A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 260 -- Cheque bounce case -- Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Conversion of trial -- Summon trial – Summary trial – Role of Magistrate -- Object of Section 143 of the Act is quick disposal of the complaints u/s 138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code, to the extent possible -- Discretion conferred on the Magistrate by the second proviso to Section 143 is to be exercised with due care and caution, after recording reasons for converting the trial of the complaint from summary trial to summons trial -- High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Magistrates to record reasons before converting trial of complaints u/s 138 of the Act from summary trial to summons trial.

(Para 9, 24.1)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Cheque bounce case -- Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry by Magistrate – Requirement of --  Inquiry shall be conducted on receipt of complaints u/s 138 of the Act to arrive at sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, when such accused resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

(Para 11, 24.2)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Cheque bounce case -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry by Magistrate – Procedure of -- Held, section 202 (2) of the Code is inapplicable to complaints u/s 138 in respect of examination of witnesses on oath – For the conduct of inquiry u/s Section 202 of the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit -- In suitable cases, the Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.

(Para 12, 24.3)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 219, 220 – Cheque bounce case -- Multiple complaints – Service of summons – Common trial -- Recommended that suitable amendments be made to the Act for provision of one trial against a person for multiple offences u/s 138 of the Act committed within a period of 12 months, notwithstanding the restriction in Section 219 of the Code -- High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one complaint u/s 138 forming part of a transaction, as deemed service in respect of all the complaints filed before the same court relating to dishonour of cheques issued as part of the said transaction.

(Para 14-16, 24.4, 24.5)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258, 322 – Summoning of accused – Review of -- Judgments in Adalat Prasad, (2004) 7 SCC 338 and Subramanium Sethuraman (2004) 13 SCC 324 have interpreted the law correctly -- Reiterated that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons -- This does not affect the power of the Trial Court u/s 322 of the Code to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court’s notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint – Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints u/s 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in Meters and Instruments, (2018) 1 SCC 560 do not lay down correct law.

(Para 17-22, 24.6, 24.7)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 401 -- Appeal/ Revision in cheque bounce case -- Settling the dispute through mediation – High Courts requested to identify the pending revisions arising out of complaints filed u/s 138 of the Act and refer them to mediation at the earliest -- Courts before which appeals against judgments in complaints u/s 138 of the Act are pending should be directed to make an effort to settle the disputes through mediation.

(Para 23)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42, 43 – NDPS case – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act – Acquittal of -- Recovery from Private Vehicle -- R.C. of the vehicle does not indicate it to be a Public Transport Vehicle -- Private vehicle would not come within the expression “public place” -- Admitted position that there was total non-compliance of the requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act -- Total non-compliance of Section 42 is impermissible –Appeal allowed, order of High Court set aside -- Appellants acquitted of the charge levelled against them.

(Para 12-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Examination of signatures -- Petitioners do not dispute the existence of the agreement to sell -- Complaint was filed by the complainants alleging therein that the said agreement to sell had been obtained by way of forging the signatures of K.S. thereon -- Courts below have only granted the prayer of the complainants for examination of the signatures of K.S. on the agreement sell with the specimen/standard signatures of K.S. -- Held, the orders passed by the Courts below would only pave the way for proper and effective adjudication of the lis and thus, the same have neither resulted in any miscarriage of justice to the petitioners, nor would it be a case of causing any prejudice to the rights of the petitioners, in any manner.

(Para 11-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of – Jurisdiction of -- Petitioners have only been summoned and they are yet to lead evidence in support of their innocence before the trial Court -- Thus, the summoning order cannot be quashed so as to scuttle the criminal proceedings, at the very initial stage of the trial, especially when the petitioners have failed to establish that the initiation of the criminal proceedings, is an abuse of process of law.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revision dismissed as withdrawn -- Second revision petition – Maintainability of – Revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn without seeking permission to file fresh one -- It is not sweet will of the petitioner/accused to file a revision petition, withdraw it and then file a fresh revision petition, challenging the impugned order as and when he likes or suits him – Revision petition is misconceived and unwarranted -- Same is not maintainable.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 -- Domestic violence – Prima facie case -- Summoning of -- Section 18 of the 2005 Act stipulates for a protection order in favour of a woman -- Section 20 of the 2005 Act deals with the monetary relief to the aggrieved party and the same can be granted by a Court -- Before issuing notice, the learned Magistrate has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of a domestic violence.

