***

MACT -- Gratuitous passenger -- Risk not covered under policy -- Insurer directed to pay compensation first and recover from owner and driver.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation -- Gratuitous passenger -- Agricultural tractor -- Deceased travelling on bonnet of tractor as gratuitous passenger -- Risk not covered under insurance policy -- Insurer not liable to indemnify insured, but can be directed to satisfy award in first instance and thereafter recover amount from owner and driver -- “Pay and recover” principle applicable.

(Paras 3, 17-20)

***

Mutation -- Registered Will -- Revenue authorities have right to conduct summary inquiry when a document is produced for mutation but have no jurisdiction to comment upon the validity of a registered document.

***

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (6 of 1887), Sections 34, 36 -- Mutation -- Registered Will -- Summary inquiry -- Revenue authorities are required to update annual records with respect to inheritance, sale and other transfers and have right to conduct summary inquiry when a document is produced for mutation -- However, they have no jurisdiction to comment upon the validity of a registered document -- Validity and legality of Will to be agitated before Civil Court.

(Paras 6-8)

***

Ancestral nature of property must be proved by cogent evidence; mere revenue entries showing devolution upon sons, without producing the mutation or underlying document/Will, do not establish ancestral or coparcenary character, and a son cannot challenge his father’s sale of property proved to be his personal property.

***

A. Hindu Law -- Ancestral property -- Proof -- Burden on plaintiff -- Plaintiff claiming suit land to be ancestral and coparcenary property was required to lead cogent evidence, including relevant revenue excerpts and documents showing the mode of devolution -- Jamabandi entries showing mutation in favour of sons, without production of the mutation or document on the basis of which mutation was sanctioned, insufficient to establish ancestral nature of property -- Where oral evidence itself disclosed that property had been mutated on the basis of some document, withholding such mutation/document warranted adverse inference against plaintiff -- Finding that plaintiff failed to prove ancestral nature of property, upheld.

(Paras 14-16)

B. Sale deed -- Challenge by son -- Personal property of father -- Once plaintiff failed to establish that suit land was ancestral or coparcenary property and property was held to be personal property of defendant No.1, plaintiff could not challenge sale deed executed by his father -- Sale deed having been executed for consideration duly mentioned therein, no ground made out for setting aside the same -- Concurrent findings of Courts below disclosed no infirmity or illegality warranting interference in second appeal.

(Paras 15-16)

***

MACT -- Fake driving licence -- Insurer cannot recover from owner without proving owner's knowledge of fake licence -- Knowledge of owner sine qua non for insurer's recovery rights.

***

MACT -- Just compensation -- Compensation enhanced to grant just compensation despite no appeal or cross-objections by claimants.

***

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Fake driving licence -- Burden of proof -- Knowledge of owner -- Fundamental breach of insurance policy -- Insurance Company seeking exoneration or recovery rights must plead and prove that owner willfully and knowingly handed over vehicle to person not holding a valid and effective driving licence -- Mere proof that driving licence was fake does not establish breach -- Knowledge of fake licence is sine qua non for fastening liability upon owner -- In absence of proof that owner was aware of invalidity and despite such knowledge permitted driver to drive, insurer cannot avoid liability or recover compensation from owner -- Pay and recover direction set aside.

(Paras 22 to 25, 32, 38 to 41)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 149(2)(a)(ii), 166 -- Driving licence -- Duty of owner -- Owner required to verify that driver possesses a driving licence which prima facie appears genuine and is competent to drive -- Owner is not expected to make enquiries with licensing authorities all over the country to ascertain veracity of licence unless there is cause to believe otherwise -- Insurance Company remains liable unless it proves that owner/insured was aware or had notice that licence was fake or invalid and still permitted person to drive.

(Paras 39 to 40)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 149(2)(a)(ii), 166 – Fake Driving license -- Evidence -- Report regarding fake driving licence -- Tribunal relied upon report and notarized affidavit of District Transport Officer without affording opportunity to owner and claimants to rebut or cross-examine -- Though strict rules of evidence may not govern MACT proceedings, Tribunal cannot collect and rely upon evidence in violation of principles of natural justice -- Deposition of summoned witness subjected to cross-examination has evidentiary value; report submitted in response to summons cannot substitute oral testimony -- Approach held unknown to law.

(Paras 26 to 36)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Sections 166 and 168 -- Compensation enhancement without appeal of claimant -- Just compensation -- Claimants had neither filed appeal nor cross-objections for enhancement -- Court nevertheless required to determine whether compensation awarded falls within definition of 'just compensation' -- Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial piece of legislation, endeavour of Court/Tribunal while deciding claim petition should be to grant just compensation -- Award enhanced by granting loss of consortium to both parents.

(Paras 42, 44 to 49)

A. Stamp duty -- Industrial property -- Manufacturing activity coupled with sale of manufactured goods -- Sale, including retail sale, of goods manufactured in premises does not change character of use of property from industrial to commercial.

(Para 7)

B. Stamp duty -- Gift deed -- Residential property used for industrial purposes -- Use of property is determinative of valuation.

(Para 10)

C. Stamp duty -- Gift deed -- Property valued as residential though used for industrial purposes -- Residential valuation higher than industrial valuation -- Valuation adopted by executant voluntarily -- Excess stamp duty paid on such valuation not refundable merely because property held to be used for industrial purposes.

(Para 10)

***

SARFAESI -- Auction sale -- Shortfall in EMD, subsequently made good by immediate deposit of 25% of sale price, does not affect validity of bid -- Extended time for balance payment during pending litigation valid -- Borrower entitled to surplus sale proceeds with 7% interest where Bank failed to keep excess amount in interest-bearing account.

***

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002) -- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 9(3) -- Auction sale -- Earnest money deposit -- Shortfall in EMD -- Clause requiring deposit of EMD held to be non-statutory and incorporated with an object to filter out non-serious bidders -- Any anterior shortfall in deposit of EMD pales into insignificance the moment 25% of sale price was deposited -- Non-conformity did not result in any prejudice or injustice to other bidder or borrower -- Shortfall in EMD does not affect validity of bid.

(Paras 20, 21)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13 -- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 9(4) – Auction sale -- Balance sale consideration -- Payment within fifteen days or within the extended period as allowed by the Bank in writing -- In view of pendency of court proceedings, Bank agreed to extend time for deposit of balance sale consideration -- Auction-purchasers paid balance amount immediately after borrower's appeal was dismissed by Tribunal -- Contention that sale stood vitiated on account of delayed payment does not deserve acceptance.

(Para 22)

C. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13 -- Surplus sale proceeds -- Bank left with excess amount after appropriation of sale proceeds -- Bank ought to have kept the balance amount in an interest-bearing account -- For failure of Bank to do so, borrower cannot be penalized -- Borrower entitled to refund of excess amount along with interest @ 7% per annum from date when surplus amount was kept in non-interest-bearing account till payment.

(Paras 23, 24)

***

Domestic Violence -- Settlement -- Waiver of claims -- Wife voluntarily relinquished all monetary claims, including maintenance -- Revival of such claims through subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted -- Proceedings constitute abuse of process, quashed.

