Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120-B -- Murder -- Life imprisonment – Suspension of sentence -- Appeal against the conviction is pending before the High Court since 2018 -- High Court, however, declined to grant suspension of sentence pending the disposal of the appeal – Petitioner has undergone over twelve years and six months of actual imprisonment – Since the appeal before the High Court is likely to take time for disposal, Supreme Court directed that the petitioner be released on bail, pending the disposal of the appeal.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust -- For Section 406 of the IPC to get attracted, there must be criminal breach of trust in terms of Section 405 of the IPC -- For Section 405 of the IPC to be attracted, the following have to be established:

(a) the accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;

(b) the accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and

(c) such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.

Thus, criminal breach of trust would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted with or otherwise has dominion -- Such an act must not only be done dishonestly, but also in violation of any direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to carrying out the trust.

(Para 12-14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust -- Complaint does not directly refer to the ingredients of Section 405 of the IPC and does not state how and in what manner, on facts, the requirements are satisfied -- Pre-summoning evidence is also lacking and suffers on this account -- If monetary demand or claim is incorrect and not payable, offence u/s 405/ 406 is not constituted.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 415, 420 -- Cheating -- In order to apply Section 420 of the IPC,  the ingredients of Section 415 of the IPC have to be satisfied -- To constitute an offence of cheating u/s 415 of the IPC, a person should be induced, either fraudulently or dishonestly, to deliver any property to any person, or consent that any person shall retain any property -- Second class of acts set forth in the section is the intentional inducement of doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do, if she were not so deceived -- Thus, the sine qua non of Section 415 of the IPC is “fraudulence”, “dishonesty”, or “intentional inducement”, and the absence of these elements would debase the offence of cheating.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating -- There is no assertion, much less legal evidence, to submit that accused/company had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or intentional inducement to deliver a property -- It is not the case of respondent no. 2 - complainant that accused-company had tried to deceive them, either by making a false or misleading representation, or by any other action or omission; nor is it their case that accused-company had offered any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver a property -- As such, ingredients of Section 415 of the IPC are not satisfied, the offence u/s 420 of the IPC is not made out.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 464,  470,  471 -- Forged document -- To constitute the offence u/s 471 of the IPC, it has to be proven that the document was “forged” in terms of Section 470, and “false” in terms of Section 464 of the IPC -- Section 470 lays down that a document is ‘forged’ if there is: (i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine; and (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of the person using the document that it is a forged one -- Section 470 defines a forged document as a false document made by forgery -- As per Section 464 of the IPC, a person is said to have made a ‘false document’: (i) if he has made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; (ii) if he has altered or tampered a document; or (iii) if he has obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses -- Unless, the document is false and forged in terms of Sections 464 and 470 of the IPC respectively, the requirement of Section 471 of the IPC would not be met.

(Para 18)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Summoning of accused – Duty of Magistrate -- Even though at the stage of issuing process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set the criminal proceedings into motion -- Requirement of Section 204 of the Code is that the Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record -- He/she may even put questions to complainant and his/her witnesses when examined u/s 200 of the Code to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations -- Only upon being satisfied that there is sufficient ground for summoning the accused to stand the trial, summons should be issued.

(Para 21)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202, 204 – Summoning of accused -- Summoning order is to be passed when the complainant discloses the offence, and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence -- It should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course -- Summoning without appreciation of the legal provisions and their application to the facts may result in an innocent being summoned to stand the prosecution/trial -- While summoning an accused who resides outside the jurisdiction of court, in terms of the insertion made to Section 202 of the Code by Act No. 25 of 2005, it is obligatory upon the Magistrate to inquire into the case himself or direct investigation be made by a police officer or such other officer for finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(Para 21, 22)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 405, 420, 471, 120-B – Cheating -- Criminal breach of trust – Forgery -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order/ non-bailable warrants -- Non-bailable warrant was not issued in the name of any person but by designation against the Chief Manager JIPL – High Court, while dismissing the petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, failed to take due notice that criminal proceedings should not be allowed to be initiated when it is manifest that these proceedings have been initiated with ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance and with a view to spite the opposite side due to private or personal grudge -- Allegations in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence on record, when taken on the face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged -- Inherent powers of the court can and should be exercised in such circumstances -- When the allegations in the complaint are so absurd or inherently improbable, on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient wrong for proceeding against the accused, summons should not be issued – Proceedings and complaint quashed.

