Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Legally enforceable liability – Presumption – Rebuttal – Petitioner/ accused  borrowed a sum of Rs.1,80,000/- from complainant and issued two post-dated cheques on the date of borrowing itself – Petitioner/ accused defence that LIC Policy Premium cheques has been misused -- Respondent/ complainant in cross-examination stated that for paying premium, D.D. has to be taken in the name of L.I.C and not in the complainant/ respondent's name -- Premium amount of L.I.C is known and the contention of the petitioner/ accused that he had issued the cheque without filing the amount is not acceptable – Respondent/ complainant categorically discharged his initial burden -- Both the Courts below rightly convicted the petitioner -- Trial Court directed to take steps to secure the petitioner/accused to serve the remaining period of sentence.

(Para 3-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section  307, 325, 147, 148, 323, 325, 307, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Injury on the head with iron rod – Nothing on record of trial court to show injury was grievous or dangerous to life -- However as per medical record produced by the petitioner one of the injuries found to be grievous in nature – Petitioner in custody for the last more than 1 year and 2 months and is having no criminal history – Complainant and injured are already examined but it will take considerable time for the trial to conclude -- Nothing on record to show that if released on bail the petitioner is going to abscond or will tamper with the evidence -- Petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Charge -- Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence -- Charge can be framed even on the basis of strong suspicion, if the same is supported with material on record.

(Para 4)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Rash and negligent driving – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Charge u/s 304 IPC -- Allegation that petitioner was driving the oil tanker at a high speed, without blowing any horn, in a zig zag manner and intentionally struck with the scooter, which resulted in the death of all the three occupants of the scooter -- Prima facie, it appears to be a case of extreme negligence and rashness -- Alternative charge u/s 304A IPC has not been framed, such an error can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. – Charge u/s 304 affirmed, Ld. Trial Court advised to look into the alteration/amendment of the charge.

(Para 5-8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 – Defective charge – Whether vitiate trial -- Accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of charge against him, but the error in the charge, if any, can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. -- The defect in framing of the charge, per se, may not vitiate the trial.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Proclaimed person – Proceedings u/s 138 NI Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – FIR u/s 174-A of IPC along with all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22(C) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity – Petitioner in custody since 22.01.2021 and none of the 15 PWs have been examined till date -- Therefore, the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which provides for a right to speedy Trial and the petitioner can be granted the concession of bail – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 397, 450 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106, 114(a) -- Murder – Recovery of stolen goods – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of appellants:

-- A2 was found in possession of a bag carrying some of the stolen ornaments and, speaks against him, in terms of Section 114 (a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It was for A2 to explain as to how he came to be in possession of those stolen ornaments, u/s 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- However, no explanation was offered by him.

-- It is the prosecution’s case that A1 confessed to commission of the crime and upon being questioned as to the stolen gold ornaments, he himself went into the other room in his house and brought out a bag containing the gold ornaments -- This part of his confession admissible u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments.

Recovery of this stolen property from the accused would not be sufficient in itself to convict them for murder -- Inescapable fact remains that PWs 4, 6, and 10, who were witnesses independent of each other and who had no animosity or enmity with the accused, spoke in unison about seeing them running away from the house of PW-1 of the fateful night with bags in their possession -- No explanation is forthcoming as to why three separate witnesses would choose to implicate the accused falsely.

Sequence of events unfolded in quick succession during the intervening night of 21.08.2008 and 22.08.2008, leading to not only identification of the accused by the witnesses present but also their apprehension and arrest, apart from seizure of the stolen gold ornaments and cash from their possession, it is amply clear that there was no time or possibility for the police to hoist a false case upon them -- Minor discrepancies and shortcomings in the statements made by witnesses after passage of a few years would necessarily have to be discounted in such a scenario.

Conviction order upheld.

(Para 23-27)

Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013),  Section 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 470, 471, 120-B -- Smuggling of human -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statements of the parties recorded and the compromise is genuine and has been arrived at between them without any coercion or undue influence – FIR along with all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 53, 302, 376 -- Rape and murder of a 14 year old girl – Punishment for 30 years -- Death penalty by Trial Court, modified by  High Court to life imprisonment for the whole of biological life without any remission – Considering the fact that the appellant was 26 years of age when the offence was committed and there may be chances of his reformation, sentence of life imprisonment modified to the fixed term sentence for a period of 30 years without any benefit of remission.

