Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Civil / Commercial liability -- Cheating – Forgery – Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet -- Complainant’s claim is for reimbursement of the remaining amount claimed by him towards the works executed in furtherance of a contract -- Allegations, made in the complaint, present a dispute which is purely commercial and civil in nature -- It seems that the complainant has contrived to somehow or the other, involve the police machinery to act as recovery agents on his behalf -- Complaint, on the face of record, did not disclose any offence whatsoever and no FIR should have been registered based thereupon -- Allegation regarding forging the signatures of two Engineers, the Investigating Officer has already got comparison of the questioned signatures done through the handwriting expert and the report, received is inconclusive -- Hence, ex facie, the allegations of forging the signatures of the Engineers, employed by the complainant, are not substantiated from the investigation conducted in the case -- Impugned-FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken in furtherance thereof including the chargesheet quashed.

(Para 18-22)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 – SARFAESI -- Arbitration – Dispute between two banks – Common security interest -- Where such enforcement of security interest, by either bank is sought to be undertaken in terms of the SARFAESI Act, the statutory arbitration provided under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act would immediately be attracted, as soon as there is a dispute in respect to the same with another bank, financial institution, ARC etc, as enumerated in the said provision -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, statutorily empowers such parties mentioned therein, to seek resolution of their dispute by way of arbitration, and their right cannot be curtailed or confined to any executive guideline or memorandum.

(Para 12,2, 123)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 – SARFAESI -- Arbitration -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act deals with resolution of disputes relating to securitisation, reconstruction or non-payment of any amount due between the bank or financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer -- In order to attract the provision of Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, twin conditions have to be fulfilled being;

first, the dispute must be between any bank or financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer and

secondly, the dispute must relate to securitisation or reconstruction or non-payment of any amount due including interest.

Where the aforesaid two conditions are found to be prima-facie satisfied, there the DRT will have no jurisdiction and the proper recourse would only be through Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act read with the Act, 1996.

(Para 124(i)(ii))

C. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 --   SARFAESI -- Arbitration -- Amount -- The expression “non-payment of any amount due, including interest” used in Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act is of wide import and would include a various range of scenarios of ‘disputes’ connected to unpaid amounts including those arising due to third-party defaults, such as indirect defaults of the borrowers.

(Para 124(iii))

D. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 2(f), 11 --  SARFAESI – Arbitration – Borrower-Lendor relationship – Effect of -- Any dispute between two banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies or qualified buyers etc., where the jural relation between the two is of a lender and borrower, then Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act will have no application whatsoever -- The use of the phrase “any person” in the definition of ‘borrower’ in Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, makes it abundantly clear that even a bank, financial institution or asset reconstruction company or qualified buyer can be considered a borrower, if they receive financial assistance from a bank or financial institution etc by providing or creating a security interest -- Thus, a lender-turned-borrower would also fall within the scope of a “borrower” under the SARFAESI Act and shall be governed by the same statutory framework as any ordinary borrower.

(Para 124(iv))

E. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 -- SARFAESI  -- Arbitration agreement  -- Requirement of -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, provides for a statutory arbitration for any dispute mentioned therein between any of the parties enumerated thereunder -- There is no need for an explicit written agreement to arbitrate between such parties in order to attract Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act -- Said provision creates a legal fiction as regards the existence of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding whether such agreement exists or not in actuality.

(Para 124(v))

F. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 11 -- SARFAESI  -- Arbitration – Nature of -- Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act is mandatory in nature -- The use of the word “shall” therein, the mandate of the said provision cannot be bypassed or subverted by the parties by seeking recourse elsewhere.

(Para 124(vi))

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 5(5), 13, 17, 19, 34 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Section 9  -- Rejection of plaint -- SARFAESI proceedings – Title/ mortgage documents – Challenge to – Jurisdiction of civil court/ DRT -- From Section 17, it is clear that it is only the Tribunal that has the jurisdiction to determine whether “any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor” are in accordance with the Act or Rules thereunder -- The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs:

a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by SCJ in favour of PDP.

b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by PDP in favour of the bank.

c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property.

So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act -- Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act -- DRT does not have the jurisdiction to grant a declaration with respect to the mortgage deed or the sale deed as sought by the Plaintiff -- The jurisdiction to declare a sale deed or a mortgage deed being illegal is vested with the Civil Court u/s 9 of the CPC – Held, the civil Court has the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs -- Even if the Court take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC -- Even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.

(Para 12-18, 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Section 9  -- Rejection of plaint – Partial relief not barred by law – Duty of Court -- If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application -- Because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B.

(Para 25)

C. Loan by Banks -- Title clearance report -- Guidelines -- Banks should remain very careful with inadequate title clearance reports, more particularly, when such reports are obtained cheaply and at times for external reasons -- This concerns the protection of public money and is in the larger public interest -- Therefore, it is essential for the Reserve Bank of India and other stakeholders to collaborate in developing a standardized and practical approach for preparing title search report before sanctioning loans and also for the purpose of determining liability (including potential criminal action) of the Officer who approves loan -- Additionally, there should be standard guidelines for fees and costs associated with title search reports so as to ensure that they maintain high quality.

(Para 44)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (1 of 1914), Section 61(1)(a) --  Recovery of 240 bottles of 750 ML each of Indian Made Foreign Liquor -- Sentenced to period already undergone -- Mere non joining of independent witness cannot wash away the evidence of the remaining PWS -- Evidence of the official witnesses is consistent in material particulars regarding search and seizure -- Accused have not led any defence evidence -- Moreover, a heavy quantity of liquor was recovered and it is difficult to expect that liquor of such high value has been planted by the officials, particularly, when no ill will or enmity has either been alleged or proved by the accused – Conviction upheld, occurrence pertains to the year 2001 and as many as 23 years have passed ever since then -- Sentence of the accused/petitioners reduced to the period already undergone by them -- Fine amount and the sentence in default of payment of the kept intact.

