A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Initial possession of the goods may not be illegal but retaining those with the knowledge that it was stolen property, makes it culpable.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods.

(Para 23)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had the knowledge that articles seized from his possession are stolen goods -- Essential ingredient of mens Rea is clearly not established -- Where it is not established that the appellant dishonestly received stolen property with the knowledge and belief that the goods found in his possession were stolen, the conviction of the appellant u/s 411 IPC cannot be sustained – Held, appellant was erroneously convicted -- Acquittal of appellant ordered.

(Para 22-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Quashing of Charge-sheet – Compassionate appointment based upon forged degree – Role of Selection Committee -- Abuse of the process of law – Appellants are implicated, being the members of the Selection Committee, who without any verification on the assumption that the documents being genuine, recommended co-accused case for appointment – No prima facie evidence on record which implicate the appellants directly/indirectly connected to the commission of crime -- Not the case of the respondents that the appellants, in any manner, have facilitated co-accused either in creating or in fabricating the alleged forged degree for seeking compassionate appointment -- Criminal proceedings qua the appellants quashed and set aside.

(Para 5-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 323, 302, 34 – Conviction in murder case  -- Minimum sentence u/s 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life and fine -- High Court reduced the sentence to sentence already undergone (appox. seven years and ten months) – Punishment which is less than imprisonment for life shall be contrary to Section 302 IPC and is unsustainable – Judgment and order of High Court set aside – Judgment and order of Trial Court imposing the life imprisonment restored.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cause of action – Time barred complaint -- Delay of 7 days in complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- No petition filed for condoning the delay -- It is settled law that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date of which the cause of action arose -- Hence, summoning order and revisional order confirming the cognizance taken by Magistrate are erroneous and  contrary to law, set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 -- Two FIRs – Quashing of Second FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Second FIR nearly four years after the first FIR – Multiple FIR by the same person against the same accused for same set of facts and allegations is nothing but abuse of the process of law -- Act of the registration of such successive FIRs on the same set of facts and allegations at the instance of the same informant will not stand the scrutiny of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India – Appeal must succeed, FIR, charge sheet and the summoning order quashed and set aside.

(Para 11-13)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – POCSO case – Age of victim – Determination of – Stage of case -- Proof or determination of age of the victim in a POCSO case is foundational and for such an important issue, the same can be raised at any stage of the lifetime of the case, even before the appellate forum -- Impugned judgment and sentence set aside and quashed -- Matter remanded to the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO), to determine the age of the victim and to pass the final order upon appreciation of evidence under the changed circumstances.

(Para 15-21)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Age of the victim – Determination of -- Nothing on record to indicate the actual age of the victim either by medical or documentary evidence -- Special Court directed to take up the exercise of determination of the age of the victim in accordance with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and to allow the parties to produce relevant documents, examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard on the issue and thereafter to decide on the issue.

(Para 16-19)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Non-impleadment of co-borrower -- Once cheque was issued by accused, who was a co-borrower, non-impleadment of his wife/ co-borrower is of no consequence – Conviction upheld.

(Para 5, 9, 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Dishonour of cheque – Cheque by co-borrower -- Accused in his statement recorded u/s 313 CrPC, though claimed that he did not take any loan, but he himself put a suggestion to bank official that the loan account was joint in his name and his wife -- If it so, he being co-borrower was under liability to discharge liability for which he issued cheque and same was dishonoured -- Conviction upheld.

(Para 9, 11)

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Case under SC-ST Act -- Investigation by Sub Inspector instead of DSP -- Benefit of doubt – Conviction by Trial Court -- Acquittal in appeal -- Several infirmities and lacunae in the prosecution story :

-- Complainant, who got her statement recorded as PW2 and PW7 another eye-witness did not support the prosecution story at all and declared hostile.

-- Prosecution unable to establish on record that on which date, the incident had taken place – When prosecution is not sure of the date of incident, then the very happening of the incident becomes doubtful.

-- Investigating Officer is not to be below the rank of DSP -- Thus rule having been violated clearly caused prejudice to the accused making the credibility of the prosecution story doubtful.

-- Plausible motive for lodging of the FIR in view of the civil litigation pending between the accused and village Gram Panchayat and lodging of FIR could be a device to put pressure upon the accused in civil litigation and make them leave the village since as per case of the accused, theirs is the only Saini family in the village, which is otherwise inhabited by members of the HARIJAN community.

