A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 195 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – FIR u/s 174A of IPC -- Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), in its present form, encompasses Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) within its purview.

(Para 12.13-12.16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender – Procedure -- Courts meticulously adhere to the statutory requirements in letter and spirit both, duly reflecting their compliance on the record prior to pronouncing an individual as a proclaimed person or offender and invoking criminal liability.

(Para 13.1)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Mandate of -- There is no mandatory prescription in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the Court to invariably initiate separate criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 174-A IPC in every instance where an individual fails to appear as summoned by way of proclamation -- Courts should act judiciously and exercise circumspection before embarking on the stringent path of instituting criminal proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC.

(Para 13.4)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Order declaring the petitioner as proclaimed person is wholly silent as to when the proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner was issued; what was the date specified therein for the petitioner to appear in Court; when the proclamation was actually published; whether it was publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which the petitioner ordinarily resided; whether it was affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the petitioner ordinarily resided or to some conspicuous place of such town or village; whether a copy thereof was also affixed to some conspicuous part of the court-house -- Further, the order does not contain a statement by the Court to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day and in the manner specified in clause (i) of Sub-Section (2) -- These facts were not even noticed in the order passed by the Court – Order is totally non-speaking and does not at all show that while passing it, the Court had applied its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances and taken any conscious decision that it was a fit case to invoke criminal liability of the petitioner for offence u/s 174-A of IPC -- It was/is cryptic, non-speaking and mechanical order sans any reasons or application of mind – Order declaring proclaimed person and FIR Quashed.

(Para 15-17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender -- Guidelines framed:

Issuance of proclamation :

i. Preceding the issuance of the proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C., the Court must deliberate upon its previous efforts to secure the presence of the through other legally permissible means. These efforts encompass the issuance of summons, the execution of bailable and/or non-bailable warrants against the accused. The Court must thoroughly document the results stemming from these endeavours, accompanied by pertinent facts and comprehensive details. It is incumbent upon the Court to satisfactorily ascertain that the individual in question has indeed absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

ii. The phrase "reason to believe," as articulated in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, signifies that the Court must derive its belief from the available evidence and materials that the concerned person has absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

iii. Furthermore, in the proclamation, it must be set forth as to where and when the concerned individual must present himself. A designated location and time must be stipulated. Importantly, the specified date and time for appearance should not be less than a thirty-day from the date of publication of the proclamation.

Publication of proclamation–

iv. The publication of a proclamation, as outlined in Section 82(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, mandates adherence to all three prescribed modes, namely:

(a). The public reading of the proclamation in a conspicuous location within the town or village where the individual ordinarily resides.

(b). The affixation of the proclamation at a prominent spot at the individual's house or homestead.

(c). The display of the proclamation at a prominent location within the precincts of the court house.

v. All the aforesaid three modes of publication of a proclamation have to be adhered to. Failure to follow all or any of them renders the proclamation invalid in the eyes of the law. This is because the three sub-clauses (a) to (c) are mutually exclusive.

vi. If the Court so feels, in addition to the aforementioned trio of methods for securing the accused's presence, it may, at its discretion, also direct the publication of a copy of the proclamation in a daily newspaper circulating within the geographical area where the said individual ordinarily resides.

vii. If the Court, in its discretion orders publication of proclamation in newspaper, it shall also direct that the newspaper agency, upon the publication of the proclamation in the newspaper, shall dispatch a copy thereof to the accused's address, as is the procedure observed in civil matters, in terms of Order 5 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In essence, this supplementary measure ensures that the accused is duly apprised of the legal proceedings against him.

Declaration as “proclaimed person” or “proclaimed offender:

viii. Prior to the declaration of the concerned individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court shall pass a speaking order stating relevant facts and record its satisfaction that the proclamation has been duly and properly published in the prescribed manner.

ix. Furthermore, it must ensure that a period of not less than thirty days has expired between the date of publication of the proclamation and the date indicated in the proclamation for the individual's appearance. If the interval between the proclamation's publication and the date specified therein for appearance falls short of thirty days, such a publication of the proclamation cannot serve as the foundation for designating the individual in question as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender."

x. A person can be declared “Proclaimed offender” only where the proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 Cr.P.C. is in respect of any of the offences as per table given below :-

xi. If person accused of the above offences fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.

xii. In all other alleged offences, the concerned person can and shall be declared as a “proclaimed person”.

