***

Appointment of Local Commissioner -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner.

***

Supervisory jurisdiction -- The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Collection of evidence -- Burden of proof -- The plaintiff sought appointment of a Local Commissioner for inspecting the spot and submitting a report regarding the existing position of the wall and shed allegedly constructed by the defendant over the land forming part of the pahi -- Power under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is discretionary -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner -- Whether a pahi exists at the spot, what is its location and whether the construction allegedly raised by the defendant encroaches upon it are matters which have to be established by the plaintiff through legally admissible evidence -- The power under Order 26 Rule 9 cannot be invoked to fill up an evidentiary lacuna or to provide a party with an additional opportunity to establish a fact which she was required to prove herself.

(Paras 2, 3, 5-7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Scope of interference – Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Interference is warranted only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or its order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or such material irregularity as has resulted in failure of justice -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

(Para 10)

***

Interest on Solatium -- If the award of the Reference Court or the Appellate Court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium, and the claim for such interest has not been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication, then it would be open to the Executing Court to grant interest on solatium and permit its recovery from 19.09.2001, the date of the judgment in Sunder v. Union of India, 2001(7) SCC 211, and not for any prior period.

***

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23 -- Interest on Solatium -- From which date payable -- Land Acquisition Tribunal determined the amount of compensation and directed the respondent to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of possession i.e. 22.08.1984 for the first year and at the rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent period till payment, but did not clarify whether interest would be payable on solatium -- Petitioner filed execution application claiming interest on solatium from 22.08.1984 -- Executing Court held that petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium for the period from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 and was not entitled to interest for the period from 22.08.1984 to 18.09.2001 -- Held, interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and the Executing Court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder’s case, 2001(7) SCC 211 i.e. 19.09.2001 and not for any prior period -- In the absence of specific direction by the Tribunal or the High Court to pay interest on solatium, petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium from 19.09.2001 -- Executing Court rightly awarded interest from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 -- Petition dismissed.

(Paras 7-10)

***

Senior Citizen case -- Maintainability of Complaint -- Not attained the age of 60 years -- Does not fall within the definition of “senior citizen” -- Complaint itself is not maintainable.

***

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007) -- Maintainability of complaint -- Jurisdiction -- On the date of filing of the complaint, the second respondent had not attained the age of 60 years and, therefore, she did not answer the definition of a "senior citizen" -- She is also not the parent of the petitioners -- In such circumstances, the complaint itself is not maintainable and the authorities lacked jurisdiction to entertain the same.

(Paras 7)

***

Impleadment of Party – Suit for Possession – Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC rightly declined where the petitioner claimed possession of land allegedly handed over by the defendant, but produced no document or revenue record to substantiate his claim and had no concern with the agreement to sell forming the basis of the suit.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 CPC –Impleadment of party -- Suit for possession based on agreement to sell along with permanent injunction and alternate relief for recovery against the defendants -- During pendency of the civil suit, petitioner filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC for impleading him as a party, claiming possession of land handed over to him by defendant where he had planted eucalyptus trees on the basis of half batai/half share -- Petitioner had no concern with the agreement to sell -- There was no document on the file to show that defendant ever handed over any part of the land to petitioner nor any revenue record to confirm his version -- Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was rightly declined.

(Para 2, 4)

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Second marriage during subsistence of earlier marriage – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband despite subsistence of her first marriage, where she was de facto separated from her first husband, was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, and the second husband was aware of the circumstances.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Dismissal in default – Mere dismissal of an earlier petition for non-prosecution, without adjudication of the substantive claim, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Earning Capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Subsistence of earlier marriage – Expansive interpretation of “wife” – The alleged marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.1 was contracted during the subsistence of her earlier marriage, without obtaining a decree of divorce from her first husband – The parties lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period and a child was born out of their relationship – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even though her first marriage had not been dissolved by a decree of divorce, where she was de facto separated from her first husband and was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, particularly where the second husband was aware of the circumstances and had nevertheless entered into the relationship with her – The expression “wife” ought to receive a broad and expansive interpretation – Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice and its application cannot be defeated by technicalities where the factual circumstances otherwise justify the grant of maintenance.

(Para 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Dismissal in default – Maintainability of subsequent petition – Where an earlier petition seeking maintenance on the same cause of action was dismissed in default, such dismissal, being without adjudication on merits, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

(Para 7, 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Earning capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance – Entitlement to maintenance is to be considered on the basis of the actual means and circumstances of the parties and the statutory parameters governing a claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3, 18)

***

S. 376 IPC – Rape -- Acquittal -- Where the oral testimony of witnesses regarding injuries and bloodstains is contradicted by a negative FSL report and medical examination, the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Medical and Forensic Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence – Since inception, it was the stand of witnesses that there were bloodstains on the clothes of the victim – The victim stated that she had experienced pain as a result of the alleged sexual act of the appellant – The medical examination conducted within twelve hours of the alleged occurrence, however, belies the presence of any injury whatsoever on her body – The FSL report rules out the presence of blood and semen on the clothes of the victim – Absence of any blood on the clothes of the victim as well as on the undergarment of the appellant after the garments were subjected to the ‘Benzidine test’ as per the FSL report is a relevant factor, which cannot be ignored – When the oral statements of witnesses are considered along with the Final Medical Report and the report of the FSL, a grave doubt is created about their version – Entire prosecution evidence has to be taken into consideration before arriving at any conclusion – Material on record not sufficient to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 13-16)

***

Gambling in house -- Common Gaming House – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient for a "common gaming house" and the mere fact that persons were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house.

***

Gambling in house -- Special Search Warrant – Objective Satisfaction – Before authorizing a special warrant, the competent authority must, upon necessary inquiry, be satisfied that there are good grounds to suspect the house is used as a “common gaming house” – Overstepping the statutory limits would become an instrument of persecution.

***

A. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Sections 3, 4 and 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Common gaming house – Essential ingredients – The FIR did not state that the house was used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, nor did it use the word “Jugarkhana” – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient – The fact that the petitioners were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house – An FIR being silent on the aspect of “common gaming house” cannot constitute an offence – FIR and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 9, 12-14)

B. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Section 6 – Special search warrant – Objective satisfaction and inquiry – The police left the police station after receiving a special warrant merely 23 minutes after receiving the telephonic message – No officer shall be authorized by special warrant unless the competent authority is satisfied, upon making such inquiry as he may think necessary, that there are good grounds to suspect the said house to be used as a common gaming house – Issuance of the warrant within merely 23 minutes reflects that the inquiry was perfunctory in nature – While issuing a warrant under Section 6, the competent authority must be careful and confine himself exactly within the limits which the Act lays down, since overstepping the line would directly become an instrument of persecution – Such discretion must be used with utmost care since the penal consequences under Section 6 entail.

(Para 10, 11, 13)

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. -- Interim maintenance -- Court granting interim maintenance, cannot be oblivious of the cumulative variables which ought to be considered, especially since a balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim Maintenance – Balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant – Petitioner is responsible for taking care of financial needs of both the children born out of the wedlock, particularly the elder daughter, who is pursuing MBBS, which is admittedly an expensive course – Respondent was residing in the residential accommodation exclusively purchased by/belonging to the petitioner, was a well-qualified lady truly capable of earning for herself, and was having rental income and getting interest from her FDs – The learned Family Court did not give due weightage to these factors and tilted solely towards the income of the petitioner – Interim maintenance of Rs.30,000/- awarded by the learned Family Court reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

(Para 9-14)

***

Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Benefit of doubt -- Where delay in registration of FIR and material contradictions regarding the presence of last seen witnesses create serious doubt, and there is no other evidence to corroborate the last seen evidence or establish motive -- Accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Benefit of doubt -- The case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and the evidence of last seen witnesses -- The distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station is hardly 04 kms, however, the delay occurred in registration of the FIR creates a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- The material contradiction made by both witnesses creates serious doubt regarding their presence at the relevant time of occurrence -- There is no other evidence to corroborate the last seen evidence -- The appellants were living in a separate house from the deceased -- Thus, neither the appellants were present at the place of occurrence nor they had any motive in committing murder -- They had been implicated only being the family members of in-laws of the deceased -- On re-appreciation of the evidence, the case of the prosecution is found to be suffering from serious doubts -- The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts -- Benefit of doubt goes to the accused – Appellants acquitted.

