A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 378-Explanation 1, 379 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3 (26) -- Theft of sand – Movable property -- Contention that the alleged theft of sand is not punishable u/s 379 read with Section 378 of the IPC as sand is an immovable property as per Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, rejected -- Sand had been excavated and was thereupon no longer an immovable property -- Sand on being excavated would lose its attachment to the earth, ergo, it is a movable property or goods capable of being stolen.

(Para 8)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 – Theft of sand -- Offence u/s 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC are different and distinct – Contention that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law, rejected -- No bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offence u/s 379 of the IPC – However, prosecution and cognizance u/s 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act will not be valid and justified in the absence of the authorisation.

(Para 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Death of newly born baby girl – Post-mortem report showing death was due to asphyxia and there were marks of strangulation -- Circumstantial evidence – Value of -- To base conviction solely on the circumstantial evidence, unless chain of circumstances is established, conviction cannot be recorded -- From the totality of evidence on record it is clear that the baby girl was put in incubator with an oxygen mask and she has also not opened her eyes and did not cry after birth -- There was a possibility of natural death -- Though the doctor has opined in the post-mortem report, the cause of death is asphyxia but in absence of any clear evidence on record it is not safe to convict the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC -- Appellant acquitted by giving benefit of doubt.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Overt Act – Prosecution mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, who were the eye-witnesses of the incident : 

-- Accused No.3 had a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, inasmuch as he was eyeing the property which was being cultivated by the deceased on a Batai basis. Murder was committed through the overt acts of the two accused other than the appellant.

-- Moot question, whether the appellant also participated in the offence, especially since he has not been shown to be a friend or relative of the other accused, or to have any specific motive for murdering the deceased.

-- Post-mortem report and the evidence of the doctor made amply clear that the death was caused due to incised injuries, of such a nature which could have been caused by the axe and sickle carried by the other two accused.

-- Other two injuries, being a laceration and an abrasion, which could possibly be attributed to the appellant, may even have been a result of the deceased falling to the ground, since injuries such as bruises, abrasions and lacerations may very well be sustained as a result of a fall -- Thus, there does not appear to be strong evidence of the active participation of the appellant in the offence.

-- In their examination-in-chief, witnesses deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a lathi on his knee and head, it was proved in the cross-examination that these statements made before the Court were “improvements” -- If these improvements are excluded from consideration from the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, it can be safely said that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt about the active involvement of the appellant in the offence in question through any overt act.

Proceeding on the basis that the appellant was present on the spot of the offence -- Court did not find that the commission of the offence of murder stands proved as against the appellant with the help of Section 34, IPC, either.

(Para 6-10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- Principle of joint criminal liability -- In order to invoke the principle of joint liability in the commission of a criminal act, the prosecution should show that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all -- If this is shown, the liability for the offence may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone -- It may be difficult to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual, and in most cases it has to be inferred from the facts and relevant circumstances of the case – Totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused persons had the common intention to commit the offence with which they could be convicted.

(Para 12,13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Appellant had no specific motive to participate in the commission of the offence, did not have any rivalry with the deceased or his family, and has not been shown to be a friend, relative or hireling of the other two accused – Prosecution has failed to prove any common intention on the appellant’s part, inasmuch as there is no hint of any motive or reason for him to have either participated in pre-planning the murder of the deceased, or to develop the common intention to do so while present at the spot of the offence -- Evidence against the appellant is shaky and insufficient to bring home guilt against him, benefit of doubt must enure to him -- Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court as against the appellant stands set aside -- Appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 13,14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 9, 12, 13 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 409 – Exemption from personal appearance of accused -- Appellant is appearing before the learned Trial Court on each and every Friday since 2013 -- Appellant is a permanent resident of Delhi and is the Director on the Boards of several companies -- Distance between Delhi and Hyderabad is approximately 1500 kms – Normal rule is that the evidence shall be taken in the presence of the accused, however, even in the absence of the accused, such evidence can be taken but then his counsel must be present in the court -- Nothing is on record that, at any point of time, any effort has been made by the appellant to stall/delay the trial -- Exemption on the very same grounds of two co-accused in cases arising of the same FIR have been allowed, one by High Court, another by Trial Court – Personal appearance of the petitioner dispensed with conditions. Bhaskar Industries Ltd.’s case (2001) 7 SCC 401 relied.

