Cheque Bounce Cases Digest

Quashing of Complaint / Quashing of complaint under Section 138 of NI Act / Quashing of Complaint by High court

Company Cheque bounce case of Company -- Accused neither Director nor a signatory of cheque -- Incharge of the affairs of the -- (a) The complaint is based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which is not signed by the petitioner and is rather signed by accused No.3. The dishonoured cheques were given to the complainant at the time of signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. (b) The cheque numbers of the disputed cheques are duly mentioned in the body of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by accused No.3, which show that he was the person In-charge of the Company as he entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of accused No.1-Company and had issued the cheques in favour of the complainant. (c) Even the cheques are not signed by the petitioner and the same are signed by accused Nos.2 and 3. (d) In the complaints, the only allegation in para 3 is that accused No.4-petitioner is In-charge of the affairs of accused No.1-Company, however, there is no document to support this version and rather in the reply filed by the complainant in High Court, nowhere reflects that the petitioner is the In-charge of the affairs of accused No.1-Company, in any manner. (e) There is nothing on record to support the complaints that the petitioner is one Director of accused No.1-Company as it is the case of the petitioner that he never remained the Director of accused No.1-Company at any stage and this fact is not disputed in the reply. Summoning orders and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.

(P&H HC) Decided on: 05.03.2020

Offence by Company/Director – Vicarious liability of Director – (i) In order to make the company liable u/s 138 of the Act vicariously, the Director can be prosecuted if there is specific recital that the Directors thereof were at the time when offence the offence committed, were responsible for the conduct and day to day business of the complaint -- Director, who had resigned long back before the cheque was presented cannot be prosecuted -- One of the Director in the array of accused was never Director of the company since its incorporation and still he has been arrayed as accused in the capacity of Director -- The certification to this effect is computerized information, which is perse admissible under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, rather this document has not been denied with reference to any evidence to the contrary. (ii) Averments even if made in the complaint that the Director was in-charge, the same can be negated if the High Court comes across some unimpeachable/acceptable circumstance, which may lead to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time and therefore, making such Director as an accused to stand trial would be an abuse of process of law. (iii) It is mandatory in terms of Section 138 and 141 of the Act to specifically aver in the complaint that Director was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, when the offence was committed and he was responsible for day to day functioning of the company -- Role of the Director in a company is a question of fact depending upon the nomenclature of the company and other circumstances prevailing therein -- There cannot be any universal application of the rule that a Director of company is in-charge of its day to day affairs. (iv) Section 141 of the Act is a penal provision creating criminal liability -- As per nature of the offence it has to be strictly construed -- It is not sufficient to make bald cursory statement in a complaint that Director/Directors is/are in-charge of and are responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without specifying anything more as to the role of the Director/Directors -- It is requirement of law that the complainant must spell out as to how and in what manner the accused are in-charge of the affairs of the company in the conduct of its business and thus responsible for the same. (v) Some times a Director is not the active Director and he may be non executive Director, who was no doubt a custodian of governance of the company, but at the same time was not involved in day to day affairs running of its business -- For making such a Director liable there must have been specific averment in the complaint as to how and in what manner such a Director was responsible for conduct of business of the company -- In the absence of such plea the Court can definitely come to rescue of such Director against whom the proceedings are nothing but a pure abuse of process of law. (vi) “no criminal proceedings shall be initiated against the Director/accused unless specific allegations should comeforth in complaint, earmarking unambiguous role in the context of charge and responsibility in discharge of day to functioning of the company so as to prevent embarking on a fishing expedition to try and unearth material against the Director. Complaint is liable to quashed being abuse of process of law and is deficient in formulising vicarious liability of the petitioners in terms of Section 141 of the Act.

(P&H HC) Decided on: 01.04.2015

Cheque bounce case -- Offence against Director of Company – Issuance of process against Company/Directors -- Supreme Court summarized the law as follows: a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director; b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director. c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm-twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed; d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court’s powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but, nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director.

(SC) Decided on: 17.10.2014