Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of judicial officer – Seniority – Late implementation of judgment – Effect of -- Writ petition filed by the appellants was decided on 2nd May 2012, as such, the State ought to have appointed the appellants within a reasonable time -- Though the State had challenged the said order in an SLP before this Court, the order of the High Court was never stayed -- Ultimately, the SLP came to be dismissed on 30th November 2012 -- Even thereafter, for a period of around 8 months, no action was taken by the State in issuing an order of appointment to the appellants – The 2012 batch was appointed on 10th July 2012 i.e., after a period of more than 2 months from the date of the order of the High Court -- Right to be appointed accrued to the appellants on the date of the order of the High Court i.e. on 2nd May 2012 -- Held, delay in giving effect to the order of the High Court by the State Government should not be permitted to act to the prejudice of the appellants – Appeal allowed, seniority given.

(Para 12-16)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12, 19 – Guilty  of contempt – Review by other Bench – Permissibility of -- Ld. Single Judge of the High Court, held the Respondent to be guilty of intentionally and malafidely violating the orders dated 11th June 2020 and 1st July 2020 and thus committing contempt of the orders of the Court -- Respondent was granted time either to purge the contempt or failing which to file an affidavit as to why he should not be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act -- When the matter was listed before the another ld. Single Judge of the High Court after the change of roster, it was held that it cannot be said that there is any wilful and deliberate disobedience by the respondents and the respondent No.1 was discharged – Ld. Single Judge of the High Court reviewed the entire order – Held, it was not permissible for the ld. Single Judge to have revisited the issue as to whether the Respondent has in fact committed contempt or not – Impugned judgment and final order set aside, matter remitted back.

(Para 13-20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) -- CBI Case -- Settlement with Bank – Quashing of FIR -- Aggrieved party, if any, would have been the Bank which has no grievance against the Appellants -- No loss caused to the Bank -- Not only the principal amount has been returned but an amount over and above thereto, on the basis of the settlement, has been received by the Bank -- Case is at the very initial stage with the chargesheet having been filed -- Criminal case has an overwhelming and pre-dominant civil character arising out of pure commercial transaction where the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 19-24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 (3) – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Revisional power of High Court – Acquittal to conviction – Permissibility of -- High Court does not have the authority to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction while exercising its Revisional power -- But that precisely was done by the High Court under the impugned judgment -- Impugned decision of the High Court is unsustainable -- If the High Court was convinced about a wrongful acquittal, the High Court in Revision could not have ordered for conviction -- It ought to have remitted the matter back to the appellate court to re-appreciate the matter -- This course was not adopted -- Matter remitted back to the appellate court.

(Para 5-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 21, 22, 29, 37 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 439 -- NDPS -- Regular bail – Commercial quantity -- Case of the prosecution is that quantity of contraband recovered from all the accused persons falls within the meaning of commercial quantity -- Fact that all the accused persons apprehended by the Investigating Agency were having common intention has to be established during the course of trial -- At this stage, the applicant was only carrying the contraband of intermediate quantity – Contraband found from the possession of the applicant is less than commercial quantity, as such, embargo of Section 37 of NDPS Act, would not be applicable -- With regard to intermediate and small quantity, the consideration for grant of bail is under that principles govern under Section 437 of Cr.P.C -- Applicants detained for the last more than six months – Investigation is complete, charge-sheet presented, the applicant is not required for purposes of investigation – Bail allowed.

(Para 13-15)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023) -- Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage – Certificate by Arya Samaj temple – Validity of – Proof of -- Any marriage solemnized in Arya Samaj Mandir as per the Vedic procedure is valid marriage as it fulfills the requirements of Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act -- Though certificate issued by Arya Samaj may not have a statutory force of prima facie validity of marriage but the certificate issued by Arya Samaj regarding performance of marriage is not a waste paper, it can be proved by the Purohit (who performed the marriage) as per the provisions of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 during the trial of the case.