***

Settlement -- Adult daughter -- Not party to Settlement Agreement -- Cannot be said that she had waived her right to monetary claims -- Liberty granted to initiate fresh proceedings seeking monetary reliefs, in accordance with law.

***

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005) -- Settlement Agreement -- Voluntary relinquishment of claims -- Wife voluntarily relinquished all monetary claims, including maintenance, under Settlement Agreement and reiterated waiver before Family Court -- Domestic violence complaint pertained to alleged acts predating Settlement Agreement -- No fresh cause of action arising post-divorce pleaded -- Revival of such claims through subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted -- Proceedings constitute abuse of process -- Mere averments of coercion, absent any legal challenge to Settlement Agreement or decree of divorce, cannot suffice.

(Paras 8 to 13)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005) -- Settlement Agreement -- Adult daughter -- Daughter had attained majority and was not a party to Settlement Agreement -- Cannot be said that she had waived her right to monetary claims -- Settlement executed between husband and wife could not bind daughter -- Liberty granted to initiate fresh proceedings seeking monetary reliefs, in accordance with law.

(Paras 14 and 15)

***

Appointment of Lambardar -- Higher educational qualification alone not decisive.

***

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887) -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Comparative merit -- Petitioner claimed preference on ground of being B.A. LL.B. whereas selected candidate was 10+2 pass -- Rule 15 requires candidate to be literate, preferably middle pass -- Selected candidate, having studied upto 12th class, could not be said to be ineligible for appointment -- Petitioner being a practising advocate may not be available in village at all times to attend duties of Lambardar -- Collector considered age, educational qualification, landholding and recommendations of Tehsildar and Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) while appointing selected candidate -- Choice of Collector cannot be lightly interfered with, even if two views are possible, unless there is patent illegality or perversity -- No such illegality or perversity pointed out -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Paras 5.1-8)

***

Appointment of lambardar -- Recommendations of lower revenue officers not binding on Collector.

***

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 28 -- Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rules 15, 17 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Comparative merits -- Collector appointed petitioner primarily on basis of recommendations of lower revenue officers, despite rival candidate being younger and more educated -- Recommendations of lower revenue officers are not binding on Collector -- Collector required to apply his own judicious mind and consider comparative merits of all candidates in terms of Rules 15 and 17 for appointment of most suitable candidate.

(Paras 5-7.1)

***

Mutation proceedings -- Disputed title -- Pendency of civil suit -- Revenue authorities justified in keeping mutation proceedings in abeyance till final adjudication of title by competent Civil Court.

***

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Constitution of India, Articles 226 and 227 -- Mutation proceedings -- Disputed title -- Registered will -- Proceedings kept in abeyance -- Mutation arising on death of landowner -- Registered Will propounded by sons, while one of them had already instituted civil suit challenging validity of Will and claiming ownership -- Assistant Collector adjourned mutation proceedings sine die awaiting decision of Civil Court -- Where title over property is disputed and matter is pending before Civil Court, mutation entries in revenue records must remain in abeyance till title is finally adjudicated -- Plea that mutation proceedings cannot be kept in abeyance held without merit -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Paras 1-9)

***

Recall of order -- Change in legal position -- Basis of earlier dismissal having ceased to exist, order recalled and writ petition restored.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Recall of order -- Subsequent change in legal position -- Writ petition had been dismissed on basis of Supreme Court judgment subsequently reviewed -- Foundation of earlier order having ceased to exist, order of dismissal recalled and writ petition restored to its original number.

(Paras 1-4)

B. Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 13-A -- Disputed questions of fact -- Writ jurisdiction -- Land recorded as “Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Hakdaran Araji Hasab Rasad Rakba Khewat” -- Petitioners challenged carving out of plots/Baras and change in nature of land without payment of compensation -- State raised objection that disputed questions of fact were involved and statutory remedy under Section 13-A was available -- Petitioners fairly sought withdrawal of writ petition with liberty to institute suit before Competent Court -- All parties left free to raise all pleas -- Competent Court to decide matter independently in accordance with law without being influenced by any observation made by High Court -- In case stay application is filed along with suit, same directed to be considered within three weeks from date of filing.

(Paras 5-9)

***

Writ petition -- Withdrawal -- Earlier writ petition withdrawn without liberty to file fresh petition -- Subsequent writ petition on same cause not maintainable.

***

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ petition -- Withdrawal without liberty -- Subsequent petition on same cause of action -- Withdrawal of writ petition without permission to file a fresh writ petition does not amount to res judicata, but remedy under Article 226 of Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by petitioner in respect of cause of action relied upon in writ petition -- Subsequent writ petition on same cause not maintainable.

(Paras 2 to 5)

Maintenance to minor -- Enhancement -- Right of minor to claim enhancement cannot be curtailed on basis of agreement between parents at time of divorce.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 125 and 127 -- Minor -- Maintenance -- Enhancement -- Petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. preferred on behalf of minor daughter -- Rs.1,500/- per month maintenance ordered to be paid in judgment and decree for dissolution of marriage made basis for disposal of petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, deemed to have been passed in a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. -- Petition for enhancement was and is maintainable -- Right to claim maintenance or enhancement of maintenance cannot be curtailed only on basis of mutual agreement arrived at between parents at time of divorce -- In changed circumstances, daughter receiving maintenance amount from father entitled for enhancement thereof, depending upon facts and circumstances and increasing expenses to have basic amenities -- Enhancement of monthly maintenance amount from Rs.1,500/- to Rs.2,000/- reasonable and justified -- Revision dismissed.

(Paras 10, 13, 16 and 21 to 24)

***

Senior Citizens Act -- Coram of Maintenance Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal -- Haryana Government notification dated 17.11.2016 -- Tribunals required to comprise three members -- Impugned orders passed in absence of second and third members -- Orders coram non judice and nullity in eyes of law -- Set aside.

***

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007) -- Maintenance -- Restoration of possession -- Maintenance Tribunal -- Appellate Tribunal -- Coram -- Respondent instituted application seeking maintenance, restoration of possession of shop and restraint against interference in possession -- Maintenance Tribunal partly allowed application and directed petitioner to pay maintenance -- Statutory appeal allowed and transfer deed cancelled -- Haryana Government notification dated 17.11.2016 prescribed composition of Maintenance Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals -- Both Tribunals required to comprise three members, with Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate acting as respective Chairmen -- Both impugned orders passed in absence of second and third members -- Orders rendered without mandated coram -- Orders were vitiated as passed coram non judice -- Orders are nullity in the eyes of law and could not be sustained -- Impugned orders set aside -- Matter remanded to Maintenance Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

(Paras 2 to 6)

***

Sentence reduced -- Petitioner faced rigors of long criminal prosecution -- Accident had taken place about 26 years back -- Sentence reduced to period already undergone.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 304-A and 337 – Death by accident -- Sentence reduced -- Petitioner had already undergone custody of 29 days including remission out of awarded substantive sentence of one year -- Principle of proportionality to be borne in mind as awarding punishment is not merely retributive but also reformative -- Petitioner faced rigors of long criminal prosecution and accident had taken place about 26 years back -- In facts and circumstances of the case, sentence reduced to period already undergone.

