Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 325, 302, 307, 447, 506, 511, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Murder case -- Second petition for regular bail – Considering allegation against the petitioner is of pelting of stone and the petitioner is in custody for a period of more than 2 years and 4 month, coupled with the fact that out of the total 83 witnesses cited by the prosecution, only 23 witnesses have been examined so far and trial in the case will take sufficient long time, Court deemed it appropriate to release the petitioner on regular bail -- Petition allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Abuse in public view -- Allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building -- It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house -- Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act quashed. Swaran Singh’s case (2008) 8 SCC 435 relied.

(Para 14, 15, 24)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act – Civil litigation between parties -- Dispute about the possession of the land -- Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting complainant to cultivate the land for the last six months -- Any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe -- Allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property -- If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out – Finding that appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.

(Para 13-22)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Part quashing of charge-sheet -- There is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part -- In a petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out -- Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. Ishwar Pratap Singh’s case (2018) 13 SCC 612 relied.

(Para 23,24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 17(1)(a)(b) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 141 – Food adulteration case -- Company not convicted – Nominated person held guilty – Legality of – Remand to fill lacuna of case – Permissibility of -- No material distinction between Section 141 of the NI Act and Section 17 of the Act which makes the Company as well as the Nominated Person to be held guilty of the offences and/or liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly -- Clauses (a) and (b) are not in the alternative but conjoint -- Therefore, in the absence of the Company, the Nominated Person cannot be convicted or vice versa -- Since the Company was not convicted by the trial court, finding of the High Court to revisit the judgment will be unfair to the appellant/Nominated Person who has been facing trial for more than last 30 years -- Order of remand to the trial court to fill up the lacuna is not a fair option exercised by the High Court as the failure of the trial court to convict the Company renders the entire conviction of the Nominated Person as unsustainable.

(Para 22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 401 – Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 42-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – First appeal against conviction – Condonation of delay – Right of -- Held, first appeal against conviction should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation -- Appellate Court was in error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation -- Revision petition allowed, matter remitted to the same Court for deciding the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. State of Odisha v. Surendra Munda’s case 2020 (4), RCR (Criminal), 286 relied.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – TIP -- Principles which have emerged from the precedents of Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

(i) The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye-witness to the crime;

(ii) There is no specific provision either in the CrPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP;

(iii) Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of Section 162 of the CrPC;

(iv) A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held;

(v) The identification of the accused in court constitutes substantive evidence;

(vi) Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act;

(vii) A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if so required;

(viii) As a rule of prudence, the court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration;

(ix) Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible;

(x) The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the court in the circumstances of that particular case;

(xi) Identification of the accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence; and

(xii) The court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 36)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Acquittal in murder case – Serious infirmity in evidence -- Refusal to go Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Effect of -- Identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused -- Finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade -- Presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt -- Ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities -- Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence -- Prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellants are, hence, entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the offence.

(Para 39,40)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Sections 61, 78(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- 90 boxes of country made liquor/total 1080 bottles for sale in Haryana only, were recovered from boot of white coloured Duster which was driven by co-accused and the petitioner was sitting on the conductor seat -- Petitioner in judicial custody since 07.09.2020 -- Investigation of the case is complete and the final report stands filed -- Considering the above background, custody of the petitioner and the fact that the offences are triable by Magistrate, Court found that the petitioner deserves the concession of regular bail -- Outbreak of pandemic COVID-19 in the region may further delay the conclusion of trial -- Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 2-6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) – NDPS case – Default bail -- Recovery of 1300 tablets of Alprozolam and 1000 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride -- Incomplete challan was presented in the Court -- No request was submitted to the said Court by the Investigating Agency seeking extension of time for the purpose of investigation of the case -- On the expiry of a period of 180 days, the accused has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court seeking default bail – Subsequent presentation of the report of FSL will not extinguish the right of the petitioner to seek a default bail -- Petitioner held entitled to the benefit of default bail.