(Para 10, 23-25)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 29, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Son’s criminal liability – Appeal -- Accused is none other than the son of the deceased-father who borrowed the loan from the complainant and the accused agreed to repay the same and he has issued the cheque -- Such being the case, as a legal representative of the father, the accused is liable to repay the loan to the complainant – First Appellate Court not considered Section 29 of the N.I. Act and has erred in acquitting the accused -- Judgment of the First Appellate Court set aside -- Judgment of the trial Court convicting the respondent-accused upheld.

(Para 8-12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 29, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Son’s criminal liability – Time barred debt – Deceased father of accused borrowed loan in the year 2003, the cheque was issued by son after four years -- Accused once paid Rs.10,000/- by cash and subsequently, he issued a cheque to discharge the liability, he is liable for discharging his liability of his father -- Judgment of the trial Court convicting the respondent-accused upheld.

(Para 8-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of the Act was compromised and the complaint stood dismissed as withdrawn – Held, continuation of proceedings u/s 174-A IPC shall be an abuse of process of law -- Petition allowed and FIR u/s 174-A IPC along with all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of Court -- Court trying a complaint for offence u/s 138 of NI Act has discretion to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant -- Amount of compensation has not to exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque – Held, grant of interim compensation is a discretionary power and such order has to be based on reason and logic.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of Court -- No guidelines for grant of interim compensation have been laid down in Section 143-A of the NI Act -- it is a settled law that whenever a discretionary power is to be exercised by a Court, the same has to be exercised on well-recognized principles supported by reasons -- Court has to spell out the reasons for grant of interim compensation in favour of the complainant and it has also to justify in its order with reasons the quantum of interim compensation that is being awarded by him as the said quantum can vary from 1% to 20% of the cheque amount.

-- Some of the reasons for granting interim compensation may be that the accused absconds and avoids to appear before the Court despite service or there is overwhelming material on record to show that the accused is liable to pay an enforceable debt or that the accused is guilty of protracting the proceedings by avoiding to cross-examine the witnesses or producing his evidence.

(Para 10, 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Discretion of court -- Reasoned order – Requirement of -- Magistrate is empowered to grant interim compensation in favour of a complainant ranging from 1% to 20% of the cheque amount -- Trial Magistrate has granted interim compensation in the maximum range of 20% without assigning any reason – Order impugned is devoid of any reasons and no discussion is made in the impugned order as to why interim compensation is being awarded – Ld. Magistrate has not dealt with the aspect of the matter relating to denial of execution of the cheque by the accused in his statement recorded u/s 251 of the Cr. P. C – Order is not sustainable in law, quashed.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 195(1) -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – No complaint in writing by Public Servant as required u/s 195(1) Cr.P.C -- Registration of FIR and commencement of proceedings qua petitioner is impermissible -- FIR quashed.

(Para 9, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 468, 469 -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – Limitation -- Period of limitation would be one year from the date of commission of offence with respect to Section 188 IPC -- SDJM, had taken the cognizance, beyond the period of limitation as detailed in Sections 468 and 469 Cr.P.C. -- Petition allowed, FIR u/s 188 IPC, and subsequent proceedings emanating from it quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 -- Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61 – Quashing of FIR -- Excise matter – Limitation -- Maximum sentence prescribed 2 years -- Trial Court can take cognizance within 3 years -- Held, prosecution was required to file challan within three years whereas a period of 08 years has expired, however, till date challan has not been presented -- In view of mandate of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the petition allowed and FIR quashed.

(Para 2, 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 413, 473 -- Punjab Habitual Offenders (Control and Reform) Act (XII of 1952), Section 2(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 – Framing of charge u/s 413 IPC – Challenge to -- Habitually dealing in stolen property – Petitioners have not been convicted in any case -- Apart from the present case two FIR u/s 379 IPC have been registered against petitioners and the same are pending trial – Nothing on record to prove that the petitioners have been convicted in connection with their dealing in stolen property – Held, no prima facie case u/s 413 IPC is made out against the petitioners -- Resultantly, the impugned order set aside to the aforesaid extent only.

(Para 7-13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 – Criminal trial – Opportunity of cross-examination -- On the very first date, when PW-1 ASI was present and his examination-in-chief was recorded, his cross-examination was treated as NIL – Order passed by the trial Court set aside -- One effective opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine PW-1 ASI.

