Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 336, 506 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Act endangering life or personal safety of others -- Acquittal -- Test identification Parade (TIP) -- When it is established from the testimony of witnesses that occurrence took place at about 10:30 p.m., with no source of light, it is highly doubtful as to how the two police officials identified the accused, particularly when there is no evidence on record that they knew the accused earlier -- No Test Identification Parade was ever conducted -- Complainant and alleged eye-witness have not supported the prosecution case – Appeal accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Eye witness turned hostile -- Two purported ocular witnesses to the occurrence PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case, turned hostile -- In a grilling cross-examination, rather both completely denied making their respective previous statements in writing to the police officer nor did they make any affirmative answer to any incriminatory affirmative suggestion put to each of them by the Public Prosecutor -- Thus stems an inference that prosecution has been unable to invincibly substantiate the charge(s) drawn against the accused.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) in Court – Reliance upon -- Injured eye witness (PW-15) made a previous statement to the police officer discloses;

“…. That person was with muffled face and he said to shoot me because I am the person of that party. In between the person who having gun, shooted me. I can identify that voice and face thoroughly if he was produced before me, because that person was faced me prior somewhere. The person, who shooted me, I can identify him. if he was produced before me because his face was uncovered. After hitting of bullet shot, I became unconscious…….”

Held, unless the investigating officer during the course of his carrying investigations into the crime FIR, had held a valid identification parade with the participation thereins of PW-15 to enable to identify the accused, the identification of the accused by PW-15 in Court was a frail and uncreditworthy -- PW-15 was legally incapacitated to identify for the first time the accused in Court --  Therefore, no evidentiary vigour can be assigned thereto -- Prosecution case which becomes rested, upon the deposition of PW-15, thus cannot succeed.

(Para 17-20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Disclosure statement – Recovery of revolver and three live cartridges -- Ballistic expert’s opinion --  Report of the ballistic expert is of grave importance -- No conclusive opinion was made by the ballistic expert with respect to lead bullet mark CB/1 contained in parcel ‘D’ becoming fired from 0.32 inch revolver – Held, the inconclusivity of opinion leads to an inference that the recovery of 0.32 inch revolver was a recovery not related to the crime event nor also the accused can be conclusively said to make user of the said recovered fire arm in his committing the fatal assault upon deceased -- Impugned verdict of conviction and sentence(s) of imprisonment as well as of fine required to be quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 23-28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Murder -- Last seen theory -- Presence of two accused persons missing in FIR – Had the complainant been aware of the narrative as put forward by PW-14, before registration of FIR, there was no reason for him, who is a father who lost his son, to conceal such essential information -- Non-disclosure of vital information qua presence of accused with the looted goats and sheep of complainant and names of two accused persons, clearly establishes that PW14 is an introduced witness, who was examined just to complete the chain of circumstances -- Story of last seen stands badly contradicted by the contents of FIR.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report reveals that human blood was detected on the stick, and, knife (Chhura), however, the report is inconclusive qua ‘Human Blood Group’ – It was imperative for the Investigation Officer to have made efforts to collect the finger print impressions from the recovered stick, knife (Chhura), liquor bottle, and, the two glasses, and thereafter, to get them compared with the finger print impressions of the accused persons – However, the Investigation Officer concerned has evidently not carried out any such exercise -- The omission of the prosecution proves fatal to the prosecution story.

(Para 30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Murder -- Disclosure statement – Demarcation of places – Relevance -- Nothing recovered from appellant/ accused, in pursuance of his disclosure statement except demarcation of certain places, vis-à-vis, the place where liquor was consumed by accused persons, the place of occurrence, the place from where the dead body was thrown into canal, and, the place where accused persons had left the looted goats and sheep -- Such a disclosure statement does not establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, as the disclosures made therein were already in the knowledge of the Investigation Officer.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report unveils matching of the POP casts of foot and footwear impressions of respondent/accused with the ones lifted from the crime scene -- Whether the acquittal of respondent/ accused can be converted into conviction, solely on the basis of the FSL report, answer is in negative – Samples of foot prints of the accused persons were not taken in the presence of any Magistrate -- Except the FSL Report, there is no other corroborative incriminating evidence available on record -- As such, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, wherefrom the FSL Report may gain vigor, a finding of acquittal cannot be turned into a finding of guilt.

