A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Warrant remained unexecuted as accused-petitioner shifted – Proclamation on same address – Legality of – FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Sustainability of -- Without any basis, the Court formed an opinion that the petitioner is intentionally avoiding service and that he is either absconding or concealing himself -- Rather the Court was duty bound to ask the complainant to furnish his fresh address and ensure that the petitioner was duly served before commencing with the coercive process -- Held, trial Court was not required to invoke the provisions of Section 82 of Cr.P.C. -- Declaration of the petitioner as a proclaimed person, and the consequent registration of the impugned FIR cannot be sustained.

(Para 10-12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Settlement between parties – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Entire amount of the cheque in dispute stands paid -- Complainant does not have any objection, in case, the impugned order and FIR are quashed -- Once there is an amicable settlement between the parties and the main petition u/s 138 of N.I. Act, wherein accused was declared as a proclaimed person, stands withdrawn, proceedings u/s 174-A IPC cannot be permitted to continue -- Impugned order and FIR u/s 174-A, IPC quashed along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 436(2) – NDPS case – Non-appearance on one date – Cancellation of bail – Non-bailable warrants -- Legality of -- Trial Court proceeded to pass the extreme order for solitary absence of petitioner, who was on regular bail since 29.05.2019 -- Accused or his counsel can be prevented by sufficient reasons and every such absence cannot be necessarily construed as a deliberate and willful absence -- Explanation offered by the petitioner appears to be probable and therefore, the same is accepted -- Impugned order and subsequent issuance of warrants (if any) set aside.

(Para 5, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapse – Setting aside of -- Proclamation, issued on 24.11.2015 for 11.12.2015, does not fulfill the requirement of Section 82 as the period is less than the prescribed period of 30 days -- Bare fact that on 11.12.2015, the Court adjourned the trial so as to complete the requisite period of 30 days and declared the petitioner as proclaimed offender on 04.01.2016 also does not meet the mandate of the provision -- Petitioner was abroad -- No material to show that any effort was made to serve the accused-petitioner through the Ministry of External Affairs – Held, impugned order has been passed in violation of the procedure and provisions of Section 82 of the Code and the same cannot be sustained.

(Para 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 --  Vehicle ordered to be released on superdari – Challenge by NCB – Release of vehicle with conditions that superdar shall not change its colour and condition -- Car remained with revisionist/ NCB for about eight months, which was sufficient time for the investigation -- In case the NCB finds that the car in question is required to be scrutinized or examined for the purpose of further investigation qua the other two accused against whom complaint has not been filed so far, then it can move appropriate application before the trial Court, which shall then direct the superdar to produce the car in the Court, the temporary custody of which can then be given to Narcotic Control Bureau – No reason to set aside the impugned order.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 306, 116 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Dispute between the parties has been resolved amicably – Compromise is in interest of peace and tranquility in the society and for such like reasons high Court can quash the FIR and ancillary proceedings exercising power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Petition allowed and the FIR along with ancillary proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 324 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320 -- Attempt to murder – Conviction of appellants -- Compromise between parties – Reduction in quantum of sentence -- There can be no doubt that Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. does not encapsulate Section 324 and 307 IPC under its list of compoundable offences – Held, fact of amicable settlement can be a relevant factor for the purpose of reduction in the quantum of sentence – Appeal partly allowed, sentence of both the appellants reduced to the period already undergone by them.

(Para 6-17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 51(5), 55, 61 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 364, 392 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Removal of hypothecation fraudulently – Sale of vehicle thereafter -- Vehicle involved in criminal case – Release of vehicle -- Right of subsequent purchaser – Statutory authority under MV Act recorded his conclusion that entry of the appellant in whose favour the vehicle was hypothecated has been fraudulently deleted – Held, in consequence of above, all subsequent acts including the registration certificate issued in the name of respondent No.1 became nonest -- Respondent No.1 although claimed that he is a bonafide purchaser but fact remains that he is beneficiary of fraud -- Held, High Court committed error in directing the release of the vehicle in favour of respondent No.1 -- Order of the High Court, thus, is unsustainable and set aside -- Vehicle ordered to be released in favour of the appellant.

