Search By Topic: Penal Laws

301. (P&H HC) 10-08-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Court has wide powers to summon a person as an additional who has been exonerated by the Investigating Agency, if it finds that there is sufficient evidence available against the said person in order to try him along with the accused already facing trial -- However, there is no compelling duty to summon an accused – Discretionary power so conferred should only be exercised to achieve justice and must be based on the quality of evidence collected.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Court being the sole repository of justice, there is a duty cast upon it to uphold the law and ensure that the real accused should not get away by manipulating the Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency -- What the Court needs to examine while adjudicating upon an application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. is that there should be evidence available on the file in the shape of oral evidence or documentary evidence in order to invoke its powers to summon an additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 , 34 – Murder -- Summoning of additional accused – Hearsay evidence -- When the FIR was registered, no reference was made of the nephews disclosing to the petitioner that their mother had been assaulted – Deposition of the petitioner that he had been told by his nephews about the assault on their mother at the instance of the father and the grand-mother would amount to ‘hear say’ evidence and thus, inadmissible -- No admissible evidence available on the record to summon the respondent No.2 as an additional accused to face trial alongwith the charge-sheeted accused – Application dismissed by Trial court – Order upheld.

(Para 1, 13)

302. (SC) 08-08-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Cognizable offence -- Registration of FIR -- Deceased, brother of the appellant was severely beaten and brutally assaulted by the accused and he succumbed to injuries -- Thereafter, the appellant and others had gone to the concerned police station to register the crime, however the same was not registered -- Appellant thereafter submitted the complaints to the concerned respondents however no action was taken to register the complaint – Held, in view of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari’s case (2014) 2 SCC 1, registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 of CrPC, if the information discloses commission of cognizable offence -- Appeal allowed and direction given to concerned respondents to proceed further with the complaints filed by the appellant in accordance with law.

(Para 3-7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR – Summary of law rendered by Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari’s case (2014) 2 SCC 1 reiterated –

“120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.]

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3 If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

120.4 The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

120.5 The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

120.6 As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

120.7 While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and, in any case, it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

120.8 Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.”

(Para 5)

303. (SC) 08-08-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 386 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Threat to withdraw FIR – Extortion -- Quashing of FIR -- To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC -- Nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons – No offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out -- FIR quashed.

(Para 16, 24-26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 195A – False evidence -- The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 383, 386 – Extortion -- One of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. -- Delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury -- Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition -- Nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear -- In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.

(Para 22-24)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 – Inherent powers of Court – Quashing of FIR -- Once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/ complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.

(Para 26)

305. (SC) 07-08-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If the accused are already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Appellants already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful -- Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the mobile used by the accused to show that their location was at the place of incident -- Mobile numbers alleged to have been used by accused is not in his name but one person resident of Kanpur -- No evidence placed on record to show as to how the said SIM came to be in possession of the accused – Apart from that, if at the time of the incident both accused were at the same place and according to the prosecution inside the house of the deceased, and they were talking to each other on telephone, this itself creates a doubt on the prosecution version -- Evidence with regard to last seen theory is totally unreliable -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 14, 15, 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Guilt of accused – Circumstantial evidence -- Circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established -- Facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty -- Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused -- It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 18, 19)

310. (SC) 03-08-2023

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 333, 353, 451 – Deter public servant to discharge his duty -- Caused fracture in little right finger – House trespass -- Appellant held guilty of the offences punishable u/s 333, 353 and 451 of the IPC – Leniency in sentence shown considering the facts and circumstances that:

a. For espousing the cause of the labourers, the appellant visited the office of the Directorate;

b. Evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 (a peon working in the Office of the Commissioner) indicated that the appellant had sent a slip of her name to PW-6 which was kept on the table of PW-6 as she wanted to meet him. After waiting for a considerable time, as she was not allowed to meet PW-6, she forced her entry to his cabin and complained that she was made to wait;

c. PW-1 admitted that the appellant was not annoyed with her. She stated that the appellant did not indulge in any scuffle with her. When she tried to stop the appellant, she was pushed by the appellant and that is how she received injury to her little right finger;

d. The incident is more than thirty years old;

e. During the last thirty and a half years, when the trial and appeal were pending, the appellant was all throughout on bail. Even in this appeal, an exemption has been granted to her from the requirement of surrendering;

f. During this long period of more than 30 long years, there was no allegation of any objectionable activity by her; and

g. The appellant is a female whose present age is 62 years.

appellant sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and fine of Rs.30,000/- for the offence u/s 333 IPC, fine of Rs.20,000/- u/s 353 IPC and sentence for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ u/s 451 IPC -- Substantive sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-10)

312. (SC) 03-08-2023

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial -- Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.