(Paras 5, 7, 9-11)

***

Victim Compensation Scheme -- Acid Attack -- Sections 357A and 482 Cr.P.C. -- Power to recommend compensation under Section 357A is a power coupled with a duty, and every criminal court is expected to consciously examine the question of victim compensation, particularly in cases involving acid attacks -- Mere pendency of the appeal cannot be a ground to decline the relief.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 357, 357A and 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 326A -- Victim Compensation Scheme -- Acid Attack -- Inherent powers -- The trial court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 326A of the IPC but omitted to make a recommendation to the District Legal Services Authority for determination of the quantum of compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme under Section 357A of the Code -- Compensation envisaged under Section 357A of the Code is independent of, and in addition to, the compensation that may be awarded under Section 357 of the Code -- The entitlement to compensation under the Scheme cannot be curtailed merely because a fine has been imposed upon the accused -- Every criminal court is expected to consciously examine the question of victim compensation while rendering judgment, particularly in cases involving acid attacks -- Where a statutory obligation has been omitted to be discharged, depriving victims of the benefits of the Victim Compensation Scheme, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to remedy the omission -- Mere pendency of the appeal cannot be a ground to decline the relief.

(Para 10-16)

***

S. 135, Electricity Act, 2003 – Quashing of FIR -- Where the consumption of electricity is bonafide and not with dishonest intention, there may be civil liability for unpaid dues, but there is no criminal liability; hence, the FIR is liable to be quashed.

***

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Sections 126 and 135 -- Quashing of FIR -- Absence of dishonest intention -- Unpaid electricity dues -- There was an outstanding due of electricity charge payable by the petitioner to the SBPDCL -- The claim of the SBPDCL that the electricity connection of the petitioner was disconnected on account of non-payment of electricity charge, is not supported by the material on record -- The absence of disconnection further gets proved by running of the meter as usual without any tampering and the reading going up as per the consumption -- The petitioner was not consuming electricity with dishonest intention, in fact, he was using it bonafidely -- The only thing against the petitioner is that he had not paid the electricity charge due against him -- There may be civil liability, but there is no criminal liability as per the whole alleged facts and circumstances -- FIR liable to be quashed.

(Para 9-12)

***

Matrimonial dispute — Abetment of suicide — Absence of proximity — Where deceased and accused had no contact for 5 months and 12 days preceding suicide, and there was no cogent evidence of harassment or instigation, presumption under Section 113-A cannot be invoked to sustain conviction under Section 306 IPC.

***

Demand of dowry -- Burden of proof -- Where alleged dowry demand and payment are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and accused raises a reasonable defence of prior matrimonial disputes on preponderance of probabilities, conviction under Sections 498-A IPC and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is unsustainable.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A -- Abetment of suicide -- Absence of proximity -- Presumption under Section 113-A -- The deceased and her husband were not in contact with each other for 5 months and 12 days since FIR was registered by the deceased against the appellant -- It cannot be said that the appellant abetted the deceased to commit suicide even without there having been any contact or communication between them -- In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the Court cannot straightway invoke Section 113-A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.

(Paras 51, 56, 58)

B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Sections 3 and 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Demand of dowry -- Preponderance of probabilities -- The allegation of harassment for demand of dowry was levelled for the first time in FIR, prior to which the appellant had already filed a criminal complaint and a suit for divorce against the deceased -- The allegation of giving Rs.6,00,000/- in cash as dowry has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt -- There are serious discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses regarding the demand of dowry and harassment therefor -- The appellant was merely required to raise a doubt against the prosecution case on the basis of mere preponderance of probabilities, which he succeeded to do -- Therefore, the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Paras 42, 43, 59)

***

Further investigation -- Leave of Court -- No police officer, of howsoever high a rank, can direct further investigation during trial unless leave of the Court is obtained -- An application conveying orders of further investigation passed by a superior police officer is not an application seeking permission to further investigate made to Court.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 193(9) -- Further investigation during trial -- Leave of Court -- No police officer, of howsoever high a rank, can direct further investigation in a case governed by the Cr.P.C. unless the Police obtain leave of the Court to investigate further -- An application conveying to the Court orders of further investigation passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police, with a prayer to facilitate the Investigating Officer, is not at all an application seeking permission to further investigate made to Court -- Impugned order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police being absolutely without jurisdiction, quashed -- Any investigation held pursuant to the impugned order would be non est and struck off the record.

(Paras 13, 17-20, 22-25)

***

SC/ST Act – Ss. 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) -- Caste-related abusive words used over the telephone to son of complainant do not satisfy the basic ingredient of the offence.

***

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) -- Insult or intimidation in public view -- Caste-related abuses over telephone -- Allegation that respondent used caste-related abusive words over telephone while speaking with son of complainant -- Complainant neither privy to conversation nor personally heard alleged caste-related abuses -- In order to attract rigours of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), alleged offence must, prima facie, have been committed in a place within public view -- Basic ingredient of offence that words were uttered in any place within public view not made out.

(Para 6-8)

***

MACT -- Impleadment of parties -- Road construction authority -- Award could be passed only against insurer, owner or driver of vehicle -- Authority empowered with laying or maintenance of road cannot be mulcted with liability under Motor Vehicles Act.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 168 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties -- Necessary and proper party -- Tortious claim against road construction authority -- Insurance Company seeking impleadment of National Highway Authority of India and Director, KMC Construction Ltd. on ground that accident occurred due to negligence in constructing proper retaining wall -- Section 168 empowers Tribunal to pass award only against insurer, owner or driver of vehicle -- Authority empowered with laying or maintenance of road cannot be mulcted with liability under Motor Vehicles Act -- Motor Accident Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain tortious claim against any other person not named under Section 168 -- Claimant is dominus litis and Insurance Company cannot be permitted to implead parties against wishes of claimant – NHAI and Director of Construction company neither necessary nor proper parties -- Applications for impleadment rightly rejected.

(Paras 18, 19, 22, 23)

***

S. 34 IPC -- Constructive liability -- One who keeps watch to enable companions to commit an offence is as much a participant in the common intention as the principal offender.

***

Rape -- Intact hymen -- Slight penetration – It is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse necessary for offence of rape -- Rupture of hymen not a sine qua non for proving offence.

***

Sentencing -- Omission to impose fine -- In appeal preferred by accused alone, imposition of fine would amount to enhancement of sentence and Court cannot place accused in more disadvantageous position.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Constructive liability -- Active and passive participation -- Standing guard -- For attracting Section 34 IPC, prosecution must establish existence of common intention and participation of accused in commission of crime -- Such participation may be active or even passive, provided it is intended to facilitate or advance the common design -- One who keeps watch to enable his companions to commit an offence is as much a participant in the common intention as the principal offender.