(Para 17)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage – Valid marriage -- Where the marriage between two Hindus (Male and Female) is performed in accordance with the applicable rites or ceremonies of Hinduism then such marriage will be valid even if the same is performed in Arya Samaj Mandir, in any temple, house or at any open place, as the place is not relevant for performing marriage as per section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act -- It is Hindu customs and rites which is relevant for the valid marriage.

(Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 294, 506 -- Anticipatory bail – Challenge to -- Accused in jail in another case – Effect of -- Alleged offences are all triable by Judicial Magistrate, First Class -- None of the offences would carry sentence of more than seven years – Order of High Court to release respondent no. 2 on anticipatory bail does not suffer from any fundamental error of law -- Ordinarily habitual offender ought not to be released on bail in a routine manner, however the High Court has elaborately dealt with the cases against respondent no. 2 -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Conspiracy -- Very nature of the offence of conspiracy, being hatched in secrecy, no evidence of the common intention of the conspirators can be normally produced before Court – The offence can be proved largely by inferences from the acts committed or words spoken by the conspirators in pursuance of a common intention.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120B, 323, 324, 427, 450, 304 Part II – Conspiracy – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Role of A-6 – Conviction of A-6 -- Accused 1 to 4 entered the house and unleashed a frontal attack with wooden logs -- Before entering the house they picked up the wooden logs, within the eye-sight of A6 – They entered the house of PW2 on his invitation and unleashed an attack without any provocation from the inmates of the house – In retaliation of the incidents that happened earlier, on the same day A6 had seen the accused picking up the wooden logs and entering the house and also had exhorted them from outside the house – A6 definitely had the knowledge that the attack perpetrated on the accused could lead to death and the attack was carried out under his watch-full eyes – Knowledge that the attack is likely to cause death can definitely be pinned down on A6, at whose instance and connivance as also active instigation, the attack was carried out – No reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence of A6 – Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 18, 19)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Negligence of the offending vehicle -- Deposition of RW3/ I.O. about the negligence of bike driver conflicted with the charge sheet filed by him, against the truck driver -- His explanation was that the Charge sheet was filed against the truck driver since the motor-cycle driver had died in the accident – Court find itself unable to countenance the said statements of the Investigating Officer – Evidence of the eyewitness, PW3, was that he was accompanying the deceased in another bike, he specifically spoke of both the bikes being driven in normal speed when the offending truck came through the wrong side and hit the bike of the deceased -- He has also deposed that the truck was driven in a rash and negligent manner -- High Court fixing the entire liability on its owner and driver is perfectly in order -- Petitioner-insurer, who has insured the vehicle is bound to indemnify the owner of the vehicle who has the vicarious liability as against the negligence of his employee-the driver.

(Para 4-6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8 and 20(b)(ii)(C) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- NDPS – Acquittal -- Prosecution’s evidence, on 4th March 2016, one “S” was found sitting with another accused in a WagonR car -- All the contemporary documents, including the memo of arrest of the same date, do not mention the name of the appellant as the accused -- Accused is described as “S” -- In the examination of the appellant u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C, it is not put to the appellant that she is the same person as “S”, who was arrested on 4th March 2016 -- Therefore, the appellant was deprived of an opportunity to deal with the prosecution case causes prejudice to her -- Prosecution has adduced no evidence to show that the appellant is "S", who was arrested on 4^th March 2016 – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder – Intention/ knowledge -- Nature of injury – Relevancy of -- To attract Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree -- If hurt of any nature is caused and it is proved that there was intention or knowledge to cause death, Section 307 IPC would stand attracted.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder – Accused-respondent fired from his service weapon AK-47 and since he was a constable in the army, he was well aware that gunshot from such a weapon, if hits anyone will certainly result in causing death -- There is no denial of the fact that the injured had sustained four injuries, two each on both the upper thighs and they were of grievous nature -- The injuries may not be life threatening, but it leaves no doubt that there was intention to cause death -- Considering the fact that the accused was in discipline force, the incident is of 2010 and that it had happened in a rage of anger, but with predetermined mind, in the interest of justice, punishment reduced to already undergone about 1 year 5 months.