(Para 5-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Partnership firm not arrayed as an accused – Quashing of complaint u/s 138 of N. I. Act -- Cheque in question bears signature of the petitioner being authorized signatory of partnership firm -- The expression ‘company’ also includes a firm, as is provided in Explanation to Section 141 of the Act – There cannot be any vicarious liability of the partner of a partnership firm unless there is a prosecution against the partnership firm -- Thus, the complaint filed by the respondent is not maintainable and it is bad in law and entire proceedings in pursuance thereof are nothing but an abuse of process of the Court and are liable to the quashed -- Petition allowed and criminal complaint, summoning order and the order passed by the Revisional Court and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 11-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427 -- Constitution of India, Article 32, 136, 226 -- Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 136 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Theft of electricity – Conviction in nine cases – Concurrent running of sentence – Appellant is in jail for three years – Writ dismissed, meaningly the appellant has to go undergo a total term of imprisonment of 18 years – All the conviction took place on the same day – Held, High Court ought to have intervened in the exercise of its jurisdiction by setting right the miscarriage of justice -- Appeal allowed, sentences in the nine sessions trials ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of complaint – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- For the quashing of a criminal complaint, the Court, when it exercises its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 11)

B. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Manufacturing of drugs without license – Quashing of complaint -- Appellants purchased pyridoxal-5-phosphate, 75 kg (as 3 x 25kg packets), however, no stock was found on the premise of the Appellants -- Alleged breaking up of the impugned substance into smaller packages and further distribution of the same is being classified by the Respondent/ complainant as “manufacturing”

-- The impugned substance, has been categorized as a bulk food substance falling under the definition of food as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

-- The impugned substance has specifically been mentioned as a food ingredient in Serial No.4(ii) of the Schedule-I of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2016.

Alleged substance is not included as a drug in the Indian Pharmacopoeia -- Impugned substance does not require a specific license -- No explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-29)

C. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Manufacturing of drugs without license – Delay in complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.

(Para 25)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 54 -- Cheque bounce case – Additional evidence -- Certified copy of judgment of previous conviction -- Evidence showing any previous conviction is also relevant as evidence of bad character -- Thus the evidence relating to previous conviction (past actions of a person) in a case of similar nature would be relevant -- However, the evidentiary value of the same would be evaluated by the ld. trial Court at the time of final disposal of a case – No prejudice would be caused to the accused if the aforesaid judgment is taken on record as the petitioner would get an opportunity to rebut the same – Impugned order in allowing application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. not suffering from illegality and infirmity – No interfere is called for.

(Para 11,12)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Leave to appeal -- Granting of special leave to appeal against acquittal is a discretionary power.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452, 506, 166, 167 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 12 -- Rape -- Cancellation report in FIR –  Ld. JMIC dismissed the complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Applicant/ prosecutrix was alleged to be raped on 07.01.2016 and 10.02.2016 – She opted to remain silent after alleged incident of 07.01.2016 and approached police on 10.02.2016 i.e. after second incident -- There is gap of one month between first incident and second incident -- Applicant attempted to implicate police officials who did not agree with her complaint -- MLR was not supporting the case of the applicant -- No injury was found over the body of the applicant -- Complainant/applicant failed to make out prima facie case warranting summoning of alleged accused – There is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has dismissed the complaint -- Permission for special leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – Consent of complainant – Requirement of -- Section 147 of NI Act coupled with inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C., in the interest of justice, High Court is not precluded from compounding the case in absence of consent of complainant where complainant is duly compensated as Section 138 of the NI Act does not provide that it is mandatory for the Court to sentence for imprisonment in all eventualities but there is option to the Court to impose sentence of imprisonment or fine or both.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – No-consent case -- Petitioner is 52% handicapped and has deposited in the Court 10% over and above the amount of compensation – Held, complainant has been compensated adequately and therefore, substantive sentence of imprisonment is not necessary -- Accordingly complaint filed by the respondent compounded, impugned judgments/ orders set-aside and petitioner acquitted of the offence charged.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Cheating and forgery -- Forged sale deed – Quashing of Complaint – Mockery of investigation – Civil dispute pending -- When it is the specific case of the original complainant that at no point of time he had executed the disputed sale deed and his signature on the disputed sale deed has been forged, then the;  

-- first thing the police should have done was to obtain the specimen hand writings of the complainant so as to be compared with the disputed signature on the sale deed through a hand writing expert.

-- second thing which the investigating agency ought to have done is to investigate whether the sale consideration had been paid to the purchaser of the disputed plot or not and if the sale deed consideration had been paid, then in what manner.

