Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Onus to proof -- It is trite law that once the title of the property has been upheld namely a finding has been recorded by a judgment and decree in the name of plaintiff in an earlier suit, in such circumstances, the onus to prove acquisition by adverse possession lay on the defendant.

(Para 7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Resjudicata -- In the earlier round of litigation direction to the defendant-respondents was to remove at their own expenses the L.T. pole installed in the courtyard of the plaintiff-appellant within a month -- However, as per the undertaking, it was made clear that the plaintiff-appellant would not be entitled to any compensation for the transformer and poles erected in his property – Plaintiff-appellant wanted to reagitate the matter which is directly and substantially the same as in the previous litigation -- Plaintiff-appellant not able to convince that the findings in the earlier round of litigation would not operate as res judicata -- There is extra-ordinary delay of 2936 days in filing the appeal for which no cogent reasons are forthcoming – Appeal dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.

(Para 6-8)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Execution of decree – Limitation of 12 years – Cause of action -- Limitation period would commence only with the decree becoming enforceable and thus is capable of being executed -- Compromise decree dated 26.04.1960 -- Cause of action arise on 31.03.1994, period of limitation will begin only with effect from 31.03.1994 -- Execution Application made on 17.07.1995 held to be within Limitation.

(Para 9-11)

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(a)(i), 27(d) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 -- Complaint after expiry of limitation period of three years – Quashing of complaint  --- Maximum punishment would be for a period of two years -- Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. bars the concerned Court from taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation – Report of the Laboratory came into the hands of the Drugs Inspector on 02.07.2015 and thus, the limitation expired on 01.07.2018 while complaint was filed on 05.02.2019 i.e. approximately after 7 months when period of limitation was over – Complaint and all other consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-10)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – No evidence by defendant No.2-appellant to prove that her possession was nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, i.e. peaceful, open and continuous -- A person seeking to establish his adverse possession has to show that his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner -- It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period – Defendant No.2-appellant failed to lead any substantial evidence to prove her plea of adverse possession -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 7)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Arbitration award – Objection after 120 days – Condonation of delay -- Application u/s 34 of the Act beyond the period of 120 days i.e. 90 days of limitation and 30 days period -- Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable -- Delay beyond 30 days after expiry of limitation period cannot be condoned.

(Para 6)

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 16 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 5 Rule 1, Order 8 Rule 1 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Written statement filed after one year – Application for placing on record rejected -- Revisional jurisdiction – By Sec.16 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Code of Civil Procedure stands amended, which mandates that the defendant(s) has to file the written statement within 120 days from the date of service of summons, failing which the defendant(s) right to file the written statement will stand forfeited and the Court shall not accept the written statement on record – Held, there is no error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 6-11)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Decree – Delay in filing appeal – Condonation of delay -- Limitation would run from the date of passing of the decree and not from any date prior to passing of the same – Seeker of condonation of delay is not required to explain the period of his absence during the trial, what is required is the period of delay which runs as per the Limitation Act and in this case the period of limitation had started from the date of decree, therefore, any delay after explaining of such limitation was only to be explained by the appellant.

(Para 15)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 56(2) -- Arrears of electricity bill – Limitation of 2 years -- Connection of the defendant was declared PDCO on 18.3.2010 ordered to be disconnected permanently vide order dated 18.3.2010 -- Thereafter, on 22.3.2010 an amount of Rs.87,972/- has been shown outstanding against the defendant and no further electricity supplied to the defendant after 18.3.2010 – Trial court dismissed the suit by holding that limitation to file the suit shall be counted from 18.3.2010 when the connection of the defendant was declared PDCO and when this amount became due and the suit has been filed on 7.5.2012 i.e. beyond the limitation period of two years -- Ld. First Appellate Court upheld the order – High court found no perversity or illegality in the concurrent findings of facts returned by the Courts below -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 11-18)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65, 113 -- Suit for declaration and possession -- Limitation – Limitation to file a suit for possession on the basis of title is twelve years -- Declaratory relief for title of the property is sine qua non for seeking possession over it -- The former, therefore, cannot be held to take away the essential characteristics of a suit for possession -- One of the reliefs sought of declaration will not mean that the prescribed period of limitation will not be applicable.

