A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 59 -- Injured eye witness version -- Ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it -- Testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a special status in law -- As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be doubted -- Deposition by the injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies -- Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical evidence, testimony does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants.

(Para 33-37)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons -- Motive even in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the prosecution’s case -- Fact of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available -- Fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 4, 302 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Nature and extent of injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted -- Use of the sharp edges of spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder -- Thus, the circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC do not exist.

(Para 45)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay in FIR -- It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the delay in filing the FIR is well explained.

(Para 46)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular evidence.

(Para 49)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 -- Omission by Investigation officer – Effect of -- Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution’s case -- Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors such omission by the investigating agency -- Otherwise, it would shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice.

(Para 50)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65B – Electronic records – Document – Exhibition of Compact Disc (CD) – Playing of CD during deposition – Requirement of -- Author of the video not only deposed that he recorded the video, but he also gave a certificate, as contemplated under subsection (4) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, to make the CD admissible in evidence – High Court did not dispute that the electronic record was duly exhibited -- High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video – Held, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s) -- It is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video.

(Para 19)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – NDPS – Chemical examiner – Deposition of – Requirement of – As far as non-production of Chemical Examiner as a witness is concerned, u/s 293 of CrPC, report of a Chemical Examiner is admissible even if he is not produced as a witness though, the Court may summon and examine him as to the subject matter of the report -- There is no requirement of law that Chemical Examiner would have to be called in each NDPS case to prove the report when it is otherwise admissible under sub-section (1) of Section 293 of CrPC.

(Para 21)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS – Production of contraband in Trial – Requirements of – Mere non-production of the seized contraband during trial may not be fatal if there is reliable evidence in respect of its seizure, drawing of samples therefrom, and FSL report relating to the sample drawn from the seized material – However, to ensure that no adverse inference is drawn against the prosecution for non-production of the seized contraband, documents prepared in terms of the provisions of Section 52-A, inter alia, evidencing preparation of inventory of seized contraband and drawing of samples therefrom, would have to be brought on record – Likewise, evidence should be there that the sample drawn from the inventory was sent to FSL in a sealed container/ envelop, as per guidelines, and that the seal was found intact at the end of FSL – This is to obviate any doubt regarding sample being tampered in transit – Similarly, FSL’s report along with the sample tested by it is to be placed on record so that there remains no doubt regarding the sample tested.

(Para 30, 31)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386(b)(i), 391 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS -- Re-trial – Additional evidence -- High Court, observed that the representative sample was not opened before the Court at the time of recording of statement of the concerned witness -- Be that as it may, this was not a ground to direct for a retrial when the appellate court has power to take additional evidence u/s 391 of CrPC, which, inter alia, can be exercised to exhibit a document or material already on the record of the Court -- And if those defects are fatal to the prosecution, the appellate court is free to take its decision as may be warranted in the facts of the case. But, in any event, it cannot be a ground to direct a re-trial.

(Para 33)

A. Karewa marriage – Void marriage -- At the time of alleged Karewa Mariage between S and SR, wife of SR namely L was still alive -- It is settled law that second marriage, during subsistence of first marriage, is null and void.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Application for additional evidence by way of DNA test to establish paternity of the defendants No.3 to 6 -- Plaintiff had moved the said application three-and-a-half years after initiation of appeal -- Plaintiff had failed to explain as to why the said application for producing evidence in question was not moved during trial; and why the said evidence was not produced before the learned trial Court -- Needless to say, the said facts were in the knowledge of the plaintiff during trial -- However, he failed to exercise due diligence -- No error in the dismissal of the said application of the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Legal Principles -- A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Act, 1872, that is examination of at least of one of the attesting witnesses -- However, unlike other documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of living -- This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain whether the Will propounded had been duly proved -- Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator -- Only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as genuine.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Parameters to ascertain ‘suspicious circumstances’ vitiating a Will –

-- Deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession

-- Prudence requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the disposition was a voluntary act.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will in favour of nephew – Wife/ natural heir – Will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the 1^st respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance – Nothing has come on record to show the relation between the couple was bitter – Trial Court erroneously observed that non-performance of last rites of testator by 1^st respondent hinted at sour relations between the couple – Ordinarily, in a Hindu/ Sikh family, last rites are performed by Male Sapinda relations – A cumulative assessment of the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to mention the very existence of his wife in the Will, gives rise to serious doubt that the Will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant and is not the ‘free will’ of the testator – Held, non-mention of 1st respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will, is an eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated by the undue influence of the appellant.