(Para 9, 10)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 407, 415 to 420, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail -- Registration of the ECIR and the lodging of the prosecution complaint in the year 2022 were a sequel to the registration of the FIR for the predicate offence, way back in the year 2013 -- No final report has been filed in the FIR for the predicate offence, for the past nine years -- De-facto complainant in the FIR for the predicate offence, was sought to be arrested as an accused in connection with the ECIR, but the application of the Enforcement Directorate for remand was rejected -- Appellant is a Chartered Accountant by profession and has been in jail from 26.09.2022 – Second condition found in Clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 45 of PMLA is satisfied qua the appellant -- Continued incarceration may not be justified, appellant directed to be enlarged on bail.

(Para 13-16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Account closed – Defence that accused misused the security cheque by filling up the name of wife -- Cheque was written and signed by the accused -- Return memo indicates that on the date when the cheque drawn, the bank account already closed -- Complainant caused notice, which was received by the accused -- In the cross examination it is elucidated from the complainant that her husband and sons are running business in wax printing and they have business transaction with the accused – Held, this fact is no way rebut the presumption enumerated under Section 139 of N.I.Act -- Accused cannot take a plea that the said cheque was given as a security for the transaction, which took place four years ago.

(Para 14-16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Capacity to pay -- As far as the source of income, the complainant in the cross examination has indicated her source and also though she is an house wife, her husband and son being the earning members, it cannot be ruled out that she has no wherewithal to lend Rs.5,00,000/- to the accused – Contention that subject cheque was given only as a security and the complainant has no wherewithal to advance Rs.5,00,000/-, both factually not proved even by preponderance of probability -- While there is a statutory presumption, mere denial or adducing evidence which does not shake the foundational fact proved by the complainant, can be taken as a probability.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- No chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – FIR under Sections 363 and 366A of IPC, and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Suicide note – Reliance upon -- Trial Court has not found the suicide note to be trustworthy -- As per the report of the FSL, no definite opinion could be given regarding the suicide note having been executed by deceased -- Trial Court also found that it was quite strange that the deceased, in a semiconscious state, took out a note and handed over the same to his brother instead of doing so when he was in his senses – High Court do not find any illegality and error  in this finding.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Prosecution did not give any immediate cause which could have driven deceased to commit suicide -- Still further, no evidence was brought on record to show that accused incited, goaded or aided the commission of suicide -- It was, therefore, rightly held that the ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC did not stand fulfilled.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 468, 471, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438  -- Cheating – Anticipatory bail - Rs.8,10,000/- taken from the complainant on the pretext of sending two persons to Singapore – When court was not inclined to grant bail, only then the petitioner was ready and willing to affect a compromise with the complainant -- In that situation his arrest was stayed and he was asked to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, however, he has deliberately chosen not to appear -- Petitioner does not deserve the concession of anticipatory bail – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2), 378 – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction by Appellate court -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence -- Principle of according opportunity of hearing to the convict before sentencing him is equally applicable where the sentencing is done by the appellate court -- Convicts are entitled to opportunity of hearing on sentence.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2) -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence – As a general rule, the trial court is duty bound to adjourn the matter to a future date after recording the conviction so as to call upon both the sides to hear on the question of sentence before sentencing the accused persons -- Court is obliged to hear the accused persons after their conviction on the quantum of sentence before passing a sentence against them.

(Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 124A, 153A, 153B -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 18, 39 – Protection against arrest -- On discharge petitioner was released and during this period of 21 months, he was not indulged in any unlawful activity -- On the contrary, the petitioner got elected to the Legislative Assembly in the year 2021 and he is now a sitting member of the Assembly – Discharge order set aside, matter remanded back to Special Court by the High Court -- It is only the offences alleged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which are punishable with larger terms of imprisonment -- If the offences under the IPC alone are taken into account, the petitioner has served, as an undertrial prisoner, more than half of the maximum period prescribed under the relevant provisions – Held, this is not a case where the petitioner should be allowed to be detained in custody, especially after having secured an order of discharge, rightly or wrongly – Petitioner directed to be released on bail pending trial.