(Para 45, 46)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Subsequent conduct -- Conduct of accused in going to the Police Station and surrendering before the Police can be taken into consideration.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Last seen theory -- Prosecution established that the deceased and the accused persons left the house of P.W.5 together and soon thereafter the death of the deceased had occurred -- As such, the burden to show as to what happened after leaving the house would shift on the accused in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Death penalty – Commuted to life imprisonment – No criminal antecedents -- Appellant-D has been sentenced to capital punishment, was a young boy of about 25 years at the time of the incident -- Medical evidence would further reveal that the appellants have not acted in a brutal manner, inasmuch as there is only single injury inflicted on both the deceased -- As such, it cannot be considered to be ‘rarest of rare’ case -- Report of the Probation Officer as well as the Superintendent, Central Prison would show that the appellant-D has been found to be well-behaved, helping and a person with leadership qualities -- He is not a person with criminal mindset and criminal records – Sentence of capital punishment commuted to life imprisonment.

(Para 28-31)

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 36, 61 -- Exhibition of insufficiently stamped documents – Evidential value -- Documents already having been exhibited without any objection from the respondents-defendants as also in view of the bar contained in Section 36 of the Act and no recourse having been taken u/s 61 of the Act, impugned order holding the documents Ex.P-3 and P-4 as not readable in evidence, set aside.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 397, 450 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106, 114(a) -- Murder – Recovery of stolen goods – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of appellants:

-- A2 was found in possession of a bag carrying some of the stolen ornaments and, speaks against him, in terms of Section 114 (a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It was for A2 to explain as to how he came to be in possession of those stolen ornaments, u/s 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- However, no explanation was offered by him.

-- It is the prosecution’s case that A1 confessed to commission of the crime and upon being questioned as to the stolen gold ornaments, he himself went into the other room in his house and brought out a bag containing the gold ornaments -- This part of his confession admissible u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments.

Recovery of this stolen property from the accused would not be sufficient in itself to convict them for murder -- Inescapable fact remains that PWs 4, 6, and 10, who were witnesses independent of each other and who had no animosity or enmity with the accused, spoke in unison about seeing them running away from the house of PW-1 of the fateful night with bags in their possession -- No explanation is forthcoming as to why three separate witnesses would choose to implicate the accused falsely.

Sequence of events unfolded in quick succession during the intervening night of 21.08.2008 and 22.08.2008, leading to not only identification of the accused by the witnesses present but also their apprehension and arrest, apart from seizure of the stolen gold ornaments and cash from their possession, it is amply clear that there was no time or possibility for the police to hoist a false case upon them -- Minor discrepancies and shortcomings in the statements made by witnesses after passage of a few years would necessarily have to be discounted in such a scenario.

Conviction order upheld.

(Para 23-27)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 18, 19, 20, 39, 43D(5) – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Section 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Offence under UAPA – Regular bail – No reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the UAPA are prime facie true -- Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D will not apply in the case -- Charge not framed, prosecution proposes to examine more than 140 witnesses -- Some of the accused are absconding -- Thus, no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future – Special Judge directed to release the appellants on bail on appropriate conditions determined by him after hearing the appellants and respondent.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 27 – Confession – Discovery of fact – Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule under Section 25 that a confession made by an accused to a police officer is not admissible in evidence -- The first condition for the applicability of Section 27 is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact, which is the direct outcome of such information -- Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said discovery is admissible against the accused.

(Para 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 48 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B -- Criminal trial – False implication -- Preservation of CDRs and telecom record -- A case of chance recovery, so preservation or production of the electronic record is not going to affect the source of secret information – As per the notification dated 21.12.2021 issued by Ministry of Communication, Govt. of India, the telecommunication company shall maintain all call details record etc. for at least two years for scrutiny and two years has not lapsed till date of recovery -- Investigating Officer and Telecommunication Company directed to preserve the CDRs of the Police Officials, private persons and petitioner and co-accused with liberty to the petitioner to summon the same at the appropriate stage of trial, for the purpose of putting the same to confront the prosecution witnesses or to produce it in defence evidence -- Admissibility and relevance of said electronic record will be subject to the provisions of Section 65A and Section 65B of Evidence Act.

(Para 7-13)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Suit for specific performance – Power of attorney – Readiness and willingness -- Power of attorney executed on 28.02.2001 and the agreement to sell is dated 27.03.1998 – Power of attorney holder who stepped into the witness box on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant was not competent to depose qua acts done by the principal -- The only person competent to have deposed qua the readiness and willingness could have been the plaintiff-respondent who preferred not to step into the witness box -- In the absence of evidence qua readiness and willingness, the suit for specific performance could not have been decreed -- Judgments and decrees of the Courts below are erroneous -- Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dismissed -- Defendant-appellant to refund Rs.11,00,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum to the plaintiff-respondent from the date of the agreement to sell till payment.

