Search By Topic: Evidence Law

152. (SC) 11-11-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

158. (SC) 03-11-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 29, 45, 47 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession – Handwriting expert -- When the extra judicial confession is not duly proved, or does not inspire confidence or is not corroborated by any other reliable evidence, the conviction could not be based solely on such weak piece of evidence -- Prosecution having not examined the handwriting expert for proving the handwritings of the accused no.1 contained in the Inland letter allegedly addressed to the PW-19, nor any expert’s opinion having been obtained, the High Court had rightly discarded the said piece of evidence.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Identification of accused after 6 months –When there was huge time gap of about more than six months between the date of the incident and the date of recording of statements of witnesses by the Investigating Officer, the Test Identification Parade would have assisted the police in identifying the accused seen by the PW-7, however no such TI Parade was held by the Investigating Officer -- Therefore, identification of the accused nos. 2 to 5 at the instance of these witnesses becomes very doubtful.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – It is well settled that if there is considerable time gap between the persons seeing together and the proximate time of the crime, the circumstances of last seen together, even if proved cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt of the accused.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Failure of the accused, in a case based on circumstantial evidence which included “last seen together theory”, to explain u/s 313 Cr.PC as to under what circumstances the victim suffered death, would also not be a ground to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the accused were involved in the commission of the alleged crime.

(Para 12)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),Section 45 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Identification of dead body -- Super-imposition report -- Since the super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the super-imposition test -- Dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.

(Para 13)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

(Para 14)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 8, 24, 29, 45, 47, 106 – Murder -- Acquittal of accused -- Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession not corroborated by handwriting expert opinion – Last-seen theory after six months of incident without Test Identification parade by I.O. becomes doubtful – Super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report of dead body – Witness to whom car of deceased sold become hostile – Evidence did not complete the chain to dispel the hypothesis of innocence of the appellants-accused -- Prosecution failed to establish through clinching, clear, cogent and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellants-accused could be established – Judgements and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 8-16)

159. (SC) 02-11-2022

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19(1), 21, 27 – Reporting of offence -- Prompt and proper reporting of is of utmost importance -- Its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act -- Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act – Clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape – If it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault -- A conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

(Para 15, 22)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Medical evidence in sexual offences -- In relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO case – Quashing of FIR and charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.

(Para 18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145, 157 – Evidential value of statement u/s 161,  164 Cr.P.C. – Statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for such purposes.

(Para 20)

160. (P&H HC) 31-10-2022

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 116 -- Arrear of rent – Provisional assessment of rent – Disputing Landlord’s ownership – Provisional rent was tendered without reserving any right to dispute ownership of the landlord – At the time of assessment of provisional rent also, no dispute about the ownership was raised by the tenants – Besides, after attornment they/tenants are estopped from disputing ownership of the landlord.

(Para 7)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17, Order 14 Rule 5, Order 41 Rule 25 -- Additional issue – Disputing Landlord’ ownership -- Rent Controller declined the tenants’ application to raise additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord  -- Subsequently, by two orders, the tenants were again not permitted to amend their written statement to dispute the ownership -- Said orders have attained finality – No occasion for the tenants to agitate the issue again before High Court – It is an abuse of the process of law – Orders were passed by the Rent Controller based upon the reasoning given in the orders, declined to frame the Issues -- It cannot by any stretch of imagination, therefore, be said that the Controller has “omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact” --  Therefore, provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 CPC are not applicable – Held, tenants could not invoke by filing the application, beseeching the Appellate Authority to frame additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord and refer the same to the Rent Controller for recording evidence thereupon -- Nor could the tenant file the other application Order XIV Rule 5 CPC for framing of issues -- Revision dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-.

(Para 9-10)

163. (SC) 17-10-2022

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

164. (SC) 12-10-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

165. (SC) 30-09-2022

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

171. (SC) 30-08-2022

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness – Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence – Propositions of law on which there can be no controversy – They are,

(i) that as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh, (2020) 10 SCC 120 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301, the fact that the informant also happened to be the investigator, may not by itself vitiate the investigation as unfair or biased;

(ii) that it is not always necessary that the evidence of the police witnesses have to be corroborated by independent witnesses, as held in Dharampal Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 608 and Mukesh Singh (2020) 10 SCC 120 (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301;

(iii) that the independent witnesses turning hostile need not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused, when the mandatory procedure is followed and the other police witnesses speak in one voice as held in Rizwan Khan, (2020) 9 SCC 627; and

(iv) that once it is established that the contraband was recovered from the accused’s possession, a presumption arises under Section 54.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness -- Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence -- To completely disregard the lack of corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and to turn a Nelson’s eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses notably trustworthy -- If independent witnesses come up with a story which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of cards -- It is no doubt true that corroboration by independent witnesses is not always necessary -- But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become turncoats.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- I.O. examined as PW-7 claims to have done everything only in the presence of independent witnesses -- But those independent witnesses not merely denied their presence and participation but also came up with an explanation as to how their signatures found a place in those documents -- In such circumstances, a serious doubt is cast on the very search and seizure allegedly made by PW-7.

