A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- If there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu.

(Para 20)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order.

(Para 26)

C. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to.

(Para 28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Violation of District Magistrate order – Contempt of lawful authority of public servant -- Cognizance on police report – Cognizance on complaint by public authority -- Since the violation of the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, did tantamount to contempt of lawful authority of public servant(s), thereupon an offence constituted u/s 188 of the IPC, became aroused resultantly fall within the ambit of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. – Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, could not take cognizance, upon the police report, but could assume cognizance only on a complaint in writing being made before him, by the public servant concerned, and/or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 468, 473 – Cognizance on complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. – Limitation – Institution of a complaint on 15.05.2018, u/s 195 of the Cr.P.C., and, that too, after more than one year elapsing since the crime event taking place, at the crime site, did within the ambit of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., completely oust the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to either assume cognizance thereons, and/or to issue summons, upon the petitioners, to face a charge for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 188 of the IPC -- Though, the above period of limitation is condonable within the domain of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., but impugned summoning order does not reveal, that the prosecution adopted the above provision, resultantly the delay remained unexplained -- Petition allowed, proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145(1) – Affidavit of accused in evidence -- Permissibility of -- An offence u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 is in the nature of a civil wrong which has been accorded criminal overtones – Application preferred by the petitioner to exhibit evidence in the form of an affidavit allowed – Ld. Court below shall admit the affidavit of the petitioner, on the record, and the same shall be treated as the statement of the petitioner.

(Para 1, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 4, 302 -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Remission -- No prior intent but in the sudden fight multiple injuries by mercilessly beating on all the vital parts of the body and reigning blows, albeit with a wood piece, on head and on different parts of the head again and again -- With these kinds of blows, there would be no possibility of the deceased surviving – Maybe it was under the influence of liquor, but the nature of blows was such that the endeavour was to end the life of the deceased, the father -- It was certainly an act in a cruel and brutal manner taking advantage of the situation even if there was no pre-meditation – Sympathy for the son in such a scenario would be misplaced – No cause made out for application of Exception 4 of Section 300 -- State directed to consider the case of the appellant for remission, the moment he completes the mandatory sentence as per the policy for such consideration.

(Para 21-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 323, 392 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly – No concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased – No evidence what was uttered by the appellants – No evidence that the appellants instigated the other co-accused -- Appellants cannot be convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Initial possession of the goods may not be illegal but retaining those with the knowledge that it was stolen property, makes it culpable.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods.

(Para 23)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had the knowledge that articles seized from his possession are stolen goods -- Essential ingredient of mens Rea is clearly not established -- Where it is not established that the appellant dishonestly received stolen property with the knowledge and belief that the goods found in his possession were stolen, the conviction of the appellant u/s 411 IPC cannot be sustained – Held, appellant was erroneously convicted -- Acquittal of appellant ordered.

(Para 22-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Quashing of Charge-sheet – Compassionate appointment based upon forged degree – Role of Selection Committee -- Abuse of the process of law – Appellants are implicated, being the members of the Selection Committee, who without any verification on the assumption that the documents being genuine, recommended co-accused case for appointment – No prima facie evidence on record which implicate the appellants directly/indirectly connected to the commission of crime -- Not the case of the respondents that the appellants, in any manner, have facilitated co-accused either in creating or in fabricating the alleged forged degree for seeking compassionate appointment -- Criminal proceedings qua the appellants quashed and set aside.

(Para 5-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 323, 302, 34 – Conviction in murder case  -- Minimum sentence u/s 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life and fine -- High Court reduced the sentence to sentence already undergone (appox. seven years and ten months) – Punishment which is less than imprisonment for life shall be contrary to Section 302 IPC and is unsustainable – Judgment and order of High Court set aside – Judgment and order of Trial Court imposing the life imprisonment restored.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cause of action – Time barred complaint -- Delay of 7 days in complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- No petition filed for condoning the delay -- It is settled law that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date of which the cause of action arose -- Hence, summoning order and revisional order confirming the cognizance taken by Magistrate are erroneous and  contrary to law, set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 -- Two FIRs – Quashing of Second FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Second FIR nearly four years after the first FIR – Multiple FIR by the same person against the same accused for same set of facts and allegations is nothing but abuse of the process of law -- Act of the registration of such successive FIRs on the same set of facts and allegations at the instance of the same informant will not stand the scrutiny of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India – Appeal must succeed, FIR, charge sheet and the summoning order quashed and set aside.