-- If it is the case of the original complainant that a conspiracy was hatched, then in such circumstances why did the police drop the purchaser and the other individuals from the charge sheet stating that they are the bona fide purchasers of the plot in question for value without notice.

No convincing legal evidence on record to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences -- Since the purchaser of the plot in question and others have not been arrayed as accused, the entire theory of criminal conspiracy collapses like a pack of cards -- Civil Court seized of the question as regards the legality and validity of the disputed sale deed -- The matter is sub judice in the Civil Court -- It will not be proper to permit the criminal prosecution to proceed further on the allegation of the sale deed being forged – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Civil dispute – Criminal texture – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court -- A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture -- But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence -- In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court.

(Para 17)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 62 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 -- NDPS case -- Superdari to purchaser of vehicle – Vehicle lying unattended in the police custody since 06.08.2019 -- Its condition would certainly deteriorate day-by-day and in turn it would be reduced to junk in case the same is not handed over to the petitioner on the imposition of suitable conditions -- Registered owner of the vehicle has no objection if the vehicle is released on superdari to the petitioner – Petition allowed and the vehicle in question ordered to be released to the petitioner on superdari.

(Para 3, 4, 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 212, 213 – Object of framing Charge -- Object of the provisions is to make the accused aware of the accusations against him on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking to convict him and accused should be in a position to effectively defend himself.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 215, 264, 313 -- Omission to frame charge – Error in charge – Duty of Appellate Court -- Error cannot be said to be material unless the accused was misled by such error or omission and that such error or omission has caused a failure of justice -- Finding and sentence will be invalid only if in the opinion of the Court of appeal, the error or omission has occasioned a failure of justice -- When the Court of appeal is called upon to decide whether any failure of justice has been occasioned due to omission to frame a charge or error in the charge, the Court is duty bound to examine the entire record of the trial including all exhibited documents, depositions and the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313.

(Para 19, 20)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Examination of accused – Nature of -- Questioning an accused u/s 313 CrPC is not an empty formality -- Requirement of Section 313 CrPC is that the accused must be explained the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him so that accused can offer an explanation -- After an accused is questioned u/s 313 CrPC, he is entitled to take a call on the question of examining defence witnesses and leading other evidence.

(Para 22)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- Power exercisable is an extra ordinary power conferred on the Court to advance real and substantial justice -- It is required to be used with care, caution, circumspection and only if compelling reasons exist for proceeding against a person against whom no action has been initiated -- Furthermore, there must be strong and cogent evidence indicating the involvement of those persons in the commission of crime.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Married siter-in-law -- Marriage of the respondent no.2/ sister-in-law solemnized prior to the marriage of the deceased -- Allegations put forth in the FIR against the respondent no.2 are to the effect that she used to interfere in the married life of the deceased and vague allegations that she was not happy with the dowry and used to harass the deceased and demanding more dowry -- No specific instance pointed out – Improvised version by the petitioner, while appearing in the witness box that respondent no. 2 used to instigate the husband of the deceased to give beatings to her -- Respondent no.2 residing separately in the house of her in-laws – Order dismissing application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. upheld.

(Para 1, 11-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Absconder -- Publication of proclamation – 30 days’ period for appearance -- Order of proclamation is dated 22.05.2017 – Proclamation marked to the SHO on 02.06.2017, requiring the petitioner to appear before the Court on 13.06.2017 -- Publication was effected on 12.06.2017 -- Neither proclamation was publicly read in some conspicuous place nor 30 days' period was given to the petitioner to appear in the Court – Held, order dated 09.02.2018, whereby the petitioner was declared absconder, is therefore, against the provisions of Section 82 Cr.P.C – Said order is against the statutory provisions, the same is set aside.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Publication of proclamation – 30 days’ period for appearance -- Directions given that learned Courts of Judicial Magistrates are required to take the provisions of Section 82 Cr.P.C. in its true letter and spirit -- Advised that whenever a proclamation is issued, then two dates be given in the order i.e. first date should be within 15-20 days giving the direction to the serving official to complete the process of proclamation and to return the proclamation well in time and to appear in the Court for making statement about publication of proclamation -- Second date should be fixed after 30 days thereof directing the accused to appear at a specific place and on the specified date and time, so that there is no violation of the provisions of Section 82 Cr.P.C.

