Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 365, 366-A -- FIR u/s 365 – Challan u/s 363, 366-A – Run-away couple marriage – Proclaimed person -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Petitioner no.1/girl had gone out of her own free will and solemnised marriage with petitioner no.2 -- Offence u/s 363, 366A of IPC not made out against the petitioner no.2 – Petition for police protection was also filed by the petitioners -- FIR and all consequential proceedings including order declaring petitioner No. 2 as proclaimed person being abuse of process are liable to be quashed for securing the ends of justice -- In view of the settlement between the parties, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak -- Continuation of the criminal case will subject petitioner No. 2 to great oppression and injustice – FIR and consequential proceedings including order declaring petitioner no. 2 as proclaimed person are quashed.

(Para 11-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 -- Kidnapping – Run-away couple – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Offence of kidnapping is serious and non-compoundable and the Courts should not in the ordinary circumstances interfere and quash the FIR registered -- However, there are always exceptions to the normal rules and certain categories of cases, which deserve consideration specially when it is case of love affair between teenagers and on fear of the society and pressure from the community, one party alleges kidnapping, cases where the accused and the victim are well known to each other, and allegation of kidnapping is levelled only because the marriage was performed against the wishes of the parents -- FIR registered u/s 363, 366 and 120-B IPC and all subsequent proceedings are quashed.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Medical negligence death – No Medical Board opinion – Compromise between parties – Quashing of FIR -- No expert opinion of the medical board that petitioner ever committed any negligence, while performing operation and was responsible for the death of wife of complainant -- Compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties -- FIR registered u/s 304-A IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed.

(Para 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- FIR u/s 406, 498-A – Application for examining of prosecution witness through video conferencing – Held, JMIC clearly erred in dismissing the application -- Impugned order set aside, application for examination through video conferencing allowed -- Accused would be allowed all adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 182, 401 -- Acquittal in 182 Cr.P.C. proceedings -- Revisional jurisdiction of High Court is quite limited -- Court is to interfere only if there is an illegality or infirmity apparent on the face of the judgment/order passed by a Court below or the same is perverse -- Merely because another view in the matter is possible, no inference with such judgment is to be done – Revision dismissed.

(Para 13-15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Cancellation report by police – Non-acceptance by Trial Court – Case adjourned for complainant’s evidence – Challenged by accused – Remedy of – Held, after the complainant produces the evidence, Ld. Magistrate may or may not summon the accused -- If the accused are summoned, they have got remedy of challenging that order by way of filing a revision petition before the Court of Sessions or/and filing appropriate application (s) in the trial Court itself – Accused have not been summoned so far – Petition dismissed.

(Para 20-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent jurisdiction of High court -- Section 482 Cr.P.C. deals with inherent powers of the High Court providing that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Proclaimed offender – Compromise between the parties -- Relationship was not based on a false promise of marriage – Affidavit submitted by the prosecutrix establish that the relationship was consensual with the prosecutrix, 28 years at that time -- Both were major and capable of taking a reasoned decision to enter into a physical relationship -- It is also not the case of the prosecutrix that the act complained off occurred only once or that she had been subjected to any kind of force -- It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her --  FIR would further reflect that the marriage was not being solemnized on account of his parents not giving their consent – Held, it could not be said that he had made a false promise of marriage, only to entice her into the said physical relationship -- Very offence of rape would not be established -- FIR u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceeding including the order declaring him to be a proclaimed offender are quashed since the continuation of the same would tantamount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 5, 15-18)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 325, 379-B, 506, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 10, 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 427, 452, 376, 511, 148, 149 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Compromise -- Quashing of FIR -- Contention that there is no allegation of commission of rape and allegation is attempt to commit rape – This fact has not been disputed by complainant – FIR u/s 323, 427, 452, 376, 511, 148 and 149 IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A – Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioners have solemnised marriage and the complainant, who is mother of petitioner No.1, has suffered a statement before learned Magistrate in support of compromise -- Continuation of the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant FIR qua the petitioners shall be an abuse of the process of law -- FIR u/s 363 and 366-A IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354-D – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 12 – Compromise quashing -- Compromise is found genuine, voluntarily and without any coercion or undue influence -- Taking into consideration the nature of allegations and the fact that the matter has been compromised between the parties FIR u/s 354-D IPC and Section 12 of POCSO Act and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 364, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – Bail to juvenile – Right of -- Intention of the legislature is to grant bail to the juvenile irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence, alleged to have been committed by him and the same can be declined only in case where reasonable grounds are there for believing that the release :

--       is likely to bring him into the association of any known criminal or

--       expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or

--       that his release would defeat the ends of justice.

