Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Non-examination of driver – Adverse inference – Tribunal awarded compensation to claimants -- Sole argument of appellant-Insurance Company is that the accident never took place and a false claim had been filed in order to grab the compensation -- Not disputed that the deceased was taken to the hospital with the history of a road accident – Statements of RW-1 Dr. AK and RW-2 Dr. R would support the version put forth by the claimants and it has been deposed by both the witnesses that the deceased was brought to the hospital with a history of a road-side accident – Rider of the motorcycle/ respondent no. 7 while reporting the matter to the Police had got his statement recorded to the effect that the accident had taken place when a bull came on the road and struck into the motorcycle and the deceased received grievous injuries, which eventually proved fatal – Driver of the vehicle, respondent No.7, did not step into the witness box to rebut the evidence led by the claimants, since he chose not to step into the witness box, an adverse influence was drawn against him -- It is well settled that in such like cases the claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while dealing with the motor accident cases -- Approach of the Tribunal should be a holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability, which stands satisfied in the present case -- Appeal by Insurance company dismissed.

(Para 8-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 – Defer of cross-examination – Whenever witness is under cross examination, after couple of questions the matter deferred – Held, once the witness is in the witness box and is being cross examined every endeavour must be made to ensure that the cross examination is completed on that day.

(Para 2)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Abetment to suicide – Anticipatory bail – Dying declaration -- Holographic made dying declaration by the deceased did not name the petitioners to abet him to commit suicide -- Any subsequent statement, made by the deceased to any witness, becomes an oral dying declaration, and, its effect becomes completely subsumed besides becomes eclipsed within the realms of the scribed dying declaration -- Court does not deem it fit, and, appropriate to order for the custodial interrogation of the petitioners-bail applicants, as, thereupons their personal liberty would become unnecessarily fettered, and, curtailed -- Bail applicants-petitioners are admitted to anticipatory bail.

(Para 3, 4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Accidental death case – Rash and negligent driving -- Offending vehicle on inappropriate side -- Best incriminating evidence withheld by prosecution -- PW-1 and PW-2 assign the relevant incriminatory role to the convict -- Both were also required to candidly speak in their respective testifications, that the convict at driving the offending vehicle, had maneuvered it to the inappropriate side of the road, and, that thereupon, he had breached the standards of due care and caution, and, consequently, committed the charged offences -- Their respective testifications, does not reveal so -- Even the investigating officer as PW-5, despite his making a communication qua his drawing the site plan carried in Ex.PW5/E, rather not in his examination-in-chief, speaking with candor, about the afore factum of the offending vehicle being driven on the inappropriate side of the road, and, nor in the site plan, there are candid underlinings, with respect to the afore -- Benefit of doubt, is to be given to the convict – Impugned verdicts, as, drawn by the both learned Court below, upon the convict, are quashed, and, set aside.

(Para 10-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Accidental death case – Rash and negligent driving -- Offending vehicle on inappropriate side -- Best incriminating evidence withheld by prosecution -- It was incumbent upon the investigating officer, to both in Ex.P-3 (drawing) and upon his stepping into the witness box make, vivid disclosures suggestive of the offending vehicle occupying the inappropriate side of the road -- However, both the afore are not communicated by him in either -- Benefit has to be given to the accused -- Revision allowed, impugned verdicts, as, drawn by the both learned Court below, upon the convict, are quashed, and, set aside.

(Para 11-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354, 509 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 12 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – POCSO case -- Recall of minor witness and parents for cross-examination – Right of -- Victim is of tender age and she has been sought to be re-called along with her parents for the purpose of cross-examination -- It has to be borne in mind that a fair opportunity of defence has to be afforded to the petitioner/ accused particularly because the counsel was in some personal difficulty -- Recall of the witnesses appears to be essential for the just decision of the case – Victim and her parents can be compensated in terms of costs -- Re-call of witnesses allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/- to each witness.

(Para 4, 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 337, 304-A – Death due to rash and negligent driving – Eye-witness deposition – Value of -- Injured witness PW-3 was admitted in hospital and has duly identified the accused person in court as the driver of the offending canter -- In a case under Section 304-A IPC it would be extremely difficult to disbelieve the eye version account of the accident victim when he has received injuries in the occurrence because he can have no possible motive to falsely implicate an accused who is unknown to him prior to the occurrence -- Nothing to suggest Injured had received injuries in some other occurrence and not in the accident in question -- Therefore, the version of PW-2 and PW-3 regarding the manner in which the occurrence took place as also the identify of the accused cannot be disbelieved -- Conviction order confirmed by ld. lower Appellate Court upheld -- Since the petitioner is a first time offender and the occurrence is almost 10 years old – Court modified the sentence and reduce it to a period of 1-1/2 years.

