Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling the witness -- Merely because a different statement given by the same prosecution witness in another case that itself would not be a reason for recalling the witness and that too, after a period of seven years.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 397, 401, 482 -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Interlocutory order – Maintainability of revision – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Order passed in exercise of power u/s 148 of the NI Act, is neither a final order nor an intermediate order -- Such powers are in the interlocutory in nature and Revision is not maintainable -- Petitioner would be at liberty to approach High Court in exercise of inherent power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(Para 15-18)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act -- Same transaction -- While pointing out that the question as to whether a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact -- Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, which are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, the vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

(Para 20.3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 506, 376 – Rape – Threat and abuses – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act – Same transaction -- Alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016 -- Other alleged acts of hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village in Chamoli (Uttarakhand) – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either -- No allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity -- Alleged offence u/s 376 IPC and the other offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 CrPC -- Thus, the learned Sessions Judge, had rightly discharged the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction.

(Para 22.1-25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 – Acquittal of accused -- Double jeopardy – Accused having gone through the trial in relation to offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for the same charges on the same facts -- Any such process would be in blatant disregard of the settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as also Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 24.2.1)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of proceedings -- Partial payment of cheque amount – Effect of -- Cheque when presented for realization was returned for technical reason -- On the very same date, the accused transferred a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the account of the complainant through RTGS – No material placed that the cheque was re-presented towards recovery of balance amount – Ld. Magistrate has committed an error in taking cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Petition allowed, impugned proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail – Concealment of filing earlier bail application -- Law is well settled that where a process is “ex debito justitiae” the Court would refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant where the application is found to be wanting in bona fides. 

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 231, 242 -- Criminal trial -- Witnesses – Reliance upon their testimony – Nature of – Corroboration in material particulars -- Requirement of -- Witnesses are of three types, viz., (a) wholly reliable; (b) wholly unreliable; and (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable -- When the witness is “wholly reliable”, the Court should not have any difficulty inasmuch as conviction or acquittal could be based on the testimony of such single witness -- Equally, if the Court finds that the witness is “wholly unreliable”, there would be no difficulty inasmuch as neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such witness -- It is only in the third category of witnesses that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 136, 137 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 233, 243 -- Criminal trial – Defence witnesses – Value of -- It is a settled law that same treatment is required to be given to the defence witness(es) as is to be given to the prosecution witness(es).

(Para 20)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Criminal trial -- Motive – Value of – it is well settled that only because motive is established, the conviction cannot be sustained.

(Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2) (n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO matter – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Dispute amicably settled between the parties – In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so -- Respondent no.2/ girl already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other and a male child has also been born from the wedlock -- Possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 332, 353, 186, 148, 149 – Framing of charges u/s 307, 332, 353, 186, 148, 149 IPC – Challenge to – Attempt to murder -- Intention of the party has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case -- Petitioners (accused persons) were not armed with any weapon and they only started pelting stones and one such stone hit on the head of complainant who at that time was posted as BDPO -- It prima facie shows that they were having no intention to kill any person -- MLR injury found was one lacerated wound 4x1cm on right side scalp, 10cm from right ear – Said injury was declared as simple in nature being caused with blunt weapon – Nothing available on record regarding use of petrol bomb – Trial Court directed to rehear both the parties and to pass fresh order regarding framing of charges .

(Para 1, 13-16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused -- In case of Section 319 Cr.P.C. the test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if not rebutted, would lead to conviction and in absence of such satisfaction the Court should not exercise its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Quashing of summoning order – In FIR there were no specific allegations against the petitioners regarding entrustment of any money to them or with regard to cheating – Even in the statement of complainant by the police before the registration of the FIR, there were no specific allegations -- Also there were no allegations in the said statement that petitioner ‘S’ ever promised to marry the complainant -- In these circumstances, the testimony of the complainant in the Court whereby she raised specific allegations of entrustment of particular amount against petitioner ‘P’ and of cheating against petitioner ‘S’ appears to be an afterthought and thus, are shrouded by suspicion – Prosecution failed to establish that the evidence available on record is more than prima facie to proceed against the present petitioners under Section 319 Cr.P.C -- It appears that the trial Court exercised its powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. just on mere probability of the complicity of the petitioners in the present case -- Petition allowed and the impugned order set aside.