(Paras 4, 5, 6, 11, 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 375 and 376 -- Medical evidence -- Intact hymen -- Slight penetration – It is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary for the offence of rape -- Rupture of the hymen is not a sine qua non for proving the offence -- Absence of injuries or an intact hymen cannot, by itself, be a ground to discredit an otherwise credible and consistent testimony of a victim of sexual assault.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) – Rape -- Sentencing -- Omission to impose fine -- Enhancement in appeal preferred by accused -- Where IPC provision prescribes punishment in the form of imprisonment and fine, failure to impose fine amounts to an error in sentencing -- Since imposition of fine would amount to enhancement of sentence already awarded, Court, while deciding appeal preferred by accused alone, cannot place him in a more disadvantageous position -- Omission of trial Court, though legally erroneous, cannot be rectified in appellate proceedings.

(Para 22)

***

Dishonour of cheque -- Expression "insufficient funds" is a genus and dishonour for reasons such as "account closed", "payment stopped" and "referred to the drawer" are species of that genus -- Expression cannot be given narrower meaning, rather requires to be given wider meaning.

***

Dishonour of cheque – Merger of Bank -- Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of the situation that cheque issued by bank, which ultimately merged into some other bank, had become old, especially when account remained the same with new bank.

***

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Merger of Banks -- Return memo with remarks "88-Old Cheque" -- Expression "insufficient funds" is a genus and dishonour for reasons such as "account closed", "payment stopped" and "referred to the drawer" are species of that genus -- Expression cannot be given narrower meaning, rather requires to be given wider meaning -- Whether at the time of issuance of cheque accused had sufficient funds in the account is a relevant factor to be decided by Trial Court in totality of evidence -- Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of the situation that cheque issued by bank, which ultimately merged into some other bank, had become old, especially when account remained the same with new bank.

(Para 2, 4, 14, 15, 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Merger of Banks -- Return memo with remarks "88-Old Cheque" -- Quashing of complaint -- Disputed questions of fact and law -- Questions whether bank with which bank of accused came to be merged was under legal obligation to honour cheque and extent of its liability under terms governing merger are matters germane to controversy -- Such questions involve disputed issues of fact and law, which can be effectively adjudicated only after parties have led evidence in a full-fledged trial -- Prima facie case made out and sufficient material available to connect accused with alleged commission of offence -- Complaint cannot be quashed at threshold.

(Para 22, 25)

***

Section 482 Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of FIR -- Abetment of suicide -- Mere demands for repayment of money or harassment in connection with financial transactions, without anything more, do not satisfy ingredients of "abetment" -- No overt act, proximate instigation or intentional aid -- FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 107 and 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Abetment of suicide -- Demand for repayment of loan -- Mere allegations of persistent demands for repayment of money or harassment in connection with financial transactions, without anything more, do not by themselves satisfy the ingredients of "abetment" -- No material indicating any overt act, direct instigation, intentional aid or proximate conduct on part of petitioners immediately preceding the occurrence which could be said to have driven deceased and his family to commit suicide -- Suicide note and FIR cannot be depicted as expressing anything intentional on part of accused that deceased might commit suicide -- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 2, 18-20)

***

Matrimonial dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- Larger and substantial part of the alleged cause of action arose in Canada and not in India -- Allegations pertaining to India are omnibus, vague and devoid of necessary particulars -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed qua petitioner.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406 and 498-A -- Matrimonial dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- Territorial jurisdiction -- Marriage solemnized in India -- Matrimonial life primarily spent in Canada -- Principal allegations of physical and mental harassment, demand of money, retention of gold ornaments and istridhan, withholding of passport, educational certificates and immigration documents, compelling the complainant to transfer money and other acts of cruelty predominantly attributed to the period when the parties were residing together in Canada -- Allegations regarding incidents occurring in India are vague, lacking in particulars and not disclosing any specific offence committed within India -- Larger and substantial part of the alleged offences having been committed in Canada, registration of FIR in Punjab could not be sustained -- Continuation of criminal proceedings amounting to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed qua petitioner.

(Para 17, 18)

***

Supernumerary post -- Section 20(4) of RPwD Act attracted only when employee acquires disability during service -- Scheme of Act does not provide for creation of supernumerary post for person appointed as a person with disability.

***

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 20(4) -- Supernumerary post -- Person appointed as a person with disability -- Section 20(4) comes into picture only when an employee acquires a disability during service -- Scheme of RPwD Act does not provide for creation of any supernumerary post for adjustment of a person with disability appointed in his or her capacity as such -- No mandamus can be issued to post petitioner at a place where the post being held by him is not available -- Petition dismissed.

(Paras 9, 10, 13 and 14)

***

Regular bail -- NDPS Act -- Commercial quantity -- Prolonged incarceration -- Rigor imposed under Section 37 of NDPS Act stands diluted in light of Article 21 of Constitution -- Where trial is procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon petitioner, further detention as undertrial not warranted.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21(c) and 37 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Regular bail -- Commercial quantity -- Delay in trial -- Petitioner in custody for more than one year -- Recovery of 392 grams of heroin -- 15 prosecution witnesses cited, but none examined -- Trial procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon petitioner -- Rigor imposed under Section 37 of NDPS Act stands diluted in light of Article 21 of Constitution -- Further detention of petitioner as an undertrial not warranted -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 6, 6.1, 6.3 and 7)

***

Pension and Family Pension -- Monetary crunch of the Corporation cannot come in the way of petitioners receiving the benefits to which they are entitled on account of their father having served the respondent-Corporation.

***

Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 -- Pension and family pension -- Monetary crunch -- Employee having taken voluntary retirement during currency of pension Scheme -- Corporation admitting the case of petitioners -- Monetary crunch cannot come in the way of petitioners to receive benefits to which they are entitled -- Corporation under obligation to pay arrears of pension and family pension.

(Paras 4-9)

***

Parole -- Rejection on ground of non-expiry of six months from last parole -- Prison Manual cannot supersede provisions contained in parent Act -- Petitioner directed to be released on parole for 28 days.

***

Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (12 of 1969), Sections 3, 4 and 6 -- Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1969, Rule 3(3) -- Himachal Pradesh Prison Manual, 2021, Para 19.12 -- Grant of parole -- Rejection on ground that six months from date of return from last parole had not expired -- Act nowhere suggests that prayer for grant of parole can be rejected on such ground -- Provisions contained in Prison Manual cannot supersede provisions contained in parent Act -- Once conduct and behaviour of petitioner while in custody was good and nothing adverse was reported against him, prayer for grant of parole deserves to be considered -- Impugned order quashed and petitioner directed to be released on parole for 28 days.

(Paras 9-16)

***

Condonation of delay -- Appeal against conviction -- Liberal approach should be taken insofar as delay occasioned in filing an appeal from an order of conviction and sentence.

***

Sole eyewitness testimony -- May result in conviction, but only when the testimony is believable, credible, consistent with the other circumstances and inspires the confidence of the Court, and not when there are serious discrepancies raising a reasonable doubt as to the witnessing of the incident.

***

Confession to police -- A confession having been made by the accused after his arrest definitely cannot be relied upon; inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

***

S. 27 Evidence Act -- Recovery of stones and a brick rejected, nothing found in the stones recovered connecting those to the murder; no blood stains were visibly seen, nor were any detected on chemical examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 383 -- Jail Appeal -- Condonation of delay -- Access to justice -- Constitutional Courts should take a liberal approach insofar as delay occasioned in filing an appeal from an order of conviction and sentence, depriving a person of the most valuable and fundamental of all rights; liberty -- Not a mere liberal approach but a pro-active one to condone delay, however large it is, when a convict knocks at the door of a Court in appeal.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Sole eyewitness testimony -- Conviction based on single eyewitness -- Serious discrepancies -- The testimony of the eyewitness was shaky and highly improbable -- Eyewitness testimony alone resulting in conviction is not impermissible, but only when the testimony is believable, credible, consistent with the other circumstances and inspires the confidence of the Court, and not when there are serious discrepancies raising a reasonable doubt as to the witnessing of the incident.

