Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 149, 323, 302, 506, 188, 216 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder case – Regular bail -- Petitioner is not named in the FIR, no injury is attributed to him, he is in custody for almost 9 months, he is 19 year of age and is not involved in any other case, the COVID-19 pandemic and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some time, Court deemed it a fit case to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 148, 149, 302 (Section 120-B IPC added subsequently) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder case – Regular  bail -- Petitioner is not specifically named in the FIR and came to be nominated subsequently on the basis of a disclosure statement of the co-accused -- Petitioner, is behind bars since the last more than 11 months and is not even stated to be involved in any other case -- Conclusion of trial is likely to consume time as till date only 1 PW out of cited 26 PWs has been examined -- Further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose as the conclusion of trial will take some time -- Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Cheating and forgery case – Regular bail -- No allegation in the FIR to the effect that the petitioner had made any representation regarding sale of face masks or thermometers to the complainant, the role of the petitioner would be debatable -- Since the petitioner has been behind bars since the last about 4 months and is not stated to be involved in any other case, the petition accepted and the petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 324, 323, 326, 506, 148, 149, 201 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Attempt to murder –Third petition for regular bail -- Substantial change in the circumstances -- Subsequent to the withdrawal, similarly situated co-accused has been extended the concession of bail by High Court -- Charges have not yet been framed – Both the petitioner and co-accused (since granted the concession of bail) have been attributed the same injury on the thigh of the injured -- Petitioner has been in custody since 30.06.2020 -- Court deemed it a fit case for grant of the concession of regular bail to the petitioner, as the trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future, more so, in the prevailing conditions due to the outbreak of COVID-19.

(Para 2-5)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Sections 135 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Theft of electricity – Anticipatory bail -- Interim bail granted on submission that allegations in the FIR are with regard to the theft of electricity causing a loss of Rs.1,30,844/- to Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Limited -- Civil Court is seized of the matter -- FIR was lodged two years ago -- Petitioner has joined the investigation in pursuance of the interim direction issued by the Court and custodial interrogation is not required – Order granting interim bail to the petitioner is made absolute.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Petitioner has been attributed an iron rod blow on the head of injured SK as also a blunt injury on the head of RK – Petitioner was arrested on 28.01.2020 --  Trial is at the initial stage and would take time to conclude particularly keeping in view the current Covid pandemic – Offence u/s 307 IPC has been cited on the ground of intent and not on the basis of any medical opinion -- Petitioner is involved in a number of other FIRs but he has otherwise secured benefit of bail in such matters -- Compromise thrashed out between the parties -- Keeping in view the length of incarceration already suffered, petitioner is held entitled to benefit of bail.

(Para 2-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379/356 IPC (Section 379-A/34 IPC added later on) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Snatching case – Third petition for regular bail – Petitioner was arrested on 26.01.2020 -- Recovery of the articles has been effected from the petitioner as also co-accused – Investigation in the case is complete and the challan has already been presented -- Charges have till date not been framed -- Trial as such would take time to conclude particularly keeping in view the current Covid pandemic – Petitioner is not involved in any other FIR -- Keeping in view the length of incarceration already suffered, petitioner is held entitled to benefit of bail.

(Para 4-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry death – Object of -- It endeavors to address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Doctor found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries -- As the death was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence – Evidence, when the brother of the deceased visited her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry -- Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter -- She was brought back to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father -- Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house -- However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry -- Aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him -- Chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased -- Since the ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption u/s 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified u/s 304-B of IPC.

(Para 23-28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Suicide by wife – Presumption of -- For the offence u/s 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed -- Prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same -- With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113-A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions -- Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

(Para 33)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

(Para 36)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay of six years in lodging the FIR – Explanation of delay – First informant deposed that he came to know that the petitioner-accused is a fraudulent person within 2/3 months of making payment -- Thus, once the first informant had come to know that the petitioner would not take steps to send his son to Italy or return the amount allegedly received, there was no occasion to wait for a period of six years before registration of the FIR -- Neither the first informant in his deposition has stated that there were several meetings for return of the amount nor detail thereof has been provided -- Hence, the prosecution has failed to explain the delay – Conviction order set aside.