(Para 7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(i)(x) 14 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 465 – Summoning under SC ST Act By Magistrate – Jurisdiction of Special Court -- Occurrence of 02.04.2011, summoning order of 10.01.2017 – Held, cognizance taken by the Magistrate after the amendment-01.01.2016 in the Act, would not vitiate the proceedings.

(Para 18-25)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228, 300 –Double jeopardy – Plea of -- Discharge application – Framing of charge -- Stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is a stage prior to framing of the charge u/s 228 Cr.P.C. and it is at that stage alone that the court can consider the application u/s 300 Cr.P.C. -- Once the court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge u/s 228 Cr.P.C. -- Ld. trial Court erred in not considering the application u/s 300(1) Cr.P.C. at the time of framing of charge and/or prior to framing of the charge – Matter remanded back to the ld. trial Court to consider the plea of the accused on applicability of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C.

(Para 7-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail – Maintainability of – Arrest in another case -- Since the applicant is in custody in connection with another case, the present anticipatory bail application u/s 438 Cr.P.C. would not lie and would not be maintainable.

(Para 12)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7 and 13(1) (b), 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Corruption case -- Regular bail – Illegal gratification of Rs. 7,000/- for entering inheritance mutation – Though investigation is complete conclusion of the trial is likely to take time; moreso, sanction to prosecute u/s 19 of the Act is still awaited; no recovery is to be made from the petitioner and he volunteers to give his voice sample, the petitioner granted bail.

(Para 1-5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Conspiracy – Quashing of FIR -- Rs.15,000/- received by the co-accused was never ever handed over to the petitioner, recovery was effected from his co-accused – Petitioner was repeatedly asking his co-accused, Kanungo to explain as to why the said amount had not been deposited, letters would conclusively establish that the petitioner had absolutely no role to play in the defalcation of the said amount – It was his co-accused alone who had received the money and not deposited the same – Absolutely no evidence on record to establish conspiracy between the petitioner and his co-accused – FIR qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Sanction for prosecution -- For the commission of an offence u/s 409 IPC, sanction for prosecution u/s 197 Cr.P.C. is not required.

(Para 20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 210 -- Trial of case version and cross version – Procedure of -- Trial Judge directed to try both the case and cross-case one after the other -- After recording the evidence in one case, he must hear the arguments but reserve the judgment -- Thereafter, he must proceed to hear the cross-case and after recording of the evidence, he must hear the arguments and reserve the judgment in that case as well -- The same learned Judge must, thereafter, dispose of the matters by two separate judgments -- For deciding each of the cases, he shall rely only on the evidence recorded in that particular case without looking at the evidence recorded in the cross-case -- The judgments must be pronounced by the same Judge one after the other.

(Para 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory Bail – 72 hours’ notice before arrest – Direction given by the High Court to the State that 72 hours’ notice should be given to the first respondent in the event that the State finds it necessary to arrest him in connection with any complaint pertaining to a cognizable offence at the behest of the Joint Registrar (Audit) is manifestly incorrect in law -- Such a direction could not have been issued by the High Court, accordingly vacated and set aside.

(Para 1-3)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Power to pass order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. after acquittal – Power to pass order u/s 319 CR.P.C. after sentence in case of conviction -- Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?

-- The power under Section 319 of CrPC is to be invoked and exercised before the pronouncement of the order of sentence where there is a judgment of conviction of the accused. In the case of acquittal, the power should be exercised before the order of acquittal is pronounced. Hence, the summoning order has to precede the conclusion of trial by imposition of sentence in the case of conviction. If the order is passed on the same day, it will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and if such summoning order is passed either after the order of acquittal or imposing sentence in the case of conviction, the same will not be sustainable.

(Para 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Absconding accused – Presence secured subsequently – Bifurcated trial – Power of trial court u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial?

-- The trial court has the power to summon additional accused when the trial is proceeded in respect of the absconding accused after securing his presence, subject to the evidence recorded in the split up (bifurcated) trial pointing to the involvement of the accused sought to be summoned. But the evidence recorded in the main concluded trial cannot be the basis of the summoning order if such power has not been exercised in the main trial till its conclusion.

(Para 33)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 CrPC?

(i) If the competent court finds evidence or if application under Section 319 of CrPC is filed regarding involvement of any other person in committing the offence based on evidence recorded at any stage in the trial before passing of the order on acquittal or sentence, it shall pause the trial at that stage.

(ii) The Court shall thereupon first decide the need or otherwise to summon the additional accused and pass orders thereon.