(Para 11-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 446A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 34, 120-B, 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Absence from trial – Non-bailable warrants – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner had been regularly appearing before the trial Court and it was only on one occasion he absented and even his bail bonds have not been cancelled or forfeited to the State -- Keeping in view that there is only a single date default, petitioner is directed to put in appearance before the trial Court within ten days from today and on his doing so he shall be released on bail on old bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 2-4)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Renewal of passport – FIR pending against petitioner -- NOC from Trial Court -- As per condition to appear in exam, the candidates must bring to the appointment a valid, non-expired passport meeting specific country issuance criteria --  Application declined by ASJ – Court concerned is competent to grant the NOC – Held, Ld. Additional Sessions Judge has fallen in error in declining the request made by the petitioner – ASJ would take into consideration the submissions made by the parties and decide his application afresh -- Renewal of the passport at this stage is only for the purpose of requirement of the petitioner to appear in the said exam -- However, the same would not be deemed to the grant of permission to the petitioner to travel abroad -- Petition disposed of.

(Para 3-7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4), 37  -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Challan without FSL report – Application for extension of time by SHO -- Default bail -- Petitioner was sent to custody on 23.09.2021, challan was presented on 17.03.2022, without FSL report -- Along with the challan application u/s 36A(4) NDPS Act seeking extension of time filed -- Said application was not forwarded by the public prosecutor or additional public prosecutor --  Law requires that such an application should be supported by a report of public prosecutor, which indicates the progress of the investigation and further specify the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days – No such report of public prosecutor was filed along with the application – Held, request for extension of time made by the prosecution agency was not in accordance with law -- Impugned order rejecting default bail to the petitioner set aside and the petitioner ordered to be released on default bail.

(Para 5-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Scope of – Power is not to be invoked as a matter of routine but to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice -- This section gives the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event, it is felt that the ends of justice will require that the Court can invoke the extraordinary powers which are to be exercised with restraint and not lightly -- In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Respondent no.2/girl has already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other -- In such circumstances, the possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2/girl, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- As such, it is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law -- FIR qua the petitioner quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 240, 313 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B, 137 -- Framing of charges -- Call detail reports not part of challan – Right of accused – Stage of -- Petitioner, at the stage of framing of charges does not have a right to have access to the documents which are not part of challan -- Accused has to build up his defence right from the very inception after charges are framed -- Court does not see any rationale in depriving accused access to such documents at the stage of cross-examining prosecution witnesses so as to build up his defence -- Petitioner would be entitled to the aforesaid call detail record and tower location record once the charges are framed -- Petitioner would be at liberty to confront the PWs with the said documents, but the same would admissible in evidence only after such documents are duly proved during the course of defence evidence by recording statements of witnesses concerned and also in accordance with provisions of Section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act.

(Para 8-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Summary trial – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Ld. trial court recorded the statement of the complainant and convicted the petitioner and imposed one year’s sentence and fine of Rs.14 lakhs – Additional evidence application for calling witness pending before appellate Court – Held, decision arrived at by the learned trial court held to be justified -- Trial u/s 138 of NI Act has to be a summary trial and if sufficient evidence  to convict and the preponderance of probability is met, then there is no reason for creating an elaborate trial -- No interference in the revision called for, dismissed.

(Para 3, 8, 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Mutation of inheritance sanctioned -- Representation to police for taking action for getting mutation sanctioned illegally – Petition u/.s 482 Cr.P.C – Police conducted enquiry and it was found that at the time of sanction of mutation of inheritance, pedigree-table was prepared and the same was witnessed by Namberdar and legal heir of deceased was also present – After inquiry application was consigned to record room – Challenge to the mutation order is pending before Civil Court -- No further orders are required to be passed in the petition.

(Para 1-5)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Absence of accused – Recording of evidence -- If the personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with, evidence may be recorded in the presence of the pleader of the accused -- Except u/s 299, evidence cannot be recorded for any other reason in the absence of the accused.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 299 – Absence of accused – Ex-parte proceedings -- There is no provision in Cr.P.c. for keeping an accused ex parte similar to one found in CPC -- Held, trial cannot be held in the absence of an accused unless personal appearance is dispensed with for valid reasons.