(Para 6,7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 -- Investigaiton report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. – Magistrate’s power – Nature of Magistrate’s duty u/s 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the Section.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Furnishing of documents – Fair trial -- Furnishing of documents to the accused u/s 207 of the 1973 Code is a facet of right of the accused to a fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65-B – Electronic record – Document – Admissibilty of -- Electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence u/s 3 of the 1872 Act -- Any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a “document” and shall be admissible in evidence subject to satisfying other requirements of the said provision.

(Para 21-25)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 29 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3(18) – Memory Card – Document – Held, contents of the memory card would be a “matter” and the memory card itself would be a “substance” and hence, the contents of the memory card would be a “document”.

(Para 26-31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A -- Disclosure of identity of the victim – Effect of -- Explanation offered by the appellant is plausible inasmuch as the prosecution itself had done so by naming the victim in the First Information Report/Crime Case, the statement of the victim under Section 161, as well as under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, and in the chargesheet/police report filed before the Magistrate.

(Para 34)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of -- Privacy of victim – Right of Accused:

--       Accused, who are interested in reassuring themselves about the genuineness and credibility of the contents of the memory card in question or that of the pen-drive produced before the trial Court by the prosecution on which the prosecution would rely during the trial, are free to take opinion of an independent expert agency, such as the CFSL on such matters as they may be advised, which information can be used by them to confront the prosecution witnesses including the forensic report of the State FSL relied upon by the prosecution forming part of the police report.

--       Considering that this is a peculiar case of intra-conflict of fundamental rights flowing from Article 21, that is right to a fair trial of the accused and right to privacy of the victim, it is imperative to adopt an approach which would balance both the rights.

–       Court is duty bound to issue suitable directions -- Even the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the 1973 Code, is competent to issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice.

--       If the accused or his lawyer himself, additionally, intends to inspect the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in question, he can request the Magistrate to provide him inspection in Court, if necessary, even for more than once alongwith his lawyer and I.T. expert to enable him to effectively defend himself during the trial.

--       If such an application is filed, the Magistrate must consider the same appropriately and exercise judicious discretion with objectivity while ensuring that it is not an attempt by the accused to protract the trial. While allowing the accused and his lawyer or authorized I.T. expert, all care must be taken that they do not carry any devices much less electronic devices, including mobile phone which may have the capability of copying or transferring the electronic record thereof or mutating the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in any manner.

Such multipronged approach may subserve the ends of justice and also effectuate the right of accused to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 38-43)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207,  327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of – Inspection of -- Fair Trial – Right of -- Held, contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document -- If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial -- However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial -- Court may issue suitable directions to balance the interests of both sides.

(Para 44)

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 304 Part II – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Appellant shot the deceased while he was attempting to pluck fruit from the defence enclave – With due regard to the temperament of the appellant/accused during his frequent run-ins with the children, offence in question committed whilst he was deprived of the power of self-control upon sudden provocation by the children -- No calculated intention or premeditation on his part to commit the murder of the deceased -- Appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part II for 10 years and fine.

