Constitution of India, Article 226 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Life imprisonment – Premature release – Non-deposit of fine – Not known to anyone in locality – Ground of rejection -- Petitioner requires to undergo actual sentence of 10 years; and sentence of 14 years by including the remission period, as per Policy, but despite having undergone actual sentence of more than 14 years; and total sentence of more than 22 years by including remission;

-- In case, petitioner has not paid the fine imposed by the court, he is required to undergo default sentence as per the trial court judgment but that cannot be reason to consider petitioner’s case for premature release.

-- If family of petitioner has shifted from earlier address, that again cannot be the reason to decline the relief, once petitioner has fulfilled the parameters provided in the policy.

-- simply because petitioner is not known to anyone in Ludhiana, cannot be a ground to presume that his presence there will create a law and order situation.

Petition allowed, respondents directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other case.

(Para 1, 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 159, 160 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Affray – Quashing of FIR -- Alleged fight was between two friends, dining together at a Dhaba on a highway in the wee hours of the morning -- Allegation of them being under the influence of liquor was not shown to have been confirmed by the medical report -- No injury was reflected – No material that there was a supervening apprehension of threat or danger to a third person present at the spot, eventuating in the peace being disturbed -- Suffice it to say that the FIR ex facie lacks the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 159 IPC, for which the petitioner has been made to stand trial -- Allowing the proceedings to continue against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of law -- FIR and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 5-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Kidnapping -- Quashing of Charge-sheet and entire criminal proceedings – Main accused acquitted and married the victim -- Victim did not support the case of prosecution – Both the applicants are in-laws of victim with whom the main accused and victim are residing peacefully with girl child -- Held, if in the above scenario the applicants are directed to face the trial, it would be the travesty of justice and abuse of process of law for the reason that this trial would result into acquittal – Supplementary charge-sheet quashed and accordingly the summoning order as well as the entire proceedings of Criminal Case quashed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son) -- Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent.

(Para 17)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe – If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language -- Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.

(Para 18)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Trial of accused -- Before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. but at least in the charge-sheet so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence.

(Para 18)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(b)(ii)(C) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS case – Regular bail -- Fact that the co-accused who was released on bail has not surrendered cannot be a germane factor to decline bail to the co-accused/ appellant.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Attempt to murder – Injuries not dangerous -- Mere factum that the injuries sustained by the complainant, not being life endangering injuries, would not make convict to escape from penal liability as enshrined in Section 307 of the IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Attempt to murder – Acquittal -- Non-sharing of mens rea -- Only convict was in command of the steering wheel of the offending vehicle, whereas, the other co-accused were sitting thereins with him -- Unless, there was evidence on record suggestive, that the other co-accused in the offending vehicle, instigating him to ply the offending vehicle in an ill-manner, so as to result in its colliding with the Activa Honda driven by the complainant-victim, thereupon, there would be no sharing of mensrea – No such evidence is existing on record -- Co-accused did not join him, through theirs instigating or goading him --Acquittal of co-accused upheld.

(Para 26)

Constitution of India, Article 20, 142 – Voice sample – Right to Privacy -- Magistrate is given the power to order for collection of voice sample for the purpose of investigation of a crime until explicit provisions are engrafted in the CrPC by the Parliament -- Such direction was issued by invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India – No infirmity with the impugned judgment of the High Court as also of the Special Court ordering the accused to give his voice sample to facilitate investigation of the crime. Ritesh Sinha’s case (2019) 8 SCC 1 relied.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Account holder -- Joint liability – For an offence u/s 138 to be made out a cheque has to be issued by the account holder under his name and signature -- It is only the holder of the account on which the cheque is drawn can be made liable and such culpability cannot be extended to others except as provided u/s 141 N.I. Act.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Joint liability – Joint Account – Signatory of cheque – Requirement of -- In case of individual persons, a person other than a person who has drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him cannot be persecuted for an offence u/s 138 N.I. Act, unless the bank account is jointly maintained and that he was a signatory to the cheque.

