Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

905. (P&H HC) 15-12-2020

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 -- Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Whether discretion of Appellate Court – Held, power vested with the lower Appellate Court, though discretionary is supposed to be a ‘rule’ and said discretion should be exercised in all the cases unless there are some exceptional circumstances justifying deviation from the said rule.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Power of Appellate Court -- Amount is required to be deposited within a period of 60 days which may further be extended by another 30 days -- Lower Appellate Court having granted one month’s period only for depositing the amount, the same is contrary to the provisions of the Act -- Error needs to be rectified.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 374 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case – Appeal against conviction – Pre-condition of deposit of 20% of amount of fine or compensation – Interpretation of -- Section 374 Cr.P.C. does not prescribe any condition for admission of an appeal – Deposit of 20% of the compensation amount under no circumstances can be interpreted to be a condition pre-requisite for availing the right of appeal -- Imposition of any condition at the time of suspending of sentence may be a different matter failing which the order suspending sentence may be vacated -- While giving a wider connotation to Article 21 of Constitution of India, it can even be said that depriving a convict of his right to appeal by imposing any pre-requisite for availing his statutory right to challenge conviction in a higher Court would amount to depriving his liberty without adhering to the established procedure of law.

(Para 12, 13)

906. (SC) 14-12-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Closure report – Fair Investigaiton -- Investigation and closure report do not contain any material with regard to the nature of investigation for insufficiency of evidence against them -- Closure report is based on the ipse dixit of the Investigating Officer -- Investigation appears to be a sham, designed to conceal more than to investigate -- Police has the primary duty to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence -- This is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. apart from being a constitutional obligation to ensure that peace is maintained in the society and the rule of law is upheld and applied -- To say that further investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate is a preposterous statement, coming from the police – Trial of other accused stayed, closure reports partly set aside insofar as the non-charged sheeted accused are concerned -- I.P.S. appointed to carry out further investigation through a team of competent officers.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Investigaiton by police – Interference in – Power of -- Police has a statutory duty to investigate into any crime in accordance with law as provided in the Cr. P.C. -- Investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with -- But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police -- Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the materials on record, that the police has not investigated properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law -- If the court gives any directions for that purpose within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to interference with investigation -- A fair investigation is, but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden obligation to ensure adherence by the police.

(Para 8)

909. (SC) 03-12-2020

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)

912. (SC) 25-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – For transfer of trial from one Court to another, the Court must be fully satisfied about existence of such factors which would make it impossible to conduct a fair trial -- General allegation of surcharged atmosphere is not however sufficient -- One must also be mindful of the fact that when trial is shifted out from one State to another, it would tantamount to casting aspersions on the Court, having lawful jurisdiction to try the case -- Hence powers u/s 406 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in deserving cases when fair and impartial trial uninfluenced by external factors, is not at all possible -- If the Courts are able to function uninfluenced by public sentiment, shifting of trial would not be warranted.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Petitioners are on bail, being residents of Punjab, they continue to reside at their usual place and are going about their routine affairs -- If their threat perceptions were genuine, they could not have gone about their normal ways --  For this reason, the Court is inclined to believe that the atmosphere in the State does not justify shifting of the trial venue to another State.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – Alternative place without pleading -- Submission that, if the Trials cannot be shifted to Delhi, they should be shifted to Chandigarh – Held, this was not the pleaded case of the Petitioners -- Suggested alternate venue is Punjab’s capital and even though Chandigarh is an Union Territory, the population pattern in the city is like the rest of Punjab -- Such alternative plea on the grounds pleaded in these matters cannot therefore be countenanced.

(Para 20)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Transfer of trial from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary -- Except for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked -- Present bunch of cases are not perceived to be amongst such exceptional categories -- Cases are found devoid of merit, dismissed.

(Para 21-23)

914. (P&H HC) 23-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

916. (SC) 19-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)

921. (SC) 05-11-2020

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Abuse in public view -- Allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building -- It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house -- Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act quashed. Swaran Singh’s case (2008) 8 SCC 435 relied.

(Para 14, 15, 24)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Offence under SC/ST Act – Civil litigation between parties -- Dispute about the possession of the land -- Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting complainant to cultivate the land for the last six months -- Any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe -- Allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property -- If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out – Finding that appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.

(Para 13-22)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Part quashing of charge-sheet -- There is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part -- In a petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Charges against the appellant u/s 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out -- Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. Ishwar Pratap Singh’s case (2018) 13 SCC 612 relied.