(Paras 11, 14, 15, 17)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 -- Confession to police -- Inadmissibility -- A confession having been made by the accused after his arrest definitely cannot be relied upon; inadmissible under Section 25.

(Paras 12, 18)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Recovery of weapons -- Contradictions in recovery -- Absence of blood stains -- The recovery of stones and a brick from the accused was rightly rejected since there was nothing found in the stones recovered connecting those to the murder -- No blood stains were visibly seen, nor were any detected on chemical examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory -- The First Informant, the eyewitness and the mahazar witnesses consistently said that the stones and brick were lying near the bodies, in plain view and with blood stains.

(Para 13)

***

Subvention Scheme -- TMA Pai Foundation Case -- Payment of Subvention Amount beyond Academic Year 2002-03 -- It was impermissible to direct release of the subvention amount for the entire 5-year course even after academic year 2002-03 once the subvention scheme was declared unconstitutional on 31.10.2002.

***

Precedents -- Retrospective versus Prospective Applicability -- If a decision of the Apex Court does not expressly provide its application to be prospective, the law declared by the Court will have retrospective effect unless otherwise stated -- Prospective application was intended only for such statutory provisions which stipulated something contrary to the ratio laid down in the TMA Pai Foundation case.

***

A. Education Law -- Subvention Scheme -- TMA Pai Foundation Case -- Payment of Subvention Amount beyond Academic Year 2002-03 -- The scheme of subvention obligated the Central Government to pay the subvention amount to each eligible college on an annual basis and not for the entire course in lump sum -- It was not incumbent upon the Central Government to pay the subvention amount for the entire 5-year course in one go -- Directing release of the subvention amount for the entire 5 years even after academic year 2002-03 was impermissible once the subvention scheme was declared unconstitutional on 31.10.2002.

(Para 8, 12.2, 12.3, 13)

B. TMA Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka -- Retrospective versus Prospective Application -- If a decision of the Apex Court does not expressly provide its application to be prospective, then it is settled law that all decisions of this Court are retrospective in application -- A conjoint reading of paragraph 393 of the final decision in TMA Pai Foundation case by 11-Judge Bench and the clarificatory order dated 01.04.2003 of the Division Bench of this Court makes it abundantly clear that the intention of this Court was to give prospective application to only such statutory provisions which stipulated something contrary to the ratio laid down in the final decision in TMA Pai Foundation case by 11-Judge Bench -- The schemes or executive instructions, particularly the subvention scheme, ceased to operate on 31.10.2002.

(Para 11, 12.1, 12.2)

***

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts -- 'Scheduled Areas', although referring to a specific geographical area, cannot be taken to mean, in view of the object and intent of Schedule V to the Constitution, to be applicable to non-tribal parties -- The Civil Court had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the dispute pertaining to non-tribal parties.

***

A. Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (19 of 1972), Section 1(3) -- Precedent -- Binding Precedent -- Nagarjuna Gramin Bank v. Medi Narayana’s case did not lay down any proposition of law, much less to be a binding precedent -- It was rather a case of judicial deference to the executive/legislature without a legal analysis of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972.

(Paras 9.5, 9.7, 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 and Fifth Schedule -- Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (19 of 1972), Section 1(3) -- Civil Courts -- Jurisdiction in Scheduled Areas -- Disputes between exclusively non-tribal parties -- The notification of Scheduled Areas is specifically directed towards the people of the Scheduled Tribes living in that area -- Merely because the word ‘area’ has been used, it cannot be said that any and everything that falls within that geographical area pertains to scheduled tribes -- There is no basis for a blanket exclusion of Civil Courts in so far as it pertains to civil disputes of succession between exclusively non-tribal parties although the property is situated within Scheduled Areas -- The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts shall stand restored in so far as civil transactions involving exclusively non-tribal parties are concerned.

(Paras 12.5, 12.6, 13-15)

***

Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Electricity theft -- Civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred merely because allegations of theft have been made -- Jurisdiction would be barred only where a complaint regarding theft of energy has been filed by the competent officer/authority before the Special Court and cognizance has been taken, or where an FIR has been registered by the police and the matter has proceeded in accordance with law.

***

S.126 Electricity Act, 2003 -- Penalty -- Natural justice -- Penalty cannot be imposed directly without first making and communicating provisional assessment and providing opportunity of hearing to the consumer -- Direct imposition of penalty without following mandatory procedure under Section 126 violates principles of natural justice.

***

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Sections 145, 151 and 154 -- Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Theft of electricity -- Cognizance by Special Court -- Suit challenging demand raised towards loss and compounding charges -- Mere allegation of theft of electricity does not by itself bar jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Jurisdiction would be barred only where a complaint regarding theft of energy has been lodged by the competent officer/authority and the Special Court has taken cognizance thereof, or where the requisite criminal proceedings have been initiated in accordance with law -- In absence of complaint before the Special Court or registration of FIR and cognizance thereof, Civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred.

(Para 9, 14-16)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126 – Penalty -- Assessment -- Natural justice -- Penalty cannot be imposed without first making and communicating provisional assessment and providing opportunity of hearing to the consumer -- Direct imposition of penalty without following mandatory procedure under Section 126 violates principles of natural justice.

(Para 10-12)

C. Electricity Meter installed outside premises -- Tampering/defect -- Liability -- Courts below concurrently found that the electricity meter of the plaintiff was installed outside his premises and, in such circumstances, liability for tampering could not be fastened upon the plaintiff, as under Sales Circular No. D-21 of 2007, responsibility in case of tampering with or defect in a meter installed outside the premises was that of the Feeder Manager -- Findings based upon proper appreciation of facts, pleadings and law -- No substantial question of law arising for adjudication -- Regular second appeal dismissed.

(Para 12, 17)

***

Regular Bail -- Involvement of petitioner in other criminal cases cannot be the sole ground to deny him the concession of bail and the prayer for bail has to be considered in the light of facts and circumstances of each individual case.

***

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 61(2), 111(2)(a), 115, 117(2), 126, 190, 191(3), 232(1), 324(4) and 351(3) -- Regular bail -- Parity -- Petitioner not named in FIR and nominated as accused on disclosure statement of co-accused -- Co-accused similarly placed already granted regular bail -- Investigation completed and challan presented -- State opposing bail on ground that five other criminal cases were registered against petitioner -- Registration of other criminal cases cannot be the sole ground to deny concession of bail -- Prayer for bail has to be considered in light of facts and circumstances of each individual case -- Petitioner granted regular bail on ground of parity.

(Para 5, 6)

***

Road safety -- A right to safe travel is inherent to the right to free movement and the right to life and liberty under Article 21.

***

Road safety -- Third-party insurance for four years for new cars and six years for new two-wheelers is now mandatorily required to be purchased.

***

MACT -- Owner/ occupant -- Insurance companies are liable to compensate for any occupant in the vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy, which covers the owner of the vehicle as well, who was travelling in the car as a passenger.

***

A. Constitution of India, Articles 21 and 19(1)(d) – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 146 – Right to safe travel – Road safety – Third-party motor vehicle insurance – An unfortunate reality of road safety in India is that despite the existence of a statutory framework mandating third-party motor vehicle insurance, compliance thereof is found to be lacking – Consequently, victims or families affected by motor accidents often have to run pillar to post in order to receive compensation – The Right to safe travel is inherent to the right to free movement under Article 19(1)(d) and the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – The object behind mandatory insurance under Section 146 of the MVA is not just that victims of road accidents are compensated, but also that they are not drawn into prolonged litigation – Integration of the enforcement system with technology is the need of the hour to ensure compliance with statutorily mandated insurance.