(Paras 4, 7 to 13)

***

Regular bail – Murder -- Prolonged custody -- Speedy trial -- Appellant in custody for about 2 years and 7 months -- Fatal/grievous injury not attributed to him and only simple injury attributed to him -- Only 2 out of 34 prosecution witnesses examined and trial not likely to conclude shortly -- Appellant ordered to be released on bail.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Constitution of India, 1950, Article 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 396, 323, 406, 307, 148, 149 -- Regular bail – Murder -- Appellant linked to acts attributed with aid of Section 149 -- Appellant alleged to have reached spot being accompanied by co-accused and to have opened an attack upon victim, complainant and his brother -- Fatal/grievous injury on person of victim not attributed to appellant -- Only simple injury on shoulder/person of injured attributed to him -- Though allegations made out a prima facie case, appellant had been in custody for a period of about 2 years and 7 months -- Only 2 out of 34 prosecution witnesses examined so far and chances of conclusion of trial in near future bleak -- Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial not in consonance with right guaranteed under Article 21 -- Howsoever serious a crime may be, accused has a right to speedy trial -- Bail is not to be withheld as a punishment -- Impugned order set aside -- Appellant ordered to be released on bail subject to furnishing personal as well as surety bonds to satisfaction of Court concerned.

(Paras 7 to 9)

***

Land acquisition -- Petitioner withdrew challenge to acquisition notifications and award and sought liberty to invoke Section 101-A -- Permitted to file representation -- Respondents directed to consider and decide same, after affording opportunity of hearing, in accordance with law.

***

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Sections 24(2) and 101-A -- Land acquisition -- Lapse of acquisition proceedings -- Representation -- Petitioner had challenged notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and award dated 28.02.1996 and sought declaration that acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act -- During pendency of writ petition, petitioner submitted that it would not challenge acquisition proceedings and award and sought liberty to move representation requesting respondents to invoke power under Section 101-A on plea that acquisition of land was not viable -- Petitioner permitted to withdraw writ petition qua challenge to notifications and award and to file representation under Section 101-A within one month -- Respondents directed to consider and decide representation independently, in accordance with law, within four months from receipt thereof.

(Paras 3 to 7)

***

Cease to occupy -- Once landlord establishes prima facie case, onus shifts to tenant to prove actual occupation or reasonable cause for non-occupation -- Failure to rebut -- Ejectment restored.

***

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949), Section 13(2)(v) – Cease to occupy -- Ejectment -- Tenant ceased to occupy demised premises for continuous period of four months without reasonable cause -- Possession and occupation are not synonymous -- Actual occupation and useful use of tenancy premises are material -- Initial burden lies upon landlord, but onus remains shifting -- Once landlord establishes foundational facts and raises a prima facie case of cessation of occupation, onus shifts to tenant to rebut same or establish reasonable cause for non-occupation -- Tenant specifically asserted that Karyana business was being carried on from demised shop but failed to produce electricity bills, account books, purchase or sale invoices or other material indicating actual business activity -- On cumulative assessment of evidence, landlord established prima facie case and tenant failed to rebut same -- Order of ejectment order passed by Rent Controller restored -- Revision allowed.

(Paras 10 to 29, 47 to 56)

***

Striking out of written statement -- Mere inconsistency with earlier written statement or introduction of additional plea does not attract power under Order VI Rule 16 -- Statutory conditions must be satisfied.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 6 Rule 16 -- Striking out pleadings -- Amended plaint -- Amended written statement -- Plaintiff's plaint was amended and defendant filed fresh written statement -- Written statement struck off on ground that defendant had changed his earlier defence and introduced plea of limitation -- Power under Order VI Rule 16 not available merely because pleading contains defence inconsistent with or different from earlier pleading -- Court must record finding that matter sought to be struck out is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, prejudices, embarrasses or delays fair trial, or is otherwise abuse of process of Court -- None of statutory parameters satisfied -- Mere omission of earlier plea or introduction of additional plea does not furnish lawful basis for striking off entire written statement -- Impugned order set aside -- Petition allowed.

(Paras 9, 15 to 18 and 20)

***

Default bail -- Valid extension of time granted before expiry of 180 days -- No indefeasible right to default bail accrued.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A(4) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 187(3) -- Default bail -- Extension of investigation period -- Before expiry of 180 days, prosecution sought extension supported by Public Prosecutor's report setting out progress of investigation and reasons for further time -- Accused produced through video-conferencing and informed of prayer for extension -- Extension validly granted for two months -- Right to default bail does not accrue where statutory period stands validly extended before its expiry -- Revision dismissed.

(Paras 7 to 11)

***

Electronic record -- Secondary evidence -- Certificate under Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is a strict legal requirement for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence, unless the original electronic record itself is produced before the Court.

***

A. Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Sections 63 and 63(4) -- Electronic record -- Secondary evidence -- Certificate -- Requirement of certificate under Section 63(4) is a strict legal requirement which is a precondition for admissibility of secondary evidence of information contained in an electronic record -- In absence of certificate under Section 63(4), information contained in an electronic record would be inherently inadmissible as evidence -- Certificate is unnecessary if electronic record contained in computer/device on which original information is first stored is itself produced before Court by owner thereof who proves that said computer/device is owned and/or operated by him.

(Paras 4-9)

B. Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 63(4) -- Secondary evidence -- Computer-generated invoices -- Invoices being secondary evidence of electronic record require certification under Section 63(4) in order to admit same in evidence -- In absence of Section 63(4) certification, there is no question of invoices being admitted in evidence and relied upon.

(Paras 12-13)

***

Default bail -- Cannot be claimed on account of non-filing of additional copies of chargesheet once the chargesheet has been filed within the prescribed statutory period.

***

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Sections 187(3), 193(3) and 193(8) -- Default bail -- Chargesheet -- Non-filing of additional copies -- Non-filing of additional copies of chargesheet/police report as required under Section 193(8) would not entitle accused to default bail -- Right to default bail stood extinguished on filing of chargesheet.

(Paras 15, 21, 23, 26-29)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Default bail -- Right to default bail is an indefeasible right flowing from Article 21 of Constitution -- Grant of default bail is not release from custody on merits, but on failure of investigating agency to file chargesheet within prescribed period -- Object is to ensure expeditious investigation and prevent laxity therein.

(Para 20)

***

Remission policy -- Premature release -- Policy dated 12.04.2002 framed under Article 161 of Constitution of India -- Subsequent Policy dated 13.08.2008 framed under statutory powers could not override constitutional power -- Convict entitled to benefit of lesser time served under 2002 Policy.