(Para 14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Bank also summoned – Quashing of proceedings -- Petitioner/Bank has been made a party by the complainant where no role can be attributed to the bank -- Bank is only the custodian of the money of the customers and has to comply with the instructions of such customers -- In case of insufficiency of funds, the bank is only to report the same and as such, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be liable for any act of the customer who has issued the cheque which was later dishonoured – Proceeding as against the petitioner/ Bank set aside and quashed.

(Para 15-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Fraud -- Anticipatory bail – Petitioner executed agreement to sell in favour of KS and power of attorney was duly executed and registered before the Sub Registrar, wherein he was photographed -- Petitioner fraudulently entered into an agreement to sell with the complainant also regarding the same piece of land and accepted the earnest money, however, did not execute the sale deed -- Land sold through KS to another person -- Intention to defraud from the very inception – Anticipatory bail declined.

(Para 7-9)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4, 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Offence under Money-Laundering Act – Regular bail -- High Court has neither considered the rigour of Section 45 of the PML Act, 2002 nor has considered the seriousness of the offences alleged against accused for the scheduled offences under the PML Act, 2002 -- High Court has not at all considered the fact that the investigation by the Enforcement Directorate for the scheduled offences under the PML Act, 2002 is still going on – Impugned orders passed by the High Court enlarging respective respondent No. 1 on bail are unsustainable -- Matters remitted back to the High Court for afresh decision on the bail applications.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Murder – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone actual custody of 04 years, 10 months and 07 days -- Only 06 Pws have been examined out of a total of 23 Pws -- It is thus evident that the trial is not likely to be concluded at an early date -- Keeping in view the period of custody undergone, Court deemed it appropriate to grant him regular bail.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34, 120B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Murder – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody for a period of 05 years, 09 months and 23 days -- Trial is getting delayed and speedy trial is a constitutional right provided to an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Furthermore, the petitioner also becomes entitled to bail on the principle of parity as co-accused has been granted bail – Petition allowed and petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 4, 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Dishonour of cheque – Compounding of offence – Consent of complainant -- An application for compounding of the offence moved by the petitioners stating that they were ready to pay the cheque amount – Application was contested by the respondent-complainant, dismissed by trial Court upheld by Appellate court – Held, without consent of the complainant, compounding cannot be permitted – Revision dismissed.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – House trespass -- Exclusive possession – Framing of charge -- Nothing placed on record by the petitioner to even prima facie show exclusive possession of the property in dispute -- Once this had not been proved, no offence would be made out u/s 452 IPC -- Trial Court rightly did not frame any charge u/s 452 IPC – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 380 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – Theft – Framing of charge -- Apart from the bald statement that the respondent alongwith his accomplices had taken away the articles, no evidence led -- Prima facie case should be made out and charges cannot be framed on mere assumptions and presumptions or on the mere bald statements of the complainant and the witnesses -- Courts below, therefore, rightly did not frame any charge under Sections 379 and 380 IPC -- Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – Criminal intimidation – Framing of charge -- Charges framed u/s 506 IPC only as the respondent is alleged to have given threats to the petitioner that he would be eliminated -- No other evidence could have been produced -- Only the statement of the petitioner was sufficient -- Charge u/s 506 IPC upheld.

(Para 10-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 401 -- Opportunity of hearing to proposed accused in revision – Requirement of -- Revision against order of dismissal of application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. allowed – Direction by High Court to register FIR against appellant -- Proposed accused were not served notice of the revision proceedings, the order passed by the High Court is in the teeth of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the Code -- Impugned order set aside, matter remitted back to the High Court to decide the revision afresh in accordance with law.

(Para 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 13, 18, 20 -- Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 4, 5 – Default bail -- If on expiry of period of 90 days, from the causing of arrest of the accused concerned, no charge sheet is filed before the jurisdictionally competent court nor when any able extensions of time for the relevant time are granted, accused concerned entitled to claim default bail, from the jurisdictionally competent court.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Sections 13, 18, 20 -- Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 4, 5 – Default bail -- Jurisdictionally competent court -- Accused arrested on 5.8.2022, instituted an application for default bail before SDJM on 5.11.2022 -- Period of 90 days had then elapsed -- However, the jurisdiction to enter upon a valid trial of UAPA offences became divested from the SDJM, became vested in the Designated Special Court – Application was dismissed with liberty to approach jurisdictionally competent court -- Fresh application for default bail moved before the learned ASJ on 11.11.2022 – In the meantime challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C. filed on 7.11.2022 – Default bail declined by Court -- Appeal dismissed -- Impugned order as passed by the learned ASJ upheld.

