Latest Important Judgments

152. Co-operative Societies -- State Reorganisation (Uttar Pradesh - Uttarakhand) -- Deemed conversion into Multi-State Co-operative Society -- Scope and limits -- No automatic or blanket conversion of every co-operative society registered under a State Act into a multi-State co-operative society -- Deeming fiction u/s 103 applies only where, consequent upon reorganisation, the objects of the society extend to more than one State – Where objects remain confined to one State, the society continues to be governed by the State Co-operative Societies Act. A. Section 103 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 does not, by itself, confer an automatic or deemed status of a multi-State cooperative society upon every society registered under a State Cooperative Societies Act merely because the parent State has undergone reorganisation. B. The applicability of Section 103 requires a factual enquiry in each case as to whether the objects of the society extend to more than one State. If the objects are found to span more than one State, the deeming fiction under Section 103 will operate and the society would be treated as a multi-State cooperative society. If the objects remain confined to only one State, the status of the society will remain unchanged. C. It would be erroneous to undertake an enquiry into the area of operation of a society for the purposes of Section 103, when the provision itself mandates an examination only of the objects of the society. Read with Section 5, it becomes evident that Section 103 is attracted only where the objects of the society extend to more than one State. It is only in such situation that the society would, by operation of law, be treated as a multi-State cooperative society. D. The residence or domicile of the members of the cooperative society has no bearing on determining whether the society is a multi-State cooperative society. E. Section 5 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 mandates that a society may be registered as a multi-State cooperative society only when its principal objects, as reflected in its bye-laws, serve the interests of members in more than one State. It is, therefore, a pre-condition that the objects span more than one State. (SC) Decided on: 15.12.2025

153. Doctrine of lis pendens – Separate suit – Maintainability of – Third party rights – Adjudication of -- Doctrine of lis pendens along with Rules 58, 89 to 92, 99 to 104 of Order XXI CPC respectively and Section 47 CPC is as follows: (i) Section 52 of the 1882 Act embodying the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to suits where any right to the property in question is directly and specifically in issue. Whether any right in the property was directly and specifically in question in the suit would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine cannot blindly be made inapplicable to suits in which the plaint contains a specific averment that the mortgaged property be attached and sold in lieu of the decree or a charge be created on the property. If interpreted so, any judgment-debtor can render the decree incapable of execution by transferring his interest in the property during the pendency of such a suit. (ii) Rule 89 of Order XXI CPC provides an opportunity to any person claiming an interest in the property sold or a person acting for or on behalf of the persons having such interest, another opportunity to save the property from the clutches of the sale. A sine qua non for setting aside the sale under this rule would be the payment of the deposit as prescribed therein within a period of sixty days from the date of the sale. For the purposes of this rule, a pendente lite transferee of the judgment-debtor would also fall under the ambit of the phrase “person claiming an interest in the property sold”. (iii) Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC provides that the sale shall be set-aside if there exists any material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Furthermore, such material irregularity or fraud must cause a substantial injury to the applicant under Rule 90. In other words, there must be a direct nexus between the material irregularity or fraud and the substantial injury caused to the applicant. (iv) The words “material irregularity in publishing or conducting it” in Rule 90 would include any material irregularity or fraud occurring at a stage prior to the proclamation of sale as well, provided that the applicant did not have an opportunity to raise or could not have raised such a grievance at the appropriate time. Furthermore, the mere absence of or any defect in the attachment, by itself, cannot be a ground for setting aside the sale under Rule 90, unless substantial injury is proved. The applicant must make specific averments as regards the alleged irregularities or fraud, and convince the executing court that a substantial injury has been caused to him as a consequence. (v) The absence of a saleable interest on the part of the judgment-debtor to the suit property cannot be brought in as a ground under Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC. Such a ground would squarely fall within the ambit of Rule 58 of Order XXI CPC, if the sale is yet to be confirmed. (vi) Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC states that no person against whom an order under Rule 92 is made (either confirming the sale under Rule 92(1) or setting it aside under Rule 92(2) can institute a separate suit in that regard. However, there is a very narrow scope for a person to file a separate suit despite the bar under Rule 92(3). The reason for such a separate suit must be that the execution proceedings and the sale was without jurisdiction and therefore, a nullity and not binding on the plaintiff who has instituted a separate suit. (vii) Having said so, before holding such a separate suit instituted by a plaintiff alleging that the entire execution proceedings was without jurisdiction and therefore, the sale was a nullity, maintainable, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the plaintiff was not a party to the original decree or a representative of a party to the original decree, as stated in Section 47 CPC. If so, instead of filing a separate suit, such persons must prefer an application under Section 47 CPC. Upon any failure to do so, their separate suit would be hit by the bar contained in Section 47 CPC which specifically uses the words “and not by a separate suit”. (viii) The term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would mean a party other than the judgment-debtor, decree-holder or the auction-purchaser and would refer to a party who has not had his right, title or interest vis-à-vis the property in question adjudicated under Rule 58, Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC respectively. To put it very simply, the term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would refer to a party who is extraneous to the original suit proceedings and the proceedings under Order XXI CPC, and who either has not had his right, title or interest adjudicated or having the opportunity to have his right, title or interest adjudicated, has not availed such a remedy within the required time. Such a “third party” would also be someone who falls outside the scope of Section 47 CPC. (ix) Rule 92(4) is not a provision which confers any right to the third party to institute a suit for challenging the title of the judgment-debtor to the property which is subject to the execution proceedings. It is merely a procedural provision which states that such a suit must be instituted against the auction-purchaser, where the decree-holder and judgment-debtor would be necessary parties. (x) When a party other than the judgment-debtor, including a third party, is dispossessed during the course of execution of a decree, the only remedy for such a dispossessed party would lie in filing an application under Rule 99 complaining of its dispossession. In such an application, all questions including that of the right, title and interest of the parties in the proceeding, to the property, would be examined by the executing court. (xi) The words “may” used in Rule 99 along with the words “and not by a separate suit” used in Rule 101, must not be read to mean that a party who has been dispossessed has two options i.e., to either prefer an application under Rule 99 or to file a separate suit, the moment they are dispossessed. This would defeat the underlying object of the amendment made to the scheme of Rules 99 to 104 respectively wherein the executing court has been specifically empowered to look into the questions relating to the right, title and interest of the parties, quite akin to that which would have been done by way of a separate suit. Once the period of limitation for preferring an application under Rule 99 lapses, the person who has been dispossessed in the course of the execution of the decree, including a third party, cannot file a separate suit to circumvent or by-pass the said prescribed period of limitation. (xii) Rule 102 prevents the executing court from passing any order under Rule 100 if it is found that the applicant under Rule 99 is a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. This again, cannot be construed as giving leeway to such a person to institute a separate suit. Court say so for the simple reason that, even in the separate suit, the law would not look favorably upon a pendente lite transferee, and no relief of declaration of title and/or possession would be granted to him. His fate would be the same as under an application under Rule 99. (xiii) Therefore, - First, the separate suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively would be non-maintainable because they are representatives of the judgment-debtor and the bar envisaged under Section 47 CPC would squarely apply to their case. Secondly, having not availed the remedy under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC within time, the separate suit instituted for the same relief(s) would be barred. Thirdly, even if the aforesaid two reasons assigned could be said to not affect the suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, they would still not be entitled to the reliefs claimed owing to them being pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor whose transaction would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. (SC) Decided on: 15.12.2025