(Para 2, 8-10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 149 – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 4 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay in appeal – Condonation of delay – Insufficient funds for court fee – Ground of -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed as insufficient funds could not have been a sufficient ground for condonation of delay -- It would have been entirely a different matter had the appellant filed an appeal in terms of Section 149 CPC and thereafter removed the defects by paying deficit court fees.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (8 of 1974), Section 2(4), 118 – Sale of agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh -- Private company is not an ‘agriculturist’ -- Approval was not given by the State Government and then the Company assigned his right to the plaintiff who thereafter filed the suit for specific performance -- No specific clause in the “Agreement to Sell”, which says that in case the purchaser fails to obtain required permission from the State Government, it could assign its rights to an agriculturist of Himachal Pradesh and the seller therefore would not have any objection in executing the Sale deed in favour of such an assignee -- No question of granting a decree of Specific Performance in favour of the plaintiff – Dismissal of suit upheld.

(Para 11-16)

C. Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (8 of 1974), Section 118 -- Sale of agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh -- Whole purpose of Section 118 of the 1972 Act is to protect agriculturists with small holdings -- Land in Himachal Pradesh cannot be transferred to a non-agriculturist, and this is with a purpose to save the small agricultural holding of poor persons and also to check the rampant conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes.

(Para 17)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 298 days in filing LPA – Condonation of delay – Clerk of the earlier counsel who prepared the writ petition misplaced the files – Application supported by an affidavit of the legal representative of the deceased workman -- Sufficient ground made out to condone the delay – Delay condoned.

(Para 1-4)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 25-B, 25-F -- Retrenchment of workman – Reinstatement – Right of – Workman in service for brief period of 240 days – Reinstatement would not be the correct relief -- Grant of compensation of Rs.2.5 lakhs upheld.

(Para 8,9)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Limitation for mutation -- Section 34 of the Act, 1887 stipulates that the Patwari shall enter in his register of mutations every report made to him of any person acquiring rights or title in any property of the concerned revenue estate by virtue of inheritance, purchase, mortgage or otherwise and a report regarding the same has been made to him -- Same action can be taken suo moto also on acquiring knowledge -- He is also required to enquire into the correctness of entries in the register of mutations and make such order as thought fit with respect to the entry in the annual record of rights -- It is, thus, evident that no limitation has been prescribed for making an entry in the register of mutation -- Thus, the argument of limitation is liable to be rejected outright.

(Para 6)

B. Pepsu Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1954 (18 of 1954), Section 2(h) -- Occupancy tenant -- Nothing on record to show that the petitioner was recorded as occupancy tenant at the time of commencement of the Act nor is there any decree or order of any Court or authority of competent jurisdiction granting him the right of occupancy -- Thus, the petitioner is not governed by the definition and cannot claim to possess the status of an occupancy tenant by operation of law.

(Para 10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 204 – Cheque bounce complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- Issue of process – Recalling of -- After completion of Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no provision for reverting back and question the taking of cognizance and dismissing the same.

(Para 1, 8, 9, 17)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cheque bounce complaint – Delay in complaint – Condonation of delay -- Ample power has been given by the legislature by inserting the provisions of Section 142 of the N.I. Act to protect the person who has given money from technicalities -- Proper explanation was given in the petition of complaint supported by medical papers which was overlooked by the Ld. Magistrate – Order passed by Ld. Judicial Magistrate set aside/quashed -- Criminal Proceedings in complaint restored -- Petitioner is permitted to file an application for condonation of delay before the trial court and if such an application is filed, the Trial Court shall be at liberty to consider the same on its own merits.

(Para 13-29)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 65 -- Adverse possession – Permissive possession -- Hostile possession -- A person in permissible possession over the suit land cannot become owner only on the basis of long possession -- However, in case the said person starts proclaiming to be owner to the knowledge of the true owner, even if his possession in the beginning was permissive, it will become adverse, the moment he starts proclaiming to be in hostile possession.

(Para 25)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 65 -- Adverse possession – Permissive possession -- Hostile possession -- Sale by attorney when owner already died – Moment the sale deeds in favour of defendants executed by the attorney of the owner, became null and void, on account of the fact that owner had already expired, the possession of the defendants became hostile, as they no longer could be stated to be in permissive possession on the basis of the prior mortgage -- Defendants were still continuing to be in possession on the basis of these null & void sale deeds, they perfected their title on the expiry of statutory period of limitation, as their possession was open, continuous, hostile and adverse to the title to the true owners/natural heirs owner.