A reasonable doubt arises about truthfulness of the prosecution story and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and affirmatively – Benefit of doubt should have been given to the accused, which was wrongly denied to them by the trial Court – Impugned judgment and order of sentence cannot stand judicial scrutiny and are not sustainable, same are set aside.

(Para 1, 13-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Culpable homicide -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden of proof -- Fact that the appellant and the deceased were together the night when the deceased suffered the fatal injuries is established and proven -- Section 106 of the Evidence Act gets attracted.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 and 4 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Difference between Exception 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Exception 1 applies when due to grave and sudden provocation, the offender, deprived of the power of self-control, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation -- Exception 1 also applies when the offender, on account of loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident -- Exception 4 applies when an offence is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and the offender commits culpable homicide without having taken undue advantage of acting in a cruel and unusual manner -- Explanation to Exception 4 states that in such cases it is immaterial which party gives the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact -- Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable -- Law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC -- First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind -- Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given.

(Para 12)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1  -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Court should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation -- Exception 1 to Section 300 recognises that when a reasonable person is tormented continuously, he may, at one point of time, erupt and reach a break point whereby losing self-control, going astray and committing the offence -- However, sustained provocation principle does not do away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, which should be verifiable -- Further, this defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.

(Para 13)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantly torment, abuse and threaten the appellant -- On the night of the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcohol and had told the appellant to leave the house and if not, he would kill the appellant -- There was sudden loss of self-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followed by the final and immediate provocation -- There was temporary loss of self-control as the appellant had tried to kill himself by holding live electrical wires – Held, the acts of provocation on the basis of which the appellant caused the death of his brother were both sudden and grave and that there was loss of self-control -- Applying the provocation exception, Court converted the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the IPC -- Appellant has already suffered incarceration for over 10 years, sentence modified to the period already undergone with fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

(Para 16, 17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Goods were entrusted with the company, the Managing Director of the said company cannot be prosecuted without the company as an accused -- In the absence of any specific overt act on the part of the petitioner, no offence u/s 406 of IPC can be made out against the petitioner/ Managing Director – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Murder – Acquittal – Extra-judicial confession – Recovery from accused -- PW-7 turned hostile, trial court disbelief the alleged recovery of the incriminating material allegedly recovered at the instance of the respondent-accused – Court only leaves with the alleged extra-judicial confession – High Court held that extrajudicial confession was a weak piece of evidence and unless there was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the basis of extra-judicial confession could not be sustained – Held, view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be either impossible or perverse meriting interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Nature of -- Article 136 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary jurisdiction which Supreme Court exercises when it entertains an appeal by special leave and this jurisdiction, by its very nature, is exercisable only when this Court is satisfied that it is necessary to interfere in order to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice -- Terms and powers conferred under the said Article is not hedged by any technical hurdles -- Overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice -- Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then Supreme Court is not only empowered but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of justice.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Finding of fact – Interference on -- It is not the practice of Supreme Court to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court are correct or not -- It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court would interfere with such finding of fact.

(Para 16)

C. Evidence law – Criminal trial -- Testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omission.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Conviction for murder -- Facts and evidence squarely analyzed by both Trial Court as well the High Court that prosecution discharged its duties in proving the guilt of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt -- When there is ample ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence, mere non-recovery of weapon from the appellant would not materially affect the case of the prosecution -- If the testimony of an eye witness is otherwise found trustworthy and reliable, the same cannot be disbelieved and rejected merely because certain insignificant, normal or natural contradictions have appeared into his testimony -- Deceased has been attacked by the appellant in broad daylight and there is direct evidence available to prove the same and the motive behind the attack is also apparent considering there was previous enmity between the appellant and PW-1 – Held, Trial Court as well as the High Court were right in convicting the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC – No ground warranting interference with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 24-26)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – De facto complainant – Transfer of investigation to CBI -- If a citizen, who is a de facto complainant in a criminal case alleging commission of cognizable offence affecting violation of his legal or fundamental rights against high Government officials or influential persons, prays before a Court for a direction of investigation of the said alleged offence by the CBI, such prayer should not be granted on mere asking -- In an appropriate case when the Court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in a proper direction, and in order to do complete justice in the case and if high police officials are involved in the alleged crime, the Court may be justified in such circumstances to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 44-46)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – Chargesheet filed in criminal case – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Permissibility of -- After the filing of the charge sheet the court is empowered in an appropriate case to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- There are two conditions, on fulfillment of which, a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false affidavit or evidence in a proceeding before a court -- The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and, secondly, in the opinion of the court it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him – There should be something deliberate -- A statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise.