(Para 20-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 452, 323, 148 & 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- House trespass – Compromise quashing of FIR – Illaqa Magistrate/trial Court, after recording the statements of the parties qua the execution and veracity of the alleged compromise furnished the report – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 2-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Kidnapping case -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties got their statements recorded and Ld. Magistrate submitted report to the effect that the compromise is genuine – None has put in appearance on behalf of complainant party but no prejudice would be caused to them as they have already made a joint statement with regard to compromise before Ld. Magistrate – FIR and subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners on the basis of compromise.

(Para 2-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- Dowry death case – Car given to husband at the time of marriage – Superdari given to husband being registered owner by Special Court holding that since the plea of the petitioner/ complainant was that the car was given in dowry at the time of marriage of his daughter it meant that the same was gifted to the accused-husband -- By getting the car registered in his name the accused-husband accepted the said gift and thus the car cannot be said to be the istridhan of deceased – Held, registration certificate of a vehicle in favour of a person is an important determinative factor of ownership of the vehicle, keeping in view the limited scope of inquiry in a proceeding u/s 451 CrPC -- Petitioner can always stake his ownership on the car after getting the same determined by a competent court of law -- It is yet to be determined whether the car was part of the istridhan -- Ownership rights of the petitioner cannot be determined in proceedings u/s 451 CrPC – Order of Special Court upheld.

(Para 5-13)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A & 120B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Corruption case -- Application u/s 482 by third party to expedite criminal trial – Locus standi – Maintainability of – High Court directed trial court to expedite the criminal trial -- Held, respondent no. 2 (third party) has no locus to file application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to expedite the hearing in criminal trial -- Application was not clearly maintainable -- Impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.

(Para 2-4, 15)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- NDPS case – Release of Vehicle on superdari – Agreement to sell in favour of petitioner -- Held, vehicle in question can be released to the petitioner considering the fact that there is already an agreement in favour of the petitioner and also the fact that if the vehicle is allowed to remain parked in the police station it may become unfit for roadworthiness -- Petition allowed and vehicle in question is ordered to be released to the petitioner on Superdari.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 370, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trafficking of person -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – Petition allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10, 18, 19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 -- Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Whether discretion of Appellate Court – Held, power vested with the lower Appellate Court, though discretionary is supposed to be a ‘rule’ and said discretion should be exercised in all the cases unless there are some exceptional circumstances justifying deviation from the said rule.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Power of Appellate Court -- Amount is required to be deposited within a period of 60 days which may further be extended by another 30 days -- Lower Appellate Court having granted one month’s period only for depositing the amount, the same is contrary to the provisions of the Act -- Error needs to be rectified.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 374 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case – Appeal against conviction – Pre-condition of deposit of 20% of amount of fine or compensation – Interpretation of -- Section 374 Cr.P.C. does not prescribe any condition for admission of an appeal – Deposit of 20% of the compensation amount under no circumstances can be interpreted to be a condition pre-requisite for availing the right of appeal -- Imposition of any condition at the time of suspending of sentence may be a different matter failing which the order suspending sentence may be vacated -- While giving a wider connotation to Article 21 of Constitution of India, it can even be said that depriving a convict of his right to appeal by imposing any pre-requisite for availing his statutory right to challenge conviction in a higher Court would amount to depriving his liberty without adhering to the established procedure of law.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Closure report – Fair Investigaiton -- Investigation and closure report do not contain any material with regard to the nature of investigation for insufficiency of evidence against them -- Closure report is based on the ipse dixit of the Investigating Officer -- Investigation appears to be a sham, designed to conceal more than to investigate -- Police has the primary duty to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence -- This is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. apart from being a constitutional obligation to ensure that peace is maintained in the society and the rule of law is upheld and applied -- To say that further investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate is a preposterous statement, coming from the police – Trial of other accused stayed, closure reports partly set aside insofar as the non-charged sheeted accused are concerned -- I.P.S. appointed to carry out further investigation through a team of competent officers.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Investigaiton by police – Interference in – Power of -- Police has a statutory duty to investigate into any crime in accordance with law as provided in the Cr. P.C. -- Investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with -- But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police -- Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the materials on record, that the police has not investigated properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law -- If the court gives any directions for that purpose within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to interference with investigation -- A fair investigation is, but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden obligation to ensure adherence by the police.