(Para 5-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed offender -- Order challenged after 4 years -- There may not be any reason to allow, however keeping in view the fact that the matter actually arises out of proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and petitioner undertakes to continue appearing before the trial Court on each and every date and also and a mother of two minor children (less than 10 years of age), impugned order set aside, upon the petitioner furnishing adequate bail bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Theft case – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Petitioner has already undergone substantial period of sentence out of one year -- Taking into consideration that the FIR in this case was registered on 10.11.2002 and the fact that the petitioner has been facing the agony of trial for more than 16 years, no useful purpose would be served by sending the petitioner behind the bars once again, to undergo the remaining sentence -- Ends of justice would be suitably met, if the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone by him, but subject to payment of Rs.25,000/- as fine.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-A, 279, 337, 338, 427 – Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal of -- Testimony of PW-3 which includes his cross-examination does not make out a case that he had seen the accident with his own eyes and he had not seen the accused on the spot – There was no 'Test Identification Parade' of the accused and even during trial, he has not been able to identify the accused person – He was unable to note-down complete number of the offending vehicle as well -- Testimony of remaining witnesses more or less becomes formal in nature -- Apart from that, there was no material evidence available -- Revision accepted. impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set-aside.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 379 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 54 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner only, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/-.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (Exception 4), 304 Part-I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Incident took place without any premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, when the deceased attempted entry into his house; and the appellant did neither take any undue advantage nor acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- A fortiori, benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC to the appellant extended -- Death having been with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, appellant is convicted for the offence under Part-I of Section 304 IPC for a period of ten years with fine.

(Para 20,21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 200 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 34 -- Civil dispute – Criminal proceedings – Abuse of process of law -- After coming to know that the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the original complainant himself paid the mortgage money and got the mortgage redeemed and got the sale deed executed in his name – Complainant filed an application u/s 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which came to be rejected by the Ld. Magistrate -- Said order was not assailed by the complainant -- Thereafter he filed a private complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. which was pending before the Ld. Magistrate -- Despite the above, he filed a writ petition before the High Court, which is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- High Court ought to have closed the proceedings – For settling a civil dispute, the criminal complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4.1-4.3)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Recovery of -- In case an accused, against whom an order to pay interim compensation u/s 143A of the Act is passed, fails or is unable to pay the amount of interim compensation, the process u/s 421 can be taken resort to which may inter alia result in coercive action of recovery of the amount of interim compensation as if the amount represented the arrears of land revenue – Extent and rigor of the procedure prescribed for such recovery may vary from State to State but invariably, such procedure may visit the person concerned with coercive methods.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable u/s 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A – Section 143A held to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.

(Para 14-24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 120-B – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12 -- Punjab Travel Professionals Regulation Act, 2014, Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Permission to accused to go abroad -- Nothing on record to doubt the bona-fides of the petitioner -- Petitioner is ready and willing to furnish sufficient sureties including that of his father, for coming back; in case the Court so requires -- Also expressed undertaking before this Court that she would be ready to appear before the trial Court at any time, even on a notice of one week's time and she would not have any objection to the proceedings undertaken by the trial Court in her absence, in case the counsel for the petitioner is present before the Court – Petitioner is granted permission to go abroad for a period of six months.

(Para 7-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Offence u/s 498-A IPC – Valid marriage – Requirement of -- For proving the offence u/s 498-A of the Code, proof of valid marriage is not a sine qua non -- When the parties are residing and cohabited together as husband and wife, then the fact that they were not validly married, does not, ipso facto, exonerate the husband from the rigors of section 498-A of the Code.

(Para 11-13)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Customary law -- Custom is the strongest source of Hindu law -- Even after codification of Hindu laws, the legislature in its wisdom had protected the custom and also the customary rites and ceremonies of the marriage -- Section 7 specifically provides that a Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of the parties -- It is not necessary that the customary ceremonies and rites may be of both the parties, rather it may be of either of the parties to the marriage.

(Para 20,21)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Customary law -- Chunni ceremony – Validity of marriage -- Chunni ceremony is a prevalent in various communities in some areas of states of Punjab and Haryana as a ceremony for valid marriage -- Generally, the boy puts a chunni (dupatta) over the girl and accepted her as his wife -- When the petitioner himself chosen a special form of marriage i.e. by way of chunni ceremony, he resided and cohabited with her, now he is estopped for denying the same to be a valid form of marriage.