(Para 19, 20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 105 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39, 102 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA evidence – Acquittal -- Despite the presence of DNA evidence, it has to be discarded for the reason that proper methods and procedures were not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment of the evidence in the course of the Appellant-convict's conviction -- DNA evidence is only of probative value, subject to the condition that it is properly dealt with – DNA evidence collected has been rendered unusable, it suffers from various shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay; the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out etc. -- None of the circumstances posited by the prosecution are found to be conclusively proved against the Appellant-convict -- Chain of circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular hypothesis, that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence or involvement of none else in the crime -- Conviction of the Appellant-convict vacated, he is directed to be released forthwith -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 35, 43, 45)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39 -- DNA Evidence – Procedure to be followed – Directions issued, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved:

1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record.

2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken.

3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial.

4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to  maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible for explaining such lapse.

The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary instruction as may be required -- States requested to examine the necessity of conducting training of the Investigating Officers to ensure full compliance.

(Para 44, 45)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 142, 148, 323, 506 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 9 -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Plea of alibi – Held, plea of alibi put forward by the petitioners cannot form a ground for quashing the impugned challan -- Veracity of the defence put up by the petitioners can be gone into by the trial court – High Court in exercise of its powers u/s 528 of BNSS cannot hold a mini trial -- In case, the petitioners feel that their defence of alibi has not been investigated by the Investigating Agency, it is open to them to approach the learned trial Magistrate before whom charge sheet has been filed and seek further investigation of the case -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Relevant fact – Absconding of accused – Effect of -- Mere absconding by itself does not constitute a guilty mind as even an innocent man may feel panicky and may seek to evade the police when wrongly suspected of being involvement as an instinct of self-preservation -- But the act of abscondence is certainly a relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence and is a conduct u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which points to his guilty mind -- Needle of suspicion gets strengthened by the act.

(Para 10.9.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive is something that is very difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the deep recess of the mind of the person concerned and in the absence of any open declaration by the person concerned himself, the motive has to be inferred from the activities and conduct of the person -- While proof of motive certainly strengthens the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, failure to prove the same cannot be fatal.

(Para 10.11.2, 10.11.3)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, Court see no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Onus of proof -- Recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Prosecution cannot depend on the false alibi or unproven defence plea since the onus is always on the prosecution to prove the prosecution case and the onus never shifts to the accused – If weapon of crime was traced to the accused, it was incumbent upon the appellant/ accused  to explain the circumstances of the recovery of the weapon with which a linkage has been established with the injury suffered by the deceased through scientific evidence -- Apart from claiming ignorance and denying the various incriminating evidence presented during the trial, the appellant chose not to adduce any evidence to explain these circumstances -- Silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution.

(Para 10.15)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Non-explanation of evidence by accused -- Adverse inference -- Examination of an accused u/s 313 CrPC is to enable the accused to prepare and strategize his defence – Accused will have all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution witness or question any evidence and lead his defence evidence if any -- Despite the incriminating evidence which has come up against him has been pointed out to him by the Court, he has not explained any of these but merely denied or feigned ignorance to which necessary inference can be drawn against him.

(Para 10.16.1, 10.16.2)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory – Dead body of the deceased was recovered in a decomposed state, three days after the deceased was last seen together with the appellant -- As per postmortem, the death occurred 3/4 days before the postmortem examination -- Dead body was discovered with gunshot wounds on the head -- A double barrel gun with 2 spent and 1 live cartridges were recovered at the instance of the appellant -- As per the opinion of the ballistic expert, the gun showed signs of discharge and was in working condition, pellets and wads were recovered from the brain/ skull of the dead body, and these could have been fired through the gun examined and the double-barrel gun could be dismantled. Following circumstances and acts of the appellant strengthens the linkage.

