A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with possession -- Specific recital with regard to delivery of possession in the agreement to sell signed by the parties proved -- Mere failure of plaintiff to depose about the delivery of possession in the examination-in-chief would not be sufficient for the Court to record a finding that the stand of the plaintiffs with respect to delivery of actual possession is erroneous.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with actual physical possession of specific portion out of joint land – Permissibility of -- A co-sharer in actual physical possession of a specific portion out of the big parcel of joint land is entitled to deliver possession thereof to anyone -- No doubt, sale of a specific portion or parcel of land out of joint property by a co-sharer shall be deemed to be sale of undivided share out of joint land -- However, there is no bar either in the delivery of possession of specific portion or sale thereof out of the joint land -- First Appellate Court committed material irregularity while observing that a co-sharer cannot deliver the possession of the specific portion in its possession to someone out of joint property.

(Para 10)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Delay and laches – Appellate Court finds that suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from laches -- Defendant while filing the written statement did not allege that the suit suffered from laches -- Consequently no issue on this aspect was framed -- In the evidence no stand that the suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from unexplained laches -- Thus, the observations made by the learned first Appellate Court are not only beyond pleadings but also beyond evidence.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Suit for specific performance – Limitation -- Delay and laches -- Period of limitation in a suit for specific performance do not begin to run from the date on which agreement to sell has been executed – Period of limitation would either begin to run from the date fixed for its performance or if no date or period is stipulated, then from the date the plaintiff has notice that the performance has been refused by the opposite side.

(Para 11, 13, 21)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- First Appeal – Setting aside of trial court judgment -- It is not appropriate for the learned first Appellate Court to set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court without recording definite finding or the reasons for reversing thereof after critical analysis of the reasons with reference to error in the application of law or misreading or non-reading or misconstruction of the evidence available on record.

(Para 21)

F. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Agreement to sell – Entire sale consideration paid – Delay and laches – Ground of -- It is not appropriate for the Court to decline the relief of specific performance on the ground of laches particularly when the entire sale consideration has been paid and the suit was filed within limitation.

(Para 21)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 96 -- Delay of 823 days in appeal – Condonation of delay -- If one of the plaintiffs was not available to file the appeal on account of his illness, the other set of plaintiffs could have filed the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation -- Merely because a demolition notice had thereafter been issued, would not condone the negligence of the petitioners or give a fresh cause to agitate for the condonation of delay on that ground -- Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was well aware that their suit was pending and did not get the interim protection --  It was for him to ensure that the appeal was filed within the prescribed period or at least within reasonable delay -- No ground made out to condone the inordinate delay.

(Para 6)

A. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Registry to send certified copy -- Date of counting of limitation for appeal -- Period of limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved – U/s 420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost -- Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from which limitation would start running.

(Para 14)

B. Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 420(3), 421(3) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Rule 50 – Delay in appeal – Condonation of -- Appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020 – By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of period of 45 days -- Period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020 -- Appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020 -- Lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020 and there was no impediment for the appellants to file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020 – In suo moto writ petition (civil) no. 3 of 2020 in order dated 23.3.2020, extension was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute – Appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order.

(Para 16, 25)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4 – “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation -- Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.

(Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC – First appeal dismissed by High Court on account of delay of 1192 days  -- Matter was remitted to the High Court to consider the appeal on merits – Review sought by State -- Held, in a criminal matter, where the life and liberty of a person is in question, one right of appeal has always been accepted and appropriate steps must be taken to effectuate that right -- Considerations on account of delay and limitation ought not to negate the right of appeal inhering in an accused – Review petition dismissed, order under review, affirmed.

(Para 3-6)

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 –Limitation – Onus of -- It was for the applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, to prima facie show the existence in his favour, of a legally recoverable debt -- In other words, had to show that the debt is not barred by limitation.

(Para 36)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Schedule, Part II, clauses (19) to (21) -- Limitation – Period of limitation for initiation of a suit for recovery of money lent, is three years from the date on which the loan is paid -- Last loan amount is said to have been advanced in 2004-2005 -- In the winding up petition, there is not a whisper of any agreed date by which the alleged loan was to be repaid -- Debt was barred by limitation even in the year 2012, when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court – Held, NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding the same to be barred by limitation.