(Para 6, 13-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Murder – Acquittal -- Separate charge u/s 452 read with 120-B of IPC was framed against all accused except the appellant – Thus charge framed against the appellant was of being a party to criminal conspiracy -- There is also a charge that all the accused fired bullets from their revolver -- Appellant’s presence with a weapon outside the premises where the offence took place – Prosecution examined 37 witnesses -- Appellant was not confronted during his examination u/s 313 of CrPC with the only allegation of the prosecution against him – Serious prejudice was caused to the appellant – 27 years have passed since the date of the incident -- Appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and 4 months -- Option of remand will be unjust -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside.

(Para 18-23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Circumstances appearing against accused – Putting the same to accused – Law summarised as follows:

(i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction;

(ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence;

(iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused;

(iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused;

(v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident;

(vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and

(vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC.

(viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.

(Para 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 406, 370, 120B -- Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (2 of 2013), Section 13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Smuggling of human – Cheating -- Anticipatory bail --  Allegations against the petitioner are he along with other co accused cheated the complainant to the tune of Rs 33,00,000/- on the pretext of sending complainant’s son to USA -- Petitioner is the father of the main accused -- Given the penal provisions imposed and the sentence provided by the Legislature, the nature of allegations coupled with the fact that the petitioner is a first offender, and one of the relevant factors would be to provide an opportunity to course-correct – Petition allowed.

(Para 1-9, 24)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC-- FIR on account of absence of the petitioner which was subsequently regularized on his appearance after he was granted bail by the Court -- Continuation of the proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC shall be abuse of the process of the Court – Order declaring Proclaimed Person along with subsequent proceedings arising out of the same including FIR u/s 174-A of IPC quashed, subject to payment of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A -- Accident by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal – Defence witness -- Two deaths have taken place in the accident -- Instead of believing the defence of the accused, which is corroborated by the testimony of DW1 and DW2, the Courts below have relied upon the testimony of PW1 and PW2, sons of the deceased -- A defence witness is as competent as the prosecution witness and testimony of both of them stand on the same pedestal -- It is duty of the Court to analyse the statements of both the sides on equal parameters in order to judge their truthfulness -- Defence pleaded by the accused and supported by DW1 and that of DW2 is highly probable and, therefore accused deserve to be given the strong benefit of doubt – Petitioner/ accused is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 11, 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138(b) – Dishonour of cheque – Demand notice – Demand of other amount than cheque – Legality of -- In a demand notice, if other amounts is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted in a legal term of the Section 138 (b) of the Act, 1881.

(Para 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail -- Rape – Consenting party --  Misrepresentation -- In statement u/s 164 prosecutrix has categorically stated that they became friends through Facebook; he told her that he is Hindu and on his Facebook profile also he used his surname as “Dixit” and at the inception of the relationship applicant/ accused misrepresented himself and trapped the prosecutrix in his love; had applicant/accused not misrepresented to be of her faith, the prosecutrix would not have given in to the applicant/accused – Anticipatory Bail rejected.