Juvenile is entitled to bail as a matter of right unless the case falls in the exceptions carved out in the provision itself but nothing was available on record to show that any of the three exceptions specified under Section 12(1) of the Act was existing -- Both the Courts below have not satisfied the requirement of provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act and without having any material on record, the bail application of the petitioner has been declined -- Impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, are liable to be set aside -- Petitioner is directed to be released on bail.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Unlawful assembly -- Common object – Ocular evidence – Injury co-relation – Requirement of -- In a case of a mob assault, especially when there is no doubt with regard to the ocular evidence, to look for corroboration of each injury by correlating it with the evidence of a prosecution witness to a particular accused and then to discredit the prosecution case on that basis cannot be upheld and is contrary to the principles of criminal jurisprudence regarding common object and the necessary ingredients for the same.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Unlawful assembly -- Common object – Ocular evidence – Vicarious liability -- All the accused were well armed, they chased the deceased coupled with the assault on those who tried to come to the rescue of the deceased -- Fact that there may not be any firearm injury on the deceased is considered irrelevant for fixing vicarious liability as member of an unlawful assembly once the presence of the accused possessed of a weapon of assault chasing the deceased along with others stands established by reliable ocular evidence.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Unlawful assembly -- Common object – Nature of -- Overt act – Requirement of -- Determinative factor is the assembly consisting of five or more persons fully armed and who entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141 -- It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly -- Word “object” means the purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be shared by all -- Sharing of common object is a mental attitude which is to be gathered from the act of a person and result thereof -- It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful.

(Para 10,11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Finding of – Requirement of -- Courts failed to record finding that the petitioner (convict) was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner resulting in death in motor vehicular accident -- Sine qua non for convicting an accused u/s 304-A IPC is that the convict has caused the death of any person by doing rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide -- In absence of such finding, the judgments passed by the Courts below suffer from perversity.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Application by I.O. to SMO saying the deceased was under the influence of liquor -- However, when Doctor was examined as PW2, she stated that she had not taken the blood sample of the deceased -- She also did not sent viscera of the deceased to the Chemical Examiner to verify the presence of alcohol in the stomach of the deceased – There is overwriting on Exhibit P-15 and P-16 -- First informant deposed that petitioner was arrested on 6.11.2009, whereas he was shown to be arrested on 9.11.2009 -- No dent on offending vehicle – Location of offending vehicle not shown on map – No police official was associated as witness though they were alleged to seen the incident – I.O. says vehicle was standing on extreme right side of divider, whereas accident was on extreme left side of dual carriageway – Held, prosecution failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt -- Petitioner is entitled to benefit of doubt -- Revision accepted and the judgment of conviction passed by the ld. JMIC, affirmed in appeal are set aside.

(Para 6-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 378-Explanation 1, 379 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3 (26) -- Theft of sand – Movable property -- Contention that the alleged theft of sand is not punishable u/s 379 read with Section 378 of the IPC as sand is an immovable property as per Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, rejected -- Sand had been excavated and was thereupon no longer an immovable property -- Sand on being excavated would lose its attachment to the earth, ergo, it is a movable property or goods capable of being stolen.

(Para 8)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 – Theft of sand -- Offence u/s 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC are different and distinct – Contention that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law, rejected -- No bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offence u/s 379 of the IPC – However, prosecution and cognizance u/s 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act will not be valid and justified in the absence of the authorisation.

(Para 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Death of newly born baby girl – Post-mortem report showing death was due to asphyxia and there were marks of strangulation -- Circumstantial evidence – Value of -- To base conviction solely on the circumstantial evidence, unless chain of circumstances is established, conviction cannot be recorded -- From the totality of evidence on record it is clear that the baby girl was put in incubator with an oxygen mask and she has also not opened her eyes and did not cry after birth -- There was a possibility of natural death -- Though the doctor has opined in the post-mortem report, the cause of death is asphyxia but in absence of any clear evidence on record it is not safe to convict the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC -- Appellant acquitted by giving benefit of doubt.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Overt Act – Prosecution mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, who were the eye-witnesses of the incident : 

-- Accused No.3 had a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, inasmuch as he was eyeing the property which was being cultivated by the deceased on a Batai basis. Murder was committed through the overt acts of the two accused other than the appellant.

