Search By Topic: Limitation Law

57. (P&H HC) 20-12-2022

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 – Notice without Domestic incident report -- Domestic incident report is not mandatory -- Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate has not committed any illegality or irregularity by issuing notice to the petitioner without waiting for the report of Protection Officer.

(Para 13)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127 -- Acquittal u/s 498A IPC – Award of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Acquittal u/s 498A IPC will not create a bar for his wife to seek relief under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -- Payment of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. or other application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. will not effect the application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as the respondent can claim maintenance under the one case subject to adjustment of maintenance already paid by him.

(Para 14, 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Application u/s 12 of DV Act, 2005 after more than 8 years – Limitation -- Violation of any order passed under the DV Act is punishable u/s 13 of D.V. Act, 2005 -- Mere filing of complaint u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act not barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C -- This section will come into operation when any order passed u/s 12 of the Act is violated – Petition seeking quashing of complaint u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 dismissed. Kamatchi’s case 2022(2) L.A.R. 222 = (2022) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16975 relied.

(Para 16-19)

64. (SC) 19-09-2022

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7,9,61 – Liability acknowledged in 2013 -- Pendency of Winding up proceedings under Companies Act 1956 in High Court – Limitation for proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC --  On 30th March 2018, the Respondent filed petition u/s 9 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in the NCLT -- Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejected the application as barred by limitation – Respondent appealed to the NCLAT u/s 61 of the IBC -- By the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT set aside the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejecting the application of the Respondent u/s 9 of the IBC and has remitted the case to the Adjudicating Authority for admission after notice to the parties. Held,

--       For the purpose of limitation, the relevant date is the date on which the right to sue accrues which is the date when a default occurs.

--       Pendency of the proceedings in a parallel forum, invoked by the Respondent, is not sufficient cause for the delay in filing an application u/s 9 of the IBC -- By the time the application was filed, the claim had become barred by limitation.

--       Madras High Court neither suffered from any defect of jurisdiction to entertain the winding up application nor was unable to entertain the winding up application for any other cause of a like nature – Limitation for initiation of winding up proceedings in the Madras High Court stopped running on the date on which the Winding Up petition was filed -- Initiation of proceedings in Madras High Court would not save limitation for initiation of proceedings for initiation of CIRP in the NCLT u/s 7 of the IBC -- A claim may not be barred by limitation -- It is the remedy for realisation of the claim, which gets barred by limitation.

Impugned order of the NCLAT is unsustainable in law, set aside  -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 6-30)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay -- NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation -- Condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation -- Condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause -- Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case -- There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the Appellant/applicant for the delay in taking steps.

(Para 14-16)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Relevant date for limitation -- Date of enforcement of the IBC and/or the date on which an application could have first been filed under the IBC are not relevant in computation of limitation -- It would be absurd to hold that the CIRP could be initiated by filing an application u/s 7 or Section 9 of the IBC, within three years from the date on which an application under those provisions of the IBC could have first been made before the NCLT even though the right to sue may have accrued decades ago -- What is material is the date on which the right to sue accrues, and whether the cause of action continuous.

(Para 17, 18)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14, 18 -- Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Exclusion of time – Acknowledgment of liability – Fresh period of limitation -- It is now well settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the IBC as far as may be -- Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation in certain circumstances – Similarly, u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgment is signed -- However, the acknowledgment must be made before the period of limitation expires -- Proceedings in good faith in a forum which lacks jurisdiction or is unable to entertain for like nature may save limitation.

 (Para 23-25)

67. (SC) 13-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Long years living as husband and wife – Birth of child – Presumption of -- It is well settled that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock -- Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act -- Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Partition suit – Preliminary Decree – Final Decree – Role of -- Preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of the parties to the partition -- Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of the divided property, then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry, a final decree shall be passed.

(Para 29, 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Preliminary decree -- Final decree – Limitation – Nature of -- Final decree proceedings can be initiated at any point of time -- There is no limitation for initiating final decree proceedings -- Either of the parties to the suit can move an application for preparation of a final decree and, any of the defendants can also move application for the purpose -- By mere passing of a preliminary decree the suit is not disposed of.