(Para 17, 24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 19, 21 -- Admission – Reliance upon -- It is well settled that before the alleged admission of the accused is made the basis to convict the accused, it is incumbent for the court to examine as to whether such admission is clear and categoric -- If the answer to the aforesaid question is in negative, it would not result in conviction of accused.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 19, 21 -- Admission – Mens-rea -- Petitioner while cross examining the first informant had given him suggestion that the agreement was executed at the Police Station -- Such suggestion, in the facts of the case, cannot be read as admission of the offence -- As per the case of the prosecution, in the year 2009, the amount of ? 1,00,000/- was paid to the petitioner, whereas the agreement provides for return of ? 50,000/- only -- It is against normal prudence -- Still further, if it is accepted that such suggestion does amount to admission, still the agreement does not prove that the petitioner has deceitfully induced the first informant to part with ? 1,00,000/- or the petitioner had “mens rea” at that time -- Conviction order set aside.

(Para 18, 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Proved -- Standard of proof -- In civil case the plaintiff is required to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt -- No doubt, ordinarily, the presiding judges are simultaneously required to decide civil as well as criminal cases and hence, the distinction gets overlooked -- However, it is expected from them that before convicting any accused, the presiding judges should keep in mind the important distinction -- Prosecution miserably failed to satisfy the aforesaid test -- Revision allowed, the judgments passed by both the Courts below, are set aside.

(Para 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 323, 148, 149 (Sections 302, 212, 216 IPC added lateron) -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959),  Sections 25, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder case – Regular bail -- Petitioner was unarmed, he is not attributed any specific injury, he is in custody for over 3 ½ years, the COVID-19 pandemic and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some time, Court deem it a fit case to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner -- Petition allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6, 7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- NDPS case – Anticipatory bail – Disclosure statement – Petitioner was named as supplier of contraband -- Except the disclosure statement of the arrested co-accused and the fact that co-accused belongs to the same village, there is nothing on record to even remotely suggest that the petitioner had any connection with the recovered material or any prior transactions with the said arrested co-accused -- No other case against the petitioner under the NDPS Act -- Petition allowed, petitioner is granted concession of anticipatory bail.

(Para 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 20, 61, 85 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS matter -- Regular bail -- Recovery of 1.5 kg of ‘Ganja’ – It is one of the mildest form of the contraband and falls under non-commercial quantity -- Petitioner behind bars since the last more than 4 months, further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose – Petition accepted and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 1, 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(f), 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape case – Victim resiled -- Petitioner has been behind bars for a substantial period of more than 1 year -- Further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose -- Petition accepted and the petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 1, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365, 379-B, 201, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Snatching case – Regular bail -- Allegations are that the car, mobile phone and Rs.200/- cash were snatched from the complainant -- Petitioner is in custody for over 01 year and 04 months, Covid 19 pandemic and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some time, Court deem it a fit case to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 2-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Blind murder -- Regular bail -- Petitioner behind bars for a substantial period of about 2 ½ years and the trial is likely to consume time as only 7 PWs out of cited 17 PWs have been examined -- Petitioner is not involved in any other case, further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose – Petition accepted and the petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 323, 324, 506, 427, 379-B, 148, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Matter has been compromised, the petitioner is in custody for over 5 months, the COVID-19 pandemic and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some time, Court deem it a fit case to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 7)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 397, 201 – Murder case -- Bail to juvenile – Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge not at all considered entitlement of the Petitioner for bail in terms of Section 12 of the JJ Act, which could not have been overlooked even in the situation that he was sent up to face trial by the JJB in the Children’s Court – Grounds for denying bail to him could be within the proviso to Section 12(1) of the JJ Act.

(Para 9)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 397, 201 – Murder case -- Bail to juvenile – Petitioner  allegedly became a member of a gang along with co-accused crossed the age of majority at the relevant time who are already in custody – So there is little chance of the Petitioner being exposed to their association if released on bail – Petitioner remained in detention for almost an year – Petitioner released on bail.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 43(5)(D) – Bail to accused -- Prima facie case – While considering the grant of bail under Section 43 (5) D, it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire material on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.