-- Moot question, whether the appellant also participated in the offence, especially since he has not been shown to be a friend or relative of the other accused, or to have any specific motive for murdering the deceased.

-- Post-mortem report and the evidence of the doctor made amply clear that the death was caused due to incised injuries, of such a nature which could have been caused by the axe and sickle carried by the other two accused.

-- Other two injuries, being a laceration and an abrasion, which could possibly be attributed to the appellant, may even have been a result of the deceased falling to the ground, since injuries such as bruises, abrasions and lacerations may very well be sustained as a result of a fall -- Thus, there does not appear to be strong evidence of the active participation of the appellant in the offence.

-- In their examination-in-chief, witnesses deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a lathi on his knee and head, it was proved in the cross-examination that these statements made before the Court were “improvements” -- If these improvements are excluded from consideration from the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, it can be safely said that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt about the active involvement of the appellant in the offence in question through any overt act.

Proceeding on the basis that the appellant was present on the spot of the offence -- Court did not find that the commission of the offence of murder stands proved as against the appellant with the help of Section 34, IPC, either.

(Para 6-10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- Principle of joint criminal liability -- In order to invoke the principle of joint liability in the commission of a criminal act, the prosecution should show that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all -- If this is shown, the liability for the offence may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone -- It may be difficult to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual, and in most cases it has to be inferred from the facts and relevant circumstances of the case – Totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused persons had the common intention to commit the offence with which they could be convicted.

(Para 12,13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Appellant had no specific motive to participate in the commission of the offence, did not have any rivalry with the deceased or his family, and has not been shown to be a friend, relative or hireling of the other two accused – Prosecution has failed to prove any common intention on the appellant’s part, inasmuch as there is no hint of any motive or reason for him to have either participated in pre-planning the murder of the deceased, or to develop the common intention to do so while present at the spot of the offence -- Evidence against the appellant is shaky and insufficient to bring home guilt against him, benefit of doubt must enure to him -- Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court as against the appellant stands set aside -- Appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 13,14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 9, 12, 13 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 409 – Exemption from personal appearance of accused -- Appellant is appearing before the learned Trial Court on each and every Friday since 2013 -- Appellant is a permanent resident of Delhi and is the Director on the Boards of several companies -- Distance between Delhi and Hyderabad is approximately 1500 kms – Normal rule is that the evidence shall be taken in the presence of the accused, however, even in the absence of the accused, such evidence can be taken but then his counsel must be present in the court -- Nothing is on record that, at any point of time, any effort has been made by the appellant to stall/delay the trial -- Exemption on the very same grounds of two co-accused in cases arising of the same FIR have been allowed, one by High Court, another by Trial Court – Personal appearance of the petitioner dispensed with conditions. Bhaskar Industries Ltd.’s case (2001) 7 SCC 401 relied.

(Para 6,7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 -- Investigaiton report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. – Magistrate’s power – Nature of Magistrate’s duty u/s 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the Section.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Furnishing of documents – Fair trial -- Furnishing of documents to the accused u/s 207 of the 1973 Code is a facet of right of the accused to a fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65-B – Electronic record – Document – Admissibilty of -- Electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence u/s 3 of the 1872 Act -- Any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a “document” and shall be admissible in evidence subject to satisfying other requirements of the said provision.

(Para 21-25)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 29 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3(18) – Memory Card – Document – Held, contents of the memory card would be a “matter” and the memory card itself would be a “substance” and hence, the contents of the memory card would be a “document”.

(Para 26-31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A -- Disclosure of identity of the victim – Effect of -- Explanation offered by the appellant is plausible inasmuch as the prosecution itself had done so by naming the victim in the First Information Report/Crime Case, the statement of the victim under Section 161, as well as under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, and in the chargesheet/police report filed before the Magistrate.

(Para 34)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of -- Privacy of victim – Right of Accused:

--       Accused, who are interested in reassuring themselves about the genuineness and credibility of the contents of the memory card in question or that of the pen-drive produced before the trial Court by the prosecution on which the prosecution would rely during the trial, are free to take opinion of an independent expert agency, such as the CFSL on such matters as they may be advised, which information can be used by them to confront the prosecution witnesses including the forensic report of the State FSL relied upon by the prosecution forming part of the police report.

--       Considering that this is a peculiar case of intra-conflict of fundamental rights flowing from Article 21, that is right to a fair trial of the accused and right to privacy of the victim, it is imperative to adopt an approach which would balance both the rights.

–       Court is duty bound to issue suitable directions -- Even the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the 1973 Code, is competent to issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice.