(Para 31)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 -- Preliminary decree – Final decree – Directions issued to Trial Courts -- Once a preliminary decree is passed by the Trial Court, the court should proceed with the case for drawing up the final decree suo motu -- After passing of the preliminary decree, the Trial Court has to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC -- The courts should not adjourn the matter sine die -- There is also no need to file a separate final decree proceedings -- In the same suit, the court should allow the concerned party to file an appropriate application for drawing up the final decree – Suit comes to an end only when a final decree is drawn – Directions given to Trial Courts to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC soon after passing of the preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the property, suo motu and without requiring initiation of any separate proceedings.

(Para 32, 33)

73. (P&H HC) 18-08-2021

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Delay in application – Trial Court adopted hyper-technical approach while dismissing the applications -- Rules of procedure provisions of law are meant to advance ends of justice -- Courts while dealing with such like matters should endeavour to see that a lis is decided on merits rather than non-suiting a party on technical grounds -- If a litigant is grossly negligent and casual in his approach with regard to the litigation in which he is involved, then he does not deserve any sympathy or leniency for the default committed by him with regard to putting in appearance in the Court -- However, if sufficient reasons are given for non-appearance, then a very rigid and technical view in the matter should not be taken.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Delay in application – Plaintiffs are Non-Resident Indians and are of very old age -- They have rendered a plausible and satisfactory explanation for their non representation in the Court, when the case was dismissed for non-prosecution -- Trial Court should have considered the prayer of the plaintiffs to get the suit restored by condoning the delay in filing of the application sympathetically -- Claim ought to be adjudicated on merits rather than being rejected for technical reasons – Revision petition accepted; the impugned order set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court -- Trial Court may allow the applicants to lead evidence in support of their contentions, if so desired and then after hearing learned counsel for the applicants, a fresh order in accordance with law in the light of observations made in this order be passed.

(Para 8)

76. (SC) 10-03-2021

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 29-A, 43 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 43, Article 137 -- Appointment of Arbitrator -- Limitation of 3 years – No provision in Arbitration Act specifying period of limitation for filing an application u/s 11 of the Act -- One would have to take recourse to the Limitation Act, 1963, as per Section 43 of the Arbitration Act and it would be covered by the residual provision Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 29A mandates that the arbitral tribunal will conclude the proceedings within a period of 18 months -- In view of the legislative intent, the period of 3 years for filing an application u/s 11 would run contrary to the scheme of the Act -- It would be necessary for Parliament to effect an amendment to Section 11, prescribing a specific period of limitation within which a party may move the court for making an application for appointment of the arbitration under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

(Para 9, 10, 13-17)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6A), 16 -- Objection to arbitration -- Preliminary objections – Jurisdiction of – Doctrine of kompetenz-komptenz -- Court is required only to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement -- All other preliminary or threshold issues are left to be decided by the arbitrator u/s 16 -- 2019 Amendment Act has deleted sub-section (6A) in Section 11, however, the same is yet to be notified -- Consequently, sub-section (6A) continues to remain on the statute book, and governs the scope of power under Section 11 for the present.

(Para 26)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of Limitation – Jurisdiction of Arbitration Tribunal -- Issue of limitation, in essence, goes to the maintainability or admissibility of the claim, which is to be decided by the arbitral tribunal as a preliminary issue, or at the final stage after evidence is led by the parties.

(Para 32-35)

D. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of Limitation – Time-barred claim – Power of Court – Scope of -- It is only in the very limited category of cases, where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the reference -- However, if there is even the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration, otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a matter to be determined by the tribunal.

(Para 37)

E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of limitation -- Notice invoking arbitration was issued 5 ½ years after rejection of the claims -- Consequently, the notice invoking arbitration is ex facie time barred, and the disputes between the parties cannot be referred to arbitration in the facts of the case -- Application filed u/s 11 dismissed.