(Para 13-15)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Circumstantial evidence – Eye witness – Criminal jurisprudence -- Just as a strong motive does not by itself result in a conviction, the absence of motive on that sole ground cannot result in an acquittal -- When the eyewitnesses are not convincing, a strong motive cannot by itself result in conviction, likewise when the circumstances are very convincing and provide an unbroken chain leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the accused and not to any other hypothesis; the total absence of a motive will be of no consequence.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive remains hidden in the inner recesses of the mind of the perpetrator, which cannot, oftener than ever, be ferreted out by the investigation agency -- Though in a case of circumstantial evidence, the complete absence of motive would weigh in favour of the accused, it cannot be declared as a general proposition of universal application that, in the absence of motive, the entire inculpatory circumstances should be ignored and the accused acquitted.

(Para 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Accused and the deceased along with the wife of the accused and his two other children were residing in the house which was the scene of occurrence --  Accused, admittedly a right-handed person, had gunshot residue particles in his right hand --  There were also gunshot residue particles around the gunshot wound by reason of which the son succumbed -- Circumstances coupled with the falsity of the claim made by the accused immediately after the detection of the body, to the onlookers and the false explanation given by the accused in his statement u/s 313, regarding both his hands having been forcefully smeared with gunshot residue provides further links in the chain of circumstances which is complete and leads only to the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and not to any hypothesis of innocence.

(Para 26)

Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1982, Rule 2(c) – Reservation for ex-serviceman – Personal from Indian Military Nursing Service as ex-serviceman – Consideration of -- Respondent no. 4 served as a Short Service Commissioned officer in the IMNS -- Rule 2(c) specifically includes Military personnel – No reason to exclude IMNS personnel from the category of “ex-servicemen” -- Respondent no. 4 held to be qualifies as an ex-serviceman and must be considered under the “ex-servicemen” category.

(Para 17-22)

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 6(3) – Return of dowry articles – Acquittal of the accused in criminal trial would not warrant rejection of the application for return of the dowry articles -- If dowry articles are given without a demand, regardless whether an offence under the Act is committed, they still may have to be returned in view of the provisions of the Act considering that in absence of any children of the deceased, the mother would be the natural heir of the deceased.

(Para 5)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(r)(s) – Abuse by caste in public view – Requirement of law -- Acquittal -- Nothing to indicate that there was anybody present in the vicinity of the alleged scene of occurrence, other than family members of the complainant -- It cannot be said to have occurred in public view – Accused absolved of any offence under clause (r) or (s) of Section 3 of the SC & ST Act -- Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 9, 11)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(f) – Forceful dispossession – Acquittal -- As to Section 3(1)(f) (wrongful occupation of land), no allegation in the complaint that the complainant and her family were forcefully evicted from land -- Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 9, 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 447 -- House trespass – Acquittal -- Place of occurrence is at a distance of 1 km from his house -- FIR talked about the house in which she was residing while alleging trespass on the accused persons -- However, no such allegation is even spoken of in the oral evidence; thus, putting to jeopardy the offence of house trespass too – Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 10, 11)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 25H – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Termination of Chowkidar – Industrial dispute -- Petitioner completed more than 240 days in 12 months preceding his termination -- Later on again Chowkidars were engaged by the Corporation without asking the workman to opt for re-engagement -- Contention that the Corporation is not an industry, as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, was not agitated before the learned Labour Court -- In exercise of its power of judicial review, high Court has to test the award passed by learned Labour Court on the basis of material which was before said Court -- Award suffers from no illegality – Issue that Corporation is not an industry left open.