(Para 22)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of summoning order -- Abuse of process of law – Petitioners, mother-in-law aged 65 years is 40% disabled from eyes, and is suffering from old age ailments, father-in-law, aged 73 years, is a chronic kidney patient and has been on dialysis thrice a week and married sister-in-law is a Government Teacher and since her marriage in 2009, she has been residing in her matrimonial home and looking after her two minor children -- A pure matrimonial dispute between husband and wife, has been given a colour of the proceedings under the 2005 Act so as to rope in hapless parents-in-law and a married sister-in-law -- They have been roped in with an oblique motive to harass and mentally torture them -- Moreover, the allegations leveled in the complaint are vague, general and omnibus in nature -- Proceedings qua the petitioners, are nothing, but a clear abuse of process of law -- Summoning order and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 33-36)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 32-B – NDPS case – Quantity of contraband – Relevant factor -- Imposing higher than minimum sentence -- It cannot be said that while imposing a punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine, the Court has to consider only those factors which are mentioned/enumerated in Section 32B of the Act – Court may, take into consideration “such factors as it may deem fit” – Quantity of substance would fall into “such factors as it may deem fit” – If the Court has taken into consideration such factor of larger/higher quantity of substance, it cannot be said that the Court has committed an error.

(Para 6.1)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 32-B – NDPS case -- Recovery of 1 kg heroin – R.I. for 15 years and 2 lacs fine -- Submission that the main supplier has not been apprehended/ arrested and the appellant is a carrier only cannot be a ground to interfere with the sentence imposed -- Once the accused is found to be in illegal possession of the narcotic substance/drugs, if in the circumstances so warranted, can be awarded the sentence higher than the minimum prescribed/provided under the Act.

(Para 6.2, 6.3)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 32-B – NDPS case -- Recovery of 1 kg heroin – R.I. for 15 years and 2 lacs fine -- Appellant/ accused was found to be in possession of 1 kg heroin and he sold it to the informant, he cannot be said to be a mere carrier -- Even a carrier who is having the knowledge that he is carrying with him narcotic substance/drugs and is found to be with huge commercial quantity of narcotic substance/drugs can be awarded the sentence higher than the minimum sentence provided under the Act -- Minimum commercial quantity is 250 gm, appellant was found to be in possession of 4 times higher than the minimum commercial quantity -- Sentence imposed for 15 years R.I. with fine of Rs.2 lakhs, confirmed by the High Court is not required to be interfered.

(Para 6.4)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 32-B – NDPS case – Imposition of sentence -- While awarding the sentence/ punishment in case of NDPS Act, the interest of the society as a whole is also required to be taken in consideration -- While striking balance between the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, public interest, impact on the society as a whole will always be tilt in favour of the suitable higher punishment -- Merely because the accused is a poor man and/or a carrier and/or is a sole bread earner cannot be such mitigating circumstances in favour of the accused while awarding the sentence/punishment in the case of NDPS Act.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 304-B, 406, 498-A, 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 216, 401 -- Dowry death case – Charge of Murder – Requirement of -- Charges framed u/s 304-B, 406, 498-A IPC – Prayer to add 302 IPC -- Perusal of contents of the FIR itself reveals that the complainant had raised only a suspicion qua the deceased having been poisoned to death – If during trial any new evidence comes on record, the trial Court concerned is fully competent u/s 216 Cr.P.C., to add and/or alter any such charge as it may deem fit -- Acid test would be based on the material, which may come to light during the course of the trial -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 5-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Admissibilty of suicide note – Stage of -- In the FIR at the behest of the brother of the deceased and in suicide note recovered, there are specific allegations against petitioner -- No issue at this stage with regard to admissibility of suicide note as evidence – No case made out for interference in the impugned summoning order.

(Para 2, 19, 20)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(b)(ii)(C) – Recovery of 3327 kgs of ‘Ganja’ from Truck -- Helper/conductor – Role of -- Maximum/minimum sentence – Requirement of reasons -- Trial Court imposed maximum punishment of R.I. for twenty years and fine of Rs.2 lakhs -- Order of sentence did not disclose the reasons for awarding the maximum punishment to the Appellant – Trial Court neither considered the extent of involvement nor considered if there were any extenuating circumstances for imposing a lesser punishment -- High Court affirmed conviction and substantive sentence was reduced to 15 years and amount of fine reduced to Rs.1 lac – Appellant is an indigent helper on a truck, only 22/23 years of age at the time of incident and a first time offender, and considering that nothing was recovered from his custody except for documents pertaining to the vehicle, of which he was a helper (described as conductor), Court deem it appropriate to reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, which in any case, far exceeds the minimum sentence of imprisonment of 10 years.

(Para 14-20)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Recovery of .32 bore pistol -- Conviction for 1 year – Probation -- Petitioner is not a previous convict and is the only earning member of the family and is not involved in any other case and has already undergone more than one month -- Sentence modified to the extent that petitioner is directed to be released on probation for a period of one year.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Conviction in cheque bounce case – Suspension of sentence in appeal – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation amount – Non-deposit of -- Application for cancellation of bail – Non-decision upon -- Petition disposed off with a direction to the Appellate Court to take all such necessary steps as may be possible under the circumstances of spread of pandemic COVID-19 for expeditious disposal of the application -- Further direction given that in case the respondents do not deposit the amount in question, then necessary steps warranted under law be taken thereupon and the Appellate Court shall proceed to dispose off the main appeal itself at the earliest.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- Scope of -- Unless the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view, normally the High Court should not interfere with the acquittal recorded by the trial court -- Whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not; whether the findings recorded by the trial court are in conformity with the evidence or not; are the matters which depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence on record -- By reappreciating evidence on record if appellate court comes to conclusion that findings recorded by the trial court are erroneous and contrary to law, it is always open for the appellate court, by recording good and compelling reasons for interference and overturn the judgment of acquittal by converting the same to that of conviction.