(Para 21, 26)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Offence u/s 498-A IPC – Protracted trial -- Quantum of sentence -- Petitioner has suffered the agony of protracted trial for more than 13 years -- Substantive sentence is reduced to six months and to pay fine of Rs.3,000/- or in default of payment, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month

(Para 30,31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 506, 120-B/34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- Cheating and forgery – Acquittal of – Leave to appeal -- Accused are Sarpanch and her husband -- Main allegation against the respondents/accused is that they had affixed the thumb impressions in the muster-roll regarding disbursement of the amount of Rs. 4212/- in August and Rs. 2268/- in October – Muster-roll Ex. P1, was prepared by the Gram Sachiv -- All the Panches of the Gram Panchayat had signed the said muster-roll -- Other members of the Gram Panchayat, who were signatories to the muster-roll (Ex. P1), had not been arrayed as accused -- Even complainant had also put his thumb impressions on the said muster-roll -- On the complaint moved by the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, exonerated of the charges levelled against them -- Even  as per the FSL report, the thumb impressions were not matchable – Appellate court acquitted the respondents – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 379-B, 506, 148 & 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Although the FIR involves Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act, however, the fact of the case will show that the alleged weapon recovered in the case is licensed gun of the petitioner and the injury allegedly caused to the injured/witness was not that much serious, therefore, the FIR u/s 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act can be quashed on the basis of compromise -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the present petitioner.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304-A – Death by negligent driving – Conviction u/s 279/304-A IPC for 1 year – Petitioner has already undergone 4 months and 11 days of actual sentence – Petitioner is a professional driver never been convicted in any other such case -- He is a first time offender – He is on bail since 29.11.2011 -- Now sending the petitioner behind bar at this stage, would be very harsh and inequitable -- Petitioner-driver was also injured in the same accident -- Sentence awarded reduced to already undergone.

(Para 4, 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279 – Death by rash and negligence driving -- Conviction for 2 years – Petitioner has already undergone 7 months and 9 days -- Petitioner faced agony of trial for the last more than ten years -- Fit case, where the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner can be reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. seven months -- Condition imposed that he would pay Rs. 20,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased. Saurabh Bakshi’s case 2015 (2) RCR (Criminal), 495 relied.

(Para 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction in murder case – Delay in filing appeal – Dismissal of – Permissibility of -- Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was delay of 1192 days in preferring the appeal -- Held, since the matter arose out of conviction u/s 302 IPC, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and heard the matter on merit – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 – Default bail given – New sections/offences added – Anticipatory bail applied -- Petitioner was given benefit of bail u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as challan was not presented against him – Main case of the prosecution remains the same regarding disproportionate assets – Held, if some other offences have been added in the FIR, even then, the petitioner is not required for further interrogation purposes etc. – Petition allowed, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in newly added Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 326, 452/ Sections 323, 324, 342, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties – Version cross-version case – Both FIR all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners, subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-, per petition.

(Para 9, 10)

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987) – Convict under TADA Act – Long sentence undergone -- Parole – Right of -- Appellant has undergone more than 24 ½ years of imprisonment – Appellant ordered to be released on parole for a period of 21 days.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102, 451, 457 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder case – Seizure of truck – Requirement of -- Truck in question could not have been directed to be seized since there is no evidence that it was used in the commission of the offence of murder -- Merely because there were rival claims about the ownership of the truck; that does not warrant the seizure of the truck -- Truck in question ordered to be released on Sapurdari to its registered owner.

(Para 2, 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 (Fifthly), 376 – Rape case – Conviction u/s 376 of IPC – Quantum of sentence -- Prior to the Amendment 13 of 2013, the conviction u/s 376(1), the punishment shall not be less than seven years – Accused was aged about 23 years at the time of occurrence in 2009 and victim was aged about 14 years and 5 months -- Consent of victim is of no consequence to reduce the sentence less than minimum sentence of seven years – Considering the period of sentence already undergone and also the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is reduced from 10 years to the statutory minimum period of seven years.

(Para 1,4,5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Complaint against SHO -- Summoning order – Quashing of complaint and summoning order -- Two Complaints u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.c. dismissed by the Illaqa Magistrate – Petitioner being SHO of the area has not registered FIR on same complaint -- Allegations against the petitioner that he has failed to exercise his power u/s 154 Cr.P.C to register an FIR are apparently illegal and not sustainable as the petitioner being SHO of area cannot form an opinion other than formed by Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 1, 26, 27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to commit suicide – Insulting/Abusing the deceased – Effect of -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are:

(i)  the abetment;

(ii)   the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

The Act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide -- Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.