(Para 11)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 21, 43(5)(D) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120B, 414, 384, 386, 387 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25 (1B) (a), 26, 35 -- Bail to accused – Terror funding -- No prima facie case – Main accusation against the Appellant is that he paid levy / extortion amount to the terrorist organization – Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding – Appellant paid money to the members of the TPC for smooth running of his business – Appellant revealed in his statement u/s 164 Cr.PC that he was summoned to meet A-14 and the other members of the organization in connection with the payments made by him – Amount of Rs. 9,95,000/- seized from the house of the Appellant which was accounted for by the Appellant who stated that the amount was withdrawn from the bank to pay salaries to his employees and other expenses – There is no allegation that Appellant was receiving any money – On the other hand, the Appellant is accused of providing money to the members of TPC – No prima facie case made out – Appellant is directed to be released on bail.

(Para 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 304-B, 406, 498-A, 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 216, 401 -- Dowry death case – Charge of Murder – Requirement of -- Charges framed u/s 304-B, 406, 498-A IPC – Prayer to add 302 IPC -- Perusal of contents of the FIR itself reveals that the complainant had raised only a suspicion qua the deceased having been poisoned to death – If during trial any new evidence comes on record, the trial Court concerned is fully competent u/s 216 Cr.P.C., to add and/or alter any such charge as it may deem fit -- Acid test would be based on the material, which may come to light during the course of the trial -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 5-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Appellant was arrested in Copyright  case and was brought to the Office of the Video Piracy Cell and was kept in custody in the same room as that of the Head Constable (deceased) – Appellant made an attempt to escape from the custody by attacking the deceased on his head with an iron stool causing his death, however, he was caught by PW-1 SI and PW-2 HC while attempting to escape -- Evidence in its entirety clearly shows that the offence had taken place at the relevant point of time the accused and the deceased were alone inside the premises of the office of the Video Piracy Cell -- Under the above circumstance, it was for the accused to explain under what circumstances the deceased was dead – Appellant has failed to offer any cogent explanation in this regard -- Chain of circumstances has been completely proved and established beyond reasonable doubt – Appeal against conviction dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 12, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 188, 341, 379-B, 392, 397 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 59 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Snatching case – Regular bail -- Trial is likely to take some time -- Petitioner in custody since 21.07.2020 and challan stands presented -- No useful purpose would be served in keeping the petitioner behind bars any longer -- Petition allowed.

(Para 1, 5)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Recovery of .32 bore pistol -- Conviction for 1 year – Probation -- Petitioner is not a previous convict and is the only earning member of the family and is not involved in any other case and has already undergone more than one month -- Sentence modified to the extent that petitioner is directed to be released on probation for a period of one year.

(Para 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Quarrel between students -- Regular bail -- Case in hand seems to be a brawl amongst the young students, turned ugly with unanticipated consequences much to the shock of all involved -- Be that as it may, the same is for the trial Court to adjudicate, based upon the evidence to be adduced -- Even though the trial is going on, but its pace is slowed down due to the pandemic -- Same is not likely to conclude anytime soon -- On the other hand, petitioner is on the cross roads of his life and his entire career is at stake -- Any further preventive custody, would severely jeopardize his future prospects -- Material witnesses i.e complainant and father of the deceased victim, have already been examined – No useful purpose would be served to keep the petitioner in further preventive custody -- In the premise, without commenting on the merits of the case, the petition allowed.

(Para 9-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 392, 342, 395, 379-B, 120-B, 212, 216, 201, 450, 120-B, 148, 149 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59, 25.1B(F) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Dacoity/ Snatching case -- Regular bail – Detention for more than one year -- Petitioner was not named in the FIR nor any actual recovery was effected from him -- His complicity has however transpired only from the Disclosure Statement of Co-accused -- Co-accused who was similarly placed was granted Regular Bail – Further detention of the Petitioner for an indefinite period at this stage is not called for, since it transpires that so far only Challan in the case has been presented and the trial is yet to commence -- Regular Bail allowed.

