Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Petitioner continued to indulge in sexual relationship with prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage for the last 3-4 years -- She lodged the FIR only because the petitioner had betrayed and left her -- Prosecutrix was 26 years of age when her statement u/s 164 Cr. P. C. was recorded -- She is a grown-up and mature lady capable of understanding the consequences of the acts in which she had indulged with the petitioner – No offence u/s 376 IPC is made out against the petitioner and if the investigation in the FIR impugned is allowed to be continued, it would amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 24(8), 225, 397, 301, 401 -- Charges framed by trial court – Challenged in revision – Complainant/ victim right to be impleaded as party -- Held, while the victim/ complainant has a right to be heard in the revision proceedings, such right does not upscale itself to a right to be impleaded in the said criminal revision -- Victim/complainant may be heard, and such hearing shall be regulated by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 73)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 156(3), 177, 190 -- Registration of FIR – Territorial jurisdiction -- Power of Magistrate – A Magistrate can order investigation of only those cases which the Court has jurisdiction to enquire into and try under Chapter XV of J&K CrPC which is applicable to the case -- Section 177 of CrPC which falls in Chapter XV provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.

(Para 10)

B. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 188, 561A -- Quashing of FIR -- Territorial jurisdiction -- A proposal for insurance policy from the travel agent of deceased  at Delhi and it was forwarded to the authorised agent of petitioner/ company stationed at Delhi -- Travel insurance was to take effect from Delhi as the deceased had booked himself from Delhi to Frankfurt -- Death of the deceased in Switzerland -- Thus, neither any event nor its consequence has taken place within the territorial limits of either CJM or within the territorial limits of Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu -- Neither the petitioner-company, nor respondent No.2 is a State subject -- They are not even registered as companies within the jurisdiction of erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir -- Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 4 of RPC and Section 188 of CrPC would not be attracted -- Order of Ld. CJM, Jammu, directing the SHO to register the impugned FIR and investigate the same is, without jurisdiction – FIR quashed.

(Para 11-13, 21)

C. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 304 (II), 420, 409, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 561A -- Medical insurance policy – Non-honour of medi-claim – FIR for cheating, forgery & culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Quashing of FIR -- Transaction between the insurer and the insured is purely contractual in nature, if any of the parties to this contract defaults in honouring its commitment, it cannot form a basis for launching a criminal prosecution -- Merely because, on the basis of non-payment of compensation under the insurance policy to the complainant, her son breathed his last, it cannot be stated that the petitioner-company was, in any manner, responsible for his death and it cannot be prosecuted for a serious offence like culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Petitioner/ company cannot be held responsible for forgery of the cancellation letter purported to have been issued by deceased through his agent – FIR quashed.

(Para 14-21)

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Sections 420, 406, 452, 465, 467, 506 and 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 561A – Quashing of FIR -- Occupation of the house despite expiry of the license agreement – Suit for mandatory injunction against the petitioner for vacation of the house in question already filed -- No doubt the suit has been stayed but it does not mean that respondent No.2 can continue to use the criminal proceedings for settling the civil dispute between her and the petitioner – Held, dispute between the contesting parties is predominantly civil in nature and the criminal proceedings have been used to settle the civil dispute – FIR impugned is nothing but an abuse of process of law – FIR quashed.

(Para 19-21)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 470, 473, 482 – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Time barred complaint -- Sample of insecticide was taken on 26.07.2011 and the report of Public Analyst was received on 12.08.2011 – Limitation will commence from the date of receipt of the report of the Public Analyst -- Sanction letter is dated 01.01.2014, which was applied on 06.08.2012 -- Period of 1 year 4 months and 26 days is liable to be excluded for computing the period of limitation -- Complaint filed on 30.03.2016 is beyond the period of 3 years -- Ld. Magistrate was statutorily debarred from taking cognizance of the offence in view of Section 468 CrPC -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-17)

A. Constitution of India, Article 233, 234 -- Judicial Officer – Code of Conduct -- Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary -- Judge’s official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of the propriety and probity -- The standard of conduct is higher than expected from a layman and also higher than expected of an advocate -- Even his private life must adhere to high standard of propriety and probity, higher than those deemed acceptable for others.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Judicial Officer – Involvement/ Becoming party in litigation/ FIR – A Judge who himself wants to become a party in a proceeding then he must quit his office first, to maintain the standard of purity and unblemished character -- It is not possible that he remain as a sitting Judge on one hand and after using his power prevail upon his subordinate officer to affect arrest his adversary.