(Para 32)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence – Doubt on search and seizure – Acquittal of accused -- Section 54 of the Act raises a presumption and the burden shifts on the accused to explain as to how he came into possession of the contraband -- But to raise the presumption, it must first be established that a recovery was made from the accused -- The moment a doubt is cast upon the most fundamental aspect, namely the search and seizure, appellant/ accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction of the appellant set aside.

(Para 33A, 34)

172. (SC) 30-08-2022

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Scope of -- Both the Trial Court and the High Court have agreed in their appreciation of evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings of fact -- Ordinarily, in an appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of fact, Supreme Court would not enter into reappreciation of evidence -- However, if the assessment of the Trial Court and the High Court is vitiated by any error of law or procedure or misreading of evidence or any disregard to the norms of judicial process leading to serious prejudice or injustice, this Court may consider interference in an appropriate case so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.

(Para 13)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Unreasonable behaviour of eye witnesses – Acquittal of accused -- As per the assertion of PW-2 (father) and PW-3 (mother), they had seen their son being assaulted by two persons with weapon -- PW-2 had allegedly fallen unconscious after seeing the blood oozing from the body of his son -- In that situation and scenario, it is difficult to appreciate that these witnesses would go home, take meal and go to bed without bothering about the welfare of their injured son -- This aspect is coupled with the fact that they had allegedly narrated the incident to PW-1 (other son) only when he reached home after having seen the dead body of his brother -- FIR was lodged next day morning at 10 a.m. – Taking all the circumstances into account, testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 could not have been accepted as that of eye-witnesses to the incident from any standpoint – Moreover, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8 and PW-9, who were projected by the prosecution as independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case at all – Deceased had been brutally assaulted and had received multiple injuries on vital parts but, on the evidence as adduced by the prosecution, it is difficult to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants alone were the authors of such injuries -- Fit case for interference in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court – Appeal allowed -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 16-22)

C. Criminal trial – Benefit of doubt -- A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt but a fair doubt based upon reasons and common sense -- When a reasonable doubt arises in a matter, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

(Para 19)

177. (SC) 16-08-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

179. (SC) 05-08-2022

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

180. (SC) 04-08-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

181. (SC) 02-08-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Culpable homicide -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden of proof -- Fact that the appellant and the deceased were together the night when the deceased suffered the fatal injuries is established and proven -- Section 106 of the Evidence Act gets attracted.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 and 4 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Difference between Exception 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Exception 1 applies when due to grave and sudden provocation, the offender, deprived of the power of self-control, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation -- Exception 1 also applies when the offender, on account of loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident -- Exception 4 applies when an offence is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and the offender commits culpable homicide without having taken undue advantage of acting in a cruel and unusual manner -- Explanation to Exception 4 states that in such cases it is immaterial which party gives the provocation or commits the first assault.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact -- Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable -- Law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC -- First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind -- Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given.

(Para 12)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 1  -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC -- Court should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation -- Exception 1 to Section 300 recognises that when a reasonable person is tormented continuously, he may, at one point of time, erupt and reach a break point whereby losing self-control, going astray and committing the offence -- However, sustained provocation principle does not do away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, which should be verifiable -- Further, this defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.

(Para 13)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantly torment, abuse and threaten the appellant -- On the night of the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcohol and had told the appellant to leave the house and if not, he would kill the appellant -- There was sudden loss of self-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followed by the final and immediate provocation -- There was temporary loss of self-control as the appellant had tried to kill himself by holding live electrical wires – Held, the acts of provocation on the basis of which the appellant caused the death of his brother were both sudden and grave and that there was loss of self-control -- Applying the provocation exception, Court converted the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the IPC -- Appellant has already suffered incarceration for over 10 years, sentence modified to the period already undergone with fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

(Para 16, 17)

183. (SC) 15-07-2022

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Nature of -- Article 136 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary jurisdiction which Supreme Court exercises when it entertains an appeal by special leave and this jurisdiction, by its very nature, is exercisable only when this Court is satisfied that it is necessary to interfere in order to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice -- Terms and powers conferred under the said Article is not hedged by any technical hurdles -- Overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice -- Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then Supreme Court is not only empowered but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of justice.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special leave to Appeal – Finding of fact – Interference on -- It is not the practice of Supreme Court to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court are correct or not -- It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court would interfere with such finding of fact.