(Para 38-41)

F. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 to 20 -- Arbitration of dispute -- Period of limitation for issuing notice of arbitration would not get extended by mere exchange of letters or mere settlement discussions, where a final bill is rejected by making deductions or otherwise -- Sections 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act do not exclude the time taken on account of settlement discussions -- There must be a clear notice invoking arbitration setting out the “particular dispute” (including claims / amounts) which must be received by the other party within a period of 3 years from the rejection of a final bill, failing which, the time bar would prevail.

(Para 39)

G. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 43, Article 137 -- Limitation for Arbitration -- Period of limitation for filing an application u/s 11 would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the arbitrator -- It has been suggested that the Parliament may consider amending Section 11 of the 1996 Act to provide a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is in consonance with the object of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings; -- In rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time-barred, and it is manifest that there is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference.

(Para 40)

77. (SC) 08-03-2021

COVID-19 pandemic situation – Lockdown – Computing/ Extension of limitation period –

1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021.

2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services, and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications, including for legal purposes, and educational and job-related requirements.

(Para 1-3)

85. (P&H HC) 21-10-2020

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with possession -- Specific recital with regard to delivery of possession in the agreement to sell signed by the parties proved -- Mere failure of plaintiff to depose about the delivery of possession in the examination-in-chief would not be sufficient for the Court to record a finding that the stand of the plaintiffs with respect to delivery of actual possession is erroneous.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with actual physical possession of specific portion out of joint land – Permissibility of -- A co-sharer in actual physical possession of a specific portion out of the big parcel of joint land is entitled to deliver possession thereof to anyone -- No doubt, sale of a specific portion or parcel of land out of joint property by a co-sharer shall be deemed to be sale of undivided share out of joint land -- However, there is no bar either in the delivery of possession of specific portion or sale thereof out of the joint land -- First Appellate Court committed material irregularity while observing that a co-sharer cannot deliver the possession of the specific portion in its possession to someone out of joint property.

(Para 10)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Delay and laches – Appellate Court finds that suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from laches -- Defendant while filing the written statement did not allege that the suit suffered from laches -- Consequently no issue on this aspect was framed -- In the evidence no stand that the suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from unexplained laches -- Thus, the observations made by the learned first Appellate Court are not only beyond pleadings but also beyond evidence.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Suit for specific performance – Limitation -- Delay and laches -- Period of limitation in a suit for specific performance do not begin to run from the date on which agreement to sell has been executed – Period of limitation would either begin to run from the date fixed for its performance or if no date or period is stipulated, then from the date the plaintiff has notice that the performance has been refused by the opposite side.

(Para 11, 13, 21)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- First Appeal – Setting aside of trial court judgment -- It is not appropriate for the learned first Appellate Court to set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court without recording definite finding or the reasons for reversing thereof after critical analysis of the reasons with reference to error in the application of law or misreading or non-reading or misconstruction of the evidence available on record.

(Para 21)

F. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Agreement to sell – Entire sale consideration paid – Delay and laches – Ground of -- It is not appropriate for the Court to decline the relief of specific performance on the ground of laches particularly when the entire sale consideration has been paid and the suit was filed within limitation.

(Para 21)

87. (SC) 18-09-2020

A. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Registry to send certified copy -- Date of counting of limitation for appeal -- Period of limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved – U/s 420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost -- Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from which limitation would start running.

(Para 14)

B. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Delay in appeal – Condonation of -- Appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020 – By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of period of 45 days -- Period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020 -- Appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020 -- Lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020 and there was no impediment for the appellants to file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020 – In suo moto writ petition (civil) no. 3 of 2020 in order dated 23.3.2020, extension was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute – Appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order.

(Para 16, 25)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4 – “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation -- Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.

(Para 23)

89. (SC) 28-08-2020

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 –Limitation – Onus of -- It was for the applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, to prima facie show the existence in his favour, of a legally recoverable debt -- In other words, had to show that the debt is not barred by limitation.