(Para 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 149, 323, 354-D, 506 – Stalking -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties had appeared before learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate and got recorded their statements regarding compromise -- Petition allowed -- FIR along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 6-9)

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (53 of 1972), Section 2, 9, 11, 12, 39A, 49A, 51, Schedule I, II, III, IV -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Wildlife Protection Act – Quashing of complaint by High Court – Challenge to – In case a person hunts any of the wild animals which are included in Schedule I to IV, it becomes an offence inviting the penalty under Section 51 of the Act, 1972 -- Veterinary Surgeon has identified the Turtle as ‘Indian Flap Shell (Lissemy’s Punctata)’ whereas the Turtle which is included in Part II of Schedule I of the Act, 1972 is “Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata).”  -- Although Lissemys punctata is included in Part II of Schedule I of the Act, however, the Turtle which has been seized is not that which is included in Part II of Schedule I -- Turtle seized is not included in Schedule I Part II and the Turtle having already been freed on the second day of its seizure – Held, High Court did not commit any error in quashing the criminal proceedings registered for Wild Life offences -- No good ground to interfere with the order of the High Court by which the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 9-14)

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 482 -- Proclaimed offender – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory bail – Right of -- When an accused has been declared as a proclaimed offender, a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., impugning that order is not maintainable and accused should first move the Court which declared him a proclaimed offender and even an objection against validity of proclamation is required to be raised in the first instance before the Court which issued the proclamation and that power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., is not to be exercised in favour of a person, who is absconding or avoiding service -- If an accused is absconding and declared as a proclaimed offender, he should not be granted anticipatory bail -- Petition dismissed, petitioner directed to surrender before the trial Court and move application seeking regular bail. Mehnga Singh’s case 2002 (2) RCR (Criminal) 501 and Pradeep Sharma’s case 2014 (1) RCR (Criminal) 269 relied.

(Para 3,4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B -- Punjab Travel Professionals (Regulation) Act, 2014 Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Second petition for anticipatory bail – Compromise – Cheating – Petition allowed, petitioner directed to appear before the I.O. within a period of 10 days and she shall be released on interim bail on her furnishing bail/surety bonds subject to the conditions envisaged under Section 438(2) Cr.P.C. – Disposed of.

(Para 1-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – For transfer of trial from one Court to another, the Court must be fully satisfied about existence of such factors which would make it impossible to conduct a fair trial -- General allegation of surcharged atmosphere is not however sufficient -- One must also be mindful of the fact that when trial is shifted out from one State to another, it would tantamount to casting aspersions on the Court, having lawful jurisdiction to try the case -- Hence powers u/s 406 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in deserving cases when fair and impartial trial uninfluenced by external factors, is not at all possible -- If the Courts are able to function uninfluenced by public sentiment, shifting of trial would not be warranted.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Petitioners are on bail, being residents of Punjab, they continue to reside at their usual place and are going about their routine affairs -- If their threat perceptions were genuine, they could not have gone about their normal ways --  For this reason, the Court is inclined to believe that the atmosphere in the State does not justify shifting of the trial venue to another State.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – Alternative place without pleading -- Submission that, if the Trials cannot be shifted to Delhi, they should be shifted to Chandigarh – Held, this was not the pleaded case of the Petitioners -- Suggested alternate venue is Punjab’s capital and even though Chandigarh is an Union Territory, the population pattern in the city is like the rest of Punjab -- Such alternative plea on the grounds pleaded in these matters cannot therefore be countenanced.

(Para 20)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Transfer of trial from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary -- Except for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked -- Present bunch of cases are not perceived to be amongst such exceptional categories -- Cases are found devoid of merit, dismissed.

(Para 21-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 353, 186, 324, 326, 332, 333 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Grievous hurt – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner was arrested and then released on regular bail -- Subsequently, offences under Section 326, 333 IPC had been added -- It is not the case of the prosecution that petitioner has misused the concession of regular bail in any way -- Custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required -- Petition accepted.