(Para 16)

C. Evidence law – Criminal trial -- Testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omission.

(Para 22)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Conviction for murder -- Facts and evidence squarely analyzed by both Trial Court as well the High Court that prosecution discharged its duties in proving the guilt of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt -- When there is ample ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence, mere non-recovery of weapon from the appellant would not materially affect the case of the prosecution -- If the testimony of an eye witness is otherwise found trustworthy and reliable, the same cannot be disbelieved and rejected merely because certain insignificant, normal or natural contradictions have appeared into his testimony -- Deceased has been attacked by the appellant in broad daylight and there is direct evidence available to prove the same and the motive behind the attack is also apparent considering there was previous enmity between the appellant and PW-1 – Held, Trial Court as well as the High Court were right in convicting the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC – No ground warranting interference with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 24-26)

185. (SC) 14-07-2022

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Criminal appeal -- Scope and width of appeal in Supreme court -- Following principles emerge:

(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.

(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.

(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 60 -- Evidence law -- Criminal case -- Appreciation of ocular evidence – Scope of – Appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task -- There is no fixed or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence -- The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.

II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

III. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.

(Para 27)

C. Evidence law -- Criminal case – Value of eyewitness – Assessment of -- In assessing the value of the evidence of the eye-witnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence -- In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence -- Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence -- Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the eye-witnesses.

(Para 28, 29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Criminal case -- Discovery Panchnama – Reading over of it – Exhibition of – A panchnama which can be used only to corroborate the panch has to be read over to the panch and only thereafter it can be exhibited – If the panch has omitted to state something which is found in the panchnama, then after reading over the panchnama the panch has to be asked whether that portion of the panchnama is correct or not and whatever reply he gives has to be recorded – If he replies in the affirmative, then only that portion of the panchnama can be read into evidence to corroborate the substantive evidence of the panch – If he replies in the negative, then that part of the panchnama cannot be read in evidence for want of substantive evidence on record – It is, therefore, necessary that care is taken by the public prosecutor who conducts the trial that such a procedure is followed while examining the panch at the trial – It is also necessary that the learned trial judge also sees that the panchnama is read over the panch and thereafter the panchnama is exhibited after following the procedure as indicated above.

(Para 39)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the Act are broadly as under:

(1) Discovery of fact in consequence of an information received from accused;

(2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to;

(3) The accused must be in police custody when he gave informations and

(4) So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible.

Two conditions for application –

(1) information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and

(2) information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered.

(Para 42)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Value of – Involvement or usage of weapon -- Statement does not suggest that the appellant indicated anything about his involvement in the concealment of the weapon -- Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the weapon -- He could have derived knowledge of the existence of that weapon at the place through some other source also -- He might have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and, therefore, it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person discovered the weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, least it can be presumed that he used it.

(Para 45)

G. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Recovery of weapon – Contents of Panchnama/ Memo – Proof of -- In the absence of exact words, attributed to an accused person, as statement made by him being deposed by the Investigating Officer in his evidence, and also without proving the contents of the panchnamas, the trial Court was not justified in placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of weapon.

(Para 47)

H. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27 – Conduct of accused – Disclosure statement – Recovery of – Reliance upon -- While discarding the evidence in the form of discovery panchnama the conduct of the accused would be relevant u/s 8 of the Act -- Evidence of discovery would be admissible as conduct u/s 8 of the Act quite apart from the admissibility of the disclosure statement u/s 27 -- Although the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact u/s 8 of the Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence like murder -- Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of an accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect – Held, conduct of the accused alone, though may be relevant u/s 8 of the Act, cannot form the basis of conviction.

(Para 48-50)

186. (SC) 14-07-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – De facto complainant – Transfer of investigation to CBI -- If a citizen, who is a de facto complainant in a criminal case alleging commission of cognizable offence affecting violation of his legal or fundamental rights against high Government officials or influential persons, prays before a Court for a direction of investigation of the said alleged offence by the CBI, such prayer should not be granted on mere asking -- In an appropriate case when the Court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in a proper direction, and in order to do complete justice in the case and if high police officials are involved in the alleged crime, the Court may be justified in such circumstances to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 44-46)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – Chargesheet filed in criminal case – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Permissibility of -- After the filing of the charge sheet the court is empowered in an appropriate case to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- There are two conditions, on fulfillment of which, a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false affidavit or evidence in a proceeding before a court -- The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and, secondly, in the opinion of the court it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him – There should be something deliberate -- A statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise.

