A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclaimed offender order – Challenge to – Petitioner was declared proclaimed offender on 22.09.2017 – A clear period of 30 days w.e.f. the date when proclamation was actually affected upto the date nominated for causing appearance i.e. 28.08.2017 was not afforded to the petitioner and it is only a period of 26 days, which was afforded – Impugned order cannot sustain, set aside – Petition accepted.

(Para 2-4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13 (1)(a)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cheating and corruption case – Regular bail -- Petitioners are in custody since 16.12.2021 -- Considering that the investigation is complete, challan stands presented, petitioners volunteer to give their specimen signatures, conclusion of trial is likely to take time, the petitioners are granted bail.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A -- Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (4 of 1914), Schedule I, Clause 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Interim compensation – Recovery as public demand -- Whether an order for payment of interim compensation under the Negotiable Instrument Act can be enforceable under the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 as a public demand? -- Interim compensation so ordered u/s 143A of the NI Act is recoverable as a fine u/s 421 of Cr.P.C. which then, clearly falls under the definition of ‘public demand’ – Held, interim compensation ordered under the NI Act falls within the ambit of Schedule I of the Recovery Act, realization thereunder cannot be stopped.

(Para 17-20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Cheque bounce case -- Non-bailable warrants – Bailable case – Need of anticipatory bail – Held, petitioner has been summoned for an offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act which is a bailable offence -- Hence, there is no occasion for apprehension of arrest and detention in a bailable offence provided the petitioner is ready and willing to comply with the conditions set forth by the concerned Illaqa Magistrate for granting him the concession of bail – Petition withdrawn with liberty to move an application/petition for bail before the concerned Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 2)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Cancellation of bail -- Supreme Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the Appellate Court -- Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be cancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial.

Aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506 -- Rape case -- Cancellation of bail -- High Court granted bail on sole ground of delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR -- Criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainant and State has also confirmed that he is involved in at least four criminal cases – After bail, photographs appearing in the social media with his snapshots prominently displayed on posters/ hoarding in the forefront with the faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop, welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back to Bhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman” -- Brazen conduct of the respondent No.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainant that she would not get a free and fair trial and that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses -- Representation by appellant’ father to the Superintendent of Police expressing the very same apprehension – Held, respondent No. 2 does not deserve the concession of bail -- Impugned order quashed -- Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender.

(Para 26-31)

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Money laundering case – Quashing of complaint -- Lack of identity of the source of collected money -- It could not be reasonably believed that the unaccounted money is connected with the commission of offence under PMLA -- Letter of the I.T. Department and the details, makes it clear that for the currency seized, the tax is already paid, therefore, it is not the quantum earned and used for money laundering – Chances to prove allegations in the Court are very bleak -- High Court by the impugned order has recorded the finding without due consideration of the letter of the I.T. Department and other material in right perspective -- Findings of the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 18-20)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4, 44 – Money laundering case – Evidence beyond reasonable doubt -- In cases of PMLA, the Court cannot proceed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities -- Allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the Court.

(Para 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s Section 174-A – Compromise in cheque bounce case – Complaint has been dismissed as withdrawn -- Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Theft – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Conviction u/s 379, 411 for three years with fine – Appeal against conviction dismissed – Acquittal after compromise in revision --  Held, occurrence can be categorized as purely personal/ criminal act of private nature -- No injury has been caused -- Compromise is without any coercion or compulsion and has been entered into willingly and voluntarily -- Occurrence took place in the year 2017 and there is nothing on record to show that any untoward incident had taken place after the same -- Petitioner is widowed lady of 51 years of age and the complainant has stated that he has primarily entered into compromise on account of old age of the petitioner and on account of the fact that no loss has been caused to him – Criminal Revision allowed, judgment passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and the petitioner acquitted of the charges framed against her.

(Para 17, 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Compensation of 20% or less -- Discretion of Court -- Minimum sum of 20% is a statutory mandate, no discretion is left with the Court to order to deposit less than 20% of the compensation amount -- Appellate Court has rightly ordered to deposit 20% of the compensation amount.

(Para 13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Probation – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Matter pertains to an incident that occurred in the year 2000 and the present appeal has been pending since 2012 – No material on record that the accused-petitioner has any criminal antecedents – Held, the accused-petitioner are entitled to the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Petitioner ordered to be released on probation, u/s 4 of the Act.