(Para 14-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 399, 401 -- Second revision – Maintainability of – Filing of second revision petition, challenging the order passed by the Court of Session, while disposing of a revision petition is barred and it cannot be entertained by High court -- Revision petition dismissed accordingly.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of appellant – Conviction by Trial Court affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- Test Identification parade unworthy  – Forensic evidence withheld – Identification of accused by wearing of lungi – Un-natural behaviour of eye-witness -- Principle in criminal law which propagates that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to their innocence, the view favourable to the accused should be adopted -- Infirmities in the prosecution evidence, made out a case for interference -- Appeal allowed, judgment of trial Court as also of High Court set aside.

(Para 1, 8-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) – Adverse inference – Co-accused acquitted -- No chemical analyst report, relevant forensic evidence for the seized shirt of co-accused withheld by the prosecution -- When such vital forensic evidence is kept away, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution.

(Para 8.2)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – Presence of Police – Identity by lungis -- Test Identification evidence (YIP) is not substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in corroboration of statements in Court -- Major flaw was the presence of the police during the exercise, resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of section 162 of the Code -- Pahchan patra of the TIP mentions that three lungis were presented, the related witness was shown only one lungi for identification -- Such infirmities would render the TIP unworthy of acceptance, for supporting the prosecution.

(Para 10,11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Unnatural behaviour of the eye-witness – He was known to the deceased and claimed to have seen the assault -- He did not take any pro-active steps in the matter to either report to the police or inform any of the family members -- Such conduct of the eyewitness is contrary to human nature – His testimony deserves to be discarded.

(Para 14)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013), Section  13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Second bail application for anticipatory bail -- Petitioner alleged to have received a sum of Rs.9 lacs, in order to help the first informant’s son to immigrate to Canada -- First informant and the petitioner have settled the matter not disputed by first informant – Arrest of the petitioner stayed subject to the petitioner joining investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer -- Petitioner shall be bound by the conditions as envisaged under 438 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Registration of FIR – Inherent jurisdiction -- No abnormal delay in reporting the matter – Dy.S.P. issued notices to complainant party and recorded statements of various persons -- Police Officer cannot embark upon any elaborate inquiry to ascertain genuineness or reasonableness of the information and cannot refuse registration of criminal case -- It does not lie under the domain of Police Officer to substitute preliminary/detailed inquiry with the investigation of the case, as the investigation can only be done after registration of an FIR -- Refusal to register an FIR is not in accordance with law – Petition accepted and direction given for registration of case.

(Para 33-35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Reliability, genuineness and credibility of the information are not conditions precedent for registration of case -- Intention of the Legislature is to ensure prompt investigation of a cognizable offence in accordance with law – No discretion left with the Police Officer to register or not to register an FIR once information of a cognizable offence has been placed before him -- Action against erring police officer is warranted in such circumstances in which FIR is not registered in respect of cognizable offence. Some exceptions to the mandatory registration of FIR :

-- If the information does not disclose commission of cognizable offence, but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is made out or not. If the inquiry discloses cognizable offence the FIR be registered.

-- In case preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, the information is required to be supplied to the complainant within one week after disclosing the reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. Preliminary inquiry can be made in matrimonial disputes/ family disputes/ criminal offences/ medical negligence cases, corruption cases and cases where there is an abnormal delay in initiating criminal prosecution for more than three months in reporting the matter without satisfactory explanation for the delay -- Preliminary inquiry has to be completed within seven days and the delay if any, should be reflected in the general/daily diary of the Police Station.

Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) --  Non-registration of FIR – Procedure thereafter -- If a person has a grievance that the Police is not registering the FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C, then he can approach the Sr. Superintendent of Police u/s 154(3) Cr.P.C. by way of filing a representation in writing -- If such representation does not yield any satisfactory result and the FIR is not registered, then it would be open to the aggrieved person to file an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate concerned -- On receipt of such application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can direct for registration of FIR -- Magistrate can also monitor the investigation to ensure an appropriate investigation. Madhu Bala’s case 1997(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 679.