(Para 13-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 275(1) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Evidence through video conferencing -- Petitioner residing in Canada and not fit to travel – Statement of petitioner is very material for the proper adjudication of the case – No serious objection raised by respondents – One opportunity granted to get statement recorded through video conferencing.

(Para 4-7)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Rent laws – Evidence by power of attorney -- Power attorney holder who does not have personal knowledge of the facts cannot depose in respect of the matter qua which the principal alone would have personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is to be cross-examined -- Rent note (Ex.P-1) was drafted by the husband of the respondent-landlady i.e. her power attorney holder – It cannot thus be said that the power attorney holder did not have knowledge about the facts.

(Para 13)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Denial of relationship of landlord-tenant – Assessment of arrears of rent – Ejectment of tenant -- Since the relationship of landlord and tenant itself was denied, which stand proved by way of evidence, there was no requirement for the Rent Controller to assess the rent and the petitioner-tenant would be liable for ejectment that the relationship of landlord and tenant stood proved and that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent.

(Para 17)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142, 145(2) – Cheque bounce case -- Striking off evidence of complainant -- Application of the petitioners/accused for striking off the evidence dismissed by Trial Court – Challenge to -- In case the complainant is required to be re-examined, the Court needs to pass a specific order either on the application u/s 145(2) of the N.I. Act or suo motu by the Court – Trial Court has allowed the complainant for re-examination suo motu, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the stakes involved therein in view of the enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Indian Bank Association’s case 2014 (5) SCC 590 and as such the application of the petitioners for striking off the evidence has rightly been dismissed -- If the complainant is not allowed in the case at hand to file detailed affidavit, then the purpose and purport of the provisions contained in the N.I. Act would be rendered to be a nullity and the same would definitely prejudice the indefeasible rights of the complainant – Petition dismissed.

(Para 1, 10-12)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63, 65 – Secondary evidence – Revisional jurisdiction -- Trial Court, keeping in view the facts of the case permitted the plaintiffs to lead secondary evidence in order to prove the alleged first rent note -- Such permission is always granted subject to the existence and proof of the document -- Trial Court has only granted permission to lead secondary evidence – Court found it not appropriate to interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 1, 2)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Material witness given up – Additional evidence for – Witness had procured the CCTV footage from the camera installed in the building, where the occurrence in question took place -- It has been submitted that the prosecution would just take one day to examine the aforementioned witness and hence it would in no way hamper or delay the proceedings before the trial Court – Trial Court directed to record the evidence of PW-8/Constable, as prayed for -- However, prosecution shall ensure that the evidence of PW8/Constable is recorded and concluded within two days.

(Para 3-5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125(4) – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Wife living in adultery – DNA of son not matched – Right of -- Maintenance declined primarily on the score that petitioner No.1/wife was living in adultery and petitioner No.3/son has not been born out of the cohabitation of petitioner No.1 and the respondent -- It is evident that the DNA profile of son of petitioner No.1 had not matched with the DNA profile of the respondent – Held, in such circumstances, no error can be found with regard to the observations of the Court below that petitioner No.3 has not been born from the cohabitation of petitioner No.1 and respondent and furthermore, petitioner No.1 was living in adultery – No illegality or irregularity in the impugned order declining the claim of maintenance which may warrant any interference – Revision dismissed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 – Agreement to sell – Proof of -- Evidence required -- Non-examination of scribe – Effect of -- Execution of the agreement to sell proved from the evidence of the plaintiff as well as by attesting witness -- It has been proved by stamp vendor that the defendant purchased the stamp paper and signed in his note book -- Defendant failed to impeach credibility of the aforesaid witness in the cross examination – Non-examination of the scribe cannot result in dismissal of the suit particularly when the plaintiff has already led sufficient evidence to prove the execution of the agreement to sell.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 14 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Suit for specific performance – Ground of delay in suit -- Readiness and willingness -- Plaintiff filed the suit after a period of 1 year and 5 months from the date fixed for registration of the sale deed -- Plaintiff has pleaded that he was always ready and willing -- Defendant was given opportunity to cross examine the witness, however failed to impeach his credibility – Both the Courts, on appreciation of evidence, have recorded a finding of the fact that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract -- No ground to interfere in the impugned judgments is made out.

(Para 10-12)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37 -- Suit for permanent injunction -- Question of title – Requirement of – In suit for grant of permanent injunction, where the main thing to be seen is as to whether the plaintiff has been in established possession of the suit land -- Question of title is not to be decided in such type of suit -- Nevertheless, the document of title to the suit property produced in evidence on behalf of any of the parties can certainly be taken into consideration to find out the nature of possession.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908), Section 151 -- Exhibition of documents – Replacement by original – Permissibility of -- Plaintiff placed on record copy of the sale deed, duly attested by Notary Public, which had been exhibited, though, it was subject to objection with regard to mode of proof and admissibility raised on behalf of the defendant -- Plaintiff sought to place on record the original sale deed and to exhibit it just to remove the technical objection -- Trial Court considering all the aspects of the case, exercising powers u/s 151 CPC had allowed that application -- Such exercise of power by the trial Court can certainly be not termed as arbitrary or perverse, rather, it comes out that such power has been exercised in a judicious manner for proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908), Section 151 -- Inherent power of civil Court – Nature of -- It is a very vast power, which can be exercised by the Court for achieving ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court -- Unnecessary interference in exercise of such power by the trial Court is uncalled for.

