Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Abetment of suicide – Quashing of proceedings -- Charge-sheet, as it stands, appears to have proceeded in an unidimensional manner by accepting the version of the complainant and his family members as the gospel truth – Whether any investigation to explore any other angle was pursued, a stoic silence of State -- None of the ingredients required in law to make out a case u/s 306 IPC to be even remotely mentioned in the charge-sheet or are being borne out from the material on record – Held, charge-sheet filed by the police and the cryptic order of cognizance, the proceedings cannot be allowed to be carried on against the appellants -- Proceedings quashed – SIT constituted for re-investigation.

(Para 15-24)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Second bail application -- There is no prohibition in filing a fresh bail application after the earlier was rejected or cancelled, if granted.

(Para 4)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Second bail application – Filing of a fresh bail application, once an earlier bail application has been rejected or if granted and thereafter cancelled is a matter of right and solely on the ground that the Apex Court had not permitted filing of the fresh bail application, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the bail application.

(Para 5)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11, 25 -- Void marriage – Maintenance to spouse – Permanent alimony – Right of -- A spouse whose marriage has been declared void u/s 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act -- Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties -- Grant of relief u/s 25 is always discretionary.

(Para 28 a)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11, 12, 24 -- Void marriage – Voidable marriage – Maintenance pendente -- Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied -- While deciding the prayer for interim relief u/s 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief u/s 24 is always discretionary.

(Para 28 b)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23 – ‘decree in proceedings’ (Sec. 23) -- Interpretation of -- ‘decrees in proceedings’ will not include the decisions dismissing the petitions seeking reliefs u/s 9 to 13 -- Decrees passed u/s 11 to 13 bring about a change of status of the parties to the marriage -- Even a decree of restitution of conjugal rights brings about a change of status of the parties in case there is no restitution of conjugal rights within one year of a decree -- Even a decree of judicial separation u/s 10 brings about a change of status in the sense that a spouse who has got such a decree is no longer under an obligation to cohabit with his or her spouse.

(Para 17)

D. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 – Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), Section 18 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 144 -- Decline of decree under Hindu Marriage Act -- Remedy for maintenance -- When a decree is sought u/s 9 to 13 and is declined by the court, the remedy u/s 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, remains available to the wife -- Even the remedy u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 144 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 continues to be available.

(Para 19)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 144 -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. / 144 of BNSS – Nature of proceedings -- Proceedings u/s 125 of the CrPC are of a summary nature -- While deciding the applications u/s 125 of the CrPC, a summary procedure is required to be followed, and a detailed adjudication of the rights of the parties cannot be made -- The same is the legal position as regards the corresponding remedy u/s 144 of the BNSS.

(Para 21)

F. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 24, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 – Maintenance pendentelite -- Conditions for applicability of Section 24 are: (i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and (ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.

(Para 25)

Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005), Section 8(1) (j) – Exemption to disclose personal information -- Disclosure of marks of other candidate in an examination – Held, disclosure of the marks though may fall in the category of personal information, yet the disclosure of this personal information is presently necessary in public interest, and therefore, it is not an information which cannot be given by the Information Officer under the RTI Act, 2005 -- To the contrary, such an information must be disclosed in order to maintain transparency in the process.

(Para 2)

Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 271AAA, Explanation (a) -- Undisclosed income – Penalty -- Section 271AAA is a penalty provision, it has to be strictly construed -- The fact that the assessee has surrendered some undisclosed income during the course of search or that the surrender is emerging out of the statements recorded during the course of search is not sufficient to fasten the levy of penalty -- The onus is on the Assessing Officer to satisfy the condition precedent stipulated in the said Explanation, before the charge for levy of penalty is fastened on the assessee -- Appellant admitted Rs.2,27,65,580/- as income for AY 2011-12 during the search before DDIT (Inv.) as well as substantiated the manner in which the said undisclosed income was derived and paid tax together with interest thereon, albeit belatedly -- Consequently, all the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 271AAA(2) stand satisfied and, therefore, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) is not attracted on the said amount of Rs.2,27,65,580/-.

