A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 195(1) -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – No complaint in writing by Public Servant as required u/s 195(1) Cr.P.C -- Registration of FIR and commencement of proceedings qua petitioner is impermissible -- FIR quashed.

(Para 9, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 468, 469 -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – Limitation -- Period of limitation would be one year from the date of commission of offence with respect to Section 188 IPC -- SDJM, had taken the cognizance, beyond the period of limitation as detailed in Sections 468 and 469 Cr.P.C. -- Petition allowed, FIR u/s 188 IPC, and subsequent proceedings emanating from it quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 413, 473 -- Punjab Habitual Offenders (Control and Reform) Act (XII of 1952), Section 2(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 – Framing of charge u/s 413 IPC – Challenge to -- Habitually dealing in stolen property – Petitioners have not been convicted in any case -- Apart from the present case two FIR u/s 379 IPC have been registered against petitioners and the same are pending trial – Nothing on record to prove that the petitioners have been convicted in connection with their dealing in stolen property – Held, no prima facie case u/s 413 IPC is made out against the petitioners -- Resultantly, the impugned order set aside to the aforesaid extent only.

(Para 7-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489A, 489C, 489-D, 201 – Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017 (2 of 2017), Section 7 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Demonetized counterfeit currency -- Regular bail -- Recovery worth Rs.8,42,60,000/-, it is a debatable issue as to whether possession of coloured photocopies of demonetized currency notes attracts the provisions of Section 489-A, 489-C and 489-D IPC – Petitioner in custody since 11.04.2022, police has presented the challan and charges are yet to be framed -- It will take considerable time for the trial to conclude even after the framing of charges -- Petitioner is having no criminal history -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 1-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 201, 467, 468, 471 -- Cheating and forgery – Recovery of amount – Regular bail -- In an offence u/s 420, 201, 467, 468, 471 IPC, the Court is certainly not going to recover the alleged amount as a condition to grant bail -- Reasonable conditions can be incorporated in exercise of judicial discretion and purpose of putting such conditions is to secure the presence of accused at the time of trial/hearing of the case before the trial Court -- Petitioner is in custody since 29.06.2022, report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. has been submitted, the offences are triable by Magistrate and further detention of the petitioner behind the bars would not serve any useful purpose -- Petition allowed and the petitioner directed to be released on regular bail – Conditions imposed.

(Para 11)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 15(1) -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 6(3) – Conviction for murder of wife – Husband’s right on dowry articles -- Wife died within 7 years of her marriage -- Record reveals that she died unnatural death other than in normal circumstances -- Thus, the case of the appellant squarely falls within Clause 3 of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, so as to maintain the custody of dowry articles with the complainant -- Provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, cannot be overlooked by invoking the provisions of Hindu Law relating to Succession -- Trial Court rightly held that husband was not entitled to retain dowry even if he was acquitted and dowry articles will remain with father of deceased.

(Para 14-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427 -- Constitution of India, Article 32, 136, 226 -- Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 136 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Theft of electricity – Conviction in nine cases – Concurrent running of sentence – Appellant is in jail for three years – Writ dismissed, meaningly the appellant has to go undergo a total term of imprisonment of 18 years – All the conviction took place on the same day – Held, High Court ought to have intervened in the exercise of its jurisdiction by setting right the miscarriage of justice -- Appeal allowed, sentences in the nine sessions trials ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Leave to appeal -- Granting of special leave to appeal against acquittal is a discretionary power.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452, 506, 166, 167 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 12 -- Rape -- Cancellation report in FIR –  Ld. JMIC dismissed the complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Applicant/ prosecutrix was alleged to be raped on 07.01.2016 and 10.02.2016 – She opted to remain silent after alleged incident of 07.01.2016 and approached police on 10.02.2016 i.e. after second incident -- There is gap of one month between first incident and second incident -- Applicant attempted to implicate police officials who did not agree with her complaint -- MLR was not supporting the case of the applicant -- No injury was found over the body of the applicant -- Complainant/applicant failed to make out prima facie case warranting summoning of alleged accused – There is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has dismissed the complaint -- Permission for special leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Cheating and forgery -- Forged sale deed – Quashing of Complaint – Mockery of investigation – Civil dispute pending -- When it is the specific case of the original complainant that at no point of time he had executed the disputed sale deed and his signature on the disputed sale deed has been forged, then the;  

-- first thing the police should have done was to obtain the specimen hand writings of the complainant so as to be compared with the disputed signature on the sale deed through a hand writing expert.

-- second thing which the investigating agency ought to have done is to investigate whether the sale consideration had been paid to the purchaser of the disputed plot or not and if the sale deed consideration had been paid, then in what manner.

