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752. (SC) 20-01-2021

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357-A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Writ jurisdiction -- Rape victim – Rights of -- Held, petitioner being a rape victim deserves treatment as rape victim by all the authorities – A rape victim suffers not only a mental trauma but also discrimination from the society – Petitioner has two sons and one daughter – One son major, two children of the petitioner are still minor – Section 357A of the Cr.P.C provides procedure for grant of compensation, the petitioner had already made application to seek compensation under the above Scheme and payment of compensation has already been made. Directions given :

-- The Deputy Commissioner, to take measure to ensure that minor children of the petitioner are provided free education in any of the Government Institutions in District where the petitioner is residing till they attain the age of 14 years.

-- The Deputy Commissioner may also consider the case of the petitioner for providing house under Prime Minister Awas Yojna or any other Central or State Scheme in which petitioner could be provided accommodation.

-- The Senior Superintendent of Police, and other competent authority shall review the Police security provided to the petitioner from time to time and take such measures as deem fit and proper.

-- The District Legal Services Authority on representation made by the petitioner shall render legal services to the petitioner as may be deemed fit to safeguard the interest of the petitioner.

(Para 16-19, 25-27)

758. (P&H HC) 13-01-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Two appeals i.e. one by accused and one by complainant – Appellate Court allowed additional evidence in complainant’s appeal, it could not have decided the appeals at that stage -- Both appeals necessarily had to await the adducing of additional evidence so that the appellate Court could take the same into account while deciding them comprehensively.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Defamation complaint case -- Additional evidence -- Trial Court had not used coercive measures to secure the presence of the concerned Clerk of Jagbani Newspaper so as to determine the link between the advertisement and the accused, if any, and that the record maintained by the office of Jagbani Newspaper was also not produced -- It was in these circumstances that the appellate Court concluded that the trial Court had closed the evidence in a hasty manner and allowed the complainant's application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Targeted case for early disposal – In such circumstances, the consent of the complainant cannot be held against him -- Appellate Court was always at liberty to exercise power independently u/s 391 Cr.P.C., once it felt that such evidence was necessary and recorded reasons therefor.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Additional evidence in appeal – Delay in application – Effect of -- Application was filed in 2017, long after the institution of the appeal in the 2013 -- Delay cannot be held to be fatal -- Appellate Court had suo motu power to exercise discretion u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Therefore, delay in the filing of the application does not vitiate the opinion formed by the appellate Court.

(Para 22)

759. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

762. (SC) 05-01-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

776. (SC) 10-12-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Vicarious criminal liability – Difference between Section 34 and 149 IPC – Common intention – Common object -- Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the unlawful assembly -- In reality, such ‘common intention’ is usually indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is done through direct evidence.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Seven injuries, some of which were deep cuts on vital parts of the body including on the head (above the ear); but the appellants broke all the bones in the complainant’s feet below the knee -- Most appallingly, the injuries have led to amputation of an entire limb, leaving the complainant permanently disabled -- This by itself shows the very likely possibility of the complainant dying if not for the timely intervention and appropriate medical care by PGIMS – No rhyme or reason for either the complainant or his brother to falsely implicate the appellants and allow the actual culprits to go scot-free – Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 25, 32)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Independence of witnesses -- It is always ideal that independent witnesses come forward to substantiate the prosecution case -- Crime took place in a private agriculture field and not in the middle of a busy public place -- Defence has not claimed that other farmers also gathered at the scene and yet have not been examined – Appellants earlier in the trial they had tried to discredit the ocular testimony of witness by claiming that he might not have been able to witness the incident owing to standing crops in the field -- Nonetheless, they expect Court to believe that there could have been others who witnessed the incident but have deliberately been suppressed by the prosecution -- Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 27, 29)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Sentencing and Leniency -- Appellants and their deceased co-accused were all armed with deadly weapons -- They surrounded the complainant and in a brutal attack caused him gruesome injuries and disabled him for life -- Appellants have not undergone even half of their sentence period -- Having enjoyed the more productive part of their lives outside jail cannot be, per se, taken as a mitigating factor -- Any misplaced sympathy with the appellants is likely to cause injustice to the victim of the crime – Court did not find justification to show leniency and reduce the sentence.

(Para 29, 30)

779. (SC) 03-12-2020

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)

782. (P&H HC) 23-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

786. (SC) 19-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)

797. (SC) 03-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – TIP -- Principles which have emerged from the precedents of Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

(i) The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye-witness to the crime;

(ii) There is no specific provision either in the CrPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP;

(iii) Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of Section 162 of the CrPC;

(iv) A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held;

(v) The identification of the accused in court constitutes substantive evidence;

(vi) Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act;

(vii) A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if so required;

(viii) As a rule of prudence, the court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration;

(ix) Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible;

(x) The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the court in the circumstances of that particular case;

(xi) Identification of the accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence; and

(xii) The court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 36)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Acquittal in murder case – Serious infirmity in evidence -- Refusal to go Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Effect of -- Identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused -- Finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade -- Presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt -- Ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities -- Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence -- Prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellants are, hence, entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the offence.

(Para 39,40)