A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Quarrel with deceased – Spur of moment -- Words uttered in a quarrel or in the spur of a movement if at all cannot be taken to be uttered with the necessary mens rea and would be an outcome of an emotional outburst or a fit of anger -- Same would not amount to abetment.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely having a dispute with the deceased or making a complaint to the Police against the deceased would not make out a case under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Reliance upon suicide note -- Suicide note does not refer to any act on the part of the accused amounting to abetment -- It only says that if something was to happen with the deceased, the accused would be responsible -- Suicide note therefore does not further the case of the prosecution.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Author of suicide note – Proof of – FSL asked for admitted document of the deceased so as to compare the writing on the suicide note along with that of the deceased, however, no such writing was dispatched to the FSL for comparison – Brother of the deceased identified the signatures of the deceased on the suicide note which would not be sufficient to affix the authorship of the suicide note.

(Para 10)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely mentioning the names of the accused in the suicide note in the absence of any specific role would not lead to the commission of an offence under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 337, 338, 427 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Acquittal of accused – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Once the accused was not known to any witness, they had seen him fleeing from the place of occurrence, it was necessary to hold test identification parade -- No test identification parade of the accused was got conducted from the complainant and witnesses of the case and this was fatal to the case of the prosecution – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 11-14)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42, 43 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- NDPS case – Appeal against conviction -- Acquittal of accused – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information not reduced into writing and not sent to the police station or higher authority -- Evidence clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance -- Explanation appended to Section 43 of the Act clearly shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression ‘public place’ -- Held, it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act; there was complete non-compliance of the said requirement of law -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Excise matter – Opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses -- Prosecution witnesses were examined but as per the petitioner, the said fact was unknown to him and therefore, the cross-examination could not be conducted by his counsel -- Held, in the absence of cross-examination, the prosecution evidence would go unrebutted -- No prejudice shall be caused to the prosecution if an opportunity is granted to the petitioner/accused to cross-examine the three witnesses in a time bound manner -- Petition allowed, one more opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine three witnesses -- Pursuant to their cross-examination, the Trial Court is directed to conclude the Trial within 08 weeks.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 – Criminal trial – Opportunity of cross-examination -- On the very first date, when PW-1 ASI was present and his examination-in-chief was recorded, his cross-examination was treated as NIL – Order passed by the trial Court set aside -- One effective opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine PW-1 ASI.

(Para 5-8)

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Regular Second Appeal in the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, is governed by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Pankajakshi’s case (2016) 6 SCC 157 relied.

(Para 1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Registered Will – Un-registered Will – Value of -- Will is not required to be mandatorily registered -- Testator may get it registered, however, an unregistered Will has equal value and has to be proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Non-examination of Advocate – Adverse inference -- Trial Court erred in drawing an adverse inference on account of non-examination of Advocate, who merely introduced Testator with the scribe-Advocate – Advocate was not the attesting witness of the Will -- Hence, he was not required to be examined.

(Para 15)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Proof of Will -- Irregular spacing in the Will -- Will is typed on a manual typewriter -- The attention of the scribe or the attesting witness was never drawn to the aforesaid alleged irregular spacing -- If the plaintiff wants the Court to believe that there is irregular spacing, the plaintiff should have sought explanation from the scribe as well as the attesting witness -- In the absence thereof, it would not be appropriate to disbelieve the Will merely on account of alleged irregular spacing in-between the lines.

(Para 16)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Execution of Pronote – Proved by one marginal witness – Scope of Handwriting and finger print Expert report – It is not essential that both the witnesses should be examined – Held, once the marginal witness had proved the execution of the document, the handwriting and finger print expert who is expected to submit report in favour of the parties approaching it, has been rightly held to be not a substantive piece of evidence in the peculiar fact of the case that the marginal witness had already proved the pronote.

