A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Life and liberty of victim/ accused -- Article 21 of the Constitution protects lives and personal liberties of both the victim and those accused of having committed an offence.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 154 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Arrest of accused -- To strike a balance, distinction is drawn between power of arrest of an accused person u/s 41 and registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Code -- While registration of an FIR is mandatory, the arrest of the accused on registration of the FIR is not -- FIR is registered on the basis of information without any qualification like credible, reasonable or true information -- Reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for registration of the FIR -- However, for making arrest in terms of Section 41(1)(b) or (g), the legal requirements and mandate is reflected in the expression ‘reasonable complaint’ or ‘credible information’.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Foreclose of investigation -- Under Section 157(1) of the Code, a Police officer can foreclose the investigation if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate -- Requirement of Section 157(1) for the Police officer to start investigation is that he has “reason to suspect the commission of an offence” -- Therefore, the Police officer is not liable to launch investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating to commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 16)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1), 173, 202 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – When the Police officer forecloses investigation in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1), he must submit a report to the Magistrate -- Here, the Magistrate can direct the Police to investigate, or if he thinks fit, hold an inquiry -- Where a Police officer, in a given case, proceeds to investigate the matter, then he files the final report u/s 173 of the Code -- The noticeable feature of the scheme is that the Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of investigation -- Magistrate, who has little or no scope to interfere with the investigation, is not absolutely powerless in view of the powers conferred in terms of Sections 159 and 173, and infra, Section 202 of the Code.

(Para 16-18)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Inherent power of the High Court -- This power is normally exercised when the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged -- When an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere into an investigation, however, if the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation can be permitted.

(Para 19-20)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) – Cognizable offence -- FIR -- The operandi for registration of information in a cognizable offence and eventual investigation is not limited to Police -- Sub-section (3) to Section 156, subject to legal stipulations, gives the ameliorating power to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order an investigation in a cognizable offence -- Two different powers vested with two distinct authorities, namely the Police and the Magistrate, who discharge distinct functions and roles under the Code as indicated above are not entirely imbricating.

(Para 23)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 -- Postponement of issue of process -- Section 202 not only refers to an inquiry but also to an investigation -- In such cases, the Police cannot on its own exercise the power of arrest in course of making its report in pursuance of the direction u/s 202 of the Code.

(Para 26)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 202 -- Magistrate is required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under Section 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure under Section 202. He can also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police.

(Para 38)

I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 397, 401 – Right of accused pre-summoning proceedings – Revision -- Accused do not have any right to appear before the Magistrate before summons are issued -- However, the law gives them a right to appear before the revisionary court in proceedings, when the complainant challenges the order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code.

(Para 39)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Duty of trial judge -- A trial judge has tremendous powers to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant” -- It is in fact the duty of the Trial Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and crucial question was left from being asked from a witness -- Duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to participate in the trial “by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.”

(Para 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 101, 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- When the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances of the case -- Discovery u/s 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased -- This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Amendment of loan amount in complaint and affidavit of evidence -- Wrong amount of loan mentioned in demand notice/ complaint as Rs. 6,60,000/- instead of Rs.7,20,000/- -- Affidavit also adduced for wrong amount --  Complainant was cross-examined on such statement on oath -- Again in cross-examination he admitted to have stated that he had given Rs.6,60,000/- to the accused -- Loan amount cannot undergo a change because the same forms the very basis of the complaint -- This would certainly change the very nature and character of the case – Held, complainant cannot be permitted to change the very foundation of his case midway during trial.

(Para 3-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 336, 506 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Act endangering life or personal safety of others -- Acquittal -- Test identification Parade (TIP) -- When it is established from the testimony of witnesses that occurrence took place at about 10:30 p.m., with no source of light, it is highly doubtful as to how the two police officials identified the accused, particularly when there is no evidence on record that they knew the accused earlier -- No Test Identification Parade was ever conducted -- Complainant and alleged eye-witness have not supported the prosecution case – Appeal accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32, 72 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302, 307 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6 – Murder – Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- In a bomb blast the then Chief Minister of Punjab along with 16 others lost their lives and a dozen others were injured.