(Para 26)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 33(3), 34 -- Correction in award – Limitation to file objection -- Starting point for the limitation in case of suo-moto correction of the award, would be the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party.

(Para 2)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 -- Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61 – Quashing of FIR -- Excise matter – Limitation -- Maximum sentence prescribed 2 years -- Trial Court can take cognizance within 3 years -- Held, prosecution was required to file challan within three years whereas a period of 08 years has expired, however, till date challan has not been presented -- In view of mandate of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the petition allowed and FIR quashed.

(Para 2, 7-9)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 – Notice without Domestic incident report -- Domestic incident report is not mandatory -- Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate has not committed any illegality or irregularity by issuing notice to the petitioner without waiting for the report of Protection Officer.

(Para 13)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127 -- Acquittal u/s 498A IPC – Award of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Acquittal u/s 498A IPC will not create a bar for his wife to seek relief under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -- Payment of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. or other application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. will not effect the application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as the respondent can claim maintenance under the one case subject to adjustment of maintenance already paid by him.

(Para 14, 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Application u/s 12 of DV Act, 2005 after more than 8 years – Limitation -- Violation of any order passed under the DV Act is punishable u/s 13 of D.V. Act, 2005 -- Mere filing of complaint u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act not barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C -- This section will come into operation when any order passed u/s 12 of the Act is violated – Petition seeking quashing of complaint u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 dismissed. Kamatchi’s case 2022(2) L.A.R. 222 = (2022) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16975 relied.

(Para 16-19)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Constitution of India, Article 136, 226 -- Acquisition of land – Delay in reference u/s 18 of Land Acquisition Act – Limitation – Condonation of delay -- Limitation for making reference u/s 18 of the Act, 1894 cannot be extended and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable – Present case is not the case of condoning the delay in exercise of powers u/s 5 of the Limitation Act -- Appellants challenged the acquisition proceedings which ended on the dismissal of the SLP vide order dated 11.4.2013 and thereafter pursuant to the liberty reserved by the High Court, within a period of six months from the date of dismissal of the SLP i.e., on 1.7.2013, the original landowners filed reference application u/s 18 of the Act, 1894 – Impugned judgment and order dismissing the writ petition/reference u/s 18 of the Act, 1894 as barred by limitation quashed and set aside -- Matter remitted to the reference court to decide the reference on merits.

(Para 10)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – State appeal against acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Delay of 303 days -- Condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of lethargic working of Government -- Delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot be mechanically condoned, in the absence of 'sufficient cause' for delay -- No explanation put forth for explaining the delay for filing the application -- Reason given is that the file moved at a leisure pace -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed -- Consequently, the application u/s 378 (3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed as time barred.

(Para 5-8)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Inception of -- Adverse possession must be hostile to the title of the owner and must begin with his wrongful dispossession -- Essential ingredient to establish the plea of adverse possession is that the person taking that plea must admit to the title of the owner.

(Para 8)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Permissive possession -- Defendants claimed adverse possession over the suit land, however, in written statement pleaded that their predecessors-in-interest came in possession of the suit land by an oral family settlement which took place with the fore-fathers of the plaintiffs, hence evidently they are implying permissive possession of the suit land – Possession did not commence with the wrongful dispossession of the plaintiffs, which is one of the pre-requisites and essential ingredients to maintain the plea of adverse possession -- Adverse and permissive possession are mutually inconsistent with each other.

(Para 8)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ petition not entertained – Alternative remedy of appeal initiated -- Exclusion of period -- Appellant is entitled to ask for exclusion of the period in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Exclusion of time is different, and cannot be equated with condonation of delay -- Period once excluded, cannot be counted for the purpose of computing the period for which delay can be condoned -- Period from the date of filing of the writ petition on 24.02.2018 and the date on which it was dismissed as not entertained viz. 07.03.2018, should have been excluded.

(Para 3)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 173 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Appeal by owner -- Delay of 376 days – Condonation of delay -- Application is silent as to when the applicant-appellant contacted his counsel to know about the date of award or when he got the appeal prepared -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed.

(Para 6)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 39, 192, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Expiry of registration of transport vehicle -- Recovery rights from owner -- If the vehicle is driven/ used without a valid registration, it amounts to violation of Section 39 and 192 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, which is a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of the policy -- Tribunal did not commit any error in granting recovery rights to the Insurance Company.