(Para 72-78)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191 – Perjury -- False evidence -- Affidavit -- An affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury.

(Para 79)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution – Court has to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely -- In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

(Para 79)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211 – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure -- Meaning of charge -- Essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence -- Complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person -- This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person – A false "charge" in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion.

(Para 91)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211, 120-B – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure – FIR/ First information reports lodged at the different police stations -- At the end of the investigation, the investigating agency reached to the conclusion that the police force had no role to play, rather Naxals were responsible for the massacre – Prima facie, it could be said that false information was given by the first informants to the police as regards the alleged massacre by the police force – Essential ingredient of an offence u/s 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge – “falsely charges” in this section, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial -- “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial -- The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding” -- Statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion – Court left it to the State /CBI to take appropriate steps in accordance with law -- It shall not be limited only to the offence under Section 211 of the IPC -- A case of criminal conspiracy or any other offence under the IPC may also surface – Court left it to the better discretion of the State /CBI to act accordingly keeping in mind the seriousness of the entire issue -- Having regard to the facts of the present case the bar of Section 195 CrPC would not apply if ultimately the State/ CBI decides to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

(Para 90-96)

187. (SC) 14-07-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Requirement of -- A dying declaration, oral or written, before it could be relied upon, must pass a test of reliability as it is a statement made in the absence of the accused and there is no opportunity to the accused even to put it through the fire of cross examination to test is genuinity or veracity -- Court has, therefore, to subject it to close scrutiny -- But once the court is satisfied that it is a truthful version as to the circumstances in which the death resulted and the persons causing injuries, the law does not expect that there should be corroboration before it can be relied upon -- However, if there are infirmities and the court does not find it safe to base any conclusion on it without some further evidence to support it, the question of corroboration arises.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire -- Dying declaration – Nature of -- Whole idea of accepting a statement in the name of dying declaration comes from a maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth -- It is believed that when a man is at the point of death and when every expectation of this world is gone, it hushes away every motive of lie.

(Para 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Murder – Dying declaration – Corroborative evidence – Conviction by trial Court, affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- On the day of occurrence, PW2 was working in his agricultural field -- His presence in his field could be said to be natural -- Not the case of the accused-appellant that PW2 had some axe to grind against him, including the other co-accused and, therefore, fabricated the entire story of an oral dying declaration -- Oral dying declaration of the deceased made before PW2 stands corroborated with the medical evidence on record -- Burn injuries were suffered by the deceased as the accused persons are said to have poured hot lali (raw material used for preparing liquor – Appellant arrested almost after about 8 days from the date of incident, he was absconding was not available at his house -- Appellant in his statement recorded u/s 313 of the CrPC has not explained where he was till the date of his arrest -- From the nature of the oral evidence, something went wrong while the deceased and the accused persons were inside the liquor factory -- It appears to be a case of sudden fight -- Held, no fundamental or basic infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court going to the root of the matter calling for any interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 25-29)

190. (SC) 11-07-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

192. (SC) 14-06-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence -- Burden of proof -- Burden rests with the accused who takes up the plea of self defence -- In the absence of proof, the Court will not be in a position to assume that there is any truth in the plea of self defence -- It would be for the accused to adduce positive evidence or extract necessary information from the witnesses produced by the prosecution and place any other material on record to establish his plea of private defence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Right of private defence – Nature of -- It is a defensive right which is available only when the circumstances so justify it -- Circumstances are those that have been elaborated in the IPC -- Such a right would be available to the accused when he or his property is faced with a danger and there is little scope of the State machinery coming to his aid -- At the same time, the courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property should be in proportion to the injury apprehended -- Not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court – Court’s assessment would be guided by several circumstances including the position on the spot at the relevant point in time, the nature of apprehension in the mind of the accused, the kind of situation that the accused was seeking to ward off, the confusion created by the situation that had suddenly cropped up resulting the in knee jerk reaction of the accused, the nature of the overt acts of the party who had threatened the accused resulting in his resorting to immediate defensive action, etc.-- Underlying factor should be that such an act of private defence should have been done in good faith and without malice.