(Para 12-15)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 – Divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty -- DNA test of child – Legitimacy of child – Presumption -- Divorce petition  by husband – In pleading husband did not deny access to wife – Admitted that he used to stay with his wife during weekends -- Presumption u/s 112 of Evidence Act gets attracted -- Baby was born to the couple having access to each other and during subsistence of valid marriage between them -- It is conclusive proof of baby’s legitimacy -- Paternity of the child cannot be allowed to be ascertained in the manner sought by the husband -- He cannot be allowed to fill up the lacuna, if any, in his evidence by seeking to conduct the DNA test of the child and the parties.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide -- Insulting the deceased by using abusive language or maltreatment will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of the suicide is imperative -- Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against the indictment -- Mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non to convict a person under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 9-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Simply because of the fact that the wife (deceased) committed suicide in matrimonial home, itself does not make her in-laws and husband liable for harassment and abetment to commit suicide -- No concrete or conclusive evidence to prove their complicity in the commission of the crime -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – Acquittal affirmed.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court – Trustworthiness of witness -- Complainant stepped into the witness box as PW-6, in her examination-in-chief, she identified the accused, however, in the cross examination, she stated that the police had called her to the police station and had told her that her mobile phone had been recovered -- She stated in the cross examination that she had not told the police that the person in the police station was the same who had snatched the purse from her before the questioning of the accused started -- It has further come on record that no description of the accused had been given by the complainant at the time of registration of the FIR and even the number of the motorcycle could not be noted down by the complainant -- Cross examination of the complainant definitely created a dent in the case of the prosecution which was rightly considered by the trial Court.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court -- Recovery of mobile and Rs. 12,000 on disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- No bill of mobile was produced on record -- It was not proved that the mobile phone which had been released on Sapurdari was the same which had been allegedly recovered from the accused -- PW-6-complaiannt duly stated in her evidence that the bill of the mobile phone and the details of the Sim had been handed over to the police, but nowhere the IMEI number was mentioned nor the bill of the mobile phone saw the light of the day – Insofar as the amount of Rs.12,000/- is concerned, there is nothing to show that these were the same Rs.12,000/- rupees which had been snatched from the complainant -- Anyone could be in possession of a sum of Rs.12,000/- and the mere recovery of the same from the said person would not mean that they had been snatched from someone -- Recovery alleged to have been made in pursuance to the disclosure statement suffered by the respondent-accused not proved -- No reliance can be placed upon the disclosure statement – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal of accused -- Prosecution rests upon three circumstances (a) the alleged confessional statement of accused/ appellant made before PW-1 and PW-7; (b) prior animosity/“tension” between appellant and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of the keys of the shop of the deceased and his currency notes amounting to Rs.300/- on the asking of the accused/appellant -- There is a significant time gap between when the deceased was lastly seen and the time of the crime – In respect of recovery of keys and the money, there is no independent corroborated material except for the confessional statement of the accused, which also is not proven on record -- Keys, the currency notes and the blood stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis -- Neither the chain of circumstances completely established nor the guilt of the accused alone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeal allowed and the appellant acquitted of all the charges framed against him.

(Para 3, 16, 20, 24-29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Unlawful assembly – Single witness/ Brother of deceased/ Interested witness – Testimony of – Reliability of -- Conviction to 8 accused – Some witnesses become hostile -- PW-1/ real brother of deceased unrefutedly reveals all the accused hiding in bushes at the spot -- This witness, despite being cross-examined extensively, is consistent in his testimony to the effect that the accused caught hold of the deceased and inflicted serious injuries upon his person -- Though, the witness is not clear as to which one of the accused had assaulted the deceased after he fell down, but then he is categorical with regard to the role played by each one of them -- Merely because no recovery was made from anyone apart from accused Nos.2 and 4 would not mean that others were not present at the scene of the crime; simply because a number of witnesses had turned hostile, does not on its own give a ground to reject the evidence of PW-1; and that PW-1 being the brother of the deceased and therefore, is an interested as well a chance witness, are untenable submissions – Appeals against conviction of accused dismissed.

(Para 1, 12, 17, 21-27)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Drafting of complaint by Advocate – Effect of -- Complaint was alleged to have been drafted by an advocate (PW-24), and not by  the petitioner with the help of the police personnel -- Does it cast doubt on the prosecution case? In Court’s view, none.

(Para 22)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 --  Murder -- Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory – Motive -- Virtually, the oral testimonies of PW-8 and PW-10 are at variance about the last seen and it becomes inconclusive – Prosecution has miserably failed to prove the alleged motive -- Though the deceased had met with a homicidal death it cannot be said that the rest of the circumstantial evidence culled out by the courts below unerringly point to the culpability of the appellants in the homicidal death of deceased -- Even the recovery of the weapon and the dress, at the instance of the appellant cannot, by itself, be conclusive as admittedly, the panch witnesses for their recovery also did not support the prosecution -- It is unsafe to maintain the conviction of the appellants; benefit of doubt extended – Appellants, acquitted.