(Para 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – First Information Report/ FIR – Nature of -- FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness statements as they progress further into the investigation and unearth the specific roles of accused persons -- FIR as is known, only sets the investigative machinery, into motion.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B, 147, 148, 324 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Conviction in murder case – Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Two courts have concurrently concluded that appellant’s name not being specifically mentioned in the FIR, would not justify his acquittal as he was specifically identified by PW2, PW4, & PW6 -- In view of his positive identification by the eye witnesses, the TIP not being conducted, was held to be immaterial -- Eye witnesses here have ascribed the same specific role to the appellant and narrated the events in same chronology, without material discrepancies – Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this case involves multiple persons attacking in a group with deadly weapons and it is not reasonable to expect recollection of every minute details by the eyewitnesses -- Prosecution has produced cogent evidence of the appellant being part of a conspiracy by all the accused in the assault, which led to the death of BM and injuries to PW1 and others -- As such, the conviction of the appellant by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, cannot be faulted.

(Para 15-18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Requirement of -- Identity of the appellant/accused was known to the witnesses and he was specifically identified by PW1, and PW2 as the person who wielded the sword and inflicted the injuries -- TIP was unnecessary in the case -- In the face of appellant’s such identification by name in the testimony of the eye witnesses, it can, be safely concluded that the failure to conduct the TIP for the appellant will not vitiate his conviction.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 62, 65-B(4) -- Exhibition of documents – Objection to – Sustainability of -- Court is to visualize as a determinative factor that whether the evidence in question is essential for just decision of the case or not -- Trial cannot be held up on objection at the time of tendering of documents in evidence – Document had already been exhibited in the statement of PW-14 at the time of production of certificate u/s 65-B of the Act -- Reasonable opportunity has been given to the defence counsel to examine the witness -- Having acquiesced the opportunity by cross-examining the witness, the petitioner cannot turn around and object to the tender made by the witness.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 306, 328, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Challan u/s 328, 306, 34 IPC – FIR as dying declaration -- Framing of charges u/s 302 IPC – Challenge to -- FIR was lodged at the instance of the deceased himself and which in a way assumes the character of a dying declaration which is on a very higher pedestal as far as the evidentiary value is concerned -- Further it is not disputed that the cause of death was poisoning -- In these circumstances it cannot be said that any error has been committed by the trial Court at the stage of framing of charges -- Meticulous examination of the evidence is not required at the time of framing of charges -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 2-5)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Daily diary report – Evidential value --Contends that as per daily dairy report, the accident took place as a stray dog suddenly came on the road and therefore, the driver of the vehicle cannot be said to be negligent – Held, daily dairy report was entered on the statement of respondent No.6, who was, at the relevant time, driving the motorcycle he cannot be expected to admit his negligence – In support of the claim petition, eyewitness has appeared before the Court to depose, he has been thoroughly cross examined by putting searching questions -- His deposition has been found creditable by the Tribunal -- Hence, the contention is without substance.

(Para 4-6)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Pleadings of negligence – Requirement of -- Contention that deceased was not wearing helmet while riding on the pillion of a motorcycle, hence amount payable by the insurer is liable to be reduced on account of contributory negligence of the deceased – Held, Insurance company has neither laid any foundation in the pleadings nor led evidence in support thereof -- Insurance company while filing the written statement did not plead that deceased was not wearing the helmet -- Still further, the insurance company did not lead any evidence to prove this fact and also failed to raise this point before the Tribunal -- Still further, insurance company has failed to draw the attention of the Court to the cross examination of eye-witness on this aspect -- In such circumstances, the argument of insurance company do not deserve acceptance.