(iii) If the decision of the court is to exercise the power under Section 319 of CrPC and summon the accused, such summoning order shall be passed before proceeding further with the trial in the main case.

(iv) If the summoning order of additional accused is passed, depending on the stage at which it is passed, the Court shall also apply its mind to the fact as to whether such summoned accused is to be tried along with the other accused or separately.

(v) If the decision is for joint trial, the fresh trial shall be commenced only after securing the presence of the summoned accused.

(vi) If the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried separately, on such order being made, there will be no impediment for the Court to continue and conclude the trial against the accused who were being proceeded with.

(vii) If the proceeding paused as in (i) above is in a case where the accused who were tried are to be acquitted and the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried afresh separately, there will be no impediment to pass the judgment of acquittal in the main case.

(viii) If the power is not invoked or exercised in the main trial till its conclusion and if there is a split-up (bifurcated) case, the power under Section 319 of CrPC can be invoked or exercised only if there is evidence to that effect, pointing to the involvement of the additional accused to be summoned in the split up (bifurcated) trial.

(ix) If, after arguments are heard and the case is reserved for judgment the occasion arises for the Court to invoke and exercise the power under Section 319 of CrPC, the appropriate course for the court is to set it down for re-hearing.

(x) On setting it down for re-hearing, the above laid down procedure to decide about summoning; holding of joint trial or otherwise shall be decided and proceeded with accordingly.

(xi) Even in such a case, at that stage, if the decision is to summon additional accused and hold a joint trial the trial shall be conducted afresh and de novo proceedings be held.

(xii) If, in that circumstance, the decision is to hold a separate trial in case of the summoned accused as indicated earlier;

(a) The main case may be decided by pronouncing the conviction and sentence and then proceed afresh against summoned accused.

(b) In the case of acquittal the order shall be passed to that effect in the main case and then proceed afresh against summoned accused.

(Para 33)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary case – Regular trial – Specific order of Magistrate – Requirement of -- When the evidence of the parties, in the chief examination, cross-examination and re-examination (if any) were recorded in verbatim and was faithfully placed on record then for merely not recording the order observing that the matter would be tried as a summons case or as a regular trial would not itself vitiate the trial conducted by the Magistrate of the Trial Court, when it has not resulted in miscarriage of justice – Ld. Sessions Judge’s Court only on technicalities set aside the judgment passed by the Trial Court and ordered for a de-novo trial -- Sessions Judge's Court ought to have decided the appeal before it on its merit – Revision allowed, judgment passed by ld. ASJ set aside, matter remanded to ld. ASJ for its fresh disposal, in accordance with law.

(Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 – Police protection in run-away marriage -- Concealment of previous marriage – Proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C -- Proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C. are to be initiated in exceptional circumstances and considering the impact of commission of offence upon the administration of justice -- Only the directions were issued to the SSP to look into the representation with regard to the threat perception – Held, not a fit case for initiating enquiry for making false pleadings in the writ petition.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 167, 218, 330, 323, 195, 348, 365, 477A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Kidnapping/ Abduction -- Anticipatory bail -- While granting anticipatory bail to the respondents/ accused, the High Court neither considered the allegations against the respective accused nor the role played by them nor the position held by them at the time of registering the FIR in the year 1994 nor the role played by them during the investigation -- High Court has also not taken note of the recommendations made by the Committee headed by a former Judge of Supreme Court – Appeals allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside -- Anticipatory Bail Applications remitted to the High Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with law and on their own merits.

(Para 5-8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Acquittal – Appeal – Burden of proof -- Burden not only lies on the complainant (just like on prosecution in criminal trial), but it also lies on the accused -- So, it cannot be said that there is limited scope for interference in the judgment of acquittal particularly, when it is for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20 -- Cheque – Requirement of Stamp -- Section 20 of the Negotiable Instrument Act talks about giving the authority to the holder to make inchoate stamped instrument complete -- Even though the cheque is negotiable instrument, it does not require stamp.

(Para 25)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 87, 138 – Cheque bounce case – Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Security cheque – Material alteration -- Unilateral putting dates on cheques – Complainant unilaterally has put in dates on the cheques without the authority of the accused and even by not informing him -- So, it amounts to material alterations -- If it is so such negotiable instrument becomes void -- Hence prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act cannot be initiated.