(Para 12-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- At the time of framing of charge, the Court is only required to prima facie presume whether a case against the accused person(s) may be made out and that the facts that emerge from the case may be taken at face value; if they disclose the existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offences, then the charges may be framed.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt.

(Para 7)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- Alleged video has not been attached with the challan report and the provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, have not been complied with, cannot be appreciated at this stage for the reason that at the time of framing of charge, the degree of belief is only presumption -- Word 'presuming', must be read ejusdem generis to the opinion that there is a ground for forming an opinion that the accused person(s) has committed the alleged offence(s) -- It would also be immaterial whether the said opinion has been formed either on the basis of direct, or circumstantial evidence.

(Para 8)

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 7, 10 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 482 – FIR under Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act -- Quashing of FIR – Maximum sentence is three years -- Limitation of three years to take cognizance -- Sale deed was executed on 28.04.2011 -- Communication dated 23.02.2012 was sent by the DTP, Kurukshetra to Superintendent of Police on 28.09.2016 leading to the registration of the FIR on 29.09.2016 -- Respondent no.2 was aware of the alleged offence, if any, on 01.12.2011/13.12.2011 and, therefore, the court could have taken cognizance within three years of that date i.e. 01.12.2014/13.12.2014 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.PC was submitted on 17.08.2017 -- Thus, the court could clearly not have taken cognizance beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.PC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 10 of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 12-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 -- Conviction in rape case – Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – Bare perusal of the case of the prosecution reveals a consensual relationship between the applicant and the prosecutrix/ an adult lady aged 35 years having two children and she entered into the relationship with the applicant with her eyes open; only if such relationship could not result in a logical end she cannot be allowed to come and allege rape by the applicant; there was no medical evidence, such an eventuality arose on account of refusal by the prosecutrix to undergo a medical examination; no private witness was examined by the prosecution; only after the applicant got married did the prosecutrix allege that the relationship between them was without her consent showing falsity in her claim; the applicant has undergone over ten months of custody; during the course of his trial he was on bail which concession he did not misuse and that the appeal filed by the applicant, which has been admitted for regular hearing, is not likely to be heard in the near future – Considering totality of facts, sentence of the applicant ordered to be suspended.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Snatching case – Leave to appeal against acquittal -- Complaint was registered against the unknown persons -- Incident was around 9 PM, no description of the accused was mentioned by the complainant -- No details like International Mobile Equipment Identity of the mobile or the number of snatched currency notes, no test identification parade was conducted by the IO -- IO made arrest next day from the bus stand of village and there was no basis to support as to how IO identified accused -- IO in his deposition deposed that arrest was on the identification of the complainant -- IO faulted in his cross-examination when he stated that neither identification memo was prepared nor the arrest memo was got signed from the complainant -- None of the documents bear the signatures of accused – Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of connecting the accused with the alleged incident – Statement of the IO when read as a whole including his answers in cross-examination itself is not enough to prove the case of the prosecution –  With so many dents created in the story of the prosecution, the view taken by the trial Court is a plausible and based upon sound record -- No case is made out of illegality on facts or law much less perversity -- Leave to file appeal is declined.

(Para 2-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce case -- Death of accused – Interim compensation – Final compensation – Recovery from Estate – Permissibility of -- In case of death of an accused the compensation awarded u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, but an interim compensation awarded u/s 143A of the said Act cannot be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, who died before the conclusion of the trial.

(Para 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 447, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation pending -- Inherent powers of High Court – Allegation that petitioners attempted to take forcible possession of the land in question -- Perusal of the FIR shows that the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences are present, therefore, it is not a case where the intervention of the Court is warranted for quashing of the FIR -- Investigation in the case is pending, therefore, it is apparent that the petition is pre-mature -- Court not inclined to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage.

(Para 3-8)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Commission of offence – Cognizance by Court – Relevant date for  limitation --  Terminal point for the prescribed period for the purposes of Section 468, shifted from the date of taking cognizance to the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings so that a complaint ought not to be discarded for reasons beyond the control of the complainant or the prosecution.

(Para 14)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Offence under Domestic Violence Act -- Limitation for domestic violence proceedings -- By the time an application is preferred u/s 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed as such there would never be a starting point for limitation -- Starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed u/s 12 of the Act.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31 – Limitation for domestic violence proceedings -- Filing of an application u/s 12 of the Act cannot be equated to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution -- High Court was in error in observing that the application u/s 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.