(Para 72-78)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191 – Perjury -- False evidence -- Affidavit -- An affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury.

(Para 79)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution – Court has to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely -- In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

(Para 79)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211 – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure -- Meaning of charge -- Essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence -- Complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person -- This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person – A false "charge" in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion.

(Para 91)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211, 120-B – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure – FIR/ First information reports lodged at the different police stations -- At the end of the investigation, the investigating agency reached to the conclusion that the police force had no role to play, rather Naxals were responsible for the massacre – Prima facie, it could be said that false information was given by the first informants to the police as regards the alleged massacre by the police force – Essential ingredient of an offence u/s 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge – “falsely charges” in this section, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial -- “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial -- The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding” -- Statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion – Court left it to the State /CBI to take appropriate steps in accordance with law -- It shall not be limited only to the offence under Section 211 of the IPC -- A case of criminal conspiracy or any other offence under the IPC may also surface – Court left it to the better discretion of the State /CBI to act accordingly keeping in mind the seriousness of the entire issue -- Having regard to the facts of the present case the bar of Section 195 CrPC would not apply if ultimately the State/ CBI decides to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

(Para 90-96)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Requirement of -- A dying declaration, oral or written, before it could be relied upon, must pass a test of reliability as it is a statement made in the absence of the accused and there is no opportunity to the accused even to put it through the fire of cross examination to test is genuinity or veracity -- Court has, therefore, to subject it to close scrutiny -- But once the court is satisfied that it is a truthful version as to the circumstances in which the death resulted and the persons causing injuries, the law does not expect that there should be corroboration before it can be relied upon -- However, if there are infirmities and the court does not find it safe to base any conclusion on it without some further evidence to support it, the question of corroboration arises.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire -- Dying declaration – Nature of -- Whole idea of accepting a statement in the name of dying declaration comes from a maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth -- It is believed that when a man is at the point of death and when every expectation of this world is gone, it hushes away every motive of lie.

(Para 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Murder – Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Conviction by trial Court, affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- On the day of occurrence, PW2 was working in his agricultural field -- His presence in his field could be said to be natural -- Not the case of the accused-appellant that PW2 had some axe to grind against him, including the other co-accused and, therefore, fabricated the entire story of an oral dying declaration -- Oral dying declaration of the deceased made before PW2 stands corroborated with the medical evidence on record -- Burn injuries were suffered by the deceased as the accused persons are said to have poured hot lali (raw material used for preparing liquor – Appellant arrested almost after about 8 days from the date of incident, he was absconding was not available at his house -- Appellant in his statement recorded u/s 313 of the CrPC has not explained where he was till the date of his arrest -- From the nature of the oral evidence, something went wrong while the deceased and the accused persons were inside the liquor factory -- It appears to be a case of sudden fight -- Held, no fundamental or basic infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court going to the root of the matter calling for any interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 25-29)

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 7, 16(1)(a)(i) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Adulterated milk –  Sample contains 6.30% of Milk Solids not fat against the minimum specified limit of 8.5% laid down for Mixed Milk -- Ex.PW-3/A is report by the Public Analyst to which Ex.PF is assigned – Despite the petitioner becoming intimated with respect to an adversarial opinion being pronounced qua the purchased from him adulterated food item, he did not choose, to controvert it, through his asking, within the statutorily stipulated period, rather qua it becoming re-analysed by the Central Food Laboratory concerned – Abandonment of a statutory right, does estop him, to rear the above contention before High Court, hence the report of the Public Analyst, obviously acquires the completest conclusivity – It is not open for the petitioner to argue, that the sample was not properly analysed – Conviction of petitioner, upheld.

(Para 4-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489-C – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Bulky recovery of counterfeit notes – Recovery of 65 counterfeit currency notes of Rs. 1000/- having same serial number – Trial Court convicted the appellant RI for 4 years, fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further rigorous imprisonment for one year -- Since the volume of the seizure is bulky, and, when no explanation has been made by the accused, about his naivety of his assuming possession of fake currency notes, thereupon, the verdict of conviction, as made against him, does not merit any interference, rather it requires to be upheld, and, sustained.