(Para 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 216 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354, 376-D -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO matter -- Rape – Alteration of charge -- In FIR and statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. made by the victim, she has not specifically alleged rape and has only stated that the accused tried to outrage her modesty – Victim is 17 year old, when was medically examined, it was disclosed to the Doctor concerned that the victim had been raped -- Report of FSL also discloses that human semen was detected from the under-garments and from the vaginal swabs – No infirmity, whereby the trial Court has proceeded to alter the charges so as to frame charges for offences u/s 376D IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration -- A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence -- If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused -- Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case -- There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dowry death – Murder -- Three dying declaration – Acquittal of accused -- First statement of the deceased is based on hearsay that she was set  on fire by respondent no. 2 and no reference of respondent no. 1 and anything about dowry demand -- Next statement blaming respondent no.1 alone, which is not signed by anybody and the Doctor who recorded the statement has not been examined and merely because his signature has been identified P.W.19 cannot establish the correctness of its contents -- Next statement of the deceased blaming respondent no.1 alone without any allegation against respondent no.2, and on the contrary states that she was brought to the hospital by respondent no.2, it again does not disclose any dowry demand -- Considering that the statements of the deceased have vacillated, there is no evidence about the fitness of mind of the deceased to make the dying declaration including the presence of the Doctor, the veracity and truthfulness of the dying declaration remains suspect -- It would not be safe to simply reject the probable defence of suicide, to reverse the acquittal and convict the respondents.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(3) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 53-A, 173 -- POCSO matter -- Blood sample for DNA test -- Investigaiton report already filed – Permissibility of -- Petitioner is facing a charge of committing repeated rape on the prosecutrix, who was less than 16 years of age and also for committing penetrative sexual assault upon her – Trial Court allowed the application for DNA test – Revision challenging the order -- Held, mere fact that application has been filed after submission of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. is no ground to entertain revision petition as charges are yet to be framed.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 344, 366, 34 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235, 360 – Kidnapping case -- Appellant/ accused no. 4 & 5 are not a main accused – Sentence reduce to 3 months/ already undergone -- Many factors which may not be relevant to determine the guilt, must be seen with a human approach, at the stage of sentencing -- Main accusation was against accused no.1, who is convicted for offences punishable under Sections 344, 366, IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of 10 years -- Even in the complaint, it was mentioned that accused no.1 was in love with the victim girl PW-2 -- It is also the case of the appellants that PW-1 was not a direct witness to the incident and PW-2 has been tutored by PW-1 -- Alleged incident is of the year 2014 and appellants (accused no. 4 & 5) have already served sentence of about three months and paid fine amount -- Pleaded that there is no one to take care of their minor son and old age parents -- Sentence modified for the period already undergone -- Appellants ordered to be released forthwith.

(Para 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summon to witness – Stage of – Scope of -- Section 311 Cr.P.C. empowers any Court at any stage of enquiry or trial or other proceedings to summon any person as witness or re-call or examine any person if it appears to be necessary for just decision of the case -- Power u/s 311 Cr.P.C. can be exercised at any stage -- There is no bar that the order for examination of the witnesses cannot be passed after the defence evidence is over.

(Para 7-9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B -- Summon to witness – Speedy trial -- Nodal Officers of Mobile Companies were mentioned in the list of witnesses and the record of calls etc., was available on the file yet they were not examined due to inadvertence of the Public Prosecutor -- Certificate u/s 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with regard to Customer Application Form and tower location was part of record – No inordinate delay to move application -- Held, it is the satisfaction of the court that examination of the witnesses is necessary for arriving at a just decision -- Direction to conclude the trial within six weeks itself cannot be a reason to dismiss the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Speedy conclusion of trial cannot be at cost of just and fair decision –Application allowed – Revision against dismissed.

(Para 4, 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8), 482 – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Further Investigaiton -- In terms of Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. a Magistrate is empowered to order further investigation in the case even after filing of challan – Petitioner may move appropriate application before learned Area Magistrate in that regard.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 240 – FIR/ Investigaiton report – Power of trial court -- Trial for graver offence – Court is not bound to try the accused for the offences for which the police has booked and forwarded the accused and if the Court finds that from the facts and circumstances and the allegations, some other offence may be graver in nature, is disclosed then the Court certainly proceed against the accused for the said offence.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 CrPC -- Complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and the High Court at that stage was not under an obligation to go into the matter or examine its correctness -- Whatever appears on the face of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same.

(Para 23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinise the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare case, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception.