(Para 4-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 120-B, 212, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder –Regular bail -- Allegations against the petitioner are that he conspired with BK and provided him exact location of the deceased and thus facilitated him in committing murder – Petitioner is in custody since 28.02.2022 and during investigation, no weapon recovered from his possession – Trial will take time to conclude -- Another accused named in the FIR is already granted concession of regular bail -- No fruitful purpose is going to be served by prolonging judicial custody of the petitioner for indefinite period – Bail allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Petitioners/ accused are residents of Kapurthala, much beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandigarh, it was required for learned Magistrate to make compliance of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- In case inquiry as contemplated u/s 202 Cr.P.C is conducted through the Police or any person authorised by the court and the accused is involved in the inquiry, he will be able to put forth his defence and then, on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Police or the authorised person, Court will be in a better position to come to the conclusion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not, for summoning of the accused – Matter remanded back to the trial Court to make compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C and only thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 384, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail -- No post mortem conducted – Death on 02.09.2021, matter was reported to the police on 05.09.2021 -- Allegations of honey trapping and black mailing in the FIR but the exact date and month of the same is not given -- Genuineness of the suicide note will be determined by the trial Court, after the recording of evidence -- Mens rea, if any, on the part of the petitioners, is also matter of evidence -- No prior complaint with regard to alleged honey trapping and black mailing of the deceased by the petitioners -- Further, the petitioners have joined the investigation -- Petition allowed and interim order made absolute.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 411 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Chain snatching case -- Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Appeal is of the year 2022 -- Applicant-appellant has undergone 01 year, 08 months and 11 days out of the sentence awarded of 05 years and the appeal is not likely to be taken up for final hearing anytime in the near future – Applicant-appellant is not involved in any other case, further incarceration is not required – Sentence suspended.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Chain snatching case -- Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence – Applicant has undergone total custody of 01 year & 09 months (1/3rd) out of the substantive sentence of 05 years -- Without commenting on the merits of the case the application allowed and the sentence of the applicant/ appellant suspended during pendency of the appeal.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 384, 385, 386, 387, 506(1), 506(2), 507, 201, 120B -- Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (24 of 2019), Section 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5), 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Extortion – Regular bail -- Alleged that appellant threatened the victim and concerned witnesses to cancel the land deal or to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore), which they refused – Role of the appellant is that he was involved in intimidating and threatening the victim on behalf of the accused no.1 for ensuring the victim’s compliance with the extortion demands -- Alleged that the appellant owns properties derived from funds of organised crimes -- Further it is revealed that the Appellant was directly involved in collecting the sum(s) extorted from the victim in the city, and that he has also been found to be involved in passing on information which is likely to assist the crime syndicate in its activities, thereby abetting the actions of the gang :

-- Had there been no other case against the Appellant and no material, at least prima facie, to indicate his regular participation in any crime, the Court could have considered his prayer, but keeping in view his alleged role, Court not inclined to exercise discretion in his favour, for now.

-- The fact, that out of the twelve charge-sheeted accused, six co-accused have not been granted bail, five have availed the benefit of default bail and only one is on regular bail, have also persuaded the Court not to interfere.

At the present juncture prayer for bail rejected, however, the stand taken on behalf of the State that the prayer for bail of the Appellant may be considered only after the protected witnesses are examined and six months’ time sought -- Upon the completion of recording of statements of the said protected witnesses, the Appellant is at liberty to renew his plea for bail.

(Para 3, 9, 13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 387, 506(1), 506(2) – Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (24 of 2019), Section 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5), 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Extortion – Regular bail – Allegation that appellant was in close contact with accused no.1 and used to supply information relating to projects of the developers and thus, facilitated the whole exercise of extortion -- Mobile phone(s) seized from the appellant revealed that he was in touch with the organised crime syndicate – For the purposes of considering grant of bail to the Appellant, at this stage, the fact that there was only one case prior to the present case, that too of the year 2014 and the FIR thereof having been quashed by the High Court, even prior to the filing of the charge-sheet -- Appellant is in jail since 16.10.2020 viz. for over 2½ years -- Admittedly, it is the first time, he is accused of such nature of crimes -- Appellant ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 9, 14-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – Mere allegation of harassment of deceased by the accused named in the FIR may not be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, under Section 306 IPC, rather to bring the accused in the ambit of section 306 IPC, it is required to be established on record that deceased committed suicide after being instigated and abetted by the accused.

(Para 44)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – No evidence that deceased was meted with harassment by the accused just prior to her death and she was instigated /abetted to commit suicide -- As such, no case under Section 306 IPC is made out – Accused acquitted.

(Para 45-47)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Proof -- It is a basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however, strong cannot take place of proof – In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof -- Large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution.