-- Petitioner himself never submitted any Mercy Petition.

-- Alleged Mercy Petition of year 2012 was filed by SGPC.

-- After the communication of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 27.09.2019, the proposal for considering the commutation of the death sentence of the petitioner was started and a decision was taken to keep the same pending till disposal of the pending appeals before Supreme Court, filed by the co-accused as well as by CBI.

-- It was after the directions issued by Supreme Court on 04.12.2020 and 02.05.2022 that the matter was again considered by the competent authority and it was decided to defer the question of commutation.

It cannot be alleged that there has been an inordinate delay in disposal of the Mercy Petition -- Argument regarding delay of more than 10 years cannot be sustained.

(Para 17)

B. Constitution of India, Article 32, 72 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302, 307 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6 – Murder – Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- In a bomb blast the then Chief Minister of Punjab along with 16 others lost their lives and a dozen others were injured -- It would not be within the domain of Supreme Court to delve upon the decision of the competent authority to defer taking of any decision at present -- It is within the domain of the executive to take a call on such sensitive issues -- Stand of the Ministry of Home Affairs to defer the decision on the Mercy Petition of the petitioner is also a decision for the reasons given thereunder -- It actually amounts to a decision declining to grant the same for the present – Direction given that competent authority, in due course of time, would again as and when it is deemed necessary, may deal with the Mercy Petition, and take a further decision.

(Para 17-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Eye witness turned hostile -- Two purported ocular witnesses to the occurrence PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case, turned hostile -- In a grilling cross-examination, rather both completely denied making their respective previous statements in writing to the police officer nor did they make any affirmative answer to any incriminatory affirmative suggestion put to each of them by the Public Prosecutor -- Thus stems an inference that prosecution has been unable to invincibly substantiate the charge(s) drawn against the accused.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) in Court – Reliance upon -- Injured eye witness (PW-15) made a previous statement to the police officer discloses;

“…. That person was with muffled face and he said to shoot me because I am the person of that party. In between the person who having gun, shooted me. I can identify that voice and face thoroughly if he was produced before me, because that person was faced me prior somewhere. The person, who shooted me, I can identify him. if he was produced before me because his face was uncovered. After hitting of bullet shot, I became unconscious…….”

Held, unless the investigating officer during the course of his carrying investigations into the crime FIR, had held a valid identification parade with the participation thereins of PW-15 to enable to identify the accused, the identification of the accused by PW-15 in Court was a frail and uncreditworthy -- PW-15 was legally incapacitated to identify for the first time the accused in Court --  Therefore, no evidentiary vigour can be assigned thereto -- Prosecution case which becomes rested, upon the deposition of PW-15, thus cannot succeed.

(Para 17-20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Disclosure statement – Recovery of revolver and three live cartridges -- Ballistic expert’s opinion --  Report of the ballistic expert is of grave importance -- No conclusive opinion was made by the ballistic expert with respect to lead bullet mark CB/1 contained in parcel ‘D’ becoming fired from 0.32 inch revolver – Held, the inconclusivity of opinion leads to an inference that the recovery of 0.32 inch revolver was a recovery not related to the crime event nor also the accused can be conclusively said to make user of the said recovered fire arm in his committing the fatal assault upon deceased -- Impugned verdict of conviction and sentence(s) of imprisonment as well as of fine required to be quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 23-28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Murder -- Last seen theory -- Presence of two accused persons missing in FIR – Had the complainant been aware of the narrative as put forward by PW-14, before registration of FIR, there was no reason for him, who is a father who lost his son, to conceal such essential information -- Non-disclosure of vital information qua presence of accused with the looted goats and sheep of complainant and names of two accused persons, clearly establishes that PW14 is an introduced witness, who was examined just to complete the chain of circumstances -- Story of last seen stands badly contradicted by the contents of FIR.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report reveals that human blood was detected on the stick, and, knife (Chhura), however, the report is inconclusive qua ‘Human Blood Group’ – It was imperative for the Investigation Officer to have made efforts to collect the finger print impressions from the recovered stick, knife (Chhura), liquor bottle, and, the two glasses, and thereafter, to get them compared with the finger print impressions of the accused persons – However, the Investigation Officer concerned has evidently not carried out any such exercise -- The omission of the prosecution proves fatal to the prosecution story.