(Para 3-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 308, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357 -- Incident of 2002 – Sentenced reduced to already undergone -- Considering the fact that the incident occurred on 13.01.2002 and the appellant has already served more than two years of sentence, while maintaining the conviction for the offence u/s 308/ 34 IPC and u/s 326 IPC, Court reduced the sentence for the period already undergone -- Compensation awarded for the offence u/s 308/34 IPC reduced to Rs.5,000/- and for offence u/s 326 IPC also reduced to Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Conviction under Arms Act – Dismissal of revision in default – Sustainability of -- Held, High Court was manifestly in error in rejecting the revision in default, on the ground that the appellant’s advocate had remained absent on the previous four occasions -- Since the revision before the High Court arose out of an order of the conviction under the Arms Act, the High Court ought to have appointed an Amicus Curiae in the absence of counsel -- Liberty of a citizen cannot be taken away in this manner – Appeal allowed, Revision restored to the file of the High Court.

(Para 7,8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 392, 394, 34 – Robbery and voluntary causing hurt while committing robbery – Compromise between parties -- Regular bail – Petitioners assaulted complainant and snatched Rs.8000/- from him -- One of petitioner took knife out from his pocket and inserted it in stomach -- Petitioners were arrested on 27.05.2020 and challan was presented on 23.7.2020 – In compromise deed respondent No.2-complainant has stated that he has not received any serious injury and the compromise has been effected between both the parties – Petitions allowed, petitioners directed to be released on regular bail.

(Para 3-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Bail on incomplete facts -- Cancellation of bail -- It is the duty of the Court to consider the entire actual facts and circumstances and then decide whether a particular accused is entitled for the grant of bail or not -- At the time of grant of bail to respondent No.2, the recovery of the knife and the corresponding injuries upon the deceased were not brought to the knowledge of the Court and were not taken into consideration -- When the said facts brought to the notice of the Court by the State, the same have been declared as insignificant so as to review the order granting bail – Held, once, a recovery of knife has been attributed to respondent No.2 as per his own disclosure statement and admittedly, there are corresponding injuries with the said weapon, which are fatal in nature received by the deceased on his head, the said facts cannot be treated as insignificant for considering the grant or cancellation of bail, especially when a person has lost his life -- Order granting bail cannot be sustained – Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender before the jail authority.

(Para 7-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 325, 302, 307, 447, 506, 511, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Murder case -- Second petition for regular bail – Considering allegation against the petitioner is of pelting of stone and the petitioner is in custody for a period of more than 2 years and 4 month, coupled with the fact that out of the total 83 witnesses cited by the prosecution, only 23 witnesses have been examined so far and trial in the case will take sufficient long time, Court deemed it appropriate to release the petitioner on regular bail -- Petition allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Abuse in public view -- Allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building -- It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house -- Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act quashed. Swaran Singh’s case (2008) 8 SCC 435 relied.

(Para 14, 15, 24)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act – Civil litigation between parties -- Dispute about the possession of the land -- Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting complainant to cultivate the land for the last six months -- Any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe -- Allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property -- If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out – Finding that appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.

(Para 13-22)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Part quashing of charge-sheet -- There is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part -- In a petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out -- Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. Ishwar Pratap Singh’s case (2018) 13 SCC 612 relied.

(Para 23,24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 17(1)(a)(b) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 141 – Food adulteration case -- Company not convicted – Nominated person held guilty – Legality of – Remand to fill lacuna of case – Permissibility of -- No material distinction between Section 141 of the NI Act and Section 17 of the Act which makes the Company as well as the Nominated Person to be held guilty of the offences and/or liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly -- Clauses (a) and (b) are not in the alternative but conjoint -- Therefore, in the absence of the Company, the Nominated Person cannot be convicted or vice versa -- Since the Company was not convicted by the trial court, finding of the High Court to revisit the judgment will be unfair to the appellant/Nominated Person who has been facing trial for more than last 30 years -- Order of remand to the trial court to fill up the lacuna is not a fair option exercised by the High Court as the failure of the trial court to convict the Company renders the entire conviction of the Nominated Person as unsustainable.