(Para 15, 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 120B – Acquittal of main accused – Trial of co-accused u/s 120B IPC -- Quashing of -- Main accused persons acquitted of the charges levelled against them u/s 386 and 120B IPC -- Applicant charge-sheeted only for the offence u/s 120B IPC for the same incident -- No fruitful purpose would be served, if the trial is proceeded against the present applicant -- Petition allowed -- Summoning order as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Liability of Insurance company -- FIR against an unknown vehicle – Effect of – Mere fact that initially the FIR records the vehicle as unknown would not be fatal for the prosecution/ claimants -- Police upon investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the driver of the car -- Inspection report prepared by the Motor Vehicle Inspector discloses a bent on the front right side of the bumper of the car to indicate that it dashed against something, which could have been the scooter of the deceased -- MACT’s Award fastened liability jointly and severally on the owner of the vehicle and the insurance company -- Liability of the respondent no.1/ Insurance company set aside by High Court -- Owner has neither appeared before the MACT nor before the High Court and not even before Supreme Court despite valid service of notice -- Court left with no option but to presume that the owner of the alleged offending vehicle which was the cause of the accident had no defence to offer -- During the police investigation owner of the vehicle admitted to the accident in question having occurred –  Appeal allowed, order of the High Court set aside and the order of the MACT restored.

(Para 17--24)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 29A -- Time limit for arbitral award – Extension of – Delay in completion of proceedings beyond 18 months – Effect of -- Once the Learned Arbitrator permitted the parties to participate in arbitral proceedings beyond the permissible period of 18 months then, the Impugned Order passed by Arbitrator that he cannot proceed because his mandate stood terminated and the arbitral proceedings were kept in abeyance, certainly amounts to prejudicing the petitioner due to an act of Arbitrator herein which defeats the principle of “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit” – Impugned order set aside, arbitration proceedings restored.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder of wife – Plea of alibi -- Circumstantial evidence -- Acquittal of husband by Trial court -- High Court emphasized that the accused and the deceased were living together and hence, the accused should have an explanation regarding the death of his wife u/s 106 of the Act, 1872 reversed the acquittal without anything other than a finding on alibi having not been proved -- The alibi being a possible and probable explanation, the accused cannot also be found to be in the teeth of Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- Not enough material to upset the order of acquittal of the Trial Court, especially when there was also no evidence led regarding the death being a result of homicide -- No circumstance leading to the guilt of the accused -- Order of the High Court set aside -- Order of acquittal of the Trial Court restored.

(Para 5, 6, 9, 10, 12-14)

A. CCS Pension Rules, 1972, Rule 56 – Regularization of daily wage employee – Pensionary  benefits -- Petitioner was engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and his services were regularized thereafter -- Petitioner shall be deemed to have retired on attaining the age of 60 years i.e. w.e.f. 12.07.2012 – A period of two years is to be added towards the qualifying service of petitioner to the period of 7 years 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner rendered total eligible regular service of 9 years, 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner has rendered more than 8 years of service though less than 10 years of service and for such reason his service is to be reckoned as 10 years, which makes him qualified for pensionary benefits.

(Para 11-17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2—Constructive res-judicata -- Petitioner approached the Court in the year 2014 for grant of benefit of work charge/regularization -- His petition was not decided on merits and directions were issued to the competent authority to consider the case of the petitioner -- It was on such consideration that the benefit of work charge and regularization was granted to the petitioner -- Once the petitioner got such benefit, he immediately made a claim for pensionary benefits in the year 2015 which was finally rejected by the respondents in the year 2019 -- Petition cannot be said to suffer from principle of constructive res judicata or Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as the petitioner had sought the relief of pensionary benefits at the first available opportunity.

(Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2)(a), 173 -- Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Default bail after 60 days – Non-prescribing of minimum punishment/ maximum upto 14 years -- Non-filing of challan -- Effect of – Section 3 of the Act though, prescribes maximum punishment up to 14 years, there is no minimum punishment provided under the said provision -- Punishment prescribed for the offence punishable u/s 5 of the said Act is maximum up to three years -- Since, the investigation was not completed in sixty days, the Respondent had become entitled to the default bail under Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C -- High Court has rightly followed the Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 case and released the Respondent on bail.

