Search By Topic: Penal Laws

356. (P&H HC) 07-06-2023

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Mens rea -- Delay of two days in FIR -- Except abusing the complainant with her caste name, there is no allegation that the appellant with a view to intentionally insult or intimidate or humiliate the complainant, abused her and that too in a place within the public view -- To attract the offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act, the mens rea is the essential ingredient -- If in the course of a quarrel or due to some other grouse, the accused abused the complainant by using the caste name, the said act by itself does not automatically attract the offence Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 10-14)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Public view -- The expression “public view” as enshrined in Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST, has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties.

(Para 10)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Incident of 08.00 PM on 22.05.2005 -- Complainant had ample opportunity to report the matter to the police, still the report was lodged at about 7:30 PM on 24.05.2005, after a delay of about two days and there is no explanation for the said delay -- Prosecution did not lead any evidence to indicate the sufficient reasons for reporting the matter so late -- Lodging of the complaint after an unexplained and inordinate delay is also a strong circumstance to doubt the commission of offence.

(Para 11)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 243 -- Defence witness – Evidential value -- Deposition of a defence witness cannot be discarded or disbelieved only on the ground that he was supporting the case of the accused -- Every defence witness has to be treated at par with a prosecution witness and if the deposition of a defence witness is found to be creditworthy, the same can always be believed and relied upon by the courts.

(Para 12)

357. (SC) 02-06-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning as additional accused – Discretionary power of court -- Pre-requisites -- For exercise of the power u/s 319, Cr. PC is that the evidence on record must show the involvement of a person in the commission of a crime and that the said person, who has not been arraigned as an accused, should face trial together with the accused already arraigned -- However, the court holding a trial, if it intends to exercise power conferred by section 319, Cr. PC, must not act mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence has come on record implicating the person sought to be summoned; its satisfaction preceding the order thereunder must be more than prima facie as formed at the stage of a charge being framed and short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 419, 420, 323, 406, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) & (s) -- Summoning as additional accused – FIR is not such where one finds complete absence of any reference to the brother of “D” who had joined “D” in assaulting and abusing the complainant or that the allegations are entirely “D” centric with none else playing any role -- It is not that involvement of brother of “D” in the crime is being referred to for the first time in the court – Appellant was not named in the FIR; but, that by itself, cannot be held to be decisive -- Once it is conceded that the appellant is a sibling of one of the named assailants, the material for forming the requisite satisfaction cannot be said to be non-existent -- Special Court formed the requisite satisfaction prior to summoning the appellant to face trial with “D” -- Order of the Special Bench and High Court affirming it cannot be faulted -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10-13)

360. (P&H HC) 02-06-2023

A. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(A)(1), Section 28 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 – Limitation – Bar to take cognizance – Quashing of criminal complaint/ proceedings -- Maximum punishment of one year for alleged offence -- Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. bars the concerned Court from taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation – Report of the Laboratory was received on 05.03.2009 & thus, the limitation to file complaint would expire on 04.03.2010 while the same has been filed by the Drug Inspector on 07.06.2012 i.e. approximately after 3 years and 3 months when period of limitation was long over – Despite of there being no application for condonation of delay, summoning order dated 08.06.2012 was passed by the Court clearly beyond jurisdiction -- Entire proceedings right from registration of the complaint are rendered unsustainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(A)(1), Section 28 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Firm as accused without any representative -- Quashing of criminal complaint/ Summoning order -- In the complaint, only the firm has been arrayed as accused without impleading it through any of its authorised representative -- Criminal proceedings against the company only, when sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on the juristic person are an exercise in futile -- Petition allowed, Criminal Complaint, summoning order and all other consequential proceedings quashed .

(Para 11, 12)

367. (P&H HC) 24-05-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 325 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Miscarriage – No medical evidence -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though wife of the complainant, was pregnant, there is absolutely no evidence on record of a miscarriage having taken place on account of beatings being meted out by the petitioners and their co-accused -- Similarly, there is absolutely no evidence of the injured suffering an injury attracting Section 325 IPC -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 342, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful confinement -- House trespass – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Complainant party and the accused reside on different floors of the same house -- Therefore, while on the one hand, it is doubtful if either of the offence was made out, on the other hand, it would be a travesty of justice to allow the instant proceedings to continue against the petitioners given the fact that there are multiple litigations pending between the parties, and therefore, their false implication cannot be ruled out – Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Hurt – Long delay -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though prima facie, the medical evidence would suggest that an offence is made out, however, the occurrence pertains to September 2006, the present complaint came to be instituted in June 2012, the summoning order came to be passed in August 2016 and the matter has come up for hearing now in May 2023 -- Therefore, it would be a travesty of justice to permit the prosecution of the petitioners for an offence u/s 323 IPC alone after 17 years of the alleged occurrence -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

368. (P&H HC) 22-05-2023

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Presumption of innocence -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty -- Presumption of innocence is a facet of Article 21 of Constitution of India.

(Para 18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 317 – Exemption from appearance of accused -- Following parameters can be applied for grant of exemption from personal appearance by the Courts while exercising power under Sections 205 and 317 of the Code -- The personal appearance of the accused should be dispensed with when the accused is:-

i) a woman;

ii) an elderly person;

iii) a person with disability;

iv) when accused is facing inconvenience and unjustified ordeal on account of delay in trial attributable to the prosecution;

v) facing extreme hardship i.e. economic and physical;

vi) required to travel a long distance to attend the trial.

These instances are not exhaustive but only illustrative.