(Para 12, 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Absence of accused – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Dispense with – Permissibility of -- There cannot be dispensation of examination of an accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C if incriminating evidence appears in the evidence of the witness -- Speedy trial does not take the meaning of jumping the stages in criminal trial.

(Para 16)

Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957), Section 63 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(c)(l), Part II First Schedule -- Copyright offence -- Whether, the offence u/s 63 of the Copyright Act is a cognizable offence or non-cognizable – Maximum punishment which can be imposed would be three years – Considering Part II of the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C., if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years and onwards but not more than seven years the offence is a cognizable offence – Language of the provision in Part II of First Schedule is very clear and there is no ambiguity – Held offence u/s 63 of the Copyright Act is a cognizable and non-bailable offence.

(Para 5-7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Reduction of sentence to fine, default sentence intact -- Cheque of Rs.3 Lacs – Conviction by Trial Court for one year with fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default whereof the appellant was directed to undergo S.I. for six months -- Out of Rs.5000/-, Rs.2500/- was to be paid to the complainant – High Court reduced the sentence from one year to three months – Considering the fact that the appellant is an old lady of 69 years, the substantive sentence substituted by fine in the sum of Rs.50,000/- in addition to the fine already deposited by the appellant; Rs.55,000/- shall be the sentence for the offences committed by the appellant -- Default sentence awarded by the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court and the High Court kept intact.

(Para 3-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 420, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Agreement to sell with complainant – Concealment of previous agreement – Conviction by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision against -- In agreement to sell executed with the complainant, it was stated that there is no prior agreement pertaining to the land -- Vendee of prior agreement to sell/ PW-1 submitted that the agreement to sell was executed with him and that the civil suit filed for specific performance of the said agreement under the Specific Relief Act was decreed in his favour and consequently, the sale deed was executed in his favour – Claim of the petitioner that he did not intend to defraud the complainant is apparently misconceived -- No explanation has been given as to why a wrong statement was made by the petitioner under his signature in the agreement – It cannot be said that the dispute in question was civil in nature – No illegality, perversity, infirmity or impropriety in the judgments passed by the Courts below – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Restricted to examine whether there is any manifest error of law or procedure, such a power is to be exercised only when there is an apparent illegality, gross procedural irregularity or impropriety leading to miscarriage of justice, legal infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of the evidence that does not reconcile to the conclusion drawn by the Court -- High Court in a revisional jurisdiction would not interfere in the opinion of the Courts below if such an opinion is a possible opinion on the basis of the evidence brought on record and would not substitute its own opinion merely because such opinion is also a possible opinion.

(Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclaimed offender order – Challenge to – Petitioner was declared proclaimed offender on 22.09.2017 – A clear period of 30 days w.e.f. the date when proclamation was actually affected upto the date nominated for causing appearance i.e. 28.08.2017 was not afforded to the petitioner and it is only a period of 26 days, which was afforded – Impugned order cannot sustain, set aside – Petition accepted.

(Para 2-4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Premature release – Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra -- Appropriate government for remission of sentence – After the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC – State of Gujarat is competent to examine the application filed for pre-mature release.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Power to suspend or remission of sentence – Appropriate Government – Concurrent jurisdiction of Centre and State -- U/s 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432(7), 433, 433A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g), 149 – Rape and murder case – Premature release -- Crime in Gujarat and trial in Maharashtra – Policy for pre-mature release of which State applicable – Held, all further proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred -- Respondents directed to consider the application of the petitioner for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 9th July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.

(Para 14)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13 (1)(a)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cheating and corruption case – Regular bail -- Petitioners are in custody since 16.12.2021 -- Considering that the investigation is complete, challan stands presented, petitioners volunteer to give their specimen signatures, conclusion of trial is likely to take time, the petitioners are granted bail.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A -- Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (4 of 1914), Schedule I, Clause 3 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Interim compensation – Recovery as public demand -- Whether an order for payment of interim compensation under the Negotiable Instrument Act can be enforceable under the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 as a public demand? -- Interim compensation so ordered u/s 143A of the NI Act is recoverable as a fine u/s 421 of Cr.P.C. which then, clearly falls under the definition of ‘public demand’ – Held, interim compensation ordered under the NI Act falls within the ambit of Schedule I of the Recovery Act, realization thereunder cannot be stopped.