(Para 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Acquittal -- Dowry death – Demand of dowry – Presumption -- Prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassed by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry – In order to presume the dowry death, it is a condition precedent that there must be unimpeachable evidence in relation to dowry demand -- As per evidence on record, there is no positive and cogent evidence about demand of dowry, and, nexus between demand of dowry and harassment could not be established -- Therefore, conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 38-41)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Life and liberty of victim/ accused -- Article 21 of the Constitution protects lives and personal liberties of both the victim and those accused of having committed an offence.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 154 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Arrest of accused -- To strike a balance, distinction is drawn between power of arrest of an accused person u/s 41 and registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Code -- While registration of an FIR is mandatory, the arrest of the accused on registration of the FIR is not -- FIR is registered on the basis of information without any qualification like credible, reasonable or true information -- Reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for registration of the FIR -- However, for making arrest in terms of Section 41(1)(b) or (g), the legal requirements and mandate is reflected in the expression ‘reasonable complaint’ or ‘credible information’.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Foreclose of investigation -- Under Section 157(1) of the Code, a Police officer can foreclose the investigation if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate -- Requirement of Section 157(1) for the Police officer to start investigation is that he has “reason to suspect the commission of an offence” -- Therefore, the Police officer is not liable to launch investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating to commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 16)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1), 173, 202 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – When the Police officer forecloses investigation in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1), he must submit a report to the Magistrate -- Here, the Magistrate can direct the Police to investigate, or if he thinks fit, hold an inquiry -- Where a Police officer, in a given case, proceeds to investigate the matter, then he files the final report u/s 173 of the Code -- The noticeable feature of the scheme is that the Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of investigation -- Magistrate, who has little or no scope to interfere with the investigation, is not absolutely powerless in view of the powers conferred in terms of Sections 159 and 173, and infra, Section 202 of the Code.

(Para 16-18)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Inherent power of the High Court -- This power is normally exercised when the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged -- When an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere into an investigation, however, if the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation can be permitted.

(Para 19-20)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) – Cognizable offence -- FIR -- The operandi for registration of information in a cognizable offence and eventual investigation is not limited to Police -- Sub-section (3) to Section 156, subject to legal stipulations, gives the ameliorating power to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order an investigation in a cognizable offence -- Two different powers vested with two distinct authorities, namely the Police and the Magistrate, who discharge distinct functions and roles under the Code as indicated above are not entirely imbricating.

(Para 23)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 -- Postponement of issue of process -- Section 202 not only refers to an inquiry but also to an investigation -- In such cases, the Police cannot on its own exercise the power of arrest in course of making its report in pursuance of the direction u/s 202 of the Code.

(Para 26)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 202 -- Magistrate is required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under Section 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure under Section 202. He can also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police.

(Para 38)

I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 397, 401 – Right of accused pre-summoning proceedings – Revision -- Accused do not have any right to appear before the Magistrate before summons are issued -- However, the law gives them a right to appear before the revisionary court in proceedings, when the complainant challenges the order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code.

(Para 39)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Duty of trial judge -- A trial judge has tremendous powers to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant” -- It is in fact the duty of the Trial Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and crucial question was left from being asked from a witness -- Duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to participate in the trial “by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.”

(Para 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 101, 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- When the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances of the case -- Discovery u/s 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased -- This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Amendment of loan amount in complaint and affidavit of evidence -- Wrong amount of loan mentioned in demand notice/ complaint as Rs. 6,60,000/- instead of Rs.7,20,000/- -- Affidavit also adduced for wrong amount --  Complainant was cross-examined on such statement on oath -- Again in cross-examination he admitted to have stated that he had given Rs.6,60,000/- to the accused -- Loan amount cannot undergo a change because the same forms the very basis of the complaint -- This would certainly change the very nature and character of the case – Held, complainant cannot be permitted to change the very foundation of his case midway during trial.

