Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

752. (SC) 22-09-2021

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail -- Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Standard prescribed for the grant of bail is ‘reasonable ground to believe’ that the person is not guilty of the offence -- Test which are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(Para 19, 20)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail -- Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act – Bail by High court – Challenge to -- Respondent was travelling in the vehicle all the way from Dimapur in Nagaland to Rampur in Uttar Pradesh with the co-accused -- Complaint notes that the CDR analysis of the mobile number used by the respondent indicates that the respondent was in regular touch with the other accused persons who were known to him – Quantity of contraband found in the vehicle is of a commercial quantity -- Contraband was concealed in the vehicle in which the respondent was travelling with the co-accused -- High Court, apart from observing that no contraband was found from the personal search of the respondent has ignored the above circumstances – High Court has clearly overlooked crucial requirements and glossed over the circumstances which were material to the issue as to whether a case for the grant of bail was established -- In failing to do so, the order of the High Court becomes unsustainable – High Court ought to have given due weight to the seriousness and gravity of the crime which it has failed to do – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside -- Respondent shall accordingly surrender forthwith.

(Para 31-34)

759. (SC) 24-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – First Information Report/ FIR – Nature of -- FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness statements as they progress further into the investigation and unearth the specific roles of accused persons -- FIR as is known, only sets the investigative machinery, into motion.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B, 147, 148, 324 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Conviction in murder case – Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Two courts have concurrently concluded that appellant’s name not being specifically mentioned in the FIR, would not justify his acquittal as he was specifically identified by PW2, PW4, & PW6 -- In view of his positive identification by the eye witnesses, the TIP not being conducted, was held to be immaterial -- Eye witnesses here have ascribed the same specific role to the appellant and narrated the events in same chronology, without material discrepancies – Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this case involves multiple persons attacking in a group with deadly weapons and it is not reasonable to expect recollection of every minute details by the eyewitnesses -- Prosecution has produced cogent evidence of the appellant being part of a conspiracy by all the accused in the assault, which led to the death of BM and injuries to PW1 and others -- As such, the conviction of the appellant by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, cannot be faulted.

(Para 15-18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Requirement of -- Identity of the appellant/accused was known to the witnesses and he was specifically identified by PW1, and PW2 as the person who wielded the sword and inflicted the injuries -- TIP was unnecessary in the case -- In the face of appellant’s such identification by name in the testimony of the eye witnesses, it can, be safely concluded that the failure to conduct the TIP for the appellant will not vitiate his conviction.

(Para 17)

763. (SC) 16-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Section 170 does not impose an obligation on the Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet – Held, if the Investigating Officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody -- The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the Investigating Officer before the court while filing the chargesheet.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate -- Occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond -- Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made -- A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it -- If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Trial courts are stated to be insisting on the arrest of an accused as a pre-requisite formality to take the chargesheet on record in view of the provisions of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C – Held, such a course is misplaced and contrary to the very intent of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 13)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 170, 173 – Filing of Investigation report/ Challan/ Charge-sheet -- Arrest of accused – Requirement of --  Appellant has joined the investigation, investigation has completed and he has been roped in after seven years of registration of the FIR -- No reason why at this stage he must be arrested before the chargesheet is taken on record – Counsel for the appellant has already stated before the Court that on summons being issued the appellant will put the appearance before the trial court -- Impugned order set aside, appeal allowed.

(Para 14)

767. (SC) 11-08-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

776. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

798. (P&H HC) 25-05-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay of six years in lodging the FIR – Explanation of delay – First informant deposed that he came to know that the petitioner-accused is a fraudulent person within 2/3 months of making payment -- Thus, once the first informant had come to know that the petitioner would not take steps to send his son to Italy or return the amount allegedly received, there was no occasion to wait for a period of six years before registration of the FIR -- Neither the first informant in his deposition has stated that there were several meetings for return of the amount nor detail thereof has been provided -- Hence, the prosecution has failed to explain the delay – Conviction order set aside.

(Para 17, 24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 19, 21 -- Admission – Reliance upon -- It is well settled that before the alleged admission of the accused is made the basis to convict the accused, it is incumbent for the court to examine as to whether such admission is clear and categoric -- If the answer to the aforesaid question is in negative, it would not result in conviction of accused.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 19, 21 -- Admission – Mens-rea -- Petitioner while cross examining the first informant had given him suggestion that the agreement was executed at the Police Station -- Such suggestion, in the facts of the case, cannot be read as admission of the offence -- As per the case of the prosecution, in the year 2009, the amount of ? 1,00,000/- was paid to the petitioner, whereas the agreement provides for return of ? 50,000/- only -- It is against normal prudence -- Still further, if it is accepted that such suggestion does amount to admission, still the agreement does not prove that the petitioner has deceitfully induced the first informant to part with ? 1,00,000/- or the petitioner had “mens rea” at that time -- Conviction order set aside.

(Para 18, 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Proved -- Standard of proof -- In civil case the plaintiff is required to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt -- No doubt, ordinarily, the presiding judges are simultaneously required to decide civil as well as criminal cases and hence, the distinction gets overlooked -- However, it is expected from them that before convicting any accused, the presiding judges should keep in mind the important distinction -- Prosecution miserably failed to satisfy the aforesaid test -- Revision allowed, the judgments passed by both the Courts below, are set aside.

(Para 24)

800. (P&H HC) 27-04-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Locus-standi of complainant -- If a forgery had been done and mis-representation has been made, any person can set law in motion.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Summoning order – Challenge to -- Justice hurried is Justice buried -- It is the settled principle that the Magistrate could have always differed with police report, but once it had been approved by the Commissioner of Police, who had been directed by High Court to look into the same and it was on record and the record of the same could have been summoned from the office of the DCP -- Magistrate could not brushed aside and ignored the report, summoning order was passed on the same day the inquiry report (Ex.CW8/C) was exhibited when produced by the complainant -- Thus, the old adage came into play that is “Justice hurried is Justice buried” -- Summoning order is liable to be quashed on this ground.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Forgery case -- Summoning order – Challenge to -- Basis for summoning was on the strength of photocopy of the documents -- Allegations of forgery would not be justified by the Trial Court in the absence of the originals as such and without an opinion of any expert evidence -- Mere the strength of the photocopies produced and in the absence of any sufficient evidence, summoning order on the said basis is not legally sustainable.

(Para 32-35)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 – Summoning of accused -- Criminal law should not be set into motion as a matter of course -- Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence and summoning the accused on the asking is not to be done unless there is cogent evidence and there is a applicability of mind.

(Para 35)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197, 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Forgery case -- Summoning of government employee as accused – Sanction of government – Requirement of -- Without the necessary sanction the Trial Court was not justified in summoning the said accused and he is entitled to the protection u/s 197 Cr.P.C. and there is a legal bar as such to initiate his summoning.

(Para 35-39)