(Para 10)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Competence of the court trying the accused would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time -- In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law.

(Para 10)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution from Superior authority – Validity of – Challenge to -- Special Judge, while dismissing the third application filed by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by the prosecution, specifically held that the sanction accorded by the government which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid -- Such findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said sub-section (3).

(Para 14)

D. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution -- Discharge of accused -- Interlocutory application seeking discharge in the midst of trial would not be maintainable -- Once the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act -- Issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same was not pressed for -- Only stage open to the accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in the trial in accordance with law.

(Para 15)

314. (P&H HC) 02-08-2023

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk -- Punishment for allowing vehicle -- Presumption of culpable mental state -- Crucial words used in section 25 are “knowingly permits it to be used for the commission of the offense by any other persons.” -- Intent of Section 25 and Section 35 is parametria the same but carves a special role upon the investigation while proving an offense u/s 25 of the NDPS Act because of the usage of the word “knowingly.” -- Thus, the presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act is similar to the intent of Section 25 of the NDPS Act, and as such, Section 35 of the NDPS Act would not dilute the burden that the Legislature had put upon the investigator in section 25 of the NDPS Act – Held, presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act would not apply in the case u/s 25 of the NDPS Act if there is not even an iota of evidence regarding knowingly permitting the usage of the things mentioned in Section 35 of the NDPS Act for the commission of the offence.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk – No evidence that the appellant knew about the other two convicts transporting the poppy husk in his tractor trolly or that he had permitted them to do so for this purpose -- Essential requirements to prove knowledge are missing -- Impugned judgment convicting the appellant u/s 25 of the NDPS Act is not in consonance with the law -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 14)

321. (SC) 31-07-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Anticipatory bail – Regular bail -- Paramount considerations in cases where bail or anticipatory bail is claimed are the nature and gravity of the offence, the propensity or ability of the accused to influence evidence during investigation or interfere with the trial process by threatening or otherwise trying to influence the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused to flee from justice and other such considerations -- During the trial, the court is always in control of the proceedings, and it is open for it to impose any condition which it deems necessary to ensure the accused’s presence and participation in the trial.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Bail after chargesheet -- Once the chargesheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course -- However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the Trial Court -- High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach -- Impugned order of rejecting the bail and directing the appellant, to surrender and later seek bail, therefore, cannot stand and set aside.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Dowry case -- Cruelty – Anticipatory bail -- Regular Bail -- Directions given in Arnesh Kumar’s case (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15107 reiterated and other directions issued:

-- All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC;

-- All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

-- The police officer- shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

-- The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

-- The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

-- Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

-- Directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the case under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a terms which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine.

-- The High Court shall frame the above directions in the form of notifications and guidelines to be followed by the Sessions courts and all other and criminal courts dealing with various offences.

-- Likewise, the Director General of Police in all States shall ensure that strict instructions in terms of above directions are issued. Both the High Courts and the DGP’s of all States shall ensure that such guidelines and Directives/Departmental Circulars are issued for guidance of all lower courts and police authorities in each State within eight weeks from today.

-- Affidavits of compliance shall be filed before this court within ten weeks by all the states and High Courts, though their Registrars.

High Courts and the Police Authorities in all States are required to comply with the above directions in the manner within the time frame mentioned.

