Search By Topic: Penal Laws

309. (P&H HC) 14-07-2023

A. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 – Refusal of Passport, travel documents etc. -- Show cause notice -- Opportunity of hearing – Reasons for denial -- Right to travel abroad is part of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India -- State can deny right to travel subject to compliance of safeguard in the form of show cause notice, opportunity of hearing and order disclosing reasons for the denial.

(Para 10)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 19(1)(a), (g), 21 -- Refusal of Passport, travel documents etc. -- Umpteen number of persons are travelling abroad for the sake of business or employment -- If these persons are mechanically denied passport or permission to visit abroad, without allaying fear to flee from justice, not only would deprive them from their right to earn livelihood but also violate their fundamental right to freedom of business and profession, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India -- Denial of passport not only amounts to violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14 & 21 but also freedom of speech, business and trade contemplated by Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution unless and until procedure prescribed by law is followed.

(Para 26)

C. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6(2) (f), (e) -- Right to Passport -- Registration of FIR – Criminal trial – Conviction – Acquittal -- Effect of – Held:

i) Clause (f) of Section 6(2) of Passport Act, 1967 is inapplicable to post conviction or post acquittal proceedings.

ii) As soon as a person is convicted or acquitted, he would be governed by Clause (e) of Section 6(2) of 1967 Act.

iii) Notification dated 25.8.1993 is applicable to criminal proceedings pending before trial court and as per instructions dated 10.10.2019, mere registration of FIR is not sufficient whereas a case should be registered before Court and Court must have taken cognizance.

iv) Clause (e) of Section 6(2) can be invoked if an applicant; within 5 years preceding the date of application, for the commission of an offence involving moral turpitude has been sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 2 years.

v) High Court is not criminal court in terms of Section 6(2)(f) of the 1967 Act.

(Para 27)

321. (Bombay HC) 10-07-2023

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

322. (P&H HC) 07-07-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant -- Necessary ingredients of an offence u/s 188 IPC are:-

(a) there must be an order promulgated by a public servant,

(b) such public servant must be lawfully empowered to promulgate such order,

(c) Such order should direct the accused to abstain from an act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management,

(d) Accused disobeys the order knowingly,

(e) Such obedience must cause or tend to cause –

(i) obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed; or

(ii) danger to human life, health or safety; or

(iii) causes or tend to cause riot or affray.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance by court -- No Court can take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC except on a written complaint made by the concerned public servant, whose order has been disobeyed.

(Para 6-8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 269 -- Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – Essential ingredients for commission of offence under Section 269 IPC are:

(i) The disease in question was infectious and dangerous to human life.

(ii) The accused did an act, which was likely to felicitate spreading of the disease

(iii) The accused did the act unlawfully or negligently

(iv) The accused knew or had reason to believe that his act was likely to spread the disease.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 – FIR -- Police report -- Cognizance by Court -- In view of the bar placed by Section 195 CrPC, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on the challan filed by the Police for offence u/s 188 IPC -- Not the case of the respondent/State that the petitioner was suffering from corona virus or any other disease on the date of alleged offence, which could spread the infection to others and thus, ingredients of Section 269 IPC are completely missing – FIR u/s 188 & 269 of the IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 9-18)

325. (P&H HC) 05-07-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Proceedings u/s 188 of the IPC can only be initiated on the basis of complaint in writing by the concerned public servant -- No FIR can be registered for the offence u/s 188 of the IPC and no report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C. to the concerned Court can be filed on the basis of evidence collected in the said FIR.

(Para 7)

B. Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Penalty -- Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Any offence under the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 is deemed to be an offence u/s 188 of the IPC – So procedure u/s 188 of the Code is to be followed by the prosecuting agency for prosecuting a person under the Epidemic Diseases Act -- No complaint has been filed but police after registration of the FIR submitted the challan – Held, it is a clear violation of the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

C. Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d) -- Punishment for obstruction – Cognizance of offence – Maximum punishment for Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act is two years, so offence is non cognizable and complaint is required to be filed in the Court and Court can take cognizance only on the complaint made by the concerned authority for violation of any provision of the said Act.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 -- Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195, 482 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Obstruction of officer/ employee – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation was completed and final report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. was filed before the concerned Magistrate -- Mandatory provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. not followed -- Only complaint could be filed by the officer whose orders were violated and not by the police on the basis of investigation -- Registration of FIR is abuse of the process of law -- Petition allowed, FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 13, 14)

327. (SC) 05-07-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 299, 308 -- Appellant/ Bus Conductor -- Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Question is whether the appellant had knowledge that he, by virtue of the act of ringing the bell, was likely to cause death -- It is not possible to say that the appellant while ringing the bell, had knowledge that his act is likely to cause the death of PW-1 – In the absence of intention and knowledge as contemplated by Section 299 of IPC, the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder was not made out.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 338 -- By applying principles incorporated in sub-section (2) of Section 222 of the Cr.P.C, the Court can consider whether the appellant has committed any other offence which is a minor offence in comparison to the offence for which he is tried – Appellant charged u/s 308 IPC, however convicted u/s 338 IPC.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 338, 308 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Charges u/s 308 IPC – Conviction u/s 338 IPC -- It was the duty of the appellant as a conductor to take care of the passengers -- Hence, before he rang the bell and gave a signal to the driver to start the bus, he ought to have verified whether all passengers had safely boarded the bus -- Appellant did not verify whether the passengers had properly boarded the bus -- This was an act of recklessness on his part -- Grievous hurt was caused to PW-1 as she suffered fracture of pelvis – Appellant is guilty of the commission of an offence punishable u/s 338 of IPC -- Omission to frame charge u/s 338 of IPC will not be fatal -- Appellant has undergone the sentence for only 36 days -- Considering the fact that the incident is of the year 2005 and other factual aspects, a sentence of simple imprisonment for six months will be an appropriate punishment -- High Court had imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000/- which amount has been deposited -- In addition to the sum of Rs.50,000/- already deposited -- Appellant to deposit an additional amount of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 14,15)