(Para 28)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Allegations in the complaint will have to be accepted on the face of it and the truth or falsity of which would not be gone into by the Court at this stage, whether the allegations in the complaint were true is to be decided on the basis of the evidence led at the stage of trial.

(Para 30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court -- Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

(Para 31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Availability of civil/ arbitration remedies -- FIR/ Complaint / Charge-sheet – Legality of -- Ingredients of the offences u/s 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial -- Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such proceedings.

(Para 32)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Breach of terms of the contract – Contention that civil dispute or initiation of the arbitral proceedings would not attract the provisions u/s 406, 420, 34 IPC may not hold good -- It can be defence during the course of trial but was not open to be examined by the High Court to take a judicial notice and for quashing of the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

(Para 35)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 240 – Original Challan – Supplementary Challan – Framing of charge without considering both the reports – Legality of -- Trial Court has not considered both the reports at the time of framing of charge and rather, observed that only after recording of evidence, it would be seen as to which of the version given is correct – Impugned order set aside with a direction to the trial Court to reconsider the matter in the light of the original challan filed as well as supplementary challan submitted in the Court.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 177, 406 –Transfer of trial -- In a criminal case, the place of inquiry and trial has to be by the Court within whose local jurisdiction, the crime was allegedly committed as provided by Section 177 of Cr.P.C. -- Cause of action as per the averments in the FIR are alleged to have arisen in New Delhi, where the matrimonial home of the petitioner is situated -- Most of the prosecution witnesses are situated in Delhi -- 12 official witnesses are serving in New Delhi -- If the Transfer Petition is allowed, they would be required to travel from New Delhi to Allahabad (Prayagraj), which would cause hinderance in performing their official duties -- Transfer Petition dismissed.

(Para 14-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal by trial court – Conviction by High Court -- Appellant has only recorded her statement u/s 313 of the Code, and has not adduced any evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration -- Once the facts came on record remained unrebutted and supported with the evidence on record with no substantive evidence of defence of the appellant to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the complaint against her – Appellant has been rightly convicted.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case -- Object of introducing Section 138 and other provisions of Chapter XVII in the Act appears to be to enhance the acceptability of cheques in the settlement of liabilities -- Drawer of the cheque be held liable to prosecution on dishonour of cheque with safeguards provided to prevent harassment of honest drawers.

(Para 13)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Cheque bounce case – Presumption of consideration – Onus to rebut – Scope of evidence -- There is a mandate of presumption of consideration in terms of the provisions of the Act and the onus shifts to the accused on proof of issuance of cheque to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for discharge of any debt or liability in terms of Section 138 of the Act  -- To rebut this presumption, facts must be adduced by the accused which on a preponderance of probability (not beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of criminal offences), must then be proved.

(Para 14, 15, 17)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque  bounce case – Principle of acquittal in criminal cases -- Applicability of -- Proceedings u/s 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal in nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal in other criminal cases are not applicable in the cases instituted under the Act.

(Para 16)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 --  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce case – After cheques being bounced, two separate legal notices were served, even after receiving the said notices, the appellant neither responded to the notices nor made any payment within the statutory period of fifteen days – When the complainant exhibited all documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant has recorded her statement u/s 313 of the Code, but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence -- Statement of the accused recorded u/s 313 of the Code is not a substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case of the accused -- No evidence to rebut the presumption -- Held, High Court, has not committed any error in recording the finding of guilt of the appellant and convicting her for an offence being committed u/s 138 of the Act, which needs no further interference -- Appeals being without any substance, dismissed.

(Para 21-24)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 200 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 – Multiple complaints -- Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respect of the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or private complaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in numerous criminal proceedings -- As such, he would be forced to keep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the police and the Courts, as and when required in each case -- Such an absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the CrPC will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and therefore cannot be adopted.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 200 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Summons to accused -- Duty of Magistrate -- Powers bestowed on the Magistrate have grave repercussions on individual citizens’ life and liberty -- Thus, these powers also confer great responsibility on the shoulders of the Magistrate and must be exercised with great caution, and after suitable judicial application of mind -- Power to issue a summoning order is a matter of grave importance, and that the Magistrate must only allow criminal law to take its course after satisfying himself that there is a real case to be made.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 200 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which the truth is the quest -- Trial Judge has a duty under the Constitution and the CrPC, to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him.

(Para 15, 16)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 200 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Trial courts and the Magistrates have an important role in curbing injustice -- They are the first lines of defence for both the integrity of the criminal justice system, and the harassed and distraught litigant – Held, trial courts have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in fit cases -- This would not only save judicial time that comes at the cost of public money, but would also protect the right to liberty that every person is entitled to under Article 21 of the Constitution -- In this context, the trial Judges have as much, if not more, responsibility in safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens of India as the highest court of this land.