(Para 12, 13)

322. (Delhi HC) 31-07-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor – Re-summoning of POCSO victim for cross-examination -- Bar u/s 33(5) POCSO Act may not be absolute and balance of rights needs to be maintained u/s 33(5) of POCSO Act and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. -- Court’s discretion in exercising its power to re-summon a witness for cross-examination has to be exercised with circumspection, caution and utmost sensitivity – Crucial word used in Section 33(5) of POCSO Act is “called repeatedly” -- This Section thus has to be interpreted to balance and applied with the right u/s 311 Cr.P.C. of accused and right to fair trial of an accused depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor -- Re-examination of POCSO victim for cross-examination – Change of counsel -- Victim was only seven years of age at the time of incident in the year 2016 -- Child victim re-lived the trauma of perverse sexual assault upon her at a very tender age of seven years, once, when she was sexually assaulted, thereafter while recording her statement before the police and u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate and thereafter before the learned Trial Court while recording her evidence – Victim cannot be directed to appear once again after six years to depose about the same incident, only on the ground that the previous counsel had cross-examined the witness in a manner which the new counsel does not find sufficient or appropriate -- Change of counsel cannot be a ground for re-summoning of the witnesses -- Though the accused has to be granted and ensured a fair trial, it cannot mean being afforded unjustified repeated opportunities of cross-examination in every case to indicate fair trial.

(Para 13-21)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned.

(Para 14)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Misuse of POCSO law – Ground of -- Any law, whether gender based or not, has the potential of being misused -- Legislature cannot stop enacting laws nor judiciary can stop applying such laws since they have been enacted to curb the larger menace of commission of such offences and getting justice to genuine victims.

(Para 15)

325. (P&H HC) 26-07-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Mutation in favour of the petitioner is relating to only that land, which was validly allotted and he had made the complete payment -- If the revenue official had initially entered a deficient mutation and the same is corrected subsequently; either on the application of the petitioner or otherwise, no fault could be found with that – Any other fact, regarding some DDR entry or some order or absence of any other order passed by any Authority is only ancillary fact; which cannot be raised to the level of introducing criminality -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Quashing of FIR –  Permissibility of -- Submission that challan has been filed, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed -- Court not found any substance in the said argument -- Once, the complaint itself is baseless, then merely because some witnesses have repeated the ipse dixit of the complaint which is based on non-existent facts or the facts against the undisputed record, before the Investigating Officer; that does not lend any legal or jurisprudential support to the report filed by the Investigating Officer -- FIR can be quashed even after filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

340. (P&H HC) 14-07-2023

A. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Refusal of Passport, travel documents etc. -- Show cause notice -- Opportunity of hearing – Reasons for denial -- Right to travel abroad is part of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India -- State can deny right to travel subject to compliance of safeguard in the form of show cause notice, opportunity of hearing and order disclosing reasons for the denial.

(Para 10)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 19(1)(a), (g), 21 -- Refusal of Passport, travel documents etc. -- Umpteen number of persons are travelling abroad for the sake of business or employment -- If these persons are mechanically denied passport or permission to visit abroad, without allaying fear to flee from justice, not only would deprive them from their right to earn livelihood but also violate their fundamental right to freedom of business and profession, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India -- Denial of passport not only amounts to violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14 & 21 but also freedom of speech, business and trade contemplated by Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution unless and until procedure prescribed by law is followed.

(Para 26)

C. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6(2) (f), (e) -- Right to Passport -- Registration of FIR – Criminal trial – Conviction – Acquittal -- Effect of – Held:

i) Clause (f) of Section 6(2) of Passport Act, 1967 is inapplicable to post conviction or post acquittal proceedings.

ii) As soon as a person is convicted or acquitted, he would be governed by Clause (e) of Section 6(2) of 1967 Act.

iii) Notification dated 25.8.1993 is applicable to criminal proceedings pending before trial court and as per instructions dated 10.10.2019, mere registration of FIR is not sufficient whereas a case should be registered before Court and Court must have taken cognizance.

iv) Clause (e) of Section 6(2) can be invoked if an applicant; within 5 years preceding the date of application, for the commission of an offence involving moral turpitude has been sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 2 years.

v) High Court is not criminal court in terms of Section 6(2)(f) of the 1967 Act.

(Para 27)