--       If the accused or his lawyer himself, additionally, intends to inspect the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in question, he can request the Magistrate to provide him inspection in Court, if necessary, even for more than once alongwith his lawyer and I.T. expert to enable him to effectively defend himself during the trial.

--       If such an application is filed, the Magistrate must consider the same appropriately and exercise judicious discretion with objectivity while ensuring that it is not an attempt by the accused to protract the trial. While allowing the accused and his lawyer or authorized I.T. expert, all care must be taken that they do not carry any devices much less electronic devices, including mobile phone which may have the capability of copying or transferring the electronic record thereof or mutating the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in any manner.

Such multipronged approach may subserve the ends of justice and also effectuate the right of accused to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 38-43)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207,  327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of – Inspection of -- Fair Trial – Right of -- Held, contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document -- If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial -- However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial -- Court may issue suitable directions to balance the interests of both sides.

(Para 44)

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 304 Part II – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Appellant shot the deceased while he was attempting to pluck fruit from the defence enclave – With due regard to the temperament of the appellant/accused during his frequent run-ins with the children, offence in question committed whilst he was deprived of the power of self-control upon sudden provocation by the children -- No calculated intention or premeditation on his part to commit the murder of the deceased -- Appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part II for 10 years and fine.

(Para 5-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed offender -- Order challenged after 4 years -- There may not be any reason to allow, however keeping in view the fact that the matter actually arises out of proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and petitioner undertakes to continue appearing before the trial Court on each and every date and also and a mother of two minor children (less than 10 years of age), impugned order set aside, upon the petitioner furnishing adequate bail bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Theft case – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Petitioner has already undergone substantial period of sentence out of one year -- Taking into consideration that the FIR in this case was registered on 10.11.2002 and the fact that the petitioner has been facing the agony of trial for more than 16 years, no useful purpose would be served by sending the petitioner behind the bars once again, to undergo the remaining sentence -- Ends of justice would be suitably met, if the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone by him, but subject to payment of Rs.25,000/- as fine.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-A, 279, 337, 338, 427 – Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal of -- Testimony of PW-3 which includes his cross-examination does not make out a case that he had seen the accident with his own eyes and he had not seen the accused on the spot – There was no 'Test Identification Parade' of the accused and even during trial, he has not been able to identify the accused person – He was unable to note-down complete number of the offending vehicle as well -- Testimony of remaining witnesses more or less becomes formal in nature -- Apart from that, there was no material evidence available -- Revision accepted. impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set-aside.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 379 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 54 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner only, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/-.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (Exception 4), 304 Part-I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Incident took place without any premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, when the deceased attempted entry into his house; and the appellant did neither take any undue advantage nor acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- A fortiori, benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC to the appellant extended -- Death having been with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, appellant is convicted for the offence under Part-I of Section 304 IPC for a period of ten years with fine.

(Para 20,21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 200 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 34 -- Civil dispute – Criminal proceedings – Abuse of process of law -- After coming to know that the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the original complainant himself paid the mortgage money and got the mortgage redeemed and got the sale deed executed in his name – Complainant filed an application u/s 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which came to be rejected by the Ld. Magistrate -- Said order was not assailed by the complainant -- Thereafter he filed a private complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. which was pending before the Ld. Magistrate -- Despite the above, he filed a writ petition before the High Court, which is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- High Court ought to have closed the proceedings – For settling a civil dispute, the criminal complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4.1-4.3)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Recovery of -- In case an accused, against whom an order to pay interim compensation u/s 143A of the Act is passed, fails or is unable to pay the amount of interim compensation, the process u/s 421 can be taken resort to which may inter alia result in coercive action of recovery of the amount of interim compensation as if the amount represented the arrears of land revenue – Extent and rigor of the procedure prescribed for such recovery may vary from State to State but invariably, such procedure may visit the person concerned with coercive methods.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable u/s 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A – Section 143A held to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.

(Para 14-24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 120-B – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12 -- Punjab Travel Professionals Regulation Act, 2014, Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Permission to accused to go abroad -- Nothing on record to doubt the bona-fides of the petitioner -- Petitioner is ready and willing to furnish sufficient sureties including that of his father, for coming back; in case the Court so requires -- Also expressed undertaking before this Court that she would be ready to appear before the trial Court at any time, even on a notice of one week's time and she would not have any objection to the proceedings undertaken by the trial Court in her absence, in case the counsel for the petitioner is present before the Court – Petitioner is granted permission to go abroad for a period of six months.