***

Constitution of India, Article 161 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 432 and 433 -- Premature release -- Applicability of remission policy -- Policy dated 12.04.2002 clearly contemplated cases of premature release being put up before Governor for orders under Article 161 of Constitution of India -- Policy dated 13.08.2008 specifically stated to have been framed in exercise of powers conferred under Sections 432 and 433, Cr.P.C. -- Both policies, thus, operate in different fields and source of power for framing 2002 Policy being Article 161, subsequent Policy dated 13.08.2008 could not supersede same -- 1993 and 2002 Policies identical in so far as source of power is concerned -- 2008 Policy could not deter effect of 2002 Policy -- Appellant entitled to benefit of lesser time served under 2002 Policy, thereby making him eligible for remission -- Findings to apply prospectively and not reopen remission applications already decided -- State directed to take decision on appellant's remission application consistent with judgment.

(Paras 9 to 18)

***

Artificial intelligence -- Fake and hallucinated material -- Decision based on such material is no decision in eyes of law and liable to be set aside.

***

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 -- Artificial intelligence -- Fake and hallucinated precedents -- NCLT relied upon non-existent, fake and hallucinated material generated through Artificial Intelligence as if it were precedent in support of its judgment -- Some judgments cited were non-existent and AI-generated paragraphs were wrongly attributed to genuine citations -- Courts to adopt zero-tolerance mode for producing, citing or using AI-generated precedents without verification -- It is misconduct on part of advocate to cite such judgments without verification and serious lapse if Judge relies upon such fake or hallucinated AI-generated material as precedents -- Decision based on such material is no decision in eyes of law, irrespective of whether material had direct or indirect bearing on decision-making -- NCLT and NCLAT judgments set aside -- Section 7 application restored to original number for consideration in accordance with law.

(Paras 1, 7, 15 to 19)

***

Senior Citizens Act -- Death of senior citizen -- Proceedings under Act, 2007 rendered infructuous on death of senior citizen, parties left to avail remedies available under law

***

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007) -- Appeal -- Death of senior citizen during pendency -- Proceedings initiated under Act intended to secure welfare of senior citizens during their lifetime -- Once senior citizen, at whose instance proceedings were initiated, ceases to survive, very substratum of proceedings stands extinguished -- Mere circumstance that proceedings incidentally involved validity of family settlement or arbitral award affecting proprietary rights would not alter their essential character -- Appellate Tribunal committed no error in holding appeal to have become infructuous -- Parties left to avail such remedies as may be available in law for adjudication of respective civil and proprietary rights.

(Paras 6 to 10)

***

Food adulteration -- Sentence -- Conviction maintained but sentence reduced to period already undergone in view of prolonged pendency of proceedings, clean antecedents and considerable lapse of time.

***

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Sections 7 and 16 -- Constitution of India, 1950, Article 21 -- Conviction -- Reduction of sentence -- Petitioner convicted for possessing khoya for sale and human consumption which fell short of minimum prescribed statutory standard -- Conviction maintained -- Considerable lapse of time since commission of offence and prolonged pendency of proceedings -- Petitioner not involved in any other criminal case and maintained a clean record -- Already undergone 02 months and 20 days out of total sentence of six months -- Petitioner faced agony of protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long period of 18 years -- Jail sentence reduced to period already undergone, subject to enhanced fine of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 9, 12 to 16)

***

Amendment of plaint -- Amendment after commencement of trial cannot be permitted in absence of due diligence.

***

Additional evidence -- Inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to overcome negligence or fill up lacunae.

***

Evidence in rebuttal -- Evidence required to establish party's own case cannot subsequently be introduced in rebuttal.

***

Article 227 -- High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over every interlocutory order.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment of plaint -- After commencement of trial -- Amendment can be permitted only when, despite due diligence, party could not have raised matter before commencement of trial -- Amendment sought at fag end of proceedings to introduce challenge to earlier judgments and compromise proceedings and alteration/substitution of plaintiff's name/legal identity -- Facts sought to be incorporated could have been raised before commencement of trial -- No satisfactory explanation for delay -- Relief sought by way of amendment prima facie beyond prescribed period of limitation -- No interference with order declining amendment.

(Para 14 to 17 and 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence -- Production at later stage -- Inherent power survives in appropriate cases where evidence could not, despite due diligence, be produced earlier and its production is necessary for just adjudication -- Such power to be exercised sparingly and cannot be invoked to overcome negligence or fill up lacunae -- Documents were within plaintiff's knowledge and could have been produced during affirmative evidence -- No exceptional circumstance made out -- Application rightly dismissed.

(Para 18 to 20 and 24)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 18 -- Evidence in rebuttal -- Scope -- Confined to issues in respect of which onus lies upon opposite party -- Party cannot reserve evidence required to establish its own case and subsequently introduce it in rebuttal after opposite party has concluded its evidence -- Revenue record sought to establish plaintiff's own case could not be characterised as evidence in rebuttal.

(Para 21 and 22)

D. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Interference with interlocutory order -- High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over every interlocutory order -- Interference warranted only where subordinate Court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or acted in a manner so perverse or contrary to settled principles of law as to occasion manifest injustice -- No such infirmity found -- Petitions dismissed.

(Para 23-25)

***

Impleadment as party -- Mere assertion of an independent right in suit property does not, by itself, confer a right to be impleaded in a simpliciter suit for permanent injunction.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10(2) -- Impleadment of party -- Simpliciter suit for permanent injunction -- No relief claimed against applicant seeking impleadment -- Mere assertion of independent right, co-ownership or possession in suit property does not by itself confer a right to be impleaded -- Applicant's impleadment would introduce an independent controversy concerning title, co-ownership and possession, thereby enlarging scope of simpliciter injunction suit -- Applicant had already instituted independent civil suit for adjudication of his asserted rights -- Application for impleadment rightly dismissed.

(Para 4 to 9)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10(2) -- Impleadment of party -- Necessary and proper party -- Necessary party is one in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed, whereas proper party is one whose presence is necessary for complete, effective and adequate adjudication of matters in dispute -- Plaintiff, being dominus litis, cannot be compelled to litigate against a person against whom no relief is sought unless requirements of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC are otherwise satisfied.

(Para 5)

***

Suit for possession -- Owner of suit property entitled to recover possession from defendant held to be an illegal unauthorized encroacher, despite failure to prove relationship of landlord and tenant.

***

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for possession -- Plaintiff proved ownership of suit property -- Defendant failed to prove alleged sale in his favour -- Relationship of landlord and tenant not proved -- Defendant failed to show in what capacity he was in possession of suit property -- Earlier suit for permanent injunction dismissed with liberty to plaintiff to seek appropriate remedy and claim of defendant regarding ownership also rejected -- Defendant held to be an illegal unauthorized encroacher -- Owner entitled to recover possession.