-- If it is the case of the original complainant that a conspiracy was hatched, then in such circumstances why did the police drop the purchaser and the other individuals from the charge sheet stating that they are the bona fide purchasers of the plot in question for value without notice.

No convincing legal evidence on record to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences -- Since the purchaser of the plot in question and others have not been arrayed as accused, the entire theory of criminal conspiracy collapses like a pack of cards -- Civil Court seized of the question as regards the legality and validity of the disputed sale deed -- The matter is sub judice in the Civil Court -- It will not be proper to permit the criminal prosecution to proceed further on the allegation of the sale deed being forged – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Civil dispute – Criminal texture – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court -- A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture -- But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence -- In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A, 201, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Snatching of mobile – Regular bail -- Keeping in view the custody period of the petitioner i.e. 04 months and 22 days; no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner; he is not involved in any other case and the fact that conclusion of trial is likely to take a considerable time as the case is at the stage of framing of the charge, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail during trial.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 238, 240, 243, 489C – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 439 – Counterfeit currency – Proclaimed offender – Regular bail – Petitioner remained a proclaimed offender and had been evading his arrest for as long as 15 years – However, instant case is a case where the petitioner has been nominated on the basis of a disclosure statement of co-accused, who has since expired and no recovery of any counterfeit currency and coin was effected from the petitioner – Petitioner behind bars since the last about 1 ½ years – Trial is not likely to be concluded in immediate future as only 2 PWs out of cited 16 PWs have been examined till date – Petition accepted and the petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver -- Cross-examination of PW-1/ injured (complainant) would clearly establish that he had seen the driver of the offending vehicle when after the accident he came out and ran away leaving the vehicle at the spot -- Merely because the owner of the vehicle was not examined does not in any manner detract from the testimony, who has clearly identified the accused not only at the time of the occurrence but also in the Court -- Thus, by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the identity of the petitioner was not established – PW1 stated that the car was being driven in a rash and negligent manner -- Minor contractions in fact would show that the witnesses in question are not tutored witnesses – Held, the prosecution has established its case against the petitioner beyond any reasonable doubt – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver – Reduction of sentence -- Since the petitioner is a first-time offender and the occurrence is almost 11 years old, the sentence of 01 year imposed by the Lower Appellate Court reduced to a period of 09 months but subject to a payment of Rs.25,000/- as fine to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.

(Para 14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary case – Regular trial – Specific order of Magistrate – Requirement of -- When the evidence of the parties, in the chief examination, cross-examination and re-examination (if any) were recorded in verbatim and was faithfully placed on record then for merely not recording the order observing that the matter would be tried as a summons case or as a regular trial would not itself vitiate the trial conducted by the Magistrate of the Trial Court, when it has not resulted in miscarriage of justice – Ld. Sessions Judge’s Court only on technicalities set aside the judgment passed by the Trial Court and ordered for a de-novo trial -- Sessions Judge's Court ought to have decided the appeal before it on its merit – Revision allowed, judgment passed by ld. ASJ set aside, matter remanded to ld. ASJ for its fresh disposal, in accordance with law.

(Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376B, 376(2)(N), 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Rape – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner is a doctor in a government hospital where the complainant was allegedly working as a nurse -- FIR indicates that parties were in a physical relationship since May 2016 -- FIR was lodged in October 2017 -- In the facts and circumstances of the case, custodial interrogation is not required – Direction given in the event of the arrest of the petitioner, he shall be released on bail.

(Para 1-6)

Public Gambling Act, 1867 (3 of 1867), Section 5, 13-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR / Charge under Gambling Act -- Non-compliance of Section 5 of the Gambling Act and section 155(2) Cr.P.C -- Even no independent witness joined – Proceedings initiated against the petitioner are untenable, especially when the raid leading to lodging of FIR itself was from the threshold marred by procedural irregularity -- Same is a ground sufficient to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of law and secure of ends of justice.

(Para 18-20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Suicide note show that the deceased was under extreme stress and tension on account of matrimonial discord and on account of pendency of some litigation pertaining to grant of maintenance -- It will certainly be debatable as to whether the aforesaid conduct as mentioned in the suicide note would qualify to be termed as an abetment to commit suicide -- Petitioner has joined investigation and she is not required for any custodial interrogation -- Petitioner not involved in any other case -- Interim directions made absolute.