(Para 34-38)

A. Constitution of India, Article 245 -- functus officio -- Rule-making power of the legislature cannot be curtailed or nullified by application of the concept of functus officio -- The principle of functus officio normally applies to a judicial forum or a quasi-judicial authority and would have no application to the rule-making authority which is within the domain of the State Government by virtue of Article 245 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 42)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226, 245 -- Statutory rules – Rule of natural justice – Opportunity of hearing – Requirement of -- It is a well-settled principle of law that while administrative actions and statutory rules that impact citizens’ rights are subject to judicial review, the notion that the State must provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making power is fundamentally flawed.

(Para 45)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Show cause notice – Challenge to -- Writ jurisdiction -- Writ Court should not entertain any petition, seeking to challenge a show cause notice unless the Court is convinced that the same has been issued by an authority having no jurisdiction, or the same is tainted with mala fides.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 74 -- Breach of contractual obligations -- Punitive measures – Blacklisting of contractor -- A mere allegation of breach of contractual obligations without anything more, per se, does not invite any such punitive action.

(Para 34)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Policy of regularization is applicable in rem and benefits admissible to each individual, who is similarly placed, had to be extended by the respondent-State without any discrimination -- Such employees ought not be forced to seek identical reliefs by way of filing separate writ petitions and that a holistic approach is required to be taken by the State Agencies as well as employer to extend the benefits to all similarly placed persons irrespective of the fact whether they have taken recourse to institution of a separate litigation or not.

(Para 23-25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Dealy and laches – Arrears of monetary benefits – Restriction upon -- Certain other persons approached this Court for seeking the benefit in the year 2014, which such writ petitions were allowed in the year 2022 -- The issue of delay and laches/ estoppel did not stand in the way of extending the said benefits, the monetary benefits restricted to a period of 38 months prior to filing of the writ petition(s) to balance the equities – Petitioners held entitled for all consequential benefits including notional fixation of pay and seniority -- However, the financial benefits restricted upto 38 months prior to the filing of the present writ petition.

(Para 24-29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437 – Right to bail u/s 437 (6) of Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Sub-section (2) of Section 437 of the Code can be divided in two parts -- The first part would indicate that it is mandatory, but in the next breath, the legislature has given discretion to the Magistrate not to grant bail by assigning reasons -- Provisions of Section 437(6) cannot be considered to be mandatory in nature and cannot be interpreted to grant an absolute and indefeasible right of bail in favour of accused -- Reasons for rejection of application under sub-section (6) have to be different and little more weighty than the reasons that may be relevant for rejection for bail at the initial stage. Following factors would be relevant:

1. Whether the reasons for being unable to conclude trial within sixty days from the first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the accused?

2. Whether there are any chances of the accused tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner?

3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the accused on being bailed out?

4. Whether accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period?

If the answer to any one of the above referred fact situations or similar fact situations is in affirmative then that would work as a fetter on the right that accrues to the accused under first part of sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code -- Right accrues to him only if he is in custody during the whole of the said period.

(Para 9-14)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, 100 -- First appeal – Second appeal – Clubbing of appeals – Permissibility of -- Though, in a normal circumstance, to avoid contradicting decrees, the Courts would be justified in considering the matters together -- Nature of consideration in the Second Appeal as against a consideration to be made in the First Appeal entirely different in as much as the reappreciation of the evidence and interference with the finding of the fact would arise only in the First Appeal and not in the Second Appeal -- Clubbing of the proceedings not justified.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Age of prosecutrix -- There are two contradictory opinions given by two medical experts – Doctor/ PW-3 states that according to the X-ray reports, the age of the prosecutrix was around 14 years, however, Chief Medical Officer/ DW-2 opined that the age of the prosecutrix was around 18 years -- In view of the two conflicting medical opinions, we are of the opinion that the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant-accused.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping – Acquittal -- From the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun – Held, High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction for the offences punishable u/s 363 and 366 of the IPC – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Divorce – Permanent alimony -- Decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Permanent alimony of Rs. 50,00,000/- granted -- Once the lis between the parties was finally settled and permanent alimony of a lump sum amount was awarded, nothing further survives for consideration -- All pending matters inter se parties would stand closed -- Final order of maintenance shall be the full and final adjudication of any maintenance proceedings between the parties, leaving no scope for further claims in this regard.

