Search By Topic: Evidence Law

3. (SC) 25-09-2024

A. Evidence law -- Injured eye-witnesses -- Sworn testimonies provided by injured witnesses generally carry significant evidentiary weight -- Such testimonies cannot be dismissed as unreliable unless there are pellucid and substantial discrepancies or contradictions that undermine their credibility -- If there is any exaggeration in the deposition that is immaterial to the case, such exaggeration should be disregarded; however, it does not warrant the rejection of the entire evidence.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- There cannot be a fixed timeframe for formation of common intention -- It is not essential for the perpetrators to have had prior meetings to conspire or make preparations for the crime -- Common intention to commit murder can arise even moments before the commission of the act -- Since common intention is a mental state of the perpetrators, it is inherently challenging to substantiate directly -- Instead, it can be inferred from the conduct of the perpetrators immediately before, during, and after the commission of the act.

(Para 19)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 302 – Murder -- Common intention -- Appellants are related by blood, arrived at the crime scene armed with a 12 bore double-barrel gun, dangs, and lathis within 15 minutes of the initial altercation, and subsequently attacked P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5, and the victims -- During this attack, A-4, the father of A-1, raged by the incident of P.W.3 slapping his adult son A-1 and the pursuant altercation, fired with his gun at P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5 and the victims -- Thereafter, all the appellants fled together carrying their weapons -- It is evident that the appellants acted with a common intention to kill, seeking to avenge the slapping incident.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 149 -- Common intention – Common object -- Determination of common intention or common object should primarily be within the domain of the trial courts, and at the most the high courts -- It should not be the role of Supreme Court to directly adjudicate issues of common intention and common object.

(Para 21)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216, 464 – Non-framing of charge -- Failure of justice -- No finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

-- Law is well-settled that in order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.

(Para 24, 25)

F. Evidence law – Independent witness -- It is settled law that examination of independent witness is not an indispensable requisite if the testimonies of other witnesses are deemed trustworthy and reliable --  Prosecution's case cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of the absence of independent witness.

(Para 29, 30)

10. (SC) 08-08-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)

12. (Allahabad HC) 16-07-2024

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 4 – Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), Section 25 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 106 -- Termination of lease – Suit for eviction, and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation -- Ex-parte proceedings -- In ex-parte proceedings the Court is required to test the case of the plaintiff and not merely believe whatever has been stated in the plaint.

-- Impugned order records that the Defendants/Revisionists had filed written statement however, at the stage of evidence did not file any evidence in support of his written statement or in rebuttal of the plaint nor examined the plaintiff witnesses.

-- Defendants/ Revisionists also did not appear at the time of arguments and the case in such circumstances proceeded ex-parte against the Defendants/ Revisionists.

– Plaintiff/ Respondent filed the certified copy of the registered Lease Agreement executed between the parties.

-- Notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, Postal receipts showing service of the Notice upon the Defendants/ Revisionists, photocopies of the cheques along with the Bank return memos showing insufficient funds in the Bank account of the Defendants/ Revisionists.

Evidence of the Plaintiff/ Respondent stood unrebutted -- Taking note of the above in the absence of any contest from the Defendants/ Revisionists learned Judge Small Causes Court proceeded to decree the suit of the Plaintiff/Respondent -- No illegality in the procedure adopted by the learned Judge Small Causes Court in decreeing the Suit of the Plaintiff/Respondent -- Findings recorded by the learned JSCC calls for no interference.

(Para 25-28, 39-41)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63(2)(3), 65, 74 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 57 -- Certified copy of registered lease deed – Admissibility in evidence –  Certified copy of the Lease Agreement will fall under the category of secondary evidence – Certified copy of the Lease Agreement is a Public Document, as contemplated u/s 74 and in terms of the 3rd Proviso to Section 65(e) or 65(f) the certified copy is admissible in evidence -- Sub Section 5 of Section 57 of the Registration Act provides that certified copy given u/s 57 of the Registration Act shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of its original document -- Rightly relied while decreeing the Suit.