(Para 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Rape case -- Compromise to solemnise marriage -- Resile from statement – Re-examination u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Witnesses resiled on account of the allurement of marriage and a chance of a blemish free life for the prosecutrix and, therefore, it can safely be said that the statement given in court denying that the offence of rape was committed, was not a statement given freely or without any fear -- An application u/s 311 of the Code may be allowed at any stage of trial -- Allowing witnesses to be recalled would be in consonance with the cardinal principle that the truth must prevail.

(Para 14-19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. by Complainant – Maintainability of -- Resile from statement under assurance of marriage -- Public Prosecutor himself cross examine the witnesses after they had turned hostile in order to elicit the truth – Public Prosecutor did not raise any objection to application u/s 311 of the Code as filed by the complainant itself raising the question of maintainability, it can be safely assumed that the said application had the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor -- Once the court is of the opinion that to ensure fair trial, an application is to be allowed in order to elicit the truth, then it should not be bound down by technicalities.

(Para 14, 20-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 441 -- Involvement in 31 cases – Bail by trial court -- Number of Sureties – Submission that the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties – Order modified to the extent that petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- and there shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- -- Court clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 433 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Life imprisonment – 11 years actual sentence undergone – Total sentence undergone 14 years including remission -- Direction given to State, having regard to the peculiar factual circumstances, to consider the case of the appellant for premature release on completion of total sentence of 14 years including remission, as a special case -- In the event of any delay in taking the decision, the appellant shall be released on self-bond, on completion of fourteen years including remission, making it subject to the decision of the Competent Authority.

 (Para 3, 4)

View of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 32 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – Section 497 IPC effectively creating a dent in individual dignity of women -- Emphasis on element of connivance or consent of husband tantamounts to subordination of women which violates Article 21 of Constitution – If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere -- It is better to be left as a ground for divorce -- As a criminal offence it will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely, dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship between the two – Held, Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional -- When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

(Para 41-56)

View of R.F. Nariman, J.

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down -- Section 198, CrPC is also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence -- Held, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid.

(Para 81-86)

View of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery -- Constitutional Validity – Criminal law must be in consonance with constitutional morality -- Being antithetical to the constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and equality, Section 497 does not pass constitutional muster – Held, Section 497 lacks an adequately determining principle to criminalize consensual sexual activity and is manifestly arbitrary -- Section 497 is a denial of substantive equality as it perpetuates the subordinate status ascribed to women in marriage and society -- Section 497 violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is based on gender stereotypes about the role of women and violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21 of the Constitution; and Section 497 is unconstitutional.

 (Para 153)

View of Indu Malhotra, J.

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery as offence -- Right to equality – Procedure to prosecute -- Constitutional validity – Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution -- Section 198(2) of the Cr.P.C. which contains the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the I.P.C. shall be unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

(Para 165-171)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Non-appearance of the petitioner before Ld. Trial Court is justified for the reason that he was not served at the given address -- After passing of the order, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail -- Matter compromised, complainant has withdrawn the complaint u/s 138 of the NIA Act -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC would amount to abuse of process of law – Order declaring proclaimed person and subsequent FIR quashed.