(Para 23)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of FIR -- F.I.R. does not disclose any offence -- Same has been procured by the C.J.M. after exerting threats upon the concerned S.I. – Taking into account the prima facie findings and the material collected by the S.I.T., F.I.R. is driven by malafides and in the colourable exercise of power -- F.I.R. quashed exercising the extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 26, 28)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- FIR -- Judicial Officer as first informant – Instructions given -- Except in the matter of grave and severe nature like murder, suicide, rape or other sexual offences, dowry death, dacoity and in rest of the remaining cases, if any, judicial officer or Judge wants to become the first informant in his personal capacity in any F.I.R., he must take his concerned District Judge into confidence and after having the assent from the District Judge, he can become an informant of any F.I.R.

(Para 27)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 2(1)(p), 3 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Proceeds of crime – Direction to register a case and arrest of  accused -- Enforcement Directorate is not an investigating agency stricto  sensu -- The command and mandate of the Enforcement Directorate under the 2002 Act is to ensure that no person benefits from the proceeds of crime derived out of the commission of a scheduled offence and to see that such property is confiscated to the State -- There cannot be any direction issued to consider representation which has been filed with a prayer to register a case and arrest certain individuals for that is not the mandate of the Enforcement Directorate.

(Para 1, 19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 33(5) – POCSO case -- Recalling of victim/ child witness repeatedly -- There is no absolute bar u/s 33(5) of the POCSO Act to recall a victim witness, every case has to be weighed on the strength of its own evidence and necessity of recalling the child victim.

(Para 4)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 436A – PMLA case – Bail -- Appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024, half of the prescribed sentence -- Trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed -- Section 436A of Cr.PC will apply even to a case under the PMLA -- But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused -- No occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed -- Appellant order to be enlarged on bail on 27th May, 2024 u/s 436A of the Cr.PC.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Cognizance of offence -- When the Magistrate in exercise of his judicial discretion directs investigation u/s 156(3) of Cr. P.C., he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence -- It is only when the Magistrate after applying his mind prefers to follow the procedure under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. by resorting to Section 200, he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Trial court perused complaint, the documents in support thereof and on submissions and after having been prima facie satisfied, exercised its judicial discretion directing investigation u/s 156(3) of Cr. P.C -- High Court should not have interfered with the same, more particularly while exercising limited powers u/s 482 of Cr. P.C --  Order passed by the High Court set aside, order of Trial Court restored.

(Para 10, 11)

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (57 of 1994), Section 3, 5, 6, 23, 25, 28 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 120B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Disclosing the sex of foetus – Role of owner of Hospital -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- No allegation, direct or indirect levelled against owner of Hospital -- Ownership of the Hospital where the ultrasound was allegedly carried upon a decoy pregnant woman would not make him liable under the PCPNDT Act -- At the very least, the allegations in the complaint should demonstrate the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused in question -- Any such evidence against owner is conspicuously absent – Petition allowed qua owner of hospital.

(Para 1, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 120-B, 406, 420, 467, 469, 471 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Cheating – Extortion -- Regular bail -- Allegations against the petitioner are based upon the disclosure statement – He is in custody for the last 5 months and 22 days -- Although, he is involved in one more case, but has already been allowed bail -- Out of 14 witnesses cited by the prosecution, not even a single witness has been examined so far and thus, trial is likely to take long time to conclude -- The case is triable by Magistrate – Bail allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Procedure of -- Section 319 of Cr.P.C. becomes applicable, when during the trial after the filing of the challan and framing of the charge-sheet, evidence is presented indicating the involvement of a person, who was not initially charged by the police -- If the evidence establishes the person's complicity, the court may proceed to include them in the proceedings -- To apply Section 319 CrPC, evidence led should be such that it shows more than a prima facie case as is exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 341, 506, 379, 379-B, 356, 201, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Snatching case -- Summoning of additional accused – As per the FIR version, the attribution to the petitioner is that he had caught hold of the petitioner -- Main accused and other assailants are attributed to be armed with weapons and having caused injuries -- There is no such attribution to the petitioner -- Apart from above, the FIR has already been quashed qua the main accused -- Merely on the basis of statement of PW1 made during trial, the trial Court was at fault in holding that there was more than a prima facie case so as to summon the petitioner -- Impugned summoning order set aside.

(Para 12-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 299 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 -- Statement of complainant u/s 161 of Cr.P.C. – Exhibited by Investigation Officer – Accused/ appellant remained absconding for a period of nearly 10 years -- Complainant left his house where he used to reside earlier -- Despite ample efforts being made by the Investigating Agency to summon and examine complainant, he could not be traced out and produced in the witness box for deposition during trial after the accused had been arrested -- Viewed in light of the provisions of Section 299 CrPC read with Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the trial Court was justified in holding that the statement of complainant recorded in these proceedings was fit to be read as a piece of substantive evidence.