(Para 20)

D. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202, 482 -- Notice u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act – Quashing of -- Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Exercise of – In Adalat Prasad’s case (2004) 7 SCC 338 it was held that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused, or any material implicating the accused, or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, aggrieved accused’s remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code -- Adalat Prasad would not get attracted at a stage when a notice is issued u/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

(Para 9, 22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 316, 323, 406, 498-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Causing death of quick unborn child (Section 316 IPC) – Dowry case -- Compromise quashing of FIR --  Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal by convict -- Suspension of sentence – Deposit of fine of Rs. 2 lacs as pre-condition – Harsh and onerous condition -- Legality of -- Appeal of the petitioner is pending and the culpability of the offence is yet to be determined by the Court, therefore, any such onerous condition, as is likely to deprive the accused of the benefit of the order granting suspension of sentence, should not normally be imposed by a Court while granting a benefit -- Petition allowed and the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, partly modified to the extent whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit the fine as a pre-condition for suspension of sentence.

(Para 2-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Dowry death case -- Summoning of cousin sister-in-law as additional accused – Challenge to -- Complaint shows that the petitioner alongwith other co-accused had been harassing and pressurizing the deceased for bringing more dowry -- Deceased was being forced to bring Rs.2.00 lacs from her parents for sending D S abroad -- Investigating Agency despite having recorded the statements of some of the independent witnesses regarding the accusation of harassment of the deceased at the hands of petitioner, which is apparent from the perusal of the zimni has chosen to ignore the statements and for reasons best known to it and has given a clean chit to the petitioner -- As to whether the petitioner is a close relative of the deceased or a distant one and as to whether she is staying in same house or in another locality of the same village, are all matters to be tested by the Trial Court during the course of the trial – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Trial Court -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 12, 13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce case – Compromise at revisional stage – Waiver of cost of 15% of cheque amount -- Petitioner has a poor financial condition is apparent from the fact that the complainant has agreed to finally settle the matter for an amount of Rs.2,50,000/-, although, the cheque was for an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- -- Petitioner is a 51 year old lady who is stated to be having no source of livelihood and with great difficulty, she has repaid the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- to the complainant -- Keeping in view the said special facts and circumstances, this Court deemed it appropriate that no costs should be imposed upon the petitioner -- Revision allowed and judgments of Lower Courts set aside and the petitioner acquitted.

(Para 18-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361-- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4 -- Theft case – Release on probation – Sentence for simple imprisonment for a period of three months and fine of Rs. 3000/- -- Section 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act empower the courts to release the offenders on probation of good conduct -- Similarly, Sections 360 and 361 of the Cr.P.C also empower the courts to release the offenders on probation of good conduct – There are no criminal antecedents against the appellants, the court is inclined to give them the benefit of releasing them on probation of good conduct -- Appellants ordered to be released on probation of good conduct.

(Para 3-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 254, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Discharge application – Dismissal of -- Particulars of offence were stated to the accused/petitioners u/s 251 of CrPC, which was denied by him and it was stated that he had given the blank cheque to the respondent firm, which has been misused -- Complaint case u/s 138 of the NI Act is a summons trial case and the ld. Trial Court has rightly held that prima facie application cannot be decided without going into merits of the case in absence of any evidence -- This finding cannot be interfered with by High Court.

(Para 6-8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Victim/aggrieved person stated before the CJM that there would be no objection if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings -- Continuing proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioner(s) quashed.

(Para 4-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce complaint – Pre-mature complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Trial Court found the complaint pre-mature -- Cheque dishonored and returned with the remark ”Account Closed” -- Notice sent to the accused, who refused to accept notice – Complaint filed on 13^th day of refusal – Complainant-appellant registered the complaint before the statutory period of 15 days -- Leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 145 -- Co-owners -- Joint possession – Exclusive possession – Appointment of receiver -- All the co-owners have an equal right to be in possession of every part of the joint property unless there is something to suggest that any of the parties is in exclusive possession of a particular portion -- Nothing on record to suggest that any of the parties is in exclusive possession --  Order appointing Receiver, set aside by ld. Additional Session Judge in revision – Order of ld. ASJ upheld.