(Para 27)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 , 482 -- Registration of FIR – Constitutional validity-- Expression 'es unius est exclusion alterious' is fully applicable to the interpretation attached with Section 154 Cr.P.C. which means that expression of one thing is the exclusion of another -- Mandate of recording the information in writing excludes the possibility of not recording the information of commission of a cognizable offence in the special register -- Therefore, conducting the investigation into an offence after registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. is the procedure established by law and the same is in conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 29)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1) -- Registration of F.I.R. -- Nature of F.I.R. – There are two types of FIRs i.e. the FIR which is duly signed by the complainant u/s 154(1) Cr.P.C and the second type of FIR could be the FIR which is registered by the Police itself on any information received or other than by way of an informant and even this information has to be duly recorded and the copy thereof should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith u/s 157(1) Cr.P.C -- It would be obligatory on the part of Police to register FIR.

(Para 30)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 166 -- FIR – Arrest of accused – Registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. and arrest of the accused are entirely different things -- Arrest of the accused is not automatic on registration of an FIR -- Arrest cannot be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence -- It would be prudent for a Police Officer not to arrest a person without a reasonable satisfaction after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fide of a complaint and reasonable belief in the context of complicity of the accused -- Arrest of person and registration of FIR are not directly linked as both have two concepts, operating under different parameters -- Misuse of aforesaid concept would result in action against the Police Officer under Section 166 IPC.

(Para 31)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 Cr.P.C., if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence -- No preliminary inquiry is permitted in such a situation -- Preliminary inquiry can be conducted in matrimonial cases, case relating to family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay of more than 3 months in initiating criminal prosecution or reporting the matter to the police without satisfactory explanation. Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 32)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR – Cancellation of -- It would be prerogative of the Police to file cancellation of the FIR after investigation in accordance with law -- In such eventuality, the complainant would be having a right to file protest petition on receipt of notice from the Court -- Thereafter the Court may accept the cancellation report or proceed with the case as a criminal case on receipt of preliminary evidence or may pass any other order in accordance with law including further investigation.

(Para 34)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail – Parity with similarly situated co-accused – Right of -- Once, a similarly situated co-accused has already been granted the bail, the same could not be denied to the petitioner unless and until any differentiating fact is pointed out -- No differentiating fact has been pointed out between the petitioner and co-accused -- Hence, the petitioner has been able to make out a case for the grant of bail on the ground of parity with co-accused – Without commenting upon the merits of the case, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail

(Para 13,14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of cases -- Transfer power u/s 406 of the Code is to be invoked sparingly -- Only when fair justice is in peril, a plea for transfer might be considered -- Court however will have to be fully satisfied that impartial trial is not possible -- Equally important is to verify that the apprehension of not getting a level playing field, is based on some credible material and not just conjectures and surmises.

-- Plea for transfer of case should not be entertained on mere apprehension of a hyper sensitive person

-- While considering a plea for transfer, the convenience of parties would be a relevant consideration -- It can’t just be the convenience of the petitioner but also of the Complainant, the Witnesses, the Prosecution besides the larger issue of trial being conducted under the jurisdictional Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of cases -- Petitioner is not pointing any fingers towards the courts and his apprehension is based only on the action taken by the State -- Transfer of trials from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary but for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked.

(Para 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 437 -- Default bail – Condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/- – Permissibility of – Held, only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail u/s 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be -- And within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail -- Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. -- Condition imposed by the High Court is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside – Condition quashed and set aside.

(Para 9-11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail -- Condition directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation is concerned is unsustainable, as it is too harsh -- Instead, condition which can be imposed is directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to remain present before the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when called for, and on breach the investigating officer can approach the concerned court for cancellation of the bail – Condition modified by Supreme Court.