(Para 5-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 454 – Theft in dwelling house – Lurking house trespass -- Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- State does not dispute the fact that offence punishable u/s 454 IPC is not stand alone offence and after acquittal of the petitioner of offence punishable under Section 380 IPC, 454 IPC cannot be maintained – Conviction u/s 454 IPC set aside.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 411 – Theft in dwelling house – Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- Recovery from the co-accused -- Petitioner was never charged for offence punishable u/s 411 IPC -- There is no order on record to show that the Trial Court ever exercised power u/s 216 Cr.P.C. to alter the charge -- Thus, the Courts below erred in holding the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 411 IPC in the absence of charge -- Conviction u/s 411 IPC set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279, 427 – Death  by rash and negligent driving -- Conviction u/s 304-A, 279, 427 IPC – Agony of protracted trial -- Reduction of sentence – Petitioner has undergone the sentence of 6 months and 12 days out of the total sentence of 1 year -- Petitioner facing the agony of protracted trial for the last 09 years approximately, ends of justice would be suitably met, if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone – Sentence reduced already undergone – Apart from fine, petitioner directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased.

(Para 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Quashing of FIR -- De-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime -- They are neither concerned with the sale deed nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question – It appears that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute – Held, High Court ought to have exercised its power u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants – Appeals allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.

(Para 18-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- PW-3-daughter in her cross examination stated that her mother have said something to her father on which the father started beating her mother -- Immediately her father had dressed up and moved her mother to the Hospital where the other family members have gone -- These aspects would indicate that there was no pre-mediation to cause the death and the incident had occurred at the spur of the moment – If these aspects are kept in view as mitigating circumstances, conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be justified -- Hence, appellant held guilty of the offence u/s 304 Part II of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more 12 years of sentence, period undergone will be sufficient punishment -- Sentence modified, the appellant ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 482 – False complaint – Quashing of Kalandra -- Kalandra/Complaint u/s 182 IPC – Cognizance of -- Court of competent jurisdiction can take cognizance of an offence punishable u/s 182 IPC only on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or his superior officer -- Mere direction by the competent authority to present Kalandara on its behalf by the SHO Police Station will not comply with the provisions of law -- Complaint was lodged by the petitioner with the Superintendent of Police but Kalandara has been presented by the SHO Police Station (i.e. by the public servant who is administratively subordinate to the Superintendent of Police), the same cannot be held to be valid and legal in terms of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. -- Court cannot take cognizance of offence punishable u/s 182 IPC against the petitioner -- Kalandara and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 307, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Appellant and co-accused acquitted u/s 323, 307, 34 IPC, however convicted u/s 25 of Arms Act -- In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumersinbh Umedsinh Rajput @ Sumersinh’s case 2008 (1) Crimes 57, charge u/s 25 of Arms Act is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence convicting the appellant u/s 25 of Arms Act  set aside and the appellant acquitted of the charge u/s 25 of Arms Act.

(Para 3, 11, 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding after conviction -- Parties have settled the dispute and complainant had accepted the sum towards the full and final settlement of the cheque, on the satisfaction of the complainant -- Sentence awarded to the petitioner for offence u/s 138 of NI Act is liable to be set aside -- Petitioner directed to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- -- Conviction and sentence of imprisonment set aside on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5, 6)

Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 3(1)(d) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 427,120-B, 34 – Murder – Life imprisonment – Ailment of mother -- Parole – Petitioner availed parole/ furlough on different occasions, without any default -- Petitioner is having old mother aged about 86 years and there is no major male member to look after her and she is suffering from heart ailment which requires surgery – Nothing on record to show that the release of petitioner on parole is likely to endanger the security of the State and maintenance of public order -- Petitioner ordered to be released on parole for a period of four weeks.