(Para 1-4)

Employees’ Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4A -- Compensation to employee – Interest thereupon -- Interest liability arises on default of the employer, in paying the admitted compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due and if there is such default, necessarily interest shall run at the rate provided -- Interest runs from the date of the accident -- 12% simple interest per annum necessarily has to be applied.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4, 5 -- Forfieture of gratuity – Initial appointment by fraud – Conviction in criminal proceedings not necessary -- Petitioner supressed his actual date of birth -- Failure of the employer to initiate a criminal proceeding on the fraud employed by way of the fabricated/ forged certificate produced for the purpose of employment, does not militate against the forfeiture -- No conviction in a criminal proceeding is necessitated, if the misconduct alleged & proved constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude -- Appointment itself being illegal, there is no question of the terminated employee seeking fruits of his employment by way of gratuity – Decision of the PSU forfeiting entire gratuity, upheld.

(Para 13-15)

B. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4, 5 -- Forfieture of gratuity -- Misappropriation of meagre amounts -- It is trite that even if minimal amounts are misappropriated it would constitute a misconduct warranting termination -- However, on the question of forfeiture of gratuity, Appointing Authority should have taken a more sympathetic approach -- Appointing Authority directed to limit the forfeiture to 25% of the gratuity payable and release the balance amounts.

(Para 15)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Withdrawal of NOC to commence Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital – Held, there can be no indefeasible right claimed on the basis of the grant issued, which is illegal -- There is no promise offered by the State or the Government by reason of the invalid order issued by the Department -- When officers of the government acts outside the scope of authority, the plea of promissory estoppel would not be available, especially since the doctrine of ultra vires comes into operation and the government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised actions of its officers – Withdrawal of NOC, upheld.

(Para 1, 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 225 – Cheque bounce complaint – Enquiry u/s 225 BNSS – Requirement of -- Drill of Section 225 BNSS (erstwhile Section 202 Cr.P.C.) was not followed before issuance of process -- Intention is to ensure that sufficient grounds exist in order to proceed against an accused in a private complaint -- It is pertinent that the concerned Court passes an order indicating substantial compliance of the aforementioned provision, in view of the directions issued in In re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 NI Act 1881 2021(2) L.A.R. 366 = (2021) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16184 -- Matter remanded back to concerned Court to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law, by taking recourse to Section 225 BNSS.

(Para 4-10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- Petitioners/ convicts directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by trial Court by the Appellate Court -- No reason given by the Court while issuing directions -- Condition of depositing of 20% of compensation amount awarded by the trial Court imposed for the purpose of suspension of sentence, set aside -- Appellate Court directed to re-consider the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties and then to pass appropriate order in accordance with the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case (SC) 2024(2) L.A.R. 323 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and till then not to take any coercive action against the petitioners.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- According to Section 148 NI Act, the requirement to deposit a minimum 20% of the fine or compensation during an appeal is not mandatory, instead, it is discretionary power vested with the appellate Court meaning the said Court can choose to waive the said deposit in certain exceptional circumstances depending on the facts of the case.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Expedite decision on appeal – Suspension of sentence -- On joint request of the parties, petitioners exempted from depositing an amount of Rs.43,65,125/- i.e. 20% of the amount of compensation during the pendency of the appeal, before the Appellate Court -- Since the complaint was initially filed on 11.01.2018 and a period of 7 years has lapsed, after the institution of the complaint, the Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal within a period of 04 months.