(Para 7-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Offence u/s 498-A IPC – Valid marriage – Requirement of -- For proving the offence u/s 498-A of the Code, proof of valid marriage is not a sine qua non -- When the parties are residing and cohabited together as husband and wife, then the fact that they were not validly married, does not, ipso facto, exonerate the husband from the rigors of section 498-A of the Code.

(Para 11-13)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Customary law -- Custom is the strongest source of Hindu law -- Even after codification of Hindu laws, the legislature in its wisdom had protected the custom and also the customary rites and ceremonies of the marriage -- Section 7 specifically provides that a Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of the parties -- It is not necessary that the customary ceremonies and rites may be of both the parties, rather it may be of either of the parties to the marriage.

(Para 20,21)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Customary law -- Chunni ceremony – Validity of marriage -- Chunni ceremony is a prevalent in various communities in some areas of states of Punjab and Haryana as a ceremony for valid marriage -- Generally, the boy puts a chunni (dupatta) over the girl and accepted her as his wife -- When the petitioner himself chosen a special form of marriage i.e. by way of chunni ceremony, he resided and cohabited with her, now he is estopped for denying the same to be a valid form of marriage.

(Para 21, 26)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Offence u/s 498-A IPC – Protracted trial -- Quantum of sentence -- Petitioner has suffered the agony of protracted trial for more than 13 years -- Substantive sentence is reduced to six months and to pay fine of Rs.3,000/- or in default of payment, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month

(Para 30,31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 506, 120-B/34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- Cheating and forgery – Acquittal of – Leave to appeal -- Accused are Sarpanch and her husband -- Main allegation against the respondents/accused is that they had affixed the thumb impressions in the muster-roll regarding disbursement of the amount of Rs. 4212/- in August and Rs. 2268/- in October – Muster-roll Ex. P1, was prepared by the Gram Sachiv -- All the Panches of the Gram Panchayat had signed the said muster-roll -- Other members of the Gram Panchayat, who were signatories to the muster-roll (Ex. P1), had not been arrayed as accused -- Even complainant had also put his thumb impressions on the said muster-roll -- On the complaint moved by the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, exonerated of the charges levelled against them -- Even  as per the FSL report, the thumb impressions were not matchable – Appellate court acquitted the respondents – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 379-B, 506, 148 & 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Although the FIR involves Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act, however, the fact of the case will show that the alleged weapon recovered in the case is licensed gun of the petitioner and the injury allegedly caused to the injured/witness was not that much serious, therefore, the FIR u/s 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act can be quashed on the basis of compromise -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the present petitioner.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304-A – Death by negligent driving – Conviction u/s 279/304-A IPC for 1 year – Petitioner has already undergone 4 months and 11 days of actual sentence – Petitioner is a professional driver never been convicted in any other such case -- He is a first time offender – He is on bail since 29.11.2011 -- Now sending the petitioner behind bar at this stage, would be very harsh and inequitable -- Petitioner-driver was also injured in the same accident -- Sentence awarded reduced to already undergone.

(Para 4, 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279 – Death by rash and negligence driving -- Conviction for 2 years – Petitioner has already undergone 7 months and 9 days -- Petitioner faced agony of trial for the last more than ten years -- Fit case, where the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner can be reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. seven months -- Condition imposed that he would pay Rs. 20,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased. Saurabh Bakshi’s case 2015 (2) RCR (Criminal), 495 relied.

(Para 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction in murder case – Delay in filing appeal – Dismissal of – Permissibility of -- Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was delay of 1192 days in preferring the appeal -- Held, since the matter arose out of conviction u/s 302 IPC, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and heard the matter on merit – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 – Default bail given – New sections/offences added – Anticipatory bail applied -- Petitioner was given benefit of bail u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as challan was not presented against him – Main case of the prosecution remains the same regarding disproportionate assets – Held, if some other offences have been added in the FIR, even then, the petitioner is not required for further interrogation purposes etc. – Petition allowed, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in newly added Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 326, 452/ Sections 323, 324, 342, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties – Version cross-version case – Both FIR all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners, subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-, per petition.

(Para 9, 10)

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987) – Convict under TADA Act – Long sentence undergone -- Parole – Right of -- Appellant has undergone more than 24 ½ years of imprisonment – Appellant ordered to be released on parole for a period of 21 days.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102, 451, 457 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder case – Seizure of truck – Requirement of -- Truck in question could not have been directed to be seized since there is no evidence that it was used in the commission of the offence of murder -- Merely because there were rival claims about the ownership of the truck; that does not warrant the seizure of the truck -- Truck in question ordered to be released on Sapurdari to its registered owner.

