Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

953. (P&H HC) 16-09-2020

A. Binding precedent -- Power of smaller Bench to say ‘per incuriam’ – A judgement may be held to be per incuriam in case it failed to notice an earlier binding precedent which covered the field -- Even in such a situation a smaller Bench cannot say that the judgement of a larger Bench is per incuriam -- The only course available to it is to make a reference to the larger Bench.

(Para 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A(4) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167, 173 -- NDPS case – Challan without report of the Chemical Examiner/Forensic Science Laboratory -- Incomplete challan -- Default bail -- By virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, the Single Bench judgements in Akash Kumar alias Sunny (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14977) and Shankar (CRM No. M-44412 of 2019/20th December 2019) are binding as they lay down a proposition of law although at variance with the law laid down by the Division Bench in Ajit Singh alias Jeeta (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121) -- Smaller Bench could not have declared the judgement of a larger Bench to be per incuriam -- Judicial discipline demands that a reference be made to a Division Bench regarding the validity and correctness of the aforementioned Single Bench judgements -- File sent to Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a request to constitute a Division Bench for consideration of this matter -- Meanwhile, direction given that petitioner be released on bail

(Para 11,12)

966. (SC) 31-08-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

971. (P&H HC) 28-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- No further evidence than what was available during investigation -- When a strong and cogent evidence is led against a person, power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised, it is not to be exercised in a casual manner -- A perusal of the statement of injured witness indicates over implication on the face of it -- No injury has been attributed to either of the respondents -- Gun-shot injuries attributed only to co-accused – If someone was present with co-accused, it cannot be said that they had any common intention or there was meeting of mind or knew that co-accused would be firing -- No fault can be found with the order passed by the trial Court dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Order, upheld and the revision petition dismissed.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- Power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the remaining respondents as an additional accused in the absence of any other evidence than the evidence that was already available with the Investigating Agency is against the well settled proposition of law – No evidence except the statement, which has already been investigated into by the concerned DSPs was relied upon by the trial Court to summon, which was not sufficient for exercising power u/s 319 Cr.P.C – In case, so many people as named were giving gandasi and lathies blows on the head, victim was bound to have suffered more injuries, which would not have left him alive and probably he would have been killed on the spot -- Trial Court erred in exercising his jurisdiction summoning the other accused where exaggeration and implication is evident on both sides -- Order of Trial Court summoning the petitioners as additional accused set aside.

(Para 28-33)

979. (SC) 19-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer power u/s 406 Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Section 406 Cr.P.C. empowers the Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals – Held, only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 174 -- Scope of section 174 Cr.P.C. proceeding – Nature of -- Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death -- These are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR u/s 154 CrPC --  Held, inquiry conducted u/s 174 CrPC is limited for a definite purpose but is not an investigation of a crime u/s 157 of the CrPC.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4) -- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Jurisdiction of Patna Police to register complaint – Consent for CBI Investigation by Bihar police -- Legality of -- At the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case -- Allegation relating to criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money which were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police -- Exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order -- At the stage of investigation not required to transfer the FIR to Mumbai police -- Bihar government was competent to give consent for entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.

(Para 22-30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4), 406 – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. at Mumbai -- Patna Police registered FIR, subsequently transferred it to the CBI – In future, if commission of cognizable offence u/s 175(2) CrPC is determined, the possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai Police cannot be ruled out – Both states are making acrimonious allegations of political interference against each other, the legitimacy of the investigation has come under a cloud -- To ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, Court exercised powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, holding that if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well.

(Para 35-41)

985. (SC) 14-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1), 389(3) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – In view of mandate of Section 389(3) of the CrPC, the principles are different in the case of sentence not exceeding three years and/or in the case of bailable offences -- Discretion u/s 389(1) is to be exercised judicially, the Appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Dowry death -- Object was to curb dowry death -- Section 304B does not categorize death, it covers every kind of death that occurs otherwise than in normal circumstances -- Where the other ingredients of Section 304B of the Code are satisfied, the deeming fiction of Section 304B would be attracted and the husband or the relatives shall be deemed to have caused the death of the bride -- In dealing with cases under Section 304B, this legislative intent has to be kept in mind -- Once there is material to show that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment before death, there is a presumption of dowry death and the onus is on the accused in-laws to show otherwise.