(Para 6)

Constitution of India Article 14, 16, 309 – Appointment of teachers -- Change in eligibility criteria – Permissibility of -- Advertisement was issued on 19.07.2023 and the eligibility criteria was set out as per 2022 Recruitment Rules -- By which the candidates must have passed Teachers Eligibility Test conducted by the State of Jharkhand – By notice dated 10.01.2024, applications were called from the residents of Jharkhand possessing CTET and STET qualification between 19.01.2024 to 23.01.2024 -- Amendments in 2022 Recruitment Rules were brought on 29.01.2024 with intent to give statutory backing for changing the eligibility in the on-going recruitment process -- Later, the amendment in the advertisement was made --  Held, this amount to change the rules of game after the game has begun – Therefore, the entire action on the part of the State Government is arbitrary and contrary to the law -- Revised eligibility criteria introduced cannot be applied to the ongoing recruitment process.

(Para 57, 58)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Split method of dependency – Deceased was to retire after 2 year of date of death -- Normally Courts and Tribunals have to apply the multiplier as per the judgement of this Court in Sarla Verma case (2009) 6 SCC 121 : 2009 INSC 506 -- Any deviation from the same warrants special reasons to be recorded -- Deceased was a technically qualified person and people are generally healthy at that age and continue working even after retirement --  Compensation on account of loss of income while applying the multiplier of 9 by the Tribunal without applying the split method is the correct calculation on that account -- Future prospects @ 15% awarded -- Loss of estate and funeral expenses, the amount of ?15,000/- each -- Consortium, there are three claimants, namely, the widow, one son and one daughter, they would be entitled to compensation on account of loss of consortium @ ?40,000/- each.

(Para 2, 8-12)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case – Consented compensation – Enhancement – Permissibility of -- Claimant-Appellant had agreed on the additional consolidated sum granted by the High Court -- Despite such consent, the objective when granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is to ensure just and fair compensation is paid to the aggrieved party – Compensation enhanced to Rs.17,82,825/-.

(Para 9-11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 309 -- Recruitment process -- Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies.

(Para 42(1))

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 -- Eligibility criteria – Change in midway – Permissibility of -- Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit -- Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness.

(Para 42(2))

C. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Select list – Right to be appointed -- Decision in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220  -- Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree deals with the right to be placed in the Select List -- The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues.

(Para 42(3))

D. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 – Recruitment rules/ procedure – Deviation from – Permissibility of -- Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved -- Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility -- However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps.

(Para 42(4(5))

E. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 –  Select list – Right to be appointment -- Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment -- State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies -- However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.

(Para 42(6)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 37 – Arbitration award – Interference in – When it comes to scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, jurisdiction of the appellate court in examining an order passed under Section 34, either setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is all the more circumscribed -- A great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act – Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act -- High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction u/s 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’ – Judgment and order passed by High Court set aside and the arbitral award restored.

(Para 39-43)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Onus on accused -- Onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused – If the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Onus on accused -- One of son of deceased’s testimony remotely suggest that any or all of the three accused persons were present in the house or that they had quarrelled with his mother when he left for school -- None of the neighbours had seen the accused present with deceased or that they were seen fleeing away on the fateful morning – Prosecution has not explained as to where the girl child was on the date of the incident -- Likewise, the prosecution also failed to provide any explanation, as to why the other son was not examined in evidence -- Failure to examine them in evidence calls for drawing of adverse inference thereby, further denting the credibility of the prosecution case -- Prosecution failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellants by convincing evidence and beyond the shadow of doubt, so as to affirm their guilt -- Accused-appellants acquitted of the charges by giving them the benefit of doubt – Appeal allowed.

(Para 18-38)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 -- Legitimacy/ Paternity of child – Presumption – DNA Test -- Issue hinges on two primary prongs requiring detailed analysis: (i) the difference between legitimacy and paternity, and consequently, the circumstances under which the presumption of legitimacy is displaced to permit an enquiry into paternity; and (ii) the exercise of ‘balancing of interests’ and evaluating the eminent need for a DNA test -- Legitimacy determines paternity u/s 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted  by proving ‘non-access’.