(Para 2, 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 (Fifthly), 376 – Rape case – Conviction u/s 376 of IPC – Quantum of sentence -- Prior to the Amendment 13 of 2013, the conviction u/s 376(1), the punishment shall not be less than seven years – Accused was aged about 23 years at the time of occurrence in 2009 and victim was aged about 14 years and 5 months -- Consent of victim is of no consequence to reduce the sentence less than minimum sentence of seven years – Considering the period of sentence already undergone and also the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is reduced from 10 years to the statutory minimum period of seven years.

(Para 1,4,5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Complaint against SHO -- Summoning order – Quashing of complaint and summoning order -- Two Complaints u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.c. dismissed by the Illaqa Magistrate – Petitioner being SHO of the area has not registered FIR on same complaint -- Allegations against the petitioner that he has failed to exercise his power u/s 154 Cr.P.C to register an FIR are apparently illegal and not sustainable as the petitioner being SHO of area cannot form an opinion other than formed by Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 1, 26, 27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to commit suicide – Insulting/Abusing the deceased – Effect of -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are:

(i)  the abetment;

(ii)   the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

The Act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide -- Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.

(Para 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Rape case -- Compromise to solemnise marriage -- Resile from statement – Re-examination u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Witnesses resiled on account of the allurement of marriage and a chance of a blemish free life for the prosecutrix and, therefore, it can safely be said that the statement given in court denying that the offence of rape was committed, was not a statement given freely or without any fear -- An application u/s 311 of the Code may be allowed at any stage of trial -- Allowing witnesses to be recalled would be in consonance with the cardinal principle that the truth must prevail.

(Para 14-19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. by Complainant – Maintainability of -- Resile from statement under assurance of marriage -- Public Prosecutor himself cross examine the witnesses after they had turned hostile in order to elicit the truth – Public Prosecutor did not raise any objection to application u/s 311 of the Code as filed by the complainant itself raising the question of maintainability, it can be safely assumed that the said application had the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor -- Once the court is of the opinion that to ensure fair trial, an application is to be allowed in order to elicit the truth, then it should not be bound down by technicalities.

(Para 14, 20-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 441 -- Involvement in 31 cases – Bail by trial court -- Number of Sureties – Submission that the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties – Order modified to the extent that petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- and there shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- -- Court clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 433 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Life imprisonment – 11 years actual sentence undergone – Total sentence undergone 14 years including remission -- Direction given to State, having regard to the peculiar factual circumstances, to consider the case of the appellant for premature release on completion of total sentence of 14 years including remission, as a special case -- In the event of any delay in taking the decision, the appellant shall be released on self-bond, on completion of fourteen years including remission, making it subject to the decision of the Competent Authority.

 (Para 3, 4)

View of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 32 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – Section 497 IPC effectively creating a dent in individual dignity of women -- Emphasis on element of connivance or consent of husband tantamounts to subordination of women which violates Article 21 of Constitution – If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere -- It is better to be left as a ground for divorce -- As a criminal offence it will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely, dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship between the two – Held, Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional -- When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

(Para 41-56)

View of R.F. Nariman, J.

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down -- Section 198, CrPC is also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence -- Held, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid.

(Para 81-86)

View of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery -- Constitutional Validity – Criminal law must be in consonance with constitutional morality -- Being antithetical to the constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and equality, Section 497 does not pass constitutional muster – Held, Section 497 lacks an adequately determining principle to criminalize consensual sexual activity and is manifestly arbitrary -- Section 497 is a denial of substantive equality as it perpetuates the subordinate status ascribed to women in marriage and society -- Section 497 violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is based on gender stereotypes about the role of women and violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21 of the Constitution; and Section 497 is unconstitutional.

 (Para 153)

View of Indu Malhotra, J.

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery as offence -- Right to equality – Procedure to prosecute -- Constitutional validity – Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution -- Section 198(2) of the Cr.P.C. which contains the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the I.P.C. shall be unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

(Para 165-171)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Non-appearance of the petitioner before Ld. Trial Court is justified for the reason that he was not served at the given address -- After passing of the order, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail -- Matter compromised, complainant has withdrawn the complaint u/s 138 of the NIA Act -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC would amount to abuse of process of law – Order declaring proclaimed person and subsequent FIR quashed.

 (Para 1, 7,8)