 (Para 1, 7,8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 15(3) -- Marital rape with girl child -- Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age is rape? – Held, Sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not -- Exception carved out in the IPC creates an unnecessary and artificial distinction between a married girl child and an unmarried girl child and has no rational nexus with any unclear objective sought to be achieved -- Artificial distinction is arbitrary and discriminatory and is definitely not in the best interest of the girl child -- Artificial distinction is contrary to the philosophy and ethos of Article 15(3) of the Constitution as well as contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution and our commitments in international conventions -- Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC to now be meaningfully read as: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”

 (Para 1, 105)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(12, 2(14) -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 3 -- Marital rape/ Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Harmonious and purposive interpretation -- Entire issue of the interpretation of the JJ Act, the POCSO Act, the PCMA and Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC can be looked at from the perspective of purposive and harmonious construction of statutes relating to the same subject matter – There seems to be no reason to arbitrarily discriminate against a girl child who is married between 15 and 18 years of age -- Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC is to be read in a purposive manner to make it in consonance with the POCSO Act, the spirit of other pro-child legislations and the human rights of a married girl child -- To harmonize the system of laws relating to children and require Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC to now be meaningfully read as: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”

(Para 99, 103, 105,108)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 –Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 -- Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Marital rape with girl child below 18 years -- Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC in so far as it relates to a girl child below 18 years is liable to be struck down on the following grounds:–

(i)      it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and violative of the rights of the girl child and not fair, just and reasonable and, therefore, violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India;

(ii)     it is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and;

(iii)    it is inconsistent with the provisions of POCSO, which must prevail.

Therefore, Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC is read down as follows:

“Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being 18 years, is not rape”.

This judgment will have prospective effect.

(Para 195)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198(6) -- Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Martial rape with wives below 18 years – Cognizance of -- Section 198(6) of the Code will apply to cases of rape of “wives” below 18 years, and cognizance can be taken only in accordance with the provisions of Section 198(6) of the Code.

(Para 196)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Discharge of accused – Compounding of offence -- Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect –Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused -- Court is entitled to close the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 143 of the Act read with Section 258 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11, 18 (i)-(iii), 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Online hearing of case – Online appearance of accused – Exemption of accused from personal appearance -- Service of summons can be by post/ e-mail/ courier -- Summons ought to indicate that the accused could make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before the specified date and inform the court and the complainant by e-mail -- If the accused complies with such summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the Court can ascertain the objection, if any, of the complainant and close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with the case -- Some cases of Section 138 cases can be decided online -- If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused -- Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used -- Personal appearances can be dispensed with.

(Para 16, 17, 20)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 64 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Discretion of the Magistrate to hold that it was undesirable to try the case summarily as sentence of more than one year may have to be passed -- Court has jurisdiction u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with further powers of recovery under Section 431 Cr.P.C -- With this approach, prison sentence of more than one year may not be required in all cases.

(Para 12, 18(iv))

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 264, 357(3) – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Procedure for summoning -- Evidence of the complaint can be given on affidavit -- Bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to record any further preliminary evidence -- Such affidavit evidence can be read as evidence at all stages of trial or other proceedings – Normal rule for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow the summary procedure except where exercise of power under second proviso to Section 143 becomes necessary.

(Para 18(iv), (v), 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Chapter XXIA -- Cheque bounce complaint – Plea bargaining -- Speedy trial -- It will be open to the Court to consider the provisions of plea bargaining -- Trial can be on day to day basis and endeavour must be to conclude it within six months.

(Para 20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Petitioner could not appear before the trial Court as he was stated to have not been served at the address, where he was residing -- After the passing of the impugned order declaring him as a proclaimed person, he had surrendered before the trial Court and was ordered to be released on bail -- In such circumstances, especially, when the petitioner has duly surrendered before the trial Court, continuation of proceedings under Section 174-A IPC would be an abuse of the process of Court.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Dowry cases – Compounding of -- Remedial steps: i) Uncalled for implication of husband and his relatives and arrest. ii) Continuation of proceedings in spite of settlement between the parties since the offence is non-compoundable and uncalled for hardship to parties on that account

To remedy the situation, it is held:

Involvement of civil society in the aid of administration of justice can be one of the steps, apart from the investigating officers and the concerned trial courts being sensitized. It is also necessary to facilitate closure of proceedings where a genuine settlement has been reached instead of parties being required to move High Court only for that purpose.

Following directions issued:-

i)    (a)     In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.

(b)   The Committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.

(c)    The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.

(d)   Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.

(e)    Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.

(f)    The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.

(g)   Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected.

(h)   The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.

(i)    Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.

(j)    The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.