329. (SC) 05-07-2023

A. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Child witness -- In case of a child witness under 12 years of age, unless satisfaction as required by the said proviso is recorded, an oath cannot be administered to the child witness.

(Para 7)

B. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- In the deposition of PW-1, it is mentioned that his age was 12 years at the time of the recording of evidence -- Proviso to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not apply -- However, in view of the requirement of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was under a duty to record his opinion that the child is able to understand the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to the questions put to him -- The Trial Judge must also record his opinion that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence -- A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring -- However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness -- Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness -- Scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution -- It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.

(Para 8, 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 324, 449, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Investigation Officer did not make investigation by recording the statements of the elder brothers of PW-1/ Minor for verifying whether they were away from the house on the date of the incident -- Shoes of the appellant did not match the moulds of the imprint of the shoe taken by the prosecution -- Possibility of the PW-1/ minor witness, being tutored cannot be ruled out -- There is no support or corroboration to the testimony of PW-1, apart from other deficiencies in the prosecution case -- It will not be safe to base the conviction only on the testimony of PW-1/ Minor which does not inspire confidence – Appeal allowed, impugned judgments aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offences.

(Para 10,11)

330. (SC) 05-07-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Strong suspicion -- It cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Extra-judicial confession -- No reason as to why the accused persons would go 100 kms. away and confess to PW-2 -- Conduct also appears to be unnatural, though IO (PW-11) was known to PW-2 and the telephone which was installed in his house was in a working condition, he did not find it necessary to inform him through telephone -- Courts below have erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- According to PW-11, the gun which was recovered from the car had two empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11) -- Evidence of Doctor (PW-5), who had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, would show that there was no external exit wound, and wad and pellets were preserved and sealed – No evidence collected as to whether the said gun belonged to the appellant MK, even the Ballistic Expert has not been examined to show that the wad and pellets were fired from the empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11)

-- In view of the serious doubt with regard to the credibility of the witnesses on the issue of extra-judicial confession and last seen theory, the failure to examine Ballistic Expert would be a glaring defect in the prosecution case.

Held, prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and, as such, the accused are entitled to benefit of doubt -- Judgment of the Trial Court quashed and set aside, appellants shall stand discharged.

(Para 22-27)

335. (SC) 04-07-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 180 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Refusal to sign statement -- No statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of any investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr. PC, which is reduced to writing, is required to be signed by the person making the statement and that section 180 of the IPC gets attracted only if a statement is refused to be signed which a public servant is legally competent to require the person making the statement to sign.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 397, 482 – Quashing of charge -- Small window that the law, through judicial precedents, provides is to look at the allegations in the FIR and the materials collected in course of investigation, without a rebuttal thereof by the accused, and to form an opinion upon consideration thereof that an offence is indeed not disclosed from it -- Unless the prosecution is shown to be illegitimate so as to result in an abuse of the process of law, it would not be proper to scuttle it.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 397, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 406, 506, 379, 120B, 180 -- Quashing of charge -- It is trite that the conspiracy to commit an offence is by itself distinct from the offence to do which the conspiracy is entered into and that such an offence, if actually committed, would be the subject-matter of a separate charge -- Allegations that the petitioner was found counting the cash received by the principal accused -- Involvement of the petitioner, howsoever limited, cannot be ruled out at this stage and, therefore, the trial ought to be permitted to proceed.

(Para 18)

346. (SC) 15-06-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Ante-timed FIR -- Original FIR clearly shows that there is some interpolation in the time of its lodging mentioned therein -- It is evident from naked eye that ‘1’ has been converted into ‘9’ and ‘5’ has been rounded off to make ‘0’ whereas ‘PM’ has been converted into ‘AM’ -- In other words, 1:50 PM has been changed to 9:00 AM -- Trial Court completely lost sight of the fact that not only the time has been changed but the word ‘PM’ has also been interpolated and converted into ‘AM’ – Thus FIR has been ante-timed from 1:50 PM to 9:00 AM -- This entitles the accused to be given the benefit of doubt.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder -- Delay in sending FIR report to court – FIR report was sent to the Court with the delay of about 4 days -- FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and a valuable piece of evidence especially for the purpose of appreciating the evidence adduced at the trial -- FIR casts a doubt on its authenticity.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Appellant no. 2 died -- Unnatural behaviour and conduct of the eyewitnesses/ son and nephew of the deceased, ante-timing of the FIR and that the ‘loi’ (blanket) and the cycle alleged to be that of the accused/appellants left behind at the site of the incident were not produced before the Court, compels the Court to doubt the presence of the son and nephew of the deceased at the site -- Delay in conducting the post-mortem – There is difference in the name of the weapons of crime – Accused/ appellant No.1 acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt.

(Para 10, 23-25)