(Para 19-25)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Revision – Sentence of cheque amount – While suspending the sentence High Court imposed a condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- -- Further, imposed condition that the petitioner shall deposit another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of four weeks after immediately coming out on bail – Both the conditions were duly complied with by the petitioner – Petitioner ready and willing to settle the remaining cheque amount within the stipulated time fixed by this Court – Conviction confirmed, sentence set aside on condition that the petitioner shall deposit the remaining cheque amount namely a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- on or before 29.05.2023.

(Para 5-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Validity of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Dishonor of cheque with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” -- It was not mentioned on the cheque that the same is valid for 3 months -- Controversy involved is totally a disputed question of facts and the same is to be appreciated by the learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence led by both the sides regarding the contentions raised that whether the cheque is valid for 3 months or not -- Petition for quashing dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 18, 19, 20, 39, 43D(5) – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Offence under UAPA – Regular bail – No reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the UAPA are prime facie true -- Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D will not apply in the case -- Charge not framed, prosecution proposes to examine more than 140 witnesses -- Some of the accused are absconding -- Thus, no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future – Special Judge directed to release the appellants on bail on appropriate conditions determined by him after hearing the appellants and respondent.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 27 – Confession – Discovery of fact – Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule under Section 25 that a confession made by an accused to a police officer is not admissible in evidence -- The first condition for the applicability of Section 27 is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact, which is the direct outcome of such information -- Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said discovery is admissible against the accused.

(Para 14)

A. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 19(2) – Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 12A -- Adulterated food – Misbranded article -- Vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves that he purchased the article of food from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty in prescribed form -- Appellant sold the article of food after purchasing the same from the manufacturer through the invoices which contained the warranty as prescribed under the Act and the Rules Hence, he had the protection available under Section 19(2)(a) of the Act.

(Para 13, 15)

B. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 19(2) – Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 12A – Warranty in writing – Adulteration of food -- A conjoint reading of Section 14, Rule 12A and Form VIA provides that no manufacturer or distributor or a dealer of any food article shall sell such article to any vendor unless he has given a warranty in writing in the prescribed form regarding nature and quality of such articles to the vendor -- Even a bill, cash memo or invoice in respect of sale of any article given by the manufacturer or distributor or dealer shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer.

(Para 11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to frame charge u/s 7 of PC Act -- Appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance – This is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective -- However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned -- Therefore, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to Frame a Proper Charge – Omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder -- Framing of charge -- While framing charge u/s 307 of IPC, what the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section and It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder – Head injury -- Blow of sharp-edged weapon -- Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence u/s 307 of the IPC and intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from the surrounding circumstances -- Injury on the vital part of the body and among other things, considering the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blow inflicted, prima-facie case u/s 307 IPC is made out.

(Para 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 -- Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135 -- Theft of electricity – Ad-interim injunction for electricity connection -- Suit for mandatory injunction seeking new electricity connection – Arguments qua theft in abstract are admissible only when the theft has been proved by any competent Court below -- Merely, registration of an FIR does not amount to any conclusive proof of the theft, as has been pleaded – Application allowed by Trial court affirmed in appeal – Held, orders passed by ld. Courts below being interim in nature are subject to outcome of the trial, no grounds to interfere.

-- electricity being a basic requirement, cannot be deprived to a consumer when allegations qua his being an erring party are yet to be adjudicated.

-- balance of convenience, at this stage, is in favour of consumer and no irreparable loss would be caused as the outstanding dues, needless to say, will be recoverable from the consumer, in case the same are found admissible as per claim of petitioner-Nigam.