(Para 17-20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Cheque bounce case -- Non-bailable warrants – Bailable case – Need of anticipatory bail – Held, petitioner has been summoned for an offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act which is a bailable offence -- Hence, there is no occasion for apprehension of arrest and detention in a bailable offence provided the petitioner is ready and willing to comply with the conditions set forth by the concerned Illaqa Magistrate for granting him the concession of bail – Petition withdrawn with liberty to move an application/petition for bail before the concerned Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 2)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Cancellation of bail -- Supreme Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the Appellate Court -- Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be cancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial.

Aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506 -- Rape case -- Cancellation of bail -- High Court granted bail on sole ground of delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR -- Criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainant and State has also confirmed that he is involved in at least four criminal cases – After bail, photographs appearing in the social media with his snapshots prominently displayed on posters/ hoarding in the forefront with the faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop, welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back to Bhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman” -- Brazen conduct of the respondent No.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainant that she would not get a free and fair trial and that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses -- Representation by appellant’ father to the Superintendent of Police expressing the very same apprehension – Held, respondent No. 2 does not deserve the concession of bail -- Impugned order quashed -- Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender.

(Para 26-31)

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Money laundering case – Quashing of complaint -- Lack of identity of the source of collected money -- It could not be reasonably believed that the unaccounted money is connected with the commission of offence under PMLA -- Letter of the I.T. Department and the details, makes it clear that for the currency seized, the tax is already paid, therefore, it is not the quantum earned and used for money laundering – Chances to prove allegations in the Court are very bleak -- High Court by the impugned order has recorded the finding without due consideration of the letter of the I.T. Department and other material in right perspective -- Findings of the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 18-20)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4, 44 – Money laundering case – Evidence beyond reasonable doubt -- In cases of PMLA, the Court cannot proceed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities -- Allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the Court.

(Para 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s Section 174-A – Compromise in cheque bounce case – Complaint has been dismissed as withdrawn -- Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Theft – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Conviction u/s 379, 411 for three years with fine – Appeal against conviction dismissed – Acquittal after compromise in revision --  Held, occurrence can be categorized as purely personal/ criminal act of private nature -- No injury has been caused -- Compromise is without any coercion or compulsion and has been entered into willingly and voluntarily -- Occurrence took place in the year 2017 and there is nothing on record to show that any untoward incident had taken place after the same -- Petitioner is widowed lady of 51 years of age and the complainant has stated that he has primarily entered into compromise on account of old age of the petitioner and on account of the fact that no loss has been caused to him – Criminal Revision allowed, judgment passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and the petitioner acquitted of the charges framed against her.

(Para 17, 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Compensation of 20% or less -- Discretion of Court -- Minimum sum of 20% is a statutory mandate, no discretion is left with the Court to order to deposit less than 20% of the compensation amount -- Appellate Court has rightly ordered to deposit 20% of the compensation amount.

(Para 13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Probation – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Matter pertains to an incident that occurred in the year 2000 and the present appeal has been pending since 2012 – No material on record that the accused-petitioner has any criminal antecedents – Held, the accused-petitioner are entitled to the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Petitioner ordered to be released on probation, u/s 4 of the Act.

(Para 12-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- At the time of framing of charge, the Court is only required to prima facie presume whether a case against the accused person(s) may be made out and that the facts that emerge from the case may be taken at face value; if they disclose the existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offences, then the charges may be framed.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt.

(Para 7)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65 -- Framing of charge – Scope of -- Alleged video has not been attached with the challan report and the provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, have not been complied with, cannot be appreciated at this stage for the reason that at the time of framing of charge, the degree of belief is only presumption -- Word 'presuming', must be read ejusdem generis to the opinion that there is a ground for forming an opinion that the accused person(s) has committed the alleged offence(s) -- It would also be immaterial whether the said opinion has been formed either on the basis of direct, or circumstantial evidence.