(Para 15-19)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 21, 186 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 195(1)(a)(i), 200 –Quashing of FIR u/s 186 of IPC -- Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions -- Joint Deputy Director merely forwarded a letter to the local police, directing them to take appropriate legal action on the basis of the complaint, which effectively led to the registration of the impugned FIR -- Given the mandatory nature and scope of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., such an approach is in clear violation of its provisions -- FIR u/s 186 of the IPC stands contrary to the procedural safeguards enshrined in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. – FIR quashed.

(Para 8-11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 353 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty -- Only allegation qua the petitioners is that they declared that if the demolition operation continued, their entire family would die by suicide by consuming poison -- Threat to die by suicide can by no means come under the ambit of use of criminal force or assault -- As such the ingredients of offence u/s 353 of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR – Petition allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Vicarious liability – Proclaimed person – Quashing of proceedings -- Complaints are silent qua any active role of the petitioner in the business of the company -- Petitioner was merely an Independent Director, had resigned prior to the issuance of most cheques, and was not a signatory to any of them -- Even for the limited period during which he rejoined the Board, there is no material brought forth or any material to suggest his involvement in the financial decisions of the company -- Complaints, summoning orders, and subsequent proceedings, including the declaration of the petitioner as a ‘Proclaimed Offender’/‘Proclaimed Person’ in the criminal complaints cannot be sustained in the absence of the foundational ingredients required u/s 141 of the Act – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 13, 17, 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Cheque bounce complaint – Vicarious liability of Manager of company – Cheques were signed and issued by one of the directors -- Petitioner is neither signatory to the cheques in question nor he is drawer of the said cheques -- It is settled position of law that merely being a director or manager of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141 of NI Act -- It is necessary to specifically aver in the complaint that the director or the concerned manager was incharge of, or responsible for the conduct of business of company -- In the absence of such averments, he cannot be vicariously held liable for the act/omission committed by the company --  Cheques in question were issued after the resignation of the petitioner was accepted by the Company -- Petitioner was having no connection with the affairs of the Company -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 153A, 505(2) – Mens rea -- Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes -- Mens rea is a necessary ingredient for the offence u/s 153A -- Mens rea is an equally necessary postulate for the offence u/s 505(2) also -- Balwant Singh and another vs. State of Punjab (1995 3 SCC 214) relied -- Main distinction between the two offences is that publication of the word or representation is not necessary under the former, such publication is sine qua non u/s 505 IPC -- The words "whoever makes, publishes or circulates" used in the setting of Section 505(2) cannot be interpreted disjunctively but only as supplementary to each other.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 153A, 505(2) – Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes – FIR against Film Producer -- Two communities/ Groups required -- It is necessary that atleast two such groups or communities should be involved -- Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections -- Petitioner who has not done anything as against any religious, racial or linguistic or regional group or community cannot be held guilty of either the offence under Section 153A or under Section 505(2) of IPC.

(Para 13, 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153, 153-A, 153-B, 160, 107, 505 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Promoting/ creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes – FIR against Movie producer -- Certification by CBFC – Effect of -- Quashing of FIR – FIR registered on the basis of a trailer and the complainant had lodged the FIR, without even watching the movie and seeing the offending contents of the movie -- Even, there is no evidence to suggest that the petitioner had provoked any person with an intention that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting -- Law is well settled that the certification issued by the CBFC, i.e., statutory body, guarantees that movie in question satisfies the requirement of law and may be exhibited for the public watching -- Further, the statute itself provides the remedy of appeal and judicial review and any person can avail his remedy in accordance with law -- Neither the State of Punjab nor any other individual had challenged the ground of certification -- FIR in question is clearly an abuse of the process of the law.

(Para 16-19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438(2) -- Criminal trial -- Intermediate order – Interlucatory order – Revisional jurisdiction – Inherent powers -- All orders other than the final orders are not interlocutory ones -- Some of them are intermediate or quasi final orders -- Intermediate order is one which is passed at intermediate stage, but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order – Held, if the contention/ objection of the petitioner, who moves the superior Court in revision against the an impugned order, is upheld and the criminal proceeding as a whole gets concluded/ terminated, the impugned order is an intermediate and not interlocutory order, despite the fact that it was passed during an interlocutory stage -- It also implies that the order may be intermediate for accused but interlocutory for the complainant/ informant/ State.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 397(2), 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 210, 438(2), 528 -- Criminal trial -- Intermediate order – Interlucatory order – Revisional jurisdiction – Inherent powers -- Complainant preferred the criminal revision against the impugned order being aggrieved on the ground that out of 23 proposed accused persons, only one accused has been summoned by learned Judicial Magistrate, and only for the offences punishable u/ss 323 and 506 of the IPC and he is seeking cognizance of additional offences punishable u/s 119, 143, 147, 166, 167, 207, 209, 217, 218, 219, 220, 228, 120B, 448, 504 and 511 of the IPC – Held, if the petition is allowed, the Proceedings before the court below would not get terminated or concluded -- Impugned order is interlocutory and not intermediate one for the complainant -- Hence, the revision petition filed by him is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.PC/ 438(2) B.N.S.S. -- Remedy of the complainant lies in invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court as provided under Section 482 Cr.PC/ 528 B.N.S.S.

However, the impugned order would have been intermediate order for the accused and he could have preferred revision petition against the summoning order, because in case of setting aside the summoning order, the whole proceeding before the Court below would get terminated.