Invoking criminal liability for the offence under section 174-A of IPC:

xiii. It is imperative to bear in mind that the primary purpose behind the issuance and publication of proclamations under Section 82, as well as the attachment and sale of an individual's property, is the securing/compelling the appearance of the concerned person, to facilitate the expeditious trial of criminal cases by obviating the often protracted delays which impede their disposal.

xiv. It is noteworthy that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prescribe an automatic or obligatory invocation of further criminal liability under Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code, in every case where an individual fails to appear pursuant to he being declared as ‘proclaimed person’ or ‘proclaimed offender’ after the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Code.

xv. Consequently, it follows that even subsequent to the formal declaration of an individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court still retains the discretion to determine whether it is judicious to initiate the rigorous criminal proceedings under Section 174-A of the IPC, being mindful that the offence carries a punishment of imprisonment for up to seven years, coupled with a fine.

xvi. In arriving at such a pivotal decision, the Court should exercise due circumspection, once more apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case considering the majesty of law vis-a-vis the nature and gravity of the offence that triggered the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.; the potential impact of said offence on the victim or society at large; steps, if any, taken for the attachment and sale of property of the person concerned and the result thereof; the stage/status of the ongoing trial, any mitigating factors that may favor the proclaimed person or offender, and conversely, any aggravating factors against them. It is thereafter, that the Court should pass a speaking and reasoned order for initiating criminal proceedings against the proclaimed person or offender for the offense under Section 174-A of the IPC.

xvii. Once the Court decides to proceed against the petitioner for an offence under Section 174-A of the IPC, it is imperative to institute a formal written complaint in the competent jurisdictional court. This imperative arises from the prevailing provision of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cheating – Regular Bail -- Investigation complete qua petitioner, he is not required for custodial interrogation – Out of 126 prosecution witnesses none has been examined till date -- Commencement/conclusion of the trial likely to take time -- Petitioner has already been languishing in jail for the last more than 07 months in preventive custody – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 468 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65 -- Forgery -- Secondary evidence -- To establish forgery it is imperative that the original document is produced or the existence and the destruction of the same is proved beyond doubt -- In the alternative, the party which wishes to lead secondary evidence with respect to the document must prove that it cannot possibly possess the primary original document as the same is in possession of the opposite party -- Original agreement to sell on which the complainants allegedly forged signatures had been affixed not brought on record but the complainant has also not been able to prove that the original had ever been executed but was in possession of the opposite party or had been destroyed -- Offence of forgery not made out.

(Para 12)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 406, 420, 34 –  Cognizance on complaint -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction -- 7 witnesses recorded before framing of charge -- Respondents-accused raised an objection that some of the accused were residing at a place beyond the area covered by the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate, the mandatory requirement of Section 202(1) of CRPC was not followed – High Court proceeded to quash the order issuing summons and remanded the complaint to the learned Magistrate to deal with the same from the stage of Section 202 of the CRPC – Considering the mandatory nature of 202(1) of the CRPC, non-compliance will result into failure of justice -- No error in the impugned order -- Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 2-5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 (1) – Cognizance on complaint -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Nature of Section 202(1) Cr.P.C -- In view of the use of word "shall" in sub-section 1 of Section 202 of the CRPC and the object of amendment made by the Act No. 25 of 2005, the provision will have to be held as mandatory in a case where the accused is residing at a place outside the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate.

(Para 4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 384, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Extortion – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner and complainant were earlier having live-in-relation for a period of 8 years before married with each other -- FIR was got lodged by alleging that an amount of Rs.20,000/- was extorted by the petitioner from the complainant, who is her own husband, on the ground of pictures pertaining to the aborted fetus – Dispute appears to be a matrimonial dispute, subject matter of the present extortion money is only Rs.20,000/- -- It will not be in the interest of justice that the petitioner is to be arrested for custodial investigation especially when she is a lady of the age of 32 years -- Anticipatory bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 477-A, 468, 424, 420, 409, 405, 34, 120A -- Haryana Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishment Act, 2013 (32 of 2014), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – 12 crores of investors duped -- Regular bail -- Co-accused, specifically named in the FIR and whose case is admittedly on parity with the petitioner, has already been allowed bail after noticing that he was in custody for 02 years, 11 months and 25 days -- Petitioner in custody for the last more than 02 years and 06 months -- Out of 66 witnesses cited by the prosecution, only five have been examined so far and thus, it is apparent that trial is likely to be conclude in long time -- Petitioner admitted to bail.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C -- High Court set aside the order issuing process for non-compliance with the mandate of Section 202 of the CRPC, however no further direction was issued to the learned Judicial Magistrate to hold an inquiry u/s 202 of the CRPC -- Impugned judgment modified, Trial Court directed to proceed from the stage of Section 202 of the Cr.PC – While doing so, the learned Magistrate will be guided by the direction issued by the Constitution Bench, Re : Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 of N.I.Act, 1881, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 325 = 2021(2) L.A.R. 366 = (2021) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16184, clause (3) of paragraph 24. "3) For the conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of documents without insisting for examination of witnesses."