(Para 22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 401 – Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 42-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – First appeal against conviction – Condonation of delay – Right of -- Held, first appeal against conviction should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation -- Appellate Court was in error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation -- Revision petition allowed, matter remitted to the same Court for deciding the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. State of Odisha v. Surendra Munda’s case 2020 (4), RCR (Criminal), 286 relied.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – TIP -- Principles which have emerged from the precedents of Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

(i) The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye-witness to the crime;

(ii) There is no specific provision either in the CrPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP;

(iii) Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of Section 162 of the CrPC;

(iv) A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held;

(v) The identification of the accused in court constitutes substantive evidence;

(vi) Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act;

(vii) A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if so required;

(viii) As a rule of prudence, the court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration;

(ix) Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible;

(x) The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the court in the circumstances of that particular case;

(xi) Identification of the accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence; and

(xii) The court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 36)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Acquittal in murder case – Serious infirmity in evidence -- Refusal to go Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Effect of -- Identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused -- Finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade -- Presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt -- Ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities -- Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence -- Prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellants are, hence, entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the offence.

(Para 39,40)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Sections 61, 78(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- 90 boxes of country made liquor/total 1080 bottles for sale in Haryana only, were recovered from boot of white coloured Duster which was driven by co-accused and the petitioner was sitting on the conductor seat -- Petitioner in judicial custody since 07.09.2020 -- Investigation of the case is complete and the final report stands filed -- Considering the above background, custody of the petitioner and the fact that the offences are triable by Magistrate, Court found that the petitioner deserves the concession of regular bail -- Outbreak of pandemic COVID-19 in the region may further delay the conclusion of trial -- Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 2-6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) – NDPS case – Default bail -- Recovery of 1300 tablets of Alprozolam and 1000 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride -- Incomplete challan was presented in the Court -- No request was submitted to the said Court by the Investigating Agency seeking extension of time for the purpose of investigation of the case -- On the expiry of a period of 180 days, the accused has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court seeking default bail – Subsequent presentation of the report of FSL will not extinguish the right of the petitioner to seek a default bail -- Petitioner held entitled to the benefit of default bail.

(Para 14-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 399, 401 -- Second revision – Maintainability of – Filing of second revision petition, challenging the order passed by the Court of Session, while disposing of a revision petition is barred and it cannot be entertained by High court -- Revision petition dismissed accordingly.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of appellant – Conviction by Trial Court affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- Test Identification parade unworthy  – Forensic evidence withheld – Identification of accused by wearing of lungi – Un-natural behaviour of eye-witness -- Principle in criminal law which propagates that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to their innocence, the view favourable to the accused should be adopted -- Infirmities in the prosecution evidence, made out a case for interference -- Appeal allowed, judgment of trial Court as also of High Court set aside.

(Para 1, 8-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) – Adverse inference – Co-accused acquitted -- No chemical analyst report, relevant forensic evidence for the seized shirt of co-accused withheld by the prosecution -- When such vital forensic evidence is kept away, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution.

(Para 8.2)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – Presence of Police – Identity by lungis -- Test Identification evidence (YIP) is not substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in corroboration of statements in Court -- Major flaw was the presence of the police during the exercise, resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of section 162 of the Code -- Pahchan patra of the TIP mentions that three lungis were presented, the related witness was shown only one lungi for identification -- Such infirmities would render the TIP unworthy of acceptance, for supporting the prosecution.

(Para 10,11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Unnatural behaviour of the eye-witness – He was known to the deceased and claimed to have seen the assault -- He did not take any pro-active steps in the matter to either report to the police or inform any of the family members -- Such conduct of the eyewitness is contrary to human nature – His testimony deserves to be discarded.