(Para 9)

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 28, 33 (1)(a) – Power of attorney – Place of registration -- Power of attorney can be executed and authenticated by the Registrar or the Sub-registrar within whose district or sub district the principal resides – General Power of Attorney does not fall within the scope of Section 28 of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Contention that only one attesting witness of the General Power of Attorney has been examined and therefore, its execution is not proved – Held, only limited documents require attestation by two attesting witnesses which primarily include a will, a gift and a mortgage -- A General Power of Attorney or a Special Power of Attorney does not require attestation by witnesses -- Hence, Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not applicable.

(Para 8)

C. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33(4) --- Registered Power of attorney – Proof of -- A registered power of attorney is not only admissible in evidence but it can be proved by mere production of it as per Section 33(4) of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) Section 32 – Acquittal of accused -- Multiple Dying declaration -- Second dying declaration rejected completely by the High Court, is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other accused – First dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured state to the hospital – Focus of the first dying declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire -- Second dying declaration, alone elaborates acts of cruelty -- That is the only piece of incriminating evidence against the accused -- Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/s 498-A IPC set aside.

(Para 20,21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 54 -- Cheque bounce case – Additional evidence -- Certified copy of judgment of previous conviction -- Evidence showing any previous conviction is also relevant as evidence of bad character -- Thus the evidence relating to previous conviction (past actions of a person) in a case of similar nature would be relevant -- However, the evidentiary value of the same would be evaluated by the ld. trial Court at the time of final disposal of a case – No prejudice would be caused to the accused if the aforesaid judgment is taken on record as the petitioner would get an opportunity to rebut the same – Impugned order in allowing application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. not suffering from illegality and infirmity – No interfere is called for.

(Para 11,12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 13 Rule 4 (as amended in Punjab and Haryana) – Exhibition of documents – Per-se admissible documents -- Duty of court -- If the documents are already a part of the record and they are per se admissible, the Court is itself required to mark those documents as exhibits -- For this purpose, no separate application is required -- The Court can mark the documents at any stage particularly when they are already a part of the record.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3 -- Document Expert – Evidence in affirmative -- Rebuttal evidence -- Defendant No.1 in the written statement admitted the agreement to sell but has pointed out that date for execution of the sale deed was fixed as 5.5.2005 and not 5.8.2005 and there was cutting in the date, so as to make it appear as 5.8.2005 -- In that way, the plaintiff was aware of this objection having been taken right from the beginning and he could have led evidence in affirmative -- When defendants No. 2 and 3 had lead evidence including examining a document expert, plaintiff moved an application to rebut the evidence adduced by defendants No. 2 and 3, which is certainly not permissible -- Application was rightly declined and no reason is there to allow the same.

(Para 5-7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Acquittal – Appeal – Burden of proof -- Burden not only lies on the complainant (just like on prosecution in criminal trial), but it also lies on the accused -- So, it cannot be said that there is limited scope for interference in the judgment of acquittal particularly, when it is for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20 -- Cheque – Requirement of Stamp -- Section 20 of the Negotiable Instrument Act talks about giving the authority to the holder to make inchoate stamped instrument complete -- Even though the cheque is negotiable instrument, it does not require stamp.

(Para 25)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 87, 138 – Cheque bounce case – Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Security cheque – Material alteration -- Unilateral putting dates on cheques – Complainant unilaterally has put in dates on the cheques without the authority of the accused and even by not informing him -- So, it amounts to material alterations -- If it is so such negotiable instrument becomes void -- Hence prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act cannot be initiated.

(Para 27-32)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Dowry death – Regular bail to mother-in-law – Deceased died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage – As per allegations in the FIR itself on the day of death, the petitioner had informed the complainant about the deceased having locked herself inside the room – After the occurrence the in-laws had shifted the deceased to the hospital – Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the presumption u/s 113-B of Evidence Act is attracted or not would be subject to the outcome of the trial – Out of total 17 prosecution witnesses, 3 witnesses have been examined – Petitioner ordered to be enlarged on bail.