(Para 30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Murder -- Disclosure statement – Demarcation of places – Relevance -- Nothing recovered from appellant/ accused, in pursuance of his disclosure statement except demarcation of certain places, vis-à-vis, the place where liquor was consumed by accused persons, the place of occurrence, the place from where the dead body was thrown into canal, and, the place where accused persons had left the looted goats and sheep -- Such a disclosure statement does not establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, as the disclosures made therein were already in the knowledge of the Investigation Officer.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report unveils matching of the POP casts of foot and footwear impressions of respondent/accused with the ones lifted from the crime scene -- Whether the acquittal of respondent/ accused can be converted into conviction, solely on the basis of the FSL report, answer is in negative – Samples of foot prints of the accused persons were not taken in the presence of any Magistrate -- Except the FSL Report, there is no other corroborative incriminating evidence available on record -- As such, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, wherefrom the FSL Report may gain vigor, a finding of acquittal cannot be turned into a finding of guilt.

(Para 45, 46)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Endeavour on the part of the Court should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal  -- If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal.

(Para 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution -- Such would not be a correct approach.

(Para 33)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 -- Murder – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence by High Court -- High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. -- All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts -- High Court has done is something impermissible -- In the overall view of the matter, High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts – Appeals allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside -- Convicts ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of three days.

(Para 34-40)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 174 (c) – Obstructing running of train by rash and negligent act – Acquittal -- No sign board, notice or milestone was installed by the Railways on the site of the occurrence, depicting that an optical fibre cable wire was installed underneath the land which could have alerted any person undertaking any work there -- Respondent-accused could not have judged without any notice in this regard that there was an optical fibre cable wire underneath -- Cutting of underground optical fibre cable wire -- It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent-accused was driving the JCB machine in a rash and negligent manner – Respondent-accused had been deputed by the Forest Department to dig the roots of the trees so that these trees could be uprooted – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 2, 4, 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Contempt of Court – MoU between the parties during the pendency of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- MoU was filed before the Trial Court, wherein, the Respondent/ accused gave an undertaking to the Trial Court that the entire settlement amount shall be paid on or before 29.02.2020 and it was further stated that in case of default, he would become liable for contempt of Court – Respondent/ accused has only paid a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs and has failed to pay the balance of Rs. 2,40,84,782.14 as per the undertaking – Respondent held guilty of contempt for wilful breach of terms of the MoU and the undertakings given – Contemnor, ordered to undergo two (02) months imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000 -- In default of payment of the fine, he shall further undergo fifteen (15) days simple imprisonment.

(Para 1, 2, 13-14)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Subsequent conduct -- Conduct of accused in going to the Police Station and surrendering before the Police can be taken into consideration.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Last seen theory -- Prosecution established that the deceased and the accused persons left the house of P.W.5 together and soon thereafter the death of the deceased had occurred -- As such, the burden to show as to what happened after leaving the house would shift on the accused in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Death penalty – Commuted to life imprisonment – No criminal antecedents -- Appellant-D has been sentenced to capital punishment, was a young boy of about 25 years at the time of the incident -- Medical evidence would further reveal that the appellants have not acted in a brutal manner, inasmuch as there is only single injury inflicted on both the deceased -- As such, it cannot be considered to be ‘rarest of rare’ case -- Report of the Probation Officer as well as the Superintendent, Central Prison would show that the appellant-D has been found to be well-behaved, helping and a person with leadership qualities -- He is not a person with criminal mindset and criminal records – Sentence of capital punishment commuted to life imprisonment.

(Para 28-31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Legally enforceable liability – Presumption – Rebuttal – Petitioner/ accused  borrowed a sum of Rs.1,80,000/- from complainant and issued two post-dated cheques on the date of borrowing itself – Petitioner/ accused defence that LIC Policy Premium cheques has been misused -- Respondent/ complainant in cross-examination stated that for paying premium, D.D. has to be taken in the name of L.I.C and not in the complainant/ respondent's name -- Premium amount of L.I.C is known and the contention of the petitioner/ accused that he had issued the cheque without filing the amount is not acceptable – Respondent/ complainant categorically discharged his initial burden -- Both the Courts below rightly convicted the petitioner -- Trial Court directed to take steps to secure the petitioner/accused to serve the remaining period of sentence.