(Para 1-4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- There is double presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent-accused -- Initial presumption of innocence is on account of the basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty -- Secondly, said presumption is reinforced by the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court after trial based on the evidence – In these circumstances, onus is heavy on the petitioner/ complainant to show the illegality or impropriety of the finding recorded by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405 – Criminal breach of trust – Following ingredients must be proved to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust –

(A) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property;

(B) that the person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or (b) dishonestly used or disposed of that property or willfully suffered any other person to do so in violation, (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Misappropriation of 1657 bags i.e. 1055 quintals 50 kg and 942 grams of paddy -- 6614 bags weighing 4286 quintals 60 kg paddy were stored for the purpose of milling -- Prosecution utterly failed to prove the dominion of the accused over the said property – Civil suit filed by the petitioner/ complainant/ FCI for recovery, on the same allegations, has already been dismissed by the Civil Court despite the fact that burden of proof in the civil suit is of much lesser degree compared to the criminal case – Prosecution utterly failed to prove the entrustment of the paddy bags, which was allegedly misappropriated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10, 12, 13)

A. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 40, 46 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985)-- Section 9, 25 – NDPS case – BSF Commandant – Acquittal -- Conviction by General Security Force Court --  Appellant was commanding the Force operating over a large area, including from where the Jerrycans (controlled substance under NDPS Act ) allegedly moved from the Indian side to the Pakistani side -- Actual manning of the area is by the subordinate personnel of the Force -- Subordinate personnel have been adjudged guilty, indicating their active involvement -- No direct evidence against the appellant – Held, appellant, being the Commandant, had no responsibility/ duty to prevent such incident -- ceteris paribus, without other material(s) incriminating the appellant or pointing to his guilt, the statement of a single person alone, ought not to have, in this instance, resulted in his conviction -- Impugned Judgment quashed, conviction and sentence set aside -- Appellant held entitled to full retiral benefits from the date of his superannuation till date.

(Para 38-51)

B. Uniform pattern of judgments -- Supreme Court held, it is desirable that all Courts and Tribunals, as a matter of practice, number paragraphs in all Orders and Judgments in seriatim -- Secretary-General shall circulate this judgement to the learned Registrars General of all High Courts, to place the same before Hon’ble the Chief Justices, to consider adoption of a uniform format for Judgments and Orders, including paragraphing -- The learned Chief Justices may direct the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to their High Courts accordingly as well.

(Para 56, 57)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 72, 161 – Mercy petition – Expedite disposal – Directions issued -- Supreme Court observed and directed all the States/appropriate authorities before whom the mercy petitions are to be filed and/or who are required to decide the mercy petitions against the death sentence, such mercy petitions are decided at the earliest so that the benefit of delay in not deciding the mercy petitions is not accrued to the accused and the accused are not benefited by such an inordinate delay and the accused may not take the disadvantage of such inordinate delay.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 72, 161 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 53, 54, 55, 302 – Murder -- Nine persons killed -- Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- Commuted to life imprisonment for natural life -- High Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment on the ground that there was an inordinate unexplained delay in not deciding the mercy petition(s) kept pending for about 7 years and 10 months – Judgment and order modified and it is directed that the accused to undergo life imprisonment for natural life and without any remission.

(Para 4-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Allegation against the petitioner are that he was one of the friends of deceased and was extending help to his wife to remain in adultery with one PS, leaving her husband and children – Held, there would be no justifiability for custodial or pre-trial incarceration at this stage -- Furthermore, the petitioner is a first offender, and one of the relevant factors would be to provide an opportunity to course-correct – Petition allowed.

(Para 5, 10,11)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 362 – Bail under SC/ST Act – Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court -- Changed circumstances -- Once an appeal under Section 14A against the order passed by the Special Court rejecting the application under Section 439 of the CrPC is decided on merits or otherwise by High Court, subsequent appeal under change of circumstances would not be directly maintainable under Section 14A before High Court even on change of circumstances and remedy to the accused, if any, is to file an application before the Special Court for grant of bail.

(Para 31)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court – Regular bail -- Power to grant bail u/s 439 of the CrPC has only vested to the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act and High Court is only empowered to hear appeal under Section 14A(2) of the POA Act against refusal or grant of bail by the Special Court under the Act.

(Para 31)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1), 482 -- Proclamation – 30 days’ time for appearance – Quashing of proclamation order -- Proclamation was effected on 10.01.2020 for 14.01.2020 – For appearance giving only 04 days’ time to the petitioner, clearly falls short of the statutory period of 30 days prescribed u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C -- Petitioner was declared as proclaimed offender on 12.03.2020; whereas for the said date, there was no proclamation u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C. was either ordered or effected – Order dated 12.03.2020 being violative of Section 82 Cr.P.C. set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Procedure of proclamation – Mandatory and inviolable -- Provisions of Section 82 (1) Cr.P.C. provides procedure for appearance of an individual before the Court in the criminal proceedings and thus, regulates the liberty of an individual as such it stems from Article 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly becomes mandatory and inviolable.

