Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376B, 376(2)(N), 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Rape – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner is a doctor in a government hospital where the complainant was allegedly working as a nurse -- FIR indicates that parties were in a physical relationship since May 2016 -- FIR was lodged in October 2017 -- In the facts and circumstances of the case, custodial interrogation is not required – Direction given in the event of the arrest of the petitioner, he shall be released on bail.

(Para 1-6)

Public Gambling Act, 1867 (3 of 1867), Section 5, 13-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR / Charge under Gambling Act -- Non-compliance of Section 5 of the Gambling Act and section 155(2) Cr.P.C -- Even no independent witness joined – Proceedings initiated against the petitioner are untenable, especially when the raid leading to lodging of FIR itself was from the threshold marred by procedural irregularity -- Same is a ground sufficient to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of law and secure of ends of justice.

(Para 18-20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Suicide note show that the deceased was under extreme stress and tension on account of matrimonial discord and on account of pendency of some litigation pertaining to grant of maintenance -- It will certainly be debatable as to whether the aforesaid conduct as mentioned in the suicide note would qualify to be termed as an abetment to commit suicide -- Petitioner has joined investigation and she is not required for any custodial interrogation -- Petitioner not involved in any other case -- Interim directions made absolute.

(Para 5-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 454 – Theft in dwelling house – Lurking house trespass -- Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- State does not dispute the fact that offence punishable u/s 454 IPC is not stand alone offence and after acquittal of the petitioner of offence punishable under Section 380 IPC, 454 IPC cannot be maintained – Conviction u/s 454 IPC set aside.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 411 – Theft in dwelling house – Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- Recovery from the co-accused -- Petitioner was never charged for offence punishable u/s 411 IPC -- There is no order on record to show that the Trial Court ever exercised power u/s 216 Cr.P.C. to alter the charge -- Thus, the Courts below erred in holding the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 411 IPC in the absence of charge -- Conviction u/s 411 IPC set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279, 427 – Death  by rash and negligent driving -- Conviction u/s 304-A, 279, 427 IPC – Agony of protracted trial -- Reduction of sentence – Petitioner has undergone the sentence of 6 months and 12 days out of the total sentence of 1 year -- Petitioner facing the agony of protracted trial for the last 09 years approximately, ends of justice would be suitably met, if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone – Sentence reduced already undergone – Apart from fine, petitioner directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased.

(Para 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Quashing of FIR -- De-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime -- They are neither concerned with the sale deed nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question – It appears that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute – Held, High Court ought to have exercised its power u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants – Appeals allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.

(Para 18-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- PW-3-daughter in her cross examination stated that her mother have said something to her father on which the father started beating her mother -- Immediately her father had dressed up and moved her mother to the Hospital where the other family members have gone -- These aspects would indicate that there was no pre-mediation to cause the death and the incident had occurred at the spur of the moment – If these aspects are kept in view as mitigating circumstances, conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be justified -- Hence, appellant held guilty of the offence u/s 304 Part II of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more 12 years of sentence, period undergone will be sufficient punishment -- Sentence modified, the appellant ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 482 – False complaint – Quashing of Kalandra -- Kalandra/Complaint u/s 182 IPC – Cognizance of -- Court of competent jurisdiction can take cognizance of an offence punishable u/s 182 IPC only on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or his superior officer -- Mere direction by the competent authority to present Kalandara on its behalf by the SHO Police Station will not comply with the provisions of law -- Complaint was lodged by the petitioner with the Superintendent of Police but Kalandara has been presented by the SHO Police Station (i.e. by the public servant who is administratively subordinate to the Superintendent of Police), the same cannot be held to be valid and legal in terms of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. -- Court cannot take cognizance of offence punishable u/s 182 IPC against the petitioner -- Kalandara and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 307, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Appellant and co-accused acquitted u/s 323, 307, 34 IPC, however convicted u/s 25 of Arms Act -- In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumersinbh Umedsinh Rajput @ Sumersinh’s case 2008 (1) Crimes 57, charge u/s 25 of Arms Act is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence convicting the appellant u/s 25 of Arms Act  set aside and the appellant acquitted of the charge u/s 25 of Arms Act.

(Para 3, 11, 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding after conviction -- Parties have settled the dispute and complainant had accepted the sum towards the full and final settlement of the cheque, on the satisfaction of the complainant -- Sentence awarded to the petitioner for offence u/s 138 of NI Act is liable to be set aside -- Petitioner directed to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- -- Conviction and sentence of imprisonment set aside on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5, 6)

Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 3(1)(d) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 427,120-B, 34 – Murder – Life imprisonment – Ailment of mother -- Parole – Petitioner availed parole/ furlough on different occasions, without any default -- Petitioner is having old mother aged about 86 years and there is no major male member to look after her and she is suffering from heart ailment which requires surgery – Nothing on record to show that the release of petitioner on parole is likely to endanger the security of the State and maintenance of public order -- Petitioner ordered to be released on parole for a period of four weeks.