(Para 9, 70(i))

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Death sentence – Life imprisonment – Murder of Wife & 4 Minor Daughters – Must scrutinize not only the nature of the offence but also the totality of the offender’s circumstances -- Certain mitigating factors, especially the Appellant’s lack of criminal antecedents and his reported conduct in prison, tilt the scales in favour of commutation -- There is no material demonstrating that he would remain a perpetual threat to society or that he is beyond reform -- Indeed, the Probation Officer’s input and the Superintendent of District Jail’s report show a potentially reformable individual -- Imposition of capital punishment is an exception and not the rule -- Even where multiple murders have been committed, if there is evidence or at least a reasonable possibility of reform, a lesser sentence must be preferred – Case does not meet the threshold of “the rarest of rare” so as to irrevocably foreclose the option of life imprisonment – Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment till his last breath.

(Para 21-24)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery of weapon --  Investigating Officer neither proved nor exhibited the disclosure statement of the appellant accused during his deposition -- Investigating Officer did not distinctly identify the accused persons at whose instance, the particular weapon, i.e., axe (kulhari) or dagger (katari), was recovered -- No indication in the testimony that he took the signatures of the accused persons on the recovery memos -- Not even this, the said witness did not even state that he signed and attested the memorandums under which the recoveries were effected -- Therefore, the substratum of the prosecution case regarding the disclosure statements rendered by the appellant-accused and the recoveries allegedly made in furtherance thereof remains unproved for want of proper evidence.

(Para 32)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Murder of six innocent persons -- Investigating Officer did not examine even a single of the villagers living adjacent to the crime scene for establishing the presence of the appellant-accused at or around the crime scene, corresponding to the time of the incident -- Investigating Officer failed to collect any evidence regarding the safe keeping of the recovered articles/ material objects, till the same reached the Forensic Science Laboratory -- Prosecution failed to prove even one of the three so-called incriminating circumstances i.e., ‘motive’, ‘last seen’ and ‘recoveries’ in its quest to bring home the guilt of the appellant-accused -- Even if, for the sake of arguments the evidence of recovery of weapons were to be accepted, the fact remains that the FSL report does not give any indication regarding the grouping of the blood found on the weapons and hence, the recoveries are of no avail to the prosecution -- The fabric of the prosecution case is full of holes and holes which are impossible to mend -- Conviction of the appellant-accused and death sentence handed down to him can also not be sustained -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 33-39)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 4, 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- PMLA case – Regular bail – Accused not produced before magistrate in 24 hours -- Violation of fundamental right – Right to bail -- Arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in custody – Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds that the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India have been violated while arresting the accused or after arresting him, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the bail application to release the accused on bail – Bail cannot be denied on the grounds of non-fulfilment of twin tests under clause (ii) of sub-section 1 of Section 45 of PMLA – High Court granted bail – No error in judgment, appeal dismissed.

(Para 3-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception-4, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sudden fight -- From the evidence, as placed on record, it is difficult to come to a finding that the appellant had come with a premeditated mind to kill the deceased -- Possibility of an altercation taking place between the appellant and the deceased for some reason and the appellant assaulting the deceased in the heat of passion on account of a sudden fight, cannot be ruled out -- Appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC -- As such, the conviction of the appellant under Part I of Section 304 IPC would meet the ends of justice.

(Para 10-12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173, 175(3) – Registration of FIR -- Investigation by Police – Power of Judicial Magistrate – Hearing to Police officer – Mandate of -- By requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions u/s 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs u/s 173 -- Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

(Para 34, 35)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- M.P. Veterinary Department Contingency Paid Employees Recruitment & Conditions of Service Rules, 1979 -- Part time sweeper – Regular pay scale -- Appellants were appointed on the ground of recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted by Collector, against the vacant posts as part time sweepers at Collector’s prescribed rates -- Appellants were appointed for posts reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes under Special Recruitment Drive -- They are covered under Clause 6 of the Circular dated 10.05.1984 since they have completed three years and fulfil all the conditions stipulated in the Circular to grant revised pay-scale -- Designation as ‘part-time’ sweepers does not affect the validity of their appointment since they were appointed against sanctioned posts nevertheless -- Appellants fighting this battle for regular pay-scale since 2016 and they have extended their service to the State for substantial years -- But more importantly they have proven that their situation is covered under the State issued Circular and Rules – Held, it confers upon them a legal right to avail regular pay-scale.