(Para 1-3, 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II, 34, 149 -- Murder case -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Case falls into the category of a culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under section 304 Part II IPC for the reasons: (i) There was no premeditation of mind to commit murder. (ii) All the accused were admittedly not armed when they stopped the vehicle of the deceased and his friends and compelled them to alight from the same.  (iii) It was during the verbal altercation at that stage that the three accused picked up the weapon of assault namely, sticks of casuarina tree and a brick from the road side. (iv) Single blow was given to the deceased by the accused nos.1 and 2. (v) The case set up for exhortation to kill the deceased has not been found to be proved. (vi) Both the groups consisted of young men. (vii) The High Court found that there was no unlawful assembly formed with a common object and accordingly had acquitted three other accused and also the present appellants from the charge of unlawful assembly under section 149 IPC. (viii) The appellants have been convicted with the aid of section 34 IPC.

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise post-conviction -- Nature of dispute is predominantly private -- Statement made in the joint petition preferred by the informant and the accused as well as the affidavit filed discloses that the compromised has been entered into voluntarily -- Nature of the offences is also not heinous – Conviction and sentence set aside and quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 475 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 328, 304-B, 498-A, 406 -- Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), Section 125 -- Criminal Courts and Court-martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978 -- Civil offence by Army personal -- Choice between criminal court and court-martial -- Stage of making option to try an accused by a Court martial and not by the criminal Court is after filing of the charge-sheet and before taking cognizance or framing of the charges -- Conduct of the Army authorities in not producing the accused petitioner before the Court/ investigating agency is nothing but a camouflage to save him from being tried as per the law -- Held, it is only when the Magistrate sets the process into motion, then only further action can be initiated u/s 475 Cr.P.C. -- Ld. Additional Sessions Judge has rightly directed handing over custody of the accused petitioner to the investigating officer so as to ensure completion of the investigation – No illegality or perversity in the findings -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 397, 401, 482 -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Interlocutory order – Maintainability of revision – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Order passed in exercise of power u/s 148 of the NI Act, is neither a final order nor an intermediate order -- Such powers are in the interlocutory in nature and Revision is not maintainable -- Petitioner would be at liberty to approach High Court in exercise of inherent power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(Para 15-18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of proceedings -- Partial payment of cheque amount – Effect of -- Cheque when presented for realization was returned for technical reason -- On the very same date, the accused transferred a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the account of the complainant through RTGS – No material placed that the cheque was re-presented towards recovery of balance amount – Ld. Magistrate has committed an error in taking cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Petition allowed, impugned proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence -- Burden of proof -- Burden rests with the accused who takes up the plea of self defence -- In the absence of proof, the Court will not be in a position to assume that there is any truth in the plea of self defence -- It would be for the accused to adduce positive evidence or extract necessary information from the witnesses produced by the prosecution and place any other material on record to establish his plea of private defence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence – Nature of -- It is a defensive right which is available only when the circumstances so justify it -- Circumstances are those that have been elaborated in the IPC -- Such a right would be available to the accused when he or his property is faced with a danger and there is little scope of the State machinery coming to his aid -- At the same time, the courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property should be in proportion to the injury apprehended -- Not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court – Court’s assessment would be guided by several circumstances including the position on the spot at the relevant point in time, the nature of apprehension in the mind of the accused, the kind of situation that the accused was seeking to ward off, the confusion created by the situation that had suddenly cropped up resulting the in knee jerk reaction of the accused, the nature of the overt acts of the party who had threatened the accused resulting in his resorting to immediate defensive action, etc.-- Underlying factor should be that such an act of private defence should have been done in good faith and without malice.

(Para 21)

C. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 46 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 300 Exception 2, 302, 304 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- CT H (PW-1) and appellant were on patrolling in the area, they had seen three persons crossing the international border from Bangladesh side -- On noticing the intruders, they had challenged them to stop at a distance of 50 meters -- But the intruders ran away in the direction of Bangladesh -- At this, PW-1 and the appellant had turned back and while continuing with their patrolling duty, they saw 6-7 persons rushing towards them from the side of Bangladesh, carrying weapons like ‘Dah’, ‘Bhala’ and ‘Lathi’ in their hands -- They managed to surround the appellant, who was closer to them -- Held, right of private self defence would be available to the appellant keeping in mind preponderance of probabilities that leans in favour of the appellant -- In a fact situation, he was left with no other option but to save his life by firing at them from his rifle and in the process two of the shots had pierced through the deceased, causing his death -- Appellant ought not to have been convicted for having committed the murder of the deceased -- Rather, the offence made out is of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 304 IPC – Appellant already suffered incarceration for a period of over eleven years, considered sufficient punishment for the offence -- Appellant accordingly set free for the period already undergone.