(Para 19-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ Summoning order -- An earlier complaint filed by the respondent No.2/ complainant with the same allegations against the appellant and bank officials came to be dismissed as withdrawn -- Second complaint was filed without disclosing the factum of the filing and withdrawal of the first complaint -- Even in the chargesheet filed in pursuance of the FIR in question, there is no mention of the filing and withdrawal of the first complaint for the same dispute -- Chargesheet did not elucidate as to how the case was made out against the appellant -- Even in the cognizance and summoning order passed by the Court below, no reasons have been assigned as to how a case is made out against the appellant, who was merely a guarantor to the loan, which, after the death of the husband of the appellant, stands settled – Held, no case for summoning the appellant in the complaint was made out -- Continuation of the proceedings will amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto, including the summoning order quashed.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012, Rule 4, 21, 21 A (ii)(A) –Termination – Violation of Natural justice -- Marks in vacation subject – Value of -- Three Intermediate Trained Teachers terminated after the authorities excluded marks obtained in vocational subjects while calculating their total percentage – Held, marks secured in the vocational subject is a way for a candidate to improve his/her overall percentage of marks -- A vocational subject, though optional, would place an additional burden on an examinee which he/she shoulders in the fervent hope of improving his/her overall percentage.

(i) the procedure that Rule 21 enshrined is only to be used for the purpose of preparation of merit list and Rule 4 does not provide for exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject; and

(ii) the termination order stands vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the respondents excluded the marks secured in the vocational subjects without affording the appellants notice or an opportunity to contest such exclusion.

Orders terminating the services of the appellants set aside.

(Para 23-43)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 149 (2)(a)(ii), 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Principle of Pay and recover – Invalid Driving licence -- On the date of accident, the driver had no valid license and the licence was not renewed -- Insurance company was entitled to take a valid defence in that regard u/s 149 (2)(a)(ii) as the driver of the offending vehicle was not duly licensed, to avoid its liability to pay the compensation -- Conditions in law are satisfied to absolve the insurance company from the payment of compensation -- It is only proper that the insurer be directed to satisfy the award, which however can be recovered by the insurer from the insured-owner of the vehicle -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 5-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 1 (1) Proviso -- Commercial suit – Written statement not filed – Right to cross-examine survives -- After the examination-in-chief of PW1 was closed, the cross-examination of Defendant no. 1 was taken as “Nil” by the Trial Court on the ground that defendant had failed to file their written statement within stipulated time -- Said reason is absolutely perverse and is contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant -- Purpose of cross-examination is to elicit the truth from the witness and impeach its credibility -- When the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, the denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away. Ranjit Singh’s case 2024 INSC 724 relied.

(Para 31)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 1 (1) Proviso -- Commercial suit – Written statement after 120 days – Second Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V CPC as amended by the Special Amendment under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 impose an absolute embargo upon the courts to accept the written statement after the expiry of one hundred twenty (120) days’ -- Timeline of 120 days’ fixed by the statute is not directory but rather mandatory, therefore, commercial courts cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days in filing the WS -- SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd.’s case (2019) 12 SCC 210 relied.

(Para 26, 27)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 1 – Commercial suit – Written statement after 120 days – Exclusionof Covid-19 period -- Statutory period of 120 days commenced from date of service of summons on 17.07.2021 and as per section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the date of service had to be excluded therefore, from 18.07.2021, the 120 days’ period commenced and it ended on 14.11.2021 -- In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 by exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India passed series of orders to exclude the period commencing from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for the purpose of computing the limitation period under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings -- Both the dates fell within the sweep of period between 15.02.2020 to 28.02.2022 -- High Court ought to have excluded the aforesaid period for the purpose of filing the written statement and ought to have permitted the defendant No.1 to file written statement on record and contest the suit on merits rather than dismissing the appeal – Written statement allowed subject to payment of Rs.1 lac as cost.

(Para 28-32)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41(1)(ba) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 35(1)(c) -- Cognizable offence – Punishable with more than 7 years – Arrest of accused -- Police officer can arrest a person without an order of a Magistrate or warrant subject to the following conditions:

a) Credible information has been received against the person that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years and

b) The police officer has reason to believe on the basis of the information received that such a person has committed the offence.

Hence, a police officer cannot casually arrest a person against whom the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years is alleged -- He can arrest provided twin conditions in clause (ba) are satisfied. The emphasis is on “credible information” -- He cannot arrest a person under clause (ba) unless credible information is received.

(Para 8)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 19(1) -- Under Section 19(1) of PMLA, there is a requirement to inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.

(Para 10)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21, 22(1) – Life and liberty – Ground of arrest – Communication of – Burden to prove -- Fundamental right of accused – Duty of Magistrate – Violation of Article 21, 22 -- Entitlement of accused for bail :

a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);

b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;

c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);

d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);

e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and

f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.

(Para 21)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Hand-cuffing/ Tying accused with hospital bed -- State of Haryana directed to issue guidelines/ departmental instructions to the police :

(i) to ensure that the act of handcuffing an accused while he is on a hospital bed and tying him to the hospital bed is not committed again.

(ii) to ensure that the constitutional safeguards under Article 22 are strictly followed. If necessary, the State Government shall amend the existing Rules/guidelines.

(Para 33)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 32 – Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 7A, 15(1)(g) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 -- Release of murder convict / child after completion of three year custody – Writ jurisdiction – Incident of 2nd November, 1981 -- Petitioner was 12 years 5 months old on the date of the incident -- Sessions Court recorded conviction against the petitioner by taking aid of Section 149 of the IPC -- Purpose for which the Sessions Court directed the petitioner to be kept in a children’s home is no longer feasible now – Petitioner absconded and could be arrested only on 19th May, 2022, and is still in custody -- On the plain terms of Section 7-A, the courts are under an obligation to consider the plea of juvenility and to grant appropriate relief if, at all, in an enquiry it is found that the convict was a juvenile on the date of offence -- Petitioner’s date of birth and his age as on date of the offence are not disputed by the respondent and, thus, no enquiry is needed to ascertain his age -- Petitioner having been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty has been curtailed not in accordance with procedure established by law -- Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 is writ large and, hence, the benefit of release from detention ought to be extended -- Petitioner ordered to be released, if not wanted in any other case – Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) – Police report – Further invitation – Power of -- Magistrate can exercise the powers for directing further investigation only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances when there is a serious defect or deficiency in the investigation which is likely to result in miscarriage of justice -- There is no other way to remedy such deficiency or defect in primary investigation.