(Para 2-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34 --  Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Murder – Regular bail -- Testimony of PW-1/ complainant stated that he had suspicion and had come to know from the people that the petitioner along with his brother had committed the murder – Submission that strangely the complainant was completely silent as to who were those persons, who had seen or informed him about the role and involvement of the petitioner in the alleged crime nor were any of those persons cited as a witness by the prosecution in the challan so filed – 08 material witnesses out of the 30 prosecution witnesses cited had been examined – Trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future, more so, in the prevailing conditions due to the outbreak of COVID-19 -- Petitioner has been in custody since 09th July, 2019, Court deemed it a fit case for grant of the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration -- A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence -- If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused -- Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case -- There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dowry death – Murder -- Three dying declaration – Acquittal of accused -- First statement of the deceased is based on hearsay that she was set  on fire by respondent no. 2 and no reference of respondent no. 1 and anything about dowry demand -- Next statement blaming respondent no.1 alone, which is not signed by anybody and the Doctor who recorded the statement has not been examined and merely because his signature has been identified P.W.19 cannot establish the correctness of its contents -- Next statement of the deceased blaming respondent no.1 alone without any allegation against respondent no.2, and on the contrary states that she was brought to the hospital by respondent no.2, it again does not disclose any dowry demand -- Considering that the statements of the deceased have vacillated, there is no evidence about the fitness of mind of the deceased to make the dying declaration including the presence of the Doctor, the veracity and truthfulness of the dying declaration remains suspect -- It would not be safe to simply reject the probable defence of suicide, to reverse the acquittal and convict the respondents.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner is the brother-in-law of the deceased -- Incident took place after seven years of the marriage -- It is alleged in the FIR that the deceased was being harassed by her in-laws and she consumed poison due to harassment by her husband -- Also contends that there is a delay of 24 hours in registering the FIR and there is no suicide note – Petitioner was  directed to appear before the Investigating Officer and join the investigation -- Petitioner having joined investigation, the Covid-19 Pandemic, the order granting interim bail to the petitioner is made absolute.

(Para 2-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Regular bail – Supplementary statement of complainant after 3 months -- Petitioner himself is not alleged to have participated directly in the murder and the role attributed to him even as per the supplementary statement is that of instigation and of harbouring the co-accused -- Veracity of such statement made after about 3 months of the occurrence, when the complainant was very well aware about the enmity between the two families, would be debatable -- Petitioner has been behind bars since the last about 4 months, further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose as the conclusion of trial will take some time -- Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Multiple dying declarations -- When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated on its own merits.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Second Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Defence that while putting the kerosene into the stove, accidentally the kerosene had fallen on the ground and also on her clothes, and thereafter when the candle fell on the ground, the same had come in contact with her clothes and kerosene -- If that is the case, there would have been injuries to her feet also -- However, no burn injuries are found on her feet -- No stove was found at the place of occurrence -- On the contrary, this evidence speaks otherwise -- Main injuries are found on the upper limbs of the body can be possible when the kerosene is poured on the deceased – Exhibit P5 (Second dying declaration) is corroborated by other surrounding circumstances and evidence and after independent evaluation of Exhibit P5 and Exhibit D2 (First dying declaration), when the High Court has found that Exhibit P5 is reliable and inspiring confidence and thereafter when the High Court has convicted the accused, it cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 7, 8, 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302 – Murder -- Imminent dangerous act -- After pouring kerosene on the deceased and thereafter setting her ablaze -- It was imminently dangerous which, in all probability, will cause death -- Merely because the accused might have tried to extinguish the fire will not take the case out of the clutches of clause fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC – High Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Murder – Dying declaration -- Deceased suffered 90 per cent injuries and was in a fit condition to make a declaration -- JMIC recorded the statement and in her dying declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze -- Though the family members of the deceased were in the hospital, they were sent out, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate – If the dying declaration is considered along with the depositions of PW-5, PW-6 and other witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the prosecution, it clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction order upheld.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration – Presence of parents and relatives – Effect of -- Held, merely because the parents and other relatives of the deceased were present in the Hospital, when the statement of the deceased was recorded, it cannot be said that the said statement was a tutored one -- Same is no ground to disbelieve the dying declaration, recorded by the Magistrate.