(Para 9-13)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 14, Rule 2(1)(2)(b) -- Issue of limitation – Preliminary issue – Issue of limitation can be framed and determined as a preliminary issue in a case where it can be decided on admitted facts -- Provisions under Order XIV Rule 2(1) and Rule 2(2)(b) permit to deal with and dispose of a suit in accordance with the decision on the preliminary issue.

(Para 18, 26)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 – Execution of decree – Limitation -- Article 136 of Limitation Act applies only when an application for execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court is to be filed.

(Para 20)

C. Pleadings – Misquoting/ not mentioning of provision -- Misquoting or non-quoting of a provision by itself will not make an order bad so long as the relevant enabling provision is in existence and it was correctly applied though without specifically mentioning it.

(Para 25)

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7,9,61 – Liability acknowledged in 2013 -- Pendency of Winding up proceedings under Companies Act 1956 in High Court – Limitation for proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC --  On 30th March 2018, the Respondent filed petition u/s 9 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in the NCLT -- Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejected the application as barred by limitation – Respondent appealed to the NCLAT u/s 61 of the IBC -- By the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT set aside the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejecting the application of the Respondent u/s 9 of the IBC and has remitted the case to the Adjudicating Authority for admission after notice to the parties. Held,

--       For the purpose of limitation, the relevant date is the date on which the right to sue accrues which is the date when a default occurs.

--       Pendency of the proceedings in a parallel forum, invoked by the Respondent, is not sufficient cause for the delay in filing an application u/s 9 of the IBC -- By the time the application was filed, the claim had become barred by limitation.

--       Madras High Court neither suffered from any defect of jurisdiction to entertain the winding up application nor was unable to entertain the winding up application for any other cause of a like nature – Limitation for initiation of winding up proceedings in the Madras High Court stopped running on the date on which the Winding Up petition was filed -- Initiation of proceedings in Madras High Court would not save limitation for initiation of proceedings for initiation of CIRP in the NCLT u/s 7 of the IBC -- A claim may not be barred by limitation -- It is the remedy for realisation of the claim, which gets barred by limitation.

Impugned order of the NCLAT is unsustainable in law, set aside  -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 6-30)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay -- NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation -- Condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation -- Condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause -- Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case -- There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the Appellant/applicant for the delay in taking steps.

(Para 14-16)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Relevant date for limitation -- Date of enforcement of the IBC and/or the date on which an application could have first been filed under the IBC are not relevant in computation of limitation -- It would be absurd to hold that the CIRP could be initiated by filing an application u/s 7 or Section 9 of the IBC, within three years from the date on which an application under those provisions of the IBC could have first been made before the NCLT even though the right to sue may have accrued decades ago -- What is material is the date on which the right to sue accrues, and whether the cause of action continuous.

(Para 17, 18)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14, 18 -- Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Exclusion of time – Acknowledgment of liability – Fresh period of limitation -- It is now well settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the IBC as far as may be -- Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation in certain circumstances – Similarly, u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgment is signed -- However, the acknowledgment must be made before the period of limitation expires -- Proceedings in good faith in a forum which lacks jurisdiction or is unable to entertain for like nature may save limitation.

 (Para 23-25)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cause of action – Time barred complaint -- Delay of 7 days in complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- No petition filed for condoning the delay -- It is settled law that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date of which the cause of action arose -- Hence, summoning order and revisional order confirming the cognizance taken by Magistrate are erroneous and  contrary to law, set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 6 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Recovery of possession – Limitation -- Suit beyond six months -- As per the pleaded case of the petitioner, he was dispossessed from the suit property on 28.04.2009 and thereafter, FIR was registered 08.05.2010 u/s 447/448/380 IPC – Instant suit came to be instituted on 02.02.2013 i.e. much beyond the prescribed period of six months – Trial Court dismissed the suit -- No error in the impugned order passed by the ld. trial Court – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1-6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Long years living as husband and wife – Birth of child – Presumption of -- It is well settled that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock -- Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act -- Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Partition suit – Preliminary Decree – Final Decree – Role of -- Preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of the parties to the partition -- Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of the divided property, then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry, a final decree shall be passed.

(Para 29, 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Preliminary decree -- Final decree – Limitation – Nature of -- Final decree proceedings can be initiated at any point of time -- There is no limitation for initiating final decree proceedings -- Either of the parties to the suit can move an application for preparation of a final decree and, any of the defendants can also move application for the purpose -- By mere passing of a preliminary decree the suit is not disposed of.