(Para 4, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Murder case – Doctor’s evidence -- Entire evidence as a whole is required to be considered with the other evidence on record -- Mere one sentence here or there and that too to the question asked by the defence in the cross-examination cannot be considered standalone -- What is stated by the Doctor/Medical officer can at the most be said to be his opinion, he is not the eye-witness to the incident -- PW1 & PW2 have categorically stated that the other accused inflicted the blows by knives -- Same is supported by the medical evidence and the deposition of PW2 -- Injuries nos. 2 to 8 are sufficient by the sharp cutting weapon -- Injuries nos. 2 to 8 are on different parts of the body which show the intention and conduct on the part of the other accused A2 & A3 -- Therefore, they are rightly convicted for the offence punishable u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- There was a prior long-time enmity between the deceased and the accused-A1 -- Even the deceased was also facing trial for the offence u/s 307 IPC at the instance of A1 -- Defence has failed to prove any circumstances by which it can be said that they are falsely implicated in the case -- Prosecution has been successful in proving the motive.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder – Conviction -- There is a direct evidence against A-1, using the gun and shooting the deceased -- Therefore, he can be convicted for the offence punishable u/s 302 IPC, without the aid of Section 34 IPC.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry death – Object of -- It endeavors to address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Doctor found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries -- As the death was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence – Evidence, when the brother of the deceased visited her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry -- Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter -- She was brought back to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father -- Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house -- However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry -- Aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him -- Chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased -- Since the ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption u/s 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified u/s 304-B of IPC.

(Para 23-28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Suicide by wife – Presumption of -- For the offence u/s 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed -- Prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same -- With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113-A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions -- Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

(Para 33)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

(Para 36)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay of six years in lodging the FIR – Explanation of delay – First informant deposed that he came to know that the petitioner-accused is a fraudulent person within 2/3 months of making payment -- Thus, once the first informant had come to know that the petitioner would not take steps to send his son to Italy or return the amount allegedly received, there was no occasion to wait for a period of six years before registration of the FIR -- Neither the first informant in his deposition has stated that there were several meetings for return of the amount nor detail thereof has been provided -- Hence, the prosecution has failed to explain the delay – Conviction order set aside.

(Para 17, 24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 19, 21 -- Admission – Reliance upon -- It is well settled that before the alleged admission of the accused is made the basis to convict the accused, it is incumbent for the court to examine as to whether such admission is clear and categoric -- If the answer to the aforesaid question is in negative, it would not result in conviction of accused.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 19, 21 -- Admission – Mens-rea -- Petitioner while cross examining the first informant had given him suggestion that the agreement was executed at the Police Station -- Such suggestion, in the facts of the case, cannot be read as admission of the offence -- As per the case of the prosecution, in the year 2009, the amount of ? 1,00,000/- was paid to the petitioner, whereas the agreement provides for return of ? 50,000/- only -- It is against normal prudence -- Still further, if it is accepted that such suggestion does amount to admission, still the agreement does not prove that the petitioner has deceitfully induced the first informant to part with ? 1,00,000/- or the petitioner had “mens rea” at that time -- Conviction order set aside.

(Para 18, 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Proved -- Standard of proof -- In civil case the plaintiff is required to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt -- No doubt, ordinarily, the presiding judges are simultaneously required to decide civil as well as criminal cases and hence, the distinction gets overlooked -- However, it is expected from them that before convicting any accused, the presiding judges should keep in mind the important distinction -- Prosecution miserably failed to satisfy the aforesaid test -- Revision allowed, the judgments passed by both the Courts below, are set aside.

(Para 24)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Manner of accident disputed – Counsel failed to draw the attention of the Court to such defence in the written statement and any discussion before the Tribunal on this aspect -- Driver of the offending vehicle did not appear in evidence, who could have deposed about the manner in which the accident took place -- Counsel also failed to draw attention of the Court to the cross examination of PW2, eye-witness on this aspect – Court  expresses inability to accept the argument.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Salary slip show deceased drew total salary of Rs.76,163/- -- Tribunal after deducting the amount towards AFPP fund subscription, AFPP refund and the amount of income tax came to income of the deceased as Rs.63,182/- per month, of which annual income works out to Rs.7,58,184/- per annum – Deceased was 39 years of age at the time of his death, therefore, 50% addition of actual salary on account of future prospects made out -- Tribunal applied 1/4th deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased, who has left behind four dependents -- Tribunal has arrived at a figure of Rs.8,52,957/- as annual dependency -- No error to interfere in the award passed by the Tribunal.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163-A -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Car was on hire – Pleadings of – Non-framing of issue – Effect of -- No evidence that the car was being plied on hire at the relevant time -- Insurance Company did not plead this fact in its written statement -- Consequently, the Tribunal did not frame any issue on this aspect – Held, Insurance Company has failed to lay any foundation by pleading the aforesaid fact and thereafter, corroborate the same by leading any evidence -- Hence, the contention is rejected.

(Para 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163-A -- Seven persons were travelling in the vehicle whereas the registered seating capacity of the vehicle is of five only – Held, Insurer is liable to the extent of persons permitted under the carriage permit – Vehicle was permitted to be occupied by five persons, only five claim petitions were filed -- No ground to admit the appeals. Anjana Shah’s (2007) 7 SCC 445 & KM Poonam’s case (2011) 2 PLR 477 relied.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 14 -- Agreement to sell – Property already mortgage with bank – Criminal proceedings initiated – Effect on civil rights -- Merely because the plaintiff had also preferred criminal proceedings on the ground that the accused had taken bank loan from Bank but had entered into an agreement with him to sell the property, and he had been cheated, would not be a ground to deny the benefit of the decree to him – Appellant/accused acquitted by giving benefit of doubt in criminal proceedings – Suit decreed by civil court, upheld.