(Para 37, 38)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Personal loan -- A personal Loan to a Promoter or a Director of a company cannot trigger the Corporate Resolution Process under the IBC.

(Para 40)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Forgery in signatures -- Fabrication of records – Proof of – Jurisdiction of -- Disputes as to whether the signatures are forged or whether records have been fabricated can be adjudicated upon evidence including forensic evidence in a regular suit and not in proceedings u/s 7 of the IBC.

(Para 40)

E. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – No financial debt in existence -- Application u/s 7 of the IBC was not maintainable -- Payment received for shares, duly issued to a third party at the request of the payee as evident from official records, cannot be a debt, not to speak of financial debt.

(Para 42,43)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law -- If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal -- It was not open to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal -- Existence of a “substantial question of law” is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way -- To be a question of law “involved in the case”, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

(Para 32, 33)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Principles summarised:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.

(Para 37)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- A decree of possession does not automatically follow a decree of declaration of title and ownership over property -- It is well settled that, where a Plaintiff wants to establish that the Defendant’s original possession was permissive, it is for the Plaintiff to prove this allegation and if he fails to do so, it may be presumed that possession was adverse, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

(Para 46)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for possession – A person claiming a decree of possession has to establish his entitlement to get such possession and also establish that his claim is not barred by the laws of limitation -- He must show that he had possession before the alleged trespasser got possession.

(Para 51)

F. Possession Follows Title -- Maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all -- The presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

(Para 52)

G. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Suit for possession – Limitation – Ground of -- A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act -- Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after expiry of the period of limitation, even though the plea of limitation may not have been taken in defence.

(Para 53)

H. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Suit for possession -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- In the absence of any whisper in the plaint as to the date on which the Defendant and/or his Predecessor-in-interest took possession of the suit property and in the absence of any whisper to show that the relief of decree for possession was within limitation, the High Court could not have reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court, and allowed the Plaintiff the relief of recovery of possession, more so when the Defendant had pleaded that he had been in complete possession of the suit premises, as owner, with absolute rights, ever since 1966, when his father had executed a Deed of Release in his favour and/or in other words for over 28 years as on the date of institution of the suit.

(Para 55)

I. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal cannot satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 59)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Duty of Court -- It is the bounden duty of the Court to examine the plaint as a whole and not selected averments therein.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7, Rule 11 -- Article 58, 113 -- Rejection of plaint -- Right to sue -- Limitation – Cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts – Suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law – Plaintiff believed that its claim was being processed -- Belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank followed by another letter -- Firm response from the Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent-Bank -- Moreover, appellant had eventually sent a legal notice then filed the suit -- Whether plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents – Order rejecting the plaint under order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC, cannot be sustained, as a result same are quashed and set aside.

(Para 12-21)

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Section 11, Explanation IV of Section 11 – Eviction proceedings – Title suit thereafter – Maintainability of -- Once, the application filed u/s 7 of the Act is decided in which question of title, though available, is not raised, it puts an end to the controversy regarding the question of title which cannot be raised thereafter by filing a suit u/s 11 of the Act -- Subsequently a suit filed u/s 11 of the Act to establish the question of title shall not be maintainable.

(Para 8, 18-20)

B. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title suit – In case, if the title of a person is threatened by the Gram Panchayat or anybody else, he can always file a suit u/s 11 of the Act for seeking declaration for having acquired the right, title or interest in the property in question.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, Rule 21-A -- Title suit – Limitation -- Whether the suit filed u/s 11 of the Act is time barred in view of Rule 21-A of the Rules if it is not filed within 30 days from the date of accrual of cause of action? – Held, cases in which application u/s 7 of the Act is not filed but a person or a Panchayat seeks a declaration of their right, title or interest in the land vested or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat then the suit has to be filed within the period of 30 days from the date of accrual of the cause of action as provided in Rule 21-A of the Rules which means that the suit has to be filed when the right, title or interest is threatened and not at any time otherwise Rule 21-A(1) of the Rules provided in the Rules will become redundant.