(Para 16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the Act, 1881:

(i) that a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;

(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Once a cheque has been signed and issued in favour of the holder, there is statutory presumption that it is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability -- However, this presumption is a rebuttable one -- If the accused will able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail -- Onus is upon the accused to rebut the presumption and to establish that the cheque in question was not given in respect of any debt or liability, however, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence, even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Respondent-accused denied his signature on the cheque -- Accused has not led any evidence in support of this plea -- Accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case -- Statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive evidence of defence of the accused but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case -- Mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.

(Para 24, 25)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Complaint against partner -- Partnership Firm not arrayed as accused – Effect of -- For the purpose of Section 141 of the Act, 1881, a firm comes within the ambit of a company – Cheque had been issued by the firm which was subsequently dishonoured, a partner of the firm would not be liable for prosecution u/s 138 of the Act, 1881 without the firm being arraigned as an accused – Ld. Trail court acquitted the accused -- Appeal, by special leave, preferred by the appellant-complainant dismissed.

(Para 1, 30-34)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 148, 149, 120-B – Murder accused -- Temporary release for marriage function -- Marriage of brother -- Presence of petitioner would be necessary – He is in custody for over 3 ½ years and is not involved in any other case -- Petition allowed,  Superintendent, Central Jail directed to send the petitioner from the Central Jail to the place of marriage at 7.00 am in police custody in a conveyance to be provided/paid for by the petitioner – He shall report back to the Central Jail, by 07.00 p.m. on the same day.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 306 -- Suicide – Homicidal death -- No marks on the body which would suggest violence or struggle -- Medical expert himself has not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death -- On the contrary, the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was ‘asphyxia due to hanging’ -- In the light of this evidence, trial court as well as the High Court have erred in holding, that the prosecution has proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Husband-wife -- Circumstantial evidence – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt -- It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Explanation by accused -- It is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused -- However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain.

(Para 24)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances -- Prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt -- As such, an important link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally absent in the case.

(Para 26-30)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof -- Prosecution has failed even to prove a single incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt -- As such, the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 34)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 -- Evidence law -- Murder -- Common intention – Conviction u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 – Firearm injury established and proved by the prosecution -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused also established and proved – As per the doctor injuries were, abrasion wound on right-hand elbow joint; several wounds of pallets on right hand and wound on little finger of right hand – As the injury on little finger was simple in nature, it was possible for P.W.27 to give complaint/Fardbeyan in writing -- Appellant ran away and he absconded for approximately 15 years, he surrendered/was arrested after another accused was convicted – It cannot be said that, the ld. Trial Court as well as the High Court, have committed any error in convicting the appellant-accused u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

(Para 6.1, 6.2)

B. Evidence law – Contradiction in deposition – Appellant/accused absconded for 15 years -- Deposition was recorded after a period of approximately 15 years, there are bound to be some minor contradiction/contradictions.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 – Evidence law -- Murder – Use of fire-arm – Non seizure of -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused has also been established and proved -- Merely because the weapon is not seized cannot be a ground to acquit the accused when his presence and his active participation and using firearm by him has been established and proved.

(Para 6.2)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape case – Relation on pretext of marriage – Non-performing of marriage -- Quashing of FIR -- From the contents of the FIR as well as the statement u/s 164 of CrPC three important features emerge: (i) The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature; (ii) The parties were in the relationship for about a period of one and a half years; and (iii) Subsequently, the appellant had expressed a disinclination to marry the second respondent which led to the registration of the FIR – Held, for the purposes of considering the application for quashing u/s 482 of CrPC, no offence has been established -- No allegation that the promise to marry was false at the inception on the contrary, from the contents of the FIR appears that there was a subsequent refusal – Held, High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition u/s 482 of CrPC – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside -- Charge sheet in pursuance of the investigation and order of the trial Court taking cognizance shall stand quashed and set aside.