(Para 1, 13)

B. Evidence beyond Pleadings – Permissibility of -- It is settled principle that evidence beyond the pleadings cannot be taken into consideration.

(Para 17)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 14, 16(1)(c) – Specific performance of agreement -- Readiness and willingness – Earnest money and additional amount of Rs.8.5 lacs paid -- Plaintiff prepared D.D. of Rs.13,50,000/-, balance consideration before the cut-off date and purchased stamp papers worth Rs.1,54,000/- -- Filing of the suit was also within a month and a half after serving a legal notice asking the appellant to execute the sale deed -- All these factors combined would go on to show that the Courts below have justifiably decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

(Para 2, 18)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 4 -- Evidence law -- Execution of agreement to sell – Willingness of -- Wife of the appellant opposed the agreement by approaching the police -- Appellant himself applied for NOC to sell the property --  These factors would go on to show that the agreement had been entered into for the sale of the said property -- Almost 1/3rd of the amount had been received in advance and therefore, it would not lie in the mouth of the appellant to contend that the same had not been executed by him willingly.

(Para 19)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 4 -- Misrepresentation – Undue influence – Proof of – It is settled principle that allegations of misrepresentation or undue influence have to be given in full and precise particulars and then duly proved under Order 6 Rule 4 CPC.

(Para 20)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 14 Rule 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Proof of Will – Onus of – Framing of issue – Onus was upon the plaintiff to get the issues framed rightly if he was wanting to set up the plea that the onus of the Will should have been upon the propounder.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 61 -- Son living separately – Exclusion of son in Will -- Admission of the plaintiff that he was residing separately for the last 35 years after his marriage would be reason enough for the testator to keep him out of the zone of succession.

(Para 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Appellant was arrested in Copyright  case and was brought to the Office of the Video Piracy Cell and was kept in custody in the same room as that of the Head Constable (deceased) – Appellant made an attempt to escape from the custody by attacking the deceased on his head with an iron stool causing his death, however, he was caught by PW-1 SI and PW-2 HC while attempting to escape -- Evidence in its entirety clearly shows that the offence had taken place at the relevant point of time the accused and the deceased were alone inside the premises of the office of the Video Piracy Cell -- Under the above circumstance, it was for the accused to explain under what circumstances the deceased was dead – Appellant has failed to offer any cogent explanation in this regard -- Chain of circumstances has been completely proved and established beyond reasonable doubt – Appeal against conviction dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 12, 13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Dowry death – Regular bail -- Plea in bail application that the deceased was “suffering from severe headache and was mentally disturbed since the past nine months” and that she was taken to a doctor by the first respondent -- Medical prescription, would prima facie indicate that there was no serious ailment -- Medical prescription of the Ayurvedic doctor and the remedies prescribed belie such a claim -- Prima facie, there are serious allegations in the FIR in regard to the harassment suffered by the deceased in close proximity to her death over demands for dowry by the accused -- In view of the provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC, as well as the presumption which arises u/s 113-B of the Evidence Act, the High Court was clearly not justified in granting bail.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail – Setting aside of -- Order of the High Court granting bail contains absolutely no reasons at all -- High Court has merely recorded the submissions and in the extract proceeded to grant bail without any evaluation of the rival submissions – Seriousness of the alleged offence has to be evaluated in the backdrop of the allegation that she was being harassed for dowry; and that a telephone call was received from the accused in close-proximity to the time of death, making a demand -- An order without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the norms which guide the judicial process – Order of the High Court granting bail set aside.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration -- A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence -- If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused -- Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case -- There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dowry death – Murder -- Three dying declaration – Acquittal of accused -- First statement of the deceased is based on hearsay that she was set  on fire by respondent no. 2 and no reference of respondent no. 1 and anything about dowry demand -- Next statement blaming respondent no.1 alone, which is not signed by anybody and the Doctor who recorded the statement has not been examined and merely because his signature has been identified P.W.19 cannot establish the correctness of its contents -- Next statement of the deceased blaming respondent no.1 alone without any allegation against respondent no.2, and on the contrary states that she was brought to the hospital by respondent no.2, it again does not disclose any dowry demand -- Considering that the statements of the deceased have vacillated, there is no evidence about the fitness of mind of the deceased to make the dying declaration including the presence of the Doctor, the veracity and truthfulness of the dying declaration remains suspect -- It would not be safe to simply reject the probable defence of suicide, to reverse the acquittal and convict the respondents.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(3) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 53-A, 173 -- POCSO matter -- Blood sample for DNA test -- Investigaiton report already filed – Permissibility of -- Petitioner is facing a charge of committing repeated rape on the prosecutrix, who was less than 16 years of age and also for committing penetrative sexual assault upon her – Trial Court allowed the application for DNA test – Revision challenging the order -- Held, mere fact that application has been filed after submission of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. is no ground to entertain revision petition as charges are yet to be framed.