(Para 1,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 452, 323, 427, 34 – Non-appearance of official prosecution witnesses -- By closing the prosecution evidence and dismissing the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. it is the complainant who has been penalised for the act and conduct of the State --  Trial Court should have taken coercive steps to secure the presence of the unexamined witness -- In case he plays truant with the Court and chooses not to appear, SSP shall take him into custody and produce him in the Court to depose as a prosecution witness.

(Para 1,3,12-14)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 59, 60 – Oral evidence – Medical evidence – Though, normally in case there is contradiction inter-se ocular account and medical account qua rather then the ocular account rendered in respect of the relevant crime does assume preponderance --  However, if the ocular account rendered qua the prosecution case is provenly false or is prevaricated, then the ocular account does loose its creditworthiness, and medical account assumes paramount evidentiary worth.

(Para 15 - I)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement before Investigation officer – Recovery from crime site -- If the recoveries are not made in pursuance to a provenly signatured disclosure statement recorded by the accused, before the investigating officer concerned, but are made from the crime site, which is but an open/un-secluded place, thereupon, the recoveries do not comprise any valid potent link in the chain of circumstances.

(Para 15 - II)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Dissolution of marriage – Witness-wife living in Canada – Cross-examination through video conferencing – Procedural aspects in conjunction with the latest technology have to be used, so as to help the parties to avail their remedies in the most efficient and effective manner, rather than curtailing their rights -- It would also ensure expeditious disposal of the proceedings including, avoid the burden of unnecessary expenses relating to the visit of petitioner, if any -- Trial court shall allow the petitioner-wife to appear as witness for the purpose of her cross-examination through video conferencing by following the procedure laid down under the aforesaid High Court Rules and orders.

(Para 10, 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Cheque bounce case – Admission of signatures on cheque -- Presumption of legally enforceable debt -- Petitioner/accused has not been able to disown the factum of issuance of cheques in favour of the complainant and nor has come out with any convincing explanation as regards the reasons for which the said cheques were issued by him -- Once the signatures of the petitioner on the cheques in question are not disputed, a presumption can safely be drawn in favour of the holder as regards the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

(Para 9)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 19, 21 -- Admission of document – Objection as to insufficient stamp duty -- Once a document admitted in evidence, such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped -- Objection as to admissibility of a document on the ground of sufficiency of stamp, has to raised when the document is tendered in evidence.

(Para 3)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 – Cheque bounce case -- Closing of cross-examination -- Trial Court closed the cross examination of CW-1 without taking note of the absence of the lawyer for the petitioners – Stated that non-appearance was due to demise of father of petitioners' counsel and this fact was also brought to the notice of the concerned Court -- Order set aside and parties permitted to appear before the trial Court subject to the condition that the petitioners shall not seek any further adjournment.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 482 – Cheque bounce case – Additional documents by complainant – Petitioner/ complainant moved an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. for leading further evidence by producing additional documents -- No doubt, the complainant had already closed the evidence -- Purpose of trial is to elicit truth -- Trial should not be fair only to the accused but it should also be fair to the complainant/prosecution -- Petitioner permitted to lead the evidence by way of additional documents.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail to husband -- Marriage in May, 2014, wife committed suicide on 4th March, 2021 – In FIR allegations pertaining to harassment caused to the deceased on account of demand of dowry -- Material witnesses examined -- Two minor children are with the grandparents -- Allegations regarding demand of dowry are general in nature -- In the cross-examination, complainant deposed that he did not remember any specific date of harassment caused or demand of dowry made – No cash and vehicle was given in the marriage -- Out of 15 prosecution witnesses, 03 witnesses examined -- Nothing on record to show that the petitioner has any criminal antecedents -- Court cannot ignore the fact that there are two minor children whose future is also at stake – Bail allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Hindu law -- Ancestral property -- Both the Courts below concurrently held that there is no evidence on record to establish ancestor property – Pedigree table in itself is no evidence of ancestry, nor can it be the basis to decide ancestral nature of property which can only be established by independent proof including the revenue records/ jamabandis -- It has to be proved beyond doubt that the property was undivided property of a Hindu family of four generations -- There is no such evidence on record -- No ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below on this issue.

