Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

856. (SC) 11-02-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 -- “weapon of offence” -- Wooden lathi and batten are the weapons which are possessed by the police and the submission cannot be accepted that the injuries cannot be caused by wooden lathi and batten which may cause death -- It depends on the manner of use of the wooden lathi and batten.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Compounding of offence with leave by the court -- Grant of leave as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 320 is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of request by the appellant which may be agreed by the victim -- Statutory requirement, makes it a clear duty of the Court to look into the nature of the offence and the evidence and to satisfy itself whether permission should be or should not be granted -- Administration of criminal justice requires prosecution of all offenders by the State -- Nature of offence, and its affect on society are relevant considerations while granting leave by the Court of compounding the offence -- Offences which affect the public in general and create fear in the public in general are serious offences, nature of which offence may be relevant consideration for Court to grant or refuse the leave.

(Para 30-32)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Compounding of offence – Permissibility of -- Police of State is protector of law and order -- People look forward to the Police to protect their life and property -- Beating of a person in the Police Station is the concern for all and causes a sense of fear in the entire society – Accused who were police officers, one of them being in-charge of Station and other Senior Inspector have themselves brutally beaten the deceased, who died the same night -- Their offences cannot be compounded by the Court in exercise of Section 320(2) read with sub-section (5) – Prayer of the appellant to compound the offence rejected.

(Para 36-38)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Custodial death – Compensation for -- Custodial violence on the deceased which led to the death is abhorrent and not acceptable in the civilized society -- Offence committed by the accused is crime not against the deceased alone but was against humanity and clear violations of rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Although the High Court has awarded the compensation of Rs.3 Lakhs in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased, held compensation awarded was not adequate -- Sentence of one year is reduced to six months -- Compensation of Rs.3.5 Lakhs each to the legal heir of the deceased in addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court granted.

(Para 39-43)

862. (SC) 03-02-2021

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Criminal appeal against conviction – Scope and ambit of -- Argument are either a question of fact or an abortive attempt for re-appreciation of evidence on record -- Such discourse ordinarily does not fall within the scope and ambit of powers vested in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(i) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Recovery of Ganja – Ground not taken in defence statement u/s 313 Cr.P.c. – Effect of -- Appellant apprehended at the spot of the incident but also was found in conscious possession of the ganja -- As regard to his co-accused, there is unfortunately no material on record to shed light on the circumstances in which charge sheet was not filed against him -- Appellant, however, did not rely upon this fact either in his defense statement u/s 313, CrPC or otherwise -- Aforementioned supplication therefore cannot be entertained at this belated stage.

(Para 8)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(1), 136 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(i) -- Reduction of sentence -- Passionately urges that: (i) the appellant has suffered protracted trial for more than 23 years; (ii) he alone has been convicted while his co-accused are acquitted; (iii) the appellant was not involved in any other case under the NDPS Act or other Penal Laws; (iv) the appellant has already undergone actual sentence of 2 years 4 months and 16 days out of the total sentence of five years; (v) and that the appellant has not misused the concession of bail granted by this Court on 02.11.2012 – Court found some merit in the submission noticed above – Appellant committed the crime in the year 1997, i.e., much before the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 came into force -- Section 20(i) of NDPS Act (as it stood in 1997), that even though a maximum sentence of five years RI and a fine of upto Rs. 50,000/- was prescribed but there was no minimum mandatory sentence – Held, ends of justice would be adequately met if the appellant’s sentence is reduced to the extent of the period he has already undergone -- Appellant shall be liable to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-.

(Para 9-12)

864. (SC) 03-02-2021

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 17 – Money laundering case -- Freezing / Stop operation of bank accounts – Procedure of -- Material on record – Authorised officer/ Adjudication officer – Role of -- No material to show that Director or other Authorised Officer recorded his belief, on the basis of information in his possession, that appellant had committed acts relating to money laundering and there was need to seize record or property -- It only stated that the Officer was investigating the case and sought relevant documents, but in the tabular column it was abruptly stated that the accounts have to be ‘debit freezed/ stop operations’ -- Freezing or the continuation thereof is without due compliance of the legal requirement and, therefore, not sustainable.