(Para 6-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summon to witness – Stage of – Scope of -- Section 311 Cr.P.C. empowers any Court at any stage of enquiry or trial or other proceedings to summon any person as witness or re-call or examine any person if it appears to be necessary for just decision of the case -- Power u/s 311 Cr.P.C. can be exercised at any stage -- There is no bar that the order for examination of the witnesses cannot be passed after the defence evidence is over.

(Para 7-9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B -- Summon to witness – Speedy trial -- Nodal Officers of Mobile Companies were mentioned in the list of witnesses and the record of calls etc., was available on the file yet they were not examined due to inadvertence of the Public Prosecutor -- Certificate u/s 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with regard to Customer Application Form and tower location was part of record – No inordinate delay to move application -- Held, it is the satisfaction of the court that examination of the witnesses is necessary for arriving at a just decision -- Direction to conclude the trial within six weeks itself cannot be a reason to dismiss the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Speedy conclusion of trial cannot be at cost of just and fair decision –Application allowed – Revision against dismissed.

(Para 4, 12, 13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal by trial court – Conviction by High Court -- Appellant has only recorded her statement u/s 313 of the Code, and has not adduced any evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration -- Once the facts came on record remained unrebutted and supported with the evidence on record with no substantive evidence of defence of the appellant to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the complaint against her – Appellant has been rightly convicted.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case -- Object of introducing Section 138 and other provisions of Chapter XVII in the Act appears to be to enhance the acceptability of cheques in the settlement of liabilities -- Drawer of the cheque be held liable to prosecution on dishonour of cheque with safeguards provided to prevent harassment of honest drawers.

(Para 13)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Cheque bounce case – Presumption of consideration – Onus to rebut – Scope of evidence -- There is a mandate of presumption of consideration in terms of the provisions of the Act and the onus shifts to the accused on proof of issuance of cheque to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for discharge of any debt or liability in terms of Section 138 of the Act  -- To rebut this presumption, facts must be adduced by the accused which on a preponderance of probability (not beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of criminal offences), must then be proved.

(Para 14, 15, 17)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque  bounce case – Principle of acquittal in criminal cases -- Applicability of -- Proceedings u/s 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal in nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal in other criminal cases are not applicable in the cases instituted under the Act.

(Para 16)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce case – After cheques being bounced, two separate legal notices were served, even after receiving the said notices, the appellant neither responded to the notices nor made any payment within the statutory period of fifteen days – When the complainant exhibited all documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant has recorded her statement u/s 313 of the Code, but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence -- Statement of the accused recorded u/s 313 of the Code is not a substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case of the accused -- No evidence to rebut the presumption -- Held, High Court, has not committed any error in recording the finding of guilt of the appellant and convicting her for an offence being committed u/s 138 of the Act, which needs no further interference -- Appeals being without any substance, dismissed.

(Para 21-24)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Multiple dying declarations -- When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated on its own merits.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Second Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Defence that while putting the kerosene into the stove, accidentally the kerosene had fallen on the ground and also on her clothes, and thereafter when the candle fell on the ground, the same had come in contact with her clothes and kerosene -- If that is the case, there would have been injuries to her feet also -- However, no burn injuries are found on her feet -- No stove was found at the place of occurrence -- On the contrary, this evidence speaks otherwise -- Main injuries are found on the upper limbs of the body can be possible when the kerosene is poured on the deceased – Exhibit P5 (Second dying declaration) is corroborated by other surrounding circumstances and evidence and after independent evaluation of Exhibit P5 and Exhibit D2 (First dying declaration), when the High Court has found that Exhibit P5 is reliable and inspiring confidence and thereafter when the High Court has convicted the accused, it cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 7, 8, 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302 – Murder -- Imminent dangerous act -- After pouring kerosene on the deceased and thereafter setting her ablaze -- It was imminently dangerous which, in all probability, will cause death -- Merely because the accused might have tried to extinguish the fire will not take the case out of the clutches of clause fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC – High Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Murder – Dying declaration -- Deceased suffered 90 per cent injuries and was in a fit condition to make a declaration -- JMIC recorded the statement and in her dying declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze -- Though the family members of the deceased were in the hospital, they were sent out, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate – If the dying declaration is considered along with the depositions of PW-5, PW-6 and other witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the prosecution, it clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction order upheld.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration – Presence of parents and relatives – Effect of -- Held, merely because the parents and other relatives of the deceased were present in the Hospital, when the statement of the deceased was recorded, it cannot be said that the said statement was a tutored one -- Same is no ground to disbelieve the dying declaration, recorded by the Magistrate.