(k)    It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper.

ii)    Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four months from today;

iii)   In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the District and Sessions Judge or any other senior Judicial Officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord;

iv)    If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;

v)     In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;

vi)    It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and

vii)   Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial.

viii)  These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

After seeing the working of the above arrangement for six months but latest by March 31, 2018, National Legal Services Authority may give a report about need for any change in above directions or for any further directions. The matter may be listed for consideration by the Court in April, 2018.

(Para 15-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B – Dowry death -- Additional accused – Summoning of – In statement recorded during trial there is no specific allegations against the respondents with regard to demand of dowry or harassment to the deceased in connection thereof – Conversation with regard to alleged demand and beating by in-laws family members of the deceased was made between the deceased and her mother – Statement of the brother, in this regard, is mere hearsay – Mother of the deceased has not been examined – Beatings by all the five family members of her in-laws do not find corroboration from the post mortem report – Testimony of the brother is not at all sufficient to satisfy the test of more than a prima facie case for summoning the additional accused.

 (Para 7-14)

B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (Act No. 28 of 1961), Section 2 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry – Dowry death case -- Demands relating to birth of child -- Any demand made in connection with birth of the child does not fall within the definition of dowry u/s 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

(Para 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 --  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 421(1), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 70 – Cheque bounce case – Compensation not paid – Default sentence undergone -- Whether the compensation still recoverable -- High Court held that despite the fact that the default sentence was undergone, yet, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compensation was recoverable – Held, object of the legal fiction created by Section 431 is to extend for the purpose of recovery of compensation until such recovery is completed and this would necessarily take not only to Section 421 of the Cr.P.C. but also to Section 70 of the Penal Code – Judgment of High Court, upheld.

(Para 4, 29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) Section 323 -- Conviction u/s 323 IPC -- Moral traptitude – Dismissal from service -- Appellant died, appeal abated – Co-accused acquitted u/s 304 Part II and convicted under section 323 IPC – Role of co-accused was similar – Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High court held that the conviction u/s 323 not to constitute offence one involving moral turpitude in terms of the test laid down in instructions dated 26.03.1975 – LR’s of deceased shall be entitled to all the benefits in terms of the judgment under appeal except the payment of back wages – All the other consequential benefits be computed and released within two months from the date of this Judgment.

(Para 4-12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 41-A – Arrest of Advocate/ Doctor – Procedure of law violated – Life and liberty of accused -- Compensation to accused arrested -- Arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest -- Dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized -- It is an assault on his/her identity – Said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution – Article 21 has been violated and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation – Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (1997) 1 SCC 416, there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of Cr.PC -- A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation is awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence -- It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

(Para 22-27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheating – Civil Dispute -- On a perusal of the FIR, it is clear to us that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, but a maladroit effort has been made to give it a criminal colour – No ingredient of Section 420 IPC is remotely attracted -- Even if it is a wrong, the complainant has to take recourse to civil action – Not the case where cognizance of the offence can be taken by the court and the accused can be asked to face trial -- Entire case projects a civil dispute and nothing else – Prosecution initiated against the petitioners stands quashed.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Compounding of offence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- There is a distinction between the power of the Court to compound an offence under Section 320 Cr. P.C. and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr. P.C.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- Offence u/s 304 A of IPC – Nature of -- It would indeed be paradoxical and incorrect to hold that the offence under Section 304-A is private in nature -- When a person or persons lose their life/lives due to the rash and negligent act of the accused, the question of mens rea or intention in such a situation pales into insignificance.

 (Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR -- To quash the proceedings under Section 304-A solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise arrived at between the accused and the legal representatives is not permissible -- Inclusion of the legal representatives in the definition of victim does not clothe him/them to enter into such a settlement, though the legal representative, undoubtedly has the authority to file an appeal or receive compensation -- However, power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can nevertheless be exercised in appropriate matters where it is felt that a prima facie case is not made out in consonance with the settled principles of law – There can indeed be no fetter on this power to act for securing the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of law – However this observation for a moment is not to be construed as taking the possibility of a conviction being bleak due to settlement, to be a relevant factor for quashing the FIR under Section 304-A IPC.