(Para 8 to 12)

***

NDPS -- Default bail -- Extension of time for presentation of challan granted without notice to accused -- Extension order set aside and accused held entitled to default bail.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) -- Default bail -- Extension of time for presentation of challan -- Mandatory notice to accused -- Extension of time granted without issuing notice to accused -- Order of extension held illegal and set aside -- Challan presented after expiry of stipulated period of 180 days -- Accused acquired indefeasible right to default bail -- Order declining default bail also set aside -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 10 and 11)

***

Civil appeal -- Remand is not to be adopted as a matter of ordinary course -- Where the Trial Court framed comprehensive issues, a finding can be returned by appreciating the pleadings, issues, oral and documentary evidence instead of remitting the matter to the Trial Court.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 41 Rules 23 and 24 -- Civil appeal – Remand -- Framing of issues -- High Court remitted the matter to the Trial Court to frame specific issues on whether the Sale Deed was a sham document, possession and limitation, and to allow parties to adduce further evidence -- Trial Court had not decided the Suit without relevant issues being presented by the pleadings of the parties, as the issues framed were comprehensive -- Remand is not to be adopted as a matter of ordinary course -- There were no circumstances preventing the first appellate court from deciding the points in issue -- The correctness or otherwise of the case of the contesting parties is appreciated from the pleadings, issues, oral and documentary evidence, and a finding can be returned instead of remitting the matter to the Trial Court -- Such discretion for remand is exercised when imminently warranted by the circumstances of a given case -- Order of remand to the Trial Court set aside.

(Para 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 16, 17)

***

Unlawful Assembly -- Mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person member of the unlawful assembly.

***

Unlawful Assembly -- Quashing of FIR -- Where petitioners distanced themselves from the unruly mob and started helping the victims, and the chances of their conviction were very bleak, no fruitful purpose would be served in permitting the FIR to sustain and the same was liable to be quashed.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 -- Unlawful assembly -- Beating by mob -- Common object -- Mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly -- Liability would shift to the bystander only when he shared the common object with the unlawful assembly -- Petitioners, though part of the protest march, after having seen the conduct of persons who allegedly gave beatings to the teachers, separated themselves and attempted to save the teachers from beatings -- They cannot be said to be a part of the unlawful assembly -- The word "knew" used in the second part of the Section implies something more than possibility and positive knowledge is necessary -- There was nothing on record to suggest that petitioners were aware of the intention and object of some members of giving beatings to the staff and teachers.

(Para 18, 19, 21, 22)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Though petitioners were part of the protest march, they immediately after having seen the behaviour of the unruly mob, distanced themselves and started helping the staff and teachers -- Complainant as well as victims had specifically named persons who had allegedly given them beatings -- Chances of conviction of the petitioners were very bleak and, as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in permitting the FIR sought to be quashed to sustain -- Consequently, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 23-25)

***

Oral evidence -- Internal documents held irrelevant and excluded from record -- Their contents cannot be brought on record indirectly by oral evidence.

***

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 60 -- Oral evidence -- Excluded documents -- Where internal documents and discussions were held irrelevant and excluded from the record, their contents could not be introduced indirectly through oral evidence -- However, evidence regarding the mere fact of discussions or the witness's independent perception, not amounting to reproduction of the contents of excluded documents, could be retained.

(Para 13-16)

***

Parking lot – Lease – Stamp duty -- Expression “lease” includes any instrument by which tolls of any description are let -- Contract for collecting parking fees is regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let, falling within the ambit of a lease deed.

***

Functus officio -- Impounding of a document is purely an administrative function under Section 33 of the Stamp Act -- Doctrine of functus officio has no application in the sphere of administrative law.

***

Adjudication as to proper stamp -- Collector is required only to determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable -- Not competent to impose a penalty or direct recovery of the deficient stamp duty, being beyond the scope of his statutory jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Stamp Act.

***

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Sections 2(16)(c) and 3 -- Lease -- Tolls -- Parking fees -- Expression “lease” includes “any instrument by which tolls of any description are let” -- Contract in question was meant for collecting parking fees -- Such contract is regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let -- Parking sites were leased out to the petitioner through execution of the instrument in question -- Instrument falls within the ambit of a lease deed and consequently attracts stamp duty payable under Schedule I-A, read with Section 3 of the Stamp Act -- Instrument in question cannot be regarded as a simpliciter operation and management agreement.

(Para 18-22)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 33 -- Impounding -- Functus officio -- Licence agreement expired on 31.01.2023, whereas the instrument was impounded subsequently on 16.05.2023 -- Audit Stamp Department is duty-bound to examine every document to ascertain whether the requisite stamp duty has been duly paid thereon -- In case of insufficient stamp, matter is required to be brought to the notice of the competent authority, who may proceed to impound the document in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 33 -- Impounding of a document is purely an administrative function under Section 33, whereas assessment of deficiency in stamp duty by the Collector is a quasi-judicial function -- Doctrine of functus officio has no application in the sphere of administrative law -- Neither the Audit Stamp Department nor the Joint Commissioner had become functus officio upon expiry of the licence agreement.

(Para 23-25)

C. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 33 -- Impounding -- Public office -- Section 33(3) provides that, “in cases of doubt”, the State Government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices -- Requirement of a determination by the State Government arises only when there exists a doubt -- Office of the Joint Commissioner cannot, by any reasonable construction, be regarded to be other than a public office -- Mere non-determination or non-declaration by the State Government does not curtail the powers of the Joint Commissioner to impound a document under Section 33 of the Stamp Act.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 31 -- Adjudication as to proper stamp -- Penalty -- Recovery of deficient stamp duty -- Under Section 31, where an instrument is brought before the Collector for adjudication, Collector is required only to determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable -- Section 31 does not postulate anything further to be done by the Collector -- After giving his opinion under Section 31, duties and powers of the Collector under Section 31 come to an end -- Collector is not competent to impose a penalty or direct recovery of the deficient stamp duty, same being beyond the scope of his statutory jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Stamp Act.

(Para 38, 40-42)

***

Murder trial – S. 12 UP Gangsters Act, 1986 -- Precedence of trials -- Gangsters Act proceedings to be given preference in event of clash of dates -- No clash of dates -- Section 12 not attracted -- High Court order keeping murder trial in abeyance set aside.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 346 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (7 of 1986), Section 12 -- Precedence of trials -- In a trial for murder under the IPC, accused filed an application seeking that trial be kept in abeyance pending conclusion of trial under Gangsters Act -- Purpose behind Section 12 was not to freeze other proceedings against accused till proceedings under Gangsters Act were concluded -- Purpose was only to indicate that, in event of clash of dates, proceedings under Gangsters Act were to get priority -- Section 346 of BNSS mandates to continue proceedings from day-to-day basis until all witnesses in attendance are examined -- Harmoniously reading Section 12 of Gangsters Act with Section 346 of BNSS, all that Section 12 contemplates is that, in event of a clash of dates, proceedings under Gangsters Act would be given preference -- Right to speedy trial is not only prerogative of accused but is also a valuable right of victim -- Interpretation canvassed by respondent-accused would give a handle to accused to delay all other cases under pretext that proceedings are pending under Gangsters Act and make a mockery of judicial process -- There was no issue of clash of dates warranting application of Section 12 -- High Court clearly erred in directing murder trial to be kept in abeyance -- Impugned order set aside.