(Para 29, 30)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 --  Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance -- Failure to establish the alleged motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence it can only be held that the said failure had weakened the case of the prosecution.

(Para 18-21)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- In a case rested on circumstantial evidence and ‘last seen’ theory is relied on as a link in the chain of circumstances, the evidence relating the time at which the deceased was lastly seen with the accused has to be proved conclusively as when it is proximate with the time of finding the dead body the burden to establish the innocence would be that of the accused.

(Para 24)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Extra-judicial confession – Corroboration not required -- Generally, it is a weak piece of evidence, however, a conviction can be sustained on the basis of extra-judicial confession provided that the confession is proved to be voluntary and truthful -- It should be free of any inducement -- Evidentiary value of such confession also depends on the person to whom it is made -- Going by the natural course of human conduct, normally, a person would confide about a crime committed by him only with such a person in whom he has implicit faith -- Moreover, the Court has to be satisfied with the reliability of the confession keeping in view the circumstances in which it is made -- As a matter of rule, corroboration is not required -- However, if an extra-judicial confession is corroborated by other evidence on record, it acquires more credibility.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Extra-judicial confession – PW-1 to PW-6 including the complainant himself whose son was killed did not support prosecution -- Case of the prosecution was that the appellant had confessed to PW-1 to PW-9 -- Prosecution’s case about extrajudicial confession does not inspire confidence – No other circumstances brought on record which could support or corroborate the prosecution case -- Evidence in form of the extra-judicial confession of the appellant deserves to be discarded -- Conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained at all -- Appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against him.

(Para 5-7)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63(c) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68, 90 – Will – Presumption as to 30 year old document – Applicability of -- Wills cannot be proved only on the basis of their age -- Presumption u/s 90 as to the regularity of documents more than 30 years of age is inapplicable when it comes to proof of wills, which have to be proved in terms of Sections 63(c) of the Succession Act, 1925, and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 69 -- Will -- Attesting witness – Non-availability of -- In the event where attesting witnesses may have died, or cannot be found, the propounder is not helpless, as Section 69 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is applicable.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery memorandum – Non-preparation of – Acquittal of accused -- Trial court found that the evidence of PWs 10 to 12 before whom confession was made were contradictory to each other -- Conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence – Trial court disbelieved the recovery of clothes and weapon on two grounds -- Firstly, that there was no memorandum statement of the accused as required u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and secondly, the recovery of the knife was from an open place accessible to one and all –View taken by the trial court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal/impossible to warrant interference -- High Court has grossly erred in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant set aside – Acquittal by Trial Court, affirmed.

(Para 12-22)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide -- In order to bring the case within the purview of ‘Abetment’ u/s 107 IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid on the part of the accused -- For the purpose proving the charge u/s 306 IPC, also there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid to drive a person to commit suicide.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Cruelty – Abetment of suicide -- Nothing comes out from evidence as to whether the death was suicidal or not -- None of the witnesses mother, father, uncle and mediator of marriage  examined by the prosecution had any knowledge as to whether the deceased had jumped into the well or she had accidently slipped into the well -- PW-21/ Doctor opined that the death of the deceased was due to the drowning as a result of Asphyxia, there was no opinion given by her nor any opinion was sought from her as to whether it was a suicide committed by the deceased or it was an accident by which she fell down in the well -- Even if it is presumed that the deceased had committed suicide, there was no evidence whatsoever adduced by the prosecution that there was an abetment on the part of any of the accused which had driven her to commit suicide -- No evidence worth the name to show that any of the appellants-accused had either instigated or intentionally aided or abetted the deceased to commit suicide or had caused any abetment as contemplated u/s Section 107 of the IPC -- While upholding the conviction of the appellants u/s 498A, appellants acquitted from the charges u/s 306 of IPC by giving them benefit of doubt.