(Para 8-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – PW-2-aunt of the deceased called the deceased and asked her what had happened, she replied that her husband had beaten her up with a wooden log -- It was the appellant/husband himself who took her to the hospital and made a false statement that she suffered a cardiac arrest but after the autopsy was conducted on the body of the deceased, it was opined that she died out of shock and haemorrhage due to thoracic injuries – Injury nos. 1 to 6 were caused with blunt weapon which resulted into death of the deceased -- Ocular evidence of PW 2-aunt of the deceased is corroborated with the medical evidence of Doctor (PW 7) – Conviction u/s 302 upheld.

(Para 4, 10-18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Circumstantial evidence -- In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled principles of law are that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances should be conclusive in nature and moreover the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of events -- However, the circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with the innocence.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 323, 324, 326, 379, 382, 148, 149, 201 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Order declaring Proclaimed offender – Challenge to – Release on bail -- Objective of the coercive mechanism prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure that the accused remains present before the Court to receive the orders and punishments as are passed qua the accused -- If the accused shows his sincere intention and desire to appear before the Court, then it would not be unjustified to protect him from being arrested -- Without commenting on the merits of the case, the petition disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to surrender before the trial Court within 10 days -- On doing so, he was ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (4), Exception 4, 302, 304 Part I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Imminent dangerous act – Sudden provocation -- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury, such culpable homicide can be said to be the murder -- However, culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (4), Exception 4, 302, 304 Part I -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Money dispute -- Sudden fight -- Deceased was admitted to the hospital after 24 hours and thereafter he died within three days due to septicemia -- If he was given the treatment immediately, the result might have been different – There was no premeditation on the part of the accused; the accused did not carry any weapon; quarrel started all of a sudden and that the accused pushed the deceased and stood on the abdomen, the case would fall under exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and neither clause 3 of Section 300 nor clause 4 of Section 300 shall be attracted -- At the most, the accused can be said to have committed the offence under Section 304-I, IPC – Appellant ordered to be sentenced to the period already undergone i.e., 14.5 years.

(Para 8-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 -- “weapon of offence” -- Wooden lathi and batten are the weapons which are possessed by the police and the submission cannot be accepted that the injuries cannot be caused by wooden lathi and batten which may cause death -- It depends on the manner of use of the wooden lathi and batten.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Compounding of offence with leave by the court -- Grant of leave as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 320 is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of request by the appellant which may be agreed by the victim -- Statutory requirement, makes it a clear duty of the Court to look into the nature of the offence and the evidence and to satisfy itself whether permission should be or should not be granted -- Administration of criminal justice requires prosecution of all offenders by the State -- Nature of offence, and its affect on society are relevant considerations while granting leave by the Court of compounding the offence -- Offences which affect the public in general and create fear in the public in general are serious offences, nature of which offence may be relevant consideration for Court to grant or refuse the leave.

(Para 30-32)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Compounding of offence – Permissibility of -- Police of State is protector of law and order -- People look forward to the Police to protect their life and property -- Beating of a person in the Police Station is the concern for all and causes a sense of fear in the entire society – Accused who were police officers, one of them being in-charge of Station and other Senior Inspector have themselves brutally beaten the deceased, who died the same night -- Their offences cannot be compounded by the Court in exercise of Section 320(2) read with sub-section (5) – Prayer of the appellant to compound the offence rejected.

(Para 36-38)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Custodial death – Compensation for -- Custodial violence on the deceased which led to the death is abhorrent and not acceptable in the civilized society -- Offence committed by the accused is crime not against the deceased alone but was against humanity and clear violations of rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Although the High Court has awarded the compensation of Rs.3 Lakhs in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased, held compensation awarded was not adequate -- Sentence of one year is reduced to six months -- Compensation of Rs.3.5 Lakhs each to the legal heir of the deceased in addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court granted.