(Para 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of complaint -- Loss of cheques – Plea of – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- FSL Report proving signatures on cheques -- Two cheques issued to repay debt – Petitioner did not deny the fact of execution of any deed of agreement on payment of such amount – Signature in the deed of agreement and two cheques are found to be similar – FSL report reveals that the signatures of the accused/petitioner in two cheques and in deed of agreement are similar in nature – Disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated upon in a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 -- Cheque bounced complaint -- Account Closed – Presumption -- Both the cheques were issued by the accused/ petitioner after closing of his account -- It transpires that the petitioner had knowledge regarding closer of his bank account and in spite of that he issued the cheques in favour of the respondent No.2/claimant -- Under such backdrop, it can be assumed that the presumption u/s 139 N.I. Act will come into play at this stage.

(Para 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 148, 149, 323, 325 -- Attempt to murder – Unlawful assembly – Acquittal -- Conviction by trial Court upheld by High court – Challenge to -- In fight, lathi and kassi (spade) were allegedly used, these are the normal agricultural implements which are used in the rural areas, which the appellants were carrying in their trolley – Due consideration not given to the injuries suffered by the appellants, entire stress on the injuries suffered by the complainant party or the evidence led by them and defence of the appellants has not been touched – Both the parties suffered injuries in free fight and the passage, which was the root cause of the fight, has been held to be the passage owned by Gram Panchayat and Rafiamm and not belonging to the complainant party -- Conviction and sentence of the appellants cannot be legally sustained, set aside.

(Para 12-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 326, 341, 506B – Attempt to murder – Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon -- Acquittal u/s 307 IPC -- Incident taken place 23/24 years ago -- Root cause as per appellant that injured was having inappropriate relations with his wife -- Weapon used is a scissors which is not a normal weapon of offence in case there is any intention to cause death -- Injury, a scratch below the neck, incised wound on the left thigh and a small cut size 1 ½ cm x 1 cm x 5 cm below the ribs – Appellant was doing the work of a tailoring -- The scissors which was seized by the police is small scissors which is used by tailors – Held, offence will not fall within Section 307 I.P.C. – Held, conviction u/s 307 IPC cannot be sustained however conviction u/s 326, 341 IPC, 506B sustained.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 341, 506B – Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon -- Conviction u/s 326, 341, 506B IPC -- Sentence reduced to already undergone  (11 months and 24 days) -- Appellant had already undergone actual sentence of 11 months and 24 days -- Considering the fact that the incident had taken place about 23/24 years ago, sentence awarded to the appellant deserves to be reduced to the period already undergone -- Amount of fine imposed is sustained, in case of non-deposit of fine, the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for a period of one month.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Allegation of murder with the aid of Section 149 IPC – Unlawful assembly -- Charge against two person – In the report/FIR there were specific allegations against five accused persons and five accused persons were named in the FIR – Investigating officer charge-sheeted only two persons -- Remaining three accused persons came to be added as accused by the learned trial Court while allowing the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C -- As they absconded and therefore their trial came to be ordered to be separated – Held, when five persons were specifically named in the FIR and five persons are facing the trial may be separately, Section 149 IPC would be attracted.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149, 302 – Unlawful assembly – Murder -- Once the respondent/ accused was found to be member of the unlawful assembly of more than five persons and he actually participated in commission of the offence may be the fatal blow might have been given by the another accused, still with the aid of Section 149 IPC, respondent/accused can be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC -- Every person who, at the time of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

(Para 10.2)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Delay in FIR – Benefit of doubt -- When the delay has been sufficiently and properly explained, no reason to give benefit of doubt to the accused on the aforesaid ground that there was a delay of 3 ½ days in lodging the FIR.