(Para 31)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 -- Preliminary decree – Final decree – Directions issued to Trial Courts -- Once a preliminary decree is passed by the Trial Court, the court should proceed with the case for drawing up the final decree suo motu -- After passing of the preliminary decree, the Trial Court has to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC -- The courts should not adjourn the matter sine die -- There is also no need to file a separate final decree proceedings -- In the same suit, the court should allow the concerned party to file an appropriate application for drawing up the final decree – Suit comes to an end only when a final decree is drawn – Directions given to Trial Courts to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC soon after passing of the preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the property, suo motu and without requiring initiation of any separate proceedings.

(Para 32, 33)

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 47-A – Deficient stamp duty – Limitation -- Reference was made by the Sub-Registrar on receipt of the audit report -- Petitioner was called upon to appear by notice which was well beyond the period of three years – Additional amount of Rs.3,12,193/- along with interest @12% towards deficient stamp duty ordered to be paid – Held, even if Section 47-A (3) of the Indian Stamp Act permits Collector to issue notice suo motu, it has to be done within a period of three years from the date of registration of the instrument -- Impugned orders passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector and Commissioner quashed -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 1, 9-11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 1 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 318 days in preferring appeal – Condonation of delay – Contended that out of the delay of 318 days, 126 days' delay satisfactorily explained, qua the remaining 192 days the delay had not been entirely explained, however, it had been caused due to the sanction and approval from the quarters concerned not being given in time on account of the long departmental procedure – Held, Courts should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and justice oriented approach and a litigant should not be made to suffer for the misdemeanour or inaction on the part of his counsel – Appellate Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay -- Impugned order set aside with costs of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 1-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 198), Order 7 Rule 11 – Limitation – Application for rejection of plaint – On a plain reading of the plaint it cannot be inferred or deduced that the suit is barred by limitation – On the face of it, the averments made in the plaint make out a case, within limitation, against the defendant-petitioners – Application dismissed.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 198), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Scope of – Exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC are drastic ones and a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint on a plain reading along with documents discloses a cause of action – No other document, be it a written statement or application for rejection of the plaint, can be looked into at this stage.

(Para 8)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Suit for partition – Delay in appeal -- Condonation of delay – Delay of 329 days in preferring the appeal – No doubt it was indeed expected from the petitioner-defendant No.1 to be more vigilant -- Counsel representing him before the trial Court also failed to inform him promptly about the suit being decreed against him – It should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to a property which concededly is of a valuable nature -- Delay condoned with cost of Rs. 10,000/-.

(Para 7,8)

A. Employees’ (Workmen) Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Dismissal of appeal on delay – Modification in interest – Permissibility of -- Having dismissed the appeal of the insurer on the ground of limitation, there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere on merits with the award of interest on compensation -- Interest with the award of compensation restored.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Employees’ (Workmen) Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4A – Award with interest -- Interest @ 12 per cent per annum on the principal sum awarded from the date of accident till the deposit -- High Court directed that the appellants are not entitled to any interest on the compensation awarded except the accrued interest -- Section 4A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923 stipulates that the Commissioner shall direct the employer to pay interest of 12% or at a higher rate, not exceeding the lending rates of any scheduled banks specified, if the employer does not pay the compensation within one month from the date it fell due – There was no legal basis for the High Court to delete the order of payment of interest -- Interest with the award of compensation restored.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Delay in application – Trial Court adopted hyper-technical approach while dismissing the applications -- Rules of procedure provisions of law are meant to advance ends of justice -- Courts while dealing with such like matters should endeavour to see that a lis is decided on merits rather than non-suiting a party on technical grounds -- If a litigant is grossly negligent and casual in his approach with regard to the litigation in which he is involved, then he does not deserve any sympathy or leniency for the default committed by him with regard to putting in appearance in the Court -- However, if sufficient reasons are given for non-appearance, then a very rigid and technical view in the matter should not be taken.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Delay in application – Plaintiffs are Non-Resident Indians and are of very old age -- They have rendered a plausible and satisfactory explanation for their non representation in the Court, when the case was dismissed for non-prosecution -- Trial Court should have considered the prayer of the plaintiffs to get the suit restored by condoning the delay in filing of the application sympathetically -- Claim ought to be adjudicated on merits rather than being rejected for technical reasons – Revision petition accepted; the impugned order set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court -- Trial Court may allow the applicants to lead evidence in support of their contentions, if so desired and then after hearing learned counsel for the applicants, a fresh order in accordance with law in the light of observations made in this order be passed.