(i) The appellant remained hidden from 11.07.2006 till 22.07.2006. He was arrested on 22.07.2006 after extensive search on numerous locations after the identification of the identity of the dead body on 14.07.2006.

(ii) The appellant had misled his friends, his family members and that of the deceased.

(iii) Personal effects of the deceased like gold chain was recovered from the appellant.

Appellant’s silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution -- Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court which the High Court upheld does not warrant any interference.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 A – Additional evidence in suit -- Order 18 Rule 17 A of the CPC which provided for production of additional evidence not previously known or which could not be produced despite due diligence has already been deleted from the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 -- Thus, there is no right to lead additional evidence.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17A -- Application for comparison through handwriting expert -- Suit for declaration and for possession in 2011 -- Reliance in the suit upon compromise dated 25.10.2010 -- In the written statement it was plea that the compromise dated 25.10.2010 was a result of fabrication -- Once the petitioner has taken the said plea in his written statement, then it was open to him to have led all evidence in support of the said plea till the time his evidence was closed – On 08.08.2023 i.e., after more than 12 years of institution of the suit, an application seeking permission for comparison through handwriting expert filed – After evidence had been closed, application cannot be allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Recall/ further examination of witness – Stage of – Scope of -- If it appears to a court trying the suit at any stage of the proceedings that it is necessary to recall and further examine a witness it can always do so -- This power can be exercised even at the stage of writing a judgment by the court -- Power is to be used for removing ambiguities, for clarifying the statement and not for the purposes of filling up the lacuna in a party's case -- Power can be exercised by the Court at its own initiative and may even be so done at the instance of a party.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17, Section 151 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Recall/ further examination of witness – Cross-examination – Permissibility of -- Section 165 of the Evidence Act provides that a Judge may in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness about any fact relevant -- If the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 are read along with the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is clear that the power to recall and re-examine a witness is exclusively that of the court trying the suit -- The parties to the suit cannot take any objection to the question asked nor can they be permitted to cross-examine any witness without the leave of the court -- If circumstances warrant, an opportunity to a party to re-call a witness for examining, cross-examining or re-examining can be granted by a Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.

(Para 7, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 3.4 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence – Rebuttal evidence -- Plaintiff-petitioner is setting up entirely a new case by way of leading additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings -- Jamabandi, which is now sought to be produced to show the possession of the plaintiff-petitioner, was to be produced in the affirmative as the onus was upon plaintiff -- Having not led the evidence in the affirmative, the plaintiff-petitioner cannot now be permitted to fill in the lacuna in the case by leading the said evidence as additional evidence --  Question of permitting the judgment to be produced as additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings would not arise.

-- Application itself is totally bereft as to why the said evidence was not led earlier.

-- There is not even a whisper that the plaintiff-petitioner was not aware of this evidence at the time of leading his evidence in the affirmative.

Application for additional evidence dismissed by Trial court – No fault, revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 4, 7-9)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 23A, 25, 27 – Additional evidence – Additional Issue – Remitting back of appeal – Permissibility of -- First Appellate Court is a Court of fact and law both and the application for additional evidence can be allowed -- First Appellate Court erred in remitting the matter back to the trial Court after framing additional issue and permitting the plaintiff to lead additional evidence -- First Appellate Court has neither set aside the judgment of the trial Court on merits nor it has formed an opinion that re-trial of the case is necessary -- Hence, the impugned order passed by the First Appellate Court to the limited extent of remitting the matter back to the lower Court set aside and the first appeal is restored to its original number -- Court will proceed in accordance with Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Mandatory or discretionary -- Provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive -- They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory -- If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

(Para 28-30)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Stage of – Right of -- Rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim -- This can be done at any stage -- Plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence -- Defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

(Para 39)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 – Partial judgment/ decree on admissions – Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim” -- Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff -- In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Judgment on admissions – A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final.

(Para 43)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Last seen theory -- Prosecution relied on last seen evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and circumstantial evidence including recovery of articles and fingerprints –PW-2 (alleged eyewitness) and PW-12 (last seen witness) disbelieved due to delayed statements – Extra judicial confessional statements disbelieved by High court – Recovery of slippers and a wheel spanner with alleged fingerprints of the accused was held insufficient to establish guilt in absence of a complete and credible chain of circumstantial evidence – Benefit of doubt extended to appellant – Conviction u/s 302 IPC set aside, holding prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence.

