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654. (SC) 02-01-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust -- For Section 406 of the IPC to get attracted, there must be criminal breach of trust in terms of Section 405 of the IPC -- For Section 405 of the IPC to be attracted, the following have to be established:

(a) the accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;

(b) the accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and

(c) such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.

Thus, criminal breach of trust would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted with or otherwise has dominion -- Such an act must not only be done dishonestly, but also in violation of any direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to carrying out the trust.

(Para 12-14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust -- Complaint does not directly refer to the ingredients of Section 405 of the IPC and does not state how and in what manner, on facts, the requirements are satisfied -- Pre-summoning evidence is also lacking and suffers on this account -- If monetary demand or claim is incorrect and not payable, offence u/s 405/ 406 is not constituted.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 415, 420 -- Cheating -- In order to apply Section 420 of the IPC,  the ingredients of Section 415 of the IPC have to be satisfied -- To constitute an offence of cheating u/s 415 of the IPC, a person should be induced, either fraudulently or dishonestly, to deliver any property to any person, or consent that any person shall retain any property -- Second class of acts set forth in the section is the intentional inducement of doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do, if she were not so deceived -- Thus, the sine qua non of Section 415 of the IPC is “fraudulence”, “dishonesty”, or “intentional inducement”, and the absence of these elements would debase the offence of cheating.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating -- There is no assertion, much less legal evidence, to submit that accused/company had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or intentional inducement to deliver a property -- It is not the case of respondent no. 2 - complainant that accused-company had tried to deceive them, either by making a false or misleading representation, or by any other action or omission; nor is it their case that accused-company had offered any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver a property -- As such, ingredients of Section 415 of the IPC are not satisfied, the offence u/s 420 of the IPC is not made out.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 464,  470,  471 -- Forged document -- To constitute the offence u/s 471 of the IPC, it has to be proven that the document was “forged” in terms of Section 470, and “false” in terms of Section 464 of the IPC -- Section 470 lays down that a document is ‘forged’ if there is: (i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine; and (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of the person using the document that it is a forged one -- Section 470 defines a forged document as a false document made by forgery -- As per Section 464 of the IPC, a person is said to have made a ‘false document’: (i) if he has made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; (ii) if he has altered or tampered a document; or (iii) if he has obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses -- Unless, the document is false and forged in terms of Sections 464 and 470 of the IPC respectively, the requirement of Section 471 of the IPC would not be met.

(Para 18)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Summoning of accused – Duty of Magistrate -- Even though at the stage of issuing process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set the criminal proceedings into motion -- Requirement of Section 204 of the Code is that the Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record -- He/she may even put questions to complainant and his/her witnesses when examined u/s 200 of the Code to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations -- Only upon being satisfied that there is sufficient ground for summoning the accused to stand the trial, summons should be issued.

(Para 21)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202, 204 – Summoning of accused -- Summoning order is to be passed when the complainant discloses the offence, and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence -- It should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course -- Summoning without appreciation of the legal provisions and their application to the facts may result in an innocent being summoned to stand the prosecution/trial -- While summoning an accused who resides outside the jurisdiction of court, in terms of the insertion made to Section 202 of the Code by Act No. 25 of 2005, it is obligatory upon the Magistrate to inquire into the case himself or direct investigation be made by a police officer or such other officer for finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(Para 21, 22)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 405, 420, 471, 120-B – Cheating -- Criminal breach of trust – Forgery -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order/ non-bailable warrants -- Non-bailable warrant was not issued in the name of any person but by designation against the Chief Manager JIPL – High Court, while dismissing the petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, failed to take due notice that criminal proceedings should not be allowed to be initiated when it is manifest that these proceedings have been initiated with ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance and with a view to spite the opposite side due to private or personal grudge -- Allegations in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence on record, when taken on the face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged -- Inherent powers of the court can and should be exercised in such circumstances -- When the allegations in the complaint are so absurd or inherently improbable, on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient wrong for proceeding against the accused, summons should not be issued – Proceedings and complaint quashed.

(Para 10, 23-25)

656. (J&K&L HC) 23-12-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of Court -- Court trying a complaint for offence u/s 138 of NI Act has discretion to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant -- Amount of compensation has not to exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque – Held, grant of interim compensation is a discretionary power and such order has to be based on reason and logic.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of Court -- No guidelines for grant of interim compensation have been laid down in Section 143-A of the NI Act -- it is a settled law that whenever a discretionary power is to be exercised by a Court, the same has to be exercised on well-recognized principles supported by reasons -- Court has to spell out the reasons for grant of interim compensation in favour of the complainant and it has also to justify in its order with reasons the quantum of interim compensation that is being awarded by him as the said quantum can vary from 1% to 20% of the cheque amount.