(Para 36)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Schedule, Part II, clauses (19) to (21) -- Limitation – Period of limitation for initiation of a suit for recovery of money lent, is three years from the date on which the loan is paid -- Last loan amount is said to have been advanced in 2004-2005 -- In the winding up petition, there is not a whisper of any agreed date by which the alleged loan was to be repaid -- Debt was barred by limitation even in the year 2012, when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court – Held, NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding the same to be barred by limitation.

(Para 37, 38)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Personal loan -- A personal Loan to a Promoter or a Director of a company cannot trigger the Corporate Resolution Process under the IBC.

(Para 40)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Forgery in signatures -- Fabrication of records – Proof of – Jurisdiction of -- Disputes as to whether the signatures are forged or whether records have been fabricated can be adjudicated upon evidence including forensic evidence in a regular suit and not in proceedings u/s 7 of the IBC.

(Para 40)

E. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – No financial debt in existence -- Application u/s 7 of the IBC was not maintainable -- Payment received for shares, duly issued to a third party at the request of the payee as evident from official records, cannot be a debt, not to speak of financial debt.

(Para 42,43)

90. (SC) 27-08-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law -- If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal -- It was not open to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal -- Existence of a “substantial question of law” is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way -- To be a question of law “involved in the case”, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

(Para 32, 33)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Principles summarised:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.

(Para 37)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- A decree of possession does not automatically follow a decree of declaration of title and ownership over property -- It is well settled that, where a Plaintiff wants to establish that the Defendant’s original possession was permissive, it is for the Plaintiff to prove this allegation and if he fails to do so, it may be presumed that possession was adverse, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

(Para 46)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for possession – A person claiming a decree of possession has to establish his entitlement to get such possession and also establish that his claim is not barred by the laws of limitation -- He must show that he had possession before the alleged trespasser got possession.

(Para 51)

F. Possession Follows Title -- Maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all -- The presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

(Para 52)

G. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Suit for possession – Limitation – Ground of -- A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act -- Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after expiry of the period of limitation, even though the plea of limitation may not have been taken in defence.

(Para 53)

H. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Suit for possession -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- In the absence of any whisper in the plaint as to the date on which the Defendant and/or his Predecessor-in-interest took possession of the suit property and in the absence of any whisper to show that the relief of decree for possession was within limitation, the High Court could not have reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court, and allowed the Plaintiff the relief of recovery of possession, more so when the Defendant had pleaded that he had been in complete possession of the suit premises, as owner, with absolute rights, ever since 1966, when his father had executed a Deed of Release in his favour and/or in other words for over 28 years as on the date of institution of the suit.

(Para 55)

I. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal cannot satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 59)

92. (P&H HC) 06-03-2020

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Section 11, Explanation IV of Section 11 – Eviction proceedings – Title suit thereafter – Maintainability of -- Once, the application filed u/s 7 of the Act is decided in which question of title, though available, is not raised, it puts an end to the controversy regarding the question of title which cannot be raised thereafter by filing a suit u/s 11 of the Act -- Subsequently a suit filed u/s 11 of the Act to establish the question of title shall not be maintainable.

(Para 8, 18-20)

B. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title suit – In case, if the title of a person is threatened by the Gram Panchayat or anybody else, he can always file a suit u/s 11 of the Act for seeking declaration for having acquired the right, title or interest in the property in question.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, Rule 21-A -- Title suit – Limitation -- Whether the suit filed u/s 11 of the Act is time barred in view of Rule 21-A of the Rules if it is not filed within 30 days from the date of accrual of cause of action? – Held, cases in which application u/s 7 of the Act is not filed but a person or a Panchayat seeks a declaration of their right, title or interest in the land vested or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat then the suit has to be filed within the period of 30 days from the date of accrual of the cause of action as provided in Rule 21-A of the Rules which means that the suit has to be filed when the right, title or interest is threatened and not at any time otherwise Rule 21-A(1) of the Rules provided in the Rules will become redundant.

(Para 21)