(Para 21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 -- Appeal against acquittal – Condonation of delay of 111 days – Declined  -- Reason/ground for condonation of delay in the application has not specifically been explained – State does not have the right to file appeals at belated stage on the ground of procedural delay -- State is expected to expedite the matter in case they want to prefer appeal against judgment of acquittal or conviction -- No proper explanation has been given by the State -- Application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Murder case -- Appeal against acquittal – Trial Court gave a specific finding that accused was not named neither by the complainant nor by PW-5 stating him to be a part of conspiracy -- As per FSL report, the weapon was found to be in a working condition but none of the live cartridges were ever used by respondent/ accused in the commission of offence – By giving the benefit of doubt, he has rightly been acquitted.

(Para 16)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68, 73 -- Agreement to sell – Execution of -- Proof of -- Evidence led on file by the plaintiff in the form of stamp vendor and the attesting witness has duly proved the execution of the agreement – Not only this, the plaintiff has also proved on record that he was present before the Sub-Registrar twice, once on the original target date fixed in the agreement and second time; after he had issued notice to the defendant for execution of the sale deed -- Courts below have not committed any illegality in holding that the plaintiff has been successful in proving the execution of the agreement.

(Para 7)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 19 -- Recovery suit – Limitation -- In case of a suit for recovery of money; per se, the limitation is to start from the date of the payment of the money, however, that limitation is applicable only in cases of pure money transaction of advancement of loan or otherwise.

(Para 8)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 55 – Agreement to sell -- Recovery suit for earnest money – Limitation would start from the date of refusal of the execution of the agreement; as defined under the agreement; or from the date of knowledge of the fraud, if any, found committed in the alleged agreement.

(Para 8)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Letters Patent Appeal -- Condonation of delay – Sufficient cause -- Though the expression “sufficient cause” is not defined in the Act but it has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case to accept or reject the application – Reason assigned as a sufficient cause by the applicants/ appellants is of the “lengthy departmental procedure" for filing the appeal -- Order is dated 15.2.2017, certified copy made available on 07.03.2017, Advocate General granted sanction on 12.6.2017 -- Applicants/appellants could have filed the present appeal immediately but the appeal was filed after a period of about 4 months without giving any explanation -- Delay has, thus, been caused because of the laxity on the part of the department -- Reason given does not fall within the definition of “sufficient cause” -- Application dismissed.

(Para 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 37 Rule 3 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for recovery – Leave to defend – Condonation of delay -- Separate application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act may not have been absolutely necessary whether or not to condone the delay -- Once some reasoning was given in the application seeking leave to defend the suit, court was required to go into the grounds for delay, consider them and then pass a reasoned order accepting or rejecting the said reasons.

(Para 15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 312 days in filing appeal – Condonation of -- Submitted that there was construction going on in the office of the filing counsel and as such the file was erroneously misplaced and as such there has been a delay in filing of the present appeal -- Explanation for condoning 312 days delay not worthy of acceptance -- Appeal is dismissed on the ground of delay.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction in murder case – Delay in filing appeal – Dismissal of – Permissibility of -- Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was delay of 1192 days in preferring the appeal -- Held, since the matter arose out of conviction u/s 302 IPC, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and heard the matter on merit – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 17, 19, Section 96 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- First appeal dismissed in default – Restoration of appeal after 176 days delay – Condonation of delay -- Application to condone the delay dismissed -- Held, delay of 176 days cannot said to be an inordinate delay, more so, when the matter relates to the First Appeal -- Appellants having lost before the Trial Court ought to be have fair and reasonable opportunity to pursue their First Appeal -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside -- First Appeal restored.

(Para 6-8)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Domestic violence case -- Limitation -- In case of decree of divorce, the limitation to file proceedings is only one year -- In case of subsisting relationship of husband and wife, there is no limitation -- Complaint under the D.V. Act can be filed at any time as the physical and mental harassment within the family is a continuing offence.

(Para 6)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- FIR u/s 498A IPC – Maintainability of complaint under DV act -- Whether complaint under D.V. Act, is maintainable where a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is already pending? -- Both the cases are of different nature and have no bearing upon each other -- However, a Magistrate in proceedings under the D.V. Act, can also add Section 498-A IPC in order to inflict punishment upon the offender -- Held, both proceedings are of different nature and can be filed separately -- Proceedings under the D.V Act can continue on the same set of facts of a case under Section 406, 498-A IPC.

(Para 8, 9)