(Para 6, 7, 19-25)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Interested witness -- First cousin’s witness -- It is settled position of law that merely because the witnesses are relatives of the deceased and as such are interested witnesses, that alone cannot be a ground to discard their testimony -- The only requirement is that the testimony of such witnesses has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception IV, 302, 304, Part 1 -- Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Place of incident is near the house of accused persons -- Possibility of a quarrel taking place on account of previous enmity between the accused persons and the deceased; and in a sudden fight in the heat of the moment, the appellant along with the co-accused assaulting the deceased cannot be ruled out -- Weapons used are a stick and the blunt side of the axe, these tools are easily available in any agricultural field -- It therefore cannot be said that there was any premeditation -- Case would not fall under the ambit of Section 302 of IPC and the appellant would be entitled to benefit of Exception IV of Section 300 of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone the sentence of 6 years 10 months – Appellant sentenced to the period already undergone.

(Para 12-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Injury to prosecutrix – Requirement of law -- Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this cannot a be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix -- It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case -- Absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Evidence of prosecutrix – Value of -- Evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.

(Para 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Comparison of signature with photocopy of partnership deed -- Permissibility of -- Held, signatures cannot be verified from a photocopied document.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Recoveries were made after several days of the incident and no bloodstains etc. were found on the weapons -- PW-15, the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination, deposed that the seized weapons were not shown to him -- Knives etc. were also not produced in court -- All the seizure witnesses turned hostile -- Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot come to the aid of the prosecution -- Clothes of the accused were not seized and sent for forensic examination to find out whether there were any bloodstains --  Medical evidence confirmed multiple stab injuries on his body leading to profuse bleeding and death -- It is for the prosecution to connect the accused to the murder of the deceased by producing credible and legally admissible evidence -- However, no credible evidence at all to connect the accused persons with the homicidal death of deceased -- Appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence of the appellants set aside.

(Para 21-25)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Rule of evidence -- Under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 it is established that in compensation cases, the strict rules of evidence used in criminal trials do not apply -- Instead, the standard of proof is based on the preponderance of probability.

(Para 13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Withdrawal of NOC to commence Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital – Held, there can be no indefeasible right claimed on the basis of the grant issued, which is illegal -- There is no promise offered by the State or the Government by reason of the invalid order issued by the Department -- When officers of the government acts outside the scope of authority, the plea of promissory estoppel would not be available, especially since the doctrine of ultra vires comes into operation and the government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised actions of its officers – Withdrawal of NOC, upheld.

(Para 1, 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 115 – Doctrine of estopple -- Appellant acted upon clause 49.5 and sought an extension of time on three occasions – Claim in the letter dated 25th January, 2017 was made by the appellant after giving solemn undertaking on 14th January, 2015 not to make any claim other than escalation in respect of delays in the completion of work, the claim made was contrary to the undertakings -- By the undertakings, the appellant agreed not to make a claim contrary to what is provided in clause 49.5; and therefore, by conduct, the appellant was estopped from challenging the validity of clause 49.5.

(Para 19)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 112 -- Legitimacy/ Paternity of child – Presumption – DNA Test -- Issue hinges on two primary prongs requiring detailed analysis: (i) the difference between legitimacy and paternity, and consequently, the circumstances under which the presumption of legitimacy is displaced to permit an enquiry into paternity; and (ii) the exercise of ‘balancing of interests’ and evaluating the eminent need for a DNA test -- Legitimacy determines paternity u/s 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted  by proving ‘non-access’.

(Para 9, 70(i))

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Evidence -- In order to render any witnesses’ testimony as unreliable, the inconsistencies shall be material ones and of such a nature that they create substantive doubts in the mind of the court towards the story or the chain of events as sought to be established by the prosecution -- Mere conjectures or hypothetical inconsistencies cannot form the basis for acquittal when the evidence, viewed as a whole, points to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 38)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Conviction of accused -- It is a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the possibility of guilt -- The gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations from definitive conclusions -- Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder –Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and trustworthy --  In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person’s guilt -- The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt -- Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend -- Chain of circumstantial evidences in the case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally inconsistent with their innocence – Conviction set aside.