(Para 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Fair trial – Cross-examination – Right of -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. to place on record certain documents was allowed, no witness was recalled or examined for the purpose of proving the additional record and the same was taken on file straightway – Petitioners filed application u/s 311 Cr.P.C to recall witnesses for the purpose of cross-examining them in relation to the additional record -- Application dismissed on the ground that the petitioners could lead defence evidence and examine any official from the concerned department – Held, denial of the petitioners' right of cross-examination cannot be countenanced -- It is a valuable right given to the accused and such right cannot be diluted in this fashion -- Approach adopted by the learned ASJ negated the very basic and fundamental norms of a fair trial – Direction given to ld. ASJ to recall the witnesses for further cross-examination and proceed thereafter with the case in accordance with law – Revision allowed.

(Para 10-14)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 452, 120-B and 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 – Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR – Report of JMIC that statements of the parties were recorded which indicates that the compromise is genuine, without any coercion or undue influence -- Inherent jurisdiction of u/s 482 Cr.P.C. exercised so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law – FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed – Petition allowed.

(Para 1-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 190, 482 – Cancellation report of FIR – ACJM vide impugned order directed attached the cancellation report with protest petition and fixed the case for evidence of the complainant – Held, cancellation report filed by the police is not binding on ACJM -- Magistrate may accept the report or on receipt of protest petition or even suo-motu direct re-investigation or further investigation and protest petition filed can be treated as complaint petition, if prima facie a case is made out -- As of now, the impugned order cannot be set aside on mere apprehension that protest petition has already been treated as a complaint u/s 190 Cr.P.C – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 207, 208 – Challan filed – Cognizance by court -- Right of accused to copy of challan -- It is only after taking of the cognizance and issuance of process that the accused is entitled, in terms of Sections 207 and 208 of the Code, to copies of the documents referred to in said provisions.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 173, 190, 207, 208 – Challan filed – Cognizance by court – Right of accused to copy of statement u/s 164 Cr.P.c. – No person is entitled to a copy of statement recorded u/s 164 of the Code till the appropriate orders are passed by the court after the charge-sheet is filed -- Right to receive a copy of such statement will arise only after cognizance is taken and at the stage contemplated by Sections 207 and 208 of the Code and not before -- Application of accused was, therefore, rightly rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge and the order so passed did not call for any interference by the High Court.

(Para 16,17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Proclamation order – 30 day notice – Requirement of --  A clear period of 30 days was not afforded to the petitioner-accused so as to cause his appearance before the court -- Thereafter, the matter was adjourned but no fresh proclamation was ordered to be issued – Such adjournment beyond 30 days cannot be treated as compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. -- Impugned order set aside – Direction given to surrender and also make the payment of Rs.10,000/- as costs to the complainant -- On his doing so, ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7,8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 446 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cheque bounce case -- Non-appearance in Trail – Presence ordered to secure through warrant of arrest -- Anticipatory bail -- On account of an accident accused got fracture on his leg and could not appear -- Resultantly, his presence was ordered to be secured through warrant of arrest – Petition disposed of, accused shall surrender before trial Court within fifteen days positively and on surrender, he shall be enlarged on bail on his furnishing personal/ surety bonds to the satisfaction of trial Court -- Trial Court is at liberty to initiate proceedings u/s 446 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner in accordance with law -- Meanwhile, no coercive steps shall be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to warrant of arrest already issued against him.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 307, 354, 341, 323, 365, 506, 148/149 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(s) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Murder case – Regular bail -- S.I.T. upon examining the 'Call Detail Records', had come to a conclusion that as per 'Tower Location' information, none of the two petitioners was present at the spot at the time of occurrence – None of the petitioners is attributed the fatal blow either as per the FIR or as per the supplementary statement made by the complainant -- Petitioners have been behind bars since the last more than 6 months and challan already stands presented -- None of the petitioners is stated to be involved in any other case, as per the custody certificate -- Petitioners are ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7,8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- FIR against accused – Permission to go abroad – Right of – While evaluating the issue, Court must have regard to nature of the allegations, the conduct of the appellant and above all, the need to ensure that he does not pose a risk of evading the prosecution – Appellant regularly travelled between the US and India on as many as sixteen occasions between 2015 and 2020 -- Lodging of an FIR should not in the facts of the case be a bar on the travel of the appellant to the US for eight weeks to attend to the business of revalidating his Green Card -- Human right to dignity and the protection of constitutional safeguards should not become illusory by the imposition of conditions which are disproportionate to the need to secure the presence of the accused, the proper course of investigation and eventually to ensure a fair trial -- There is no reason or justification to deny him the permission which has been sought to travel to the US for eight weeks – Appellant granted permission subject to certain conditions.

