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655. (J&K&L HC) 17-03-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Stop payment – Account closed -- Not only the cases of dishonour of cheques on account of insufficiency of funds or on account of exceeding of arrangement but the cases involving dishonour of cheques on account of “stop payment” and “account closed” have also been brought within the ambit of offence under the aforesaid provision.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Difference in signature -- Contention of the petitioner that in the case offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is not constituted because the cheque was dishonoured on account of difference in signatures and not for the reason of insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement, deserves to be rejected.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Even if cheque issued as a security, still then it cannot be stated that no offence is made out, once the cheque issued by him has been dishonoured by the banker.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Whether the petitioner had issued the cheque as a security and whether at the time when the cheque was presented for its payment, it was not for discharge of any debt or any other liability cannot be determined either by the trial Magistrate at the time of taking of cognizance or by High Court in these proceedings -- These are defences available to the accused/ petitioner, veracity whereof can be determined during the trial of the case -- Trial Magistrate directed to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.

(Para 20, 21)

671. (SC) 24-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – First Information Report/ FIR – Nature of -- FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness statements as they progress further into the investigation and unearth the specific roles of accused persons -- FIR as is known, only sets the investigative machinery, into motion.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B, 147, 148, 324 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Conviction in murder case – Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Two courts have concurrently concluded that appellant’s name not being specifically mentioned in the FIR, would not justify his acquittal as he was specifically identified by PW2, PW4, & PW6 -- In view of his positive identification by the eye witnesses, the TIP not being conducted, was held to be immaterial -- Eye witnesses here have ascribed the same specific role to the appellant and narrated the events in same chronology, without material discrepancies – Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this case involves multiple persons attacking in a group with deadly weapons and it is not reasonable to expect recollection of every minute details by the eyewitnesses -- Prosecution has produced cogent evidence of the appellant being part of a conspiracy by all the accused in the assault, which led to the death of BM and injuries to PW1 and others -- As such, the conviction of the appellant by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, cannot be faulted.

(Para 15-18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Requirement of -- Identity of the appellant/accused was known to the witnesses and he was specifically identified by PW1, and PW2 as the person who wielded the sword and inflicted the injuries -- TIP was unnecessary in the case -- In the face of appellant’s such identification by name in the testimony of the eye witnesses, it can, be safely concluded that the failure to conduct the TIP for the appellant will not vitiate his conviction.

(Para 17)

677. (SC) 11-08-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

683. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

699. (SC) 06-07-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Murder case – Doctor’s evidence -- Entire evidence as a whole is required to be considered with the other evidence on record -- Mere one sentence here or there and that too to the question asked by the defence in the cross-examination cannot be considered standalone -- What is stated by the Doctor/Medical officer can at the most be said to be his opinion, he is not the eye-witness to the incident -- PW1 & PW2 have categorically stated that the other accused inflicted the blows by knives -- Same is supported by the medical evidence and the deposition of PW2 -- Injuries nos. 2 to 8 are sufficient by the sharp cutting weapon -- Injuries nos. 2 to 8 are on different parts of the body which show the intention and conduct on the part of the other accused A2 & A3 -- Therefore, they are rightly convicted for the offence punishable u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- There was a prior long-time enmity between the deceased and the accused-A1 -- Even the deceased was also facing trial for the offence u/s 307 IPC at the instance of A1 -- Defence has failed to prove any circumstances by which it can be said that they are falsely implicated in the case -- Prosecution has been successful in proving the motive.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder – Conviction -- There is a direct evidence against A-1, using the gun and shooting the deceased -- Therefore, he can be convicted for the offence punishable u/s 302 IPC, without the aid of Section 34 IPC.

(Para 15)