(Para 11-17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A -- Suicide within 7 year of marriage – Presumption u/s 113-A of Evidence Act -- Mere fact of commission of suicide by itself would not be sufficient for the court to raise the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, and to hold the accused guilty of Section 306 IPC.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 24, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- No one has seen the commission of crime -- Basic links in the chain of circumstances starts with motive, then move on to last seen theory, recovery, medical evidence, expert opinions if any and any other additional link which may be part of the chain of circumstances.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Circumstantial evidence – Role of Motive -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive has an important role to play -- Motive may also have a role to play even in a case of direct evidence but it carries much greater importance in a case of circumstantial evidence than a case of direct evidence -- It is an important link in the chain of circumstances.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 24, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution not come forward with any motive – Dead body not recovered, only a limb was recovered but no DNA testing was carried out – In respect to last seen theory in the first information (PW-7) not mentioned that deceased left his house along with the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ although in his statement before the Trial Court stated so but when confronted with his statement u/s 161 CrPC and also about the entry in the police records, he had no explanation for the same -- PW-25/ mother, the main witness of the last seen stated that when she returned from the office around 5 PM on 19.06.2007, she saw deceased/son going out on the motor bike of his father and she followed her son upto the gate and saw the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ standing at the gate, this witness in her cross-examination when confronted with her statement u/s 161 CrPC said that no such statement is there, although according to her, she had told the Investigating Officer that she had seen the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ at her gate – If the extra-judicial confession accepted, the statement of last seen theory given by the mother (PW-25) becomes difficult to be given any credibility -- Recoveries which is an important link in the chain of circumstances the recoveries have been from an open place – Major links of the chain of circumstances have not been proved -- Appellant would be entitled to benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed and the appellant acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 15-22)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Retracted extra-judicial confession – Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and especially when it has been retracted during trial – It requires strong evidence to corroborate it and also it must be established that it was completely voluntary and truthful.

(Para 21)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17-A – Additional evidence – Change of Counsel – Ground of -- Merely by change of a counsel, a litigant does not get any right to adduce further evidence for the reason that the earlier counsel had not advised him to produce that evidence earlier.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Handwriting expert – Comparing the writing filled in the body of the cheque -- Once the signature on the cheque is admitted by the accused-respondent, it is immaterial as to who had filled in the details in the cheque and therefore, no purpose is going to be served by allowing the application for appointing the handwriting expert.

(Para 4, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Conviction by Trial Court – Appeal dismissed by High Court -- Scope of Appeal in Supreme Court -- Wholesome reappreciation of evidence is not within the scope of appeal.

(Para 13)

B. Evidence law -- Discrepancy in deposition – Effect of -- PW-1, sixty-five years of age, was deposing before the Court from her memory after one year from the incident, such discrepancies would not result in rejection of her testimony altogether.

(Para 16.2)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Medical officers established that the child suffered strangulation with a wound measuring 20 cm in length and 2 cm in breadth around the neck and with thyroid cartilage bone having been fractured -- PW-8/ Doctor opined that if outer end of the saree was twisted and put around the neck and the person was strangled, there was a chance of such a wound -- The saree in question duly recovered from the appellant and was said to be carrying blood stains – In statement u/s 313 CrPC, the appellant has not given any explanation whatsoever and has not made any statement except denying the circumstances put to her -- Victim child was last seen alive with the appellant only; she was required to explain the circumstances leading to the demise of the child -- Burden of Section 106 of the Evidence Act operates heavily against the appellant – No case for interference with the concurrent findings of fact is made out – Conviction and sentencing of the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be faulted.

(Para 17-22)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Last seen theory based on circumstantial evidence may be a weak kind of evidence by itself to base conviction solely on such theory, when the said theory is proved coupled with other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last seen with the accused, and the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accused does owe an explanation u/s 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances under which death might have taken place -- If the accused offers no explanation or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and some other corroborative evidence in the form of recovery of weapon etc. forming a chain of circumstances is established, the conviction could be based on such evidence.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 27, 106 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Murder -- Homicidal death -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Petitioner had taken the deceased with him on the previous day evening and thereafter he was also seen with the deceased by the witness (PW-4) and the very next day early morning, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in the field at village -- Time gap between the period when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the corpse of the deceased being quite proximate, the non-explanation of the petitioner with regard to the circumstance under which and when the petitioner had departed the company of the deceased was a very crucial circumstance proved against him -- Enmity between the deceased and the petitioner had also surfaced -- Corroborative evidence with regard to recovery of the weapon-axe alleged to have been used in the commission of crime from the petitioner, also substantiated the case of prosecution -- Entire oral as well as documentary evidence having been threadbare considered by the Sessions Court as also High Court while holding the petitioner guilty of the charged offence – No need again reappreciate the same in the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India – Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Non-examination of witnesses – Effect of – It has no material bearing -- It is the discretion of the prosecution to lead as much evidence as is necessary for proving the charge -- It is not the quantity of the witnesses but the quality of witnesses which matters.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C -- Non-examination of the statement u/s 164 CrPC has no relevance or bearing to the findings and conclusions arrived at by the courts below -- It was for the Investigating Officer to have got the statement u/s 164 CrPC recorded -- If he did not think it necessary in his wisdom, it cannot have any bearing on the testimony of PW-1 and the other material evidence led during trial.

(Para 22)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18, Rule 17A – Additional evidence in rebuttal -- Categoric stand of the defendant in the written statement was that the agreement to sell was false, frivolous and a fabricated document -- Onus to prove the agreement to sell was on the plaintiff -- Attorney of the defendant-respondent stepped into the witness box and the documents were not put to the said attorney -- Held, bonafides on the part of the plaintiff-petitioner are questionable, he chose not to produce them in the affirmative -- No valid or cogent reasons are coming forth for not producing the documents earlier – Order dismissing application for leading additional evidence moved by plaintiff-petitioner affirmed.