(Para 21-24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 – Grievous injuries -- Non-taking of cognizance by police – Reference made to medical record -- Despite representation to the SSP no action has been taken in this regard -- It would be in the interest of justice to issue directions to respondents to look into the matter and the representation and to take action if required in accordance with law.

(Para 1-5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 461(I), 462 -- Criminal cases – Trail of offence/offender  – Territorial jurisdiction – Appropriate Court to raise the issue -- Words “tries an offence” are more appropriate than the words “tries an offender” in section 461 (l) -- This is because, lack of jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be cured by section 462 and hence section 461, logically, could have included the trial of an offence by a Magistrate, not empowered by law to do so, as one of the several items which make the proceedings void -- In contrast, the trial of an offender by a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of section 462, provided there is no other bar for the court to try the said offender (such as in section 27) -- But Section 461 (l) makes the proceedings of a Magistrate void, if he tried an offender, when not empowered by law to do.

-- the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence” or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depend upon facts established through evidence

-- if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same has to be decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in sections 177 to 184 of the Code and

-- these questions may have to be raised before the court trying the offence and such court is bound to consider the same.

(Para 38, 39)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 26, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 461(I), 462 -- Criminal cases – Territorial jurisdiction – Transfer of petition – Power of -- Facts to be established by evidence, may relate either to the place of commission of the offence or to other things dealt with by Sections 177 to 184 of the Code -- In such circumstances, Supreme Court cannot order transfer, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, even before evidence is marshalled -- Hence the transfer petitions dismissed.

(Para 41, 42)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, Rule 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Summoning of accused – Challenge to -- Insolvency proceedings – Effect of -- Account of the Company was frozen by virtue of orders dated 03.12.2018 passed by the NCLT -- All the moveable and immoveable assets of the Company have been taken over – Held, cheque in question is dated 12.06.2017, which was dishonoured on 29.07.2017 i.e. much prior to the passing of the order by the NCLT -- Even the legal notice dated 26.08.2017 served upon the petitioner is prior to commencement of IBC proceedings – Petitioner cannot thus take ruse under NCLT order passed after the institution of impugned complaint and passing of the summoning order.

(Para 3,4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 160, 438, 482 – Blanket Anticipatory bail – Alleged,  due to participation in the protest of the Farmers' Bill, 2020, the police are running after petitioners to implicate in some false case apart from harassing and humiliating them by conducting raids at their houses under the influence of the senior leaders of the ruling party -- Without commenting upon the merits of the case or opining on the veracity of the allegations the petition disposed of with a direction that in case the presence of the petitioners is required in connection with the investigation of any case, procedure as contemplated under Section 160 Cr.P.C be strictly followed.

(Para 3,4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 437, 439 – Statutory/ Default bail granted – Challan filed before submitting bail bonds – Cancellation of bail -- Before petitioner could furnish his bail bonds the challan was filed at about 5.00 p.m., following which, the statutory bail already granted was cancelled vide the impugned order – Impugned order set aside and a direction passed upon the Ld. Court below to accept the bail bonds, if any, in compliance of the previous order granting him statutory bail – Held, cancellation can only be ordered on merits of the case u/s 437 or 439 of the Cr.P.C., and not merely on account of the fact that challan had been presented by the I.O after the said order was passed.