(Para 22-27)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- The provocation must be both grave and sudden -- In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-control -- If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception -- Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not grave.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following conditions must be complied with:

(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused;

(ii) The provocation must be grave;

(iii) The provocation must be sudden;

(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;

(v) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control; and

(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- Accused must establish the following circumstances:

(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and sudden;

(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power of self-control; and

(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Burden of proof -- It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be attributed to it.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1, 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant -- However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation -- The incident occurred at a spur of a moment -- The act was not pre-planned or pre-meditated -- What is important to note is that the appellant had no weapon in his hands -- He picked up a cement stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the head of the deceased -- Therefore, it could be said that the appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner – Conviction u/s 304 Part 1 of the IPC, upheld – Sentence reduced to already  undergone.

(Para 30-33)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (4) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 – Maintenance to wife -- Decree of restitution of conjugal rights – Effect of -- Mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C -- It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree.

(Para 29)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (4) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 34, 35, 36, 37 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 40, 41, 42, 43 -- Maintenance to wife -- Decree of restitution of conjugal rights – Effect of -- Contention that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings – Held, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings.

-- Section 41 of Evidence Act specifically deals with instances where an earlier judgment, order or decree constitutes conclusive proof whereas Section 42 provides that an earlier judgment is relevant if it relates to matters of public nature relevant to the inquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

-- Two proceedings are altogether independent and are not directly or even indirectly connected, in the sense that proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. do not arise from proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights.

(Para 30-34)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 (1) -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Maintenance to wife -- Decree of divorce – Effect of -- A wife, who suffered a decree of divorce on the ground of deserting her husband, would not be entitled to maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. as long as the marriage subsisted, but she would be entitled to such maintenance once she attained the status of a divorced wife, in the light of the definition of a ‘wife’ in Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. Rohtash Singh’s case (2000) 3 SCC 180, relied.

(Para 38)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Evidence law -- Non recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction, if there are direct reliable witnesses. Rakesh’s case (2021) 7 SCC 188 relied.

(Para 70)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Evidence law -- Testimony of police personnel involved in recovery of articles need not be disbelieved and testimony of police personnel is to be treated similarly as testimony of any other witness. Karamjit Singh’s case (2003) 5 SCC 291 relied.

(Para 71)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154 – Murder -- Hostile witness -- Merely because the witnesses turn hostile does not necessarily mean that their evidence has to be thrown out entirely and what is supportive of the prosecution certainly be used. Gangadhar Behera’s case (2002) 8 SCC 381 relied.

(Para 76)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 101 – Murder – Burden of proof -- Prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence.

(Para 78)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 -- Extra-judicial confession before Village Police Patil – Admissibility of – Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer – Same is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act -- However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.

(Para 36, 42)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 154 -- Discovery panchnama – Proof of -- Witness turned hostile -- If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama through the evidence of the Investigating Officer -- Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved -- From the plain reading of the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.

(Para 47-49)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Motive -- Murder -- Motive is a double-edged weapon -- Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that too for a serious offence like murder -- Motive may be considered along with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating circumstances.

(Para 51)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Burden to establish innocence -- Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs -- The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution -- However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him -- However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is subject to one well-settled principle of law -- The prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- If the prosecution has not been able to lay the foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it cannot starightaway invoke the said Section and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.

(Para 55)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on his head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused -- When a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness -- Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Principles that courts must adhere to while appreciating and evaluating evidence in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as follows:

(i). The testimony of each prosecution and defence witness must be meticulously discussed and analysed. Each witness's evidence should be assessed in its entirety to ensure no material aspect is overlooked.

(ii). Circumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Thus, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the testimony of each witness must be explicitly delineated.

(iii). Each of the links of incriminating circumstantial evidence should be meticulously examined so as to find out if each one of the circumstances is proved individually and whether collectively taken, they forge an unbroken chain consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(iv). The judgment must comprehensively elucidate the rationale for accepting or rejecting specific pieces of evidence, demonstrating how the conclusion was logically derived from the evidence. It should explicitly articulate how each piece of evidence contributes to the overall narrative of guilt.