(Para 5-7)

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 16(1)(a)(i) -- Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 14 – Sample in clean and dry bottle – Non-compliance of – Acquittal of accused -- Sample for the purposes of analysis has to be taken in clean and dry bottles -- Any violation would render the results of the analysis unreliable, therefore, due procedure must be followed under the rules – Equity demands that there must atleast be some evidence or supporting material to the effect that the jars were clean at the time of taking the samples -- In the absence of any testimony of any person, who had cleaned the jars, the only inference which can be drawn is that the jars were not cleaned at the time of taking of the sample for which the Court below rightly gave the benefit of doubt to the accused – Appeal against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination -- Evidence untested by cross-examination can have no value but the evidence cannot be rejected as inadmissible.

(Para 3, 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination – Evidence is admissible but the weight to be attached to such evidence should depend on the circumstances of each case and that though in some cases the Court may act upon it, if there is other evidence on record, its probative value may be very small and may even be disregarded.

(Para 3, 11)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination -- Court should look at the evidence carefully to see whether there are indications that by a complete cross-examination the testimony of the witness was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith to be successfully impeached -- If the evidence is inadmissible the Court is not entitled to consider it at all whereas if it admissible the Court must decide on the circumstances of each case whether any weight should be attached to it or not.

(Para 3, 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – High speed of car itself is not an offence -- Testimony that the offending car came from the opposite side and struck against the motorcycle, all witnesses clearly stated that the car was being driven at high speed -- None of them whispered even a single word as to how the car was being driven in rash or negligent manner -- Accident took place on a wide road, driving car on such road at high speed, in itself does not amount to rash or negligent driving – Conviction set aside.

(Para 7-13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Apparent from the testimony of eye-witnesses projected by the prosecution i.e. PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 that none of them saw the petitioner-accused driving the car at the spot -- Test Identification got conducted in the police station is of no relevance, as only accused was shown to PW-9 -- Identification of the accused for the first time in the Court, when the witnesses did not have the opportunity to see the face of the driver of the offending vehicle at the spot, is of no significance -- As per the FIR version, the car driver had fled from the spot after talking to ‘S’, who was occupying one of the motorcycle, prosecution gave up PW - ‘S’ for reasons best known to it -- Had ‘S’ been examined and established the identity of accused as car driver, then statement of other witnesses could have been believed that it is the accused, who was driving the car – Held, prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused – Conviction set aside.

(Para 10-13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rash and negligent driving – Criminal liability of owner of vehicle – Release of vehicle on superdari – Effect of -- Accused-petitioner is the registered owner of the offending car and he got the car released on superdari as owner but this in itself cannot be a reason to draw conclusion that he was driving the offending car at the relevant time -- PW-9 deposed that car was occupied by two persons and he cannot say as to who was driving the car – Ld. First Appellate Court fell in grave error by observing that as the accused was the owner of the car, so it was for him to explain u/s 106 of the Evidence Act as to who was driving his car -- Onus was on the prosecution to prove that it is the accused-petitioner, who was driving the offending car at the relevant time, which the prosecution has failed to establish -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 11-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 313, 482 – Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce case – Handwriting expert – Closure of defence evidence -- Delay substantially attributable to the procedural formalities within the office of State Legal Services Authority for seeking production of handwriting expert – Even impugned orders shall cause serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioner, amounting to denial of fair trial -- Two effective opportunities granted -- State Legal Services Authority requested to take decision for the purpose of granting necessary financial assistance at the earliest so that the petitioner be able to avail her chance to defend herself.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Adulteration of tea with intoxicant substance – Burdon of proof -- Admission u/s 313 Cr.P.C. by the appellant-accused qua bringing tea does not absolve the prosecution from discharging the onus of proof regarding the tea, which was consumed by complainant, being adulterated with any stupefying or intoxicant substance -- No concrete evidence available on record, either forensic or medical, to support the version of the prosecution, except the bald statement of the complainant himself -- Appellant-accused deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed, verdict of conviction, and, order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Presumption u/s 113-A of Indian Evidence Act -- Principles

(1) The presumption carried in the Indian Evidence Act, is attractable only when the charge drawn against the accused is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC.

(2) The said statutory provision has a limited effect, in respect of a charge drawn under Section 304-B of the IPC, as the implied presumption, created through the words “shall be deemed to have caused her death”, which hence occur at the end of the relevant statutory provisions, yet do not discharge, the prosecution from adducing evidence qua the deceased being meted cruelty or harassment, in respect of demands of dowry, as, made upon her by her husband, or by his relatives.