(Para 24-2)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 107 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Abetment to suicide – Regular bail -- Accused must instigate the deceased with an intention that the person should commit suicide -- It would be a matter of adjudication during trial as to whether the petitioner aided in the commission of the suicide in any manner or instigated the deceased to commit suicide -- As per the FIR, the petitioner and his father-in-law were reprimanding the deceased not to do obscene acts -- Petitioner is in custody since 18.03.2022 and the challan stands submitted -- None of the prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- No suicide note has been recovered and the petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents -- Trial of the case is not likely to conclude in the near future, but without commenting upon the merits of the case, the petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Summary trial – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Ld. trial court recorded the statement of the complainant and convicted the petitioner and imposed one year’s sentence and fine of Rs.14 lakhs – Additional evidence application for calling witness pending before appellate Court – Held, decision arrived at by the learned trial court held to be justified -- Trial u/s 138 of NI Act has to be a summary trial and if sufficient evidence  to convict and the preponderance of probability is met, then there is no reason for creating an elaborate trial -- No interference in the revision called for, dismissed.

(Para 3, 8, 9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Absence of accused – Recording of evidence -- If the personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with, evidence may be recorded in the presence of the pleader of the accused -- Except u/s 299, evidence cannot be recorded for any other reason in the absence of the accused.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Absence of accused – Ex-parte proceedings -- There is no provision in Cr.P.c. for keeping an accused ex parte similar to one found in CPC -- Held, trial cannot be held in the absence of an accused unless personal appearance is dispensed with for valid reasons.

(Para 12, 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Absence of accused – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Dispense with – Permissibility of -- There cannot be dispensation of examination of an accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C if incriminating evidence appears in the evidence of the witness -- Speedy trial does not take the meaning of jumping the stages in criminal trial.

(Para 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13 (1)(a)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cheating and corruption case – Regular bail -- Petitioners are in custody since 16.12.2021 -- Considering that the investigation is complete, challan stands presented, petitioners volunteer to give their specimen signatures, conclusion of trial is likely to take time, the petitioners are granted bail.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A -- Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (4 of 1914), Schedule I, Clause 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Interim compensation – Recovery as public demand -- Whether an order for payment of interim compensation under the Negotiable Instrument Act can be enforceable under the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 as a public demand? -- Interim compensation so ordered u/s 143A of the NI Act is recoverable as a fine u/s 421 of Cr.P.C. which then, clearly falls under the definition of ‘public demand’ – Held, interim compensation ordered under the NI Act falls within the ambit of Schedule I of the Recovery Act, realization thereunder cannot be stopped.

(Para 17-20)

A. Evidence law -- Circumstantial evidence -- In order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent and coherent -- Inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused -- Circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder of children of A-1 -- Proximity between A-1 and A-2 – Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution has not even established the motive of the crime beyond reasonable doubt -- A1 and A2 talked on call, only proves that they shared a close relationship -- However, what these records do not prove, is that the murder was somehow in furtherance of this alleged proximity between A1 and A2 -- High Court’s inference in this regard was a mere dubious conclusion in absence of any cogent or concrete evidence -- High Court itself based its inferences on mere probability when it held that “It is quite probable that A2 would have through that the minor children had been a hurdle for his close proximity with A1” -- Prosecution has also failed to establish by evidence the supposed objective of these murders and what was it that was sought to be achieved by such an act -- Court observed that the act of A2 was inspired by the desire to “exclusively possess” A1 -- However, it seems improbable that A2 would murder the minor children of PW5 and A1 to increase or protect his intimacy to A1 rather than eliminate the husband of A1 himself -- Conviction cannot be upheld.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B – Call records – Certification of electronic evidence – Requirement of -- Electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law -- Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.

(Para 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 342, 395, 397, 307, 34 and 120-B – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 25(1) (a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Robbery – Attempt to murder – Regular bail – Involvement in other case – Held, case for bail has to be considered on its own merits -- Even though the antecedents of an accused may be one amongst the relevant considerations while adjudicating a petition on merits for grant of bail, however, a mere involvement of the petitioner in other cases cannot be the sole basis to keep him confined in perpetuity – FIR does not attribute any overt act on the part of the petitioner in the commission of the offence -- Involvement of the petitioner is only on the basis of a disclosure made by the co-accused -- Role attributed to the person and the evidence collected during the investigation by the Investigating Agency would invariably remain a prime consideration with the Court while considering the application of bail along with stage of the prosecution case and the period of custody – Bail granted.