(Para 29-34)

13. (P&H HC) 12-07-2024

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

16. (HP HC) 19-06-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Circumstances related to death -- Victim did not give any history of the consumption of the poison and the Medical Officer could not find any symptom of the poisoning --  Therefore, he did not treat the victim for poisoning --  Statement made by the victim nowhere states that the accused had forced her to consume the poison -- She stated that one black pill was taken from the bag of accused, which was consumed -- She fell asleep thereafter -- She has not specifically stated whether the victim had herself taken the medicine or it was administered to her -- There is no proof that the pill consumed by the victim was aluminium phosphide -- Statement made by the victim cannot constitute the circumstances relating to her death and the same cannot be admitted as a dying declaration.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) – Rape with  minor – Acquittal -- Medical evidence does not show that the victim was subjected to recent sexual intercourse -- Heavy reliance was placed upon the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- However, the same was not subjected to further examination to find out whether it belonged to accused or not -- Further, no semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the accused -- Therefore, nothing much can be made out of the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view by holding that no case of commission of an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of IPC was made out.

(Para 28-30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 305 -- Abetment of suicide of child -- No evidence to show when the poison was taken by the deceased -- Her statement does not show that the accused had created any circumstance forcing her to consume poison -- There is no evidence that the deceased had consumed poison while she was with the accused -- Hence, the offence punishable u/s 305 of IPC is not made out against the accused.

(Para 31)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Birth certificate – Age of victim -- Mere fact that the entry was not made immediately but was made subsequently as per the order of the SDM will not take away their effect -- The entries were made ante litem mortem and are to be treated as correct -- Entry was based on the Panchayat certificate, which was not brought will not take away the effect of the entry which was made before the dispute had arisen – Age of victim was about 14 years on the date of the incident, proved.

(Para 33)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Victim was going to Nahan from where she was taken to the house of SR -- No evidence that the consent of her guardian was taken -- Hence, the offence of kidnapping was duly established.

(Para 37)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Kidnapping – Charge u/s 366 of IPC – Punishment u/s 363 IPC – Permissibility of -- Accused was not charged with the commission of an offence punishable u/ 363 of the IPC but with Section 366 of the IPC, which is an aggravated form of Section 363 of the IPC -- Hence, the accused can be convicted of the commission of offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC despite the absence of charge as no prejudice has been caused to him.

(Para 38)

17. (HP HC) 18-06-2024

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Victim’s age – Birth and death register of Gram Panchayat -- Proof of -- Victim’s date of birth was recorded as 28.10.2002 -- During cross-examination of the victim, on the suggestion given to her, she had specifically stated that her date of birth was 28.10.2002, which corroborates the entry in the birth and death register of the concerned Gram Panchayat – Held,  the evidence led by the prosecution is conclusive to prove that the date of birth of the victim was 28.10.2002.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Sole witness of prosecutrix -- Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence -- If the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.

(Para 14)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape – Victim travelled a long distance in the company of accused persons throughout the night and had many opportunities to disclose her fate to the world at large --  As per her statement recorded u/s 164, Cr.PC, a police man met her at some place at Una-Hoshiarpur road, however, she had not disclosed anything to the police man also -- This conduct of the victim is unusual -- Statement of victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. is not in consistence with her deposition before the Court -- Her deposition does not inspire confidence.

(Para 21, 39)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- It is not a substantive piece of evidence and such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency in order to ensure that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction -- The Test Identification Parade is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used in corroboration of the statements in Court

(Para 32)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- When the accused persons were produced before the ACJM, the photographs of the accused persons were annexed to the conviction slip -- Thus the possibility of the victim having seen the photographs of accused persons during their custody with the police and also subsequently before the TIP cannot be ruled out -- There is no record to suggest that non-suspected selected for the parade were of the same age, height, general appearance and position as that of the accused persons -- Moreover, there is a delay in conducting the TIP as the accused persons were taken in custody on 13.02.2018, but the application for conducting of TIP was moved by the Investigating Officer on 16.02.2018, which delay the prosecution has failed to explain -- Father of the victim, in his cross-examination, admitted that a lady police having two stars on her shoulders, was also present at the time of TIP -- Thus, it cannot be said the TIP was conducted in accordance with the guidelines -- As such, it cannot be held to be sustainable in the eyes of law and no reliance could be placed upon the Test Identification Parades.