(Para 1,5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Accidental death case – Rash and negligent driving -- Offending vehicle on inappropriate side -- Best incriminating evidence withheld by prosecution -- PW-1 and PW-2 assign the relevant incriminatory role to the convict -- Both were also required to candidly speak in their respective testifications, that the convict at driving the offending vehicle, had maneuvered it to the inappropriate side of the road, and, that thereupon, he had breached the standards of due care and caution, and, consequently, committed the charged offences -- Their respective testifications, does not reveal so -- Even the investigating officer as PW-5, despite his making a communication qua his drawing the site plan carried in Ex.PW5/E, rather not in his examination-in-chief, speaking with candor, about the afore factum of the offending vehicle being driven on the inappropriate side of the road, and, nor in the site plan, there are candid underlinings, with respect to the afore -- Benefit of doubt, is to be given to the convict – Impugned verdicts, as, drawn by the both learned Court below, upon the convict, are quashed, and, set aside.

(Para 10-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Accidental death case – Rash and negligent driving -- Offending vehicle on inappropriate side -- Best incriminating evidence withheld by prosecution -- It was incumbent upon the investigating officer, to both in Ex.P-3 (drawing) and upon his stepping into the witness box make, vivid disclosures suggestive of the offending vehicle occupying the inappropriate side of the road -- However, both the afore are not communicated by him in either -- Benefit has to be given to the accused -- Revision allowed, impugned verdicts, as, drawn by the both learned Court below, upon the convict, are quashed, and, set aside.

(Para 11-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclamation order – Statutory period of 30 days not complied with – Effect of -- Impugned order being illegal, is liable to be set aside – Petitioner is directed to appear before the trial Court within one month and should seek regular bail, interim bail granted till his appearance. Ashok Kumar’s case 2013 (4) RCR (Criminal) 550 relied.

(Para 2-5)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Child in conflict with law -- Rejection of bail -- Revision against -- Bail is the general rule and only in cases covered by exceptions provided in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act, bail can be denied -- Impugned order stated that there is an apprehension that life of CCL would be in danger -- State is not in the position to substantiate the basis for the reasons recorded -- Impugned order set aside -- Matter remitted back to Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board to consider the matter afresh.

(Para 1-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 304-A, 338, 302 – Further investigation – Power of Magistrate – Right of complainant -- If the investigating officer, suppresses credible evidence with respect to the adding of an offence carried u/s 302 IPC, and, the afore omissions are willful and deliberate or are a sequel of slipshod investigations, being made by the investigating officer, in the FIR, thereupon, it is open to the petitioner to file an application, through the aegis of the learned Police Prosecutor concerned, before the learned trial Magistrate concerned, and, seek therein relief, for further investigations being made, in respect of the above by the investigating officer concerned, other than the officer who was earlier conducted the investigations, and, that too by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt – Friendly loan of Rs. 3 lacs -- Basic ingredients which are required for transaction is not disputed -- There was good acquaintance between the petitioner and the accused prior to the transaction took place – No dispute relating to the issuing of demand notice by the petitioner to the accused – Accused/ Respondent No.1 convicted, sentenced to pay fine of Rs.3,00,000/-, in default simple imprisonment for one year.

(Para 2, 29, 30)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Sections 61/1/14, 78 (2) Third Proviso – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 452 – Excise matter – Release of vehicle on superdari – Value of vehicle – Assessment of – Third Proviso “equivalent to the value of the conveyance thereof” -- Valid connotation thereof, is that the value of the seized/ impounded vehicle, at the stage of either its seizure, and more importantly, at the stage of the preferment of the application -- Apposite depreciation which has occurred, since the date of purchase, and, upto the application, being preferred, is to be borne in mind, as it becomes the actual saleable price of the vehicle concerned -- Trial court making a direction to furnish a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs. 8 lakhs – High Court reduced it to Rs. 4 lac -- Impugned orders set aside -- Judicial Magistrate to receive evidence qua the depreciated value of the vehicle to make an order imposing a condition, either cash security or a bank guarantee.

(Para 3-5, 9-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 248, 438, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 323, 427, 447, 452, 506, 380 -- Anticipatory bail with a condition to deposit of Rs.1,10,000/- -- Acquittal in trial – Right to refund -- After acquittal, in a petition moved by the petitioner, High Court directed CJM for release of amount – CJM needlessly proceeded to interpret the order without any jurisdiction, and observed that filing of appeal against acquittal by complainant was not brought to the notice of High Court, therefore, the amount should not be disbursed to the applicant/accused till further clarification from the High Court – Held, CJM passed the order by giving irrational reasons, which not only show his dearth of understanding criminal jurisprudence & fundamental principles of law, but also reflect judicial indiscipline on his part, which amounts to grave misconduct and warrants departmental action against him -- Impugned order set aside -- Amount deposited by the petitioner ordered to be refunded forthwith -- Copy of the order sent to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for initiating departmental action against CJM.