(Para 7-10)

A. Constitution of India, Article 309 -- Recruitment initiated – Advertisement made – Non-challenge to – Effect of -- Private respondent did not challenge the advertisement in its entirety (nor did anyone else) -- Hence, the advertisement holds the field and it is only under this advertisement that the respective rights of the appellant and private respondent can be determined.

(Para 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Recruitment initiated – Advertisement made – Midway change – Permissibility of -- Recruitment process had begun with the publication of the advertisement calling for applications and the process ends with filling of the vacancies -- The selection process had begun and midway changes could not have taken place – Held, once an eligibility criteria was declared by means of a fresh Advertisement, the same cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process, as the same would tantamount to ‘changing the rules of the game, after the game is played’.

(Para 16, 21)

C. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Advertisement made – Qualified candidate – Right of -- Once it is accepted that the DSP post in question was reserved for ‘SC Sports (Women)’ as per advertisement, the appellant must be accepted as the only person qualified in her category who could be appointed as she is the only SC woman candidate who successfully cleared all the tests for the post of DSP.

(Para 23)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 – Dowry case -- Summoning of additional accused – Quashing of -- Acquittal of main accused – Effect of -- If main accused are acquitted, no criminal proceedings can be sustained against other co-accused on the same set of witnesses – Whenever, there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction valuable time of the Court should not be wasted -- Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue – Petition allowed, summoning the accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. for facing trial quashed.

(Para 8-10)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(j) (ii), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties have settled the dispute amicably and have also verified the contents of the compromise -- Cognizance/ summoning order, charge-sheet as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 457, 427, 323, 504, 506, 448, 511, 120B -- Cognizance by court -- Summoning order in printed form – Effect of -- Summoning order passed in a printed proforma by filing up the blanks reveals that the Trial Court has not applied its judicial mind and in a very cursory manner the Trial Court took cognizance -- Summoning order is cryptic -- Cognizance/ summoning order quashed, Trial Court directed to exercise discretionary power and decide afresh while taking cognizance on the charge sheet after taking into consideration the entire materials and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

(Para 5-10)

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (19 of 2010), Section 14, 15, 22 --  Opportunity to file objection -- NGT abdicated its adjudicatory role and let the GPCB and CPCB to proceed and act on their own reports -- GPCB called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 8,16,30,000 in terms of the directions of the NGT -- Before accepting the reports and issuing directions based upon it, NGT ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to rebut the report and question the compensation assessed therein -- This was not done -- Such action of the NGT cannot be countenanced – Order set aside, O.A. before NGT restored.

(Para 6, 15, 16)

A. Construction of deed -- Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not covey the intention correctly -- If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it -- In constructing a deed, looking at the surrounding circumstances and subject matter is legitimate only if the words used are doubtful.

(Para 16)

B. Construction of deed – Contract is first constructed in its plain, ordinary and literal meaning -- This is also known as the literal rule of construction -- If there is an absurdity created by literally reading the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed -- This construction is generally called the golden rule of construction -- Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed in light of its object and context to determine the purpose of the contract -- This approach must be used cautiously.

(Para 17)

C. Construction of a deed – It is “generally speaking, a matter of law -- However, when there is an ambiguity in the deed, determining its meaning is a mixed question of fact and law.

(Para 18)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Mandatory or discretionary -- Provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive -- They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory -- If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

(Para 28-30)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Stage of – Right of -- Rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim -- This can be done at any stage -- Plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence -- Defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

(Para 39)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 – Partial judgment/ decree on admissions – Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim” -- Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff -- In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Judgment on admissions – A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final.

(Para 43)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988 (28 of 1988), Section 8, 9 (As amended in 2012) – Minimum sentence prescribed – Effect of -- Section 9 does not prescribe a minimum sentence for the offence punishable under it -- By amendment minimum sentence made 2 years -- Amendment came into effect on 1st October 2012, whereas the offence was committed on 17th June 2010 and the order of sentence was issued on 11/13th November 2010 -- Said amendment would not be applicable -- Appellant has already been granted remission for the main offence u/s 302 IPC -- However, following the date of remission, the appellant has undergone an additional incarceration of approximately 10 months -- Sentence already undergone would subserve the ends of justice for the offence punishable under the Prisoners Act, 1988.