(Paras 16-17, 20-21)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Sections 146 and 196 – Mandatory third party insurance – Enforcement – Technology integration – Directions – Existing offline technology for issuance of challans and road-safety management is required to be integrated with e-models, specifically when it comes to ensuring compliance with statutorily mandated insurance – ANPR Cameras deployed on highways and roads are to be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau and the VAHAN portal for issuance of automatic e-challans to uninsured vehicles – State Police to be provided with handheld devices or downloadable apps, linked with the data from Insurance Information Bureau and VAHAN portal, to monitor real-time insurance status of vehicles and impose challans for violations – Henceforth, third-party insurance for four years for new cars and six years for new two wheelers be required to be purchased.

(Paras 18, 22, 23.1-23.2 and 23.7)

C. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 (41 of 1999), Section 14 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 146 – Motor-vehicle insurance – Uniform policy structure – Customer option form – A broad four-layer structure is to be implemented for private vehicles to bring clarity to policy options, allowing the vehicle-owner to make an informed choice: (I) Third Party only base policy; (II) Optional cover for the occupant(s)/pillion rider; (III) Personal accident cover for the owner, driver and occupant(s); and (IV) Own damage cover -- Every customer will be issued a ‘customer option form’ at the time of purchase to ‘opt in’ via check box to the add-on options -- The IRDA shall formulate uniform policy wordings for these optional covers.

(Para 23.4-23.5)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Motor accident claim – Comprehensive/package policy – Liability of insurance company – Owner travelling as passenger – In accordance with the circular of the IRDA dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies are liable to compensate for any occupant in the vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy – A comprehensive policy would cover the owner of the vehicle as well, who was travelling in the car as a passenger – Tribunal erroneously absolved the insurance company of its liability on the ground that no extra premium was paid to cover the personal risk of the owner’s vehicle – Courts, in matters concerning motor accident claims, should not adopt a hyper-technical approach.

(Paras 27, 29, 31 and 34)

***

Compulsory Retirement – The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood – The order is not punitive in nature and is passed in public interest and thus, Judicial review is extremely narrow and restricted

***

A. Fundamental Rules, Rule 56(j) – Compulsory Retirement – Object and scope of judicial review – The object underlying compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood so as to maintain a high standard of efficiency and integrity in public service – An order of compulsory retirement is not punitive in nature and implies neither stigma, prejudice nor any suggestion of misbehaviour – The order is passed in public interest on the subjective satisfaction of the Government – Principles of natural justice, audi alteram partem, find no application – Judicial review is extremely narrow and restricted – The Court, while exercising judicial review, cannot sit in judgment as an appellate authority, but can interfere where the order is malafide, based on no evidence, arbitrary or perverse.

(Paras 5, 7)

B. Fundamental Rules, Rule 56(j) – Compulsory Retirement – Assessment of service record – “Washed-off theory” – Disciplined force – Members of the CISF, being a disciplined and uniformed force entrusted with vital security functions, are expected to maintain a consistently high standard of efficiency, vigilance and discipline -- Government or the Review Committee, as the case may be, shall take a decision considering the entire record of service, attaching more importance and weightage to records and performance during the subsequent years, weighing in both favourable and adverse remarks – An order of compulsory retirement cannot be invalidated merely because uncommunicated adverse remarks formed part of the material considered by the authority – The “washed-off theory”, applicable in matters relating to promotion, has no application where the competent authority assesses the suitability of an employee for continued retention in service – Where the performance of an employee suffers a discernible decline in the last two years immediately preceding the order of compulsory retirement, such decline is material for determining whether the employee is fit to be retained in service – The entire service record may be considered, including adverse material preceding the employee’s promotion, while due weight must be accorded to the service record of the immediate past period.

(Paras 6, 8-15)

***

Jurisdiction of Reference Court -- The jurisdiction exercised by the Reference Court under Section 3H(4) is, wide enough to incidentally determine questions of title insofar as such determination is necessary for deciding the person entitled to the compensation arising out of the acquisition.

***

Approbate and reprobate -- A litigant who has taken the benefit of a remand order cannot subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the forum to which the matter was remitted merely because the findings ultimately returned are averse to him.

***

A. National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3H(4) -- Jurisdiction of Reference Court -- Determination of title -- A dispute arose between the appellants and respondent No. 1 asserting a competing claim over the acquired property and over the compensation amount payable therefor -- The determination of the person entitled to receive compensation inevitably requires an adjudication of the underlying claim of title -- Such an inquiry is incidental and integral to the jurisdiction conferred under Section 3H(4) -- A reference to the principal civil court is not intended to be a mere ministerial exercise of dividing the compensation amongst claimants -- Its purpose is to secure a judicial determination of the person lawfully entitled to receive the compensation where such entitlement itself is disputed -- The jurisdiction exercised by the Reference Court under Section 3H(4) is, therefore, wide enough to incidentally determine questions of title -- Any contrary interpretation would frustrate the legislative scheme and compel parties to simultaneously pursue independent civil suits for declaration of title, thereby defeating the very object of referring the dispute to the principal civil court.

(Paras 7, 15, 18, 22.5, 22.6, 22.7)

B. Remand order -- Finality inter partes -- Approbate and reprobate -- Once the remand order was accepted by the parties and was not subjected to any further challenge, the directions contained therein became binding upon both the parties as well as the Reference Court -- A litigant who has taken the benefit of a remand order cannot subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the forum to which the matter was remitted merely because the findings ultimately returned are averse to him.

(Paras 22-24)

***

Ratification -- A ratified act is deemed valid from the date of the original, unauthorised act, and not merely from the date of ratification.

***

Acceptance of resignation without authority -- Principle against approbation and reprobation -- A resignation, though initially accepted by one not clothed with authority, may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both sides have treated it as final and altered their positions upon that footing.

***

Withdrawal of resignation -- Resignation shall take effect only on the date on which the resignation is accepted by the appointing authority, and non-communication of an acceptance does not keep the resignation alive for withdrawal.

***

A. Delhi Technological University Act, 2009 (6 of 2009), Section 23(2)(ix) -- Service Law -- Resignation -- Ratification -- Withdrawal of resignation -- Respondent tendered his resignation, requested waiver of the notice period, and was relieved with effect from 31.05.2016 by an officer holding additional charge of Vice-Chancellor who was not the competent authority under Section 23(2)(ix) -- Nearly four months after being relieved and having accepted all consequential benefits, the respondent sought withdrawal of his resignation before the Board of Management (BOM) ratified the acceptance of the resignation -- A ratified act is deemed valid from the date of the original, unauthorised act, and not merely from the date of ratification -- Once the competent authority ratifies an act, the law treats it as though the authority had existed from the beginning, and ratification operates retrospectively to cure the defect arising from the absence of prior authority -- Once ratified, the acceptance related back to the date on which the resignation was accepted by the In-charge Vice-Chancellor, leaving, in point of law, no resignation in existence which the respondent could have withdrawn -- An employee who has acted upon and accepted the consequences of his own resignation cannot later found a challenge on a technical infirmity in the mode of its acceptance.

(Paras 4, 5, 16-19, 24, 25)

B. Delhi Technological University Act, 2009 (6 of 2009), Section 23(2)(ix) -- Service Law -- Acceptance of resignation without authority -- Principle against approbation and reprobation -- A resignation, even where accepted in the first instance by one not clothed with authority to accept it, may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both sides have, by their conduct, treated it as final and altered their positions upon that footing -- In such a case, an employee is precluded, not by any doctrine of curative ratification but by the ordinary principle against approbation and reprobation, from later impugning the very transaction he brought about and from which he has already taken the entire benefit.