188. India’s international obligations under the UNCRPD, Article 31 -- Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983, Rules 196, 197, 198(iii) – Right of person with disabilities in prison – In addition to the salutary directions set out in L. Muruganantham, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1444 = (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20637 = 2025 INSC 844, following directions shall also be read in conjunction with the mandate of the said judgment: - A. The directions issued by this Court in L. Muruganantham (supra) shall be extended to all the States and the Union Territories, to ensure that the principles are adopted mutatis mutandis within their prison systems as well. B. Every State and Union Territories shall establish a robust, independent and accessible grievance redressal mechanism specifically designed for prisoners with disabilities. The said mechanism shall ensure prompt registration, effective monitoring and timely resolution of complaints, so as to safeguard inmates from systemic neglect, abuse and discriminatory practices. C. Appropriate facilities shall be created to ensure that prisoners with disabilities have meaningful access to inclusive education within the prison system. No inmate shall be deprived of the opportunity to pursue educational programmes solely on account of disability, and suitable adjustments shall be made to facilitate their effective participation. D. Section 89 of the RPwd Act shall mutatis mutandis be made applicable to prison establishments across the country. All prison authorities shall take adequate steps to disseminate awareness of the obligations flowing from the said provision to all officers, staff, legal-aid personnel, and other stakeholders. E. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has sought directions for the provision of appropriate assistive devices, mobility aids, and other support equipment to prisoners with disabilities. However, considering the crucial issue relating to prison security and the practical modalities of implementation, we, for the present, deem it appropriate to call upon all States and Union Territories to indicate in its compliance report the structured institutional mechanism proposed to ensure the regular availability, maintenance, and secure provision of assistive devices, mobility aids, and other disability-support equipment for prisoners with disabilities. The affidavit shall clearly outline the procedures, infrastructure, procurement systems, supervision protocols, and security measures by which such assistive aids will be made accessible to inmates, enabling them to carry out their daily activities with dignity without compromising institutional safety. F. Prisoners with benchmark disabilities shall be entitled to enhanced visitation provisions, in order to ensure sustained family support, emotional well-being, and continuous monitoring of their special needs. The specific modalities for such visitation shall be framed by the concerned departmental head of each State and Union Territory so as to balance security considerations with the imperative of accessibility and humane treatment. All States and Union Territories directed to place on record a comprehensive compliance report before this Court within four months, indicating the measures undertaken for effectuating the directions issued in L. Muruganantham (supra) as well as those mandated herein -- The report shall clearly set out the steps adopted, the progress achieved, and the modalities evolved for ensuring faithful implementation of the aforesaid directions in the prisons located within their jurisdictions. (SC) Decided on: 02.12.2025

200. Dowry death – Presumption – Regular bail by High Court – Cancellation of -- Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage – Dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC -- Consequently, the presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1/ husband -- High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles -- Courts has to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail – Held, such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society -- Judicial passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice -- A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative, not only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry -- Bail cancelled. (SC) Decided on: 28.11.2025