(v). The judgment must reflect that the finding of guilt, if any, has been reached after a proper and careful evaluation of circumstances in order to determine whether they are compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis.

(Para 30)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) -- Criminal trial -- Interested witness – Evidence of -- Merely because a witness is an interested witness, it cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such a witness -- However, the testimony of such a witness has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Acquittal – Deposition of witness – Parity for all accused -- High Court comes to a conclusion that it is difficult to believe that the witness could have witnessed the incident in the manner narrated by him and granted benefit of doubt to co-accused persons then conviction of accused on the basis of the evidence of the very same witness only on the basis of conjectures and surmises is not permissible -- Seizure of knife, testimony of Inspector of police would show that the recovery was made from an open place accessible to one and all -- As such, only on the basis of the circumstance of such a recovery, the conviction could not have been based – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-17)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Onus on accused -- Onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused – If the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Onus on accused -- One of son of deceased’s testimony remotely suggest that any or all of the three accused persons were present in the house or that they had quarrelled with his mother when he left for school -- None of the neighbours had seen the accused present with deceased or that they were seen fleeing away on the fateful morning – Prosecution has not explained as to where the girl child was on the date of the incident -- Likewise, the prosecution also failed to provide any explanation, as to why the other son was not examined in evidence -- Failure to examine them in evidence calls for drawing of adverse inference thereby, further denting the credibility of the prosecution case -- Prosecution failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellants by convincing evidence and beyond the shadow of doubt, so as to affirm their guilt -- Accused-appellants acquitted of the charges by giving them the benefit of doubt – Appeal allowed.

(Para 18-38)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- Motive on its own cannot make or break the prosecution case.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Time gap – Relevant factor – It is a vital link in the chain of other circumstances but on its own strength it is insufficient to sustain conviction unless the time-gap between the deceased being last seen alive with the accused and recovery of dead body of the deceased is so small that possibility of any other person being the author of the crime is just about impossible -- Where the time-gap is large, intervening circumstances including act by some third person cannot be ruled out -- In such a case, adverse inference cannot be drawn against the accused merely because he has failed to prove as to when he parted company of the deceased.

(Para 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Walking in public street -- Time gap – Effect of -- No evidence led by the prosecution to demonstrate that the place where the deceased was last seen alive with the accused was near the place from where deceased’s body was recovered -- Further, the time gap between 4.30 PM of 2.2.1997 and 8.30 AM of 3.2.1997 (i.e., when the dead body was recovered) is so large that third party hand in the crime cannot be ruled out -- If two or more persons are seen walking on a public street, either side by side, or behind one another, it is not such a circumstance from which it may be inferred with a degree of certainty that those were together or in company of each other -- Likewise, a person may exchange pleasantries with another person walking on the path, but that by itself is not sufficient to infer that the two are in company of each other – Last seen circumstance not of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused-appellants – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 27, 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Disclosure Statement – Recovery -- Disclosure statement not admissible in evidence because the alleged discovery was not made pursuant to that statement -- Disclosure statement was recorded at the police station whereas recovery was made from the place pointed out by the accused enroute to the police station -- It was, therefore, a case of recovery from the place allegedly pointed out by the accused and not based on a disclosure statement.

(Para 37)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Recovery of currency note from accused -- Nothing on record to show that the money belonged to the deceased -- Currency notes are commonly available and there is nothing in the statement of the witness to show that the currency notes shown to him during his examination had any distinguishing mark which would enable him to identify them; hence, his testimony that the currency notes handed over by him to the deceased were the same currency notes, which were shown to him in the Court is not acceptable.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Recovery on disclosure statement – Exclusive knowledge – Requirements of -- Disclosure statement shows that the stone was not concealed anywhere and was lying in the open -- Where the recoveries were effected from a place accessible, the same cannot be relied upon -- Since, there is no evidence of the exclusive knowledge of the accused, therefore, the stone cannot be connected to the accused.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Other articles and stick was recovered from the spot at a distance of 200 metre from the dead body by I.O. -- As per the statement of the accused recorded u/s 27, he had thrown the stone and the stick at the same place -- It is difficult to believe that the investigating officer would not have discovered the stone when he had inspected the spot and found other articles on the spot – These circumstances cast reasonable doubt on the recovery of the stone at the instance of accused.