(Para 8)

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 7, 10 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 482 – FIR under Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act -- Quashing of FIR – Maximum sentence is three years -- Limitation of three years to take cognizance -- Sale deed was executed on 28.04.2011 -- Communication dated 23.02.2012 was sent by the DTP, Kurukshetra to Superintendent of Police on 28.09.2016 leading to the registration of the FIR on 29.09.2016 -- Respondent no.2 was aware of the alleged offence, if any, on 01.12.2011/13.12.2011 and, therefore, the court could have taken cognizance within three years of that date i.e. 01.12.2014/13.12.2014 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.PC was submitted on 17.08.2017 -- Thus, the court could clearly not have taken cognizance beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.PC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 10 of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 12-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 -- Conviction in rape case – Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – Bare perusal of the case of the prosecution reveals a consensual relationship between the applicant and the prosecutrix/ an adult lady aged 35 years having two children and she entered into the relationship with the applicant with her eyes open; only if such relationship could not result in a logical end she cannot be allowed to come and allege rape by the applicant; there was no medical evidence, such an eventuality arose on account of refusal by the prosecutrix to undergo a medical examination; no private witness was examined by the prosecution; only after the applicant got married did the prosecutrix allege that the relationship between them was without her consent showing falsity in her claim; the applicant has undergone over ten months of custody; during the course of his trial he was on bail which concession he did not misuse and that the appeal filed by the applicant, which has been admitted for regular hearing, is not likely to be heard in the near future – Considering totality of facts, sentence of the applicant ordered to be suspended.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Snatching case – Leave to appeal against acquittal -- Complaint was registered against the unknown persons -- Incident was around 9 PM, no description of the accused was mentioned by the complainant -- No details like International Mobile Equipment Identity of the mobile or the number of snatched currency notes, no test identification parade was conducted by the IO -- IO made arrest next day from the bus stand of village and there was no basis to support as to how IO identified accused -- IO in his deposition deposed that arrest was on the identification of the complainant -- IO faulted in his cross-examination when he stated that neither identification memo was prepared nor the arrest memo was got signed from the complainant -- None of the documents bear the signatures of accused – Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of connecting the accused with the alleged incident – Statement of the IO when read as a whole including his answers in cross-examination itself is not enough to prove the case of the prosecution –  With so many dents created in the story of the prosecution, the view taken by the trial Court is a plausible and based upon sound record -- No case is made out of illegality on facts or law much less perversity -- Leave to file appeal is declined.

(Para 2-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce case -- Death of accused – Interim compensation – Final compensation – Recovery from Estate – Permissibility of -- In case of death of an accused the compensation awarded u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, but an interim compensation awarded u/s 143A of the said Act cannot be recovered from the estate of a deceased accused, who died before the conclusion of the trial.

(Para 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 447, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation pending -- Inherent powers of High Court – Allegation that petitioners attempted to take forcible possession of the land in question -- Perusal of the FIR shows that the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences are present, therefore, it is not a case where the intervention of the Court is warranted for quashing of the FIR -- Investigation in the case is pending, therefore, it is apparent that the petition is pre-mature -- Court not inclined to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage.

(Para 3-8)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Commission of offence – Cognizance by Court – Relevant date for  limitation --  Terminal point for the prescribed period for the purposes of Section 468, shifted from the date of taking cognizance to the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings so that a complaint ought not to be discarded for reasons beyond the control of the complainant or the prosecution.

(Para 14)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Offence under Domestic Violence Act -- Limitation for domestic violence proceedings -- By the time an application is preferred u/s 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed as such there would never be a starting point for limitation -- Starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed u/s 12 of the Act.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31 – Limitation for domestic violence proceedings -- Filing of an application u/s 12 of the Act cannot be equated to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution -- High Court was in error in observing that the application u/s 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.

(Para 20)

D. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202, 482 -- Notice u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act – Quashing of -- Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Exercise of – In Adalat Prasad’s case (2004) 7 SCC 338 it was held that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused, or any material implicating the accused, or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, aggrieved accused’s remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code -- Adalat Prasad would not get attracted at a stage when a notice is issued u/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

(Para 9, 22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 316, 323, 406, 498-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Causing death of quick unborn child (Section 316 IPC) – Dowry case -- Compromise quashing of FIR --  Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal by convict -- Suspension of sentence – Deposit of fine of Rs. 2 lacs as pre-condition – Harsh and onerous condition -- Legality of -- Appeal of the petitioner is pending and the culpability of the offence is yet to be determined by the Court, therefore, any such onerous condition, as is likely to deprive the accused of the benefit of the order granting suspension of sentence, should not normally be imposed by a Court while granting a benefit -- Petition allowed and the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, partly modified to the extent whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit the fine as a pre-condition for suspension of sentence.