-- Since freezing of accounts was without following the prescribed procedure, respondent banks are directed to defreeze the respective accounts and clear the cheques issued by the appellant towards statutory dues such as ITDS, PF, ESI, Professional Tax, Gratuity etc., subject to availability of funds in the accounts. If any further amount remains available in the accounts after payment of the statutory dues and with regard to the same any action is to be taken by the respondent No.4, it would be open to them to do so subject to compliance of the required legal procedure afresh.

(Para 11-16)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 17 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102 – Money laundering case -- Freezing / Stop operation of bank account – Procedure u/s 17 of PLA not followed – Seizure u/s Section 102 Cr.P.C. would not be valid for the reasons :

Firstly, Since PMLA is a stand-alone enactment and it contains provision for seizure (including freezing), the procedure contemplated therein has to be followed.

Secondly, when power is available under a special enactment, power under general law cannot be resorted to.

Thirdly, scheme of Section 102 Cr.P.C. is different from the scheme under PMLA. Power under Section 102 CrPC is for the Police Officer to be exercised during course of investigation.

Lastly, if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner.

(Paras 11, 12, 15)

866. (SC) 02-02-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Appeal against conviction – Acquittal by High Court -- Non-consideration of reasons of trial court and re-appreciation of evidence – Sustainability of -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent/accused without adverting to the reasons given by the Ld. trial Court while convicting the accused and without reappreciating the entire evidence on record in detail cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside -- Appeal before the High Court is restored to its original file.

(Para 6, 6.1, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378 -- Appeal against acquittal/ conviction – Power of Court -- Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal passed by the Learned trial Court, is required to bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused -- Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law -- Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court -- Therefore, while dealing with the cases of acquittal by the trial Court, the Appellate Court would have certain limitations -- So far as the appeal against the order of conviction is concerned, there are no such restrictions and the Court of appeal has wide powers of appreciation of evidence and the High Court has to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record being a First Appellate Court. Keeping in mind that once the Learned Trial Court has convicted there shall not be presumption of innocence as would be there in the case of acquittal.

(Para 6.1-6.2)

880. (SC) 20-01-2021

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357-A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Writ jurisdiction -- Rape victim – Rights of -- Held, petitioner being a rape victim deserves treatment as rape victim by all the authorities – A rape victim suffers not only a mental trauma but also discrimination from the society – Petitioner has two sons and one daughter – One son major, two children of the petitioner are still minor – Section 357A of the Cr.P.C provides procedure for grant of compensation, the petitioner had already made application to seek compensation under the above Scheme and payment of compensation has already been made. Directions given :

-- The Deputy Commissioner, to take measure to ensure that minor children of the petitioner are provided free education in any of the Government Institutions in District where the petitioner is residing till they attain the age of 14 years.

-- The Deputy Commissioner may also consider the case of the petitioner for providing house under Prime Minister Awas Yojna or any other Central or State Scheme in which petitioner could be provided accommodation.

-- The Senior Superintendent of Police, and other competent authority shall review the Police security provided to the petitioner from time to time and take such measures as deem fit and proper.

-- The District Legal Services Authority on representation made by the petitioner shall render legal services to the petitioner as may be deemed fit to safeguard the interest of the petitioner.

(Para 16-19, 25-27)

889. (P&H HC) 13-01-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Two appeals i.e. one by accused and one by complainant – Appellate Court allowed additional evidence in complainant’s appeal, it could not have decided the appeals at that stage -- Both appeals necessarily had to await the adducing of additional evidence so that the appellate Court could take the same into account while deciding them comprehensively.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Defamation complaint case -- Additional evidence -- Trial Court had not used coercive measures to secure the presence of the concerned Clerk of Jagbani Newspaper so as to determine the link between the advertisement and the accused, if any, and that the record maintained by the office of Jagbani Newspaper was also not produced -- It was in these circumstances that the appellate Court concluded that the trial Court had closed the evidence in a hasty manner and allowed the complainant's application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Targeted case for early disposal – In such circumstances, the consent of the complainant cannot be held against him -- Appellate Court was always at liberty to exercise power independently u/s 391 Cr.P.C., once it felt that such evidence was necessary and recorded reasons therefor.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Additional evidence in appeal – Delay in application – Effect of -- Application was filed in 2017, long after the institution of the appeal in the 2013 -- Delay cannot be held to be fatal -- Appellate Court had suo motu power to exercise discretion u/s 391 Cr.P.C. -- Therefore, delay in the filing of the application does not vitiate the opinion formed by the appellate Court.