(Para 16)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 306 -- Suicide – Homicidal death -- No marks on the body which would suggest violence or struggle -- Medical expert himself has not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death -- On the contrary, the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was ‘asphyxia due to hanging’ -- In the light of this evidence, trial court as well as the High Court have erred in holding, that the prosecution has proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Husband-wife -- Circumstantial evidence – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt -- It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Explanation by accused -- It is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused -- However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain.

(Para 24)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances -- Prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt -- As such, an important link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally absent in the case.

(Para 26-30)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Burdon of proof -- Prosecution has failed even to prove a single incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt -- As such, the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 34)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 -- Evidence law -- Murder -- Common intention – Conviction u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 – Firearm injury established and proved by the prosecution -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused also established and proved – As per the doctor injuries were, abrasion wound on right-hand elbow joint; several wounds of pallets on right hand and wound on little finger of right hand – As the injury on little finger was simple in nature, it was possible for P.W.27 to give complaint/Fardbeyan in writing -- Appellant ran away and he absconded for approximately 15 years, he surrendered/was arrested after another accused was convicted – It cannot be said that, the ld. Trial Court as well as the High Court, have committed any error in convicting the appellant-accused u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

(Para 6.1, 6.2)

B. Evidence law – Contradiction in deposition – Appellant/accused absconded for 15 years -- Deposition was recorded after a period of approximately 15 years, there are bound to be some minor contradiction/contradictions.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302/34 – Evidence law -- Murder – Use of fire-arm – Non seizure of -- Use of firearm by the appellant-accused has also been established and proved -- Merely because the weapon is not seized cannot be a ground to acquit the accused when his presence and his active participation and using firearm by him has been established and proved.

(Para 6.2)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – PW-2-aunt of the deceased called the deceased and asked her what had happened, she replied that her husband had beaten her up with a wooden log -- It was the appellant/husband himself who took her to the hospital and made a false statement that she suffered a cardiac arrest but after the autopsy was conducted on the body of the deceased, it was opined that she died out of shock and haemorrhage due to thoracic injuries – Injury nos. 1 to 6 were caused with blunt weapon which resulted into death of the deceased -- Ocular evidence of PW 2-aunt of the deceased is corroborated with the medical evidence of Doctor (PW 7) – Conviction u/s 302 upheld.

(Para 4, 10-18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Circumstantial evidence -- In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled principles of law are that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances should be conclusive in nature and moreover the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of events -- However, the circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with the innocence.

(Para 13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Admission of signatures on cheque -- Legal enforceable liability – Presumption of -- Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative -- Obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him – Held, once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed of undertaking, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt -- Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay -- Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position and amounts to a patent error of law.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Legal enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Presumptions raised u/s 118 and Section 139 are rebuttable in nature – A probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”, and not mere possibility -- Bare denial of passing of consideration would not aid the case of accused.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Deed of undertaking – Denial of genuineness – Relevance of -- Appellants’ mere bald denial regarding genuineness of the Deed of Undertaking, despite admitting the signatures of Appellant No. 2 thereupon, does not cast any doubt on the genuineness of the said document.

(Pare 17)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Blank signed cheque and stamp papers – Legal enforceable liability -- Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Even if the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated.

(Para 18)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 139, Chapter XVII – Cheque bounce matters – Criminal and civil liability – Redressal of -- Object of Chapter XVII of the NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive -- Provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for dishonour of cheque as well as civil liability for realisation of the cheque amount -- There needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation and unless there exist special circumstances, the Courts should uniformly levy fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

(Para 20)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 139 –Cheque bounce case – Sentence and compensation -- Neither did the respondent ask for compensation before the High Court nor has he chosen to challenge the High Court’s judgment -- Since, he has accepted the High Court’s verdict, his claim for compensation stands impliedly overturned -- Respondent, in any case, is entitled to receive the cheque amount of Rs.11.20 lakhs which the appellant has already deposited with the Registry of Court -- Appellant No.2 shall not be required to undergo the awarded sentence -- Registry is directed to transfer the amount of Rs.11.20 lakhs along with interest accrued thereupon to the respondent within two weeks.

(Para 21, 22)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B – Whatsapp Messages – Evidential value -- NCB placed reliance on Whatsapp messages by which the petitioner could be implicated -- Certificate u/s 65B of the Indian Evidence Act is required when reliance is being placed upon electronic record – Certificate not shown, said message would be of no evidentiary value as on date -- Narcotics Bureau would be at liberty to rely upon the Whatsapp messages after due compliance of provisions of Section 65-B Evidence Act. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar’s case  (2020) 7 SCC 1 relied.