(Para 11-13)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – POCSO case – Age of victim – Determination of – Stage of case -- Proof or determination of age of the victim in a POCSO case is foundational and for such an important issue, the same can be raised at any stage of the lifetime of the case, even before the appellate forum -- Impugned judgment and sentence set aside and quashed -- Matter remanded to the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO), to determine the age of the victim and to pass the final order upon appreciation of evidence under the changed circumstances.

(Para 15-21)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Age of the victim – Determination of -- Nothing on record to indicate the actual age of the victim either by medical or documentary evidence -- Special Court directed to take up the exercise of determination of the age of the victim in accordance with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and to allow the parties to produce relevant documents, examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard on the issue and thereafter to decide on the issue.

(Para 16-19)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Non-impleadment of co-borrower -- Once cheque was issued by accused, who was a co-borrower, non-impleadment of his wife/ co-borrower is of no consequence – Conviction upheld.

(Para 5, 9, 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Dishonour of cheque – Cheque by co-borrower -- Accused in his statement recorded u/s 313 CrPC, though claimed that he did not take any loan, but he himself put a suggestion to bank official that the loan account was joint in his name and his wife -- If it so, he being co-borrower was under liability to discharge liability for which he issued cheque and same was dishonoured -- Conviction upheld.

(Para 9, 11)

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Case under SC-ST Act -- Investigation by Sub Inspector instead of DSP -- Benefit of doubt – Conviction by Trial Court -- Acquittal in appeal -- Several infirmities and lacunae in the prosecution story :

-- Complainant, who got her statement recorded as PW2 and PW7 another eye-witness did not support the prosecution story at all and declared hostile.

-- Prosecution unable to establish on record that on which date, the incident had taken place – When prosecution is not sure of the date of incident, then the very happening of the incident becomes doubtful.

-- Investigating Officer is not to be below the rank of DSP -- Thus rule having been violated clearly caused prejudice to the accused making the credibility of the prosecution story doubtful.

-- Plausible motive for lodging of the FIR in view of the civil litigation pending between the accused and village Gram Panchayat and lodging of FIR could be a device to put pressure upon the accused in civil litigation and make them leave the village since as per case of the accused, theirs is the only Saini family in the village, which is otherwise inhabited by members of the HARIJAN community.

A reasonable doubt arises about truthfulness of the prosecution story and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and affirmatively – Benefit of doubt should have been given to the accused, which was wrongly denied to them by the trial Court – Impugned judgment and order of sentence cannot stand judicial scrutiny and are not sustainable, same are set aside.

(Para 1, 13-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Culpable homicide -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden of proof -- Fact that the appellant and the deceased were together the night when the deceased suffered the fatal injuries is established and proven -- Section 106 of the Evidence Act gets attracted.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 and 4 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Difference between Exception 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Exception 1 applies when due to grave and sudden provocation, the offender, deprived of the power of self-control, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation -- Exception 1 also applies when the offender, on account of loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident -- Exception 4 applies when an offence is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and the offender commits culpable homicide without having taken undue advantage of acting in a cruel and unusual manner -- Explanation to Exception 4 states that in such cases it is immaterial which party gives the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact -- Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable -- Law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC -- First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind -- Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given.

(Para 12)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1  -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Court should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation -- Exception 1 to Section 300 recognises that when a reasonable person is tormented continuously, he may, at one point of time, erupt and reach a break point whereby losing self-control, going astray and committing the offence -- However, sustained provocation principle does not do away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, which should be verifiable -- Further, this defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.

(Para 13)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantly torment, abuse and threaten the appellant -- On the night of the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcohol and had told the appellant to leave the house and if not, he would kill the appellant -- There was sudden loss of self-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followed by the final and immediate provocation -- There was temporary loss of self-control as the appellant had tried to kill himself by holding live electrical wires – Held, the acts of provocation on the basis of which the appellant caused the death of his brother were both sudden and grave and that there was loss of self-control -- Applying the provocation exception, Court converted the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the IPC -- Appellant has already suffered incarceration for over 10 years, sentence modified to the period already undergone with fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

