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11. (SC) 07-11-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 309 -- Recruitment process -- Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies.

(Para 42(1))

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 -- Eligibility criteria – Change in midway – Permissibility of -- Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit -- Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness.

(Para 42(2))

C. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Select list – Right to be appointed -- Decision in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220  -- Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree deals with the right to be placed in the Select List -- The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues.

(Para 42(3))

D. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 – Recruitment rules/ procedure – Deviation from – Permissibility of -- Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved -- Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility -- However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps.

(Para 42(4(5))

E. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 –  Select list – Right to be appointment -- Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment -- State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies -- However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.

(Para 42(6)

13. (HP HC) 21-10-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Promotion of employee – Departmental proceedings – Effect of -- Departmental proceedings can be said to have been initiated only upon issuance of the charge-memo/ charge-sheet and not prior thereto -- In case of initiation of departmental proceedings against an employee as on date of consideration of his case for promotion by the DPC, the sealed covered procedure is required to be adopted -- Said sealed cover is to be opened after culmination of the departmental proceedings.

(Para 4(ii))

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Departmental proceedings – Withdrawal of promotion – Permissibility of -- Charge-memo issued to the petitioner on 01.04.2023, whereas, the DPC had already recommended petitioner’s name for promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector on 21.03.2023 -- Formal order promoting the petitioner on accrual of vacancies was passed on 02.08.2023 – Order dated 24.08.2023, withdrawing petitioner’s promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector is not in consonance with law.

(Para 4(iii))

C. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 11, 14, 16 – Departmental proceedings for minor punishment – Withholding of promotion – Permissibility of -- Charge-memo was not issued to the petitioner for imposition of major penalties under Rule 14 -- Promotion cannot be withheld on account of employer’s intention to initiate departmental proceedings for imposition of minor penalty upon an employee.

(Para 4(iv))

16. (SC) 24-09-2024

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Promotion during pendency of criminal case -- DPC – Charge-sheet thereafter – Putting the result in sealed cover – Legality of -- Disciplinary/ criminal proceedings can be said to be initiated against the employee only when a charge memo is issued to the employee in a disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet for a criminal prosecution is filed in the competent Court -- Sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after issuance of the charge-memo/ charge-sheet -- Pendency of investigation and grant of prosecution sanction will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure.

-- Charge sheet was filed by CBI, after completion of investigation on 25th October, 2008, whereas the DPC to consider the promotion of Additional Commissioners of Income Tax was convened on 22nd February, 2007, wherein the sealed cover procedure was adopted qua the respondent.

-- It is thus clear that the charge sheet against the respondent was filed well after the meeting of the DPC was convened.

Hence, it could not be said that the prosecution for a criminal charge was pending against the respondent when the DPC was convened -- Therefore, the move on the part of DPC to resort to the sealed cover procedure was unjustified and unsustainable on facts and in law -- The ‘Sealed Cover’ wherein the assessment of the respondent was considered by the DPC was opened in court -- Letter shows that the DPC assessed the respondent to be ‘FIT’ for promotion -- Consequential steps in light of the above recommendations shall follow.

(Para 24-29)

31. (SC) 22-08-2024

Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 -- RGPSM’s General Service Conditions, Clause 4 -- Appointment in Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan / SSA -- Termination of service/ contract – Non-renewal of contract -- Appellant topped the revised Merit List, leading to her appointment -- While serving complaint(s) against her : (i) not punctual in attending to her duties, and; (ii) not correctly reported with regard to the events in the hostel -- She, inter alia, frankly admits to being late on occasion, but to compensate for her late-coming, she used to sit till late evening in the office for completion of work.

-- Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one month’s notice is sufficient -- The Clause also makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in “undesirable activities”, the Mission Director was competent to terminate such person’s services “with immediate effect”.

-- Ld. Single Judge of High Court quashed the order holding that the termination orders being stigmatic in nature, relating to alleged misconduct involving moral turpitude, the same could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry.

Respondents have placed themselves in a Catch-22 situation – If it is a case of termination simpliciter and non-stigmatic, then one month’s notice was required to be issued to the appellant, which was not done – If impugned order to be seen as falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be stigmatic -- Impugned order does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment – Order of Ld. Single Judge, upheld, appellant held entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly-situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50% -- In view of the long passage of time, liberty denied to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge.

(Para 12, 30-36)

33. (UK HC) 20-08-2024

A. Uttar Pradesh Agriculture Group-B Service Rules, 1995 -- Qualification in advertisement – Recruitment Rules – Applicability of -- Bachelor degree in Agricultural Engineering added as one of the qualification for appointment to the post in question after issuance of advertisement -- Petitioner cannot claim benefit of such changed qualification, and his eligibility has to be seen with reference to the Rules as were prevailing on the date of commencement of selection process.

(Para 6)

B. Uttar Pradesh Agriculture Group-B Service Rules, 1995 -- Qualification as per rules – Subsequent amendment – Effect of -- As per the recruitment Rules in vogue at the time of advertisement, a candidate with Bachelor degree in Agriculture or possessing any qualification recognised by the State Government as equivalent thereto, alone is eligible for appointment to the post in question -- Subsequent amendment in the Rules will not improve the case of petitioner.

(Para 7)

C. Uttar Pradesh Agriculture Group-B Service Rules, 1995 -- Qualification – Permitting candidate without qualification -- Estoppel  against Public Service Commission -- Eligibility of a candidate is scrutinised at the time of interview or thereafter at the time of appointment --  There cannot be estoppel against statute -- Recruitment Rules are statutory in nature and any person, who is not qualified as per the recruitment Rules, cannot claim estoppel against the selecting body i.e. Public Service Commission by contending that after permitting him to appear in the selection process, his candidature cannot be rejected on the ground that his qualification is not as per the requirement of the Rules.

(Para 9)

46. (SC) 09-07-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 13, 226 -- Army Welfare Education Society / Private Educational  Institution – Service dispute – Maintainability of writ –

-- Whether the appellant Army Welfare Education Society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to make a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution maintainable against it?

-- Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving a private educational  institution and its employees can be adjudicated upon in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Held, High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution -- School run by the Appellant Society imparts education -- Relationship is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract -- If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element -- The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents.

(Para 42, 46)

B. Doctrine of legitimate expectation -- Features :

-- First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;

-- Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings;

-- Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation;

-- Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters;

-- Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

-- Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally.

The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case.

(Para 48, 49)

C. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Arbitrariness in State action -- It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action -- It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.

(Para 49)

D. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Schol run by Society – Applicability upon -- Even if the function being performed by a private educational institution in imparting education may be considered as a public function, the relationship between the administration of such an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law -- No statutory obligation on the appellant society which requires that the salaries and allowances of the respondents are to be kept at par with what is payable to teachers of Government institutions -- Appellant society, for the purposes of its relationship with its employees, cannot be regarded as a public or Government authority -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation will have no applicability to the facts of the case.

(Para 50-52)