(Para 8)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- Co-sharer’s possession – Nature of -- Possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be possession of all, unless and until the said co-sharer can establish exclusive possession with the intention to oust the right of the other co-sharer -- Appellants has not been able to point out any evidence, which shows ouster – Appeal is without any merit and is dismissed.

(Para 1, 4-6)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 238-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 -- Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor -- Acknowledgment of liability in Balance-sheet – Extension of limitation -- There is a compulsion in law to prepare a balance sheet but no compulsion to make any particular admission, is correct in law as it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether an entry made in a balance sheet qua any particular creditor is unequivocal or has been entered into with caveats, which then has to be examined on a case by case basis to establish whether an acknowledgement of liability has, in fact, been made, thereby extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

(Para 1, 22-35)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 29-A, 43 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 43, Article 137 -- Appointment of Arbitrator -- Limitation of 3 years – No provision in Arbitration Act specifying period of limitation for filing an application u/s 11 of the Act -- One would have to take recourse to the Limitation Act, 1963, as per Section 43 of the Arbitration Act and it would be covered by the residual provision Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 29A mandates that the arbitral tribunal will conclude the proceedings within a period of 18 months -- In view of the legislative intent, the period of 3 years for filing an application u/s 11 would run contrary to the scheme of the Act -- It would be necessary for Parliament to effect an amendment to Section 11, prescribing a specific period of limitation within which a party may move the court for making an application for appointment of the arbitration under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

(Para 9, 10, 13-17)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6A), 16 -- Objection to arbitration -- Preliminary objections – Jurisdiction of – Doctrine of kompetenz-komptenz -- Court is required only to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement -- All other preliminary or threshold issues are left to be decided by the arbitrator u/s 16 -- 2019 Amendment Act has deleted sub-section (6A) in Section 11, however, the same is yet to be notified -- Consequently, sub-section (6A) continues to remain on the statute book, and governs the scope of power under Section 11 for the present.

(Para 26)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of Limitation – Jurisdiction of Arbitration Tribunal -- Issue of limitation, in essence, goes to the maintainability or admissibility of the claim, which is to be decided by the arbitral tribunal as a preliminary issue, or at the final stage after evidence is led by the parties.

(Para 32-35)

D. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of Limitation – Time-barred claim – Power of Court – Scope of -- It is only in the very limited category of cases, where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the reference -- However, if there is even the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration, otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a matter to be determined by the tribunal.

(Para 37)

E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Issue of limitation -- Notice invoking arbitration was issued 5 ½ years after rejection of the claims -- Consequently, the notice invoking arbitration is ex facie time barred, and the disputes between the parties cannot be referred to arbitration in the facts of the case -- Application filed u/s 11 dismissed.

(Para 38-41)

F. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11  -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 to 20 -- Arbitration of dispute -- Period of limitation for issuing notice of arbitration would not get extended by mere exchange of letters or mere settlement discussions, where a final bill is rejected by making deductions or otherwise -- Sections 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act do not exclude the time taken on account of settlement discussions -- There must be a clear notice invoking arbitration setting out the “particular dispute” (including claims / amounts) which must be received by the other party within a period of 3 years from the rejection of a final bill, failing which, the time bar would prevail.

(Para 39)

G. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 43, Article 137 -- Limitation for Arbitration -- Period of limitation for filing an application u/s 11 would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the arbitrator -- It has been suggested that the Parliament may consider amending Section 11 of the 1996 Act to provide a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is in consonance with the object of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings; -- In rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time-barred, and it is manifest that there is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference.

(Para 40)

COVID-19 pandemic situation – Lockdown – Computing/ Extension of limitation period –

1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021.

2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services, and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications, including for legal purposes, and educational and job-related requirements.