(Para 19,20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR – Reference: whether the crime registered u/s 304-A IPC can be quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at by the legal heir/legal representative of the victim/deceased with the offender – Reference is answered in the negative as there can be no quashing of an offence registered u/s 304-A and subsequent proceedings, solely on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the legal heirs/representatives of the victim (deceased) and the accused.

(Para 1, 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 406, 420, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Misappropriation of Istridhan – Criminal breach of trust -- FIR against sister-in-law and her husband – Quashing of FIR -- Main grouse of the complainant was that with respect to the illness of husband before the marriage -- There is not even a whisper that the petitioners were entrusted with any dowry articles -- Entrustment is sine-quo-non for the offence under Section 406 IPC -- It cannot be believed that the petitioners who are admittedly residing separately were entrusted with the istridhan -- No overt act had been attributed to the petitioners, not even a single instance of harassment or cruelty or demand of dowry had been referred against the petitioners – On the basis of wild allegations, the petitioners cannot be put to the ordeal of trial -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be sheer abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR and consequent proceedings taken therein, against the petitioners are quashed.

(Para 18,19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry death – Acquittal of accused -- Rs.20,000/- for the purchase of agricultural land was demanded by father-in-law when husband was in Dubai – Husband is stated to have returned to India from Dubai eight to ten months, after the above demand -- A female child was born about a year after the return of husband to India -- After the birth of the female child, deceased-wife had remained in her maternal house, for about four to five months -- Even if the above oral allegation is accepted as correct, it was a demand made about two years before the occurrence -- Same was too remote to the occurrence, and therefore, would not satisfy the requirement of “soon before her death” contemplated under Section 304B(1) of the Indian Penal Code -- Demand of sewing-machine was clarified by mother of girl during her cross-examination that her daughter knew tailoring and the sewing-machine was given to her for tailoring clothes -- This was really a gift and therefore, cannot be considered as a part of the demand made by inlaws husband for himself or for his family members -- This allegation is inconsequential -- High Court was, therefore, fully justified in acquitting the accused.

(Para 16-21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Compounding of offence -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court :

--      Power conferred u/s 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences u/s 320 of the Code. No doubt, u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

--       When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i)   ends of justice, or

(ii)  to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(Para 31 (I), (II))

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376, 395 – Heinous offence offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

(Para 31 (III))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- For offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(Para 31 (III)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence of civil character – Matrimonial disputes -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(Para 31 (IV))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court – While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(Para 31 (V))

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings :

--       Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.

--       However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.

--       It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(Para 31 (VI))

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Timing of compromise – Role of -- While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role :

--       Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.

--       Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.

--       On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

(Para 31 (VII))

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise after conviction -- Where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court -- Here charge is proved u/s 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

(Para 31 (VII))

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 9, 85(2), 138 – Self cheque -- Bearer cheque – Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Holder in due course -- There a presumption in favour of the holder in due course that the instrument was drawn for consideration, unless the contrary is proved -- Bank is bound to make payment to the bearer -- Dishonour of the cheque was for the reason that the account of the petitioner did not carry sufficient funds -- Plea that the cheque being a self cheque would not attract Section 138 of the NI Act, is not tenable.

(Para 5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 –Non-compoundable offence – Compromise quashing -- Inherent powers of High Court -- Section 320 CrPC is not exercisable in relation to a case of non-compoundable offence -- Refusal to invoke power u/s 320 CrPC, however, does not debar the High Court from resorting to its inherent power u/s 482 CrPC and pass an appropriate order so as to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 10, 14,15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise in Non-compoundable offence -- Inherent power of High Court -- Stage of case -- Magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 CrPC but such a power, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420,467,468 – Compromise after conviction – Inherent power of High Court -- Negation of the compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together as a joint family – It would also lead to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of justice delivery system – Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power u/s 482 CrPC after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards – Petition allowed, judgement and order of conviction set aside.

(Para 4, 10, 20-22)