Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

651. (SC) 05-08-2022

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

653. (SC) 04-08-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

657. (P&H HC) 27-07-2022

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time -- Report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C., rather within a period of 180 days, since the opening of the investigations, becomes meted strictest compliances -- Very rarely any occasion, arises for the jurisdictionally empowered Court, becoming led to, on valid, and, cogent reasons, make reliance, upon the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, necessarily for enabling, that with a supplementary challan, the report of the FSL becomes appended, and, also becomes instituted before the learned trial Judge concerned, for hence the earlier purported defective report, as filed within 180 days, rather not, becoming purportedly vitiated and, stained.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time – Heaviness of docket rather precluding the FSL concerned, to make examination of the stuff, inside a cloth parcel, may not always be a truthful projection, for the relevant leave, rather within the ambit of the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, being asked for, by the learned Public Prosecutor concerned, from the jurisdictionally empowered Court, rather it may be surmisal -- Therefore, the strength of the Chemical Examiners, at all the FSLs concerned, if is deficit, and, leads to the above crises, thereupon, the above shortfalls be ensured to be forthwith made good, through prompt deployments of Chemical Examiners, at all the FSLs concerned, within the States of Punjab, Haryana, and, U.T. Chandigarh, and, in the above regard all concerned, directed to take the promptest measures.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time – Court gave directions, both upon the Secretary Home, Punjab, and, upon, the DGP Punjab, and, also upon the Secretary Home, Haryana, and, DGP Haryana, as well as the, upon, the Administrator U.T. Chandigarh, besides, upon, the DGP, U.T. Chandigarh.

i)       They shall ensure that all the investigating officers holding investigations into the NDPS cases, hence ensure theirs making the earliest, and, promptest, despatches of the sealed sample cloth parcels, through validly drawn road certificate, to all the FSLs concerned. The FSLs concerned, to which the sample cloth parcels are sent, be ensured to be adequately manpowered, to deal with the heavy docket, if any.

ii)      However, since surmisal reasons with respect to heaviness of dockets do emerge, and, hence lead to delayed reports being made, upon the stuff inside sample cloth parcels, as sent to the FSLs concerned. Therefore, for obviating the above, this Court deems fit, and, just, to hence constitute a Regulatory Mechanism rather imperatively for obviating the emergence of the above stated conundrum. Consequently, this Court directs the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, and, also the U.T. Chandigarh, to constitute in their respective States/Territories, a Steering Committee, headed by an officer not less than the rank of a Secretary, for not only drawing statistics, in respect of the heaviness of dockets at the FSLs concerned, but also to quarterly garner statistics, from their respective FSLs concerned, about the volume of work pending at the respective FSLs concerned, and, to ensure that promptest opinions, are made by the Chemical Analysts', at the respective FSLs concerned, on the stuff sent to the FSLs' concerned, for theirs' making examinations, and, also opinion(s)' thereons. The respectively constituted Steering Committees, shall also keep track of the relevant despatches, rather through the respective Superintendents of Police of police districts concerned, and, shall also keep track that with respect to the seizures, the investigating officers concerned, not later than two weeks since the making of the relevant seizure, depositing them, in the malkhanas concerned, and, shall also ensure that within a week thereafter, the sample parcels are sent for examinations, of the stuff inside the sample parcels, to the respective FSLs concerned.

iii)     The above data be shared with the prosecuting agency, and, if yet, it makes unfoldments, that despite sufficiency of manpower, the load of stuff to be examined inside the sample cloth parcels concerned, is immense, thereupon the prosecution may, within the ambit of the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, and, obviously on the above prima-facie credible, and, weighty reason, hence seek the leave of the Court, to grant extension, for filing of a supplementary report, before the learned jurisdictionally empowered Court, necessarily for ensuring the appendings therewith, the report of the FSLs concerned.

Report of the Steering Committees concerned, and, also the action taken thereons, after every 6 months' hereafters', be intimated to the Registry of High Court.

(Para 20, 21)

660. (P&H HC) 21-07-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce case – Revision -- Allegation of forgery against complainant -- Had that been the case, the accused would have certainly filed a criminal complaint in that regard -- No effort has been made to examine any expert either -- Further, there is no denial by the petitioner to the signatures upon the cheque -- Except bald assertion, the accused has not been able to raise a probable defence even while referring to the cross-examination of the complainant and his witnesses – No infirmity in the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court affirmed by the ld. Appellate Court – No merit, revision dismissed.