(Para 3-5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 311A – Cheque bounce complaint -- Expert evidence in rebuttal -- Respondent/ accused disputed his signatures on the cheque from the very beginning -- If the complainant knowing fully well that the accused has denied his signatures on the cheque, did not choose to examine an expert, he cannot be permitted to examine such expert by way of rebuttal to defence evidence – Application dismissed by Trial court – Order upheld.

(Para 1, 8-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Misbranding of insecticide -- Proceedings after 3 years -- Quashing of complaint against Dealer – Proceedings qua the manufacturing company and its responsible officers etc., already stand quashed on the grounds that the complaint had been instituted more than 03 years after laboratory report had been received -- No useful purpose would be served by allowing the present proceedings to continue --  Petition allowed – Complaint, summoning order and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO case -- Sodomy with minor boy – Acquittal -- Blood group of accused matched with the semen found on underwear of victim -- Affirmative incriminatory opinion recorded against the accused – Held, existence of semen stains on the underwear of the victim-boy, did require that the blood group of the victim also being collected by the investigating officer – In the event similarity of blood group of the accused and the victim conclusion would become sparked from the DNA specialist – Investigating officer did not collect the blood sample of the victim -- Resultantly, the opinion would beget thereto an exculpatory effect -- No apposite DNA profiling made – Benefit of doubt is to be accorded to the appellant-convict -- Victim completely resiling from his statements – Appeal allowed, convicting and sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17-19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91, 92, 482 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22(c), 29, 61, 85 -- NDPS case – Procuring Tower location and call details of mobile -- Prosecution alleges the apprehension of the petitioner on 10.10.2021, whereas petitioner contends that he had been arrested on 09.10.2021 at about 8 PM -- Prosecution alleges that petitioner had been arrested from main highway Rajpura, Sirhind; whereas petitioner contends that he was abducted by the police from near his house at Delhi -- Direction given that tower location and call details of the mobile of the petitioner be preserved for the period 09.10.2021 to 11.10.2021 and the same be produced in the Court and the copy thereof be also provided to the petitioner.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Regular bail -- Duped the complainant and 300 other persons of a huge amount of Rs.50 Crore -- Challan presented and charges were framed  -- Out of 317 prosecution witnesses only ten have been examined till date --  Trial is likely to take quite some time -- Petitioner has already been languishing in jail for more than 02 years and seven months in preventive custody – Offence allegedly committed by petitioner is of non-violent nature -- Petitioner is 64-year old, senior citizen, a family person and only bread winner of his family – Co-accused granted bail -- Petition allowed.

(Para 4-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 14 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing petition -- Whether during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, the proceedings under the Negotiable Instrument Act can continue simultaneously or not – Recovery proceedings barred u/s 14 of the IBC are primarily civil in nature, whereas the proceedings u/s 138 of the NI Act are criminal in nature, and both have a different set of purpose -- By operation of the provisions of the IBC, the criminal prosecution initiated against the natural persons u/s 138 read with 141 of the NI Act would not stand terminated – Quashing petition dismissed.

(Para 6-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 295, 295A -- Hurting religious feeling – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner attempted to hurt the religious feelings of a particular community -- Said utterances were made in the State of Rajasthan -- No other case against the petitioner – Petition allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15, 18(3) – Trial of juvenile as adult – J.J. Board ordered to treat accused-juvenile as adult -- No Child Psychologist was consulted and so far as the two members are concerned, one of the member is M.A History and the another member is B.A. M.S. – In view of the report sent by the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board that none of the Members or even the Presiding Officer was conversant with the child psychology or child psychiatry etc. – Impugned order set aside, matter remanded back to the Juvenile Justice Board for fresh consideration.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Criminal Revision – Absence of counsel/ party – Revision dismissed without consideration on merit – Held, even in the absence of a party or his counsel, a revision petition calls for consideration on merits in accordance with the parameters for consideration of a revision petition – Matter remanded to be considered anew -- Interim bail granted would continue to remain in force and would be subject to the outcome of the revision petition.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – False complaint – Kalandra u/s 182 Cr.P.C – Quashing of Kalandra -- Complaint to the Superintendent of Police which was entrusted to DSP, who found the complaint to be false – SHO lodged the impugned Kalandra u/s 182 IPC before the Magistrate – Held, impugned Kalandra/ complaint is not maintainable being a clear violation of the provisions contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Superintendent of Police or any officer superior to him could have filed the Kalandra u/s 182 IPC – Continuation of proceedings on such Kalandra/ complaint is sheer abuse of process of law – Impugned Kalandra/ DDE u/s 182 IPC and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-14)

A. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Investigation officer -- Simply because the person who detected the commission of the offence, is the one who filed the report or investigated, such an investigation cannot be said to be bad in law.