(Para 10-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 204, 438 -- Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(6), 447 -- Anticipatory bail – Serious Economic offences – SFIO investigated over 125 companies and filed a criminal complaint involving Rs. 4120 crores in fraudulent loans -- The Special Court issued bailable and later non-bailable warrants against the accused, many of whom deliberately evaded service -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 CrPC were initiated -- Despite prior knowledge of the case many accused concealed themselves and avoided appearance -- High Courts granted anticipatory bail to several accused.

Held, High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering the anticipatory bail application of such accused -- As per Section 212 (6), the offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act not entitled to be released on bail or on his bond, unless twin conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. The twin conditions are:-

(i) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

These twin conditions are mandatory in nature.

Economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside.

(Para 23-26, 31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Last seen theory -- Prosecution relied on last seen evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and circumstantial evidence including recovery of articles and fingerprints –PW-2 (alleged eyewitness) and PW-12 (last seen witness) disbelieved due to delayed statements – Extra judicial confessional statements disbelieved by High court – Recovery of slippers and a wheel spanner with alleged fingerprints of the accused was held insufficient to establish guilt in absence of a complete and credible chain of circumstantial evidence – Benefit of doubt extended to appellant – Conviction u/s 302 IPC set aside, holding prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence.

(Para 6, 7, 19-25)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 12, 226, 200A -- SARFAESI – Assets Recovery Company as Assignee -- Possession by police officer – Permissibility of – Maintainability of writ -- Section 14 empowers the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to take possession of the property -- Section 14(1-A) further empowers the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to “authorized any Officer subordinate to him” to take possession of the said assets.

-- ADM delegated the Additional Commissioner of Police with a further power to delegate it to a Police Officer for taking the possession -- In addition, the petitioners were also deprived of their possession over movable assets (which were not hypothecated/ mortgaged).

Possession of the immovable and the movable assets have been taken by the Government Authorities -- Remedy of issuance of a writ court be available as prima facie, there was a violation of the rights vested by virtue of Article 300A of the Constitution of India -- Writ petition allowed, however, with liberty to take possession in accordance with law strictly in terms of the mandate of Section 14 (1-A) of the SARFAESI Act.

(Para 17-25)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 122, 123, 126 -- Gift deed – Completion of -- Unilateral cancellation – Permissibility of -- Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement -- Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method – If the original deed was returned after registration, the fact that it was already acted upon, cannot be altered -- Receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the TP Act -- Once the document is declared as “gift”, Donor/ defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed -- Unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed executed by Donor/ Defendant No.1 / father also is invalid.

(Para 18)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ petition – Challenge to orders of quasi-judicial authorities -- Cause of action arose to father – Locus standi of son after 30 year -- Father of the petitioners died in the year 2015 -- Orders which now being assailed by the petitioners was in existence for almost 30 years as till the date when the father of the petitioners died and in his wisdom the father of the petitioner, never assailed it – Held, petitioners do not have any locus to file and maintain the writ petition.

(Para 3, 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 23 Rule 1(3)(b) – Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh -- Petitioner raised her grievance against execution of the gift deed  and consequent attestation of mutation, but no specific relief has been prayed to declare the gift deed illegal, null or void and not binding on the rights of petitioner -- Such omission entails consequences under order 2 rule 2 of the Code -- Petitioner cannot sue again in respect of the omitted portion of the claim -- Since, the plea which had been left from incorporation, could not be said to be alien to the subject matter or cause of action of the suit, even the requirements of order 23 rule 1(3) (b) were satisfied -- Suit is at very initial stage, issues have not been framed; therefore, no prejudice likely to be caused to the respondents --  Petitioner permitted to withdraw the suit with permission to file afresh on the same cause of action.