(Para 18)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 142 -- Criminal complaint – Curbing injustice -- Magistrate was aware of the significant delay in the filing of private complaint and of the material improvements from the earlier -- It was incumbent on the Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuse of process of the court, make further enquiries, and dismiss the frivolous complaint at the outset after judicial application of mind -- However, this was not done -- Magistrate issued process against the Appellants – To bring peace between the parties, who are fighting various litigations since 2006, Court exercised powers under Article 142 to quash all the litigations between the parties arising out of this incident.

(Para 19-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Murder – Dying declaration -- Deceased suffered 90 per cent injuries and was in a fit condition to make a declaration -- JMIC recorded the statement and in her dying declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze -- Though the family members of the deceased were in the hospital, they were sent out, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate – If the dying declaration is considered along with the depositions of PW-5, PW-6 and other witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the prosecution, it clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction order upheld.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration – Presence of parents and relatives – Effect of -- Held, merely because the parents and other relatives of the deceased were present in the Hospital, when the statement of the deceased was recorded, it cannot be said that the said statement was a tutored one -- Same is no ground to disbelieve the dying declaration, recorded by the Magistrate.

(Para 16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the Act, 1881:

(i) that a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;

(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Once a cheque has been signed and issued in favour of the holder, there is statutory presumption that it is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability -- However, this presumption is a rebuttable one -- If the accused will able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail -- Onus is upon the accused to rebut the presumption and to establish that the cheque in question was not given in respect of any debt or liability, however, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence, even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Respondent-accused denied his signature on the cheque -- Accused has not led any evidence in support of this plea -- Accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case -- Statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive evidence of defence of the accused but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case -- Mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.

(Para 24, 25)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Complaint against partner -- Partnership Firm not arrayed as accused – Effect of -- For the purpose of Section 141 of the Act, 1881, a firm comes within the ambit of a company – Cheque had been issued by the firm which was subsequently dishonoured, a partner of the firm would not be liable for prosecution u/s 138 of the Act, 1881 without the firm being arraigned as an accused – Ld. Trail court acquitted the accused -- Appeal, by special leave, preferred by the appellant-complainant dismissed.

(Para 1, 30-34)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Complaint as well as FIR – Legality of -- Merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments -- However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal proceedings – Quashing of – Inherent power of High Court -- Inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to achieve salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment -- When the Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon accused, in exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be quashed.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Inherent power of High Court -- Complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act pending -- After a period of three months, an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR – Ld. Magistrate declined to order registration of FIR and decided to inquire into the matter by treating the same as complaint case -- Ld. Sessions Judge remanded back the matter to the learned Magistrate with directions to pass a speaking order – Thereafter, after a period of two years, impugned FIR against the appellants with police station with the similar contents and allegations which were levelled in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C – Complainant is not proceeding further with his application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending since last five years – In the FIR, no reference of application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. and complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act – Held, impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law and can be said to be filed with a view to harass the appellants -- High Court ought to have exercised the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India/482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have quashed the impugned FIR to secure the ends of justice – Appeal allowed, impugned criminal proceedings/FIR registered u/ss 420/406 IPC quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape case – Relation on pretext of marriage – Non-performing of marriage -- Quashing of FIR -- From the contents of the FIR as well as the statement u/s 164 of CrPC three important features emerge: (i) The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature; (ii) The parties were in the relationship for about a period of one and a half years; and (iii) Subsequently, the appellant had expressed a disinclination to marry the second respondent which led to the registration of the FIR – Held, for the purposes of considering the application for quashing u/s 482 of CrPC, no offence has been established -- No allegation that the promise to marry was false at the inception on the contrary, from the contents of the FIR appears that there was a subsequent refusal – Held, High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition u/s 482 of CrPC – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside -- Charge sheet in pursuance of the investigation and order of the trial Court taking cognizance shall stand quashed and set aside.

(Para 8-12)

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 4(1), 21(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 – Mining case – Registration of FIR -- Tipper took into possession – Release on superdari – Direction to deposit penalty amount by Trial court – Matter at this stage disposed off by modifying the condition, directing deposit of penalty amount by the accused on the judicial file – Such penalty, if required, shall be realised from the petitioner after completion of the trial – Other conditions imposed by the Ld. JMIC Ist Class, sustained.

(Para 1, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness – Scope of -- True test, is whether it appears to the Court that the evidence of such person who is sought to be recalled is essential to the just decision of the case.

(Para 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summon as witness -- Prosecution sought to produce a copy of the relevant document pertaining to the approval granted by the Board on the record and to have it marked as an exhibit in the evidence, for which purpose PWs 1 and 11 were sought to be recalled – In its applications, the prosecution noted that these witnesses were required to mark the relevant document, which was crucial for the decision of the case since the respondent had taken a defense that this document had been signed by the Chairman without the Board’s approval -- Applications allowed.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – PW-2-aunt of the deceased called the deceased and asked her what had happened, she replied that her husband had beaten her up with a wooden log -- It was the appellant/husband himself who took her to the hospital and made a false statement that she suffered a cardiac arrest but after the autopsy was conducted on the body of the deceased, it was opined that she died out of shock and haemorrhage due to thoracic injuries – Injury nos. 1 to 6 were caused with blunt weapon which resulted into death of the deceased -- Ocular evidence of PW 2-aunt of the deceased is corroborated with the medical evidence of Doctor (PW 7) – Conviction u/s 302 upheld.