(Para 2,3,9-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 337 -- Rash and negligent driving -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Accused and injured compromised the matter -- Continuing with proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose -- High Court invokes the inherent jurisdiction and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings.

(Para 1,2,3,13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Stop payment – Account closed -- Not only the cases of dishonour of cheques on account of insufficiency of funds or on account of exceeding of arrangement but the cases involving dishonour of cheques on account of “stop payment” and “account closed” have also been brought within the ambit of offence under the aforesaid provision.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Difference in signature -- Contention of the petitioner that in the case offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is not constituted because the cheque was dishonoured on account of difference in signatures and not for the reason of insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement, deserves to be rejected.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Even if cheque issued as a security, still then it cannot be stated that no offence is made out, once the cheque issued by him has been dishonoured by the banker.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Whether the petitioner had issued the cheque as a security and whether at the time when the cheque was presented for its payment, it was not for discharge of any debt or any other liability cannot be determined either by the trial Magistrate at the time of taking of cognizance or by High Court in these proceedings -- These are defences available to the accused/ petitioner, veracity whereof can be determined during the trial of the case -- Trial Magistrate directed to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.

(Para 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is pending, challan has not been presented -- Held, petition is premature at this stage -- Petitioner would be at liberty to approach the court after filing of the challan.

(Para 3-5)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22(C), 36(4), 36-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) – NDPS case -- Default bail – Challan without FSL Report -- Expiry of 180 days -- Petitioner was arrested on 02.10.2020 and had moved an application under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. on 21.05.2021. i.e. after the expiry of 180 days -- Challan was prepared on 14.11.2020 and was presented on 24.11.2020 and no FSL report has been presented in the Court till date -- Petitioner has been in custody since 02.10.2020 i.e. 1 year and 4½ months and there are as many as 12 witnesses, none of whom have been examined yet and thus, the conclusion of trial is likely to take time, moreso, in view of the present COVID-19 pandemic situation – Revision allowed at this stage and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail – In case question of law is held against the present petitioner and is contrary to the law laid down in Ajit Singh alias Jeeta's case, then, the State would be at liberty to seek cancellation/modification of this order, if warranted at that stage. Suresh’s case, (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15648 & Ajit singh @ Jeeta’s case (2018) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121 relied.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 193 -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C – Wrong information of income to Family court – Complaint u/s 191, 193 IPC against wife -- Foremost duty of the party claiming maintenance is to disclose to the Court her actual financial status -- Petitioner joined as an Assistant Professor in University on a monthly salary of Rs.28,000/- on 3.7.2017 -- Her petition u/s 125 Cr.PC was filed on 26.07.2017 -- During the entire litigation she did not disclose information about her job and her earnings and infact deliberately and intentionally to grab maintenance, submitted wrong information to the Court that she was unemployed – Order initiating enquiry and complaint u/s 191/ 193, upheld.

(Para 1, 9-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Proceedings u/s 340 Cr.PC are undoubtedly initiated at the instance of one party but it is a matter of administration of justice and, therefore, ultimately it is between the parties and the court.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 389 -- Cheque bounce case -- Conviction in -- Appeal against -- Suspension of sentence -- Non-deposit of 20% compensation within 60 days -- Submits that the petitioner had already deposited an amount equivalent to 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation during the proceedings of trial and that the petitioner presently is facing a financial crunch and is unable to deposit another 20% though he has a good case on merits -- Lower Appellate Court directed to take necessary steps to hear the appeal and dispose off the same in the given time – If the petitioner or his counsel is not present on the dates fixed, it shall be open to the Lower Appellate Court to nominate any counsel from Free Legal Aid.