(Para 27-29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Disclosure statement -- Statement u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be used to prove that the accused had killed the deceased.

(Para 39)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3 -- Rebuttal evidence – Onus of proof – Effect of -- Onus of issue no. 1 was cast upon the plaintiff-petitioners and hence it was incumbent upon the plaintiff-petitioners to have led their evidence in the affirmative -- A party cannot be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal the onus of which was cast upon the said party.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Fair trial -- Right of accused – Preservation of call details – Right to privacy of police officials -- Legislative intent behind enactment of Section 91 Cr.P.C. is to ensure that no cogent material or evidence involved in the issue remains undiscovered in unearthing the true facts during investigation, enquiry, trial or other proceedings -- While passing the appropriate direction for preserving and production of call details/ tower location details u/s 91 Cr.P.C. would violate the right to privacy of the police officials but the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in ensuring free and fair investigation/ trial would prevail over the right to privacy of the police officials.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 427, 279 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B -- Death by rash and negligent driving -- Fair trial – Right of accused -- Preservation of call details – Denial of an adequate opportunity to the accused by non-production of the electronic record, which is admissible u/s 65-A and 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act in criminal trial, would amount to miscarriage of justice -- Power u/s 91 Cr.P.C. must be exercised for production of such evidence, which would assist the Court in discovering the truth in the pursuit of justice -- Learned trial Court directed to pass necessary directions u/s 91 Cr.P.C. for preserving and production of the call details/ tower location details of the phone numbers mentioned in the application filed u/s 91 Cr.P.C

(Para 8-10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17, 18 – Cross-examination of plaintiff – Deliberate delay – Trial court declined prayer to cross-examine the plaintiff – Deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner-defendant No.2 to delay the proceedings -- Impugned order passed by the trial Court cannot be said unjustified -- Although, there is no justification for setting aside the impugned order, in the interest of justice, trial Court directed to provide one opportunity to him to cross-examine PW1/ plaintiff subject to costs of Rs.50,000/- payable to plaintiff-respondent.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Recovery suit – Pronote – Proof of -- Non-appearance of defendant – Adverse inference -- Defendant having not entered the witness box, adverse inference is liable to be drawn against him that he did not want to face the cross-examination -- In the presence of the testimony of the two attesting witnesses of the pronote as well as receipt proving due execution of the same by the defendant, no reliance could have been placed upon the statement of an expert witness disputing the signature of defendant, particularly when defendant himself had not entered into the witness box, to deny his signature.

(Para 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Recovery suit – Bahi khatta entries -- Only reliance of the plaintiff-appellant was on the bahi khatta entries -- Defendant-respondent had denied the bahi khatta entries and hence the onus lay on the plaintiff-appellant to prove the signatures in the bahi khatta entries -- Neither the details of the cheques nor the account number/ account statement was produced by the plaintiff-appellant -- It was incumbent upon the plaintiff-appellant to prove his case by leading affirmative evidence -- Onus to prove that the loan was taken by the defendant-respondent lay heavily on the plaintiff-appellant who failed to discharge the same – Suit dismissed.

(Para 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) -- Injured eye-witnesses -- Sworn testimonies provided by injured witnesses generally carry significant evidentiary weight -- Such testimonies cannot be dismissed as unreliable unless there are pellucid and substantial discrepancies or contradictions that undermine their credibility -- If there is any exaggeration in the deposition that is immaterial to the case, such exaggeration should be disregarded; however, it does not warrant the rejection of the entire evidence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- There cannot be a fixed timeframe for formation of common intention -- It is not essential for the perpetrators to have had prior meetings to conspire or make preparations for the crime -- Common intention to commit murder can arise even moments before the commission of the act -- Since common intention is a mental state of the perpetrators, it is inherently challenging to substantiate directly -- Instead, it can be inferred from the conduct of the perpetrators immediately before, during, and after the commission of the act.