(Para 33-37)

F. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Acquittal of accused – Disciplinary action against Investigation Agency -- Investigation in the case was conducted in a casual and perfunctory manner -- Prosecution has withheld the CCTV footage, SFSL reports with respect to the medical examinations of the victim as well as the accused persons and also with respect to the articles which were seized from the vehicles allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in order to connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence -- Director General of Police directed to take appropriate disciplinary and departmental inquiry against the erring police officials for having conducted a shoddy investigation, that eventually led to the acquittal of the appellants herein.

(Para 46)

18. (HP HC) 18-06-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act are not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt -- Mere fact that the dead body of the deceased was found two kilometers back from place where the appellant had left him, could not be a ground to doubt the statement -- False explanation cannot be used as an additional link to fortify the prosecution case -- Suspicion, howsoever strong, it may be, cannot take the place of proof -- A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law -- The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in a case can be stated to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction – Findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and do not in any manner re-concile with the evidence on record -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17, 19-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence -- If the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established and that those circumstances must be conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused -- Moreover all the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence -- Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 23)

19. (SC) 15-05-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration -- Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration -- However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration -- Unless the evidence tendered is tested by cross-examination, it is not creditworthy -- Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to this general rule.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Murder -- Dying declaration -- Attending doctor certified that the deceased was capable of narrating her statement -- Substance of the dying declaration is also borne out by the medical history of the patient recorded by the doctor which has also been proved in evidence -- Though there are inconsistencies and improvements in the version of the prosecution witnesses, there is however convergence with the core of the narration of the deceased made in the dying declaration and the medical history recorded by the doctor -- No reason to doubt the correctness of the dying declaration -- Evidence on record, particularly Ex. 59/ dying declaration clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt -- Appellant held guilty.

(Para 35-37)

21. (SC) 07-05-2024

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 299 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 -- Statement of complainant u/s 161 of Cr.P.C. – Exhibited by Investigation Officer – Accused/ appellant remained absconding for a period of nearly 10 years -- Complainant left his house where he used to reside earlier -- Despite ample efforts being made by the Investigating Agency to summon and examine complainant, he could not be traced out and produced in the witness box for deposition during trial after the accused had been arrested -- Viewed in light of the provisions of Section 299 CrPC read with Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the trial Court was justified in holding that the statement of complainant recorded in these proceedings was fit to be read as a piece of substantive evidence.

(Para 23, 38, 39)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Murder of wife -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen together – Circumstances leading to murder were in the exclusive knowledge of the appellant -- He has offered no explanation as to the manner in which deceased was strangled to death within the confines of the room where only he and the deceased were present -- Bald plea of denial offered by the accused by way of an explanation to this gravely incriminating circumstance is not sufficient to absolve him of the burden cast upon him by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 46)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Incriminating circumstances -- Prosecution has established the following links in the chain of incriminating circumstantial evidence: (i) Motive; (ii) Last seen together; (iii) Medical evidence establishing that the cause of death of the deceased was homicidal. (iv) Confessional note; (v) Abscondence for nearly 10 years; (vi) Wrong explanation given by the accused in his statement under Section 313 CrPC; (vii) Failure of the accused to offer explanation for the homicidal death of his wife in the night time when only the accused and deceased were present in the house leading to the interference of guilt by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Conviction of appellant confirmed – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 47-51)

33. (P&H HC) 04-04-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Withholding of evidence -- Adverse inference – Presumption -- Section 114 enables the Court to presume existence of certain facts, which includes drawing of adverse inference particularly when the evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it -- Such presumption can be drawn only if the party intentionally withholds the best evidence.

(Para 6)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Non-examination of Landlady -- Adverse inference -- In each and every case, mere non-appearance of landlady/ landlord in the witness box would not necessarily require the Court to draw adverse inference -- It depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

(Para 7)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Non-examination of Landlady -- Adverse inference -- Landlady’s husband, who is also residing with her, appeared in evidence -- He has answered all the questions, which were put to him in his cross-examination -- Courts have not erred in refusing to draw adverse inference – Revision dismissed.

(Para 7, 11)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Eviction petition -- Titel of landlord -- Rent proceedings are summary and the landlord is not required to prove his title as in the civil case.