-- Some of the reasons for granting interim compensation may be that the accused absconds and avoids to appear before the Court despite service or there is overwhelming material on record to show that the accused is liable to pay an enforceable debt or that the accused is guilty of protracting the proceedings by avoiding to cross-examine the witnesses or producing his evidence.

(Para 10, 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of court -- Reasoned order – Requirement of -- Magistrate is empowered to grant interim compensation in favour of a complainant ranging from 1% to 20% of the cheque amount -- Trial Magistrate has granted interim compensation in the maximum range of 20% without assigning any reason – Order impugned is devoid of any reasons and no discussion is made in the impugned order as to why interim compensation is being awarded – Ld. Magistrate has not dealt with the aspect of the matter relating to denial of execution of the cheque by the accused in his statement recorded u/s 251 of the Cr. P. C – Order is not sustainable in law, quashed.

(Para 14, 15)

664. (SC) 15-12-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Cheating and forgery -- Forged sale deed – Quashing of Complaint – Mockery of investigation – Civil dispute pending -- When it is the specific case of the original complainant that at no point of time he had executed the disputed sale deed and his signature on the disputed sale deed has been forged, then the;  

-- first thing the police should have done was to obtain the specimen hand writings of the complainant so as to be compared with the disputed signature on the sale deed through a hand writing expert.

-- second thing which the investigating agency ought to have done is to investigate whether the sale consideration had been paid to the purchaser of the disputed plot or not and if the sale deed consideration had been paid, then in what manner.

-- If it is the case of the original complainant that a conspiracy was hatched, then in such circumstances why did the police drop the purchaser and the other individuals from the charge sheet stating that they are the bona fide purchasers of the plot in question for value without notice.

No convincing legal evidence on record to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences -- Since the purchaser of the plot in question and others have not been arrayed as accused, the entire theory of criminal conspiracy collapses like a pack of cards -- Civil Court seized of the question as regards the legality and validity of the disputed sale deed -- The matter is sub judice in the Civil Court -- It will not be proper to permit the criminal prosecution to proceed further on the allegation of the sale deed being forged – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Civil dispute – Criminal texture – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court -- A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture -- But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence -- In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court.

(Para 17)

665. (P&H HC) 14-12-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

682. (SC) 11-11-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

687. (J&K&L HC) 01-11-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cause of action – Demand Notice – Presumption of service -- Incorrect address -- Mere issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, same would arise only when the notice has been communicated to the drawer of the cheque and who fails to liquidate the cheque amount within the stipulated period -- Presumption of receipt of notice by drawer of the cheque can be raised only if the notice has been dispatched through registered post, to his correct address and such inference cannot be drawn if the notice has been sent on the incorrect address of the drawer of the cheque.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Demand Notice – Service of – Ground of -- Whether the notice of demand has been actually received by the petitioner/accused can be determined only during the trial of the case -- Argument that the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid ground is, therefore, without any merit.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Wrong mentioning of particulars of cheques and Memos -- Errors made by the ld. trial Magistrate in recording the particulars of the cheques and the memos cannot be termed as typographical in nature -- These errors are relating to essential aspects of the case and the same clearly reflects that the learned trial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has approached the case in a mechanical and negligent manner -- Impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate clearly reflects non-application of mind on his part and, as such, is not sustainable in law -- Impugned order, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to pass a fresh order of cognizance on the basis of the material available before him after hearing the complainant/ respondent.

(Para 13-16)

691. (P&H HC) 19-10-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

693. (SC) 17-10-2022

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

694. (SC) 12-10-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

696. (SC) 10-10-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

697. (SC) 30-09-2022

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

698. (SC) 30-09-2022

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- If there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu.

(Para 20)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order.

(Para 26)

C. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to.

(Para 28)

699. (P&H HC) 29-09-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Violation of District Magistrate order – Contempt of lawful authority of public servant -- Cognizance on police report – Cognizance on complaint by public authority -- Since the violation of the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, did tantamount to contempt of lawful authority of public servant(s), thereupon an offence constituted u/s 188 of the IPC, became aroused resultantly fall within the ambit of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. – Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, could not take cognizance, upon the police report, but could assume cognizance only on a complaint in writing being made before him, by the public servant concerned, and/or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 468, 473 – Cognizance on complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. – Limitation – Institution of a complaint on 15.05.2018, u/s 195 of the Cr.P.C., and, that too, after more than one year elapsing since the crime event taking place, at the crime site, did within the ambit of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., completely oust the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to either assume cognizance thereons, and/or to issue summons, upon the petitioners, to face a charge for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 188 of the IPC -- Though, the above period of limitation is condonable within the domain of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., but impugned summoning order does not reveal, that the prosecution adopted the above provision, resultantly the delay remained unexplained -- Petition allowed, proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)