(Para 19)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 302 – Murder -- Common intention -- Appellants are related by blood, arrived at the crime scene armed with a 12 bore double-barrel gun, dangs, and lathis within 15 minutes of the initial altercation, and subsequently attacked P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5, and the victims -- During this attack, A-4, the father of A-1, raged by the incident of P.W.3 slapping his adult son A-1 and the pursuant altercation, fired with his gun at P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5 and the victims -- Thereafter, all the appellants fled together carrying their weapons -- It is evident that the appellants acted with a common intention to kill, seeking to avenge the slapping incident.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Common intention – Common object -- Determination of common intention or common object should primarily be within the domain of the trial courts, and at the most the high courts -- It should not be the role of Supreme Court to directly adjudicate issues of common intention and common object.

(Para 21)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216, 464 – Non-framing of charge -- Failure of justice -- No finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

-- Law is well-settled that in order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.

(Para 24, 25)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) -- Independent witness -- It is settled law that examination of independent witness is not an indispensable requisite if the testimonies of other witnesses are deemed trustworthy and reliable --  Prosecution's case cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of the absence of independent witness. 

(Para 29, 30)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65B – Primary evidence -- Original mobile tendered in evidence -- Certificate u/s 65B of Evidence Act – Requirement of -- Once the plaintiff offered to tender original mobile-phone which is a primary evidence, there was no requirement for certification under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act as the same is contemplated in a situation wherein electronic evidence is being led by way of secondary evidence.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Post mortem report – Evidential value -- A post mortem report is generally not considered as conclusive evidence of the facts mentioned in the report regarding the cause of death, time of death etc. -- It could always be corroborated with other direct evidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye witnesses -- However, when there is no other credible evidence on record to contradict the report, the facts stated in the post mortem report are generally taken as true.

(Para 30)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- It is trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable conclusion of guilt.

(Para 35)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364 -- Kidnapping – Murder -- Motive -- Without the proof of foundational facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of motive alone -- Accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is evident -- In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from implicating the other -- In such circumstances, placing reliance upon motive alone could be a double-edged sword.

(Para 35)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part-I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- There is a possibility of deceased and (PW-1) coming to the shop of accused no.2 and a fight taking place between the two groups -- Nothing on record to establish that there was any pre-meditation --  Possibility of the offence being committed by the appellants without pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out -- Nothing on record to show that the appellants have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- Appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Case would be covered under Part-I of Section 304 of IPC --  Appellants have undergone the sentence of more than 8 years without remission – Appeals partly allowed, appellants sentenced to the period already undergone.

(Para 3, 15-18)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Expert evidence – Conviction -- Without independent and reliable corroboration, the opinion of the handwriting experts cannot be solely relied upon to base the conviction. 

(Para 13)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12(2) – Facilitating second passport – Acquittal -- Abetment – Burden of proof -- Burden is cast on the prosecution to prove that the accused had knowingly furnished false information or supressing known material information with the intent of securing a passport or travel document to a person and thereby had abetted in the commission of offence punishable under Section 12(1) and thereby punishable under Section 12(2) of the Passports Act – Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 2, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death -- Suicide with in seven years of marriage -- Deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband which compelled her to commit suicide -- However, witnesses did not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand for dowry -- With respect to the demand for dowry, witnesses have just made some general statements -- It has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry -- Trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established.

-- A case of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of IPC and cruelty u/s 498A of IPC made out against the husband, although the offence u/s 304B is not made out and consequently, conviction u/s 304B of IPC set aside – Appellant/ husband convicted u/s 306 and 498A of IPC, sentenced to three years of R.I. and a fine of Rs. 25000/- on each count -- Both the sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 4-8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Additional evidence in  Rebuttal -- The fact concerning which, additional evidence being sought to be led, was already pleaded in the plaint -- In fact, it was the foundational fact -- Plaintiffs were required to lead evidence in affirmative on the facts pleaded in the plaint -- They cannot be allowed to lead such evidence in rebuttal -- Application dismissed.

(Para 4, 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27, Section 100 – Application for additional evidence – Decision upon – Mandate of -- When an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is moved during pendency of the appeal, it is incumbent on the part of the appellate Court to consider the same at the hearing of the appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents for evidence proposed to be adduced have any relevance/ bearing on the issues involved or not -- Appellate Court directed to dispose of the application in accordance with law and then decide the appeal accordingly.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)