(Para 21)

B. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Police official witnesses – No independent witness -- Law is well settled that if the evidence of a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy then basing the conviction thereupon, cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground -- Testimonies of official witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined.

(Para 22-26)

C. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in producing Contraband before the Magistrate – Day after the arrest of the Appellant, 2nd October, 2003 was a holiday and therefore the contraband seized was, upon directions produced before the concerned Magistrate on the next working day, that being, 3 October 2003 -- This being the uncontroverted position, the production of the seized Arrack cannot be said to be delayed.

(Para 27)

D. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in completion of investigation – Mere urging that delay casts a suspicion on the investigation, without any evidence being led in furtherance thereof, cannot be sustained -- Inordinate delay has been taken as presumptive proof of prejudice, but in particular cases where the accused is in custody -- Accused was released on bail on 21st October 2003 -- Hence, the presumption of prejudice will not apply in the instant facts.

(Para 28-30)

E. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Dealy in investigation/ trial – Sentence reduced to 3 months -- Considering the facts that the offence in question is dated 1st October 2003; the final report after delayed investigation was submitted on 17th April 2006, appellant was convicted on 3rd November 2008, and that more than 20 years have passed since the commission of the offence, sentence modified, appellant to serve a period of three months, simple imprisonment.

(Para 31-33)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471  -- Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (19 of 2017), Section 132(1)(B)(C) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Creating false and bogus companies for extracting GST amount -- Habitual offender – Regular bail -- Bail to a petitioner cannot be denied solely on the ground that several other cases are pending against him, even though, he has been able to make out a case for grant of bail in the facts of the present case -- Petitioner has already undergone more than 01 year and 11 months of the custody and the trial is at an initial stage – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Court has wide powers to summon a person as an additional who has been exonerated by the Investigating Agency, if it finds that there is sufficient evidence available against the said person in order to try him along with the accused already facing trial -- However, there is no compelling duty to summon an accused – Discretionary power so conferred should only be exercised to achieve justice and must be based on the quality of evidence collected.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Court being the sole repository of justice, there is a duty cast upon it to uphold the law and ensure that the real accused should not get away by manipulating the Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency -- What the Court needs to examine while adjudicating upon an application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. is that there should be evidence available on the file in the shape of oral evidence or documentary evidence in order to invoke its powers to summon an additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 , 34 – Murder -- Summoning of additional accused – Hearsay evidence -- When the FIR was registered, no reference was made of the nephews disclosing to the petitioner that their mother had been assaulted – Deposition of the petitioner that he had been told by his nephews about the assault on their mother at the instance of the father and the grand-mother would amount to ‘hear say’ evidence and thus, inadmissible -- No admissible evidence available on the record to summon the respondent No.2 as an additional accused to face trial alongwith the charge-sheeted accused – Application dismissed by Trial court – Order upheld.

(Para 1, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Cognizable offence -- Registration of FIR -- Deceased, brother of the appellant was severely beaten and brutally assaulted by the accused and he succumbed to injuries -- Thereafter, the appellant and others had gone to the concerned police station to register the crime, however the same was not registered -- Appellant thereafter submitted the complaints to the concerned respondents however no action was taken to register the complaint – Held, in view of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari’s case (2014) 2 SCC 1, registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 of CrPC, if the information discloses commission of cognizable offence -- Appeal allowed and direction given to concerned respondents to proceed further with the complaints filed by the appellant in accordance with law.

(Para 3-7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR – Summary of law rendered by Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari’s case (2014) 2 SCC 1 reiterated –

“120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.]

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3 If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

120.4 The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

120.5 The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

120.6 As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

120.7 While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and, in any case, it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

120.8 Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.”

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 386 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Threat to withdraw FIR – Extortion -- Quashing of FIR -- To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC -- Nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons – No offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out -- FIR quashed.

(Para 16, 24-26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 195A – False evidence -- The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 383, 386 – Extortion -- One of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. -- Delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury -- Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition -- Nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear -- In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.

(Para 22-24)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 – Inherent powers of Court – Quashing of FIR -- Once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/ complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.