(Para 11.1)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), Section 2(3), 3(3) -- Detention under NSA -- Revenue officials went to the property to recover their dues, allegation that petitioner was of endeavoring to obstruct locking of premises -- Subsequently added that on a phone call he threatened the officers -- Assuming all the facts to be correct, the exercise of the said Act (NSA) in respect of the incident is shocking and unsustainable – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-10)

B. National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), Section 1, 2(3), 3(3) -- Detention order under NSA – Object and reason -- Statement of object and reasons of the Act would show that it was to control the antisocial and antinational elements including secessionist, communal and pro-caste elements, that affect the services essential to the community, thereby posing a grave challenge -- This was particularly in respect of defence, security, public order and services essential to the community which have resulted in the National Security Ordinance, 1980 being promulgated and the Act was to replace the ordinance.

(Para 9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability -- Vicarious liability is a specific species and assumes critical importance, particularly when there is criminal liability involved and therefore, cannot be taken lightly -- If such an extension of principle of vicarious liability were to remain, it would go against the very grain and texture.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Officer in Company -- Vicarious liability – Merely holding a designation or office in a company not sufficient for liability under section 141.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Bald averment against petitioner – Some accused dropped -- Bald averments against Accused No. 3-8 being directors of Accused-Company and in-charge of and responsible for the conduct, affairs and business of the company -- No specific averment made that this was so at the time of the commission of the offence -- Signatory of the cheque was also the Managing Director of the Company would be deemed to be in-charge, it was not as if the complainant was remediless -- Considering that Accused No.4 to 8 were dropped by the complainant, there was no reason for the complainant to have continued with proceedings against Accused No.3.

(Para 18)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Incharge of Company – Vicarious liability – Letter head of company – Reliance upon -- Merely the mention of the name of Accused No.3 on the letter head as being the Head of the Group, does not ipso facto or ipso jure make him in-charge of and responsible for the affairs and business of the company at the time the offence was committed.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Non-Executive Director – Non-executive director may be the custodian of governance of the Company but are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of running its business and only monitor executive activities of the Company -- Phraseology used in Section 141 of the Act of being in charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of Company is a reference to an “executive activity” which imports an element of running day-to-day affairs of the Company and would not be extended to a role which is essentially supervisory, policy oriented, of oversight or regulatory i.e. non-executive in character.

(Para 21)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 -- Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 175 – Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 104, 203 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Non-executive Co-chairman – Managing Director and executive directors are appointed for a company to ensure that all executive decisions – Non Executive Directors are to advice or oversight of the functioning of the company -- Even the role of ‘Chairman’/ ‘Chairperson’ is not typically of an executive nature -- Creeping up an escalating liability to Chairpersons of large conglomerates/ companies for cheques issued in day-to-day affairs of the business of a company would unfairly and unnecessarily expand the provisions of vicarious liability under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act – No prejudice is caused to the complainant as the signatory of the cheque, the Managing Director is already arrayed as accused -- Proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13, 22-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Police remand beyond 15 days – Permissibility of -- In the case of Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141, Supreme Court observed that there cannot be any police custody beyond 15 days from the date of arrest  -- View taken requires re-consideration -- On 16.04.2021, the ld. Special Judge allowed police custody of the respondent-accused for seven days i.e., up to 22.04.2021, the respondent-accused got himself admitted in the hospital 18.04.2021 and obtained interim bail on 21.04.2021 which came to be extended till 08.12.2021 when his interim bail came to be cancelled by the learned Special Judge by observing that the accused has misused the liberty – By not permitting the CBI to have the police custody interrogation for the remainder period of seven days, it will be giving a premium to an accused who has been successful in frustrating the judicial process -- Appellant-CBI permitted to have the police custody remand of the respondent for a period of four days.

(Para 7-10)

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 – Territorial jurisdiction of Court to take cognizance --  Irrespective of where the FIR relating to the scheduled offence was filed and irrespective of which Court took cognizance of the scheduled offence, the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Special Court to take cognizance of a compliant under PMLA should be decided with reference to the place/places where anyone of the activities/processes which constitute the offence under Section 3 took place.

(Para 3, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint – Lucknow to Kerala -- Lack of jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a complaint can be no ground to order its transfer.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint -- Lucknow to Kerala -- 7 out of 10 accused persons are residents of Kerala can hardly be a ground for ordering the transfer of investigation -- Majority of witnesses are also from Kerala/ South India is also no ground to order the transfer of the complaint.

