Search By Topic: Penal Laws

701. (UK HC) 03-03-2021

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the Act, 1881:

(i) that a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;

(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Once a cheque has been signed and issued in favour of the holder, there is statutory presumption that it is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability -- However, this presumption is a rebuttable one -- If the accused will able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail -- Onus is upon the accused to rebut the presumption and to establish that the cheque in question was not given in respect of any debt or liability, however, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence, even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Respondent-accused denied his signature on the cheque -- Accused has not led any evidence in support of this plea -- Accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case -- Statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive evidence of defence of the accused but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case -- Mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.

(Para 24, 25)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Complaint against partner -- Partnership Firm not arrayed as accused – Effect of -- For the purpose of Section 141 of the Act, 1881, a firm comes within the ambit of a company – Cheque had been issued by the firm which was subsequently dishonoured, a partner of the firm would not be liable for prosecution u/s 138 of the Act, 1881 without the firm being arraigned as an accused – Ld. Trail court acquitted the accused -- Appeal, by special leave, preferred by the appellant-complainant dismissed.

(Para 1, 30-34)

703. (SC) 02-03-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 306 -- Suicide – Homicidal death -- No marks on the body which would suggest violence or struggle -- Medical expert himself has not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death -- On the contrary, the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was ‘asphyxia due to hanging’ -- In the light of this evidence, trial court as well as the High Court have erred in holding, that the prosecution has proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Husband-wife -- Circumstantial evidence – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt -- It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Explanation by accused -- It is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused -- However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain.

(Para 24)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances -- Prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt -- As such, an important link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally absent in the case.

(Para 26-30)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof -- Prosecution has failed even to prove a single incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt -- As such, the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 34)

704. (SC) 01-03-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 -- Evidence law -- Murder -- Common intention – Conviction u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 – Firearm injury established and proved by the prosecution -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused also established and proved – As per the doctor injuries were, abrasion wound on right-hand elbow joint; several wounds of pallets on right hand and wound on little finger of right hand – As the injury on little finger was simple in nature, it was possible for P.W.27 to give complaint/Fardbeyan in writing -- Appellant ran away and he absconded for approximately 15 years, he surrendered/was arrested after another accused was convicted – It cannot be said that, the ld. Trial Court as well as the High Court, have committed any error in convicting the appellant-accused u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

(Para 6.1, 6.2)

B. Evidence law – Contradiction in deposition – Appellant/accused absconded for 15 years -- Deposition was recorded after a period of approximately 15 years, there are bound to be some minor contradiction/contradictions.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 – Evidence law -- Murder – Use of fire-arm – Non seizure of -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused has also been established and proved -- Merely because the weapon is not seized cannot be a ground to acquit the accused when his presence and his active participation and using firearm by him has been established and proved.

(Para 6.2)

708. (SC) 11-02-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (4), Exception 4, 302, 304 Part I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Imminent dangerous act – Sudden provocation -- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury, such culpable homicide can be said to be the murder -- However, culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 (4), Exception 4, 302, 304 Part I -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Money dispute -- Sudden fight -- Deceased was admitted to the hospital after 24 hours and thereafter he died within three days due to septicemia -- If he was given the treatment immediately, the result might have been different – There was no premeditation on the part of the accused; the accused did not carry any weapon; quarrel started all of a sudden and that the accused pushed the deceased and stood on the abdomen, the case would fall under exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and neither clause 3 of Section 300 nor clause 4 of Section 300 shall be attracted -- At the most, the accused can be said to have committed the offence under Section 304-I, IPC – Appellant ordered to be sentenced to the period already undergone i.e., 14.5 years.

(Para 8-11)

709. (SC) 11-02-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 -- “weapon of offence” -- Wooden lathi and batten are the weapons which are possessed by the police and the submission cannot be accepted that the injuries cannot be caused by wooden lathi and batten which may cause death -- It depends on the manner of use of the wooden lathi and batten.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Compounding of offence with leave by the court -- Grant of leave as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 320 is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of request by the appellant which may be agreed by the victim -- Statutory requirement, makes it a clear duty of the Court to look into the nature of the offence and the evidence and to satisfy itself whether permission should be or should not be granted -- Administration of criminal justice requires prosecution of all offenders by the State -- Nature of offence, and its affect on society are relevant considerations while granting leave by the Court of compounding the offence -- Offences which affect the public in general and create fear in the public in general are serious offences, nature of which offence may be relevant consideration for Court to grant or refuse the leave.

(Para 30-32)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Compounding of offence – Permissibility of -- Police of State is protector of law and order -- People look forward to the Police to protect their life and property -- Beating of a person in the Police Station is the concern for all and causes a sense of fear in the entire society – Accused who were police officers, one of them being in-charge of Station and other Senior Inspector have themselves brutally beaten the deceased, who died the same night -- Their offences cannot be compounded by the Court in exercise of Section 320(2) read with sub-section (5) – Prayer of the appellant to compound the offence rejected.