(Para 3-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section  307, 325, 147, 148, 323, 325, 307, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Injury on the head with iron rod – Nothing on record of trial court to show injury was grievous or dangerous to life -- However as per medical record produced by the petitioner one of the injuries found to be grievous in nature – Petitioner in custody for the last more than 1 year and 2 months and is having no criminal history – Complainant and injured are already examined but it will take considerable time for the trial to conclude -- Nothing on record to show that if released on bail the petitioner is going to abscond or will tamper with the evidence -- Petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Charge -- Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence -- Charge can be framed even on the basis of strong suspicion, if the same is supported with material on record.

(Para 4)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Rash and negligent driving – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Charge u/s 304 IPC -- Allegation that petitioner was driving the oil tanker at a high speed, without blowing any horn, in a zig zag manner and intentionally struck with the scooter, which resulted in the death of all the three occupants of the scooter -- Prima facie, it appears to be a case of extreme negligence and rashness -- Alternative charge u/s 304A IPC has not been framed, such an error can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. – Charge u/s 304 affirmed, Ld. Trial Court advised to look into the alteration/amendment of the charge.

(Para 5-8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 – Defective charge – Whether vitiate trial -- Accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of charge against him, but the error in the charge, if any, can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. -- The defect in framing of the charge, per se, may not vitiate the trial.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Proclaimed person – Proceedings u/s 138 NI Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – FIR u/s 174-A of IPC along with all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22(C) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS case – Regular bail – Commercial quantity – Petitioner in custody since 22.01.2021 and none of the 15 PWs have been examined till date -- Therefore, the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which provides for a right to speedy Trial and the petitioner can be granted the concession of bail – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 397, 450 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106, 114(a) -- Murder – Recovery of stolen goods – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of appellants:

-- A2 was found in possession of a bag carrying some of the stolen ornaments and, speaks against him, in terms of Section 114 (a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It was for A2 to explain as to how he came to be in possession of those stolen ornaments, u/s 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- However, no explanation was offered by him.

-- It is the prosecution’s case that A1 confessed to commission of the crime and upon being questioned as to the stolen gold ornaments, he himself went into the other room in his house and brought out a bag containing the gold ornaments -- This part of his confession admissible u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments.

Recovery of this stolen property from the accused would not be sufficient in itself to convict them for murder -- Inescapable fact remains that PWs 4, 6, and 10, who were witnesses independent of each other and who had no animosity or enmity with the accused, spoke in unison about seeing them running away from the house of PW-1 of the fateful night with bags in their possession -- No explanation is forthcoming as to why three separate witnesses would choose to implicate the accused falsely.

Sequence of events unfolded in quick succession during the intervening night of 21.08.2008 and 22.08.2008, leading to not only identification of the accused by the witnesses present but also their apprehension and arrest, apart from seizure of the stolen gold ornaments and cash from their possession, it is amply clear that there was no time or possibility for the police to hoist a false case upon them -- Minor discrepancies and shortcomings in the statements made by witnesses after passage of a few years would necessarily have to be discounted in such a scenario.

Conviction order upheld.

(Para 23-27)

Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013),  Section 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 470, 471, 120-B -- Smuggling of human -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statements of the parties recorded and the compromise is genuine and has been arrived at between them without any coercion or undue influence – FIR along with all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 53, 302, 376 -- Rape and murder of a 14 year old girl – Punishment for 30 years -- Death penalty by Trial Court, modified by  High Court to life imprisonment for the whole of biological life without any remission – Considering the fact that the appellant was 26 years of age when the offence was committed and there may be chances of his reformation, sentence of life imprisonment modified to the fixed term sentence for a period of 30 years without any benefit of remission.