(Para 2-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Dowry death case -- Summoning of cousin sister-in-law as additional accused – Challenge to -- Complaint shows that the petitioner alongwith other co-accused had been harassing and pressurizing the deceased for bringing more dowry -- Deceased was being forced to bring Rs.2.00 lacs from her parents for sending D S abroad -- Investigating Agency despite having recorded the statements of some of the independent witnesses regarding the accusation of harassment of the deceased at the hands of petitioner, which is apparent from the perusal of the zimni has chosen to ignore the statements and for reasons best known to it and has given a clean chit to the petitioner -- As to whether the petitioner is a close relative of the deceased or a distant one and as to whether she is staying in same house or in another locality of the same village, are all matters to be tested by the Trial Court during the course of the trial – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Trial Court -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 12, 13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce case – Compromise at revisional stage – Waiver of cost of 15% of cheque amount -- Petitioner has a poor financial condition is apparent from the fact that the complainant has agreed to finally settle the matter for an amount of Rs.2,50,000/-, although, the cheque was for an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- -- Petitioner is a 51 year old lady who is stated to be having no source of livelihood and with great difficulty, she has repaid the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- to the complainant -- Keeping in view the said special facts and circumstances, this Court deemed it appropriate that no costs should be imposed upon the petitioner -- Revision allowed and judgments of Lower Courts set aside and the petitioner acquitted.

(Para 18-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361-- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4 -- Theft case – Release on probation – Sentence for simple imprisonment for a period of three months and fine of Rs. 3000/- -- Section 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act empower the courts to release the offenders on probation of good conduct -- Similarly, Sections 360 and 361 of the Cr.P.C also empower the courts to release the offenders on probation of good conduct – There are no criminal antecedents against the appellants, the court is inclined to give them the benefit of releasing them on probation of good conduct -- Appellants ordered to be released on probation of good conduct.

(Para 3-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 254, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Discharge application – Dismissal of -- Particulars of offence were stated to the accused/petitioners u/s 251 of CrPC, which was denied by him and it was stated that he had given the blank cheque to the respondent firm, which has been misused -- Complaint case u/s 138 of the NI Act is a summons trial case and the ld. Trial Court has rightly held that prima facie application cannot be decided without going into merits of the case in absence of any evidence -- This finding cannot be interfered with by High Court.

(Para 6-8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Victim/aggrieved person stated before the CJM that there would be no objection if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings -- Continuing proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioner(s) quashed.

(Para 4-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce complaint – Pre-mature complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Trial Court found the complaint pre-mature -- Cheque dishonored and returned with the remark ”Account Closed” -- Notice sent to the accused, who refused to accept notice – Complaint filed on 13^th day of refusal – Complainant-appellant registered the complaint before the statutory period of 15 days -- Leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 145 -- Co-owners -- Joint possession – Exclusive possession – Appointment of receiver -- All the co-owners have an equal right to be in possession of every part of the joint property unless there is something to suggest that any of the parties is in exclusive possession of a particular portion -- Nothing on record to suggest that any of the parties is in exclusive possession --  Order appointing Receiver, set aside by ld. Additional Session Judge in revision – Order of ld. ASJ upheld.

(Para 1,5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused – Accidental death case – Rash and negligent driving -- Offending vehicle on inappropriate side -- Best incriminating evidence withheld by prosecution -- PW-1 and PW-2 assign the relevant incriminatory role to the convict -- Both were also required to candidly speak in their respective testifications, that the convict at driving the offending vehicle, had maneuvered it to the inappropriate side of the road, and, that thereupon, he had breached the standards of due care and caution, and, consequently, committed the charged offences -- Their respective testifications, does not reveal so -- Even the investigating officer as PW-5, despite his making a communication qua his drawing the site plan carried in Ex.PW5/E, rather not in his examination-in-chief, speaking with candor, about the afore factum of the offending vehicle being driven on the inappropriate side of the road, and, nor in the site plan, there are candid underlinings, with respect to the afore -- Benefit of doubt, is to be given to the convict – Impugned verdicts, as, drawn by the both learned Court below, upon the convict, are quashed, and, set aside.

(Para 10-14)