(Para 36-38)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Custodial death – Compensation for -- Custodial violence on the deceased which led to the death is abhorrent and not acceptable in the civilized society -- Offence committed by the accused is crime not against the deceased alone but was against humanity and clear violations of rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Although the High Court has awarded the compensation of Rs.3 Lakhs in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased, held compensation awarded was not adequate -- Sentence of one year is reduced to six months -- Compensation of Rs.3.5 Lakhs each to the legal heir of the deceased in addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court granted.

(Para 39-43)

721. (SC) 20-01-2021

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357-A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Writ jurisdiction -- Rape victim – Rights of -- Held, petitioner being a rape victim deserves treatment as rape victim by all the authorities – A rape victim suffers not only a mental trauma but also discrimination from the society – Petitioner has two sons and one daughter – One son major, two children of the petitioner are still minor – Section 357A of the Cr.P.C provides procedure for grant of compensation, the petitioner had already made application to seek compensation under the above Scheme and payment of compensation has already been made. Directions given :

-- The Deputy Commissioner, to take measure to ensure that minor children of the petitioner are provided free education in any of the Government Institutions in District where the petitioner is residing till they attain the age of 14 years.

-- The Deputy Commissioner may also consider the case of the petitioner for providing house under Prime Minister Awas Yojna or any other Central or State Scheme in which petitioner could be provided accommodation.

-- The Senior Superintendent of Police, and other competent authority shall review the Police security provided to the petitioner from time to time and take such measures as deem fit and proper.

-- The District Legal Services Authority on representation made by the petitioner shall render legal services to the petitioner as may be deemed fit to safeguard the interest of the petitioner.

(Para 16-19, 25-27)

727. (P&H HC) 13-01-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Two appeals i.e. one by accused and one by complainant – Appellate Court allowed additional evidence in complainant’s appeal, it could not have decided the appeals at that stage -- Both appeals necessarily had to await the adducing of additional evidence so that the appellate Court could take the same into account while deciding them comprehensively.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Defamation complaint case -- Additional evidence -- Trial Court had not used coercive measures to secure the presence of the concerned Clerk of Jagbani Newspaper so as to determine the link between the advertisement and the accused, if any, and that the record maintained by the office of Jagbani Newspaper was also not produced -- It was in these circumstances that the appellate Court concluded that the trial Court had closed the evidence in a hasty manner and allowed the complainant's application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Targeted case for early disposal – In such circumstances, the consent of the complainant cannot be held against him -- Appellate Court was always at liberty to exercise power independently u/s 391 Cr.P.C., once it felt that such evidence was necessary and recorded reasons therefor.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Additional evidence in appeal – Delay in application – Effect of -- Application was filed in 2017, long after the institution of the appeal in the 2013 -- Delay cannot be held to be fatal -- Appellate Court had suo motu power to exercise discretion u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Therefore, delay in the filing of the application does not vitiate the opinion formed by the appellate Court.

(Para 22)

728. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

731. (SC) 05-01-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

745. (SC) 10-12-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Vicarious criminal liability – Difference between Section 34 and 149 IPC – Common intention – Common object -- Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the unlawful assembly -- In reality, such ‘common intention’ is usually indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is done through direct evidence.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Seven injuries, some of which were deep cuts on vital parts of the body including on the head (above the ear); but the appellants broke all the bones in the complainant’s feet below the knee -- Most appallingly, the injuries have led to amputation of an entire limb, leaving the complainant permanently disabled -- This by itself shows the very likely possibility of the complainant dying if not for the timely intervention and appropriate medical care by PGIMS – No rhyme or reason for either the complainant or his brother to falsely implicate the appellants and allow the actual culprits to go scot-free – Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 25, 32)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Independence of witnesses -- It is always ideal that independent witnesses come forward to substantiate the prosecution case -- Crime took place in a private agriculture field and not in the middle of a busy public place -- Defence has not claimed that other farmers also gathered at the scene and yet have not been examined – Appellants earlier in the trial they had tried to discredit the ocular testimony of witness by claiming that he might not have been able to witness the incident owing to standing crops in the field -- Nonetheless, they expect Court to believe that there could have been others who witnessed the incident but have deliberately been suppressed by the prosecution -- Conviction u/s 307 upheld.

(Para 27, 29)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder -- Sentencing and Leniency -- Appellants and their deceased co-accused were all armed with deadly weapons -- They surrounded the complainant and in a brutal attack caused him gruesome injuries and disabled him for life -- Appellants have not undergone even half of their sentence period -- Having enjoyed the more productive part of their lives outside jail cannot be, per se, taken as a mitigating factor -- Any misplaced sympathy with the appellants is likely to cause injustice to the victim of the crime – Court did not find justification to show leniency and reduce the sentence.

(Para 29, 30)

748. (SC) 03-12-2020

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)