(Para 9, 10)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 407, 415 to 420, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail -- Registration of the ECIR and the lodging of the prosecution complaint in the year 2022 were a sequel to the registration of the FIR for the predicate offence, way back in the year 2013 -- No final report has been filed in the FIR for the predicate offence, for the past nine years -- De-facto complainant in the FIR for the predicate offence, was sought to be arrested as an accused in connection with the ECIR, but the application of the Enforcement Directorate for remand was rejected -- Appellant is a Chartered Accountant by profession and has been in jail from 26.09.2022 – Second condition found in Clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 45 of PMLA is satisfied qua the appellant -- Continued incarceration may not be justified, appellant directed to be enlarged on bail.

(Para 13-16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Account closed – Defence that accused misused the security cheque by filling up the name of wife -- Cheque was written and signed by the accused -- Return memo indicates that on the date when the cheque drawn, the bank account already closed -- Complainant caused notice, which was received by the accused -- In the cross examination it is elucidated from the complainant that her husband and sons are running business in wax printing and they have business transaction with the accused – Held, this fact is no way rebut the presumption enumerated under Section 139 of N.I.Act -- Accused cannot take a plea that the said cheque was given as a security for the transaction, which took place four years ago.

(Para 14-16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Capacity to pay -- As far as the source of income, the complainant in the cross examination has indicated her source and also though she is an house wife, her husband and son being the earning members, it cannot be ruled out that she has no wherewithal to lend Rs.5,00,000/- to the accused – Contention that subject cheque was given only as a security and the complainant has no wherewithal to advance Rs.5,00,000/-, both factually not proved even by preponderance of probability -- While there is a statutory presumption, mere denial or adducing evidence which does not shake the foundational fact proved by the complainant, can be taken as a probability.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- No chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – FIR under Sections 363 and 366A of IPC, and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Suicide note – Reliance upon -- Trial Court has not found the suicide note to be trustworthy -- As per the report of the FSL, no definite opinion could be given regarding the suicide note having been executed by deceased -- Trial Court also found that it was quite strange that the deceased, in a semiconscious state, took out a note and handed over the same to his brother instead of doing so when he was in his senses – High Court do not find any illegality and error  in this finding.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Prosecution did not give any immediate cause which could have driven deceased to commit suicide -- Still further, no evidence was brought on record to show that accused incited, goaded or aided the commission of suicide -- It was, therefore, rightly held that the ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC did not stand fulfilled.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 468, 471, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438  -- Cheating – Anticipatory bail - Rs.8,10,000/- taken from the complainant on the pretext of sending two persons to Singapore – When court was not inclined to grant bail, only then the petitioner was ready and willing to affect a compromise with the complainant -- In that situation his arrest was stayed and he was asked to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, however, he has deliberately chosen not to appear -- Petitioner does not deserve the concession of anticipatory bail – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2), 378 – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction by Appellate court -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence -- Principle of according opportunity of hearing to the convict before sentencing him is equally applicable where the sentencing is done by the appellate court -- Convicts are entitled to opportunity of hearing on sentence.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2) -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence – As a general rule, the trial court is duty bound to adjourn the matter to a future date after recording the conviction so as to call upon both the sides to hear on the question of sentence before sentencing the accused persons -- Court is obliged to hear the accused persons after their conviction on the quantum of sentence before passing a sentence against them.

(Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 124A, 153A, 153B -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 18, 39 – Protection against arrest -- On discharge petitioner was released and during this period of 21 months, he was not indulged in any unlawful activity -- On the contrary, the petitioner got elected to the Legislative Assembly in the year 2021 and he is now a sitting member of the Assembly – Discharge order set aside, matter remanded back to Special Court by the High Court -- It is only the offences alleged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which are punishable with larger terms of imprisonment -- If the offences under the IPC alone are taken into account, the petitioner has served, as an undertrial prisoner, more than half of the maximum period prescribed under the relevant provisions – Held, this is not a case where the petitioner should be allowed to be detained in custody, especially after having secured an order of discharge, rightly or wrongly – Petitioner directed to be released on bail pending trial.

(Para 19-25)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Revision – Sentence of cheque amount – While suspending the sentence High Court imposed a condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- -- Further, imposed condition that the petitioner shall deposit another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of four weeks after immediately coming out on bail – Both the conditions were duly complied with by the petitioner – Petitioner ready and willing to settle the remaining cheque amount within the stipulated time fixed by this Court – Conviction confirmed, sentence set aside on condition that the petitioner shall deposit the remaining cheque amount namely a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- on or before 29.05.2023.

