Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

757. (SC) 25-01-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Acquittal of accused – Revisional Powers for conviction -- Section 401 (3) of Cr.P.C. prohibits/bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- High Court has revisional power to examine whether there is manifest error of law or procedure etc., however, after giving its own findings on the findings recorded by the court acquitting the accused and after setting aside the order of acquittal, the High Court has to remit the matter to the trial Court and/or the first appellate Court, as the case may be.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Acquittal by the first appellate court -- Revisional Powers for conviction -- High Court has two options available, (i) to remit the matter to the first appellate Court to rehear the appeal; or (ii) in an appropriate case remit the matter to the trial Court for retrial -- High Court has erred in quashing and setting aside the order of acquittal and reversing and/or converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Order of conviction is therefore unsustainable, beyond the scope and ambit of Section 401 Cr.P.C., more particularly sub-section (3) of Section 401 Cr.P.C.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Acquittal in complaint case – Right to appeal -- Where an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint, the complainant (other than victim) can prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C., subject to the grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court.

(Para 10.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4), 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Non-preferring of appeal by victim -- Revisional jurisdiction -- In a case where the victim and/or the complainant, as the case may be, has not preferred and/or availed the remedy of appeal against the order of acquittal as provided under Section 372 Cr.P.C. or Section 378(4), as the case may be, the revision application against the order of acquittal at the instance of the victim or the complainant, as the case may be, shall not be entertained and the victim or the complainant, as the case may be, shall be relegated to prefer the appeal as provided under Section 372 or Section 378(4), as the case may be.

(Para 10.2)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401(5) -- Power of High Court to treat Revision as Appeal -- Where under the Cr.P.C. an appeal lies, but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person, the High Court has jurisdiction to treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly as per sub-section (5) of Section 401 Cr.P.C., however, subject to the High Court being satisfied that such an application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do and for that purpose the High Court has to pass a judicial order, may be a formal order, to treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.

(Para 11)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 401(3)(5) -- Acquittal of accused – Conviction by High court in revision – Impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court reversing the acquittal and convicting the accused quashed and set aside – Matters remitted to the High Court – High Court directed to treat the revision applications as appeals under Section 372 Cr.P.C. and thereafter to decide and dispose of the same in accordance with law on their own merits.

(Para 12, 13)

760. (P&H HC) 11-01-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82((2)(i)(a) – Proclaimed offender -- Proclamation notice – Service of – Mandate of – Non-compliance of -- Serving executing officer in his report/statement, made a disclosure that he affixed one copy of the proclamation on the gate of the house of the accused -- However, a reading of the afore report, does not disclose, that he had also read it publicly in some conspicuous place of the town or village, in which the accused ordinarily resides -- A reading of the apposite report, not disclosing that he had also meted compliance to Clause (a) of sub-sub-Section (i) of sub-Section (2) of Section 82, of the Cr.P.C, thereupon, his report is in departure of the statutory injunction, as therethrough, became cast upon him -- Consequently, the knowledge of the proclamation notice, was not hence completely acquired by the petitioner, and, also the endeavour of the executing officer to serve the proclamation notice, upon the accused, is completely deficit on score.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82((2)(i)(a) – Proclaimed offender – Resident of Canada – Procedure of Service -- Petitioner is residing in Canada since 23.10.2008, therefore, it was rather imperative, for the learned trial Magistrate concerned, to even if he intended to secure his appearance before him, or before any other Court of law, to ensure that personal service of the process of Court, became through, the Embassy of India, located in Canada – Neither the executing officer, has ensured the causing of personal service upon the accused at Canada, nor the learned Magistrate concerned, has ensured that any proclamation notice became served, upon, the accused at Canada, hence through the aegis of the Embassy of India, located in Canada -- Petition allowed, and impugned order declaring the petitioner, as a proclaimed offender, as well as subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, become quashed, and set aside.

(Para 8)

761. (P&H HC) 11-01-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Cheque bounce case -- Conviction u/s 138 NI Act – Suspension of sentence on furnishing of personal and surety bonds in the sum of Rs. 1 Lakh – Later on an application by complainant, Appellate Court proceeded to direct the appellant, to pay an amount of Rs. 2,30,000/- comprising 20% of the compensation amount to the complainant within one month – Order made by Appellate Court is a discreet, and, tacit attempt, to proceed to impermissibly review, and scuttle the effect of the binding order -- It is ridden with a vice of infirmity, if so, and, even if assuming the order did hold some aura or tinge of validity, yet until and unless there was some evidently deterrent circumstances, prevailing upon the learned Appellate Court, as comprised in the appellant rather deliberately delaying the making of an expeditious decision, upon the appeal, there was no occasion for the learned Appellate Court to make the order -- De hors finality being assignable to P-3/order suspending sentence, High Court directed the convict / petitioner to deposit 15% of the cheque amount before the learned Appellate Court within one month.