(Para 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) – Police report – Further invitation – Reasoning – Requirement of -- Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by observing that since the complainant was not satisfied with the cancellation report, therefore, the matter was being sent for further investigation -- It is apparent that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate did not apply her judicious mind as no observation whatsoever had been given that there was any serious defect or deficiency in the investigation conducted by the investigating agency which was likely to result in miscarriage of justice or she was not satisfied with any important aspect of investigation already conducted – Held, impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside -- Ordered accordingly.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Inherent powers of High Court – No need to analyze all facts -- In exercise of inherent powers, the High Court is not expected to analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court -- Power conferred under this section is very specific and to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court.

(Para 15)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Quashing of FIR -- Cancellation report – Further investigation -- Allegations in the FIR against the petitioner are that on 06.10.2022, he had wrongfully restrained and confined the respondent No.2 when he was passing through the backside gate of the Court building of District Court, Ludhiana by forcibly making him sit in an Innova car and pressurizing him to purchase the property of the petitioner on the exaggerated price with threat to otherwise kidnap his children – Location of phone did not show his presence at the place from where the alleged occurrence had taken place -- Matter was reported to the police 24 days after the alleged incident -- It cannot be believed by any dint of imagination that the petitioner had pressurized the respondent No.2 to purchase the same property qua which he was fighting to tooth and nail and had also lodged an another FIR bearing No.151 -- Ingredients for commission of offences punishable u/s 341, 342 and 347 of IPC are not established at all -- Empty threats do not mean that case u/s 506 of IPC is made out – Challan report says that the police/ investigating agency left it to the trial Court to decide as to whether alleged incident had taken place or not? -- Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction at this stage also -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would certainly be an abuse of process and these proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment -- FIR and the proceedings arising out of the same quashed.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) –Cancellation of bail -- Denying bail – Parameters for denying bail and cancelling bail are quite varied -- Denial of bail is a matter of discretion and can be decided upon without inspecting the details of the matter -- If the Court is of the opinion that the accused is likely to misuse the liberty granted to him, it can deny bail simply on the basis of gravity of the offence -- However, cancellation would amount to curtailment of the liberty already granted to an under trial accused, which cannot be embarked upon in a cursory fashion -- Only if a grave error is highlighted in the order granted bail or it is evident that the accused is misusing the concession, can the Court consider cancellation.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 325, 323, 506, 34 -- Cancellation of bail – Version and cross version case -- The veracity of the prosecution case against accused/ respondent no.2 and co-accused shall be adjudicated upon during the course of the trial -- The challan having been presented and the case now is fixed for framing of charges, require no interference -- Petition dismissed, being devoid of merits.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Departmental punishment – Writ jurisdiction -- Scope of interference while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary proceedings is very limited -- Court has no power to look into quantum of sentence/punishment unless and until Court finds that sentence awarded is disproportionate to alleged offence -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India can look into the procedure followed by authorities, in case, it is found that enquiry officer or disciplinary authority has not considered any evidence on record or misread the evidence or procedure as prescribed by law has not been followed, the Court can interfere.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Departmental punishment – Writ jurisdiction -- A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals -- Error of jurisdiction includes order by inferior court or tribunal without jurisdiction or in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction -- A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice -- There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court.

(Para 8)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Punishment of forfeiture of five increments with permanent effect -- Writ jurisdiction – No evidence on record proving that accused could not be arrested on account of help of petitioner/ ASI -- Respondent in the departmental proceedings has miserably failed to connect the petitioner with allegations made in the chargesheet -- There was a team of six police officials in whose presence accused escaped from the spot -- It was not duty of the petitioner to arrest accused -- It appears that respondent has attributed entire responsibility to petitioner and held him guilty -- Impugned orders set aside.

(Para 11, 12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 – Additional evidence -- Documents which respondent-plaintiff is allowed to be proved by way of additional evidence are mutations and copy of amended site plan along with mutation which is official record and cannot be manipulated and as regards site plan is concerned, the same is also on record and it will definitely help the Court in arriving at the just conclusion and to effectively dispose of the litigation between the parties – Held, the learned Civil Judge has not exercised the jurisdiction in perverse manner and has not committed any material illegality or irregularity warranting interference by this Court -- Finding no merits, revision petition dismissed.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438, 442 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise at revision stage – Setting aside of conviction/ sentence -- Acquittal -- In case of dishonour of cheque, accused convicted, there is no stage prescribed for compounding of offence -- Petitioner permitted to compound the offence -- Considering the mitigating circumstances of the petitioner cost reduced to Rs.5,000/- -- Judgment of conviction/ order of sentence recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 11)

Constitution of India, Article 233 (2) – Appointment of Additional District Judge – Direct recruitment process/ Advocate Quota – Eligibility of Judicial officer – Reference answered:

(i)    Judicial Officers who have already completed seven years in Bar before they were recruited in the subordinate judicial service would be entitled for being appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge in the selection process for the post of District Judges in the direct recruitment process;

(ii)   The eligibility for appointment as a District Judge/Additional District Judge is to be seen at the time of application;

(iii) Though there is no eligibility prescribed under Article 233(2) for a person already in judicial service of the Union or of the State for being appointed as District Judge, in order to provide a level playing field, direction given that a candidate applying as an in-service candidate should have seven years’ combined experience as a Judicial Officer and an advocate;

(iv) A person who has been or who is in judicial service and has a combined experience of seven years or more as an advocate or a Judicial Officer would be eligible for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge under Article 233 of the Constitution;

(v)   In order to ensure level playing field, further direction given that the minimum age for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge for both advocates and Judicial Officers would be 35 years of age as on the date of application.

(vi) It is held that the view taken in the judgments of this Court right from Satya Narain Singh (1985) 1 SCC 225 till Dheeraj Mor (2020) 7 SCC 401, which take a view contrary to what has been held hereinabove do not lay down the correct proposition of law.