(Para 27-32)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 37, 61, 85 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act -- Regular bail -- Recovery of 500 grams of heroin – Charges framed on 28.09.2021, about 18 adjournments granted but no prosecution witness examined except one formal witness – Prosecution witnesses are the official witnesses -- Petitioner in incarceration for about 2 years, 1 month and 24 days – Argument that petitioner is falsely implicated get substantiated from the fact that for 18 times no prosecution witness came forward for deposition -- Petitioner is not involved in any other case under the NDPS Act – Not argued that in case the petitioner is released on bail, then he may repeat the offence or may abscond from justice -- Both the conditions for making a departure from the bar contained u/s 37 of the NDPS Act satisfied – Court deemed it fit and proper to grant the regular bail to the petitioner -- Petition allowed.

(Para 2-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cheque bounce case -- Quashing of order declaring accused proclaimed person – Submitted that the petitioner was never served with the summons and has now come to know about the pendency of the complaint and he is ready to surrender before the trial Court and face the trial -- Issuance of notice of motion to respondents dispensed with, petition allowed, impugned order declaring the petitioner a proclaimed persons, set aside -- Petitioner directed to appear before the trial Court within a period of 15 days and on doing so, the trial Court will release him on bail -- Till then arrest stayed.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 384, 323, 506, 34, 457, 458 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Lurking house trespass or house breaking – Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties have entered into compromise voluntarily and without any undue influence – FIR and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom quashed qua petitioners.

(Para 5, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216, 397 -- Application for alteration of charge dismissed – Revision -- Dismiss in default – Revision petition could not have been dismissed in default -- In the event of absence of the parties, revisional Court could have itself examined the record to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order assailed before it -- Impugned order set aside, revisional Court directed to dispose of the revision petition in accordance with law.

(Para 4-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Dowry death – Regular bail to mother-in-law – Deceased died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage – As per allegations in the FIR itself on the day of death, the petitioner had informed the complainant about the deceased having locked herself inside the room – After the occurrence the in-laws had shifted the deceased to the hospital – Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the presumption u/s 113-B of Evidence Act is attracted or not would be subject to the outcome of the trial – Out of total 17 prosecution witnesses, 3 witnesses have been examined – Petitioner ordered to be enlarged on bail.

(Para 1,7)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29(1)(A), 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint under insecticides Act – Offence by Company -- Company not impleaded as accused – Quashing of complaint -- Director, employee or responsible officer of the company/firm cannot be prosecuted without impleadment of the said company/firm -- Thus, the complaint held not maintainable against both the petitioners on account non-arraignment of manufacturing company of which petitioner No.1 is Director and petitioner No.2 is Area Sales Manager, as an accused in the same -- Petition allowed, criminal complaint, and all consequential proceedings arising thereof, against both the petitioners quashed.

(Para 1, 14, 15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Cheque by Trust -- Trust not impleaded as party in complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act -- Maintainability of the complaint – Petitioner is admittedly neither the signatory of the cheque nor is there any averment made by the complainant in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of and was responsible to the trust for the conduct of its business -- Mandate of Section 141 of NI Act not pleaded and established remotely -- Further proceeding in the complaint is nothing but an abuse of process of Court –Complaint as a whole being unsustainable in the eye of law needs to be quashed and accordingly quashed.

(Para 6-10)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – State appeal against acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Delay of 303 days -- Condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of lethargic working of Government -- Delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot be mechanically condoned, in the absence of 'sufficient cause' for delay -- No explanation put forth for explaining the delay for filing the application -- Reason given is that the file moved at a leisure pace -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed -- Consequently, the application u/s 378 (3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed as time barred.

(Para 5-8)

Public Gambling Act, 1867 (3 of 1867), Section 5, 13-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR / Charge under Gambling Act -- Non-compliance of Section 5 of the Gambling Act and section 155(2) Cr.P.C -- Even no independent witness joined – Proceedings initiated against the petitioner are untenable, especially when the raid leading to lodging of FIR itself was from the threshold marred by procedural irregularity -- Same is a ground sufficient to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of law and secure of ends of justice.