(Para 2-9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Cheque bounce case -- Interim deposit of compensation u/s 148 of NI Act – Restoration of compensation to accused/appellant – Order of – Requirement of -- Legally incumbent upon the learned First Appellate Court, to order that in case there is allowing of the appeal, as preferred before it, by the accused-convict, thereupon the interim compensation, as determined, be restored or refunded to the accused/ convict, by the complainant -- However, the directions, as legally required to be made, while being seized with an application, u/s 148 of the NI Act, are not existing, hence the order suffers from an infirmity.

(Para 7)

764. (P&H HC) 20-12-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Power to summon witness – Nature of -- Section 311 Cr.P.C. gives wide powers to the Court to summon a witness or re-examine a witness who has already been examined and the word 'any' which has been used as a pre-fix would also include a person who is not cited as a witness -- Paramount requirement is just decision and for that purpose an additional person can be summoned while invoking provisions of Section 311 Cr. P. C.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summon of additional witness – Complainant/ PW-15 reveals that at the time of occurrence in question, he alongwith his cousin-Arashdeep (being pillion rider) on motorcycle was following his father (since deceased) who  was going ahead of them on his scooter -- Further, two days after formation of Special Investigation Team (SIT), third statement of petitioner/complainant was recorded (Ex.P-15/A) which reveals that Arashdeep (cousin of petitioner/complainant) was accompanying him at the time of occurrence in question and even there is an endorsement of the said fact by Arashdeep at the foot of said statement -- It is not a case where the petitioner (complainant) was making an attempt to fill up the lacuna in the prosecution case but it was merely a fall out of an oversight committed by the Prosecuting Agency conducting the case – Held, a fair chance has to be given to petitioner (complainant) assisted by State to prove its case and, thus, to arrive at the truth, which is the only object and guideline while exercising the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C., incorporation of name of Arashdeep, in the list of prosecution witnesses and examination of said Arashdeep as prosecution witness, appears to be essential for the just decision of the case -- Impugned order dismissing the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. -- Petition allowed.

(Para 13-15)

765. (SC) 07-12-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427 – Life imprisonment or Sentence of imprisonment -- Subsequent sentence/ life imprisonment -- Concurrent running of sentence -- Consecutively running of sentence – Provision explained:

-- When a person who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced -- Meaning thereby both sentences shall run consecutively unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

-- As per Sub­section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.PC when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence -- Therefore, in aforesaid two cases only the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with previous sentence.

In aforesaid two cases only the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with previous sentence. Otherwise the subsequent sentence shall run consecutively and the imprisonment in subsequent sentence shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced.

(Para 8.2)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427 – Concurrent running of sentence – Consecutively running of sentence – Law summarised :

(i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced;

(ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence;

(iii) the general rule is that where there are different transactions, different crime numbers and cases have been decided by the different judgments, concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under Section 427 of Cr.PC;

(iv) under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the power and discretion to issue a direction that all the subsequent sentences run concurrently with the previous sentence; however discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of the offence or the offences committed and the facts in situation. However, there must be a specific direction or order by the court that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence.

(Para 9)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(c), 23, 29 -- NDPS case – Conviction in two different trials -- Concurrent running of sentence -- Appellant sentenced to undergo 12 years RI for the offence u/s 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act by Amritsar Court – In another case he has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI for the offence u/s 29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by Delhi Court -- In one case he has been convicted for having possession of 4 kg of heroin and in another case for having 750 grams of heroin -- In the subsequent judgment and order of conviction and sentence by the Delhi court there is no specific order passed by the learned Trial Court (Court at Delhi) that the sentences to run concurrently – Held, while awarding sentence or punishment in case of NDPS Act, interest of society as a whole is required to be taken into consideration – Even while applying discretion u/s 427 of Cr.P.C, discretion shall not be in favour of accused who is found to be indulging in illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

(Para 11)

768. (SC) 07-10-2021

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 45 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 -- Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(6) -- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 43D (5) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) -- Bail after filing charge-sheet – Consideration of -- Categories/Types of Offences – Guidelines issued :

Categories/Types of Offences

A)    Offences punishable with imprisonment of 7 years or less not falling in category B & D.

B)    Offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years.

C)    Offences punishable under Special Acts containing stringent provisions for bail like NDPS (S.37), PMLA (S.45), UAPA (S.43D(5), Companies Act, 212(6), etc.

D)    Economic offences not covered by Special Acts.

REQUISITE CONDITIONS

1)       Not arrested during investigation.

