Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

861. (SC) 20-01-2021

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357-A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Writ jurisdiction -- Rape victim – Rights of -- Held, petitioner being a rape victim deserves treatment as rape victim by all the authorities – A rape victim suffers not only a mental trauma but also discrimination from the society – Petitioner has two sons and one daughter – One son major, two children of the petitioner are still minor – Section 357A of the Cr.P.C provides procedure for grant of compensation, the petitioner had already made application to seek compensation under the above Scheme and payment of compensation has already been made. Directions given :

-- The Deputy Commissioner, to take measure to ensure that minor children of the petitioner are provided free education in any of the Government Institutions in District where the petitioner is residing till they attain the age of 14 years.

-- The Deputy Commissioner may also consider the case of the petitioner for providing house under Prime Minister Awas Yojna or any other Central or State Scheme in which petitioner could be provided accommodation.

-- The Senior Superintendent of Police, and other competent authority shall review the Police security provided to the petitioner from time to time and take such measures as deem fit and proper.

-- The District Legal Services Authority on representation made by the petitioner shall render legal services to the petitioner as may be deemed fit to safeguard the interest of the petitioner.

(Para 16-19, 25-27)

870. (P&H HC) 13-01-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Two appeals i.e. one by accused and one by complainant – Appellate Court allowed additional evidence in complainant’s appeal, it could not have decided the appeals at that stage -- Both appeals necessarily had to await the adducing of additional evidence so that the appellate Court could take the same into account while deciding them comprehensively.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Defamation complaint case -- Additional evidence -- Trial Court had not used coercive measures to secure the presence of the concerned Clerk of Jagbani Newspaper so as to determine the link between the advertisement and the accused, if any, and that the record maintained by the office of Jagbani Newspaper was also not produced -- It was in these circumstances that the appellate Court concluded that the trial Court had closed the evidence in a hasty manner and allowed the complainant's application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Targeted case for early disposal – In such circumstances, the consent of the complainant cannot be held against him -- Appellate Court was always at liberty to exercise power independently u/s 391 Cr.P.C., once it felt that such evidence was necessary and recorded reasons therefor.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Additional evidence in appeal – Delay in application – Effect of -- Application was filed in 2017, long after the institution of the appeal in the 2013 -- Delay cannot be held to be fatal -- Appellate Court had suo motu power to exercise discretion u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Therefore, delay in the filing of the application does not vitiate the opinion formed by the appellate Court.

(Para 22)

871. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Warrant remained unexecuted as accused-petitioner shifted – Proclamation on same address – Legality of – FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Sustainability of -- Without any basis, the Court formed an opinion that the petitioner is intentionally avoiding service and that he is either absconding or concealing himself -- Rather the Court was duty bound to ask the complainant to furnish his fresh address and ensure that the petitioner was duly served before commencing with the coercive process -- Held, trial Court was not required to invoke the provisions of Section 82 of Cr.P.C. -- Declaration of the petitioner as a proclaimed person, and the consequent registration of the impugned FIR cannot be sustained.

(Para 10-12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Settlement between parties – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Entire amount of the cheque in dispute stands paid -- Complainant does not have any objection, in case, the impugned order and FIR are quashed -- Once there is an amicable settlement between the parties and the main petition u/s 138 of N.I. Act, wherein accused was declared as a proclaimed person, stands withdrawn, proceedings u/s 174-A IPC cannot be permitted to continue -- Impugned order and FIR u/s 174-A, IPC quashed along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

(Para 13, 14)

872. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

877. (SC) 05-01-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

886. (P&H HC) 15-12-2020

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 -- Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Whether discretion of Appellate Court – Held, power vested with the lower Appellate Court, though discretionary is supposed to be a ‘rule’ and said discretion should be exercised in all the cases unless there are some exceptional circumstances justifying deviation from the said rule.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Deposit of 20% amount of fine or compensation – Power of Appellate Court -- Amount is required to be deposited within a period of 60 days which may further be extended by another 30 days -- Lower Appellate Court having granted one month’s period only for depositing the amount, the same is contrary to the provisions of the Act -- Error needs to be rectified.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 374 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case – Appeal against conviction – Pre-condition of deposit of 20% of amount of fine or compensation – Interpretation of -- Section 374 Cr.P.C. does not prescribe any condition for admission of an appeal – Deposit of 20% of the compensation amount under no circumstances can be interpreted to be a condition pre-requisite for availing the right of appeal -- Imposition of any condition at the time of suspending of sentence may be a different matter failing which the order suspending sentence may be vacated -- While giving a wider connotation to Article 21 of Constitution of India, it can even be said that depriving a convict of his right to appeal by imposing any pre-requisite for availing his statutory right to challenge conviction in a higher Court would amount to depriving his liberty without adhering to the established procedure of law.

