretion to exercise such power -- Once repentance is demonstrated, the Court may act with magnanimity -- However, the apology must be bona fide and must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court, which is required to exercise this discretion judiciously.

(Para 8.3)

B. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 – Criminal Contempt – Punishment – Apology -- In reply-affidavit, the appellant-contemnor tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology, which stands duly recorded by the High Court -- However, the High Court declined to accept the apology -- It concluded that the apology was merely perfunctory, tendered for the sake of formality, and that the expression of remorse appeared borrowed rather than borne out of sincere repentance -- High Court sentenced the appellant-contemnor to simple imprisonment for a period of one week and imposed a fine of Rs.2,000/- -- Held, High Court failed to exercise its contempt jurisdiction with due circumspection -- Once the appellant-contemnor had, from the very first day of her appearance in the suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse and tendered an unconditional apology, the High Court was required to examine whether such apology satisfied the statutory parameters u/s 12 of the Contempt Act -- In the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law -- Ends of justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by the High Court – Appeal allowed.

(Para 2, 9-11)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce – Cruelty – Marriage broken down irretrievably -- Parties have been residing separately since 2012 which is more than thirteen years now, and no substantial or meaningful effort has been made in restoring their matrimonial relationship -- High Court also interacted with the parties in person and found the marriage to have broken down irretrievably -- Relationship has become deeply embittered and acrimonious over the years -- They have a seventeen-year old daughter whose wellbeing, care, and future stability must remain paramount -- No purpose in perpetuating a legal bond that has long ceased to have any substance -- Continuing the marital tie would serve neither the spouses nor their child -- Divorce granted by High Court, affirmed.

(Para 4-7)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia), 25 -- Divorce – Permanent alimony -- Respondent-husband is a serving judicial officer holding a responsible public position and is, therefore, under a heightened obligation to ensure fair, adequate, and dignified financial security for his wife and daughter -- Appellant-wife, who is presently not engaged in legal practice, is entitled to maintain a standard of living broadly commensurate with what she enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage -- Child, now seventeen years of age and soon to pursue higher education, will also require continued financial support and stability -- Rs.50,00,000/- awarded -- LIC policy purchased by the respondent-husband, the amount of Rs.41,00,000/- shall be deposited in the account of the daughter and a sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be deposited by the respondent-husband in his daughter’s account until she is able to maintain herself; bearing all expenses towards her marriage; and that the prohibition against disinheriting the daughter are upheld and shall continue to operate -- All pending proceedings, whether civil or criminal, instituted by either party against the other and arising from the marriage shall stand closed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While invoking power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. trial court should consider the statements of the witnesses adduced before it and it should not place reliance upon the material available in the charge-sheet or the case diary.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While passing the summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. court must consider whether more than prima-facie case is made out, or not -- Mere prima-facie case is not sufficient -- It is to analyze, whether before the trial court material was sufficient to summon the revisionists u/s 319 Cr.P.C. or not.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife/ child – Education of wife will not come in way to claim maintenance – No evidence to establish that the revisionist No.1/ wife is presently employed or earning -- Mere fact that she is a post graduate and has done ITI Diploma in tailoring by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that revisionist No.1/wife is working for gain -- Revisionist No.1/ wife staying at her parental home and taking care of her child without any financial or emotional support from the opposite party No.2/husband -- Complete responsibility of meeting the daily need, education and medical expenses of a minor child lies upon both the parents -- Held that both the revisionist No.1/ wife as well as the minor son are equally entitled to maintenance from the opposite party No.2 and he is legally liable to maintain both his wife and minor son – Matter remanded back to the learned Family Court for fresh determination of maintenance.

(Para 15-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial Evidence – Last seen together theory – Failure to establish proximity and reliable identification – Effect – No clear-cut time specified on which the death occurred, when it is trite that the last seen together theory projected by the prosecution should be proximate to the death of the victim – It is the roommates of the deceased who informed PW1 that they were told by a friend of the deceased that he was going to meet A1 in the evening -- The roommates of the deceased were not examined -- Identification of the accused by a witness for the first time in the police station, without holding a Test Identification Parade -- Nothing on record to indicate ownership of auto rickshaw, who was alleged to be driver of auto rickshaw, who had picked up three persons and dropped them near scene of occurrence --   Ransom calls hence remained an unsolved puzzle – Last scene theory not proved -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 13-16, 31)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Confession statement -- Confession can form a legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made -- Confession allegedly made by the appellants is of no use in bringing home a conviction, especially when there was no corroboration available, of the statements made, from other valid evidence -- Admissions were only that made in the confessional statements, of the death having occurred in the presence of the accused, on the day the deceased was found missing, which is not worthy of acceptance – Conviction set aside.

(Para 29-31)

A. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Occupancy tenant recorded as owner in revenue record/ Jamabandi – No question of getting a declaration from the Court to the effect that he had become the owner by virtue of the 1952 Act.

(Para 15)

B. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Death of occupancy tenant -- After getting ownership, he died without leaving behind legal heirs -- Effect of -- Occupancy tenant was already recorded as an owner well before his death -- As such, the defendants-appellants, the erstwhile landlords were left with no right, title or interest whatsoever in the suit land so as to seek redemption of the same – Trial Court rightly set aside mutation re-entered in the name of erstwhile owner.

(Para 16, 17)