(Para 16, 17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Goods were entrusted with the company, the Managing Director of the said company cannot be prosecuted without the company as an accused -- In the absence of any specific overt act on the part of the petitioner, no offence u/s 406 of IPC can be made out against the petitioner/ Managing Director – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Murder – Acquittal – Extra-judicial confession – Recovery from accused -- PW-7 turned hostile, trial court disbelief the alleged recovery of the incriminating material allegedly recovered at the instance of the respondent-accused – Court only leaves with the alleged extra-judicial confession – High Court held that extrajudicial confession was a weak piece of evidence and unless there was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the basis of extra-judicial confession could not be sustained – Held, view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be either impossible or perverse meriting interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Nature of -- Article 136 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary jurisdiction which Supreme Court exercises when it entertains an appeal by special leave and this jurisdiction, by its very nature, is exercisable only when this Court is satisfied that it is necessary to interfere in order to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice -- Terms and powers conferred under the said Article is not hedged by any technical hurdles -- Overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice -- Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then Supreme Court is not only empowered but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of justice.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Finding of fact – Interference on -- It is not the practice of Supreme Court to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court are correct or not -- It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court would interfere with such finding of fact.

(Para 16)

C. Evidence law – Criminal trial -- Testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omission.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Conviction for murder -- Facts and evidence squarely analyzed by both Trial Court as well the High Court that prosecution discharged its duties in proving the guilt of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt -- When there is ample ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence, mere non-recovery of weapon from the appellant would not materially affect the case of the prosecution -- If the testimony of an eye witness is otherwise found trustworthy and reliable, the same cannot be disbelieved and rejected merely because certain insignificant, normal or natural contradictions have appeared into his testimony -- Deceased has been attacked by the appellant in broad daylight and there is direct evidence available to prove the same and the motive behind the attack is also apparent considering there was previous enmity between the appellant and PW-1 – Held, Trial Court as well as the High Court were right in convicting the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC – No ground warranting interference with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 24-26)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – De facto complainant – Transfer of investigation to CBI -- If a citizen, who is a de facto complainant in a criminal case alleging commission of cognizable offence affecting violation of his legal or fundamental rights against high Government officials or influential persons, prays before a Court for a direction of investigation of the said alleged offence by the CBI, such prayer should not be granted on mere asking -- In an appropriate case when the Court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in a proper direction, and in order to do complete justice in the case and if high police officials are involved in the alleged crime, the Court may be justified in such circumstances to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 44-46)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – Chargesheet filed in criminal case – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Permissibility of -- After the filing of the charge sheet the court is empowered in an appropriate case to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- There are two conditions, on fulfillment of which, a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false affidavit or evidence in a proceeding before a court -- The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and, secondly, in the opinion of the court it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him – There should be something deliberate -- A statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise.

(Para 72-78)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191 – Perjury -- False evidence -- Affidavit -- An affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury.

(Para 79)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution – Court has to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely -- In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

(Para 79)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211 – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure -- Meaning of charge -- Essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence -- Complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person -- This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person – A false "charge" in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion.

(Para 91)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211, 120-B – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure – FIR/ First information reports lodged at the different police stations -- At the end of the investigation, the investigating agency reached to the conclusion that the police force had no role to play, rather Naxals were responsible for the massacre – Prima facie, it could be said that false information was given by the first informants to the police as regards the alleged massacre by the police force – Essential ingredient of an offence u/s 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge – “falsely charges” in this section, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial -- “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial -- The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding” -- Statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion – Court left it to the State /CBI to take appropriate steps in accordance with law -- It shall not be limited only to the offence under Section 211 of the IPC -- A case of criminal conspiracy or any other offence under the IPC may also surface – Court left it to the better discretion of the State /CBI to act accordingly keeping in mind the seriousness of the entire issue -- Having regard to the facts of the present case the bar of Section 195 CrPC would not apply if ultimately the State/ CBI decides to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

(Para 90-96)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Requirement of -- A dying declaration, oral or written, before it could be relied upon, must pass a test of reliability as it is a statement made in the absence of the accused and there is no opportunity to the accused even to put it through the fire of cross examination to test is genuinity or veracity -- Court has, therefore, to subject it to close scrutiny -- But once the court is satisfied that it is a truthful version as to the circumstances in which the death resulted and the persons causing injuries, the law does not expect that there should be corroboration before it can be relied upon -- However, if there are infirmities and the court does not find it safe to base any conclusion on it without some further evidence to support it, the question of corroboration arises.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire -- Dying declaration – Nature of -- Whole idea of accepting a statement in the name of dying declaration comes from a maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth -- It is believed that when a man is at the point of death and when every expectation of this world is gone, it hushes away every motive of lie.