(Para 8)

B. Evidence law -- Attorney appeared as witness – Original attorney -- Plaintiff himself not appeared to testify in support of the plaint – Power of attorney holder/PW-4 failed to produce the original power of attorney on record -- Opportunities afforded, still  could not bring the original on record -- It was, therefore, held that photocopy of the power of attorney cannot be read in evidence -- As the plaintiff himself has not deposed in the case, therefore, no exception can be taken to the adverse inference drawn against him on this account.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 29, 45, 47 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession – Handwriting expert -- When the extra judicial confession is not duly proved, or does not inspire confidence or is not corroborated by any other reliable evidence, the conviction could not be based solely on such weak piece of evidence -- Prosecution having not examined the handwriting expert for proving the handwritings of the accused no.1 contained in the Inland letter allegedly addressed to the PW-19, nor any expert’s opinion having been obtained, the High Court had rightly discarded the said piece of evidence.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Identification of accused after 6 months –When there was huge time gap of about more than six months between the date of the incident and the date of recording of statements of witnesses by the Investigating Officer, the Test Identification Parade would have assisted the police in identifying the accused seen by the PW-7, however no such TI Parade was held by the Investigating Officer -- Therefore, identification of the accused nos. 2 to 5 at the instance of these witnesses becomes very doubtful.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – It is well settled that if there is considerable time gap between the persons seeing together and the proximate time of the crime, the circumstances of last seen together, even if proved cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt of the accused.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Failure of the accused, in a case based on circumstantial evidence which included “last seen together theory”, to explain u/s 313 Cr.PC as to under what circumstances the victim suffered death, would also not be a ground to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the accused were involved in the commission of the alleged crime.

(Para 12)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),Section 45 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Identification of dead body -- Super-imposition report -- Since the super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the super-imposition test -- Dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.

(Para 13)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

(Para 14)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 8, 24, 29, 45, 47, 106 – Murder -- Acquittal of accused -- Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession not corroborated by handwriting expert opinion – Last-seen theory after six months of incident without Test Identification parade by I.O. becomes doubtful – Super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report of dead body – Witness to whom car of deceased sold become hostile – Evidence did not complete the chain to dispel the hypothesis of innocence of the appellants-accused -- Prosecution failed to establish through clinching, clear, cogent and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellants-accused could be established – Judgements and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 8-16)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19(1), 21, 27 – Reporting of offence -- Prompt and proper reporting of is of utmost importance -- Its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act -- Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act – Clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape – If it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault -- A conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

(Para 15, 22)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Medical evidence in sexual offences -- In relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO case – Quashing of FIR and charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.

(Para 18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145, 157 – Evidential value of statement u/s 161,  164 Cr.P.C. – Statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for such purposes.

(Para 20)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 116 -- Arrear of rent – Provisional assessment of rent – Disputing Landlord’s ownership – Provisional rent was tendered without reserving any right to dispute ownership of the landlord – At the time of assessment of provisional rent also, no dispute about the ownership was raised by the tenants – Besides, after attornment they/tenants are estopped from disputing ownership of the landlord.

(Para 7)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17, Order 14 Rule 5, Order 41 Rule 25 -- Additional issue – Disputing Landlord’ ownership -- Rent Controller declined the tenants’ application to raise additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord  -- Subsequently, by two orders, the tenants were again not permitted to amend their written statement to dispute the ownership -- Said orders have attained finality – No occasion for the tenants to agitate the issue again before High Court – It is an abuse of the process of law – Orders were passed by the Rent Controller based upon the reasoning given in the orders, declined to frame the Issues -- It cannot by any stretch of imagination, therefore, be said that the Controller has “omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact” --  Therefore, provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 CPC are not applicable – Held, tenants could not invoke by filing the application, beseeching the Appellate Authority to frame additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord and refer the same to the Rent Controller for recording evidence thereupon -- Nor could the tenant file the other application Order XIV Rule 5 CPC for framing of issues -- Revision dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-.