(Para 26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 194, 195, 199, 200, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Regular bail -- Two material witnesses examined and have not supported the prosecution case -- Whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to inculpate the petitioner and his co-accused shall be adjudicated upon during the course of the Trial – Petitioner in custody since 15.10.2021 and only 08 out of 36 prosecution witnesses have been examined – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If the accused are already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Appellants already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful -- Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the mobile used by the accused to show that their location was at the place of incident -- Mobile numbers alleged to have been used by accused is not in his name but one person resident of Kanpur -- No evidence placed on record to show as to how the said SIM came to be in possession of the accused – Apart from that, if at the time of the incident both accused were at the same place and according to the prosecution inside the house of the deceased, and they were talking to each other on telephone, this itself creates a doubt on the prosecution version -- Evidence with regard to last seen theory is totally unreliable -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 14, 15, 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Guilt of accused – Circumstantial evidence -- Circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established -- Facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty -- Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused -- It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 18, 19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of  trial – Held, such an exercise, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Quashing of proceedings -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of IPC is very limited -- High Court has almost conducted a mini trial and quashed the proceedings -- High Court has elaborately discussed the statements of the witnesses recorded u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C. -- It is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the chargesheet -- Order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 4-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153, 153-A, 212, 216, 120-B -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Regular bail – Allegation that petitioner alongwith other unknown persons was illegally supplying arms and ammunitions and funding separatists with an intent to create disturbance in the name of religion, at the instance of Pakistani Agency ISI and, to target the leaders of religious organizations and political leaders to disturb peace and tranquility in Punjab – Petitioner is in preventive custody for past more than 11 months -- Petitioner is a 23-year old young student, was aspirant to study further in Canada, where he had though secured admission, but was apprehended at the airport when he was leaving from India -- He has already done his food course from the Food Craft Institute and also worked for the Taj group at the Taj Hotel Resorts and Palaces -- No probability of tampering with evidence as the same has already been seized by the investigating agency -- Co-accused of the petitioner have been granted concession of bail -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 6-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4, 5 -- Conviction u/s 452, 324, 323, 506 IPC – Accused released on probation – Probation period already stands expired -- Compensation as ordered by the Appellate Court already stand deposited – Held, nothing survives in the criminal revision, dismissed.

(Para 1-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Abetment to suicide – Regular bail -- Petitioner is a lady of the age of 33 years having two minor children -- Petitioner was married to the deceased – Although the allegations have been levelled against the petitioner not only in the FIR but also so stated in the suicide note but these are to be seen only at the time of adducing evidence -- Incarceration of the petitioner is more than 6 months – Petition allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 333, 353, 451 – Deter public servant to discharge his duty -- Caused fracture in little right finger – House trespass -- Appellant held guilty of the offences punishable u/s 333, 353 and 451 of the IPC – Leniency in sentence shown considering the facts and circumstances that:

a. For espousing the cause of the labourers, the appellant visited the office of the Directorate;

b. Evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 (a peon working in the Office of the Commissioner) indicated that the appellant had sent a slip of her name to PW-6 which was kept on the table of PW-6 as she wanted to meet him. After waiting for a considerable time, as she was not allowed to meet PW-6, she forced her entry to his cabin and complained that she was made to wait;

c. PW-1 admitted that the appellant was not annoyed with her. She stated that the appellant did not indulge in any scuffle with her. When she tried to stop the appellant, she was pushed by the appellant and that is how she received injury to her little right finger;

d. The incident is more than thirty years old;

e. During the last thirty and a half years, when the trial and appeal were pending, the appellant was all throughout on bail. Even in this appeal, an exemption has been granted to her from the requirement of surrendering;

f. During this long period of more than 30 long years, there was no allegation of any objectionable activity by her; and

g. The appellant is a female whose present age is 62 years.

appellant sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and fine of Rs.30,000/- for the offence u/s 333 IPC, fine of Rs.20,000/- u/s 353 IPC and sentence for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ u/s 451 IPC -- Substantive sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trivial nature of offence -- Long pendency of trial -- Quashing of Chargesheet -- Considering the nature of allegations which are of very trivial nature and considering the fact that there is no progress made in the proceedings since the chargesheet was filed in the year 2015, continuing the proceedings would be a persecution and harassment to the appellant -- Proceedings pending in the court of CJM against the appellant quashed and set aside.

(Para 3-7)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial -- Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.

(Para 10)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Competence of the court trying the accused would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time -- In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law.

(Para 10)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution from Superior authority – Validity of – Challenge to -- Special Judge, while dismissing the third application filed by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by the prosecution, specifically held that the sanction accorded by the government which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid -- Such findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said sub-section (3).