(Para 28-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389, 439 –Bail being the rule and jail an exception  -- Regular bail – Suspension of sentence – Difference between -- There is a difference between grant of bail u/s 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence u/s 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post-conviction.

-- In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.

-- In case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial.

(Para 36)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors -- There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 36)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Death took place within 7 or 8 months and there is oral evidence of the parents of cruelty and torture immediately preceding the death -- Also evidence of payment of Rs.2,50,000/- to the Respondent-Accused by the victim’s brother -- Respondent No.2-accused has not been able to demonstrate any apparent and/or obvious illegality or error in the judgment of the Sessions Court, to call for suspension of execution of the sentence. Held,

-- In considering an application for suspension of sentence, the Appellate Court is only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in the order of conviction that renders the order of conviction prima facie erroneous.

-- Where there is evidence that has been considered by the Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under Section 389 to re-assess and/or re-analyze the same evidence and take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release the convict on bail.

Appellant spent money beyond his financial capacity, at the wedding of the victim and had even gifted an I-10 car -- Failure to lodge an FIR complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim is inconsequential -- Parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete breakdown of the marriage by lodging an FIR against the Respondent No.2 and his parents, while the victim was alive. Impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender for being taken into custody -- The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

(Para 38-42)

992. (P&H HC) 11-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 173, 482 – Delay in FIR / Investigation – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- There is unreasonable delay in registration of FIR as well as investigation of the case which warrants interference by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction – Direction given, Commissioner of police directed to ensure expeditious completion of the investigation preferably within sixty days – Chief Judicial Magistrate/ concerned JMIC to monitor investigation by periodically calling for status report from the police and to issue appropriate directions for expeditious completion thereof, if so required.

(Para 9, 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Investigation of criminal case -- Investigation has to be fair, prompt, transparent and judicious to both the victim as well as the accused. Ineffective, unfair, obscure, inexpedient and delayed investigation negates and is the antithesis of the rule of law affirmed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 197, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166A -- Investigation of criminal case -- Deliberate inaction -- Unreasonable delay -- Failure to collect evidence -- Undue sympathy with/ shielding of the offenders – Remedy to complainant/ victim -- Complainant/victim of a crime may apply to the Judicial Magistrate, empowered to take cognizance of the offences in question on police report, for monitoring of investigation who can issue appropriate directions for expeditious completion of investigation -- Complainant/victim of a crime may also file complaint u/s 166A (b) of the IPC against the Investigating Officer -- Complainant/victim of a crime may alternatively file petition in the High Court for transfer of investigation to an independent agency such as CBI etc.

(Para 16-18)

993. (P&H HC) 11-08-2020

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A, 147, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386, 401 (1) – Cheque bounce case -- Sentence to accused -- Revisional power – Nature of -- While exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Court possesses exercises all the powers conferred on an Appellate Court to alter the nature or the extent or the nature and extent of the sentence.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A, 147, 148 – Cheque bounce case – Not an offence against society – Imposition of sentence -- Offence u/s 138 of the Act is quasi criminal in nature -- It is not an offence against society and an accused can escape punishment by settling with the complainant -- Thus, while imposing a sentence u/s 138 of the Act, the Court must be alive to the concern of the Legislature in inserting Chapter XVII in the Act and then amending the provisions thereof to make the same more stringent as well as the jurisprudential principles of deterrence and restoration and that the offence is quasi criminal in nature.

(Para 10-14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Cheque bounce case – Cheque amount of Rs.4 lacs -- Maximum sentence of R.I. for two years imposed -- Compensation of payment of the cheque amount along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of issuance of cheque till the date of the judgment also awarded -- Award of maximum sentence is held to be arbitrary -- Petitioner is a poor person and having undergone a protracted trial of almost 10 years, also exist -- Sentence is reduced to RI for a period of one year and six months along with payment of compensation as awarded by the trial Court.

(Para 15-17)