(Para 3-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 336, 506 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Act endangering life or personal safety of others -- Acquittal -- Test identification Parade (TIP) -- When it is established from the testimony of witnesses that occurrence took place at about 10:30 p.m., with no source of light, it is highly doubtful as to how the two police officials identified the accused, particularly when there is no evidence on record that they knew the accused earlier -- No Test Identification Parade was ever conducted -- Complainant and alleged eye-witness have not supported the prosecution case – Appeal accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32, 72 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302, 307 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6 – Murder – Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- In a bomb blast the then Chief Minister of Punjab along with 16 others lost their lives and a dozen others were injured.

-- Petitioner himself never submitted any Mercy Petition.

-- Alleged Mercy Petition of year 2012 was filed by SGPC.

-- After the communication of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 27.09.2019, the proposal for considering the commutation of the death sentence of the petitioner was started and a decision was taken to keep the same pending till disposal of the pending appeals before Supreme Court, filed by the co-accused as well as by CBI.

-- It was after the directions issued by Supreme Court on 04.12.2020 and 02.05.2022 that the matter was again considered by the competent authority and it was decided to defer the question of commutation.

It cannot be alleged that there has been an inordinate delay in disposal of the Mercy Petition -- Argument regarding delay of more than 10 years cannot be sustained.

(Para 17)

B. Constitution of India, Article 32, 72 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302, 307 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6 – Murder – Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- In a bomb blast the then Chief Minister of Punjab along with 16 others lost their lives and a dozen others were injured -- It would not be within the domain of Supreme Court to delve upon the decision of the competent authority to defer taking of any decision at present -- It is within the domain of the executive to take a call on such sensitive issues -- Stand of the Ministry of Home Affairs to defer the decision on the Mercy Petition of the petitioner is also a decision for the reasons given thereunder -- It actually amounts to a decision declining to grant the same for the present – Direction given that competent authority, in due course of time, would again as and when it is deemed necessary, may deal with the Mercy Petition, and take a further decision.

(Para 17-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Eye witness turned hostile -- Two purported ocular witnesses to the occurrence PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case, turned hostile -- In a grilling cross-examination, rather both completely denied making their respective previous statements in writing to the police officer nor did they make any affirmative answer to any incriminatory affirmative suggestion put to each of them by the Public Prosecutor -- Thus stems an inference that prosecution has been unable to invincibly substantiate the charge(s) drawn against the accused.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) in Court – Reliance upon -- Injured eye witness (PW-15) made a previous statement to the police officer discloses;

“…. That person was with muffled face and he said to shoot me because I am the person of that party. In between the person who having gun, shooted me. I can identify that voice and face thoroughly if he was produced before me, because that person was faced me prior somewhere. The person, who shooted me, I can identify him. if he was produced before me because his face was uncovered. After hitting of bullet shot, I became unconscious…….”

Held, unless the investigating officer during the course of his carrying investigations into the crime FIR, had held a valid identification parade with the participation thereins of PW-15 to enable to identify the accused, the identification of the accused by PW-15 in Court was a frail and uncreditworthy -- PW-15 was legally incapacitated to identify for the first time the accused in Court --  Therefore, no evidentiary vigour can be assigned thereto -- Prosecution case which becomes rested, upon the deposition of PW-15, thus cannot succeed.

(Para 17-20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Disclosure statement – Recovery of revolver and three live cartridges -- Ballistic expert’s opinion --  Report of the ballistic expert is of grave importance -- No conclusive opinion was made by the ballistic expert with respect to lead bullet mark CB/1 contained in parcel ‘D’ becoming fired from 0.32 inch revolver – Held, the inconclusivity of opinion leads to an inference that the recovery of 0.32 inch revolver was a recovery not related to the crime event nor also the accused can be conclusively said to make user of the said recovered fire arm in his committing the fatal assault upon deceased -- Impugned verdict of conviction and sentence(s) of imprisonment as well as of fine required to be quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 23-28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Murder -- Last seen theory -- Presence of two accused persons missing in FIR – Had the complainant been aware of the narrative as put forward by PW-14, before registration of FIR, there was no reason for him, who is a father who lost his son, to conceal such essential information -- Non-disclosure of vital information qua presence of accused with the looted goats and sheep of complainant and names of two accused persons, clearly establishes that PW14 is an introduced witness, who was examined just to complete the chain of circumstances -- Story of last seen stands badly contradicted by the contents of FIR.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report reveals that human blood was detected on the stick, and, knife (Chhura), however, the report is inconclusive qua ‘Human Blood Group’ – It was imperative for the Investigation Officer to have made efforts to collect the finger print impressions from the recovered stick, knife (Chhura), liquor bottle, and, the two glasses, and thereafter, to get them compared with the finger print impressions of the accused persons – However, the Investigation Officer concerned has evidently not carried out any such exercise -- The omission of the prosecution proves fatal to the prosecution story.