(Para 2-9)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances -- In case of a circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else and the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 5.4)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 166 (3)(4) – Search in violation of Section 100(4) and 166(3)(4) of Cr.P.C -- Circumstantial evidence – Role of -- Investigaiton officer received a secret information that one jeep is lying in abandoned condition on the Chandigarh road and though the distance was around 300 kilo meters, he straightway went to Chandigarh and recovered the jeep in the presence of Bhunter people brought by him and did not follow the procedure as required to be followed under Section 166 (3 & 4), Cr.P.C -- Even he did not comply with the provisions of Section 100 (4) Cr.P.C -- Non-following of the aforesaid provisions alone may not be a ground to acquit the accused -- However, considering the overall surrounding circumstances and in a case where recovery is seriously doubted, non-compliance of the aforesaid play an important role.

(Para 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 366 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 -- Kidnapping – Appellants facilitating procurement of Sim Card – Conspiracy – Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Sim card was allegedly used by co-accused and his colleagues in the commission of offence of kidnapping -- Whether the appellant was a party to the agreement to do or caused to do the illegal act of kidnapping to be a member of the criminal conspiracy -- No substantial evidence that the appellant was aware that the sim card would be later on or was likely to be used in the commission of the offence of kidnapping -- Sentence suspended during the pendency of the criminal appeal pending before High Court.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-A, 120-B -- Conspiracy cannot be assumed from a set of unconnected facts or from a set of conduct at different places and times without a reasonable link.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 60 – NDPS case – Seizure of vehicle -- Release of vehicle on Sapurdari –Merely because vehicle was carrying narcotic substance and the same has been seized under the Act cannot be a ground for declining the release of vehicle on sapurdari -- Condition of the vehicle is likely to deteriorate while in custody on account of non-user thereof -- Aspect of confiscation of the vehicle can be looked at the appropriate stage but it cannot be termed to be a circumstance to deny the release of vehicle on sapurdari -- Vehicle ordered to be released on sapurdari.

(Para 2-7)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Sections 61, 1, 14 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Excise matter – Anticipatory bail -- Allegations as per the FIR are that police on secret information got recovered 100 litre of Lahan from room adjoining residential house of petitioner – As per petitioner false case has been planted against him and he is a simple agriculturist and is not involved in any other case and therefore, has prayed for grant of anticipatory bail -- Petitioner is not required for custodial interrogation at all -- Petitioner shall join the investigation as and when called upon to do so and shall abide by the conditions as provided under Section 438(2) Cr.P.C and would not make any default in this regard.

(Para 2-7)

A. Binding precedent -- Power of smaller Bench to say ‘per incuriam’ – A judgement may be held to be per incuriam in case it failed to notice an earlier binding precedent which covered the field -- Even in such a situation a smaller Bench cannot say that the judgement of a larger Bench is per incuriam -- The only course available to it is to make a reference to the larger Bench.

(Para 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A(4) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167, 173 -- NDPS case – Challan without report of the Chemical Examiner/Forensic Science Laboratory -- Incomplete challan -- Default bail -- By virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, the Single Bench judgements in Akash Kumar alias Sunny (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14977) and Shankar (CRM No. M-44412 of 2019/20th December 2019) are binding as they lay down a proposition of law although at variance with the law laid down by the Division Bench in Ajit Singh alias Jeeta (Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121) -- Smaller Bench could not have declared the judgement of a larger Bench to be per incuriam -- Judicial discipline demands that a reference be made to a Division Bench regarding the validity and correctness of the aforementioned Single Bench judgements -- File sent to Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a request to constitute a Division Bench for consideration of this matter -- Meanwhile, direction given that petitioner be released on bail

(Para 11,12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Writ petition for a mandamus to transfer the investigation to CBI --  Denovo Investigaiton -- Death of the deceased was initially sought to be passed off as accidental by collision with a train or suicidal -- F.I.R. u/s 302, IPC was registered very much belatedly, albeit reluctantly, only at the persistence of the petitioner and her husband after they repeatedly approached the higher authorities -- Entire investigation and the closure report lack bonafide -- Closure report set aside and direction given for a de novo investigation by a fresh team of investigators to be headed by a senior police officer of the State consisting of efficient personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also -- No officer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of the team conducting de novo investigation -- Fresh investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months and the police report be filed before the court concerned whereafter the matter shall proceed in accordance with law -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Acquittal by Trial Court – Power of appellate court -- View taken by the trial court was not at all possible, having regard to the evidence on record – High Court rightly set aside the same – Submission that even assuming that other view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of the trial court rejected.