(Paras 12, 15, 19, 22-26)

***

Abetment of suicide -- When Section 306 IPC is read with Section 107 IPC, it is clear that there must be direct or indirect instigation in close proximity to the commission of suicide, along with clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide.

***

Abetment of suicide -- Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, adverse remarks regarding official performance, or even stern behaviour on part of superior officer cannot be elevated to status of abetment under Section 306 IPC

***

Criminal intimidation -- Alleged threats of suspension -- Appellant was not the competent authority to suspend the deceased -- Essential ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 IPC not attracted.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 306 and 107 -- Abetment of suicide -- Superior officer -- Proximity and mens rea --  Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC requires direct or indirect instigation in close proximity to commission of suicide, along with clear mens rea to abet commission of suicide -- There must exist a proximate act amounting to instigation or intentional aid -- Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, adverse remarks regarding official performance, or even stern behaviour on part of superior officer cannot be elevated to status of abetment under Section 306 IPC – There is complete absence of any proximate act of instigation immediately preceding suicide -- Prosecution failed to prima facie establish any intention to instigate, aid or abet deceased to commit suicide -- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law -- Appellant discharged.

(Para 14, 22-26, 28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 504 and 506 -- Intentional insult -- Criminal intimidation -- Official acts performed by superior officer and alleged threats of suspension -- Allegations against Appellant pertain primarily to acts performed in his official capacity as superior officer of deceased -- Material on record does not disclose any intentional insult likely to provoke a breach of peace, nor does it reveal any criminal intimidation -- Appellant was not the competent authority to suspend deceased -- Essential ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 IPC not attracted -- Appellant discharged.

(Para 27, 28)

***

Consortium -- In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses spousal, parental and filial consortium.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166(1)(c) – Compensation to major children -- Loss of Consortium -- Appellant No. 1 is the wife whereas appellant Nos. 2 to 4 are the sons and daughter of the deceased -- All the children are aged between 18 and 21 years -- All legal representatives of the deceased become entitled to compensation and can file a claim petition -- Head of “consortium” is part of the conventional sum to be awarded as part of the compensation -- In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium” -- Right to consortium would include company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family -- Each of the claimants who are the wife and the children of the deceased, would be entitled to a fixed amount each under the head of consortium -- Amount enhanced @ 10% at the interval of every three years, Rs. 48,400/- each -- Additional amount of Rs. 1,46,600/- shall be payable with 7.5% interest from the date of filing of the petition till realisation

(Para 5-8)

***

Execution -- DRT -- RC -- Transfer of an execution proceeding to the DRT -- Order XXI Rule 22 of the CPC has no impact on the validity of the auction sale.

***

Execution -- DRT -- RC -- Income Tax Act, 1961, Second Schedule, Rule 2 -- Where the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor were already parties to the execution proceedings and had notice of the auction, the question of substantial injury being caused on account of non-service of notice under Rule 2 does not arise.

***

Execution – One Residential house – LR’s right -- Protection afforded by Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code is personal to the judgment-debtor and this protection does not extend to the legal representatives.

***

Writ jurisdiction -- A mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 22 -- Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Sections 29 and 31 -- Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Second Schedule -- Execution proceedings were transferred from civil court to the DRT under Section 31 of the 1993 Act -- DRT attached and sold a property in execution of the decree – Auction was challenged due to omission of notice under Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code – Held, transfer of execution proceeding to the DRT under Section 31 of the 1993 Act did not merely change the forum of execution, it clothed the Recovery Officer with the power to recover the amount in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 29 of the 1993 Act read with Second Schedule to the 1961 Act, in supersession of the procedure under the Code before the civil court -- Procedure governing the execution before the Recovery Officer only required notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act -- Therefore, Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code has no impact on the validity of the auction sale.

(Para 37)

B. Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Second Schedule, Rules 2 and 61 -- Notice of demand – Requirement of -- No notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule was served on the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor -- However, they were already parties to the execution proceedings, had notice about the auction, and had filed applications regarding the property -- Question of substantial injury being caused on account of non-service of notice under Rule 2 does not arise -- Further, they did not take recourse to the remedy provided under Rule 61 -- Absence of notice under Rule 2 does not render either the execution or the sale void.

(Para 39, 40)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 60(1)(ccc) -- One main residential house -- Exemption from attachment -- Personal to judgment-debtor – Legal representative’s right -- Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code in its application to Delhi exempts attachment and sale of one main residential house belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and occupied by him -- The protection is by its own text personal to the judgment-debtor as it is confined to a house belonging to and occupied by the judgment-debtor -- This protection does not extend to the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor -- A legal representative is a distinct juridical concept from a judgment-debtor and cannot claim personal exemption merely by virtue of residing in a house which belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor.

(Para 42, 43)

D. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 60(1)(ccc) -- Writ jurisdiction -- Mixed question of law and fact -- Plea of exemption under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code was raised for the first time in a writ petition, without any factual foundation having been laid before the Recovery Officer or the DRT -- A question of fact that requires an investigation and inquiry for which no factual foundation has been laid cannot be allowed to be agitated in a writ petition -- A mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition -- High Court erred in entertaining and remitting the matter to the Recovery Officer to decide the exemption plea after giving an opportunity to lead evidence.

(Para 45, 46)

***

Compensation for electrocution -- Writ Petition -- Maintainability -- If questions of fact are disputed, then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy.

***

Strict Liability -- In cases of electrocution of an individual, to impose strict liability would be more appropriate -- Liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part.

***

Electrocution – Compensation -- Multiplier method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution.

***

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Maintainability of Writ Petition -- Electrocution -- Disputed questions of fact -- Petitions were filed claiming compensation for death and injury due to electrocution -- The appellant opposed the petitions on the ground of maintainability, lack of fault on the part of the appellant, and the presence of disputed questions of fact -- If questions of fact are disputed, then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy in cases of electrocution -- As there are disputed questions of facts involved, the Writ Petition seeking compensation filed by the respondent was not maintainable.

(Para 7-9, 16)

B. Electrocution -- Tort Law -- Strict Liability vs. Absolute Liability -- In cases of electrocution of an individual, the standard of liability upon bodies such as the appellant is strict liability, not absolute liability -- To impose strict liability would be more appropriate, for not in all cases can it be said that the electricity boards are liable -- Those who carry out the inherently dangerous activity should bear the burden, and the State is no exception to that rule -- They are liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part, provided that none of the exceptions to the rule of strict liability apply to the case at hand.

(Para 14)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 57 – Compensation for electrocution -- Yardstick for calculation -- The multiplier method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution -- Since the calculation paradigm as provided for in connection with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the multiplier, the scenario thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis to electrocution cases -- The Electricity Act 2003 provides for the liability of the licensee to pay compensation in certain scenarios under Section 57 thereof but does not say anything regarding the method applicable to calculating the same -- The overarching principle of just and reasonable, fair compensation would govern the calculation here as well, based on the income of the person and other related claims.

(Para 15)

**

Interim relief -- Protection from arrest -- While dismissing a petition seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that the same is not maintainable, the high court or the sessions court cannot extend or grant protection which is in the nature of interim relief that could be granted during the pendency of the application.