(Para 4, 10-18)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11 -- Circumstantial evidence -- In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled principles of law are that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances should be conclusive in nature and moreover the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of events -- However, the circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with the innocence.

(Para 13)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 473 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- Excise matter -- Release of vehicle on superdari -- Stringent condition – Bank guarantee -- Trial Court, while releasing the vehicle on superdari, directed to furnish personal superdari bond along with bank guarantee of Rs.2,50,000/- -- Considering the hardship being faced by the petitioner that he is unable to get his vehicle released for the last one and half year and also in view of the fact that the vehicle is lying unused and parked in police station in an open space and may outlive its life, Court deemed it appropriate to substitute the condition of furnishing bank guarantee of Rs.2.50 lacs with furnishing of personal bond in a sum of Rs.2.50 lacs and additional security bond of Rs.2.50 lacs.

(Para 2-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 323, 324, 326, 379, 382, 148, 149, 201 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Order declaring Proclaimed offender – Challenge to – Release on bail -- Objective of the coercive mechanism prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure that the accused remains present before the Court to receive the orders and punishments as are passed qua the accused -- If the accused shows his sincere intention and desire to appear before the Court, then it would not be unjustified to protect him from being arrested -- Without commenting on the merits of the case, the petition disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to surrender before the trial Court within 10 days -- On doing so, he was ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11, 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 – Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Sections 61, 78 – Excise matter – Release of vehicle on superdari – Surety of land – Entry in revenue record – Legality of -- Surety for release of the vehicle – Ld. JMIC, directed vehicle would be released on Sapurdari upon the said land being attached in lieu thereof with an entry to that effect being made in the revenue record – Held, land as would be attached, would not be subjected to any other kind of encumbrance whatsoever during the period of the trial of the petitioner -- Thereafter, of course, orders would be passed as regards the vehicle in question, as per law.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 408 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-B and 498-A -- Transfer of trial -- No ground to transfer the case merely on presumption and assumptions of the petitioner that he will not get justice from the Court.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 408 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-B and 498-A -- Transfer of trial -- Only ground seeking transfer of the trial is that the accused persons are making some proclamation that they have a talked with the staff of the Court to get an order of acquittal is no ground to raise a finger on the integrity of the trial Court/Presiding Officer – Transfer petition dismissed.

(Para 12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 319, 482 – NDPS case -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Proclaimed offender – Quashing of FIR -- Petitioner was declared as a proclaimed offender, and that too without following the mandatory provisions in this regard -- Co-accused stands acquitted -- There is no other evidence on record to sustain the prosecution of the petitioner – Mere fact that the petitioner stands declared as P.O., would not be a hindrance in quashing the proceedings against him, particularly when the co-accused already stands acquitted by the trial Court – Held, continuing of criminal proceedings against the petitioner is nothing but a futile exercise and an empty formality -- Hence, the FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are liable to be quashed qua the present petitioner as well -- Petition allowed.

(Para 13-19)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 -- “weapon of offence” -- Wooden lathi and batten are the weapons which are possessed by the police and the submission cannot be accepted that the injuries cannot be caused by wooden lathi and batten which may cause death -- It depends on the manner of use of the wooden lathi and batten.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Compounding of offence with leave by the court -- Grant of leave as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 320 is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of request by the appellant which may be agreed by the victim -- Statutory requirement, makes it a clear duty of the Court to look into the nature of the offence and the evidence and to satisfy itself whether permission should be or should not be granted -- Administration of criminal justice requires prosecution of all offenders by the State -- Nature of offence, and its affect on society are relevant considerations while granting leave by the Court of compounding the offence -- Offences which affect the public in general and create fear in the public in general are serious offences, nature of which offence may be relevant consideration for Court to grant or refuse the leave.

(Para 30-32)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Compounding of offence – Permissibility of -- Police of State is protector of law and order -- People look forward to the Police to protect their life and property -- Beating of a person in the Police Station is the concern for all and causes a sense of fear in the entire society – Accused who were police officers, one of them being in-charge of Station and other Senior Inspector have themselves brutally beaten the deceased, who died the same night -- Their offences cannot be compounded by the Court in exercise of Section 320(2) read with sub-section (5) – Prayer of the appellant to compound the offence rejected.

(Para 36-38)

D. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324 – Beating by police -- Custodial death – Compensation for -- Custodial violence on the deceased which led to the death is abhorrent and not acceptable in the civilized society -- Offence committed by the accused is crime not against the deceased alone but was against humanity and clear violations of rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Although the High Court has awarded the compensation of Rs.3 Lakhs in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased, held compensation awarded was not adequate -- Sentence of one year is reduced to six months -- Compensation of Rs.3.5 Lakhs each to the legal heir of the deceased in addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court granted.