(Para 20)

C. First Statutes of the National Institute of Technology, 2009, Statute 30 -- Service Law -- Resignation -- Effective date of resignation -- Non-communication of acceptance -- Withdrawal of resignation -- Respondent tendered an unconditional letter of resignation which was accepted by the competent authority on 22.11.2018, but before such acceptance was communicated on 04.12.2018 and before he was permitted to be relieved upon completion of the notice period, sought to withdraw his resignation on 28.11.2018 -- The proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, is explicit that resignation shall take effect only on the date on which it is accepted by the appointing authority -- It imposes neither any requirement of communication as a condition of efficacy nor makes acceptance of resignation contingent upon expiry of the notice period -- Non-communication of an acceptance which has, in fact, already been made by the competent authority does not keep the resignation alive for withdrawal.

(Paras 8, 9, 27)

***

Anticipatory bail -- Benefit of anticipatory bail cannot be denied for the reason that some money is yet to be recovered -- Whether or not the money was indeed entrusted to the petitioner would be a matter of trial.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406 and 420 -- Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482(2) -- Anticipatory bail -- Recovery of money -- Complainant alleged that petitioner had cheated him of Rs.5,50,000/- on the pretext of securing job for his son -- The State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail arguing that custodial interrogation of the petitioner was required to effect recovery and that though petitioner joined investigation, he did not cooperate in investigation nor got Rs.5,50,000/- recovered -- Benefit of anticipatory bail cannot be denied for the reason that some money is yet to be recovered -- Whether or not the money was indeed entrusted to the petitioner would be a matter of trial – Bail allowed.

(Para 2, 4, 5)

***

Attempt to culpable homicide -- Grievous injury -- Intention or knowledge to cause death -- Where only lathis were allegedly used and no sharp-edged weapon was recovered, a grievous injury pertaining to a fracture of a metacarpal bone cannot by itself be construed as an injury dangerous to life or indicative of an intention or knowledge to cause death.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 308 and 325 -- Attempt to commit culpable homicide -- Framing of charge -- Grievous injury -- Intention or knowledge to cause death -- Injury No. 3, pertaining to a fracture of the left fourth metacarpal bone, was declared to be grievous in nature -- Only lathis were allegedly used in the occurrence and no sharp-edged weapon was recovered from the petitioners -- Injury No. 3, cannot by itself be construed as an injury dangerous to life or indicative of an intention or knowledge on the part of the petitioners to cause the death of the complainant -- Essential ingredients of Section 308 IPC are not prima facie made out -- Rather, the allegations, at the highest, disclose the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 IPC -- Charge under Section 308 IPC set aside.

(Paras 4, 6, 7)

***

Negotiable Instruments – Dishonour of Cheque -- Compounding of the offence under Sec 138 can also be done by the High Court or Court of Session in a revision petition under Section 401 of Cr.P.C.

***

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Dishonour of cheque -- Compromise between parties -- Compounding of offence -- Acquittal in revision -- During the pendency of the revision petition, a compromise was effected between the parties -- Since the parties had voluntarily settled their disputes, it was a fit case for allowing them to compound the offence -- Revision petition allowed -- Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the appellate Court, set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Paras 6, 11-12)

***

S. 319 Cr.P.C -- Summoning of additional accused -- Where persons found innocent during investigation are sought to be summoned subsequently, the evidence which emerges during trial must necessarily be of a much higher quality than a mere repetition of the earlier allegations and must disclose something more than what was already before the investigating agency

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 401 -- Summoning of additional accused – Setting aside of -- Neither in the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. nor in the examination-in-chief of PW-1 was any specific overt act or individual role attributed to the petitioners -- In the deposition, substantially a reiteration of the allegations already contained in Complaint Ex. PA and does not disclose any fresh, specific or stronger evidence against the petitioners than what was already available with the investigating agency – Impugned order summoning petitioners as additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C set aside.

(Para 19-23, 27, 28)

***

Apportionment of compensation -- If a dispute arises between parties in the sense of a lis, with each party propounding a different share for himself based on past transactions and the law applicable, the dispute can alone be determined by the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within whose jurisdiction the acquired land is situated.

***

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3H(3) & (4) -- Apportionment of compensation -- Jurisdiction of Competent Authority vis-à-vis Principal Civil Court -- Where a dispute regarding apportionment of compensation is a full-fledged lis and not merely a case where the shares of parties are substantially undisputed, the Competent Authority cannot adjudicate upon the entitlement or shares of the claimants -- The power under Section 3H(3) is confined to distribution of compensation where entitlement remains substantially non-contentious -- If parties assert rival claims to different shares based on past transactions and the applicable law, the dispute falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 3H(4) -- In such a case, the Competent Authority must make a reference to the competent Civil Court and has no jurisdiction to determine the parties' respective shares.

(Para 5, 6, 8, 12, 13)

***

Writ -- Delay and laches -- If the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court can dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong.

***

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Delay and laches -- Maintainability of writ petition at a belated stage -- The petitioner sought to challenge an order passed by the State Information Commission after an inordinate delay of close to three years without any explanation -- When the extraordinary jurisdiction of a writ is invoked, this Court is called upon to satisfy itself whether the jurisdiction has been invoked within a reasonable time -- Writ courts are not to indulge in permitting an indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong -- The doctrine of delay and laches squarely applied to the facts of the present case and could not be lightly brushed aside -- No explanation -- Writ petition dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of laches.

(Paras 4, 5, 7- 9)

***

Right of reproduction and right to employment -- A woman cannot be forced to choose between bearing a child and employment.

***

U.P. Forest Department Lower Subordinate (Forest Guard and Wildlife Guard) Service Rules, 2015 -- Postponement of Physical Efficiency Test (PET) -- Pregnancy -- Rules silent -- Right of reproduction and right to employment -- Appellant sought postponement of the Physical Efficiency Test (PET) on account of her advanced stage of pregnancy, which was rejected on the ground that the Service Rules, 2015 contained no such provision -- A married woman is not disqualified for appointment and pregnancy, by itself, is not a disqualification for participating in the selection process -- Where the Rules are silent and contain no specific bar, the Commission has the power, in extraordinary circumstances, to postpone the PET -- Denial of such postponement essentially forces a woman to have a choice of either bearing a child or employment, which cannot be permitted as the same interferes with both her rights, i.e. right of reproduction and right to employment -- Rejection of the appellant's prayer for postponement of her PET by the respondents cannot be sustained – Appeal allowed.

(Paras 3, 5, 13, 17-22)

***

Maintenance -- Without evidence of marriage or specific pleadings of a live-in relationship, a claimant seeking maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot claim benefit available to persons in a live-in relationship.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance -- Proof of marriage and live-in relationship -- Trial Court rejected the revisionist's claim for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. on the finding that she was not the legally wedded wife of opposite party no. 2, whose earlier marriage was subsisting -- In the absence of any specific pleading regarding the existence of a live-in relationship or evidence establishing the solemnization of marriage, the claimant cannot claim the benefit available to persons in a live-in relationship, particularly when the existence of such relationship is categorically denied by the opposite party.

(Paras 10-13)

***

Foreigners Act, 1946 -- Section 7 cannot be invoked merely on the basis that a person is a trustee, office bearer, or member of an organization owning or managing the premises.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), Sections 7 and 14 -- Quashing of FIR -- Liability under Section 7 -- Keeper vis-à-vis Trustee or Member -- Personal nature of criminal liability -- Petition for quashing FIR registered under Sections 7 and 14 of the Foreigners Act -- Liability under Section 7 is attracted only against a person who falls within the category of a "keeper" of the premises -- Mere status as a trustee, office bearer or member of an organization owning or managing the premises does not attract criminal liability unless specific allegations show that such person acted as a "keeper" or was responsible for the statutory obligations under Section 7 -- FIR contained no allegation that petitioner was the keeper of the Ashram premises or responsible for providing accommodation, maintaining records or performing statutory obligations -- Criminal liability being personal in nature cannot be fastened merely on account of association with the Trust -- FIR quashed qua the petitioner.