(3) That the statutory phrase “and it is shown” which segregates the first, and, second component of the relevant discharging section, cast a conjunctive onus, upon the prosecution to prove the earlier, and, later components' of the relevant charging sections.

(4) That the word “shall be deemed to have caused her death” do not ever discharge the prosecution from adducing evidence rather for unflinchingly proving both the components, as carried in sub-Section (1) of Section 304-B of the IPC.

(5) The evidence necessary for proving the above foundational facts, rather for supporting the ingredients, as carried in Section 304-B IPC, is required to be always adduced by the prosecution, and, the implied presumption, gets strengthened only, when the defence omits to put the relevant exculpatory suggestions to the PWs concerned, and/or fails to secure a favourable answer thereto, rather from the PWs concerned.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court --Leave to appeal against the verdict of acquittal dismissed.

(Para 19, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 41 – Forged Will – Quashing of FIR – Genuineness of Will upheld upto Supreme Court  in probate proceedings – A judgment by a probate Court as per Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is in rem -- Whether any Court will be able to ignore the findings of the Civil Court regarding genuineness of the Will, answer is no – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6, 12-13)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, Order 41 Rule 27 -- First appeal – Application for additional evidence – Appeal decided without decision on application -- Non-deciding of the application filed by the appellant under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC has caused prejudice to the appellant -- Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court set aside and the case is remanded back to the Lower Appellate Court with a direction to decide the appeal as well as cross-objections filed by the respondents afresh after deciding the application filed by the appellant-Corporation under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3 – Handwriting Expert -- Rebuttal evidence -- Defendant-petitioner specifically averred in written statement that the document was forged and fabricated and that there was no compromise and signatures specifically denied – It was incumbent for the plaintiff-respondents to have led their evidence in the affirmative -- Not having led their evidence in the affirmative, no evidence could have been permitted in rebuttal.

(Para 7,8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 323, 302, 34 -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Death occurred 20 days after the attack -- Held, no stereotypical assumption or formula that where death occurs after a lapse of some time, the injuries (which might have caused the death), the offence is one of culpable homicide -- What is important is the nature of injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course to lead to death -- Doctor who conducted the post-mortem clearly deposed that death was caused due to cardio respiratory failures, as a result of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased -- Thus, the injuries and the death were closely and directly linked -- Conviction for murder do not call for interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 4, 26, 27)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161(3), 173, 207 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 74, 76 -- Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005), Section 4(1)(b) -- Public Interest litigation -- Free public access to chargesheets/ final reports u/s 173 of the Cr.P.C. on State websites :

– Conjoint reading of Section 173 Cr.P.C. and Section 207 Cr.P.C. the Investigating Agency is required to furnish the copies of the report along with the relevant documents to be relied upon by the prosecution to the accused and to none others -- It may as such violate the rights of the accused as well as the victim and/or even the investigating agency

-- Chargesheet/ documents along with the chargesheet cannot be said to be public documents u/s 74 of the Evidence Act, reliance placed upon Sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act is absolutely misplaced.

-- Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act -- Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced.

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief namely directing all the States to put on their websites the copies of all the chargesheets/challans filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 1-7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Last seen circumstance – Evidential value -- “last seen” doctrine has limited application, where the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused, and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on the basis of the “last seen” circumstance.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Murder – Acquittal of accused -- Last seen circumstance – Time gap -- Save the “last seen” theory, there is no other circumstance or evidence -- Importantly, the time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused and the probable time of his death, based on the post mortem report, which was conducted two days later, was silent about the probable time of death, though it stated that death occurred approximately two days before the post mortem, is not narrow -- Given this fact, and the serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, as well as the fact that the FIR was lodged almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on the “last seen” circumstance even if it were to be assumed to have been proved to convict the accused-appellants is not justified -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused set aside.

(Para 25)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Quarrel with deceased – Spur of moment -- Words uttered in a quarrel or in the spur of a movement if at all cannot be taken to be uttered with the necessary mens rea and would be an outcome of an emotional outburst or a fit of anger -- Same would not amount to abetment.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely having a dispute with the deceased or making a complaint to the Police against the deceased would not make out a case under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Reliance upon suicide note -- Suicide note does not refer to any act on the part of the accused amounting to abetment -- It only says that if something was to happen with the deceased, the accused would be responsible -- Suicide note therefore does not further the case of the prosecution.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Author of suicide note – Proof of – FSL asked for admitted document of the deceased so as to compare the writing on the suicide note along with that of the deceased, however, no such writing was dispatched to the FSL for comparison – Brother of the deceased identified the signatures of the deceased on the suicide note which would not be sufficient to affix the authorship of the suicide note.