The reference answered accordingly

All rules framed by the State Governments in consultation with the High Courts which are not in accordance with the aforesaid answers quashed and set aside – Direction given that all the State Governments in consultation with the High Courts shall frame/ amend the rules in accordance with what has been held, within a period of three months.

(Para 171-173)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 337 – Conviction for causing death by rash and negligent driving – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced (1 Month 4 days) -- Occurrence pertains to the year 2000 and as many as more than 24 ½ years have passed ever since then – Petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents and is a first time offender -- Subject to the payment of the fine as imposed and payment of Rs.1 Lac as compensation to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased, the sentence of the accused/ petitioner reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. 01 month and 04 days.

(Para 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Petitioner faced trial in a criminal case and during pendency of the same, he was declared a proclaimed person and as a result thereof, FIR was registered u/s 174-A IPC -- Ultimately, the petitioner was acquitted in the main case but the case arising out of his absence in pursuance to the said FIR remained pending and in this case also he was declared as proclaimed person due to his absence – Held, as the root cause of the controversy i.e. main criminal trial stands concluded wherein the petitioner has been acquitted, so the continuation of the proceedings to the above detailed FIR are nothing but an abuse of process of the Court – FIR quashed subject to payment of Rs.35,000/- as costs.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Policy dated 13.08.2008 for pre-mature release -- Murder convict – Life imprisonment -- Pre-mature release – Right of -- State level committee declined the premature release by stating that the petitioner is involved in 9 other criminal offences, his conduct is required to be further evaluate – Held, once a duly enacted policy is in existence, it must be honored and applied to each case in its letter and spirit -- In a civilized society like ours, it would be truly unfortunate, if an offender is not given the opportunity to realize and fully fathom his mistake and channel that awareness into making fruitful contributions in society -- Policy does not indicate any provision allowing deferment of the case of an applicant -- Impugned order set aside -- Official respondents directed to consider the case of the petitioner afresh, strictly in accordance with the policy applicable at the time of his conviction, preferably within a period of 08 weeks -- Any deviation from the policy or the guidelines/ directions given by this Court would entitle the petitioner to file an appropriate petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, seeking initiation of Contempt of Court proceedings against the official concerned.

(Para 4-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 25, 37 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS – Commercial quantity – Regular Bail – Rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Petitioner in custody for the last 01 year 11 months and 09 days and only 04 of the 12 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far – Petitioner is first-time offender with no other case registered against him -- Rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted to an extent in view of the salutary provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which provides for the right to a speedy trial -- Case of the petitioner can be considered for the grant of bail, moreso as the co-accused has already been granted the same concession – Bail allowed.

(Para 9, 10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22C, 29 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail -- Petitioner nominated on the basis of a series of disclosure statements suffered by co-accused -- No subsequent recovery from the petitioner -- Involved in two more cases of similar nature, that alone cannot be a ground to deny him the benefit of bail -- Mere call details, without the transcript of the conversations exchanged between the accused persons, would not be considered to be corroborative material in absence of substantive material found against them -- Petitioner is in custody since 28.08.2024 -- Investigation has since been completed and challan filed -- Conclusion of trial would take time – Bail allowed.

(Para 6)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 7A, 14(1), 15, 49 – Juvenility claimed in SLP – On directions learned Special Judge hold enquiry under Section 7A of the JJ Act --  Reliance upon the matriculation certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, age comes to 17 years when the offence in question was allegedly committed by him – Claim of juvenility could be raised before any court and at any stage -- Convict ‘B’ declared juvenile on the date of offence -- Ordinarily juvenile was required to be dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board for carrying out necessary inquiry in terms of Section 14 of the JJ Act and thereafter to pass order under Section 15 including an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of 3 years – Now more than four decades have passed by since commission of the offence -- It is neither possible nor feasible to remand the case of appellant No. 3 to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board to carry out the exercise under Sections 14 and 15 of the JJ Act -- Judgment and order of the trial court as affirmed by the High Court qua appellant no. 3 set aside on the ground of juvenility.

(Para 19-23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 440, 468, 471, 120B – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), Section 5(2), 5(1)(d) –  Non-compliance of Section 313 of Cr.P.C. – Acquittal -- Four questions generally were put to the appellants in a most mechanical manner -- These questions did not reflect the specific prosecution evidence which came on record qua the appellants -- As all the incriminating evidence were not put to the notice of the appellants, therefore, there was a clear breach of Section 313 CrPC as well as the principle of audi alteram partem -- Certainly, this caused serious prejudice to the appellants to put forth their case – Such omission is a serious irregularity has completely vitiated the trial -- Allegedly offence committed was from September, 1982 to December, 1982 -- Trial was concluded on 29.05.2006 -- At this distant point of time, instead of aiding the cause of justice, it will lead to miscarriage of justice if the case remanded to the trial court to restart the trial from the stage of recording the statements of the accused persons u/s 313 CrPC -- Appellants held entitled to the benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 35-39)

A. Constitution of India, Article 22(1), 22(5) – Arrest – Detention – Communication of grounds to arrestee/ detainee – Right of -- Son of the appellant has been arrested for specific offences as mentioned in the grounds of arrest -- His case is governed by Clause (1) and not by Clause (5) of Article 22 -- However, under both the clauses, certain information has to be supplied to the person arrested and detained -- Under Clause (1), the ground for arrest has to be communicated to the person arrested -- Under Clause (5) the grounds on which the order of detention has been made has to be communicated to the person detained.

-- On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the information will enable the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible.

-- For the purposes of Clause (1) of Article 22, it is not necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence. However, the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested. The grounds to be communicated to the arrested person should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case.