(Para 13-18)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Appellant acted upon clause 49.5 and sought an extension of time on three occasions – Claim in the letter dated 25th January, 2017 was made by the appellant after giving solemn undertaking on 14th January, 2015 not to make any claim other than escalation in respect of delays in the completion of work, the claim made was contrary to the undertakings -- By the undertakings, the appellant agreed not to make a claim contrary to what is provided in clause 49.5; and therefore, by conduct, the appellant was estopped from challenging the validity of clause 49.5.

(Para 19)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Limitation of six months – Minor claimant – Effect upon -- Date of the accident 20.07.2020 -- Respondent/ claimant had attained the age of majority on 06.03.2023 and that the petition was filed on 25.04.2023 i.e. within one and a half month after attaining the age of majority – Tribunal allowed the claim as the claim petition cannot be stated to be time barred.

-- No law cited to show that in case a person is a minor at the time of the accident and is therefore incompetent to file a claim petition, then, he/she cannot file the same within a period of six months of his/her attaining the age of majority.

-- Additionally, Section 166(3) of the MV Act made applicable from 01.04.2022 and were not in force on the date when the accident took place i.e. 20.07.2020 -- No judgment cited to show that the said provisions would also apply to a case where the accident had taken place prior to the date when the said provisions had come into force.

Impugned order is in accordance with law and deserves to be upheld.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375(2), Exception 2, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape with wife – Quashing of FIR -- As per Exception 2 u/s 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant -- The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant -- No prima facie case constituting any offence is made out against the appellant and—FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed – Appeal allowed.

(Para 17)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Divorce -- Dispute between the parties remains only concerning the maintenance amount and both the parties have agreed to the grant of divorce – Husband has already remarried, the present parties stayed together for only about two months after the marriage, have no intention to continue their marital relationship, the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband has evidently broken down irretrievably – No interfere with the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court and confirmed by the High Court.

(Para 15)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 -- Divorce -- Permanent alimony -- Husband has not been forthright in disclosure of his income and assets and is clearly attempting to escape his liability to support the appellant post-divorce -- In pursuance of the affidavit filed by the appellant, it can be plainly inferred that the respondent has multiple sources of income including the rental income from tenanted premises -- There is no issue out of the wedlock -- Considering the total facts and circumstances of the case, the financial status of the parties, their standards of living, the fact that the respondent has already remarried and also bears the financial responsibility of his new family, Rs. 10,00,000/- awarded as a one-time settlement in favour of the appellant-wife shall serve the purpose of equity and meet the ends of justice.

(Para 19)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 37, 38 -- Suit for simpliciter injunction – Maintainability of -- Plaintiffs failed to pray for any declaration and their suit simpliciter for injunction -- High Court dismissed the suit being maintainable -- Held, if the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs then the suit should not fail only on the ground that the matter has been filed only for injunction simpliciter and no main relief in the form of declaration has been prayed for -- Judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with law.

(Para 13-23)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Agreement to sell – Weather, it is transfer of title? -- Agreement for sale in respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in favour of the purchaser under the agreement -- An agreement for sale does not create any interest in the property -- The only mode by which an immovable property worth more than Rs.100/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a sale deed duly registered in accordance with the Indian Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Kidnapping -- Procuration of minor girl – Acquittal -- Age of girl -- Prosecutrix herself indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant -- Age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out -- Evidence of the prosecutrix not supported the case of the prosecution -- Independent eye-witness (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution’s case on recovery -- Prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Contradiction in statements – Disclosure statement -- Recovery of knife – Value of -- Difficult to believe the testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 for the following reasons:

a. The statement made by both the eyewitnesses that the appellant inflicted two to three stab wounds on the back of the deceased with a knife are omissions;

b. The version of PW-4 that he was standing at a distance of fifteen feet from the scene of occurrence is also an omission;

c. The statement of PW-5 that PW-4 was present at the time of the incident is an omission. His statement that the deceased fell on his chest is an omission.

