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604. (SC) 11-07-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

609. (SC) 14-06-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence -- Burden of proof -- Burden rests with the accused who takes up the plea of self defence -- In the absence of proof, the Court will not be in a position to assume that there is any truth in the plea of self defence -- It would be for the accused to adduce positive evidence or extract necessary information from the witnesses produced by the prosecution and place any other material on record to establish his plea of private defence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence – Nature of -- It is a defensive right which is available only when the circumstances so justify it -- Circumstances are those that have been elaborated in the IPC -- Such a right would be available to the accused when he or his property is faced with a danger and there is little scope of the State machinery coming to his aid -- At the same time, the courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property should be in proportion to the injury apprehended -- Not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court – Court’s assessment would be guided by several circumstances including the position on the spot at the relevant point in time, the nature of apprehension in the mind of the accused, the kind of situation that the accused was seeking to ward off, the confusion created by the situation that had suddenly cropped up resulting the in knee jerk reaction of the accused, the nature of the overt acts of the party who had threatened the accused resulting in his resorting to immediate defensive action, etc.-- Underlying factor should be that such an act of private defence should have been done in good faith and without malice.

(Para 21)

C. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 46 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 300 Exception 2, 302, 304 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- CT H (PW-1) and appellant were on patrolling in the area, they had seen three persons crossing the international border from Bangladesh side -- On noticing the intruders, they had challenged them to stop at a distance of 50 meters -- But the intruders ran away in the direction of Bangladesh -- At this, PW-1 and the appellant had turned back and while continuing with their patrolling duty, they saw 6-7 persons rushing towards them from the side of Bangladesh, carrying weapons like ‘Dah’, ‘Bhala’ and ‘Lathi’ in their hands -- They managed to surround the appellant, who was closer to them -- Held, right of private self defence would be available to the appellant keeping in mind preponderance of probabilities that leans in favour of the appellant -- In a fact situation, he was left with no other option but to save his life by firing at them from his rifle and in the process two of the shots had pierced through the deceased, causing his death -- Appellant ought not to have been convicted for having committed the murder of the deceased -- Rather, the offence made out is of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 304 IPC – Appellant already suffered incarceration for a period of over eleven years, considered sufficient punishment for the offence -- Appellant accordingly set free for the period already undergone.

(Para 24-2)

610. (SC) 02-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

614. (P&H HC) 18-05-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

615. (SC) 13-05-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

616. (SC) 13-05-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)

619. (SC) 04-05-2022

A. Evidence law -- Circumstantial evidence -- In order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent and coherent -- Inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused -- Circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder of children of A-1 -- Proximity between A-1 and A-2 – Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution has not even established the motive of the crime beyond reasonable doubt -- A1 and A2 talked on call, only proves that they shared a close relationship -- However, what these records do not prove, is that the murder was somehow in furtherance of this alleged proximity between A1 and A2 -- High Court’s inference in this regard was a mere dubious conclusion in absence of any cogent or concrete evidence -- High Court itself based its inferences on mere probability when it held that “It is quite probable that A2 would have through that the minor children had been a hurdle for his close proximity with A1” -- Prosecution has also failed to establish by evidence the supposed objective of these murders and what was it that was sought to be achieved by such an act -- Court observed that the act of A2 was inspired by the desire to “exclusively possess” A1 -- However, it seems improbable that A2 would murder the minor children of PW5 and A1 to increase or protect his intimacy to A1 rather than eliminate the husband of A1 himself -- Conviction cannot be upheld.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B – Call records – Certification of electronic evidence – Requirement of -- Electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law -- Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.

(Para 21)

628. (SC) 01-04-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

635. (J&K&L HC) 17-03-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Stop payment – Account closed -- Not only the cases of dishonour of cheques on account of insufficiency of funds or on account of exceeding of arrangement but the cases involving dishonour of cheques on account of “stop payment” and “account closed” have also been brought within the ambit of offence under the aforesaid provision.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Difference in signature -- Contention of the petitioner that in the case offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is not constituted because the cheque was dishonoured on account of difference in signatures and not for the reason of insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement, deserves to be rejected.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Even if cheque issued as a security, still then it cannot be stated that no offence is made out, once the cheque issued by him has been dishonoured by the banker.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Whether the petitioner had issued the cheque as a security and whether at the time when the cheque was presented for its payment, it was not for discharge of any debt or any other liability cannot be determined either by the trial Magistrate at the time of taking of cognizance or by High Court in these proceedings -- These are defences available to the accused/ petitioner, veracity whereof can be determined during the trial of the case -- Trial Magistrate directed to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.

(Para 20, 21)