(Para 5-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Validity of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Dishonor of cheque with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” -- It was not mentioned on the cheque that the same is valid for 3 months -- Controversy involved is totally a disputed question of facts and the same is to be appreciated by the learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence led by both the sides regarding the contentions raised that whether the cheque is valid for 3 months or not -- Petition for quashing dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 18, 19, 20, 39, 43D(5) – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Offence under UAPA – Regular bail – No reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the UAPA are prime facie true -- Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D will not apply in the case -- Charge not framed, prosecution proposes to examine more than 140 witnesses -- Some of the accused are absconding -- Thus, no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future – Special Judge directed to release the appellants on bail on appropriate conditions determined by him after hearing the appellants and respondent.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 27 – Confession – Discovery of fact – Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule under Section 25 that a confession made by an accused to a police officer is not admissible in evidence -- The first condition for the applicability of Section 27 is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact, which is the direct outcome of such information -- Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said discovery is admissible against the accused.

(Para 14)

A. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 19(2) – Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 12A -- Adulterated food – Misbranded article -- Vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves that he purchased the article of food from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty in prescribed form -- Appellant sold the article of food after purchasing the same from the manufacturer through the invoices which contained the warranty as prescribed under the Act and the Rules Hence, he had the protection available under Section 19(2)(a) of the Act.

(Para 13, 15)

B. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 19(2) – Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 12A – Warranty in writing – Adulteration of food -- A conjoint reading of Section 14, Rule 12A and Form VIA provides that no manufacturer or distributor or a dealer of any food article shall sell such article to any vendor unless he has given a warranty in writing in the prescribed form regarding nature and quality of such articles to the vendor -- Even a bill, cash memo or invoice in respect of sale of any article given by the manufacturer or distributor or dealer shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer.

(Para 11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to frame charge u/s 7 of PC Act -- Appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance – This is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective -- However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned -- Therefore, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to Frame a Proper Charge – Omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder -- Framing of charge -- While framing charge u/s 307 of IPC, what the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section and It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder – Head injury -- Blow of sharp-edged weapon -- Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence u/s 307 of the IPC and intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from the surrounding circumstances -- Injury on the vital part of the body and among other things, considering the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blow inflicted, prima-facie case u/s 307 IPC is made out.

(Para 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 -- Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135 -- Theft of electricity – Ad-interim injunction for electricity connection -- Suit for mandatory injunction seeking new electricity connection – Arguments qua theft in abstract are admissible only when the theft has been proved by any competent Court below -- Merely, registration of an FIR does not amount to any conclusive proof of the theft, as has been pleaded – Application allowed by Trial court affirmed in appeal – Held, orders passed by ld. Courts below being interim in nature are subject to outcome of the trial, no grounds to interfere.

-- electricity being a basic requirement, cannot be deprived to a consumer when allegations qua his being an erring party are yet to be adjudicated.

-- balance of convenience, at this stage, is in favour of consumer and no irreparable loss would be caused as the outstanding dues, needless to say, will be recoverable from the consumer, in case the same are found admissible as per claim of petitioner-Nigam.

(Para 1-4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- There is double presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent-accused -- Initial presumption of innocence is on account of the basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty -- Secondly, said presumption is reinforced by the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court after trial based on the evidence – In these circumstances, onus is heavy on the petitioner/ complainant to show the illegality or impropriety of the finding recorded by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405 – Criminal breach of trust – Following ingredients must be proved to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust –

(A) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property;

(B) that the person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or (b) dishonestly used or disposed of that property or willfully suffered any other person to do so in violation, (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Misappropriation of 1657 bags i.e. 1055 quintals 50 kg and 942 grams of paddy -- 6614 bags weighing 4286 quintals 60 kg paddy were stored for the purpose of milling -- Prosecution utterly failed to prove the dominion of the accused over the said property – Civil suit filed by the petitioner/ complainant/ FCI for recovery, on the same allegations, has already been dismissed by the Civil Court despite the fact that burden of proof in the civil suit is of much lesser degree compared to the criminal case – Prosecution utterly failed to prove the entrustment of the paddy bags, which was allegedly misappropriated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10, 12, 13)

A. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 40, 46 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985)-- Section 9, 25 – NDPS case – BSF Commandant – Acquittal -- Conviction by General Security Force Court --  Appellant was commanding the Force operating over a large area, including from where the Jerrycans (controlled substance under NDPS Act ) allegedly moved from the Indian side to the Pakistani side -- Actual manning of the area is by the subordinate personnel of the Force -- Subordinate personnel have been adjudged guilty, indicating their active involvement -- No direct evidence against the appellant – Held, appellant, being the Commandant, had no responsibility/ duty to prevent such incident -- ceteris paribus, without other material(s) incriminating the appellant or pointing to his guilt, the statement of a single person alone, ought not to have, in this instance, resulted in his conviction -- Impugned Judgment quashed, conviction and sentence set aside -- Appellant held entitled to full retiral benefits from the date of his superannuation till date.

(Para 38-51)

B. Uniform pattern of judgments -- Supreme Court held, it is desirable that all Courts and Tribunals, as a matter of practice, number paragraphs in all Orders and Judgments in seriatim -- Secretary-General shall circulate this judgement to the learned Registrars General of all High Courts, to place the same before Hon’ble the Chief Justices, to consider adoption of a uniform format for Judgments and Orders, including paragraphing -- The learned Chief Justices may direct the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to their High Courts accordingly as well.

(Para 56, 57)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 72, 161 – Mercy petition – Expedite disposal – Directions issued -- Supreme Court observed and directed all the States/appropriate authorities before whom the mercy petitions are to be filed and/or who are required to decide the mercy petitions against the death sentence, such mercy petitions are decided at the earliest so that the benefit of delay in not deciding the mercy petitions is not accrued to the accused and the accused are not benefited by such an inordinate delay and the accused may not take the disadvantage of such inordinate delay.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 72, 161 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 53, 54, 55, 302 – Murder -- Nine persons killed -- Death sentence – Long pendency of mercy petition -- Commuted to life imprisonment for natural life -- High Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment on the ground that there was an inordinate unexplained delay in not deciding the mercy petition(s) kept pending for about 7 years and 10 months – Judgment and order modified and it is directed that the accused to undergo life imprisonment for natural life and without any remission.

(Para 4-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail -- Allegation against the petitioner are that he was one of the friends of deceased and was extending help to his wife to remain in adultery with one PS, leaving her husband and children – Held, there would be no justifiability for custodial or pre-trial incarceration at this stage -- Furthermore, the petitioner is a first offender, and one of the relevant factors would be to provide an opportunity to course-correct – Petition allowed.

(Para 5, 10,11)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 362 – Bail under SC/ST Act – Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court -- Changed circumstances -- Once an appeal under Section 14A against the order passed by the Special Court rejecting the application under Section 439 of the CrPC is decided on merits or otherwise by High Court, subsequent appeal under change of circumstances would not be directly maintainable under Section 14A before High Court even on change of circumstances and remedy to the accused, if any, is to file an application before the Special Court for grant of bail.

(Para 31)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court – Regular bail -- Power to grant bail u/s 439 of the CrPC has only vested to the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act and High Court is only empowered to hear appeal under Section 14A(2) of the POA Act against refusal or grant of bail by the Special Court under the Act.

(Para 31)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1), 482 -- Proclamation – 30 days’ time for appearance – Quashing of proclamation order -- Proclamation was effected on 10.01.2020 for 14.01.2020 – For appearance giving only 04 days’ time to the petitioner, clearly falls short of the statutory period of 30 days prescribed u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C -- Petitioner was declared as proclaimed offender on 12.03.2020; whereas for the said date, there was no proclamation u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C. was either ordered or effected – Order dated 12.03.2020 being violative of Section 82 Cr.P.C. set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Procedure of proclamation – Mandatory and inviolable -- Provisions of Section 82 (1) Cr.P.C. provides procedure for appearance of an individual before the Court in the criminal proceedings and thus, regulates the liberty of an individual as such it stems from Article 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly becomes mandatory and inviolable.

(Para 8)