(Para 39-43)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437(6) –Magistrate Trial -- Trial not concluded in 60 days – Right to Bail -- Contention that petitioner is in custody since 06.12.2019; he is not involved in any other case and despite the offences being triable by the Court of Magistrate; investigation has not been concluded within a period of 60 days after first date of recording the evidence i.e. 02.01.2020 – State has not disputed the factual position -- Out of total 21 prosecution witnesses, only 01 PW has been examined so far -- Petitioner is in long custody, due to COVID-19 situation, trial is not proceeding further -- Petition allowed -- Order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, set aside and the petitioner is granted bail u/s 437 (6) Cr.P.C.

(Para 3-5)

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Sections 13, 17, 18, 18-B, 20 -- National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (34 of 2008), Section  43(D)(2)(b) -- Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), Sections 3, 4, 5 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Special Court under NIA – Challan not within 90 days of arrest – Extension of time by Illaqa Magistrate – Power of – Default bail – Held, Special Court only is competent to exercise powers u/s 43(D)(2)(b) -- Since the Illaqa Magistrate was not competent to extend the period as has been ordered, therefore, Court is left with no option but to hold that the challan which was presented beyond the period of 90 days without there being any valid extension of the said period – Order declining the application for release of the petitioners in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. cannot sustain -- Petitioners ordered to be released on bail in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

(Para 4-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- Accordingly, FIR u/s 376 IPC, and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioners on the basis of compromise.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Application for permission to cross-examine – Exhibition of documents – De-exhibition of -- No provision under law for de-exhibition of the document, which has already been exhibited in evidence -- Since the petitioner has got an opportunity of raising objection with regard to admissibility of the document at the time of final arguments and if the accused is successful in showing to the Court that the document has not been proved in accordance with law, then the same may not be taken into consideration.

(Para 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 446(3) -- Surety by old age parents for son in parole – Non-surrender by convict – Penalty of Rs. 2 lacs each imposed reduced to Rs.5,000/- each -- Convict failed to surrender and later on, he was found to be arrested in some other case and was in jail -- In view of the mitigating circumstances explained in the petition and considering the facts that the petitioners are old aged persons; their financial condition is not good; life convict already stands arrested in other case and has surrendered before the jail authorities; the petitioners are petty farmers, having meagre land holdings and the Covid-19 situation in country and also in view of the judgment rendered in Gopal Kaur’s case 2011 (6) RCR (Criminal) 1394, the penalty is reduced to Rs.5,000/- each.

(Para 12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Criminal appeal against conviction – Scope and ambit of -- Argument are either a question of fact or an abortive attempt for re-appreciation of evidence on record -- Such discourse ordinarily does not fall within the scope and ambit of powers vested in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(i) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Recovery of Ganja – Ground not taken in defence statement u/s 313 Cr.P.c. – Effect of -- Appellant apprehended at the spot of the incident but also was found in conscious possession of the ganja -- As regard to his co-accused, there is unfortunately no material on record to shed light on the circumstances in which charge sheet was not filed against him -- Appellant, however, did not rely upon this fact either in his defense statement u/s 313, CrPC or otherwise -- Aforementioned supplication therefore cannot be entertained at this belated stage.

(Para 8)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(1), 136 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20(i) -- Reduction of sentence -- Passionately urges that: (i) the appellant has suffered protracted trial for more than 23 years; (ii) he alone has been convicted while his co-accused are acquitted; (iii) the appellant was not involved in any other case under the NDPS Act or other Penal Laws; (iv) the appellant has already undergone actual sentence of 2 years 4 months and 16 days out of the total sentence of five years; (v) and that the appellant has not misused the concession of bail granted by this Court on 02.11.2012 – Court found some merit in the submission noticed above – Appellant committed the crime in the year 1997, i.e., much before the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 came into force -- Section 20(i) of NDPS Act (as it stood in 1997), that even though a maximum sentence of five years RI and a fine of upto Rs. 50,000/- was prescribed but there was no minimum mandatory sentence – Held, ends of justice would be adequately met if the appellant’s sentence is reduced to the extent of the period he has already undergone -- Appellant shall be liable to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 482 – Kidnapping on pretext of marriage – Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet -- No allegation against the appellant -- Main allegation was against co-accused but the prosecutrix married him on 4.8.2013 and had given birth to two children out of that wedlock -- In the absence of any allegation against the appellant, continuation of proceedings against him is nothing but an abuse of process of law -- Proceedings initiated against him on the basis of FIR would be untenable -- High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition – Order of High Court set aside -- Entire proceedings consequent to FIR and charge sheet stand quashed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 17 – Money laundering case -- Freezing / Stop operation of bank accounts – Procedure of -- Material on record – Authorised officer/ Adjudication officer – Role of -- No material to show that Director or other Authorised Officer recorded his belief, on the basis of information in his possession, that appellant had committed acts relating to money laundering and there was need to seize record or property -- It only stated that the Officer was investigating the case and sought relevant documents, but in the tabular column it was abruptly stated that the accounts have to be ‘debit freezed/ stop operations’ -- Freezing or the continuation thereof is without due compliance of the legal requirement and, therefore, not sustainable.