(Paras 1, 2, 10-12, 17)

***

Cheque bounce complaint -- Second complaint -- Delay liable to be condoned by excluding the period spent by the complainant in prosecuting the previous complaint dismissed on account of its prematurity.

***

Cheque bounce complaint -- Findings given in first complaint set aside in appeal – As such cannot have any bearing on the merits of the fresh complaint.

***

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 and 142(b) – Cheque bounce complaint -- Condonation of delay – Second complaint -- Previous complaint dismissed as premature -- Exclusion of period spent in prosecuting previous complaint -- Delay in filing the fresh complaint is liable to be condoned by excluding the period spent in prosecuting the previous complaint which was dismissed on account of its prematurity -- Where the payee or holder in due course files a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the earlier criminal case, the delay in filing the complaint shall be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to S.142(b).

(Paras 5-9, 13-15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. 26 of 1881), Section 138 – Second complaint -- Effect of findings recorded in earlier proceedings -- Findings recorded by the trial Court on merits, having been set aside by the High Court while deciding the appeal against acquittal, have no existence in the eyes of law and, therefore, cannot have any bearing on the merits of the fresh complaint.

(Para 12)

***

Summoning of accused -- At the time of considering the issuance of process against the accused, the Magistrate is required not only to take into consideration the allegations made in the complaint, but also the material collected by the Inquiry Officer, to whom the inquiry has been entrusted under Section 202 CrPC.

***

Second revision petition -- Bar put by Section 397(3) CrPC on a second revision petition cannot be allowed to be circumvented by resorting to inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 and 203 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 -- Issuance of process -- Dismissal of complaint -- Consideration of report under S. 202 CrPC -- Complaint alleging commission of offence under S. 406 IPC -- SHO, upon inquiry, reported that the petitioner had abandoned the shop leaving outstanding rent and electricity charges and that the articles were retained by the respondents as security in terms of a settlement affidavit -- Trial Magistrate dismissed the complaint under S. 203 CrPC, which was upheld in revision -- Held, while considering issuance of process against the accused, the Magistrate is required to take into consideration not only the allegations made in the complaint but also the material collected by the Inquiry Officer to whom the inquiry has been entrusted under S. 202 CrPC -- There was sufficient material before the trial Magistrate to conclude that the dispute between the parties was purely of civil nature and had been given a criminal colour by filing the complaint -- Finding of the trial Magistrate was based upon adequate material and could not be said to be perverse.

(Para 2, 3, 8-11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397(3), 482 -- Second revision petition -- Bar under Section 397(3) -- Exercise of inherent powers by High Court -- Bar put by Section 397(3) of Cr. P. C on the second revision petition cannot be allowed to be circumvented by resorting to inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr. P. C. -- It is only in very exceptional and rare cases that High Court would entertain a petition u/s 482 Cr. P. C against an order passed by a Sessions Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction – No exceptional circumstances in the present case – Petition dismissed.

(Para 12)

***

Writ jurisdiction -- Compensation in exercise of writ jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction is an exceptional public law remedy available only when there is an established violation of fundamental rights, coupled with malafides or gross abuse of process causing demonstrable harm.

***

Fundamental Rights -- Mere registration of FIR on receiving information of commission of a cognizable offence and closure as "not admitted" do not constitute violation of any of the fundamental rights.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 8A, 27B and 29 -- Inherent powers -- Grant of compensation -- Petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashment of FIR and compensation -- Investigation closed as “not admitted” for want of sufficient admissible evidence -- Compensation in writ or inherent jurisdiction is an exceptional public law remedy available only upon established violation of fundamental rights coupled with malafides or gross abuse of process causing demonstrable harm -- Investigation having been conducted in accordance with law and petitioners having neither been arrested nor subjected to harassment, custodial torture or illegal detention, mere registration of FIR and its subsequent closure as “not admitted” did not constitute violation of any fundamental right – Claim for compensation rejected.

(Para 1, 3, 12, 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 8A and 27B -- Illegal trafficking and laundering of proceeds -- Applicability of Sections 8A and 27B -- Allegations in FIR prima facie disclosed involvement of petitioners in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs and laundering of proceeds therefrom, attracting Section 8A, punishable under Section 27B -- Contention that the FIR did not disclose any cognizable offence as the provisions were not standalone substantive offences, held, misconceived.

(Para 16)

***

Preventive detention -- Mere fact that the dossier and the detention order share the same date cannot lead to an automatic presumption of arbitrariness.

***

Preventive detention -- "Public order" vs. "Law and order" -- While every disturbance of public order involves a breach of law and order, every crime affecting law and order does not inherently disturb public order.

***

Preventive detention -- Scope of judicial review -- Court does not sit in appeal over the material on record to supplant the subjective satisfaction; the judicial inquiry is strictly confined to verifying adherence to constitutional and statutory guarantees.

***

A. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (6 of 1978), Section 8(1)(a) -- Preventive detention -- Procedural safeguards -- Challenge to detention order on the ground of non-compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards and non-application of mind owing to the dossier and detention order bearing the same date -- Detention record established that the detenue was supplied with all relied upon documents and informed of his right to make a representation to the Government as well as the District Magistrate -- Mere identity of dates on the dossier and detention order does not give rise to a presumption of arbitrariness -- Grounds of detention disclosed a conscious and independent assessment of the detenu's conduct and were not a mere copy-paste of the police dossier – Detention order not warrants interference.

(Para 1, 2, 7-9, 14)

B. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (6 of 1978), Section 8(1)(a) -- Preventive detention -- "Public order" vs. "Law and order" -- Detenu, an alleged member of an organized criminal gang involved in multiple FIRs, was accused of opening indiscriminate fire upon a police patrolling party -- While every disturbance of public order involves a breach of law and order, every crime affecting law and order does not inherently disturb public order -- Violent conduct of the detenu transcended ordinary law enforcement issues and fell squarely within the ambit of public order, being sufficient to instil fear and insecurity in the citizenry and possessing the propensity to disturb public order -- Detention order not warrants interference.

(Paras 10, 11, 14)

C. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226 -- Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (6 of 1978), Section 8(1)(a) -- Preventive detention -- Scope of judicial review -- Jurisdiction under Article 226 to review preventive detention orders is inherently circumscribed -- Court does not sit in appeal over the material on record to supplant the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority -- Judicial review is confined to examining compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards and whether the detention order suffers from mala fides or total non-application of mind.

(Para 13) 

***

NDPS -- Bail -- Long incarceration coupled with non-commencement of trial and the petitioner's prospects of rehabilitation justified grant of regular bail despite recovery of commercial quantity of heroin.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 -- Regular bail -- Commercial quantity -- Long incarceration -- Delay in trial -- Prospects of rehabilitation -- Despite criminal antecedents and recovery of commercial quantity of heroin, regular bail was granted as the petitioner had remained in custody for more than one year and four months, none of the 21 prosecution witnesses had been examined and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future -- The subsequent marriage of the victim in an earlier POCSO case with the petitioner and their settled family life, though having no bearing on the merits of the NDPS case, was a relevant circumstance indicating the petitioner's prospects of rehabilitation -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 6, 10 & 11)

***

Interim custody of seized property -- Scope of jurisdiction -- While exercising powers under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC, the Court determines only prima facie entitlement to interim possession and not title or ownership -- Registration certificate is a relevant but not conclusive factor for grant of interim custody.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 451 and 457 -- Interim custody of seized property -- Nature and scope of jurisdiction -- Subject vehicles, though registered in the name of the appellant's company, were seized during investigation into allegations of criminal trespass and misappropriation of company funds -- High Court granted interim custody to the respondent company -- Held, Sections 451 and 457 CrPC confer wide judicial discretion upon the Criminal Court to entrust interim custody of seized property to the person found prima facie entitled to its possession -- The enquiry under the said provisions is confined to interim possession and does not extend to adjudication of title or ownership, which falls within the domain of the competent civil forum.