(Para 16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce case -- Revision -- Reduction of sentence -- Cheque amounting Rs.4,58,000/- -- Sentenced to R.I. for one year, fine of Rs.5,000/- and in case default sentence of one month -- Conduct of the petitioner is extremely disturbing, firstly, did not appear at the time the Appeal was pending before the ASJ and was declared a proclaimed offender and was released on interim bail -- Petitioner continued as such for a period of approximately three years -- When the matter came up for hearing before High Court, an assurance was given that he would surrender and file a revision petition, however the petitioner was untraceable -- No mitigating circumstances for reducing his sentence.

(Para 8, 17, 18)

663. (SC) 14-07-2022

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Criminal appeal -- Scope and width of appeal in Supreme court -- Following principles emerge:

(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.

(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.

(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 60 -- Evidence law -- Criminal case -- Appreciation of ocular evidence – Scope of – Appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task -- There is no fixed or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence -- The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.

II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

III. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.

(Para 27)

C. Evidence law -- Criminal case – Value of eyewitness – Assessment of -- In assessing the value of the evidence of the eye-witnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence -- In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence -- Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence -- Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the eye-witnesses.

(Para 28, 29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Criminal case -- Discovery Panchnama – Reading over of it – Exhibition of – A panchnama which can be used only to corroborate the panch has to be read over to the panch and only thereafter it can be exhibited – If the panch has omitted to state something which is found in the panchnama, then after reading over the panchnama the panch has to be asked whether that portion of the panchnama is correct or not and whatever reply he gives has to be recorded – If he replies in the affirmative, then only that portion of the panchnama can be read into evidence to corroborate the substantive evidence of the panch – If he replies in the negative, then that part of the panchnama cannot be read in evidence for want of substantive evidence on record – It is, therefore, necessary that care is taken by the public prosecutor who conducts the trial that such a procedure is followed while examining the panch at the trial – It is also necessary that the learned trial judge also sees that the panchnama is read over the panch and thereafter the panchnama is exhibited after following the procedure as indicated above.

(Para 39)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the Act are broadly as under:

(1) Discovery of fact in consequence of an information received from accused;

(2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to;

(3) The accused must be in police custody when he gave informations and

(4) So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible.

Two conditions for application –

(1) information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and

(2) information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered.

(Para 42)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Value of – Involvement or usage of weapon -- Statement does not suggest that the appellant indicated anything about his involvement in the concealment of the weapon -- Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the weapon -- He could have derived knowledge of the existence of that weapon at the place through some other source also -- He might have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and, therefore, it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person discovered the weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, least it can be presumed that he used it.

(Para 45)

G. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Discovery Panchnama/ Memo – Recovery of weapon – Contents of Panchnama/ Memo – Proof of -- In the absence of exact words, attributed to an accused person, as statement made by him being deposed by the Investigating Officer in his evidence, and also without proving the contents of the panchnamas, the trial Court was not justified in placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of weapon.

(Para 47)

H. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27 – Conduct of accused – Disclosure statement – Recovery of – Reliance upon -- While discarding the evidence in the form of discovery panchnama the conduct of the accused would be relevant u/s 8 of the Act -- Evidence of discovery would be admissible as conduct u/s 8 of the Act quite apart from the admissibility of the disclosure statement u/s 27 -- Although the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact u/s 8 of the Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence like murder -- Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of an accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect – Held, conduct of the accused alone, though may be relevant u/s 8 of the Act, cannot form the basis of conviction.

(Para 48-50)

664. (SC) 14-07-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – De facto complainant – Transfer of investigation to CBI -- If a citizen, who is a de facto complainant in a criminal case alleging commission of cognizable offence affecting violation of his legal or fundamental rights against high Government officials or influential persons, prays before a Court for a direction of investigation of the said alleged offence by the CBI, such prayer should not be granted on mere asking -- In an appropriate case when the Court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in a proper direction, and in order to do complete justice in the case and if high police officials are involved in the alleged crime, the Court may be justified in such circumstances to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 44-46)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – Chargesheet filed in criminal case – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Permissibility of -- After the filing of the charge sheet the court is empowered in an appropriate case to handover the investigation to an independent agency like the CBI.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- There are two conditions, on fulfillment of which, a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false affidavit or evidence in a proceeding before a court -- The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and, secondly, in the opinion of the court it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him – There should be something deliberate -- A statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise.

(Para 72-78)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191 – Perjury -- False evidence -- Affidavit -- An affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury.

(Para 79)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 192, 193, 195 -- Perjury -- Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution – Court has to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely -- In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

(Para 79)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211 – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure -- Meaning of charge -- Essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence -- Complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person -- This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person – A false "charge" in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion.