(Para 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 323, 342, 354, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Bail by trial court – Cancellation of bail by High Court – Explanation from Trial Judge – Legality of -- Trial Judge granting bail on the ground that the chargesheet had been submitted and that the other accused were on bail was eminently fair and reasonable – Order of the High Court directing that the appellant be arrested immediately and seeking an explanation from the Second Additional Sessions Judge was wholly disproportionate and was not warranted -- Members of the district judiciary cannot be placed in a sense of fear if they were to exercise the jurisdiction lawfully entrusted to them for granting bail in appropriate cases -- Application for cancellation of bail dismissed, bail confirmed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Additional evidence -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Who can file -- It is not necessary that the applicant has to be either complainant or prosecution or victim or a listed witness -- The provisions can be invoked by any other person who is able to show that the evidence of witness sought to be examined will be necessary for just decision of the case.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B – Certificate u/s 65-B of Evidence Act – Competent witness -- Certificate u/s 65-B and proving of the same, certainly goes to the root of the matter and therefore, the only person who is duly authorised regarding the same can be a competent witness in this regard.

(Para 19)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153-A, 295-A, 298, 323, 406 and 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 --  Forcible conversion of religion -- Third petition – Regular bail --  Petitioner in jail for more than 1 year and 4 months -- 16 out of 34 witnesses have been examined -- Petitioner not involved in any other case except for one more FIR which was lodged on the next day pertaining to the similar kind of allegations – Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153-A, 295-A, 342, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Forcible conversion of religion -- Third bail petition – Regular bail -- Incarceration for more than 1 year and 5 months -- 8 out of 31 witnesses examined -- Petitioner not involved in any other case except for one more FIR which was lodged one day prior to the present case pertaining to the similar kind of allegations -- Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 43)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of Proclaimed person order/ FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Since the petitioner has joined the trial, order declaring proclaimed person has lost its significance -- Petitioner is no longer a proclaimed person and thus, continuing with the FIR would be oppressive -- Accordingly quashed.

(Para 1, 2)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheques -- Demand notice -- Three cheques for an amount of Rs.14,00,000/- -- Legal notice to pay the cheque amount and in case of legal action, to bear the entire cost of the proceeding, interest on the amount besides legal fee – It is not a case that the opposite party demanded an amount more than the cheque amount of Rs.14,00,000/- -- Impugned notice cannot be said to be not in conformity with law.

(Para 4-7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheques -- Demand notice with additional claim – Legality of -- Defect in notice cannot invalidate the proceeding when the demand is only for the cheque amount with additional claim towards the miscellaneous expenses.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide -- Insulting the deceased by using abusive language or maltreatment will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of the suicide is imperative -- Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against the indictment -- Mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non to convict a person under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 9-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Simply because of the fact that the wife (deceased) committed suicide in matrimonial home, itself does not make her in-laws and husband liable for harassment and abetment to commit suicide -- No concrete or conclusive evidence to prove their complicity in the commission of the crime -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – Acquittal affirmed.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court – Trustworthiness of witness -- Complainant stepped into the witness box as PW-6, in her examination-in-chief, she identified the accused, however, in the cross examination, she stated that the police had called her to the police station and had told her that her mobile phone had been recovered -- She stated in the cross examination that she had not told the police that the person in the police station was the same who had snatched the purse from her before the questioning of the accused started -- It has further come on record that no description of the accused had been given by the complainant at the time of registration of the FIR and even the number of the motorcycle could not be noted down by the complainant -- Cross examination of the complainant definitely created a dent in the case of the prosecution which was rightly considered by the trial Court.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court -- Recovery of mobile and Rs. 12,000 on disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- No bill of mobile was produced on record -- It was not proved that the mobile phone which had been released on Sapurdari was the same which had been allegedly recovered from the accused -- PW-6-complaiannt duly stated in her evidence that the bill of the mobile phone and the details of the Sim had been handed over to the police, but nowhere the IMEI number was mentioned nor the bill of the mobile phone saw the light of the day – Insofar as the amount of Rs.12,000/- is concerned, there is nothing to show that these were the same Rs.12,000/- rupees which had been snatched from the complainant -- Anyone could be in possession of a sum of Rs.12,000/- and the mere recovery of the same from the said person would not mean that they had been snatched from someone -- Recovery alleged to have been made in pursuance to the disclosure statement suffered by the respondent-accused not proved -- No reliance can be placed upon the disclosure statement – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489-C, 489D -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 - Counterfeit currency – Regular bail – Recovery of 298 counterfeit currency notes of denomination of 100 each, 181 counterfeit currency notes of denomination of 200 each and 64 counterfeit currency notes of denomination of 2000 each --  Held, veracity of the prosecution case shall be established during the course of trial -- Petitioner is a first time offender in custody since 12.08.2022 and only 01 out of 07 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- Trial of the case is not likely to be concluded any time soon -- As such his further incarceration is not required – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 2-7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Quashing of complaint against partner/ wife – Vicarious liability – Partnership firm -- Cheque from personal account of husband -- Petitioner is not a signatory to the cheque and the said cheque was issued on personal account of accused No.1/ husband – Though the petitioner is a partner in the partnership firm and amounts were taken from the finance firm, it would not be proper for the complainant to prosecute the petitioner, who is not a signatory to the said cheque – Petitioner is not vicariously liable u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act -- Petition allowed.

