Search By Topic: NDPS Cases

251. (SC) 29-10-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

258. (SC) 26-10-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167 (2) – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A (4) -- Default bail – Compulsive bail – In common legal parlance, the right to bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) is commonly referred to as ‘default bail’ or ‘compulsive bail’ as it is granted on account of the default of the investigating agency in not completing the investigation within the prescribed time, irrespective of the merits of the case. Held,

-- Once the accused files an application for bail u/s 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency.

-- The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court.

-- However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC.

-- Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid.

(Para 6, 18)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A (4) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- NDPS case -- Appellant was remanded to judicial custody on 04.08.2018, hence the mandatory period of 180 days prescribed for filing of final report u/s 167(2), CrPC (excluding the date of remand) was completed on 31.01.2019 – Appellant-accused had exercised his option to obtain bail by filing the application at 10:30 a.m. on the 181st day of his arrest, i.e., immediately after the court opened, on 01.02.2019 -- Public Prosecutor had not filed any application seeking extension of time to investigate into the crime prior to 31.01.2019 or prior to 10:30 a.m. on 01.02.2019 -- Public Prosecutor participated in the arguments on the bail application till 4:25 p.m. on the day it was filed -- It was only thereafter that the additional complaint came to be lodged against the Appellant – Held, appellant-accused was deemed to have availed of his indefeasible right to bail, the moment he filed an application for being released on bail and offered to abide by the terms and conditions of the bail order, i.e. at 10:30 a.m. on 01.02.2019 – Petitioner was held entitled to be released on bail notwithstanding the subsequent filing of an additional complaint.

(Para 3.3, 3.4, 17-19)

273. (P&H HC) 16-09-2020

A. Binding precedent -- Power of smaller Bench to say ‘per incuriam’ – A judgement may be held to be per incuriam in case it failed to notice an earlier binding precedent which covered the field -- Even in such a situation a smaller Bench cannot say that the judgement of a larger Bench is per incuriam -- The only course available to it is to make a reference to the larger Bench.

(Para 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A(4) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167, 173 -- NDPS case – Challan without report of the Chemical Examiner/Forensic Science Laboratory -- Incomplete challan -- Default bail -- By virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, the Single Bench judgements in Akash Kumar alias Sunny (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14977) and Shankar (CRM No. M-44412 of 2019/20th December 2019) are binding as they lay down a proposition of law although at variance with the law laid down by the Division Bench in Ajit Singh alias Jeeta (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121) -- Smaller Bench could not have declared the judgement of a larger Bench to be per incuriam -- Judicial discipline demands that a reference be made to a Division Bench regarding the validity and correctness of the aforementioned Single Bench judgements -- File sent to Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a request to constitute a Division Bench for consideration of this matter -- Meanwhile, direction given that petitioner be released on bail

(Para 11,12)

282. (SC) 31-08-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

300. (SC) 05-08-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c) – Recovery of cannabis -- Prima facie case should be beyond reasonable doubt – Burden of proof on accused shift thereafter -- Stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as Section 37, the minimum sentence of 10 years, absence of any provision for remission do not dispense with the requirements of prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only where after which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused -- Gravity of the sentence and the stringency of the provisions will therefore call for a heightened scrutiny of the evidence for establishment of foundational facts by the prosecution.

(Para 2, 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c), 37 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Recovery of cannabis from house -- Conscious possession of contraband – Proof of -- Fair trial – Right of -- Appellant produced the sale agreement of house in question, Exhibit P.28 with promptness the very next day -- It was never investigated for its genuineness by the police and neither were the panchayat records verified -- Voters list entry of 2008 being prior to the sale is of no consequence -- Conscious possession not established so as to attribute the presumption under the NDPS Act against him with regard to recovery of the contraband -- Conviction could not be based on a foundation of conjectures and surmises to conclude on a preponderance of probabilities, the guilt of the appellant without establishing the same beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellant has been denied the right to a fair investigation, which is but a facet of a fair trial guaranteed to every accused under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Conviction of the appellant held to be unsustainable and is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted.

(Para 2, 12-17)