(Para 7-11)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 54 – Possession of contraband – Onus of proof -- Onus was on the accused to explain the possession and in absence of the same being discharged, presumption u/s 54 of the NDPS Act will kick in.

(Para 11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- NDPS case – Release of vehicle on Superdari – Held, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the vehicle parked in the premises of police station -- Large number of vehicles are since seized by the police officials daily and, all are kept unattended -- Resultantly, with passage of time, condition of vehicle becomes beyond repair -- Owner can always be put to terms by the Court while releasing the vehicle -- Trial too is not likely to commence or conclude any time soon, due to current pandemic conditions – Vehicle/car ordered to be released on superdari.

(Para 5-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 2(b), 12 -- Non-payment of arrears of enhanced maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C – Contempt proceedings -- High Court ordered arrears of enhanced maintenance shall be paid in three equal instalments within six months -- Respondent flouted the order with impunity -- Firstly, the order was not complied by making three equal installments -- Secondly, even Court gave chance to respondent to comply with the order, but the respondent made a self-serving statement in the context of paying of Rs.1.5 lakhs unconditionally without adhering to the payment of arrears of maintenance -- Held, respondent has wilfully and deliberately violated the order and he has no respect for the Court's order -- Respondent convicted for civil contempt u/s 2(b) and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of two months with fine of Rs.2,000/-.

(Para 21, 22)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 -- NDPS matter – Large period of custody during pendency of appeal -- Suspension of sentence -- Rigors of Section 37 would have to be met before the sentence of a convict is suspended and bail granted and mere passage of time cannot be a reason for the same.

(Para 4, 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 -- Summoning of additional accused -- Complainant in her statement on the basis of which the FIR had been registered, specifically mentioned the names and roles of respondents No.2 to 7 – By inquiry report, the concerned DSP had found respondents No.2 to 7 as innocent -- Inquiry report is based on the statements of both the parties as also the mobile tower location -- Though in their statements, respondents No.2 to 7 have denied their involvement, yet they were present in the village – Held, power u/s 319 Cr.P.C., to arraign an accused is to be exercised sparingly and where there is strong and cogent evidence, but the Court is duty bound to give due weightage to the evidence collected and the statements recorded at the time of the registration of the FIR, during investigation and during trial – Enough prima-facie evidence to summon respondents No.2 to 7 as additional accused, to face the trial – Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. allowed and respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are ordered to be summoned to face the trial as additional accused – Said respondents directed to appear before the trial Court and upon doing so, they ordered to be released on bail by the trial Court, on their furnishing adequate surety and bail bonds.

(Para 17-19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC – First appeal dismissed by High Court on account of delay of 1192 days  -- Matter was remitted to the High Court to consider the appeal on merits – Review sought by State -- Held, in a criminal matter, where the life and liberty of a person is in question, one right of appeal has always been accepted and appropriate steps must be taken to effectuate that right -- Considerations on account of delay and limitation ought not to negate the right of appeal inhering in an accused – Review petition dismissed, order under review, affirmed.

(Para 3-6)

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 2(ix), 7(ii) -- Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 32(e) -- Lot/Code/Batch Identification – Prosecution for misbranding being in violation of Rule 32(e), lacking in necessary declaration of lot/batch numbers – Barcode was available on the sample is not in dispute – Held, lot/code/batch identification to facilitate it being traced to the manufacturer are available in the barcode and which can be decoded by a barcode scanner -- No useful purpose is going to be served by allowing the present prosecution to continue and it will be an abuse of the process of law, causing sheer waste of time, causing unnecessary harassment to the appellant, if the prosecution is allowed to continue – Appeal allowed and prosecution of the appellant quashed.