(Para 3-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Probation – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Matter pertains to an incident that occurred in the year 2000 and the present appeal has been pending since 2012 – No material on record that the accused-petitioner has any criminal antecedents – Held, the accused-petitioner are entitled to the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Petitioner ordered to be released on probation, u/s 4 of the Act.

(Para 12-14)

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 7, 10 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 482 – FIR under Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act -- Quashing of FIR – Maximum sentence is three years -- Limitation of three years to take cognizance -- Sale deed was executed on 28.04.2011 -- Communication dated 23.02.2012 was sent by the DTP, Kurukshetra to Superintendent of Police on 28.09.2016 leading to the registration of the FIR on 29.09.2016 -- Respondent no.2 was aware of the alleged offence, if any, on 01.12.2011/13.12.2011 and, therefore, the court could have taken cognizance within three years of that date i.e. 01.12.2014/13.12.2014 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.PC was submitted on 17.08.2017 -- Thus, the court could clearly not have taken cognizance beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.PC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 10 of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 12-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce case -- Death of accused – Interim compensation – Final compensation – Recovery from Estate – Permissibility of -- In case of death of an accused the compensation awarded u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, but an interim compensation awarded u/s 143A of the said Act cannot be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, who died before the conclusion of the trial.

(Para 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 201, 302, 365 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder -- Abetment to suicide – Criminal conspiracy -- Regular bail -- Co-accused enlarged on Bail -- Submits that co-accused was named in the FIR and there is direct allegation against him, whereas name of the appellant surfaced during the investigation in the disclosure statement of co-accused, therefore, his case is on better footings – Challan was presented u/s 306 IPC, after deleting Sections 302 & 201 IPC -- Appellant is in custody for the last 01 year, 05 months and 24 days; he is not involved in any other case and the case is still at the stage of framing of charge, therefore, it will take some time in conclusion of the trial – Without commenting anything on merits of the case and considering the facts and circumstances of the case appeal allowed, appellant ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 4-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 384, 387, 506 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27,  54, 59 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 439 – Extortion matter -- Habitual offender – Regular bail -- All relevant recoveries effected at the instance of the bail applicant/ petitioner -- Report u/s 173 of the Cr.P.C. filed -- No further cooperation of the bail applicant / petitioner required -- Applicant suffering judicial incarceration since 21.12.2021 – Petitioner admitted to bail -- Stringent conditions upon imposed.

(Para 3-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail -- Involvement in other case – A mere involvement of the accused in other cases cannot be the sole basis for rejecting the petition for bail.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 307, 452, 325, 324, 323, 427, 148, 149 and 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25 and 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder case – Regular bail -- Petitioner is not attributed any role in the incident -- It is also not denied that there were two incidents -- There is no rebuttal of the submission that in the statement u/s 161 CrPC, the complainant has retracted his allegations against the petitioner and has specifically stated that the petitioner was not involved in the incident -- Besides, the petitioner has already undergone an actual custody of more than 1 year and 08 months -- Only one witness has been examined so far out of 55 witnesses to be examined by the prosecution -- Conclusion of the trial is likely to take long time -- No further interest of justice would be served by continued incarceration of the petitioner – Court deemed it appropriate to enlarge the petitioner on bail.

(Para 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 254, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Discharge application – Dismissal of -- Particulars of offence were stated to the accused/petitioners u/s 251 of CrPC, which was denied by him and it was stated that he had given the blank cheque to the respondent firm, which has been misused -- Complaint case u/s 138 of the NI Act is a summons trial case and the ld. Trial Court has rightly held that prima facie application cannot be decided without going into merits of the case in absence of any evidence -- This finding cannot be interfered with by High Court.

(Para 6-8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 120-B, 201 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Murder case -- Regular bail -- No injury attributed with the weapon qua to the petitioner -- Petitioner is in custody since 01.09.2020 -- Court deemed it appropriate to allow the benefit of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 1-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail – Dying declaration -- Holographic made dying declaration by the deceased did not name the petitioners to abet him to commit suicide -- Any subsequent statement, made by the deceased to any witness, becomes an oral dying declaration, and, its effect becomes completely subsumed besides becomes eclipsed within the realms of the scribed dying declaration -- Court does not deem it fit, and, appropriate to order for the custodial interrogation of the petitioners-bail applicants, as, thereupons their personal liberty would become unnecessarily fettered, and, curtailed -- Bail applicants-petitioners are admitted to anticipatory bail.

(Para 3, 4)