(Para 14)

D. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution -- Discharge of accused -- Interlocutory application seeking discharge in the midst of trial would not be maintainable -- Once the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act -- Issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same was not pressed for -- Only stage open to the accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in the trial in accordance with law.

(Para 15)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 17 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS case – Regular  bail – Recovery of 1.5 kg of opium -- Custody 3 months and 3 days -- Petitioner on interim bail since 29.09.2022, not misused the liberty granted; not involved in any other case under NDPS Act; challan was presented on 20.08.2022, however, charges have not yet been framed and in all there are 16 witnesses -- Trial is likely to take a considerable time, thus his further incarceration would not serve any useful purpose -- Regular bail allowed.

(Para 2, 6, 7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk -- Punishment for allowing vehicle -- Presumption of culpable mental state -- Crucial words used in section 25 are “knowingly permits it to be used for the commission of the offense by any other persons.” -- Intent of Section 25 and Section 35 is parametria the same but carves a special role upon the investigation while proving an offense u/s 25 of the NDPS Act because of the usage of the word “knowingly.” -- Thus, the presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act is similar to the intent of Section 25 of the NDPS Act, and as such, Section 35 of the NDPS Act would not dilute the burden that the Legislature had put upon the investigator in section 25 of the NDPS Act – Held, presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act would not apply in the case u/s 25 of the NDPS Act if there is not even an iota of evidence regarding knowingly permitting the usage of the things mentioned in Section 35 of the NDPS Act for the commission of the offence.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk – No evidence that the appellant knew about the other two convicts transporting the poppy husk in his tractor trolly or that he had permitted them to do so for this purpose -- Essential requirements to prove knowledge are missing -- Impugned judgment convicting the appellant u/s 25 of the NDPS Act is not in consonance with the law -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500, 52 – Complaint to SDM -- Defamation – Good faith -- Whether the allegations made in the complaint addressed to the SDM make out the offence u/s 500 IPC or not? – Held, no case is made out to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offence -- No defamation as such -- Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation.

(Para 15, 16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Amendment/ correction w.r.t. to cheque number in complaint -- Typographical error, which originated from the legal notice, was indeed unintentional -- Application to correct the cheque numbers approved -- Proceedings shall continue based on the corrected cheque numbers, which are already on record before the trial court for further proceedings in the trial -- Proceedings shall commence from the same stage.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 489-A, 489-B, 489-C, 489-D, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Counterfeited currency – Regular  bail -- Petitioner in preventive custody merely on an unfounded suspicion that if he is let out, he may either tamper with evidence and/or influence witnesses -- Offence allegedly committed by petitioner is of non-violent nature and in that sense his release on bail is not a threat to society at large by committing any violent crime – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part-I – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Father of PW-1 refused to provide Rs.500/- for NCC Camp -- PW-1 narrated the said incident to her mother, who asked father to give the said amount, even then, the father did not provide the said amount -- Thereafter, a quarrel started between father and mother – Mother gave blows with a stick on the head and legs of her father, he sustained injuries, which led to his death -- Stick by no means, can be called a deadly weapon -- Possibility of the appellant causing the death of the deceased while being deprived of the power of self-control, due to the provocation on account of the deceased not agreeing to pay Rs.500/- to PW-1, cannot be ruled out – Appellant held entitled to benefit of doubt, inasmuch as the offence committed shall fall under Exception I of Section 300 IPC -- Appeal allowed, conviction of the appellant altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC.

(Para 12-16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Non-examination of Viscera – Consumption of tranquillizer -- Post-mortem report refrains to give any opinion about the cause of demise on the premise that the report of the chemical examiner upon the viscera of the deceased is awaited – Non-making of examination(s) thereof, cannot lead to an opinion, that the deceased had died on account of his either voluntary consuming or becoming forcibly administered rather any tranquillizer -- When no candid material exist(s) on record suggestive about the cause of demise of the deceased, irrespective of the fact that the body of the deceased was found in the premises of the convict-appellant,  no conclusion can be made that the convict-appellant had any incriminatory role in the demise of the deceased -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 19, 29)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Report of the pathologist – Report states that the condition of the lungs of the deceased showed mild congestion and the said fact is also spoken by PW-16 in his cross-examination -- Cause of demise of the deceased was owing to a lung infection, which may have remained untreated -- Consequently, the demise of the deceased appears to be natural than homicidal -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 21, 29)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 -- Charge – Grievous hurt -- Injury resulted into avulsion fracture, completely severing the digital phalanx of the two fingers of the complainant -- Specific allegation in the FIR that weapon used was iron rod having sharp edge -- Injury is grievous in nature -- No reason for the Trial Court to decline the application for addition of Section 326 IPC -- Impugned order set aside -- Trial Court directed to frame charge u/s 326 IPC as well.