(Para 25-28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 22(1) – Arrest – Communication of grounds to arrestee – Right of -- If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons for the arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to him, that is sufficient compliance with the requirement that he should be informed of the grounds for his arrest -- If he is arrested without a warrant, he must be told why he has been arrested -- If he is arrested for committing an offence, he must be told that he has committed a certain offence for which he would be placed on trial -- In order to inform him that he has committed a certain offence, he must be told of the acts done by him which amounts to the offence -- He must be informed of the precise acts done by him for which he would be tried; informing him merely of the law applicable to such acts would not be enough.

(Para 36)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part 1 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Dispute regarding a mobile phone one day prior to the occurrence -- On the date of the occurrence an altercation/ occurrence took place between both sides who happened to be at the place of occurrence regarding the mobile phone -- In the  occurrence, accused took out an iron Patti which is a carpenter’s tool from inside his trousers and gave a single blow on the deceased whereas appellant-other accused have caught hold of the deceased from his legs -- The blow was not repeated -- Thus, apparently, it is a case of a sudden occurrence on the spur of the moment after a brief altercation and accused YK has used a carpenter’s tool as a weapon inflicting a single injury only without acting in a cruel manner or taking undue advantage of the situation -- Inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction should be under Section 304 Part I of IPC and not under Section 302 IPC – Sentenced to R.I for 10 years.

(Para 20, 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Common intention – Acquittal – Appellant/ I.S. attributed the role of having caught hold of the deceased from his legs -- Neither was he armed and nor has any injury been attributed to him -- Had he shared a common intention with other appellant/ accused / YK to commit murder he would not have gone unarmed -- It cannot be presumed that appellant-IS was aware of the concealed weapon and accompanied YK to the spot with the common intention to commit the offence of murder – IS/ appellant/ accused given benefit of doubt, acquitted.

(Para 22)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Murder – Extra-judicial confession – Evidential value -- Where a murder has been committed in secrecy, it is unlikely that the accused would become garrulous after the commission of the offence and confess to having committed the offence to another person -- It is settled law that an extra-judicial confession is a somewhat weak piece of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the other evidence on record.

(Para 33)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Identification of the accused for the first time in Court has little evidentiary value even though it is for the limited purpose for establishing motive.

(Para 37)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- In a case of circumstantial evidence motive for the commission of a crime assumes importance.

(Para 37)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Fingerprints from the car had been taken but the report was not exhibited, which was the best evidence to establish that the accused and the deceased had been in the car where the deceased had been murdered – As per the case of the prosecution, the accused had first administered a stupefying substance to the complainant who felt intoxicated, however no attempt was made to take samples of the blood and urine of the complainant -- No stupefying substance was recovered at the instance of the accused pursuant to his arrest -- Chain of circumstantial evidence is certainly not complete so as to conclusively point towards the guilt of the accused – Appeal allowed, accused acquitted.

(Para 40-43)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Lie detector test – Evidential value -- A lie detector test can be administered only upon consent of an accused -- Mere refusal would not provide a missing link in the chain of circumstantial evidence -- Assuming the accused did submit himself to a lie detector test and stated something inculpating himself the said statement could not be categorized as material evidence against him -- Conducting of lie a detector test is merely an aid in investigation in case the accused discloses any such relevant information.

(Para 42)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 302 -- Common intention in free fight case – Incident occurred after Panchayat proceedings -- Manner of occurrence and the number of injured on both sides makes it apparently a case of ‘free fight’ or spontaneous rather than pre-meditated crime – Nothing on record to show that the accused other than “S” had any knowledge or intention that “S” was going to cause death --  “S” was not carrying any gun when the Panchayat proceedings were going on – Other accused can be held liable for their individual act and cannot be held vicariously liable.

(Para 2, 34, 37)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 41, 42, 43 -- NDPS -- Private conveyance – Search of vehicle – Compliance of Section 41(1) and 42(2) of NDPS Act – Requirement of -- Where secret information is received in terms of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, then the search of a private conveyance even in a public place/ transit would require compliance of Sections 41(1) and 42(2) of the NDPS Act i.e. the information so received must be taken down in writing and conveyed to the immediate superior officer within 72 hours -- However, where the search of a public conveyance is to be conducted in a public place/transit, no such compliance is required -- Whether a vehicle is a private conveyance or a public conveyance would be a question of fact in each case.

(Para 35)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 42, 43 – NDPS – Search of vehicle -- ‘private public’ and a ‘public conveyance’ -- In the case of the former, Section 42 of the Act would apply and in the case of the latter, Section 43 of the NDPS Act would apply.

(Para 36)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Jump of bail – Proclaimed person – Primary object of every Court is only to examine the commission of crime in question before it viz-a-viz the person/ accused, who is subjected to such proceedings, and if possible justice be imparted at the earliest without unnecessary delay -- Not expected that undue time would be devoted in securing the presence of absconded accused and also to waste energy by enforcing the special mechanism to arrest such accused -- When the petitioner came to know about passing of the impugned order, the petitioner immediately moved the petition, showing his inclination to submit himself before the trial Court – Impugned order set aside to the extent of declaring the petitioner as ‘proclaimed person’ -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 6-8)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Age – Land holding -- Appointed candidate/ Respondent No.4 has the land in the village of which he has been appointed as Lambardar and his name was recommended by the Tehsildar as well as by the Sub Division Magistrate, which was accepted by the all the authorities, whereas no land is owned by the appellant in the village -- Appellant is 24 years of age and respondent No.4 is 30 years of age -- Six years difference between the age is not such that it will tilt the pendulum in favour of the appellant -- No ground made out for interference – LPA dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Ld. Single Judge by giving details of both the candidates has found that the respondent No.4 was better suited than the appellant coupled with the fact that respondent No.4 has been working for the last 28 years, it will not be in the interest to dislodge the respondent No.4 from the said post -- No perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge -- Mere passage of time can, on occasion, give rise to judicial discretion to be exercised by the Courts, which has rightly been exercised by the learned Single Judge – Respondent No.4 is more educated than the appellant and both almost are having same land holding in the village and respondent No.4 has worked as Sarbara Lambardar at the time when he was appointed -- LPA dismissed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time – Rescinding of contract -- Contract between the parties not extinguished by passing of a decree for specific performance and it subsists despite the decree -- Court does not become a functus officio after the grant of the decree for specific performance and it retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the sale deed is executed -- Court does not adjudge the same like an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, where each day's delay must be explained -- Court is given the discretion to extend the time -- It also enables the judgment debtor to seek for rescinding the contract for non-compliance of the directions given in the decree and while considering this application, the Court is given the discretion to rescind the contract or in an appropriate case to even extend the time for paying the purchase money.