(Para 4-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Illegal activity -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal – Ld. Trial Court dismissed the complaint as Rs.3 lakhs paid to respondent/accused for getting job in the Department of Railway which is a Government Department as it was for illegal activities and it cannot be called as legally enforceable liability -- No infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has acquitted the respondent -- Leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail to husband -- Marriage in May, 2014, wife committed suicide on 4th March, 2021 – In FIR allegations pertaining to harassment caused to the deceased on account of demand of dowry -- Material witnesses examined -- Two minor children are with the grandparents -- Allegations regarding demand of dowry are general in nature -- In the cross-examination, complainant deposed that he did not remember any specific date of harassment caused or demand of dowry made – No cash and vehicle was given in the marriage -- Out of 15 prosecution witnesses, 03 witnesses examined -- Nothing on record to show that the petitioner has any criminal antecedents -- Court cannot ignore the fact that there are two minor children whose future is also at stake – Bail allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 356, 379, 411, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, voluntary, without any undue influence or pressure – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners only.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa) – Dishonour of cheque -- Complainant – Victim -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is not a victim as defined U/s 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Acquittal – Appeal -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of NI Act is not entitled to file an appeal against acquittal according to the provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C rather he may prefer an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court invoking the provision of Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cause of action – Demand Notice – Presumption of service -- Incorrect address -- Mere issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, same would arise only when the notice has been communicated to the drawer of the cheque and who fails to liquidate the cheque amount within the stipulated period -- Presumption of receipt of notice by drawer of the cheque can be raised only if the notice has been dispatched through registered post, to his correct address and such inference cannot be drawn if the notice has been sent on the incorrect address of the drawer of the cheque.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Demand Notice – Service of – Ground of -- Whether the notice of demand has been actually received by the petitioner/accused can be determined only during the trial of the case -- Argument that the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid ground is, therefore, without any merit.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Wrong mentioning of particulars of cheques and Memos -- Errors made by the ld. trial Magistrate in recording the particulars of the cheques and the memos cannot be termed as typographical in nature -- These errors are relating to essential aspects of the case and the same clearly reflects that the learned trial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has approached the case in a mechanical and negligent manner -- Impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate clearly reflects non-application of mind on his part and, as such, is not sustainable in law -- Impugned order, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to pass a fresh order of cognizance on the basis of the material available before him after hearing the complainant/ respondent.

(Para 13-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 376, 377, 406, 498-A, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 376 IPC/ Rape – Section 377 IPC/ Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR  -- Court is conscious of the fact that Sections 376/ 377 I.P.C. are heinous offences and non-compoundable -- But in the peculiar facts and circumstances and in the larger interest of both the parties and to secure the ends of justice, Court deemed it appropriate to use its discretion u/s 482 Cr.P.C in favour of the parties – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 392, 397, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Robbery – Regular bail -- Without commenting anything as regards merits of the case, but while noticing that the petitioner behind bars since the last about 7 months and otherwise has a clean record and that none of the cited 9 PWs has been examined till date, further detention of the petitioner would not be justified – Petition accepted, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 379-B, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR – Compromise found to be genuine, without any pressure or undue influence – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise, ordered to be quashed.

(Para 4, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A, 34, 411 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Snatching of mobile – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody from 15.07.2022, stated to be not involved in any other case and is not a habitual offender -- Challan presented, petitioner was nominated on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the co-accused -- Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 2, 6)

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- If there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu.

(Para 20)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order.

(Para 26)

C. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to.

(Para 28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Violation of District Magistrate order – Contempt of lawful authority of public servant -- Cognizance on police report – Cognizance on complaint by public authority -- Since the violation of the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, did tantamount to contempt of lawful authority of public servant(s), thereupon an offence constituted u/s 188 of the IPC, became aroused resultantly fall within the ambit of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. – Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, could not take cognizance, upon the police report, but could assume cognizance only on a complaint in writing being made before him, by the public servant concerned, and/or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 468, 473 – Cognizance on complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. – Limitation – Institution of a complaint on 15.05.2018, u/s 195 of the Cr.P.C., and, that too, after more than one year elapsing since the crime event taking place, at the crime site, did within the ambit of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., completely oust the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to either assume cognizance thereons, and/or to issue summons, upon the petitioners, to face a charge for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 188 of the IPC -- Though, the above period of limitation is condonable within the domain of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., but impugned summoning order does not reveal, that the prosecution adopted the above provision, resultantly the delay remained unexplained -- Petition allowed, proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145(1) – Affidavit of accused in evidence -- Permissibility of -- An offence u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 is in the nature of a civil wrong which has been accorded criminal overtones – Application preferred by the petitioner to exhibit evidence in the form of an affidavit allowed – Ld. Court below shall admit the affidavit of the petitioner, on the record, and the same shall be treated as the statement of the petitioner.

(Para 1, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 4, 302 -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Remission -- No prior intent but in the sudden fight multiple injuries by mercilessly beating on all the vital parts of the body and reigning blows, albeit with a wood piece, on head and on different parts of the head again and again -- With these kinds of blows, there would be no possibility of the deceased surviving – Maybe it was under the influence of liquor, but the nature of blows was such that the endeavour was to end the life of the deceased, the father -- It was certainly an act in a cruel and brutal manner taking advantage of the situation even if there was no pre-meditation – Sympathy for the son in such a scenario would be misplaced – No cause made out for application of Exception 4 of Section 300 -- State directed to consider the case of the appellant for remission, the moment he completes the mandatory sentence as per the policy for such consideration.