d. Both the witnesses did not report the incident to the Police. According to PW-4, he informed the incident to one Sumesh, who has not been examined;

e. Both the witnesses did not take the deceased to a hospital; and

f. Though other persons were present at the time of the incident, the said witnesses have not been examined.

Once evidence of two witnesses is disbelieved, the only remaining evidence against the appellant is of the recovery of the knife at his instance – It is not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction set aside. Manoj Kumar Soni’s case 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 relied.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Section 24 -- Duty of Public Prosecutor -- A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case -- The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well -- If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it -- On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused -- Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

(Para 96)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Murder – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction in revision – Power of -- Sub-section (3) of Section 401 CrPC prohibits/ bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Defence counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to correct the Court if the Court is falling in some error and for all this, the State Government responsible -- It is the State Government who appointed the concerned Public Prosecutor -- High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants -- Appeals allowed -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside -- State Government directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the three appellants towards compensation within a period of four weeks.

(Para 1-3, 40-46, 97-99)

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Writ jurisdiction -- Instrumentality of State -- For issuing writ against a legal entity, it would have to be an instrumentality or agency of a State or should have been entrusted with such functions as are Governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence Governmental.

-- A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State Government; (ii) Authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any Statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.

(Para 10 (1)(2))

B. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Non-Banking Companies – Writ jurisdiction -- Although a non-banking finance company like the Muthoot Finance Ltd. with which we are concerned is duty bound to follow and abide by the guidelines provided by the Reserve Bank of India for smooth conduct of its affairs in carrying on its business, yet those are of regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guideline and not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the company -- Writ petition rejected on the ground of maintainability .

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder -- Common intention -- For convicting the accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds -- It must be established that all the accused had preplanned and shared a common intention to commit the crime with the accused who has actually committed the crime -- It must be established that the criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused -- Prosecution failed to show that the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4/ appellants had common intention with accused No.1-JS prior to the accused No.1-JS’s shooting at the deceased resulting in her death – Conviction set aside.

(Para 1, 2, 18-20)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation  in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Carpenter – 74% disability -- It would be unfair to classify a carpenter as an unskilled worker -- Minimum wages as applied to skilled persons is to be taken for the purpose of calculation of compensation, as on the relevant date would be Rs.8337.10 -- Loss of future earnings at 74% disability Rs.8337 x 74% = Rs.6,169.45, Annual loss of earning Rs. 6,169.45 x 12 = Rs.74,033.4 and applying multiplier of 14 Rs.74,033.4 x 14 = Rs.10,36,467.6 -- Future prospect 25% = Rs.3,50,158 – Treatment and Medical charges = 60,000/-, Pain and Suffering = 60,000/-, Loss of Income during treatment = 15,000/-, Attendant Charges = 15,000/-, Special Diet and Nursing = 10,000/-, Transportation Charges = 15,000/-, Loss of Amenities = 30,000/- -- Total compensation of Rs. 15,91, 625/- alongwith 7.5% p.a awarded.

(Para 7, 9)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Conviction of accused -- It is a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the possibility of guilt -- The gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations from definitive conclusions -- Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder –Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and trustworthy --  In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person’s guilt -- The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt -- Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend -- Chain of circumstantial evidences in the case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally inconsistent with their innocence – Conviction set aside.

(Para 22-27)

Service matter – Disciplinary proceedings -- Fundamental defect in enquiry -- Appellant’s result was kept in abeyance in view of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings -- Defect was accepted by the Bank when they did not press the appeal -- Appellant should be granted all monetary benefits since the fundamental defect in the enquiry was due to no fault of the appellant.

(Para 6, 30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)