-- Since freezing of accounts was without following the prescribed procedure, respondent banks are directed to defreeze the respective accounts and clear the cheques issued by the appellant towards statutory dues such as ITDS, PF, ESI, Professional Tax, Gratuity etc., subject to availability of funds in the accounts. If any further amount remains available in the accounts after payment of the statutory dues and with regard to the same any action is to be taken by the respondent No.4, it would be open to them to do so subject to compliance of the required legal procedure afresh.

(Para 11-16)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 17 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102 – Money laundering case -- Freezing / Stop operation of bank account – Procedure u/s 17 of PLA not followed – Seizure u/s Section 102 Cr.P.C. would not be valid for the reasons :

Firstly, Since PMLA is a stand-alone enactment and it contains provision for seizure (including freezing), the procedure contemplated therein has to be followed.

Secondly, when power is available under a special enactment, power under general law cannot be resorted to.

Thirdly, scheme of Section 102 Cr.P.C. is different from the scheme under PMLA. Power under Section 102 CrPC is for the Police Officer to be exercised during course of investigation.

Lastly, if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner.

(Paras 11, 12, 15)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) -- Corruption matter -- Recovery of currency notes -- Mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused -- To prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe -- Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence -- Even the presumption u/s 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. C.M. Girish Babu’s case (2009) 3 SCC 779 and B. Jayaraj’s case (2014) 13 SCC 55.

(Para 12)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 232, 378 -- Acquittal by trial court – Conviction by High Court – Possible view of Trial court – Interference in -- Initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court -- Acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside -- Before recording conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment of conviction set aside.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Appeal against conviction – Acquittal by High Court -- Non-consideration of reasons of trial court and re-appreciation of evidence – Sustainability of -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent/accused without adverting to the reasons given by the Ld. trial Court while convicting the accused and without reappreciating the entire evidence on record in detail cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside -- Appeal before the High Court is restored to its original file.

(Para 6, 6.1, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378 -- Appeal against acquittal/ conviction – Power of Court -- Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal passed by the Learned trial Court, is required to bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused -- Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law -- Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court -- Therefore, while dealing with the cases of acquittal by the trial Court, the Appellate Court would have certain limitations -- So far as the appeal against the order of conviction is concerned, there are no such restrictions and the Court of appeal has wide powers of appreciation of evidence and the High Court has to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record being a First Appellate Court. Keeping in mind that once the Learned Trial Court has convicted there shall not be presumption of innocence as would be there in the case of acquittal.

(Para 6.1-6.2)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) – NDPS case – Challan without FSL report – FSL report presented after 180 days -- Default bail -- Petitioner is entitled to be released on bail considering the fact that the challan presented without being accompanied by the FSL report, would be treated to be an incomplete challan.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 446 – Summoning of additional accused – Challenge to -- Non-bailable warrant and proceedings u/s 446 Cr.P.C. – Effect of -- Revisional Court – Power of -- High Court did not examine the correctness of the order by which the appellants were summoned by ADJ u/s 319 Cr.P.C., rather has dismissed the Criminal Revision on basis of a subsequent fact by which notice has been issued u/s 446 Cr.P.C. -- High Court took the view that since the proceedings in pursuance of Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been initiated and that no simultaneous challenge to summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. would be tenable before the High Court till the order u/s 446 passed in proceedings at the behest of revisionist subsist -- Held, High Court completely erred in refusing to consider the correctness of the summoning order on the ground that notice u/s 446 Cr.P.C. has been issued – As and when it is found that order dated 17.08.2019 (summoning order) could not have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., all subsequent proceedings thereto shall automatically come to an end – Matter remitted back to High Court, Criminal Revision of the appellants be considered afresh by the High Court in accordance with the law.

(Para 11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401, 451 – NDPS case – Recovery of 26 kgs of poppy husk from cabinet of truck -- Confiscation of truck -- Superdari declined – Revisional jurisdiction -- Petitioner comes out to be a habitual offender being involved in as much as 8 criminal cases, most of them under NDPS Act – Contention that condition of the truck may deteriorate being open to vagaries of nature – Held, comparative mischief shall be much more if the truck is released on superdari to the present petitioner, who comes out to be a habitual criminal and a drug peddler since that would facilitate more transportation of drugs rather than letting the truck remain in the premises of the police station open to the risk of damage on account of rain, wind and change of season etc. -- Lives of our people are more precious than damage to the truck -- Impugned order is detailed and well-reasoned -- Revisional jurisdiction of Court is quite limited -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 2,3, 8-11)