(Para 91)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 211, 120-B – False charge of offence made with the intent to injure – FIR/ First information reports lodged at the different police stations -- At the end of the investigation, the investigating agency reached to the conclusion that the police force had no role to play, rather Naxals were responsible for the massacre – Prima facie, it could be said that false information was given by the first informants to the police as regards the alleged massacre by the police force – Essential ingredient of an offence u/s 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge – “falsely charges” in this section, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial -- “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial -- The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding” -- Statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion – Court left it to the State /CBI to take appropriate steps in accordance with law -- It shall not be limited only to the offence under Section 211 of the IPC -- A case of criminal conspiracy or any other offence under the IPC may also surface – Court left it to the better discretion of the State /CBI to act accordingly keeping in mind the seriousness of the entire issue -- Having regard to the facts of the present case the bar of Section 195 CrPC would not apply if ultimately the State/ CBI decides to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

(Para 90-96)

672. (SC) 16-06-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act -- Same transaction -- While pointing out that the question as to whether a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact -- Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, which are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, the vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

(Para 20.3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 506, 376 – Rape – Threat and abuses – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act – Same transaction -- Alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016 -- Other alleged acts of hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village in Chamoli (Uttarakhand) – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either -- No allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity -- Alleged offence u/s 376 IPC and the other offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 CrPC -- Thus, the learned Sessions Judge, had rightly discharged the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction.

(Para 22.1-25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 – Acquittal of accused -- Double jeopardy – Accused having gone through the trial in relation to offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for the same charges on the same facts -- Any such process would be in blatant disregard of the settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as also Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 24.2.1)

675. (SC) 03-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 231, 242 -- Criminal trial -- Witnesses – Reliance upon their testimony – Nature of – Corroboration in material particulars -- Requirement of -- Witnesses are of three types, viz., (a) wholly reliable; (b) wholly unreliable; and (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable -- When the witness is “wholly reliable”, the Court should not have any difficulty inasmuch as conviction or acquittal could be based on the testimony of such single witness -- Equally, if the Court finds that the witness is “wholly unreliable”, there would be no difficulty inasmuch as neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such witness -- It is only in the third category of witnesses that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 233, 243 -- Criminal trial – Defence witnesses – Value of -- It is a settled law that same treatment is required to be given to the defence witness(es) as is to be given to the prosecution witness(es).

(Para 20)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Criminal trial -- Motive – Value of – it is well settled that only because motive is established, the conviction cannot be sustained.

(Para 23)

677. (SC) 02-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

679. (P&H HC) 02-06-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused -- In case of Section 319 Cr.P.C. the test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if not rebutted, would lead to conviction and in absence of such satisfaction the Court should not exercise its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Quashing of summoning order – In FIR there were no specific allegations against the petitioners regarding entrustment of any money to them or with regard to cheating – Even in the statement of complainant by the police before the registration of the FIR, there were no specific allegations -- Also there were no allegations in the said statement that petitioner ‘S’ ever promised to marry the complainant -- In these circumstances, the testimony of the complainant in the Court whereby she raised specific allegations of entrustment of particular amount against petitioner ‘P’ and of cheating against petitioner ‘S’ appears to be an afterthought and thus, are shrouded by suspicion – Prosecution failed to establish that the evidence available on record is more than prima facie to proceed against the present petitioners under Section 319 Cr.P.C -- It appears that the trial Court exercised its powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. just on mere probability of the complicity of the petitioners in the present case -- Petition allowed and the impugned order set aside.

(Para 11-13)

683. (P&H HC) 01-06-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Scope of – Power is not to be invoked as a matter of routine but to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice -- This section gives the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event, it is felt that the ends of justice will require that the Court can invoke the extraordinary powers which are to be exercised with restraint and not lightly -- In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Respondent no.2/girl has already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other -- In such circumstances, the possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2/girl, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- As such, it is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law -- FIR qua the petitioner quashed.

(Para 8-12)

690. (P&H HC) 18-05-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

692. (SC) 13-05-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

696. (SC) 05-05-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Cancellation of bail -- Supreme Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the Appellate Court -- Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be cancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial.

Aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506 -- Rape case -- Cancellation of bail -- High Court granted bail on sole ground of delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR -- Criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainant and State has also confirmed that he is involved in at least four criminal cases – After bail, photographs appearing in the social media with his snapshots prominently displayed on posters/ hoarding in the forefront with the faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop, welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back to Bhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman” -- Brazen conduct of the respondent No.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainant that she would not get a free and fair trial and that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses -- Representation by appellant’ father to the Superintendent of Police expressing the very same apprehension – Held, respondent No. 2 does not deserve the concession of bail -- Impugned order quashed -- Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender.

(Para 26-31)