(Para 1-3)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 9, 14 – Limitation -- Arrears of salary from 1998 to 2013 – Acknowledgement in 2014 by Company – NCLT admitted application, Interim Resolution Professional appointed and moratorium imposed – NCALT set aside the order of NCLT – Held, from the date of the last acknowledgement i.e. 30.09.2014 till the date on which the petition before the NCLT was filed i.e. 27.07.2017, three years have not elapsed – Arrears of salary due for a period of at least 3 years prior to 30.09.2014 would certainly be within limitation, and therefore payable to the Appellant -- NCLT judgment is correct in admitting the Section 9 application by the Appellant -- There is an acknowledgement of liability, which therefore shows that there is no “dispute” as to amounts owed to the Appellant -- Impugned NCLAT judgment set aside, consequently, the NCLT judgment is restored to the file.

(Para 3, 6, 7, 10)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 532 days in SLP and 6616 days from the original order – Condonation of delay -- Petitioner approached the Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay -- In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record – Court categorized such kind of cases as “certificate cases” filed with the only object to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court on the ground that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal -- Objective is to complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who may be in default – Looking to the gross negligence and the impunity with which the Union of India in a matter like this, Court considered it appropriate to impose special costs of Rs.1 lakh to be recovered from the concerned officer(s), to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Welfare Fund within four weeks.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Section 136 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 502 days in filing SLP – Condonation of -- Leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of Supreme Court -- This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 563 – Such kind of cases as “certificate cases” filed with the only object to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court -- Objective is to complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who may be in default in following the due process or may have done it deliberately -- Rs.25,000/- cost imposed for wastage of judicial time -- Amount ordered to be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the Special Leave Petition – SLP dismissed as time barred.

(Para 2-6)

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (35 of 2019), Section 38 – Time to file reply for 45 (30 + 15) days -- Delay of four days in filing the written statements during Covid-19 period -- Extension of time -- Period of limitation of 30 days to file the written statement had expired on 12.08.2020 and the extended period of 15 days expired on 27.08.2020 – Interim order 23.03.2020 passed by Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, SMW(C) No.3 of 2020 was continuing – Held, limitation for filing the written statement before the National Commission would be deemed to have been extended as it is clear from the order dated 23.03.2020 that the extended period of limitation was applicable to all petitions/applications/suits/appeals and all other proceedings – Appeals allowed – Direction given that the written statement filed by the appellant shall be taken on record.

(Para 10-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Conviction under Arms Act – Dismissal of revision in default – Sustainability of -- Held, High Court was manifestly in error in rejecting the revision in default, on the ground that the appellant’s advocate had remained absent on the previous four occasions -- Since the revision before the High Court arose out of an order of the conviction under the Arms Act, the High Court ought to have appointed an Amicus Curiae in the absence of counsel -- Liberty of a citizen cannot be taken away in this manner – Appeal allowed, Revision restored to the file of the High Court.

(Para 7,8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Evidence in Civil dispute – Standard of proof -- It is settled that the standard of proof required in a civil dispute is preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 80)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 17 – Fraud – Limitation -- Though the discrepancies in the GPA are bound to create some doubt, however, in absence of any tangible evidence produced by the plaintiff to support the plea of fraud, it does not take the matter further -- Testimony of the attesting witness, scribe and other independent witnesses plainly support the case of the defendants -- That evidence dispels the doubt if any; and tilt the balance in favour of the defendants – Since the plaintiff could not establish the existence of fraud, it must follow that the suits are ex-facie barred by limitation.

(Para 80, 81)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal – Power of -- Trial Court and the first appellate Court appreciated the evidence properly – The view was possible view – High Court ought not to have disturbed the same in the second appeal and that too on surmises and conjectures – Appeals allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court set aside – Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is hereby restored.

(Para 83)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 401 – Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 42-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – First appeal against conviction – Condonation of delay – Right of -- Held, first appeal against conviction should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation -- Appellate Court was in error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation -- Revision petition allowed, matter remitted to the same Court for deciding the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. State of Odisha v. Surendra Munda’s case 2020 (4), RCR (Criminal), 286 relied.

(Para 6)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with possession -- Specific recital with regard to delivery of possession in the agreement to sell signed by the parties proved -- Mere failure of plaintiff to depose about the delivery of possession in the examination-in-chief would not be sufficient for the Court to record a finding that the stand of the plaintiffs with respect to delivery of actual possession is erroneous.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with actual physical possession of specific portion out of joint land – Permissibility of -- A co-sharer in actual physical possession of a specific portion out of the big parcel of joint land is entitled to deliver possession thereof to anyone -- No doubt, sale of a specific portion or parcel of land out of joint property by a co-sharer shall be deemed to be sale of undivided share out of joint land -- However, there is no bar either in the delivery of possession of specific portion or sale thereof out of the joint land -- First Appellate Court committed material irregularity while observing that a co-sharer cannot deliver the possession of the specific portion in its possession to someone out of joint property.