(Para 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Murder – Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Conviction by trial Court, affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- On the day of occurrence, PW2 was working in his agricultural field -- His presence in his field could be said to be natural -- Not the case of the accused-appellant that PW2 had some axe to grind against him, including the other co-accused and, therefore, fabricated the entire story of an oral dying declaration -- Oral dying declaration of the deceased made before PW2 stands corroborated with the medical evidence on record -- Burn injuries were suffered by the deceased as the accused persons are said to have poured hot lali (raw material used for preparing liquor – Appellant arrested almost after about 8 days from the date of incident, he was absconding was not available at his house -- Appellant in his statement recorded u/s 313 of the CrPC has not explained where he was till the date of his arrest -- From the nature of the oral evidence, something went wrong while the deceased and the accused persons were inside the liquor factory -- It appears to be a case of sudden fight -- Held, no fundamental or basic infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court going to the root of the matter calling for any interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 25-29)

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 7, 16(1)(a)(i) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Adulterated milk –  Sample contains 6.30% of Milk Solids not fat against the minimum specified limit of 8.5% laid down for Mixed Milk -- Ex.PW-3/A is report by the Public Analyst to which Ex.PF is assigned – Despite the petitioner becoming intimated with respect to an adversarial opinion being pronounced qua the purchased from him adulterated food item, he did not choose, to controvert it, through his asking, within the statutorily stipulated period, rather qua it becoming re-analysed by the Central Food Laboratory concerned – Abandonment of a statutory right, does estop him, to rear the above contention before High Court, hence the report of the Public Analyst, obviously acquires the completest conclusivity – It is not open for the petitioner to argue, that the sample was not properly analysed – Conviction of petitioner, upheld.

(Para 4-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489-C – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Bulky recovery of counterfeit notes – Recovery of 65 counterfeit currency notes of Rs. 1000/- having same serial number – Trial Court convicted the appellant RI for 4 years, fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further rigorous imprisonment for one year -- Since the volume of the seizure is bulky, and, when no explanation has been made by the accused, about his naivety of his assuming possession of fake currency notes, thereupon, the verdict of conviction, as made against him, does not merit any interference, rather it requires to be upheld, and, sustained.

(Para 1-3, 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II, 34, 149 -- Murder case -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Case falls into the category of a culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under section 304 Part II IPC for the reasons: (i) There was no premeditation of mind to commit murder. (ii) All the accused were admittedly not armed when they stopped the vehicle of the deceased and his friends and compelled them to alight from the same.  (iii) It was during the verbal altercation at that stage that the three accused picked up the weapon of assault namely, sticks of casuarina tree and a brick from the road side. (iv) Single blow was given to the deceased by the accused nos.1 and 2. (v) The case set up for exhortation to kill the deceased has not been found to be proved. (vi) Both the groups consisted of young men. (vii) The High Court found that there was no unlawful assembly formed with a common object and accordingly had acquitted three other accused and also the present appellants from the charge of unlawful assembly under section 149 IPC. (viii) The appellants have been convicted with the aid of section 34 IPC.