(Para 45, 46)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time by Appellate court -- Appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the power of the Court to extend the time for depositing the amount can be exercised even in the appellate stage by the Court.

(Para 48)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Decree in appeal -- Time to make payment – Extension of time -- What is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court -- The appellate court owes a duty to specify the time period -- If during the specified time period the decree holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale consideration or fails to deposit the balance sale consideration and later upon expiry of the specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then it would be within the discretion of the trial court to grant further time to deposit the balance sale consideration or decline.

(Para 49, 50)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Extension of time – Discretion of Court – Discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in mind various factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the length of delay and also the equities that might have been created during the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor -- It is the cumulative effect and considerations of such factors that should weigh with the court concerned while permitting the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration beyond the time period that might have been prescribed by the trial court in its final decree.

(Para 50)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28(1) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Decree for specific performance of the contract – Execution of – Limitation -- Just because a decree of specific performance can be executed within 12 years from the date of original decree or from the date the appellate court affirms such decree that, by itself, does not mean that a decree holder deposits the balance sale consideration at his own sweet will -- If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any particular time period then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period of time.

(Para 51, 52)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Registration of FIR – Cognizable offence -- Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- In Lalita Kumari, case (2014) 2 SCC 1 it was categorically held that the registration of an FIR is mandatory u/s 154 CrPC if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence – Scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification -- However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR -- Decision in Lalita Kumari’s case does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR -- Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR – Petitioner seeking a blanket direction for non-registration of FIR or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases – Permissibility of – Held, Supreme Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him -- Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would also amount to judicial overreach -- Courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A 376 (3) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3 (a), 4 (ii) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- POCSO – Rape -- Regular bail -- According to the FIR, the applicant enticed the victim a young girl -- FIR records that the applicant has established physical relations with the victim -- Applicant and the victim, both are young and they were in romantic relationship -- Victim admitted that she was known to the applicant and they wanted to marry -- Father of the victim has also stated that the applicant and the victim both were in romantic relationship -- Bail allowed.

(Para 1-7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus by mother – Maintainability of -- Custody of girl child with grandparents -- Girl child stated that she is happy with her grand-parents, who are taking good care of her -- However, she stated that she wants that her mother may join their company so that the entire family stays together -- Since the custody of the minor girl with the father and grand-parents cannot be termed as unlawful, no scope for interference in this Habeas Corpus Petition – Writ dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 7, 8)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 303(2), 3(5), 317(2) -- Electricity Act, 2003 (No.36 of 2003), Section 136(1) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Theft – Common intention – Anticipatory bail -- Three co-accused were arrested -- Stolen property was recovered from arrested co-accused -- They told that applicant was also involved in the said offence -- Two arrested persons have already been granted bail -- Applicant is not a convicted person -- Personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2 (xxiii-a), 2 (vii-a), 8, 21, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – NDPS – Regular bail -- Applicant was sitting on a cot in a hut -- Police recovered 24.10 gm. smack (heroin) in the polythene from the spot -- Applicant fled from the spot -- FIR registered on 17.07.2025 and the applicant surrendered before the Magistrate on 02.08.2025 -- 5 gm of heroin is small quantity and greater than 250 gm is commercial quantity -- Object of keeping the accused in detention during the investigation is not punishment -- Main purpose is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused – Bail allowed.

(Para 2-9)

A. Goa Children’s Act, 2003 (18 of 2003), Section 2(m), 8(2) – Child abuse – Acquittal -- Appellant/ accused hit child with the school bag belonging to his own son – Held, it would still not be sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of “child abuse” punishable under Section 8 of the Act of 2003 -- Offence of child abuse necessarily presupposes an intention to cause harm, cruelty, exploitation, or ill-treatment directed towards a child in a manner that exceeds a mere incidental or momentary act during a quarrel -- A simple blow with a school bag, without any evidence of deliberate or sustained maltreatment, does not satisfy the essential ingredients of child abuse -- Medical officer in his cross-examination stated that the possibility of the injuries being caused due to a fall cannot be ruled out – Held, ex-facie the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/s 8 of the Act of 2003 is unsustainable – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-18, 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504 – Provoke breach of peace -- Appellant/ accused hit child with the school bag belonging to his own son – Alleged act of the appellant in abusing the child could not be construed to be such which was intended to provoke breach of peace -- Hence, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 504 IPC is also unsustainable in facts as well as in law -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18, 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 352 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 -- Conviction – Probation -- Offence punishable u/s 323 IPC carries maximum punishment of simple imprisonment for one year whereas offence punishable u/s 352 IPC carries maximum punishment of imprisonment for three months -- Thus, the mandatory provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 would apply and the appellant deserves to be given benefit thereof -- Appellant ordered to be released on probation.

(Para 21)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- In Trial Court’s judgment, Not an iota of discussion about the validity of the Will as contemplated under Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and yet, the validity of the Will has been upheld -- This is contrary to law -- Even the High Court, while evaluating the validity of the Will, has gone on a different tangent and has erroneously held that the requirement of examining the attesting witnesses springs into action only in cases of disputes between legal heirs. Such an observation is quite contrary to law, for Section 68 of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory to examine at least one of the attesting witnesses of the Will -- Mere fact that the Will was registered will not grant validity to the document

(Para 27)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Validity of Will -- Suspicious circumstances -- Not even a whisper of reasoning as to why the propounder of the Will choose to exclude other three children from the bequest, and whether any other properties or assets were given to them -- It is highly unlikely that a father would grant his entire property to one of his children, at the cost of three others, without there being any evidence of estrangement between the father and the children -- This suspicious circumstance surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff either -- Hence, for these cumulative reasons, the Will propounded by plaintiff though registered would not confer any valid title on the plaintiff either.