(Para 18-20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 454 – Theft in dwelling house – Lurking house trespass -- Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- State does not dispute the fact that offence punishable u/s 454 IPC is not stand alone offence and after acquittal of the petitioner of offence punishable under Section 380 IPC, 454 IPC cannot be maintained – Conviction u/s 454 IPC set aside.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 411 – Theft in dwelling house – Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- Recovery from the co-accused -- Petitioner was never charged for offence punishable u/s 411 IPC -- There is no order on record to show that the Trial Court ever exercised power u/s 216 Cr.P.C. to alter the charge -- Thus, the Courts below erred in holding the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 411 IPC in the absence of charge -- Conviction u/s 411 IPC set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 32 – Writ for fair investigation and transfer of trial -- Murder -- Petitioners being daughter and wife of the deceased have a fundamental right to get justice as victim and they have a legitimate expectation that criminal trial is being conducted in a fair and impartial manner and uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations – Justice is not to be done but the justice is seen to have been done also -- As per the settled position of law, free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution -- If the criminal trial is not free and fair and if it is biased, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would be at stake, shaking the confidence of the public in the system -- However, at the same time, looking to the large number of witnesses to be examined during the trial and no hardship is caused to those witnesses, instead of transferring the trial to New Delhi, case transferred to CBI Special Court at Hyderabad -- CBI also directed to complete the further investigation/investigation in the FIR on the larger conspiracy and destruction of evidence, at the earliest independently and in an unbiased manner.

(Para 13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B -- Punjab Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2000 (9 of 2000), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Evasion of VAT – FIR under General Acts – Quashing of FIR -- Provisions of the VAT Act only provide for mandatory penalty -- If a special provision has been made qua a particular subject (Value Added Tax), the said subject is excluded from the general provisions (Indian Penal Code) -- Since the provisions of the VAT Act do not provide for the registration of the FIR and the said Act is a Code in itself, the provisions of the IPC also cannot be invoked -- FIR could not have been registered against a person who was said to have evaded tax -- Petition allowed, FIR, the report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 199, 200 -- Maintainability of second complaint – Exceptional circumstances -- Second complaint can be maintainable in exceptional circumstances -- If the first complaint was dismissed without venturing into the merits of the case or on a technical ground and/or by returning a reasoning which can be termed as perverse or absurd in law, and/or when the essential foundation of second complaint is based upon such set of facts which were either not in existence at the time when the first complaint was filed or the complainant could not have possibly lay his hands to such facts at that time, an exception can be made to entertain the second complaint.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 199, 200 -- Maintainability of Second complaint -- Judicial Magistrate having found that the allegations made by the appellant were in the teeth of fourth exception to Section 499 IPC, he declined to issue process to the respondents -- Such dismissal cannot be said to be without application of judicial mind – Such an order is always justiciable before a superior Court -- Even if the said Order is set aside, it does not mean that the trial court did not apply its mind -- Appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the High Court in a Criminal Revision Petition and withdrew the same to work out his remedy as may be available in law -- This Order cannot be construed to have permitted the appellant to file a second complaint on identical set of facts.

(Para 16, 17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Quashing of FIR -- De-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime -- They are neither concerned with the sale deed nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question – It appears that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute – Held, High Court ought to have exercised its power u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants – Appeals allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.

(Para 18-23)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372 – Acquittal of accused – Victim’s right of appeal -- Right to appeal given to a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code is prospective in nature and has been made enforceable w.e.f. 31.12.2009 -- A victim has a right to prefer appeal in respect of three types of the orders referred to in the proviso 2 Section 372 Cr.P.C., if such order has been passed on or after 31.12.2009 and no such right was available to the complainant/victim prior to 31.12.2009.

(Para 15, 16)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 12(11) – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Parole – Non-decisioning of application – Writ petition – State that decision with respect to the grant of parole is to be taken within a period of 7 weeks -- 7 weeks have already elapsed, petition disposed of with a direction to the official respondents to take a final decision on the application within a period of 10 days.

(Para 2-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating with bank -- Sale of mortgaged property -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Matter amicably resolved amongst the parties, as per the compromise policy, the entire amount has been paid by the petitioners to the bank and bank as of now has no claim qua them and has closed the account – Considering the reply by State and the fact that the entire amount has been paid back, it is a fit case for quashing of the FIR on the basis of compromise -- Petitions allowed and FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-B, 120-B, 302, 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 439 -- Murder – Dowry death – Regular bail to mother-in-law -- Petitioner is the mother-in-law of the deceased and is in custody for a period of 01 years, 08 months and 27 days -- It will be debatable and moot point during the course of trial as to whether it was a case of ante-mortem strangulation or suicidal hanging -- Out of 25, examination-in-chief of only one witness has been recorded and thereafter, an application u/s 319 Cr.P.C has been moved -- Conclusion of trial is likely to take some time and no fruitful purpose will be served by detaining the petitioner in further custody -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)