(Para 30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Murder -- Disclosure statement – Demarcation of places – Relevance -- Nothing recovered from appellant/ accused, in pursuance of his disclosure statement except demarcation of certain places, vis-à-vis, the place where liquor was consumed by accused persons, the place of occurrence, the place from where the dead body was thrown into canal, and, the place where accused persons had left the looted goats and sheep -- Such a disclosure statement does not establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, as the disclosures made therein were already in the knowledge of the Investigation Officer.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report unveils matching of the POP casts of foot and footwear impressions of respondent/accused with the ones lifted from the crime scene -- Whether the acquittal of respondent/ accused can be converted into conviction, solely on the basis of the FSL report, answer is in negative – Samples of foot prints of the accused persons were not taken in the presence of any Magistrate -- Except the FSL Report, there is no other corroborative incriminating evidence available on record -- As such, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, wherefrom the FSL Report may gain vigor, a finding of acquittal cannot be turned into a finding of guilt.

(Para 45, 46)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Endeavour on the part of the Court should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal  -- If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal.

(Para 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution -- Such would not be a correct approach.

(Para 33)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 -- Murder – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence by High Court -- High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. -- All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts -- High Court has done is something impermissible -- In the overall view of the matter, High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts – Appeals allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside -- Convicts ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of three days.

(Para 34-40)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 174 (c) – Obstructing running of train by rash and negligent act – Acquittal -- No sign board, notice or milestone was installed by the Railways on the site of the occurrence, depicting that an optical fibre cable wire was installed underneath the land which could have alerted any person undertaking any work there -- Respondent-accused could not have judged without any notice in this regard that there was an optical fibre cable wire underneath -- Cutting of underground optical fibre cable wire -- It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent-accused was driving the JCB machine in a rash and negligent manner – Respondent-accused had been deputed by the Forest Department to dig the roots of the trees so that these trees could be uprooted – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 2, 4, 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Contempt of Court – MoU between the parties during the pendency of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- MoU was filed before the Trial Court, wherein, the Respondent/ accused gave an undertaking to the Trial Court that the entire settlement amount shall be paid on or before 29.02.2020 and it was further stated that in case of default, he would become liable for contempt of Court – Respondent/ accused has only paid a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs and has failed to pay the balance of Rs. 2,40,84,782.14 as per the undertaking – Respondent held guilty of contempt for wilful breach of terms of the MoU and the undertakings given – Contemnor, ordered to undergo two (02) months imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000 -- In default of payment of the fine, he shall further undergo fifteen (15) days simple imprisonment.

(Para 1, 2, 13-14)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Subsequent conduct -- Conduct of accused in going to the Police Station and surrendering before the Police can be taken into consideration.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Last seen theory -- Prosecution established that the deceased and the accused persons left the house of P.W.5 together and soon thereafter the death of the deceased had occurred -- As such, the burden to show as to what happened after leaving the house would shift on the accused in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Death penalty – Commuted to life imprisonment – No criminal antecedents -- Appellant-D has been sentenced to capital punishment, was a young boy of about 25 years at the time of the incident -- Medical evidence would further reveal that the appellants have not acted in a brutal manner, inasmuch as there is only single injury inflicted on both the deceased -- As such, it cannot be considered to be ‘rarest of rare’ case -- Report of the Probation Officer as well as the Superintendent, Central Prison would show that the appellant-D has been found to be well-behaved, helping and a person with leadership qualities -- He is not a person with criminal mindset and criminal records – Sentence of capital punishment commuted to life imprisonment.

(Para 28-31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)