***

S. 69 CGST Act -- Communication of order -- An order under Section 69 of the CGST Act being a sine qua non to seek anticipatory bail, it would be an anomaly to hold that the order need not be communicated at all -- Without such communication, question of arrest would not arise.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 69 -- Pre-arrest bail -- Grant of interim protection upon dismissal -- The High Court rejected the application for anticipatory bail noting that in the absence of an order under Section 69 of the CGST Act, there could be no apprehension of arrest -- Nonetheless, the High Court granted protection to the respondent from arrest for a period of one week, if the order under Section 69 is passed, from the date of intimation of such order -- An interim relief can only be in the aid of and ancillary to the main relief -- While dismissing a petition seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that the same is not maintainable, whatever be the ground therefor, the high court or the sessions court cannot extend or grant protection which is in the nature of interim relief that could be granted during the pendency of the application.

(Paras 2, 4, 8–11)

B. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Sections 69 and 132 -- Order of arrest -- Reasons to believe -- Requirement of communication -- Once the Commissioner concludes that there are “reasons to believe” that any offence under Section 69 has been committed warranting an arrest and an order to that effect is passed, the alarm is activated and the person becomes an accused who is open to be arrested and, thus, acquiring the right to seek pre-arrest bail -- The order under Section 69 of the CGST Act being a sine qua non to seek anticipatory bail, it would be an anomaly to hold that the order need not be communicated at all -- Communication of the order reinforces the right of the accused to seek anticipatory bail -- Without such communication, question of arrest would not arise.

(Paras 16–22)

***

Condonation of delay -- Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference.

***

RERA Act -- Interest under Section 18 is compensatory in character and therefore, it cannot operate retrospectively -- Section 2(za) of the Act, 2016, deployed for levy of interest for the delay which occurred prior to the said Act, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary.

***

RERA Act – S. 44(4) -- Communication of orders -- Where the email was sent by the Tribunal to the parties containing the copy of dismissal order, and each and every case is updated on the portal of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the appellant was not aware of the case.

***

Frivolous litigation -- Appellant has continued to initiate repetitive proceedings, thereby delaying the enforcement of the respondent's lawful entitlement -- Exemplary cost could be imposed.

***

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Condonation of delay -- Sufficient cause -- There was a delay of more than 720 days in filing the restoration application -- Burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the applicant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence -- Expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party -- Appellant failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied -- Thus, the delay caused in filing the restoration application by the appellant is miserably barred by limitation and the delay at belated stage cannot be condoned.

(Para 50, 57-62)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 2(za), 18 -- Builder-buyer agreement -- One-sided clauses -- Retroactive application -- Any term of one-sided agreement will not be final binding -- Any agreement or settlement of one-sided cannot be made a condition precedent by the promoter to handover possession of the unit to the allottee and the settlement is void ab initio -- Clause 19 of the builder-buyer agreement clearly stipulates that in case of default by the allottee, he would be charged 24% interest -- Interest as provided under Section 18 of the Act, 2016, is compensatory in character and therefore, it cannot operate retrospectively -- Levy of interest at the rate of 24% for delay in handing over possession from the promised date of possession cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary -- Promoter cannot escape from responsibility/liability, the contractual terms will not have any overriding effect.

(Para 41, 74-78)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 44(4) -- Appellate Tribunal -- Communication of orders -- A plain reading of Section 44(4) of the RERA Act, 2016, clearly shows that it is mandatory for the Appellate Tribunal to send a copy of every order to the parties -- Email was sent by the Tribunal to the parties containing the copy of dismissal order and the receipt of the same has been acknowledged during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the respondents before the Tribunal -- Each and every case is updated on the portal of the Tribunal and the date fixed in every matter and case status is uploaded on the portal of the Tribunal -- It cannot be said that the appellant was not aware of the case -- Thus, it is clear that the Tribunal has complied with the provisions of Section 44(4) of RERA Act, 2016.

(Paras 68, 70, 71)

D. Frivolous litigation -- Exemplary costs -- Despite the matter having attained finality at various stages, the appellant has continued to initiate repetitive proceedings, thereby delaying the enforcement of the respondent's lawful entitlement under the orders passed by the competent authorities and this Court -- Even after more than 13 years from the date of booking, the appellant has neither completed the project nor obtained the requisite Occupancy Certificate -- It is a fit case, where exemplary cost could be imposed as the respondent being a lady had been harassed for the last 13 years and had to run from pillar to post and also face a multiple litigation, for no fault of her own -- Accordingly, a cost of Rs.2,50,000/- is imposed upon the appellant to be paid to the respondent within a period of four weeks for filing various frivolous case.

(Para 83-92)

***

Ex-servicemen -- ESM status -- Proscription against being treated as an ESM would apply only where the application was made more than one year prior to the expiry of the prescribed period -- Persons who had already retired from the Armed Forces were ESMs.

***

Regular Appointment -- Contractual employment -- Right to be considered for regular appointment pursuant to the interview survived, and contractual appointment did not extinguish that right.

***

A. Ex-servicemen Re-employment Rules, 1979, Rule 5 -- Ex-servicemen (ESM) status -- Age relaxation -- The respondent's candidature for regular recruitment as a Professor was cancelled on the sole ground that he did not satisfy the criteria for grant of age relaxation -- The persons who would apply after the expiry of the prescribed period would be as entitled to be treated as ESMs as persons who would apply within one year of the expiry of the prescribed period -- The proscription against being treated as an ESM would apply only where the application was made more than one year prior to the expiry of the prescribed period -- Persons who had already retired from the Armed Forces were obviously ESMs -- Inasmuch as the respondent had applied for regular recruitment as Professor in the ESIC Hospital after he had completed his prescribed period in the IAF, it would not be correct to hold that he was not an ESM -- He qualified as an ex-serviceman and was entitled to the benefit of Rule 5 and age relaxation thereunder.

(Paras 4, 8–12, 15)

B. Service Law -- Regular Appointment -- Effect of contractual employment -- Prior to the cancellation of his candidature, the respondent had also been interviewed for being appointed as Professor on contractual basis, whereafter he was appointed on contract -- This is not a case of regularization of a contract employment -- Even though the respondent was appointed on contract basis, his independent right to have been appointed on regular basis pursuant to the interview which had taken place survived -- The appointment of the respondent on contractual basis did not wipe out that right.

(Paras 16–20)

***

Appointment of Local Commissioner -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner.

***

Supervisory jurisdiction -- The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Collection of evidence -- Burden of proof -- The plaintiff sought appointment of a Local Commissioner for inspecting the spot and submitting a report regarding the existing position of the wall and shed allegedly constructed by the defendant over the land forming part of the pahi -- Power under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is discretionary -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner -- Whether a pahi exists at the spot, what is its location and whether the construction allegedly raised by the defendant encroaches upon it are matters which have to be established by the plaintiff through legally admissible evidence -- The power under Order 26 Rule 9 cannot be invoked to fill up an evidentiary lacuna or to provide a party with an additional opportunity to establish a fact which she was required to prove herself.