(Para 12, 13)

887. (SC) 14-12-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Closure report – Fair Investigaiton -- Investigation and closure report do not contain any material with regard to the nature of investigation for insufficiency of evidence against them -- Closure report is based on the ipse dixit of the Investigating Officer -- Investigation appears to be a sham, designed to conceal more than to investigate -- Police has the primary duty to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence -- This is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. apart from being a constitutional obligation to ensure that peace is maintained in the society and the rule of law is upheld and applied -- To say that further investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate is a preposterous statement, coming from the police – Trial of other accused stayed, closure reports partly set aside insofar as the non-charged sheeted accused are concerned -- I.P.S. appointed to carry out further investigation through a team of competent officers.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Investigaiton by police – Interference in – Power of -- Police has a statutory duty to investigate into any crime in accordance with law as provided in the Cr. P.C. -- Investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with -- But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police -- Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the materials on record, that the police has not investigated properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law -- If the court gives any directions for that purpose within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to interference with investigation -- A fair investigation is, but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden obligation to ensure adherence by the police.

(Para 8)

890. (SC) 03-12-2020

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Registration of FIR – Cognizance of offence -- Court concluded:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

(Para 13)

B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4, 21, 22, 23-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 414 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Section 22 – Offence under Mines Act and IPC -- Compounding of offence – Effect of -- In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section1 of Section 23A, considering sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder so compounded -- However, the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.

(Para 13)

893. (SC) 25-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – For transfer of trial from one Court to another, the Court must be fully satisfied about existence of such factors which would make it impossible to conduct a fair trial -- General allegation of surcharged atmosphere is not however sufficient -- One must also be mindful of the fact that when trial is shifted out from one State to another, it would tantamount to casting aspersions on the Court, having lawful jurisdiction to try the case -- Hence powers u/s 406 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in deserving cases when fair and impartial trial uninfluenced by external factors, is not at all possible -- If the Courts are able to function uninfluenced by public sentiment, shifting of trial would not be warranted.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Petitioners are on bail, being residents of Punjab, they continue to reside at their usual place and are going about their routine affairs -- If their threat perceptions were genuine, they could not have gone about their normal ways --  For this reason, the Court is inclined to believe that the atmosphere in the State does not justify shifting of the trial venue to another State.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial – Alternative place without pleading -- Submission that, if the Trials cannot be shifted to Delhi, they should be shifted to Chandigarh – Held, this was not the pleaded case of the Petitioners -- Suggested alternate venue is Punjab’s capital and even though Chandigarh is an Union Territory, the population pattern in the city is like the rest of Punjab -- Such alternative plea on the grounds pleaded in these matters cannot therefore be countenanced.

(Para 20)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of trial -- Transfer of trial from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary -- Except for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked -- Present bunch of cases are not perceived to be amongst such exceptional categories -- Cases are found devoid of merit, dismissed.

(Para 21-23)

895. (P&H HC) 23-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

897. (SC) 19-11-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Hostile witness – Consideration of other evidence for conviction -- No doubt large number of witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of prosecution conducted the case -- In the absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice to convict the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313, 433, 433-A -- Murder of wife – Circumstantial evidence – Conviction of husband – Appeal against – Commutation of sentence -- Death by asphyxia due to strangulation -- Minimum five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death -- Most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found -- It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant/husband where there were only family members staying – No possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased – Appellant/ husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation -- No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries -- This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime -- Appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation – Appeal dismissed -- Respondent/State directed to examine for release of appellant on completion of 14 years of actual sentence in accordance with norms.

(Para 23-27)