(Para 11)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 8, 21, 22, 29, 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Regular bail -- Total 57000 tablets i.e. 20,000 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride 100 mg (Trade Name Clovidol-100 SR) from “PK” and 37,000 from “BK” – On disclosure of statement “PK”, petitioner was named as a person who had sent the contraband to her for its onwards dispatch to other “BK” – After notice u/s 67 of Act, petitioner was arrested on 14.06.2020 – Investigation complete and the challan stands presented -- No useful purpose would be served in keeping the petitioner behind bars -- Petition allowed and the petitioner is directed to be released on regular bail on execution of adequate personal/ surety bond of an amount of Rs.10 Lakhs.

(Para 3, 11)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 116 -- Death of landlord – Petition by one of LR -- Tenant-landlord relationship -- Maintainability of ejectment petition -- It is settled principle that the tenant is no one to raise the question of title, in view of the presumption u/s 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Any legal heir of the original landlord is entitled to file the eviction petition.

(Para 10, 11)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need of landlord – Prima facie case -- Presumption of -- It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how he can adjust himself as to which portion of the tenanted premises he is to set up his business -- Only a prima facie case is to be taken into consideration by the Rent Controller to draw the presumption that the requirement is bona fide.

(Para 12)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Long occupation of tenanted premises – Ejectment of tenant -- Merely because the tenant is carrying business since 1995 would not entitle him to continue in the premises for all times to come.

(Para 12)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 139, 145  -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- FIR author not examined – Non-reporting of accident to police by eye-witness -- Adverse inference -- Eye witness (AW-3) accompanied deceased to hospital in his car -- It is quite natural that such a person who had accompanied the injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid, could not have simultaneously gone to the police station to lodge the FIR -- High Court ought not to have drawn any adverse inference against the witness for his failure to report the matter to Police -- Failure of the respondents to cross examine the solitary eye-witness or confront him with their version, despite adequate opportunity, must lead to an inference of tacit admission on their part -- They did not even suggest the witness that he was siding with the claimants -- High Court has failed to appreciate the legal effect of this absence of cross-examination of a crucial witness -- Statement of AW-3 does not suffer from any evil of suspicion and is worthy of reliance -- Tribunal rightly relied upon his statement and decided in favour of the claimants.

(Para 17-24)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Principle of evidence -- Strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases -- Standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt -- One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eye-witnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant’s version is more likely than not true.

(Para 22)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 101, 102 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Burdon of proof -- Rash and negligent driving by other vehicle – Defence of – Non-examination as witness – Effect of -- Adverse inference -- If the owner-cum-driver of the car were setting up a defence plea that the accident was a result of not his but the other vehicle driver’s carelessness or rashness, then the onus was on him to step into the witness box and explain as to how the accident had taken place -- Fact that he chose not to depose in support of what he has pleaded in his written statement, further suggests that he was himself at fault -- High Court, therefore, ought not to have shifted the burden of proof.

(Para 23)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Future prospects -- Deceased was 34 year old – Appellants are held entitled to compensation as awarded by the Tribunal, besides 40% addition in the annual income of the deceased towards ‘future prospects’ -- Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, is directed to recalculate the compensation amount accordingly -- Appellants are held entitled to interest @ 8.5%, as per the Tribunal’s award, on the entire amount of compensation.

(Para 4, 26)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Evidence in Civil dispute – Standard of proof -- It is settled that the standard of proof required in a civil dispute is preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 80)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 17 – Fraud – Limitation -- Though the discrepancies in the GPA are bound to create some doubt, however, in absence of any tangible evidence produced by the plaintiff to support the plea of fraud, it does not take the matter further -- Testimony of the attesting witness, scribe and other independent witnesses plainly support the case of the defendants -- That evidence dispels the doubt if any; and tilt the balance in favour of the defendants – Since the plaintiff could not establish the existence of fraud, it must follow that the suits are ex-facie barred by limitation.

(Para 80, 81)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal – Power of -- Trial Court and the first appellate Court appreciated the evidence properly – The view was possible view – High Court ought not to have disturbed the same in the second appeal and that too on surmises and conjectures – Appeals allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court set aside – Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is hereby restored.

(Para 83)

Adoption deed – Challenge to -- Evidence without pleadings -- It is fairly well settled that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party -- When the adoption ceremony, which had taken place on 14.11.2001, is mentioned in the registered adoption deed, which was questioned in the suit, there is absolutely no reason for not raising specific plea in the suit and to file application at belated stage to summon the record to prove that the second respondent was on duty as on 14.11.2001 -- There was an order from the High Court for expeditious disposal of the suit and the application which was filed belatedly is rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Revisional Court and High Court.

(Para 7)