(Para 2-8)

Electricity Act, 2003 (No.36 of 2003), Section 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 482 -- Regular bail in 21 cases -- Onerous and impossible conditions imposed for bail – Inherent power of High Court – Exercise of – Condition imposed of furnishing Rs.50,000/- as bail bond with one local surety for the like amount in each of the 21 FIRs is certainly an onerous condition, as in effect it will mean that he will have to furnish Rs.10,50,000/- as bail bonds with a local surety for the like amount in totality -- Fit case for invoking inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Impugned orders set aside – Petitioner shall furnish one surety in one case for a sum of Rs.2 lakhs and two sureties for a sum of Rs.2 lakhs each, which sureties, would be applicable for all 21 cases -- Petitioner, in any case, shall furnish separate personal bonds in all 21 cases -- Upon the same being furnished, the petitioner ordered to be released on bail forthwith.

(Para 1,8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part II – falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus – Applicability of -- Contention that once the witnesses had been disbelieved with respect to the co-accused, their testimonies with respect to the present accused must also be discarded -- In effect, relying on the legal maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”, which Indian Courts have always been reluctant to apply -- Trial Court gave specific reasons for disbelieving the testimony of the witnesses with respect to the co-accused, and extending the benefit of doubt to them, while convicting the appellant on the strength of the evidence against him – Court found no infirmity in the approach of the Trial Court -- Conviction u/s 304 Part II upheld. Nisar Ali’s case AIR 1957 SC 366 and Rohtas’s case (2019) 10 SCC 554 relied.

(Para 1, 11-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 460, 34 – Murder case – Regular bail -- Blind murder wherein none had seen any of the accused -- Petitioners sought to be nominated on the basis of disclosure statements made by the co-accused, who came to be arrested after 9 months of the occurrence and that too after recording of statement of daughter of the deceased – Veracity and admissibility of such statement would certainly be debatable -- Petitioners are not even stated to be involved in any other case, their further detention would not serve any useful purpose -- Petitioners ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 6,7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 341, 354C, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape case – Regular bail -- Petitioner is in custody since 25.01.2020 -- Allegations of rape and criminal intimidation are against co-accused -- In the FIR, no overt act has been attributed to the petitioner and his involvement in the offence has surfaced on the basis of disclosure statement of prime accused -- No obscene material has been found in the mobile recovered from the petitioner -- His another co-accused has already been granted bail and on the ground of parity alone, the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail -- That apart, investigation is over and commencement of trial is still awaited -- In the current pandemic scenario, the trial of the case is not likely either to start or get over soon – Taking wholesome view of the matter, but without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the petitioner admitted to bail.

(Para 4,5)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 324, 326, 34 – Compromise quashing of FIR -- As per the report, compromise reached between the parties seems to be genuine and without pressure or coercion -- Statements of the petitioners as well as the complainant are also on record which suggest that the matter stands amicably settled -- Petition allowed, FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner(s). Gian Singh’s case 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543 and Narinder Singh’s case (2014) 6 SCC 466 relied.

(Para 3-7)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 1, 2(12)(13)(20)(35), 8, 12, 15, 18, 19, 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Child in conflict with law – Regular bail – Maintainability of -- Whether a child in conflict with law, who is being tried as an adult for the purpose of trial u/s 18(3) of the J.J. Act, could maintain an application for grant of regular bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act or u/s 439 Cr.P.C. before the Children’s Court and the High Court – Held, an application for grant of bail to a Child apprehended or detained by the police will be entertained by the J.J. Board u/s 12 of the J.J. Act and an application u/s 439 Cr.P.C. before the Children’s Court will not be maintainable.

(Para 9-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 377 -- Appeal by victim/State for enhancement of sentence – Maintainability of -- Victim’s right of appeal is restricted to three eventualities, namely, acquittal of the accused; conviction of the accused for lesser offence; or for imposing inadequate compensation – Held, it is open for the State Government to prefer appeal for inadequate sentence u/s 377, Cr.PC but no appeal can be maintained by victim u/s 372, Cr.PC on the ground of inadequate sentence.

(Para 9)