(Para 39-43)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 395, 397, 201 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Dacoity case -- Regular bail – Interim bail -- Cash amount was looted from an ATM machine – Contention that petitioner was named on the basis of the disclosure statement of the co-accused -- Petitioner is in custody for the last 01 year and 08 months; the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required -- Conclusion of the trial will take some time due to COVID-19 situation -- Petition partly allowed and the petitioner is directed to be released on interim bail till 10.06.2021 -- However, the trial Court, after assessing the situation, if the trial has not started in ordinary course and the evidence is recorded, may cancel or may continue the interim bail granted to the petitioner till further orders.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 4, 304 Part 1 – Couplable homicide not amounting to murder -- Accused is an agriculturist, and the Shovel is a part of an agricultural tool that is possessed by agriculturists -- Accused was attributed with the first blow with the Shovel followed a hit by a stone on the head of the deceased which was picked up from the street -- Accused and the deceased were from the same family -- Cause of provocation was sudden, without premeditation -- Injuries were inflicted without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken advantage or acted cruelly or unusually -- In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is a case falling under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC -- Appellant is liable to be convicted for an offence under Section 304 Part I.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 395, 397, 216 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dacoity case – Regular bail -- Absconded for 18 years – Especially when the petitioner is not named in the FIR while the co-accused was specifically named, he is in custody for about 06 months, Covid 19 pandemic and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some time – Court deemed it a fit case to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 4, 5)

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Sections 13, 17, 18, 18-B, 20 -- National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (34 of 2008), Section  43(D)(2)(b) -- Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Sections 3, 4, 5 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Special Court under NIA – Challan not within 90 days of arrest – Extension of time by Illaqa Magistrate – Power of – Default bail – Held, Special Court only is competent to exercise powers u/s 43(D)(2)(b) -- Since the Illaqa Magistrate was not competent to extend the period as has been ordered, therefore, Court is left with no option but to hold that the challan which was presented beyond the period of 90 days without there being any valid extension of the said period – Order declining the application for release of the petitioners in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. cannot sustain -- Petitioners ordered to be released on bail in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

(Para 4-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 482 – Kidnapping on pretext of marriage – Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet -- No allegation against the appellant -- Main allegation was against co-accused but the prosecutrix married him on 4.8.2013 and had given birth to two children out of that wedlock -- In the absence of any allegation against the appellant, continuation of proceedings against him is nothing but an abuse of process of law -- Proceedings initiated against him on the basis of FIR would be untenable -- High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition – Order of High Court set aside -- Entire proceedings consequent to FIR and charge sheet stand quashed.

(Para 9-11)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 127, 135 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Electricity dues – Pilferage/ Theft of Electricity --  Dispute of – Writ jurisdiction --  Civil suit – Remedy of – Petitioner calls in question the calculation of electricity dues, for a period of one year, prepared by the respondent-power supply company -- Petitioner has already availed the remedy of civil suit, but the same was later on withdrawn as the interim order granted was subject to certain conditions, which apparently were not found convenient -- In other words, the petitioner is indulging in forum shopping – Writ petition involves disputed questions of fact, which can appropriately be adjudicated after permitting the parties to lead the evidence – Writ petition disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to move an application for revival of the civil suit, if so advised -- If such an application is filed, the trial Court will consider the same sympathetically.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 323, 324, 326, 120-B, 148,149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Custody since 23.11.2020 -- Role attributed to the petitioner is that she raised lalkara – Challan is likely to be presented soon -- Trial is likely to take time to conclude, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind bar any longer – Petition allowed and the petitioner is directed to be released on bail.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 323, 34 – Conviction in Murder – Juvenile (17 years 1 month) at the time of incident – Sentence of more than two years undergone -- Appellant being juvenile, conviction order passed by the Trial Court and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court affirming such conviction deserve to be set aside -- Since the appellant has already been in custody for more than two years, no reason to send the matter back to the Juvenile Justice Board – Appeal allowed.

(Para 5-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 489-A, 489-B, 489-C, 120-B, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 439 – Counterfeit currency case -- Proclaimed offender – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody since 19.12.2020 -- Charges framed, other co-accused, who faced the trial have already been acquitted by the trial Court – No other case against the petitioner -- Court deemed it appropriate to admit the petitioner on bail.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Culpable homicide – Regular bail -- Petitioner had given kicks and fist blows to the deceased -- Petitioner was neither attributed any injury with any weapon nor any weapon was recovered from the his possession – Allegation regarding common intention is to be established during trial -- Deceased died due to head injury, and this injury is not attributed to the petitioner – He is in custody since 17.8.2020, coupled with the fact that trial in the case may take long time, Court deemed it appropriate to release him on regular bail.

(Para 8)