(Para 11-19)

Constitution of India, Article 243U -- President of Municipal Council -- Conversion of Municipal Council to Corporation – Contention that as term of Municipal Council is five years, in accordance with the Constitutional provisions, the Council has a right to continue for a period of five years – Held, Article 243-U shall have its forcibility provided the Council is still there -- If a decision is taken by the State to convert a Council into a Corporation then, as from the date when the Council become a Corporation, its term would end automatically.

(Para 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Cheque bounce appeal -- Deposit of 20% of compensation – Mandate of -- Appellate court to determine financial condition directed the applicant/ appellant to submit ITR for the last 5 years -- Court has to consider that condition of deposit of 20% will not be unjust but also, the fact whether the imposing condition would amount to deprivation of the right of the appeal of the appellant -- No illegality in the impugned order.

(Para 8, 9)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Delayed submission of Medical bill for re-imbursement of deceased employee beyond 90 days – Rejection of – Permissibility of -- If an employee has died during treatment, his wife/ heirs should not be harassed for technical reasons -- Such a rule that prescribes for submitting medical bills for reimbursement may at times be put to strict compliance where employee is alive but in case of heirs where employee has died during treatment, such rules should not be permitted to come in the way of reimbursement of genuine claims of medical bills -- Petitioner directed to submit again the medical bills within a period of four weeks, concerned respondent shall clear the same as per relevant rules by taking appropriate decision within a period of two weeks.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375,  376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Discharge of accused – Rape – Promise to marry -- Mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case -- An offence u/s 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations – Ingredients of offences u/s 375/ 506 IPC not established -- Trial Court discharged the accused – High Court in revision set aside the order of discharge has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Charge-sheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record – Order of High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings terminated.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(f), 417, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Promise to marry -- Discharge of accused -- Appellant and the Complainant came in contact in 2014, during the pendency of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Complainant’s marriage -- It is from day one, she had knowledge and was conscious of the fact, that the Appellant was in a subsisting marriage, though separated – Complainant was receiving financial help from the Appellant for herself and her son --  Complainant cannot plead ‘misconception of fact’ or ‘rape on the false pretext to marry’ -- No evidence to conclude that there was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement – No criminal intimidation -- There is a growing tendency of resorting to initiation of criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour -- Every consensual relationship, where a possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out -- It is such lis that amounts to an abuse of process of law -- Court deemed fit to terminate the proceedings at the stage of charge itself – Appeal allowed.

(Para 14-22)

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17, 69 (a) to (j); Section 22A, 22B (State amendment of Tamilnadu) – Registration Rules, Rule 55A(i) (State Amendment of Tamilnadu) -- Registration of sale deed – Refusal to register -- Power of Registrar – Rule 55A(i) declared ultra vires the 1908 Act -- None of Clauses (a) to (j) of Section 69 provides for framing Rules conferring power on the registering authority to refuse registration of a document of transfer -- No provision under the 1908 Act confers power on any authority to refuse registration of a transfer document -- Unless documents are produced evidencing title as required by Rule 55A(i), registration of the sale deed shall be refused.

Held, registering officer is not concerned with the title held by the executant -- He has no adjudicatory power to decide whether the executant has any title -- Even if an executant executes a sale deed or a lease in respect of a land in respect of which he has no title, the registering officer cannot refuse to register the document if all the procedural compliances are made and the necessary stamp duty as well as registration charges/fee are paid – Rule-making power u/s 69 cannot be exercised to make a Rule that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1908 Act -- Due to the inconsistency, Rule 55A(i) declared ultra vires the 1908 Act.

(Para 11-15)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Registration of sale deed/ Lease deed – Power of Registrar -- Effect of wrong registration -- Under the scheme of the 1908 Act, it is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property which he is seeking to transfer -- Once the registering authority is satisfied that the parties to the document are present before him and the parties admit execution thereof before him, subject to making procedural compliances, the document must be registered -- The execution and registration of a document have the effect of transferring only those rights, if any, that the executant possesses -- If the executant has no right, title, or interest in the property, the registered document cannot effect any transfer.