(Para 22)

890. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Warrant remained unexecuted as accused-petitioner shifted – Proclamation on same address – Legality of – FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Sustainability of -- Without any basis, the Court formed an opinion that the petitioner is intentionally avoiding service and that he is either absconding or concealing himself -- Rather the Court was duty bound to ask the complainant to furnish his fresh address and ensure that the petitioner was duly served before commencing with the coercive process -- Held, trial Court was not required to invoke the provisions of Section 82 of Cr.P.C. -- Declaration of the petitioner as a proclaimed person, and the consequent registration of the impugned FIR cannot be sustained.

(Para 10-12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Settlement between parties – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Entire amount of the cheque in dispute stands paid -- Complainant does not have any objection, in case, the impugned order and FIR are quashed -- Once there is an amicable settlement between the parties and the main petition u/s 138 of N.I. Act, wherein accused was declared as a proclaimed person, stands withdrawn, proceedings u/s 174-A IPC cannot be permitted to continue -- Impugned order and FIR u/s 174-A, IPC quashed along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

(Para 13, 14)

891. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 --  Date of birth -- Recitals of the admission and withdrawal register are admissible in evidence, as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 18)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 154, 155 -- Hostile witness – Evidential value -- Reliance upon other evidence -- Simply on the score that witnesses did not support the prosecution version in the Court, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that no such occurrence had taken place -- Their testimonies, as such, cannot be discarded in toto – Testimony of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon by the prosecution, to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version and cannot be treated as washed off the records -- There is no legal bar to base conviction of the accused, upon such kind of testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.

-- While facing cross-examination, the prosecutrix has identified her signatures on Ex.P1 and Ex.P2 and she has also admitted about having undergone medical examination.

-- Though, she had stated about the statement Ex.P4 before the Magistrate, to be an outcome of pressure of the police but however, no reason, as such, has been assigned, as to why the police intend to falsely implicate the appellant by making the prosecutrix as tool.

-- No bitterness or animosity at the behest of the police, towards the accused-appellant, as such, is coming forth -- Neither the accused, in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C., has stated about the reason for false implication.

-- MLR, opinion has been given that-'possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out and depends on semen and DNA analysis of supplied cloth and swabs.'

-- As per conclusion in DNA report-The Autosomal STR analysis indicates that DNA profile of seminal stains on source of item no.3B (Cotton Swab) and item No.4 (Salwar) is matching with the DNA Profile of Irshad (Source of item No.6).

Result of genuine DNA test is scientifically adequate and reliance upon the same can be laid to establish the connectivity of the wrong doer -- Thus, in the light of such medical evidence brought on record, sexual assault upon the prosecutrix, as such, and the role of the appellant, is established -- When linkage of the appellant, as such, through scientific manner is coming forth, it was incumbent upon the appellant, to lead sufficient evidence to rebut the legal presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act, operating against him -- Convection u/s 4 POCSO Act and Section 376 (3) IPC, upheld.

(Para 22-30)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3) -- Section 376(3) – Retrospective effect of penal provisions -- Sentence awarded u/s 376(3) IPC, while considering the same to be greater in degree than Section 4 of the POCSO Act -- Amendment in the IPC, thereby, adding Section 376(3) IPC, received assent of Hon'ble President of India on 11.08.2018 and in the light of the same, it is submitted that no retrospective effect can be given to this provision, in view of the occurrence in question (allegedly) having taken place on 02.06.2018 – Held, submission so made is not tenable, as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, was deemed to have come into force on 21.04.2018 and that being so, it was in force at the time of taking of place of occurrence in question on 02.06.2018 – Ld. trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence (20 years RI), so provided in the aforesaid Section 376(3) IPC and the same is just and reasonable.

(Para 30)

896. (SC) 05-01-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)