(Para 23,24)

924. (SC) 03-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – TIP -- Principles which have emerged from the precedents of Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

(i) The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye-witness to the crime;

(ii) There is no specific provision either in the CrPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP;

(iii) Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of Section 162 of the CrPC;

(iv) A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held;

(v) The identification of the accused in court constitutes substantive evidence;

(vi) Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act;

(vii) A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in court, if so required;

(viii) As a rule of prudence, the court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration;

(ix) Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible;

(x) The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the court in the circumstances of that particular case;

(xi) Identification of the accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence; and

(xii) The court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.

(Para 36)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 – Acquittal in murder case – Serious infirmity in evidence -- Refusal to go Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Effect of -- Identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused -- Finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade -- Presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt -- Ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities -- Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence -- Prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellants are, hence, entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the offence.

(Para 39,40)

928. (SC) 29-10-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of appellant – Conviction by Trial Court affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- Test Identification parade unworthy  – Forensic evidence withheld – Identification of accused by wearing of lungi – Un-natural behaviour of eye-witness -- Principle in criminal law which propagates that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to their innocence, the view favourable to the accused should be adopted -- Infirmities in the prosecution evidence, made out a case for interference -- Appeal allowed, judgment of trial Court as also of High Court set aside.

(Para 1, 8-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) – Adverse inference – Co-accused acquitted -- No chemical analyst report, relevant forensic evidence for the seized shirt of co-accused withheld by the prosecution -- When such vital forensic evidence is kept away, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution.

(Para 8.2)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – Presence of Police – Identity by lungis -- Test Identification evidence (YIP) is not substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in corroboration of statements in Court -- Major flaw was the presence of the police during the exercise, resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of section 162 of the Code -- Pahchan patra of the TIP mentions that three lungis were presented, the related witness was shown only one lungi for identification -- Such infirmities would render the TIP unworthy of acceptance, for supporting the prosecution.

(Para 10,11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Unnatural behaviour of the eye-witness – He was known to the deceased and claimed to have seen the assault -- He did not take any pro-active steps in the matter to either report to the police or inform any of the family members -- Such conduct of the eyewitness is contrary to human nature – His testimony deserves to be discarded.

(Para 14)

929. (SC) 29-10-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

931. (P&H HC) 27-10-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Registration of FIR – Inherent jurisdiction -- No abnormal delay in reporting the matter – Dy.S.P. issued notices to complainant party and recorded statements of various persons -- Police Officer cannot embark upon any elaborate inquiry to ascertain genuineness or reasonableness of the information and cannot refuse registration of criminal case -- It does not lie under the domain of Police Officer to substitute preliminary/detailed inquiry with the investigation of the case, as the investigation can only be done after registration of an FIR -- Refusal to register an FIR is not in accordance with law – Petition accepted and direction given for registration of case.

(Para 33-35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Reliability, genuineness and credibility of the information are not conditions precedent for registration of case -- Intention of the Legislature is to ensure prompt investigation of a cognizable offence in accordance with law – No discretion left with the Police Officer to register or not to register an FIR once information of a cognizable offence has been placed before him -- Action against erring police officer is warranted in such circumstances in which FIR is not registered in respect of cognizable offence. Some exceptions to the mandatory registration of FIR :

-- If the information does not disclose commission of cognizable offence, but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is made out or not. If the inquiry discloses cognizable offence the FIR be registered.

-- In case preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, the information is required to be supplied to the complainant within one week after disclosing the reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. Preliminary inquiry can be made in matrimonial disputes/ family disputes/ criminal offences/ medical negligence cases, corruption cases and cases where there is an abnormal delay in initiating criminal prosecution for more than three months in reporting the matter without satisfactory explanation for the delay -- Preliminary inquiry has to be completed within seven days and the delay if any, should be reflected in the general/daily diary of the Police Station.

Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) --  Non-registration of FIR – Procedure thereafter -- If a person has a grievance that the Police is not registering the FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C, then he can approach the Sr. Superintendent of Police u/s 154(3) Cr.P.C. by way of filing a representation in writing -- If such representation does not yield any satisfactory result and the FIR is not registered, then it would be open to the aggrieved person to file an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate concerned -- On receipt of such application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can direct for registration of FIR -- Magistrate can also monitor the investigation to ensure an appropriate investigation. Madhu Bala’s case 1997(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 679.