(Para 1-3)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167, 482 – Police remand after 15 days/ 48 days of judicial custody -- Petitioner surrendered before the learned JMIC on 17.11.2020 and was sent to the judicial custody -- Precise grievance of the petitioner is that once he had spent 48 days in judicial custody, the investigating agency had no legal right to ask for his remand as the same was beyond the statutory period of 15 days as per the mandate of Section 167 Cr.P.C – Held, stage at which the petitioner had agitated the issue is equally relevant for consideration of his grievance – Petitioner approached High Court after a gap of more than one year -- Petitioner has already undergone the period of remand of one day, hence, the prayer for quashing of the same has already become infructuous.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167, 173(8) -- Further investigation -- Remand beyond 15 days – Effect of -- Investigating agency has a statutory independent right for further investigation of the case -- Even if, the remand granted by the Magistrate was beyond 15 days, the same cannot result in making the investigation non-est in the eyes of law.

(Para 9)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Acquittal by Trial court – Presumption of innocence – Power of Appellate Court -- It is well settled that:-

(A) While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the Trial Court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate Court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the Trial Court deserves to be upturned .

(B) With an order of acquittal by the Trial Court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced.

(C) If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate Court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal.

(Para 7)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 50 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 379 -- Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, Section 2A -- NDPS case -- Acquittal by Trial court – Conviction by High court – Non-compliance of requirement of affording an option for personal search – However, no recovery from personal search -- High Court proceeded to consider the evidence on record straightaway without considering the reasons that had weighed with the Trial Court -- It is true that the personal search did not result in recovery of any contraband material but the non-compliance of requirement of affording an option, was one of the reasons which weighed with the Trial Court in disbelieving the case of the prosecution -- Assessment on facts made by the Trial Court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference by the High Court – Appeal allowed, judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside and order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 8-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 504, 406, 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Acquittal in dowry matter – Revision against -- No medical evidence on record to prove the allegations of physical assault – Allegation of  physical assault in the presence of two cousins, but neither of them were examined during trial nor cited as prosecution witnesses -- Petitioner/complainant while appearing as PW-1 did not utter a word, much less, by way of a whisper regarding the allegations of physical assaults – A panchayat was convened between the parties with regard to the harassment but none of the members of the said panchayat were either examined during trial nor cited as prosecution witnesses -- Allegations of misappropriation of the dowry could not be proved by any cogent or reliable evidence in the absence of any evidence of entrustment of dowry – Revision against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife -- Family Court appointed a Local Commissioner for verifying the plight of respondent-wife and it was confirmed that the respondent-wife was living in house located in the agricultural land, which was 2-3 Kms away from the village -- On the perusal of the report, the petitioner was requested to provide a proper accommodation to the deserted wife but he refused to the same -- During the pendency of the proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C, the petitioner/ husband clandestinely transferred his land in favour of the son from his second wife -- Judicial Magistrate directed the petitioner to pay Rs.3 lacs in lumpsum for maintenance and compensation for the injuries including mental torture and emotional distress caused to the respondent-wife – Order affirmed.

(Para 4,5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance after 30 years – Limitation -- Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance after more than 30 years – Held, cause of action for maintenance is continuing and thus, the arguments regarding delay in filing the same is without any merit.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 275(1) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Evidence through video conferencing -- Petitioner residing in Canada and not fit to travel – Statement of petitioner is very material for the proper adjudication of the case – No serious objection raised by respondents – One opportunity granted to get statement recorded through video conferencing.

(Para 4-7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque by Company – Vicarious liability -- Resignation by Directors before issuance of cheque – Plea that resignation not accepted by the Company – Resignation were tendered before issuance of the cheques and petitioners have sent resignation in the Form No. DIR 11 & 12 to the Registrar of the Company and the same are available in the website -- Only a bald averment is made in the complaint against the petitioners that they were responsible for day to day affairs of the company -- There is no specific averment against them to show, as to how and in what manner the petitioners are responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company – Moreover, they were not the Managing Director of the Company – Petition allowed, complaint qua the petitioners quashed.

(Para 4, 8-17)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 -- Dishonour of cheques – Complainant has right to file and maintain separate complaint for dishonour of each and every cheque.

(Para 17)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 218, 219, 220, 482 -- Dishonour of cheques – Separate notices on dishonour -- Charge together -- At no stretch of imagination it can be termed to be a single transaction attracting the provision of Section 220 of Cr.P.C. -- Liability of accused in both cases is different in nature as in one case cheques are stated to have been issued to discharge the debt of financial assistance provided by an individual, whereas, in another case cheques are stated to have been issued for discharging the liability towards the purchase of goods from sole proprietorship concern – Application u/s 219, 220 of Cr.P.C. dismissed by Trial court, upheld.

(Para 1, 8-19)