(Para 9-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Fake driving license -- Renewal of fake driving license – Liability of Insured-owner -- Merely because the driving license of the driver is fake, would not be a sufficient ground by itself to absolve the insurance company of its liability to indemnify the insured -- Driving license periodically renewed -- It can be safely inferred that owner while employing driver, had not only satisfied himself about his driving skills but also qua the validity of his driving license -- Owner could not be expected to carry out a roving enquiry into the authenticity of the driving license, more so, when driving license in question had been regularly renewed -- Insurance company is held liable to indemnify the insured  and pay the amount of compensation to the claimants.

(Para 12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused -- Seal of sample -- Scribe/witness of consent memo -- Independent witness – Sample was drawn in the presence of the learned JMIC on which seal was put, seal was never sent to the forensic laboratory -- Prosecution has, therefore, not been able to prove that there was a recovery of any contraband from the appellant -- No justification as to why two material witnesses ASI/scribe and HC/witness of consent memo were not examined -- Police party did not even care to join the witnesses, who were the shopkeepers of the vicinity and employees of the PRTC workshop which was only 200-300 yards from the place of occurrence, would also cast a shadow upon the prosecution story -- Evidence adduced by the defence through 4 DWs have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and there was no reason to discard the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses especially in view of the fact that the allegations were pertaining to the false implication of the appellant – Appellant, therefore, deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17,18)

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Deposition of wife – Non-cross-examination by husband – Effect of -- Right of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses of the appellant-original applicant was closed, as he had failed to appear before the Family Court despite the issuance of warrants -- Allegations made by the appellant-wife in her evidence before the Court had remained unchallenged and, therefore, there was no reason for the Family Court to disbelieve her version -- Family Court could not have passed the order believing the oral submissions of the respondent.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Able-bodied husband -- Respondent being an able-bodied, he is obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child -- Rs.10,000/- per month awarded to the appellant-wife from the date of filing maintenance petition over and above the maintenance allowance of Rs. 6,000/- granted by the Family Court to the son.

(Para 13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce case – Proprietorship firm not made party – Effect of – In proceeding u/s 138 of N.I.Act, the arraying of a proprietor as an accused or a proprietary concern represented by the proprietor would be sufficient compliance with the requirements u/s 138 of N.I.Act, the proprietor and the proprietary concern is not required to be separately arrayed as a party accused.

(Para 11-11.6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce case – Complaint/ evidence through power of attorney – Permissibility of -- A power of attorney could file a complaint, could depose to an affidavit as also record his sworn statement in a proceedings u/s 138 of N.I.Act.

(Para 12-12.6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145(1) – Affidavit of accused in evidence -- Permissibility of -- An offence u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 is in the nature of a civil wrong which has been accorded criminal overtones – Application preferred by the petitioner to exhibit evidence in the form of an affidavit allowed – Ld. Court below shall admit the affidavit of the petitioner, on the record, and the same shall be treated as the statement of the petitioner.

(Para 1, 14-16)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 73 – Comparison of signatures/ thumb impressions – Validity of documents -- Neither the nomenclature of the document, nor the content of a document, nor the legality, validity, authenticity or veracity of the document is required to be gone into, while making consideration of the prayer for comparison of signature/L.T.I. of two documents.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 73 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Comparison of signatures/ thumb impressions – Defendants did not admit the purported document produced by the petitioners/ plaintiffs -- Basis of denial of such document is oral assertion only without any supportive evidence -- When the court below upon due discharge of discretion vested to the court has allowed comparison of the two documents, due to the failure of defendants to cause production of original deed, such discretion being lawfully exercised, would not suggest for any revisit of such prayer in aid of a recalling application filed by defendants.