(Para 2-11, 27, 30)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 451 and 457 -- Interim custody of seized vehicles -- Registration Certificate -- Evidentiary value -- Continued possession -- Payment of hypothecation instalments -- Registration certificate, though a relevant piece of evidence, is not decisive of the question relating to interim custody -- There exists no inflexible principle that interim custody must invariably follow the registration certificate irrespective of other relevant circumstances -- Held, where the respondent company was in continued possession of the vehicles, had admittedly discharged the hypothecation instalments from its own account and the appellant had executed an undertaking permitting continued use of the vehicles by the respondent company, such circumstances outweighed the evidentiary value of the registration certificates and justified grant of interim custody in favour of the respondent company.

(Para 32-37)

***

Service Law -- Estoppel by participation -- A candidate who participates in a selection process without objection cannot ordinarily challenge the process after being declared unsuccessful -- However, where arbitrariness or illegality in the selection process is writ large and vitiates the selection, participation would not preclude the candidate from questioning the process and seeking appropriate relief.

***

Shortlisting of candidates -- Rule providing only one mode of shortlisting -- Selection Committee could not prescribe qualifying or cut-off marks not contemplated by the Rules -- Once the rule-making authority consciously provided only one mode of shortlisting, it was not open to the Selection Committee to superimpose an additional eligibility threshold -- The rules of the game could not have been changed mid-way to the detriment of eligible candidates.

***

Relief -- Arbitrary exclusion from selection -- Passage of time -- Where candidates establish that they were subjected to arbitrary treatment and sufficient vacancies continue to exist, relief cannot be denied merely because they have grown in age.

***

A. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014, Rules 9(B), 16(3)(a)(iii) and 17(3) -- Selection process -- Estoppel by participation -- Arbitrariness in State action -- Appellants participated in the recruitment process with full knowledge that CITS certificate had been made a preferential qualification and without challenging the Rules or the advertisements prior to the examination -- Though a candidate cannot ordinarily challenge a selection process after participating therein, such principle has no application where arbitrariness or illegality in the process is writ large -- Failure of the Selection Committee/State of Uttar Pradesh to follow the recruitment procedure prescribed under the 2014 Rules, by introducing an arbitrary qualifying/cut-off mark not contemplated by the Rules, vitiated the process of selection -- Participation by the appellants could not validate such illegality or disentitle them from relief.

(Paras 9-11, 19)

B. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014, Rule 16(3)(b)(i) -- Direct recruitment -- Shortlisting of candidates -- Prescription of qualifying/cut-off marks -- Rule 16(3)(b)(i) envisages shortlisting only where applications are received in large numbers by restricting candidates called for interview to four times the number of vacancies -- Rule does not contemplate exclusion of eligible candidates from the zone of consideration on the basis of qualifying or cut-off marks secured under Rule 16(3)(a) -- Selection Committee, having no authority to superimpose an additional eligibility threshold, acted contrary to the recruitment procedure prescribed under the Rules -- Prescription of qualifying/cut-off marks resulted in exclusion of eligible candidates and substantial vacancies remaining unfilled -- Such action was arbitrary and amounted to changing the rules of the game mid-way.

(Para 12, 16-19)

C. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Direct recruitment -- Service Law -- Relief -- Available vacancies -- Passage of time -- More than a decade having elapsed since issuance of the advertisements and the appellants having advanced in age, relief could not be denied solely on that ground -- Appellants having established arbitrary exclusion from the selection process and sufficient vacancies being available for their accommodation, denial of relief would result in injustice -- Direction issued to consider the appellants for appointment against existing vacancies after interview in accordance with the Rules, with prospective effect.

(Para 20-23)

***

Declaration of law -- Dismissal of Special Leave Petition expressly reserving question of law does not constitute binding precedent.

***

A. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 5 and 8 – Guards in Indian Railways -- Promotions carrying the same Grade Pay -- A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the promotee's Grade Pay does not change -- Characteristic elements of a promotion are the formal process by which it is granted, the enhanced responsibilities of the higher post, and the structural hierarchy within which it is situated -- Promotions within the Guard cadre continue to retain their promotional character notwithstanding convergence of Grade Pay after the Sixth Central Pay Commission -- Such promotions satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 8 of the MACPS and are liable to be counted for grant of financial upgradations.

-- Paragraph 8 of the MACPS applies to the Guard cadre. The posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard are distinct posts in the promotional hierarchy as per the applicable Recruitment Rules, carrying the same Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2. The functional promotions earned within the Guard cadre constitute "promotions" within the meaning of Paragraph 8. An employee who has traversed the Guard cadre up to Mail/Express Guard has earned three promotions counted under Paragraph 8 (with the Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard movement ignored under Paragraph 5) and has thereby exhausted all three financial upgradation slots under the MACPS. He is not entitled to any further financial upgradation.

-- The illustration to Paragraph 5, correctly understood, is a transitional provision addressing the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions and upgradations. It does not override Paragraph 8 in respect of the post-01.09.2008 MACPS period. The Guard cadre's pre-revised pay scales correspond to those in the illustration, but the illustration directs only that pre-MACPS promotions be ignored for the purpose of the MACPS starting count; it does not direct that all subsequent promotions earned within the MACPS period, or all promotions earned before the MACPS period but counted under Paragraph 8, are similarly to be ignored.

(Para 5, 6, 40, 41, 44, 46, 65(i), 65(iii))

B. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2 and 8 -- Financial Stagnation -- Meaning of 'Promotion' -- Mere absence of change in Grade Pay does not divest a promotion of its Promotional character -- Promotions within the Guard cadre carrying the same Grade Pay nevertheless entitle the employee to promotional increments, enhanced basic pay, running-duty allowances and post-specific emoluments -- An employee who has received successive promotions with corresponding financial benefits cannot be regarded as having suffered financial stagnation within the meaning of the MACPS and is, therefore, not entitled to further financial upgradation.

(Para 38, 40, 62, 65(ii))

C. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraph 2 -- Grade Pay Ceiling -- Binding nature of executive clarifications -- Departmental clarifications issued by the DoPT are integral to the Scheme and binding on all authorities -- RBE Nos. 76/2011 and 142/2012 clarify that financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the Grade Pay ceiling of the promotional hierarchy -- An employee cannot be granted Grade Pay higher than what he may get on actual promotion in the hierarchy applies to the MACPS and governs the present case.

(Para 48, 50, 54, 65(iv), 65(v))

D. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 141 — Dismissal of Special Leave Petition — An order dismissing a Special Leave Petition while expressly leaving the question of law open does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 or a binding precedent — Reliance thereon by the High Court as determinative of the legal position held, erroneous.

(Para 57, 65(vi))

***

Cyber Fraud -- Bail -- Clean antecedents, completion of investigation and prolonged custody, coupled with doubtful evidentiary value of the co-accused's disclosure statement, justified grant of regular bail.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483, 23 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 318(4) and 61(2) -- Regular bail -- Cyber fraud -- Clean antecedents -- Completion of investigation -- Disclosure statement of co-accused -- Admissibility -- Speedy trial -- Petitioner granted regular bail as he had remained in custody for more than five and a half months, investigation qua him stood completed, nothing remained to be recovered and trial was not likely to conclude in the near future -- The only material against the petitioner was the disclosure statement of a co-accused, prima facie hit by Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, no recovery or discovery having been effected pursuant thereto -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 13 to 19)