(Para 14)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013), Section  13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Second bail application for anticipatory bail -- Petitioner alleged to have received a sum of Rs.9 lacs, in order to help the first informant’s son to immigrate to Canada -- First informant and the petitioner have settled the matter not disputed by first informant – Arrest of the petitioner stayed subject to the petitioner joining investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer -- Petitioner shall be bound by the conditions as envisaged under 438 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Registration of FIR – Inherent jurisdiction -- No abnormal delay in reporting the matter – Dy.S.P. issued notices to complainant party and recorded statements of various persons -- Police Officer cannot embark upon any elaborate inquiry to ascertain genuineness or reasonableness of the information and cannot refuse registration of criminal case -- It does not lie under the domain of Police Officer to substitute preliminary/detailed inquiry with the investigation of the case, as the investigation can only be done after registration of an FIR -- Refusal to register an FIR is not in accordance with law – Petition accepted and direction given for registration of case.

(Para 33-35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Reliability, genuineness and credibility of the information are not conditions precedent for registration of case -- Intention of the Legislature is to ensure prompt investigation of a cognizable offence in accordance with law – No discretion left with the Police Officer to register or not to register an FIR once information of a cognizable offence has been placed before him -- Action against erring police officer is warranted in such circumstances in which FIR is not registered in respect of cognizable offence. Some exceptions to the mandatory registration of FIR :

-- If the information does not disclose commission of cognizable offence, but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is made out or not. If the inquiry discloses cognizable offence the FIR be registered.

-- In case preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, the information is required to be supplied to the complainant within one week after disclosing the reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. Preliminary inquiry can be made in matrimonial disputes/ family disputes/ criminal offences/ medical negligence cases, corruption cases and cases where there is an abnormal delay in initiating criminal prosecution for more than three months in reporting the matter without satisfactory explanation for the delay -- Preliminary inquiry has to be completed within seven days and the delay if any, should be reflected in the general/daily diary of the Police Station.

Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) --  Non-registration of FIR – Procedure thereafter -- If a person has a grievance that the Police is not registering the FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C, then he can approach the Sr. Superintendent of Police u/s 154(3) Cr.P.C. by way of filing a representation in writing -- If such representation does not yield any satisfactory result and the FIR is not registered, then it would be open to the aggrieved person to file an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate concerned -- On receipt of such application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can direct for registration of FIR -- Magistrate can also monitor the investigation to ensure an appropriate investigation. Madhu Bala’s case 1997(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 679.

(Para 27)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 , 482 -- Registration of FIR – Constitutional validity-- Expression 'es unius est exclusion alterious' is fully applicable to the interpretation attached with Section 154 Cr.P.C. which means that expression of one thing is the exclusion of another -- Mandate of recording the information in writing excludes the possibility of not recording the information of commission of a cognizable offence in the special register -- Therefore, conducting the investigation into an offence after registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. is the procedure established by law and the same is in conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 29)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1) -- Registration of F.I.R. -- Nature of F.I.R. – There are two types of FIRs i.e. the FIR which is duly signed by the complainant u/s 154(1) Cr.P.C and the second type of FIR could be the FIR which is registered by the Police itself on any information received or other than by way of an informant and even this information has to be duly recorded and the copy thereof should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith u/s 157(1) Cr.P.C -- It would be obligatory on the part of Police to register FIR.

(Para 30)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 166 -- FIR – Arrest of accused – Registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. and arrest of the accused are entirely different things -- Arrest of the accused is not automatic on registration of an FIR -- Arrest cannot be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence -- It would be prudent for a Police Officer not to arrest a person without a reasonable satisfaction after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fide of a complaint and reasonable belief in the context of complicity of the accused -- Arrest of person and registration of FIR are not directly linked as both have two concepts, operating under different parameters -- Misuse of aforesaid concept would result in action against the Police Officer under Section 166 IPC.

(Para 31)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 Cr.P.C., if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence -- No preliminary inquiry is permitted in such a situation -- Preliminary inquiry can be conducted in matrimonial cases, case relating to family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay of more than 3 months in initiating criminal prosecution or reporting the matter to the police without satisfactory explanation. Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 32)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR – Cancellation of -- It would be prerogative of the Police to file cancellation of the FIR after investigation in accordance with law -- In such eventuality, the complainant would be having a right to file protest petition on receipt of notice from the Court -- Thereafter the Court may accept the cancellation report or proceed with the case as a criminal case on receipt of preliminary evidence or may pass any other order in accordance with law including further investigation.