(Para 37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498A, 323, 354, 506, 509 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – FIR in matrimonial dispute – DNA profiling of children – Permissibility of -- Blood sampling of the children was directed, who were not parties to the proceeding nor were their status required to be examined in the complaint -- This raised doubt on their legitimacy of being borne to legally wedded parents -- Section 112 of the Evidence Act, also gives a protective cover from allegations of this nature -- Paternity of the children was not in question in the subject-proceeding -- Held, merely because something is permissible under the law cannot be directed as a matter of course to be performed particularly when a direction to that effect would be invasive to the physical autonomy of a person -- Such direction would violate the privacy right of the persons subjected to such tests and could be prejudicial to the future of the two children who were also sought to be brought within the ambit of the Trial Court’s direction – Appeal allowed, Order of the Trial Court and High Court set aside.

(Para 6-11)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness – Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence – Propositions of law on which there can be no controversy – They are,

(i) that as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh, (2020) 10 SCC 120 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301, the fact that the informant also happened to be the investigator, may not by itself vitiate the investigation as unfair or biased;

(ii) that it is not always necessary that the evidence of the police witnesses have to be corroborated by independent witnesses, as held in Dharampal Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 608 and Mukesh Singh (2020) 10 SCC 120 (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301;

(iii) that the independent witnesses turning hostile need not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused, when the mandatory procedure is followed and the other police witnesses speak in one voice as held in Rizwan Khan, (2020) 9 SCC 627; and

(iv) that once it is established that the contraband was recovered from the accused’s possession, a presumption arises under Section 54.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness -- Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence -- To completely disregard the lack of corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and to turn a Nelson’s eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses notably trustworthy -- If independent witnesses come up with a story which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of cards -- It is no doubt true that corroboration by independent witnesses is not always necessary -- But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become turncoats.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- I.O. examined as PW-7 claims to have done everything only in the presence of independent witnesses -- But those independent witnesses not merely denied their presence and participation but also came up with an explanation as to how their signatures found a place in those documents -- In such circumstances, a serious doubt is cast on the very search and seizure allegedly made by PW-7.

(Para 32)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence – Doubt on search and seizure – Acquittal of accused -- Section 54 of the Act raises a presumption and the burden shifts on the accused to explain as to how he came into possession of the contraband -- But to raise the presumption, it must first be established that a recovery was made from the accused -- The moment a doubt is cast upon the most fundamental aspect, namely the search and seizure, appellant/ accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction of the appellant set aside.

(Para 33A, 34)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Scope of -- Both the Trial Court and the High Court have agreed in their appreciation of evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings of fact -- Ordinarily, in an appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of fact, Supreme Court would not enter into reappreciation of evidence -- However, if the assessment of the Trial Court and the High Court is vitiated by any error of law or procedure or misreading of evidence or any disregard to the norms of judicial process leading to serious prejudice or injustice, this Court may consider interference in an appropriate case so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.

(Para 13)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Unreasonable behaviour of eye witnesses – Acquittal of accused -- As per the assertion of PW-2 (father) and PW-3 (mother), they had seen their son being assaulted by two persons with weapon -- PW-2 had allegedly fallen unconscious after seeing the blood oozing from the body of his son -- In that situation and scenario, it is difficult to appreciate that these witnesses would go home, take meal and go to bed without bothering about the welfare of their injured son -- This aspect is coupled with the fact that they had allegedly narrated the incident to PW-1 (other son) only when he reached home after having seen the dead body of his brother -- FIR was lodged next day morning at 10 a.m. – Taking all the circumstances into account, testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 could not have been accepted as that of eye-witnesses to the incident from any standpoint – Moreover, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8 and PW-9, who were projected by the prosecution as independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case at all – Deceased had been brutally assaulted and had received multiple injuries on vital parts but, on the evidence as adduced by the prosecution, it is difficult to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants alone were the authors of such injuries -- Fit case for interference in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court – Appeal allowed -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 16-22)

C. Criminal trial – Benefit of doubt -- A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt but a fair doubt based upon reasons and common sense -- When a reasonable doubt arises in a matter, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