(Para 21-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 323, 392 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly – No concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased – No evidence what was uttered by the appellants – No evidence that the appellants instigated the other co-accused -- Appellants cannot be convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Initial possession of the goods may not be illegal but retaining those with the knowledge that it was stolen property, makes it culpable.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods.

(Para 23)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had the knowledge that articles seized from his possession are stolen goods -- Essential ingredient of mens Rea is clearly not established -- Where it is not established that the appellant dishonestly received stolen property with the knowledge and belief that the goods found in his possession were stolen, the conviction of the appellant u/s 411 IPC cannot be sustained – Held, appellant was erroneously convicted -- Acquittal of appellant ordered.

(Para 22-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Quashing of Charge-sheet – Compassionate appointment based upon forged degree – Role of Selection Committee -- Abuse of the process of law – Appellants are implicated, being the members of the Selection Committee, who without any verification on the assumption that the documents being genuine, recommended co-accused case for appointment – No prima facie evidence on record which implicate the appellants directly/indirectly connected to the commission of crime -- Not the case of the respondents that the appellants, in any manner, have facilitated co-accused either in creating or in fabricating the alleged forged degree for seeking compassionate appointment -- Criminal proceedings qua the appellants quashed and set aside.

(Para 5-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 323, 302, 34 – Conviction in murder case  -- Minimum sentence u/s 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life and fine -- High Court reduced the sentence to sentence already undergone (appox. seven years and ten months) – Punishment which is less than imprisonment for life shall be contrary to Section 302 IPC and is unsustainable – Judgment and order of High Court set aside – Judgment and order of Trial Court imposing the life imprisonment restored.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cause of action – Time barred complaint -- Delay of 7 days in complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- No petition filed for condoning the delay -- It is settled law that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date of which the cause of action arose -- Hence, summoning order and revisional order confirming the cognizance taken by Magistrate are erroneous and  contrary to law, set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 -- Two FIRs – Quashing of Second FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Second FIR nearly four years after the first FIR – Multiple FIR by the same person against the same accused for same set of facts and allegations is nothing but abuse of the process of law -- Act of the registration of such successive FIRs on the same set of facts and allegations at the instance of the same informant will not stand the scrutiny of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India – Appeal must succeed, FIR, charge sheet and the summoning order quashed and set aside.

(Para 11-13)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – POCSO case – Age of victim – Determination of – Stage of case -- Proof or determination of age of the victim in a POCSO case is foundational and for such an important issue, the same can be raised at any stage of the lifetime of the case, even before the appellate forum -- Impugned judgment and sentence set aside and quashed -- Matter remanded to the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO), to determine the age of the victim and to pass the final order upon appreciation of evidence under the changed circumstances.

(Para 15-21)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Age of the victim – Determination of -- Nothing on record to indicate the actual age of the victim either by medical or documentary evidence -- Special Court directed to take up the exercise of determination of the age of the victim in accordance with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and to allow the parties to produce relevant documents, examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard on the issue and thereafter to decide on the issue.

(Para 16-19)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Non-impleadment of co-borrower -- Once cheque was issued by accused, who was a co-borrower, non-impleadment of his wife/ co-borrower is of no consequence – Conviction upheld.

(Para 5, 9, 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Dishonour of cheque – Cheque by co-borrower -- Accused in his statement recorded u/s 313 CrPC, though claimed that he did not take any loan, but he himself put a suggestion to bank official that the loan account was joint in his name and his wife -- If it so, he being co-borrower was under liability to discharge liability for which he issued cheque and same was dishonoured -- Conviction upheld.

(Para 9, 11)

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Case under SC-ST Act -- Investigation by Sub Inspector instead of DSP -- Benefit of doubt – Conviction by Trial Court -- Acquittal in appeal -- Several infirmities and lacunae in the prosecution story :

-- Complainant, who got her statement recorded as PW2 and PW7 another eye-witness did not support the prosecution story at all and declared hostile.

-- Prosecution unable to establish on record that on which date, the incident had taken place – When prosecution is not sure of the date of incident, then the very happening of the incident becomes doubtful.

-- Investigating Officer is not to be below the rank of DSP -- Thus rule having been violated clearly caused prejudice to the accused making the credibility of the prosecution story doubtful.

-- Plausible motive for lodging of the FIR in view of the civil litigation pending between the accused and village Gram Panchayat and lodging of FIR could be a device to put pressure upon the accused in civil litigation and make them leave the village since as per case of the accused, theirs is the only Saini family in the village, which is otherwise inhabited by members of the HARIJAN community.

A reasonable doubt arises about truthfulness of the prosecution story and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and affirmatively – Benefit of doubt should have been given to the accused, which was wrongly denied to them by the trial Court – Impugned judgment and order of sentence cannot stand judicial scrutiny and are not sustainable, same are set aside.

(Para 1, 13-15)