(Para 34)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail – Parity with similarly situated co-accused – Right of -- Once, a similarly situated co-accused has already been granted the bail, the same could not be denied to the petitioner unless and until any differentiating fact is pointed out -- No differentiating fact has been pointed out between the petitioner and co-accused -- Hence, the petitioner has been able to make out a case for the grant of bail on the ground of parity with co-accused – Without commenting upon the merits of the case, petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail

(Para 13,14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of cases -- Transfer power u/s 406 of the Code is to be invoked sparingly -- Only when fair justice is in peril, a plea for transfer might be considered -- Court however will have to be fully satisfied that impartial trial is not possible -- Equally important is to verify that the apprehension of not getting a level playing field, is based on some credible material and not just conjectures and surmises.

-- Plea for transfer of case should not be entertained on mere apprehension of a hyper sensitive person

-- While considering a plea for transfer, the convenience of parties would be a relevant consideration -- It can’t just be the convenience of the petitioner but also of the Complainant, the Witnesses, the Prosecution besides the larger issue of trial being conducted under the jurisdictional Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of cases -- Petitioner is not pointing any fingers towards the courts and his apprehension is based only on the action taken by the State -- Transfer of trials from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary but for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked.

(Para 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 437 -- Default bail – Condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/- – Permissibility of – Held, only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail u/s 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be -- And within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail -- Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. -- Condition imposed by the High Court is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside – Condition quashed and set aside.

(Para 9-11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail -- Condition directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation is concerned is unsustainable, as it is too harsh -- Instead, condition which can be imposed is directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to remain present before the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when called for, and on breach the investigating officer can approach the concerned court for cancellation of the bail – Condition modified by Supreme Court.

(Para 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Fair trial – Cross-examination – Right of -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. to place on record certain documents was allowed, no witness was recalled or examined for the purpose of proving the additional record and the same was taken on file straightway – Petitioners filed application u/s 311 Cr.P.C to recall witnesses for the purpose of cross-examining them in relation to the additional record -- Application dismissed on the ground that the petitioners could lead defence evidence and examine any official from the concerned department – Held, denial of the petitioners' right of cross-examination cannot be countenanced -- It is a valuable right given to the accused and such right cannot be diluted in this fashion -- Approach adopted by the learned ASJ negated the very basic and fundamental norms of a fair trial – Direction given to ld. ASJ to recall the witnesses for further cross-examination and proceed thereafter with the case in accordance with law – Revision allowed.

(Para 10-14)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 452, 120-B and 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 – Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR – Report of JMIC that statements of the parties were recorded which indicates that the compromise is genuine, without any coercion or undue influence -- Inherent jurisdiction of u/s 482 Cr.P.C. exercised so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law – FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed – Petition allowed.

(Para 1-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 190, 482 – Cancellation report of FIR – ACJM vide impugned order directed attached the cancellation report with protest petition and fixed the case for evidence of the complainant – Held, cancellation report filed by the police is not binding on ACJM -- Magistrate may accept the report or on receipt of protest petition or even suo-motu direct re-investigation or further investigation and protest petition filed can be treated as complaint petition, if prima facie a case is made out -- As of now, the impugned order cannot be set aside on mere apprehension that protest petition has already been treated as a complaint u/s 190 Cr.P.C – Petition dismissed.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 207, 208 – Challan filed – Cognizance by court -- Right of accused to copy of challan -- It is only after taking of the cognizance and issuance of process that the accused is entitled, in terms of Sections 207 and 208 of the Code, to copies of the documents referred to in said provisions.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 173, 190, 207, 208 – Challan filed – Cognizance by court – Right of accused to copy of statement u/s 164 Cr.P.c. – No person is entitled to a copy of statement recorded u/s 164 of the Code till the appropriate orders are passed by the court after the charge-sheet is filed -- Right to receive a copy of such statement will arise only after cognizance is taken and at the stage contemplated by Sections 207 and 208 of the Code and not before -- Application of accused was, therefore, rightly rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge and the order so passed did not call for any interference by the High Court.

(Para 16,17)