(Para 27)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 , 482 -- Registration of FIR – Constitutional validity-- Expression 'es unius est exclusion alterious' is fully applicable to the interpretation attached with Section 154 Cr.P.C. which means that expression of one thing is the exclusion of another -- Mandate of recording the information in writing excludes the possibility of not recording the information of commission of a cognizable offence in the special register -- Therefore, conducting the investigation into an offence after registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. is the procedure established by law and the same is in conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 29)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1) -- Registration of F.I.R. -- Nature of F.I.R. – There are two types of FIRs i.e. the FIR which is duly signed by the complainant u/s 154(1) Cr.P.C and the second type of FIR could be the FIR which is registered by the Police itself on any information received or other than by way of an informant and even this information has to be duly recorded and the copy thereof should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith u/s 157(1) Cr.P.C -- It would be obligatory on the part of Police to register FIR.

(Para 30)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 166 -- FIR – Arrest of accused – Registration of FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. and arrest of the accused are entirely different things -- Arrest of the accused is not automatic on registration of an FIR -- Arrest cannot be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence -- It would be prudent for a Police Officer not to arrest a person without a reasonable satisfaction after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fide of a complaint and reasonable belief in the context of complicity of the accused -- Arrest of person and registration of FIR are not directly linked as both have two concepts, operating under different parameters -- Misuse of aforesaid concept would result in action against the Police Officer under Section 166 IPC.

(Para 31)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR -- Registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 Cr.P.C., if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence -- No preliminary inquiry is permitted in such a situation -- Preliminary inquiry can be conducted in matrimonial cases, case relating to family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay of more than 3 months in initiating criminal prosecution or reporting the matter to the police without satisfactory explanation. Lalita Kumari’s case 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 relied.

(Para 32)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Registration of FIR – Cancellation of -- It would be prerogative of the Police to file cancellation of the FIR after investigation in accordance with law -- In such eventuality, the complainant would be having a right to file protest petition on receipt of notice from the Court -- Thereafter the Court may accept the cancellation report or proceed with the case as a criminal case on receipt of preliminary evidence or may pass any other order in accordance with law including further investigation.

(Para 34)

934. (SC) 15-10-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 437 -- Default bail – Condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/- – Permissibility of – Held, only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail u/s 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be -- And within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail -- Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. -- Condition imposed by the High Court is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside – Condition quashed and set aside.

(Para 9-11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail -- Condition directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation is concerned is unsustainable, as it is too harsh -- Instead, condition which can be imposed is directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to remain present before the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when called for, and on breach the investigating officer can approach the concerned court for cancellation of the bail – Condition modified by Supreme Court.

(Para 10)

936. (P&H HC) 13-10-2020

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)

945. (SC) 30-09-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 461(I), 462 -- Criminal cases – Trail of offence/offender  – Territorial jurisdiction – Appropriate Court to raise the issue -- Words “tries an offence” are more appropriate than the words “tries an offender” in section 461 (l) -- This is because, lack of jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be cured by section 462 and hence section 461, logically, could have included the trial of an offence by a Magistrate, not empowered by law to do so, as one of the several items which make the proceedings void -- In contrast, the trial of an offender by a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of section 462, provided there is no other bar for the court to try the said offender (such as in section 27) -- But Section 461 (l) makes the proceedings of a Magistrate void, if he tried an offender, when not empowered by law to do.

-- the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence” or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depend upon facts established through evidence

-- if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same has to be decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in sections 177 to 184 of the Code and

-- these questions may have to be raised before the court trying the offence and such court is bound to consider the same.

(Para 38, 39)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 26, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 461(I), 462 -- Criminal cases – Territorial jurisdiction – Transfer of petition – Power of -- Facts to be established by evidence, may relate either to the place of commission of the offence or to other things dealt with by Sections 177 to 184 of the Code -- In such circumstances, Supreme Court cannot order transfer, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, even before evidence is marshalled -- Hence the transfer petitions dismissed.

(Para 41, 42)

949. (SC) 25-09-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances -- In case of a circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else and the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 5.4)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 100(4), 166 (3)(4) – Search in violation of Section 100(4) and 166(3)(4) of Cr.P.C -- Circumstantial evidence – Role of -- Investigaiton officer received a secret information that one jeep is lying in abandoned condition on the Chandigarh road and though the distance was around 300 kilo meters, he straightway went to Chandigarh and recovered the jeep in the presence of Bhunter people brought by him and did not follow the procedure as required to be followed under Section 166 (3 & 4), Cr.P.C -- Even he did not comply with the provisions of Section 100 (4) Cr.P.C -- Non-following of the aforesaid provisions alone may not be a ground to acquit the accused -- However, considering the overall surrounding circumstances and in a case where recovery is seriously doubted, non-compliance of the aforesaid play an important role.

(Para 7)