(Para 10)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Delay and laches – Appellate Court finds that suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from laches -- Defendant while filing the written statement did not allege that the suit suffered from laches -- Consequently no issue on this aspect was framed -- In the evidence no stand that the suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from unexplained laches -- Thus, the observations made by the learned first Appellate Court are not only beyond pleadings but also beyond evidence.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Suit for specific performance – Limitation -- Delay and laches -- Period of limitation in a suit for specific performance do not begin to run from the date on which agreement to sell has been executed – Period of limitation would either begin to run from the date fixed for its performance or if no date or period is stipulated, then from the date the plaintiff has notice that the performance has been refused by the opposite side.

(Para 11, 13, 21)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- First Appeal – Setting aside of trial court judgment -- It is not appropriate for the learned first Appellate Court to set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court without recording definite finding or the reasons for reversing thereof after critical analysis of the reasons with reference to error in the application of law or misreading or non-reading or misconstruction of the evidence available on record.

(Para 21)

F. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Agreement to sell – Entire sale consideration paid – Delay and laches – Ground of -- It is not appropriate for the Court to decline the relief of specific performance on the ground of laches particularly when the entire sale consideration has been paid and the suit was filed within limitation.

(Para 21)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 96 -- Delay of 823 days in appeal – Condonation of delay -- If one of the plaintiffs was not available to file the appeal on account of his illness, the other set of plaintiffs could have filed the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation -- Merely because a demolition notice had thereafter been issued, would not condone the negligence of the petitioners or give a fresh cause to agitate for the condonation of delay on that ground -- Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was well aware that their suit was pending and did not get the interim protection --  It was for him to ensure that the appeal was filed within the prescribed period or at least within reasonable delay -- No ground made out to condone the inordinate delay.

(Para 6)

A. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Registry to send certified copy -- Date of counting of limitation for appeal -- Period of limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved – U/s 420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost -- Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from which limitation would start running.

(Para 14)

B. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Delay in appeal – Condonation of -- Appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020 – By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of period of 45 days -- Period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020 -- Appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020 -- Lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020 and there was no impediment for the appellants to file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020 – In suo moto writ petition (civil) no. 3 of 2020 in order dated 23.3.2020, extension was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute – Appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order.

(Para 16, 25)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4 – “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation -- Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.

(Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC – First appeal dismissed by High Court on account of delay of 1192 days  -- Matter was remitted to the High Court to consider the appeal on merits – Review sought by State -- Held, in a criminal matter, where the life and liberty of a person is in question, one right of appeal has always been accepted and appropriate steps must be taken to effectuate that right -- Considerations on account of delay and limitation ought not to negate the right of appeal inhering in an accused – Review petition dismissed, order under review, affirmed.

(Para 3-6)

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 –Limitation – Onus of -- It was for the applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, to prima facie show the existence in his favour, of a legally recoverable debt -- In other words, had to show that the debt is not barred by limitation.

(Para 36)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Schedule, Part II, clauses (19) to (21) -- Limitation – Period of limitation for initiation of a suit for recovery of money lent, is three years from the date on which the loan is paid -- Last loan amount is said to have been advanced in 2004-2005 -- In the winding up petition, there is not a whisper of any agreed date by which the alleged loan was to be repaid -- Debt was barred by limitation even in the year 2012, when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court – Held, NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding the same to be barred by limitation.

(Para 37, 38)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Personal loan -- A personal Loan to a Promoter or a Director of a company cannot trigger the Corporate Resolution Process under the IBC.

(Para 40)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Forgery in signatures -- Fabrication of records – Proof of – Jurisdiction of -- Disputes as to whether the signatures are forged or whether records have been fabricated can be adjudicated upon evidence including forensic evidence in a regular suit and not in proceedings u/s 7 of the IBC.

(Para 40)

E. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – No financial debt in existence -- Application u/s 7 of the IBC was not maintainable -- Payment received for shares, duly issued to a third party at the request of the payee as evident from official records, cannot be a debt, not to speak of financial debt.

(Para 42,43)