(Para 4-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Illegal activity -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal – Ld. Trial Court dismissed the complaint as Rs.3 lakhs paid to respondent/accused for getting job in the Department of Railway which is a Government Department as it was for illegal activities and it cannot be called as legally enforceable liability -- No infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has acquitted the respondent -- Leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail to husband -- Marriage in May, 2014, wife committed suicide on 4th March, 2021 – In FIR allegations pertaining to harassment caused to the deceased on account of demand of dowry -- Material witnesses examined -- Two minor children are with the grandparents -- Allegations regarding demand of dowry are general in nature -- In the cross-examination, complainant deposed that he did not remember any specific date of harassment caused or demand of dowry made – No cash and vehicle was given in the marriage -- Out of 15 prosecution witnesses, 03 witnesses examined -- Nothing on record to show that the petitioner has any criminal antecedents -- Court cannot ignore the fact that there are two minor children whose future is also at stake – Bail allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 356, 379, 411, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, voluntary, without any undue influence or pressure – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners only.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa) – Dishonour of cheque -- Complainant – Victim -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is not a victim as defined U/s 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Acquittal – Appeal -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of NI Act is not entitled to file an appeal against acquittal according to the provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C rather he may prefer an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court invoking the provision of Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cause of action – Demand Notice – Presumption of service -- Incorrect address -- Mere issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, same would arise only when the notice has been communicated to the drawer of the cheque and who fails to liquidate the cheque amount within the stipulated period -- Presumption of receipt of notice by drawer of the cheque can be raised only if the notice has been dispatched through registered post, to his correct address and such inference cannot be drawn if the notice has been sent on the incorrect address of the drawer of the cheque.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Demand Notice – Service of – Ground of -- Whether the notice of demand has been actually received by the petitioner/accused can be determined only during the trial of the case -- Argument that the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid ground is, therefore, without any merit.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Wrong mentioning of particulars of cheques and Memos -- Errors made by the ld. trial Magistrate in recording the particulars of the cheques and the memos cannot be termed as typographical in nature -- These errors are relating to essential aspects of the case and the same clearly reflects that the learned trial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has approached the case in a mechanical and negligent manner -- Impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate clearly reflects non-application of mind on his part and, as such, is not sustainable in law -- Impugned order, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to pass a fresh order of cognizance on the basis of the material available before him after hearing the complainant/ respondent.

(Para 13-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 376, 377, 406, 498-A, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 376 IPC/ Rape – Section 377 IPC/ Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR  -- Court is conscious of the fact that Sections 376/ 377 I.P.C. are heinous offences and non-compoundable -- But in the peculiar facts and circumstances and in the larger interest of both the parties and to secure the ends of justice, Court deemed it appropriate to use its discretion u/s 482 Cr.P.C in favour of the parties – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 392, 397, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Robbery – Regular bail -- Without commenting anything as regards merits of the case, but while noticing that the petitioner behind bars since the last about 7 months and otherwise has a clean record and that none of the cited 9 PWs has been examined till date, further detention of the petitioner would not be justified – Petition accepted, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 379-B, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR – Compromise found to be genuine, without any pressure or undue influence – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise, ordered to be quashed.

(Para 4, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A, 34, 411 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Snatching of mobile – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody from 15.07.2022, stated to be not involved in any other case and is not a habitual offender -- Challan presented, petitioner was nominated on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the co-accused -- Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 2, 6)

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- If there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu.

(Para 20)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order.

(Para 26)

C. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Preventive detention -- Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to.

(Para 28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Violation of District Magistrate order – Contempt of lawful authority of public servant -- Cognizance on police report – Cognizance on complaint by public authority -- Since the violation of the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, did tantamount to contempt of lawful authority of public servant(s), thereupon an offence constituted u/s 188 of the IPC, became aroused resultantly fall within the ambit of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. – Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, could not take cognizance, upon the police report, but could assume cognizance only on a complaint in writing being made before him, by the public servant concerned, and/or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 468, 473 – Cognizance on complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. – Limitation – Institution of a complaint on 15.05.2018, u/s 195 of the Cr.P.C., and, that too, after more than one year elapsing since the crime event taking place, at the crime site, did within the ambit of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., completely oust the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to either assume cognizance thereons, and/or to issue summons, upon the petitioners, to face a charge for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 188 of the IPC -- Though, the above period of limitation is condonable within the domain of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., but impugned summoning order does not reveal, that the prosecution adopted the above provision, resultantly the delay remained unexplained -- Petition allowed, proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145(1) – Affidavit of accused in evidence -- Permissibility of -- An offence u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 is in the nature of a civil wrong which has been accorded criminal overtones – Application preferred by the petitioner to exhibit evidence in the form of an affidavit allowed – Ld. Court below shall admit the affidavit of the petitioner, on the record, and the same shall be treated as the statement of the petitioner.

(Para 1, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 4, 302 -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Remission -- No prior intent but in the sudden fight multiple injuries by mercilessly beating on all the vital parts of the body and reigning blows, albeit with a wood piece, on head and on different parts of the head again and again -- With these kinds of blows, there would be no possibility of the deceased surviving – Maybe it was under the influence of liquor, but the nature of blows was such that the endeavour was to end the life of the deceased, the father -- It was certainly an act in a cruel and brutal manner taking advantage of the situation even if there was no pre-meditation – Sympathy for the son in such a scenario would be misplaced – No cause made out for application of Exception 4 of Section 300 -- State directed to consider the case of the appellant for remission, the moment he completes the mandatory sentence as per the policy for such consideration.

(Para 21-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 323, 392 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly – No concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased – No evidence what was uttered by the appellants – No evidence that the appellants instigated the other co-accused -- Appellants cannot be convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 5)