(Para 19)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 317 – Exemption from appearance of accused -- When the presence of an accused becomes indispensable at any subsequent stage of an inquiry or trial, the Court has ample powers to secure his presence in such eventuality – One size fits all approach cannot be taken while exercising the powers u/s 205 and 317 as each case is required to be assessed on its own facts and circumstances.

(Para 20)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 317 – Exemption from appearance of accused -- If the trial is being delayed on account of the absence of the accused when the witnesses are required to identify him, the accused can be directed to be present for this purpose -- Courts should only order appearance of the accused when it becomes indispensable.

(Para 22)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 317 – Sections 341, 379, 448, 451, 452, 506, 34 -- Exemption from appearance of accused – High Court exempted personal appearance of accused before Trial court subject to the following conditions:

i) Petitioners shall be represented through their counsel;

ii) shall not delay/stall the trial proceedings;

iii) shall not dispute their identity as accused;

iv) shall have no objection if the prosecution evidence is recorded in their absence but in the presence of their counsel;

v) shall appear before the trial Court as and when required; and

vi) any other condition which the trial Court may impose.

(Para 23)

373. (SC) 19-05-2023

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son) -- Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent.

(Para 17)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe – If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language -- Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.

(Para 18)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Trial of accused -- Before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. but at least in the charge-sheet so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence.

(Para 18)

377. (Meghalaya HC) 13-05-2023

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Account holder -- Joint liability – For an offence u/s 138 to be made out a cheque has to be issued by the account holder under his name and signature -- It is only the holder of the account on which the cheque is drawn can be made liable and such culpability cannot be extended to others except as provided u/s 141 N.I. Act.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Joint liability – Joint Account – Signatory of cheque – Requirement of -- In case of individual persons, a person other than a person who has drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him cannot be persecuted for an offence u/s 138 N.I. Act, unless the bank account is jointly maintained and that he was a signatory to the cheque.

(Para 14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Bank also summoned – Quashing of proceedings -- Petitioner/Bank has been made a party by the complainant where no role can be attributed to the bank -- Bank is only the custodian of the money of the customers and has to comply with the instructions of such customers -- In case of insufficiency of funds, the bank is only to report the same and as such, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be liable for any act of the customer who has issued the cheque which was later dishonoured – Proceeding as against the petitioner/ Bank set aside and quashed.

(Para 15-17)

383. (P&H HC) 12-05-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – House trespass -- Exclusive possession – Framing of charge -- Nothing placed on record by the petitioner to even prima facie show exclusive possession of the property in dispute -- Once this had not been proved, no offence would be made out u/s 452 IPC -- Trial Court rightly did not frame any charge u/s 452 IPC – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 380 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – Theft – Framing of charge -- Apart from the bald statement that the respondent alongwith his accomplices had taken away the articles, no evidence led -- Prima facie case should be made out and charges cannot be framed on mere assumptions and presumptions or on the mere bald statements of the complainant and the witnesses -- Courts below, therefore, rightly did not frame any charge under Sections 379 and 380 IPC -- Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 – Criminal intimidation – Framing of charge -- Charges framed u/s 506 IPC only as the respondent is alleged to have given threats to the petitioner that he would be eliminated -- No other evidence could have been produced -- Only the statement of the petitioner was sufficient -- Charge u/s 506 IPC upheld.

(Para 10-12)

386. (SC) 11-05-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Murder – Acquittal -- Separate charge u/s 452 read with 120-B of IPC was framed against all accused except the appellant – Thus charge framed against the appellant was of being a party to criminal conspiracy -- There is also a charge that all the accused fired bullets from their revolver -- Appellant’s presence with a weapon outside the premises where the offence took place – Prosecution examined 37 witnesses -- Appellant was not confronted during his examination u/s 313 of CrPC with the only allegation of the prosecution against him – Serious prejudice was caused to the appellant – 27 years have passed since the date of the incident -- Appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and 4 months -- Option of remand will be unjust -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside.

(Para 18-23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Circumstances appearing against accused – Putting the same to accused – Law summarised as follows:

(i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction;

(ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence;

(iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused;

(iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused;

(v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident;

(vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and

(vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC.

(viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.

(Para 16)

397. (SC) 04-05-2023

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 384, 385, 386, 387, 506(1), 506(2), 507, 201, 120B -- Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (24 of 2019), Section 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5), 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Extortion – Regular bail -- Alleged that appellant threatened the victim and concerned witnesses to cancel the land deal or to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore), which they refused – Role of the appellant is that he was involved in intimidating and threatening the victim on behalf of the accused no.1 for ensuring the victim’s compliance with the extortion demands -- Alleged that the appellant owns properties derived from funds of organised crimes -- Further it is revealed that the Appellant was directly involved in collecting the sum(s) extorted from the victim in the city, and that he has also been found to be involved in passing on information which is likely to assist the crime syndicate in its activities, thereby abetting the actions of the gang :

-- Had there been no other case against the Appellant and no material, at least prima facie, to indicate his regular participation in any crime, the Court could have considered his prayer, but keeping in view his alleged role, Court not inclined to exercise discretion in his favour, for now.

-- The fact, that out of the twelve charge-sheeted accused, six co-accused have not been granted bail, five have availed the benefit of default bail and only one is on regular bail, have also persuaded the Court not to interfere.

At the present juncture prayer for bail rejected, however, the stand taken on behalf of the State that the prayer for bail of the Appellant may be considered only after the protected witnesses are examined and six months’ time sought -- Upon the completion of recording of statements of the said protected witnesses, the Appellant is at liberty to renew his plea for bail.

(Para 3, 9, 13-15)