(Para 3-6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 --  Murder -- Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory – Motive -- Virtually, the oral testimonies of PW-8 and PW-10 are at variance about the last seen and it becomes inconclusive – Prosecution has miserably failed to prove the alleged motive -- Though the deceased had met with a homicidal death it cannot be said that the rest of the circumstantial evidence culled out by the courts below unerringly point to the culpability of the appellants in the homicidal death of deceased -- Even the recovery of the weapon and the dress, at the instance of the appellant cannot, by itself, be conclusive as admittedly, the panch witnesses for their recovery also did not support the prosecution -- It is unsafe to maintain the conviction of the appellants; benefit of doubt extended – Appellants, acquitted.

(Para 29, 30)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 --  Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance -- Failure to establish the alleged motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence it can only be held that the said failure had weakened the case of the prosecution.

(Para 18-21)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- In a case rested on circumstantial evidence and ‘last seen’ theory is relied on as a link in the chain of circumstances, the evidence relating the time at which the deceased was lastly seen with the accused has to be proved conclusively as when it is proximate with the time of finding the dead body the burden to establish the innocence would be that of the accused.

(Para 24)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Extra-judicial confession – Corroboration not required -- Generally, it is a weak piece of evidence, however, a conviction can be sustained on the basis of extra-judicial confession provided that the confession is proved to be voluntary and truthful -- It should be free of any inducement -- Evidentiary value of such confession also depends on the person to whom it is made -- Going by the natural course of human conduct, normally, a person would confide about a crime committed by him only with such a person in whom he has implicit faith -- Moreover, the Court has to be satisfied with the reliability of the confession keeping in view the circumstances in which it is made -- As a matter of rule, corroboration is not required -- However, if an extra-judicial confession is corroborated by other evidence on record, it acquires more credibility.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Extra-judicial confession – PW-1 to PW-6 including the complainant himself whose son was killed did not support prosecution -- Case of the prosecution was that the appellant had confessed to PW-1 to PW-9 -- Prosecution’s case about extrajudicial confession does not inspire confidence – No other circumstances brought on record which could support or corroborate the prosecution case -- Evidence in form of the extra-judicial confession of the appellant deserves to be discarded -- Conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained at all -- Appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against him.

(Para 5-7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42 – NDPS case – Acquittal – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information was not reduced into writing -- Consequently, there was no question of sending the secret information to the police station or higher police officers -- Thus, there was breach of mandatory provision of Section 42 of the Act and the learned Trial Court has wrongly convicted the appellant -- Appellant is liable to be acquitted.

(Para 12-14)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Ruqa -- Sending of ruqa for recording of the FIR in the police station can never be termed as sufficient compliance of Section 42 of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Information to higher police officers -- As per the mandate of Section 42 of the Act, when there is total and definite non-compliance of such statutory provisions, the question of prejudice looses its significance -- It will per se amount to prejudice.

(Para 13)