(Paras 2, 3, 5-7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Scope of interference – Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Interference is warranted only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or its order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or such material irregularity as has resulted in failure of justice -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

(Para 10)

***

Interest on Solatium -- If the award of the Reference Court or the Appellate Court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium, and the claim for such interest has not been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication, then it would be open to the Executing Court to grant interest on solatium and permit its recovery from 19.09.2001, the date of the judgment in Sunder v. Union of India, 2001(7) SCC 211, and not for any prior period.

***

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23 -- Interest on Solatium -- From which date payable -- Land Acquisition Tribunal determined the amount of compensation and directed the respondent to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of possession i.e. 22.08.1984 for the first year and at the rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent period till payment, but did not clarify whether interest would be payable on solatium -- Petitioner filed execution application claiming interest on solatium from 22.08.1984 -- Executing Court held that petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium for the period from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 and was not entitled to interest for the period from 22.08.1984 to 18.09.2001 -- Held, interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and the Executing Court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder’s case, 2001(7) SCC 211 i.e. 19.09.2001 and not for any prior period -- In the absence of specific direction by the Tribunal or the High Court to pay interest on solatium, petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium from 19.09.2001 -- Executing Court rightly awarded interest from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 -- Petition dismissed.

(Paras 7-10)

***

Senior Citizen case -- Maintainability of Complaint -- Not attained the age of 60 years -- Does not fall within the definition of “senior citizen” -- Complaint itself is not maintainable.

***

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007) -- Maintainability of complaint -- Jurisdiction -- On the date of filing of the complaint, the second respondent had not attained the age of 60 years and, therefore, she did not answer the definition of a "senior citizen" -- She is also not the parent of the petitioners -- In such circumstances, the complaint itself is not maintainable and the authorities lacked jurisdiction to entertain the same.

(Paras 7)

***

Impleadment of Party – Suit for Possession – Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC rightly declined where the petitioner claimed possession of land allegedly handed over by the defendant, but produced no document or revenue record to substantiate his claim and had no concern with the agreement to sell forming the basis of the suit.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 CPC –Impleadment of party -- Suit for possession based on agreement to sell along with permanent injunction and alternate relief for recovery against the defendants -- During pendency of the civil suit, petitioner filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC for impleading him as a party, claiming possession of land handed over to him by defendant where he had planted eucalyptus trees on the basis of half batai/half share -- Petitioner had no concern with the agreement to sell -- There was no document on the file to show that defendant ever handed over any part of the land to petitioner nor any revenue record to confirm his version -- Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was rightly declined.

(Para 2, 4)

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Second marriage during subsistence of earlier marriage – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband despite subsistence of her first marriage, where she was de facto separated from her first husband, was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, and the second husband was aware of the circumstances.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Dismissal in default – Mere dismissal of an earlier petition for non-prosecution, without adjudication of the substantive claim, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Earning Capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Subsistence of earlier marriage – Expansive interpretation of “wife” – The alleged marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.1 was contracted during the subsistence of her earlier marriage, without obtaining a decree of divorce from her first husband – The parties lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period and a child was born out of their relationship – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even though her first marriage had not been dissolved by a decree of divorce, where she was de facto separated from her first husband and was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, particularly where the second husband was aware of the circumstances and had nevertheless entered into the relationship with her – The expression “wife” ought to receive a broad and expansive interpretation – Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice and its application cannot be defeated by technicalities where the factual circumstances otherwise justify the grant of maintenance.

(Para 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Dismissal in default – Maintainability of subsequent petition – Where an earlier petition seeking maintenance on the same cause of action was dismissed in default, such dismissal, being without adjudication on merits, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

(Para 7, 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Earning capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance – Entitlement to maintenance is to be considered on the basis of the actual means and circumstances of the parties and the statutory parameters governing a claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3, 18)

***

S. 376 IPC – Rape -- Acquittal -- Where the oral testimony of witnesses regarding injuries and bloodstains is contradicted by a negative FSL report and medical examination, the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Medical and Forensic Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence – Since inception, it was the stand of witnesses that there were bloodstains on the clothes of the victim – The victim stated that she had experienced pain as a result of the alleged sexual act of the appellant – The medical examination conducted within twelve hours of the alleged occurrence, however, belies the presence of any injury whatsoever on her body – The FSL report rules out the presence of blood and semen on the clothes of the victim – Absence of any blood on the clothes of the victim as well as on the undergarment of the appellant after the garments were subjected to the ‘Benzidine test’ as per the FSL report is a relevant factor, which cannot be ignored – When the oral statements of witnesses are considered along with the Final Medical Report and the report of the FSL, a grave doubt is created about their version – Entire prosecution evidence has to be taken into consideration before arriving at any conclusion – Material on record not sufficient to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 13-16)

***

Gambling in house -- Common Gaming House – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient for a "common gaming house" and the mere fact that persons were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house.

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Gambling in house -- Special Search Warrant – Objective Satisfaction – Before authorizing a special warrant, the competent authority must, upon necessary inquiry, be satisfied that there are good grounds to suspect the house is used as a “common gaming house” – Overstepping the statutory limits would become an instrument of persecution.

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A. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Sections 3, 4 and 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Common gaming house – Essential ingredients – The FIR did not state that the house was used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, nor did it use the word “Jugarkhana” – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient – The fact that the petitioners were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house – An FIR being silent on the aspect of “common gaming house” cannot constitute an offence – FIR and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 9, 12-14)

B. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Section 6 – Special search warrant – Objective satisfaction and inquiry – The police left the police station after receiving a special warrant merely 23 minutes after receiving the telephonic message – No officer shall be authorized by special warrant unless the competent authority is satisfied, upon making such inquiry as he may think necessary, that there are good grounds to suspect the said house to be used as a common gaming house – Issuance of the warrant within merely 23 minutes reflects that the inquiry was perfunctory in nature – While issuing a warrant under Section 6, the competent authority must be careful and confine himself exactly within the limits which the Act lays down, since overstepping the line would directly become an instrument of persecution – Such discretion must be used with utmost care since the penal consequences under Section 6 entail.

(Para 10, 11, 13)

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S. 125 Cr.P.C. -- Interim maintenance -- Court granting interim maintenance, cannot be oblivious of the cumulative variables which ought to be considered, especially since a balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant.

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim Maintenance – Balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant – Petitioner is responsible for taking care of financial needs of both the children born out of the wedlock, particularly the elder daughter, who is pursuing MBBS, which is admittedly an expensive course – Respondent was residing in the residential accommodation exclusively purchased by/belonging to the petitioner, was a well-qualified lady truly capable of earning for herself, and was having rental income and getting interest from her FDs – The learned Family Court did not give due weightage to these factors and tilted solely towards the income of the petitioner – Interim maintenance of Rs.30,000/- awarded by the learned Family Court reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

(Para 9-14)