(Para 21)

C. Border Security Force Act, 1968 (47 of 1968), Section 46 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 300 Exception 2, 302, 304 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- CT H (PW-1) and appellant were on patrolling in the area, they had seen three persons crossing the international border from Bangladesh side -- On noticing the intruders, they had challenged them to stop at a distance of 50 meters -- But the intruders ran away in the direction of Bangladesh -- At this, PW-1 and the appellant had turned back and while continuing with their patrolling duty, they saw 6-7 persons rushing towards them from the side of Bangladesh, carrying weapons like ‘Dah’, ‘Bhala’ and ‘Lathi’ in their hands -- They managed to surround the appellant, who was closer to them -- Held, right of private self defence would be available to the appellant keeping in mind preponderance of probabilities that leans in favour of the appellant -- In a fact situation, he was left with no other option but to save his life by firing at them from his rifle and in the process two of the shots had pierced through the deceased, causing his death -- Appellant ought not to have been convicted for having committed the murder of the deceased -- Rather, the offence made out is of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 304 IPC – Appellant already suffered incarceration for a period of over eleven years, considered sufficient punishment for the offence -- Appellant accordingly set free for the period already undergone.

(Para 24-2)

193. (SC) 13-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Long years living as husband and wife – Birth of child – Presumption of -- It is well settled that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock -- Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act -- Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Partition suit – Preliminary Decree – Final Decree – Role of -- Preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of the parties to the partition -- Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of the divided property, then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry, a final decree shall be passed.

(Para 29, 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Preliminary decree -- Final decree – Limitation – Nature of -- Final decree proceedings can be initiated at any point of time -- There is no limitation for initiating final decree proceedings -- Either of the parties to the suit can move an application for preparation of a final decree and, any of the defendants can also move application for the purpose -- By mere passing of a preliminary decree the suit is not disposed of.

(Para 31)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 -- Preliminary decree – Final decree – Directions issued to Trial Courts -- Once a preliminary decree is passed by the Trial Court, the court should proceed with the case for drawing up the final decree suo motu -- After passing of the preliminary decree, the Trial Court has to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC -- The courts should not adjourn the matter sine die -- There is also no need to file a separate final decree proceedings -- In the same suit, the court should allow the concerned party to file an appropriate application for drawing up the final decree – Suit comes to an end only when a final decree is drawn – Directions given to Trial Courts to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC soon after passing of the preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the property, suo motu and without requiring initiation of any separate proceedings.

(Para 32, 33)

194. (SC) 03-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 231, 242 -- Criminal trial -- Witnesses – Reliance upon their testimony – Nature of – Corroboration in material particulars -- Requirement of -- Witnesses are of three types, viz., (a) wholly reliable; (b) wholly unreliable; and (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable -- When the witness is “wholly reliable”, the Court should not have any difficulty inasmuch as conviction or acquittal could be based on the testimony of such single witness -- Equally, if the Court finds that the witness is “wholly unreliable”, there would be no difficulty inasmuch as neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such witness -- It is only in the third category of witnesses that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 233, 243 -- Criminal trial – Defence witnesses – Value of -- It is a settled law that same treatment is required to be given to the defence witness(es) as is to be given to the prosecution witness(es).

(Para 20)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Criminal trial -- Motive – Value of – it is well settled that only because motive is established, the conviction cannot be sustained.

(Para 23)

195. (SC) 02-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

198. (SC) 13-05-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)

199. (SC) 04-05-2022

A. Evidence law -- Circumstantial evidence -- In order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent and coherent -- Inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused -- Circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder of children of A-1 -- Proximity between A-1 and A-2 – Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution has not even established the motive of the crime beyond reasonable doubt -- A1 and A2 talked on call, only proves that they shared a close relationship -- However, what these records do not prove, is that the murder was somehow in furtherance of this alleged proximity between A1 and A2 -- High Court’s inference in this regard was a mere dubious conclusion in absence of any cogent or concrete evidence -- High Court itself based its inferences on mere probability when it held that “It is quite probable that A2 would have through that the minor children had been a hurdle for his close proximity with A1” -- Prosecution has also failed to establish by evidence the supposed objective of these murders and what was it that was sought to be achieved by such an act -- Court observed that the act of A2 was inspired by the desire to “exclusively possess” A1 -- However, it seems improbable that A2 would murder the minor children of PW5 and A1 to increase or protect his intimacy to A1 rather than eliminate the husband of A1 himself -- Conviction cannot be upheld.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B – Call records – Certification of electronic evidence – Requirement of -- Electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law -- Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.

(Para 21)