(Para 27)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A – Agreement to sell -- Part-performance – Benefit of -- One of the main ingredients for taking shelter u/s 53A is the factum of possession -- Unless the transferee in the instrument of agreement to sale is able to prove that he has been in possession of the suit property, no benefit u/s 53A will be given -- Very fact that plaintiff has filed the present suit for possession, along with other reliefs, shows that on the date of filing of the suit, plaintiff was not in possession of the entire suit property -- Since there was no possession with the plaintiff, he cannot derive any benefit under the doctrine of part-possession.

(Para 31)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Appellant 20 years aged was a final year B.Com student who had also enrolled with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India rendered immobile with paraplegia for reason of the fracture of C4-5 -- Tribunal adopted an income of Rs.3,339/- per month being the minimum wages -- Court not convinced that the Minimum wages would be determined on the basis of the educational qualification alone without reference to the nature of work carried on – Held, even if he had not obtained the certificate as a Chartered Accountant, upon graduation, he could have been employed as an Accountant, who would have, on any reasonable estimate, received an amount of Rs.5,000/- as monthly income in the year 2001 -- 40% future prospects given with multiplier of 18 -- Loss of income for the 100% disabled paraplegic would be Rs.15,12,000/- (Rs.5,000/- x 140% x 12 x 18) – With medical expenses of Rs.11,22,356/- compensation totalling to Rs.40,34,356/- -- Total award carrying interest @ 9% per annum from the filing of the petition till realisation -- In addition, Rs.20 lakhs as future medical expenses incurred by the parents awarded.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Parameters -- If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 498A, 506, 34 – Quashing of FIR for father/ mother/ sister-in-law --  Cruelty -- Statements of a general nature against the present appellants  that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery -- When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members -- Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars -- Cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself -- Such allegations are absent in the present case – For offence punishable u/s 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants --  Proceedings against appellants deserve to be quashed in their entirety -- High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants – FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Motive -- Disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- For drawing an inference pertaining to motive, the trial Court relied upon the document which was a disclosure made by respondents -- Manifestly, the use of the said document was limited to the extent permitted u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Inculpatory narrative recited therein could not have been used to draw any inference regarding motive, which was required to be established from substantive evidence.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65B – Cal details – Proof of -- Both the circumstances, i.e., non-production of the certificate u/s 65-B of the Evidence Act, and the call detail records being presented through a handwritten note without examining the scribe thereof would lead to an inescapable conclusion that the call details were not proved as per law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 302 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Mere threat to inflict harm may constitute an incriminating circumstance but in isolation, the said circumstance would fall woefully short of proof of conspiracy to commit murder.

(Para 37)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 --  Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Plaintiff asserted that his land is situated adjoining the disputed rasta (pathway), which is duly recorded as a rasta in the revenue records and defendants are restraining him from using the said rasta seeking decree of mandatory and permanent injunction – Defendants’ case is that the suit rasta forms part of their private property and no public pathway exists at the spot and entries in the revenue record were erroneous and have since been rightly rectified – Appointment of a Local Commissioner is sought solely for the purpose of collecting evidence, such an appointment is impermissible and ought to be dis-allowed -- Appointment of the Local Commissioner was made with the limited objective of ascertaining the existing status of the property on the spot, and not for the purpose of collecting evidence – Learned Court of first instance has recorded its due satisfaction while appointing the Local Commissioner -- Order, upheld.

(Para 5-10)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Hereditary claim -- Sarbraha Lambardar -- Only argument that the petitioner is son of previous deceased Lambardar (SC) and also remained Sarbraha Lambardar and therefore, he deserves preference for appointment to the post of Lambardar -- Held, hereditary claim in the matter of appointment of Lambardar is ultra vires of the Constitution and preference to a candidate on the ground that he has remained a Sarbarah Lambardar would tantamount to give preference to hereditary claim – All the courts below concurrently found respondent No. 6 as a better and suitable candidate for appointment to the post of Lambardar inasmuch as that he is younger in age and more educated than the petitioner --  No compelling reasons to interfere in the impugned orders and finding no merit, the instant civil writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

(Para 5-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 419, 420, 468, 471 -- Sale deed by impersonation – Conspiracy – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced -- Prime accused in conspiracy with the petitioners secured attestation and registration of the sale deed -- Role of Petitioners as Lambardar and co-villager was not passive but active in facilitating the fraudulent transaction – Principal beneficiary expired does not exonerate the petitioners of liability -- Criminal conspiracy u/s 120-B of the IPC is an independent offence, and once participation is proved, conviction can stand irrespective of the status of other conspirators -- Held, both the Courts below rightly held the petitioners guilty u/s 120-B of the IPC -- Petitioners have been facing trial since 1998 and are not involved in any other case -- Considering the protracted proceedings, their age, and the fact that they have already suffered the ordeal of litigation for more than two decades, sentence reduced to the period already undergone by them.

(Para 1, 5-14)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – JBT Teacher – Candidature of – Contention that that respondent No.6 is working as a JBT Teacher and is not available to perform his functions as Lambardar, which should have been treated as a disqualification – Held, once, the said pleaded ‘disqualification’ is not pre-requisite under governing the Rules, merely on the asking of the appellant, the same cannot be treated as disqualification -- For the last 15 years, respondent No.6 has been performing the duties of the post of Lambardar, no complaint has been received that he was not available to discharge the duties of the post as and when required -- Contention of the appellant cannot be accepted – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6, 7, 11)