(Para 19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 391 – Appeal against acquittal – Application for additional evidence – Law on remand back – Lower Appellate Court while allowing the application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. cannot ask the Magistrate’s Court to decide the matter afresh -- That option would be open in a case where arguments have been heard in the appeal on merits after examining the additional evidence and the Lower Appellate Court finds it to be a case wherein the judgment of the Trial Court ought to be set aside – In such a scenario, the Lower Appellate Court has the power to set aside the judgment and order rehearing -- However, in the present case, the facts are slightly different, no arguments advanced on merits and the Additional Sessions Judge, has simply allowed the application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. and set aside the judgment of acquittal and remanded the case back – Impugned order set aside and the case is remanded back to the Additional Sessions Judge for a fresh decision on merits.

(Para 12-15)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – POCSO case – Age of victim – Determination of – Stage of case -- Proof or determination of age of the victim in a POCSO case is foundational and for such an important issue, the same can be raised at any stage of the lifetime of the case, even before the appellate forum -- Impugned judgment and sentence set aside and quashed -- Matter remanded to the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO), to determine the age of the victim and to pass the final order upon appreciation of evidence under the changed circumstances.

(Para 15-21)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Age of the victim – Determination of -- Nothing on record to indicate the actual age of the victim either by medical or documentary evidence -- Special Court directed to take up the exercise of determination of the age of the victim in accordance with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and to allow the parties to produce relevant documents, examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard on the issue and thereafter to decide on the issue.

(Para 16-19)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Motor vehicle accident compensation case – Breach of policy – Pleading and evidence – Requirement of – It is mandatory for the insurance company not only to plead the breach of conditions of an insurance policy but also to substantiate the same by adducing positive evidence – In the absence of any evidence it cannot be presumed that there was a breach of the conditions of the insurance policy.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Cheque signed by drawer – Presumption u/s 139 of N.I.Act/ Cheque towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability – Rebuttal of -- Handwriting expert to examine writing on cheque – Permissibility of – High Court permitted to engage a hand-writing expert to seek an opinion on whether “the authorship on the questioned writings” (the disputed cheque) can be attributed to the respondents -- Evidence of a hand-writing expert on whether the respondent had filled in the details in the cheque would be immaterial to determining the purpose for which the cheque was handed over --  Presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert -- No purpose served by allowing the application for adducing the evidence of the hand-writing expert – Order of High Court set aside, appeal allowed.

(Para 4, 17)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Culpable homicide -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden of proof -- Fact that the appellant and the deceased were together the night when the deceased suffered the fatal injuries is established and proven -- Section 106 of the Evidence Act gets attracted.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 and 4 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Difference between Exception 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Exception 1 applies when due to grave and sudden provocation, the offender, deprived of the power of self-control, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation -- Exception 1 also applies when the offender, on account of loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident -- Exception 4 applies when an offence is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and the offender commits culpable homicide without having taken undue advantage of acting in a cruel and unusual manner -- Explanation to Exception 4 states that in such cases it is immaterial which party gives the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact -- Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable -- Law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC -- First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind -- Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given.

(Para 12)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1  -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Court should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation -- Exception 1 to Section 300 recognises that when a reasonable person is tormented continuously, he may, at one point of time, erupt and reach a break point whereby losing self-control, going astray and committing the offence -- However, sustained provocation principle does not do away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, which should be verifiable -- Further, this defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.

(Para 13)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantly torment, abuse and threaten the appellant -- On the night of the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcohol and had told the appellant to leave the house and if not, he would kill the appellant -- There was sudden loss of self-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followed by the final and immediate provocation -- There was temporary loss of self-control as the appellant had tried to kill himself by holding live electrical wires – Held, the acts of provocation on the basis of which the appellant caused the death of his brother were both sudden and grave and that there was loss of self-control -- Applying the provocation exception, Court converted the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the IPC -- Appellant has already suffered incarceration for over 10 years, sentence modified to the period already undergone with fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

(Para 16, 17)