(Para 15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Mere breach of promise to repay per se does not infer dishonest intention -- Appellant had clarified he had suffered continuous business setbacks -- Due to losses, he was unable to pay the 2nd non-applicant -- He had sold the coal to a brick manufacturer and suffered losses thereto -- Failure to pay due to unfortunate business losses cannot be clothed with culpability and the process of criminal law utilized to recover outstanding dues -- Proceeding arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 17-23)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34(3) – Objection u/s 34 of Arbitration Act -- Limitation of three calendar months as opposed to 90 days -- Statutory language of Section 34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation period as “three months”, as opposed to the condonable period as “thirty days” -- This difference in language unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months as opposed to 90 days -- Argument that 3 months must be read as 90 days in the context of Section 34(3), rejected.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4, 12  -- Objection u/s 34 of Arbitration Act – Limitation -- Exclusion of days -- Respondent received a signed copy of the award on 09.04.2022, this date must be excluded and the 3-month limitation period must be reckoned from 10.04.2022 -- This expires on 09.07.2022, which happened to be a second Saturday when the court was not working -- Hence, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the benefit of the respondent -- Respondent’s application u/s 34, which was filed on 11.07.2022, i.e., the next working day of the court, must be considered as being filed within the limitation period.

(Para 13, 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 378 – Appeal against conviction/ Acquittal -- Huge pendency of criminal appeals in High Courts – Preference of hearing -- Priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison -- The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat -- However, a right balance has to be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail -- If the appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail and especially where a life sentence has been imposed are heard after a decade or more from its filing, if the appeal is dismissed, the question arises of sending the accused back to jail after a long period of more than a decade -- Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority.

(Para 15)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 21 -- Consumer – Privity of contract -- Tripartite Agreement would lead to the conclusion that the essential transaction of sale was between the complainant-respondent and the borrower who was the buyer of the flat of the complainant-respondent for an agreed consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- -- Complainant-respondent, having no privity of contract with the appellant, cannot be termed a ‘consumer’ under the Act.

(Para 17)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 24A – Limitation to file complaint – Condonation of delay -- NCDRC is competent to condone any period of delay in filing a complaint beyond two years from the date when the cause of action arises, the discretion is circumscribed by twin conditions: (i) that the complainant satisfy the NCDRC that he had sufficient cause for not filing his complaint within such period, and; (ii) that the NCDRC record the reasons for condoning such delay -- Neither reasons nor a formal order condoning delay is forthcoming, either in the order-sheets or in the Impugned Order -- Despite the appellant raising the issue of limitation, the Impugned Order is silent on the said score – NCDRC ought to have passed a reasoned order condoning the delay or refusing to condone the delay.

(Para 21-23)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Suit for declaration of absolute ownership – Pleadings -- One who comes before the court with a declaration that, he is the absolute owner of the schedule property, he must plead the correct property number, extent and also boundaries before the court with cogent and acceptable evidence.

(Para 11)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Choice of Collector -- Collector has taken note of age, education, landholding etc. of the respective candidates and also taken into account the recommendation by lower revenue officers etc. -- Respondent No. 4 was a novice of about 20 years of age whereas the petitioner was found to be a mature and intelligent person, Collector found petitioner as a suitable candidate -- It is a well settled law that in the matter of appointment of Lambardar, the choice of Collector is not to be lightly interfered with even if two views are possible – Order of Financial Commissioner set aside and the order passed by learned Collector, appointing the petitioner as Lambardar maintained.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Recommendation of revenue officer -- Collector is not bound by the recommendation made by the revenue authorities in favour of a candidate; however, due consideration is to be accorded to such recommendations as they are in a position to assess the suitability of a candidate and such recommendation would have some persuasive value.

(Para 6.5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Preliminary stage of investigation -- There is no absolute rule that even if the investigation is at a preliminary stage, the Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot interfere.

(Para 4)