Search By Topic: Penal Laws

756. (SC) 10-12-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Vicarious criminal liability – Difference between Section 34 and 149 IPC – Common intention – Common object -- Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the unlawful assembly -- In reality, such ‘common intention’ is usually indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is done through direct evidence.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Seven injuries, some of which were deep cuts on vital parts of the body including on the head (above the ear); but the appellants broke all the bones in the complainant’s feet below the knee -- Most appallingly, the injuries have led to amputation of an entire limb, leaving the complainant permanently disabled -- This by itself shows the very likely possibility of the complainant dying if not for the timely intervention and appropriate medical care by PGIMS – No rhyme or reason for either the complainant or his brother to falsely implicate the appellants and allow the actual culprits to go scot-free – Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 25, 32)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Independence of witnesses -- It is always ideal that independent witnesses come forward to substantiate the prosecution case -- Crime took place in a private agriculture field and not in the middle of a busy public place -- Defence has not claimed that other farmers also gathered at the scene and yet have not been examined – Appellants earlier in the trial they had tried to discredit the ocular testimony of witness by claiming that he might not have been able to witness the incident owing to standing crops in the field -- Nonetheless, they expect Court to believe that there could have been others who witnessed the incident but have deliberately been suppressed by the prosecution -- Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 27, 29)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Sentencing and Leniency -- Appellants and their deceased co-accused were all armed with deadly weapons -- They surrounded the complainant and in a brutal attack caused him gruesome injuries and disabled him for life -- Appellants have not undergone even half of their sentence period -- Having enjoyed the more productive part of their lives outside jail cannot be, per se, taken as a mitigating factor -- Any misplaced sympathy with the appellants is likely to cause injustice to the victim of the crime – Court did not find justification to show leniency and reduce the sentence.

(Para 29, 30)

759. (SC) 03-12-2020

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)

762. (P&H HC) 23-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

766. (SC) 19-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)

777. (SC) 03-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – TIP -- Principles which have emerged from the precedents of Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

(i) The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye-witness to the crime;

(ii) There is no specific provision either in the CrPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP;

(iii) Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of Section 162 of the CrPC;

(iv) A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held;

(v) The identification of the accused in court constitutes substantive evidence;

(vi) Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act;

(vii) A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if so required;

(viii) As a rule of prudence, the court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration;

(ix) Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible;

(x) The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the court in the circumstances of that particular case;

(xi) Identification of the accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence; and

(xii) The court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 36)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Acquittal in murder case – Serious infirmity in evidence -- Refusal to go Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Effect of -- Identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused -- Finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade -- Presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt -- Ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities -- Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence -- Prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellants are, hence, entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the offence.

(Para 39,40)

784. (SC) 29-10-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

792. (P&H HC) 13-10-2020

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)