2)    Cooperated throughout in the investigation including appearing before Investigating Officer whenever called.

(No need to forward such an accused along with the chargesheet (Siddharth Vs. State of UP, 2021 SCC online SC 615)

CATEGORY A

After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance

a)    Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.

b)    If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.

c)    NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.

d)    NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.

e)    Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.

CATEGORY B/D

On appearance of the accused in Court pursuant to process issued bail application to be decided on merits.

CATEGORY C

Same as Category B & D with the additional condition of compliance of the provisions of Bail under NDPS S. 37, 45 PMLA, 212(6) Companies Act 43 d(5) of UAPA, POSCO etc.”

Category A deals with both police cases and complaint cases -- Trial Courts and the High Courts will keep in mind the aforesaid guidelines while considering bail applications -- While issuing notice to consider bail, the trial Court is not precluded from granting interim bail taking into consideration the conduct of the accused during the investigation which has not warranted arrest -- This aspect would be guided by the statutory provisions.

Separate set of offences are categorized as “economic Offences” not covered by the special Acts. In Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, Court has observed that in determining whether to grant bail both aspects have to be taken into account:

a)       seriousness of the charge and

b)       severity of punishment.

Copy of this order ordered to be circulated to the Registrars of the different High Courts to be further circulated to the trial Courts so that the unnecessary bail matters do not come up to Supreme Court -- This is the only purpose for which guidelines issued, but they are not fettered on the powers of the Courts.

(Para 2-12)

771. (SC) 22-09-2021

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail -- Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Standard prescribed for the grant of bail is ‘reasonable ground to believe’ that the person is not guilty of the offence -- Test which are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(Para 19, 20)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail -- Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Bail by High court – Challenge to -- Respondent was travelling in the vehicle all the way from Dimapur in Nagaland to Rampur in Uttar Pradesh with the co-accused -- Complaint notes that the CDR analysis of the mobile number used by the respondent indicates that the respondent was in regular touch with the other accused persons who were known to him – Quantity of contraband found in the vehicle is of a commercial quantity -- Contraband was concealed in the vehicle in which the respondent was travelling with the co-accused -- High Court, apart from observing that no contraband was found from the personal search of the respondent has ignored the above circumstances – High Court has clearly overlooked crucial requirements and glossed over the circumstances which were material to the issue as to whether a case for the grant of bail was established -- In failing to do so, the order of the High Court becomes unsustainable – High Court ought to have given due weight to the seriousness and gravity of the crime which it has failed to do – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside -- Respondent shall accordingly surrender forthwith.

(Para 31-34)

778. (SC) 24-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – First Information Report/ FIR – Nature of -- FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness statements as they progress further into the investigation and unearth the specific roles of accused persons -- FIR as is known, only sets the investigative machinery, into motion.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B, 147, 148, 324 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Conviction in murder case – Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Two courts have concurrently concluded that appellant’s name not being specifically mentioned in the FIR, would not justify his acquittal as he was specifically identified by PW2, PW4, & PW6 -- In view of his positive identification by the eye witnesses, the TIP not being conducted, was held to be immaterial -- Eye witnesses here have ascribed the same specific role to the appellant and narrated the events in same chronology, without material discrepancies – Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this case involves multiple persons attacking in a group with deadly weapons and it is not reasonable to expect recollection of every minute details by the eyewitnesses -- Prosecution has produced cogent evidence of the appellant being part of a conspiracy by all the accused in the assault, which led to the death of BM and injuries to PW1 and others -- As such, the conviction of the appellant by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, cannot be faulted.

(Para 15-18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Requirement of -- Identity of the appellant/accused was known to the witnesses and he was specifically identified by PW1, and PW2 as the person who wielded the sword and inflicted the injuries -- TIP was unnecessary in the case -- In the face of appellant’s such identification by name in the testimony of the eye witnesses, it can, be safely concluded that the failure to conduct the TIP for the appellant will not vitiate his conviction.

(Para 17)

782. (SC) 16-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Section 170 does not impose an obligation on the Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet – Held, if the Investigating Officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody -- The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the Investigating Officer before the court while filing the chargesheet.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate -- Occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond -- Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made -- A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it -- If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Trial courts are stated to be insisting on the arrest of an accused as a pre-requisite formality to take the chargesheet on record in view of the provisions of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C – Held, such a course is misplaced and contrary to the very intent of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 13)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Appellant has joined the investigation, investigation has completed and he has been roped in after seven years of registration of the FIR -- No reason why at this stage he must be arrested before the chargesheet is taken on record – Counsel for the appellant has already stated before the Court that on summons being issued the appellant will put the appearance before the trial court -- Impugned order set aside, appeal allowed.

(Para 14)

786. (SC) 11-08-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

795. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)