(Para 13-15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 216 – Charge – Alteration of charge -- Prima facie case -- Charge can be altered as per Section 216 Cr.P.C. at any stage before pronouncement of judgment -- Only prima facie case is to be seen at the stage – Charge should be as wide as possible – Ultimately, if offence of lessor gravity is found to have been committed comparing to the offence charged, conviction can be recorded accordingly -- However, if on conclusion of trial, graver offence is found to have been committed as compared to the offence charged, then de novo trial may have to be ordered depending upon the circumstances.

(Para 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Anticipatory bail – Regular bail -- Paramount considerations in cases where bail or anticipatory bail is claimed are the nature and gravity of the offence, the propensity or ability of the accused to influence evidence during investigation or interfere with the trial process by threatening or otherwise trying to influence the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused to flee from justice and other such considerations -- During the trial, the court is always in control of the proceedings, and it is open for it to impose any condition which it deems necessary to ensure the accused’s presence and participation in the trial.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Bail after chargesheet -- Once the chargesheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course -- However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the Trial Court -- High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach -- Impugned order of rejecting the bail and directing the appellant, to surrender and later seek bail, therefore, cannot stand and set aside.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Dowry case -- Cruelty – Anticipatory bail -- Regular Bail -- Directions given in Arnesh Kumar’s case (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15107 reiterated and other directions issued:

-- All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC;

-- All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

-- The police officer- shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

-- The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

-- The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

-- Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

-- Directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the case under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a terms which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine.

-- The High Court shall frame the above directions in the form of notifications and guidelines to be followed by the Sessions courts and all other and criminal courts dealing with various offences.

-- Likewise, the Director General of Police in all States shall ensure that strict instructions in terms of above directions are issued. Both the High Courts and the DGP’s of all States shall ensure that such guidelines and Directives/Departmental Circulars are issued for guidance of all lower courts and police authorities in each State within eight weeks from today.

-- Affidavits of compliance shall be filed before this court within ten weeks by all the states and High Courts, though their Registrars.

High Courts and the Police Authorities in all States are required to comply with the above directions in the manner within the time frame mentioned.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor – Re-summoning of POCSO victim for cross-examination -- Bar u/s 33(5) POCSO Act may not be absolute and balance of rights needs to be maintained u/s 33(5) of POCSO Act and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. -- Court’s discretion in exercising its power to re-summon a witness for cross-examination has to be exercised with circumspection, caution and utmost sensitivity – Crucial word used in Section 33(5) of POCSO Act is “called repeatedly” -- This Section thus has to be interpreted to balance and applied with the right u/s 311 Cr.P.C. of accused and right to fair trial of an accused depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor -- Re-examination of POCSO victim for cross-examination – Change of counsel -- Victim was only seven years of age at the time of incident in the year 2016 -- Child victim re-lived the trauma of perverse sexual assault upon her at a very tender age of seven years, once, when she was sexually assaulted, thereafter while recording her statement before the police and u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate and thereafter before the learned Trial Court while recording her evidence – Victim cannot be directed to appear once again after six years to depose about the same incident, only on the ground that the previous counsel had cross-examined the witness in a manner which the new counsel does not find sufficient or appropriate -- Change of counsel cannot be a ground for re-summoning of the witnesses -- Though the accused has to be granted and ensured a fair trial, it cannot mean being afforded unjustified repeated opportunities of cross-examination in every case to indicate fair trial.

(Para 13-21)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned.

(Para 14)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Misuse of POCSO law – Ground of -- Any law, whether gender based or not, has the potential of being misused -- Legislature cannot stop enacting laws nor judiciary can stop applying such laws since they have been enacted to curb the larger menace of commission of such offences and getting justice to genuine victims.

(Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 458, 460, 323, 285, 302, 148, 149 -- Additional accused -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Discussion on merits of evidence – Stage of -- Merits of the evidence has to be appreciated only during the trial, by cross examination of the witnesses and scrutiny of the Court not to be done at the stage of Section 319 -- High Court did not appreciate the important fact that the charges being faced by the accused were u/ss 458, 460, 323, 285, 302, 148 and 149 of IPC -- For attracting the offence u/s 149 IPC, one simply has to be a part of an unlawful assembly, any specific individual role or act is not material -- At the stage of summoning an accused, there has to be a prima facie satisfaction of the Court -- Court can stop the trial at that stage itself if such application had been moved u/s 319 -- Prosecution had fully made out its case for summoning u/s 319 Cr.PC -- Order of the High Court set aside.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 201, 210 – FIR as well as private complaint – Same incident – Summoning in complaint case – Permissibility of -- JMIC was conscious of the fact that FIR was registered on account of the same incident – Impugned order summoning the petitioners have been passed in derogation of the procedure as prescribed under Section 210 Cr.P.C -- It was incumbent upon the trial Court to stay the proceedings of the inquiry/ trial and call for a report on the matter from the Police Officer, who is conducting the investigation -- Trial Court having failed to resort to the mandatory procedure, the impugned order cannot be sustained, set aside.

(Para 6-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Mutation in favour of the petitioner is relating to only that land, which was validly allotted and he had made the complete payment -- If the revenue official had initially entered a deficient mutation and the same is corrected subsequently; either on the application of the petitioner or otherwise, no fault could be found with that – Any other fact, regarding some DDR entry or some order or absence of any other order passed by any Authority is only ancillary fact; which cannot be raised to the level of introducing criminality -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Quashing of FIR –  Permissibility of -- Submission that challan has been filed, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed -- Court not found any substance in the said argument -- Once, the complaint itself is baseless, then merely because some witnesses have repeated the ipse dixit of the complaint which is based on non-existent facts or the facts against the undisputed record, before the Investigating Officer; that does not lend any legal or jurisprudential support to the report filed by the Investigating Officer -- FIR can be quashed even after filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 104 – Impounding of passport -- Power u/s 104 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to impound a passport -- Reason is that the provisions of the PP Act which deal with the specific subject of impounding passports shall prevail over Section 104 of Cr.P.C. Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674 referred.

(Para 8)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1) – Seizure/ Impounding of passport -- Section 102 (1) of Cr.P.C., the Police have the power to seize the passport but there is no power to impound the same -- If the power of seizure of a passport is exercised u/s 102, the Police cannot withhold the said document and the same must be forwarded to the Passport Authority -- Thereafter, Passport Authority to decide whether the passport needs to be impounded. Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674 referred.

(Para 8)

C. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91, 102 -- Passport taken in custody u/s 91 of Cr.P.C – Court fail to understand why the passport of the appellant was required for the purpose of the pending criminal case -- As there was neither a seizure of the passport nor impounding thereof, the appellant was entitled to return of the passport.

(Para 9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 50 – NDPS case -- Offer u/s 50 of the NDPS Act -- Independent witness did not support the case of the prosecution -- As per Section 50 of the NDPS Act, option required to be given was that he has a right to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer; whereas the option which was given to him was that whether the accused opted to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Civil Gazetted Officer or before him – Word ‘Magistrate’ was missing from the notice -- Mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act were not complied with, which goes to the root of the case and no conviction can be based on such a defective option – Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be upheld -- Appeal allowed, bail bonds discharged.

(Para 9, 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Appeal against acquittal -- Accused paid an amount of Rs.50,000/- during proceedings of the complaint clearly stating that he be given time to pay the balance amount – He did not dispute at that time that his liability was only to the extent of Rs.50,000/- -- This statement, making payment of Rs.50,000/- by the accused, also indicates that accused had the legal liability towards the complainant – Cheque for Rs. 2,25,658.08 dishonored on account of insufficient funds – Respondent/ accused failed to make payment despite statutory notice -- Acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be at all sustained, set aside -- Accused-respondent held guilty u/s 138 of the NI Act and convicted.

(Para 15-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Sentence for 2 months 29 days -- Considering that petitioner is first time offender and has faced agony of trial for a considerable long period, to meet the ends of justice sentence reduced to 2 months & 29 days, the period already undergone by him.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 324, 148, 149 -- Version and cross-version case – Acquittal -- Once the genesis of occurrence has been suppressed, it is not a case where the Court can separate grain from chaff and believe that the silence of the complainants does not prejudice the case of the accused -- Injuries received by the accused were not simple which could be ignored, but were dangerous to life -- Non-explanation of injuries on the accused can be fatal to the prosecution's case – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 1, 10-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34, 326, 324, 323, 201 – Attempt to murder -- Regular bail -- Version and cross-version case -- Which party is the aggressor party would be adjudicated upon during the course of trial -- Petitioner is in custody since 15.03.2023 and none of the 14 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- Trial is not likely to be concluded soon -- Co-accused have been granted the concession of anticipatory bail -- As such, the further incarceration of the petitioner is not required ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 3-7)