(Para 10)

34. (P&H HC) 03-04-2024

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint – Presumption as to liability – Rebuttal – Standard of proof -- Once execution of the cheque is proved/ admitted, the presumptions u/s 118(a) and 139 of the said Act would arise that it is supported by a consideration -- Such presumptions are rebuttable in nature and the accused can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence, and if the accused is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the complainant who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would dis-entitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument -- Standard of proof so as to prove defence on the part of an accused is 'preponderance of probabilities' and inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Void cheque – Alteration in cheque -- Amount written in cheque corrected in figures or in number without the knowledge and consent of maker of the cheque amounts to material alteration and also amounts cancellation -- The figure “2" was specifically inserted in cheque specifically without the knowledge of the drawer is a material alteration which makes the documents void -- Accused is not liable for any type of legal recoverable debt -- Nothing is on file to prove any type of transaction or debt to held the accused liable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 8-10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Receipt issued on the letter pad of the shop of accused is also not proved the liability of the accused in any manner as no witness regarding the receipt is on the letter pad and without any witness the document did not prove any type of liability towards the accused.

(Para 9)

40. (P&H HC) 30-01-2024

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Interference in finding on facts – Sub-clause No.(c) of Section 41 (1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, enables the High Court for the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, to reappreciate the evidence, if the decision is suffering from substantial error or defect resulting in defect in the decision of the case -- Consequently, it is permissible for the Court while deciding second appeal to re-appreciate the evidence if the decisions of the Courts suffer from perversity --  However, it is not permissible to interfere if two views are possible -- Interference in the second appeal has to be restricted to rare and exceptional cases where the court finds that the findings of fact stand vitiated by erroneous approach based on miss application of evidence or reliance on inadmissible evidence.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 73 – Agreement to sell – Handwriting expert -- It is well settled that invariably the Handwriting and Finger Print Expert gives a favourable opinion to the person who has engaged him – U/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Presiding Judge is not debarred from carefully comparing the signatures and finger prints on various documents -- Adverse inference could not be drawn against the defendants for failure to examine Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert.

(Para 27(17))

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32, 33 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C was neither relevant nor admissible in evidence as the plaintiff failed to fulfill the requirements of Section 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 27(18))

D. Agreement to sell -- Examination of the regular scribe was important.

(Para 27(21))

45. (SC) 04-01-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Normal approach in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C – Involvement of accused during deposition -- If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C – Improved fact during deposition -- Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation -- The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance.

(Para 26)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136 -- Illiterate witness – Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses -- It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence -- If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- PW-5, a chance witness was in his village, answering the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen the accused persons going in a jeep -- The side-on view would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they were travelling in a jeep – It is not safe to rely on this testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping after having murdered his wife.

(Para 29)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Explanation u/s 313 Cr.P.C. -- Main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence – There was alive a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s 313 CrPC, and it is sufficient to create a doubt.

(Para 30)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Evidential value -- Statement of an accused under Section 313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and, secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an opportunity to cross examine the accused – It cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

(Para 32, 33)

50. (P&H HC) 04-12-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- Preserving and requisitioning of the call details and tower location details would be necessary, otherwise the same would be lost forever -- Right of accused to invoke the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C. for obtaining documents in support of his defence has been recognized by the Constitutional Courts -- Legislative intent behind enactment of Section 91 Cr.P.C. is to ensure that no cogent material or evidence involved in the issue remains undiscovered in unearthing the true facts during investigation, enquiry, trial or other proceedings.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- While passing the appropriate direction for preserving and production of call details/tower location details under Section 91 Cr.P.C. would violate the right to privacy of the police officials but the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in ensuring free and fair investigation/trial would prevail over the right to privacy of the police officials.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- Denial of an adequate opportunity to the accused by non-production of the electronic record, which is admissible under Section 65-A and 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act in criminal trial, would amount to miscarriage of justice -- Power under 91 Cr.P.C. must be exercised for production of such evidence, which would assist the Court in discovering the truth in the pursuit of justice.

(Para 9)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- As principles of natural justice are integral part of fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, any denial of the best available evidence or effective and substantial hearing to accused in proving defence would amount to denial of free and fair trial.

(Para 10)