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise post-conviction -- Nature of dispute is predominantly private -- Statement made in the joint petition preferred by the informant and the accused as well as the affidavit filed discloses that the compromised has been entered into voluntarily -- Nature of the offences is also not heinous – Conviction and sentence set aside and quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 475 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 328, 304-B, 498-A, 406 -- Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), Section 125 -- Criminal Courts and Court-martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978 -- Civil offence by Army personal -- Choice between criminal court and court-martial -- Stage of making option to try an accused by a Court martial and not by the criminal Court is after filing of the charge-sheet and before taking cognizance or framing of the charges -- Conduct of the Army authorities in not producing the accused petitioner before the Court/ investigating agency is nothing but a camouflage to save him from being tried as per the law -- Held, it is only when the Magistrate sets the process into motion, then only further action can be initiated u/s 475 Cr.P.C. -- Ld. Additional Sessions Judge has rightly directed handing over custody of the accused petitioner to the investigating officer so as to ensure completion of the investigation – No illegality or perversity in the findings -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 397, 401, 482 -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Interlocutory order – Maintainability of revision – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Order passed in exercise of power u/s 148 of the NI Act, is neither a final order nor an intermediate order -- Such powers are in the interlocutory in nature and Revision is not maintainable -- Petitioner would be at liberty to approach High Court in exercise of inherent power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(Para 15-18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of proceedings -- Partial payment of cheque amount – Effect of -- Cheque when presented for realization was returned for technical reason -- On the very same date, the accused transferred a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the account of the complainant through RTGS – No material placed that the cheque was re-presented towards recovery of balance amount – Ld. Magistrate has committed an error in taking cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Petition allowed, impugned proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence -- Burden of proof -- Burden rests with the accused who takes up the plea of self defence -- In the absence of proof, the Court will not be in a position to assume that there is any truth in the plea of self defence -- It would be for the accused to adduce positive evidence or extract necessary information from the witnesses produced by the prosecution and place any other material on record to establish his plea of private defence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence – Nature of -- It is a defensive right which is available only when the circumstances so justify it -- Circumstances are those that have been elaborated in the IPC -- Such a right would be available to the accused when he or his property is faced with a danger and there is little scope of the State machinery coming to his aid -- At the same time, the courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property should be in proportion to the injury apprehended -- Not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court – Court’s assessment would be guided by several circumstances including the position on the spot at the relevant point in time, the nature of apprehension in the mind of the accused, the kind of situation that the accused was seeking to ward off, the confusion created by the situation that had suddenly cropped up resulting the in knee jerk reaction of the accused, the nature of the overt acts of the party who had threatened the accused resulting in his resorting to immediate defensive action, etc.-- Underlying factor should be that such an act of private defence should have been done in good faith and without malice.

(Para 21)

C. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 46 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 300 Exception 2, 302, 304 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- CT H (PW-1) and appellant were on patrolling in the area, they had seen three persons crossing the international border from Bangladesh side -- On noticing the intruders, they had challenged them to stop at a distance of 50 meters -- But the intruders ran away in the direction of Bangladesh -- At this, PW-1 and the appellant had turned back and while continuing with their patrolling duty, they saw 6-7 persons rushing towards them from the side of Bangladesh, carrying weapons like ‘Dah’, ‘Bhala’ and ‘Lathi’ in their hands -- They managed to surround the appellant, who was closer to them -- Held, right of private self defence would be available to the appellant keeping in mind preponderance of probabilities that leans in favour of the appellant -- In a fact situation, he was left with no other option but to save his life by firing at them from his rifle and in the process two of the shots had pierced through the deceased, causing his death -- Appellant ought not to have been convicted for having committed the murder of the deceased -- Rather, the offence made out is of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 304 IPC – Appellant already suffered incarceration for a period of over eleven years, considered sufficient punishment for the offence -- Appellant accordingly set free for the period already undergone.

(Para 24-2)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 107 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Abetment to suicide – Regular bail -- Accused must instigate the deceased with an intention that the person should commit suicide -- It would be a matter of adjudication during trial as to whether the petitioner aided in the commission of the suicide in any manner or instigated the deceased to commit suicide -- As per the FIR, the petitioner and his father-in-law were reprimanding the deceased not to do obscene acts -- Petitioner is in custody since 18.03.2022 and the challan stands submitted -- None of the prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- No suicide note has been recovered and the petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents -- Trial of the case is not likely to conclude in the near future, but without commenting upon the merits of the case, the petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Summary trial – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Ld. trial court recorded the statement of the complainant and convicted the petitioner and imposed one year’s sentence and fine of Rs.14 lakhs – Additional evidence application for calling witness pending before appellate Court – Held, decision arrived at by the learned trial court held to be justified -- Trial u/s 138 of NI Act has to be a summary trial and if sufficient evidence  to convict and the preponderance of probability is met, then there is no reason for creating an elaborate trial -- No interference in the revision called for, dismissed.

(Para 3, 8, 9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Absence of accused – Recording of evidence -- If the personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with, evidence may be recorded in the presence of the pleader of the accused -- Except u/s 299, evidence cannot be recorded for any other reason in the absence of the accused.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Absence of accused – Ex-parte proceedings -- There is no provision in Cr.P.c. for keeping an accused ex parte similar to one found in CPC -- Held, trial cannot be held in the absence of an accused unless personal appearance is dispensed with for valid reasons.

(Para 12, 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Absence of accused – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Dispense with – Permissibility of -- There cannot be dispensation of examination of an accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C if incriminating evidence appears in the evidence of the witness -- Speedy trial does not take the meaning of jumping the stages in criminal trial.

(Para 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)