(Para 10)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely mentioning the names of the accused in the suicide note in the absence of any specific role would not lead to the commission of an offence under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 337, 338, 427 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Acquittal of accused – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Once the accused was not known to any witness, they had seen him fleeing from the place of occurrence, it was necessary to hold test identification parade -- No test identification parade of the accused was got conducted from the complainant and witnesses of the case and this was fatal to the case of the prosecution – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 11-14)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42, 43 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- NDPS case – Appeal against conviction -- Acquittal of accused – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information not reduced into writing and not sent to the police station or higher authority -- Evidence clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance -- Explanation appended to Section 43 of the Act clearly shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression ‘public place’ -- Held, it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act; there was complete non-compliance of the said requirement of law -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Excise matter – Opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses -- Prosecution witnesses were examined but as per the petitioner, the said fact was unknown to him and therefore, the cross-examination could not be conducted by his counsel -- Held, in the absence of cross-examination, the prosecution evidence would go unrebutted -- No prejudice shall be caused to the prosecution if an opportunity is granted to the petitioner/accused to cross-examine the three witnesses in a time bound manner -- Petition allowed, one more opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine three witnesses -- Pursuant to their cross-examination, the Trial Court is directed to conclude the Trial within 08 weeks.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 – Criminal trial – Opportunity of cross-examination -- On the very first date, when PW-1 ASI was present and his examination-in-chief was recorded, his cross-examination was treated as NIL – Order passed by the trial Court set aside -- One effective opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine PW-1 ASI.

(Para 5-8)

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Regular Second Appeal in the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, is governed by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Pankajakshi’s case (2016) 6 SCC 157 relied.

(Para 1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Registered Will – Un-registered Will – Value of -- Will is not required to be mandatorily registered -- Testator may get it registered, however, an unregistered Will has equal value and has to be proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Non-examination of Advocate – Adverse inference -- Trial Court erred in drawing an adverse inference on account of non-examination of Advocate, who merely introduced Testator with the scribe-Advocate – Advocate was not the attesting witness of the Will -- Hence, he was not required to be examined.

(Para 15)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Proof of Will -- Irregular spacing in the Will -- Will is typed on a manual typewriter -- The attention of the scribe or the attesting witness was never drawn to the aforesaid alleged irregular spacing -- If the plaintiff wants the Court to believe that there is irregular spacing, the plaintiff should have sought explanation from the scribe as well as the attesting witness -- In the absence thereof, it would not be appropriate to disbelieve the Will merely on account of alleged irregular spacing in-between the lines.

(Para 16)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Execution of Pronote – Proved by one marginal witness – Scope of Handwriting and finger print Expert report – It is not essential that both the witnesses should be examined – Held, once the marginal witness had proved the execution of the document, the handwriting and finger print expert who is expected to submit report in favour of the parties approaching it, has been rightly held to be not a substantive piece of evidence in the peculiar fact of the case that the marginal witness had already proved the pronote.

(Para 9)

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 28, 33 (1)(a) – Power of attorney – Place of registration -- Power of attorney can be executed and authenticated by the Registrar or the Sub-registrar within whose district or sub district the principal resides – General Power of Attorney does not fall within the scope of Section 28 of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Contention that only one attesting witness of the General Power of Attorney has been examined and therefore, its execution is not proved – Held, only limited documents require attestation by two attesting witnesses which primarily include a will, a gift and a mortgage -- A General Power of Attorney or a Special Power of Attorney does not require attestation by witnesses -- Hence, Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not applicable.

(Para 8)

C. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33(4) --- Registered Power of attorney – Proof of -- A registered power of attorney is not only admissible in evidence but it can be proved by mere production of it as per Section 33(4) of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) Section 32 – Acquittal of accused -- Multiple Dying declaration -- Second dying declaration rejected completely by the High Court, is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other accused – First dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured state to the hospital – Focus of the first dying declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire -- Second dying declaration, alone elaborates acts of cruelty -- That is the only piece of incriminating evidence against the accused -- Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/s 498-A IPC set aside.

(Para 20,21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 54 -- Cheque bounce case – Additional evidence -- Certified copy of judgment of previous conviction -- Evidence showing any previous conviction is also relevant as evidence of bad character -- Thus the evidence relating to previous conviction (past actions of a person) in a case of similar nature would be relevant -- However, the evidentiary value of the same would be evaluated by the ld. trial Court at the time of final disposal of a case – No prejudice would be caused to the accused if the aforesaid judgment is taken on record as the petitioner would get an opportunity to rebut the same – Impugned order in allowing application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. not suffering from illegality and infirmity – No interfere is called for.

(Para 11,12)