(Para 23, 38, 39)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Murder of wife -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen together – Circumstances leading to murder were in the exclusive knowledge of the appellant -- He has offered no explanation as to the manner in which deceased was strangled to death within the confines of the room where only he and the deceased were present -- Bald plea of denial offered by the accused by way of an explanation to this gravely incriminating circumstance is not sufficient to absolve him of the burden cast upon him by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 46)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Incriminating circumstances -- Prosecution has established the following links in the chain of incriminating circumstantial evidence: (i) Motive; (ii) Last seen together; (iii) Medical evidence establishing that the cause of death of the deceased was homicidal. (iv) Confessional note; (v) Abscondence for nearly 10 years; (vi) Wrong explanation given by the accused in his statement under Section 313 CrPC; (vii) Failure of the accused to offer explanation for the homicidal death of his wife in the night time when only the accused and deceased were present in the house leading to the interference of guilt by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- Conviction of appellant confirmed – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 47-51)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- History sheet – Name of minor child -- Extra care and precaution, to be observed by a police officer while ensuring that the identity of a minor child is not disclosed -- It will prevent the undesirable exposure to the minor children.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- History sheet – Scope of -- Police authorities of States and Union Territories may consider the desirability of ensuring that no mechanical entries in History Sheet are made of innocent individuals, simply because they happen to hail from the socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, along with those belonging to Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes.

(Para 14)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Punjab Police Rules 1934, Rule 23.8, 23.9 -- Life – Scope -- Expression ‘life’ unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and all that goes along with it –  Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one’s surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter.

(Para 15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 403, 420, 421, 425 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Commercial transaction – Breach of contract -- Three hypothecated trucks not produced for inspection -- Rather disclosed that they had dismantled  and disposed of the same -- Said act prima facie, makes out a case u/s 421 and 425 of IPC -- At the stage of considering the quashing of the FIR, the Court is required only to look into the allegations made in the complaint/ FIR by taking them to be at their face value -- Mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings -- Both criminal and civil law remedy can be pursued – Quashing petition dismissed.

(Para 34-38)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to commit suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Power to quash the FIR depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case -- It is required to be seen by the High Court as to whether Section 306 IPC is even made out from the contents of FIR or not before coming to the conclusion that quashing of proceedings u/s 306 IPC on the basis of compromise should be allowed or not by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. -- Merely by blaming the petitioners to be responsible for commission of suicide by the deceased in the suicide note, cannot be sufficient to invoke Section 306 IPC – FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-15, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to commit suicide – No details are given as to when and in what manner, petitioners harassed the deceased -- Simply by mentioning in the suicide note that accused-petitioner  harassed the deceased and is responsible for the commission of suicide by deceased, cannot be sufficient to invoke Section 306 IPC.

(Para 19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Cheque bounce complaint – Production of Bank Account statement of complainant from Bank – Locus standi of accused -- Trial Court dismissed the application by observing that power to summon any document on file is vested with the Court or the Officer In-charge of the Police Station and thus, the application moved at the instance of petitioner-accused could not be entertained -- Held, power u/s 91 of CrPC can be exercised either by the Court on its own or even on an application moved by either of the parties to the trial – Impugned order set aside, matter remanded back to trial court to adjudicate afresh.

(Para 3-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 – Murder – Summoning of additional accused – Quashing of summoning order -- Not being an eye-witness, PW-1’s deposition is not sufficient enough to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction u/s 319 to summon the appellants -- No other witnesses deposed against the appellants -- No documentary evidence – No role attributed to the appellants -- Deposition of PW-1 is in line and consistent with her statement u/s 161 -- Higher degree of satisfaction required for exercising power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. is not met – Held, Trial Court committed a serious error in issuing summons to the appellants -- High Court should have quashed the order – Appeal allowed, impugned order/ judgment set aside.

(Para 23-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 104 – Accused at abroad – Proclaimed person -- At the time of issuance of proclamation u/s 82 of the Cr.P.C., the trial Court was fully conscious of the fact that the petitioner has gone abroad -- Trial Court at the first instance should have proceeded u/s 105 of the Cr.P.C. for effecting service upon the petitioner through German Consulate -- Date of appearance was short of 30 days statutory period -- Still further, the petitioner was declared as proclaimed person on date, which was not fixed for appearance – Held, declaration of petitioner as proclaimed person was wholly in violation of the statutory mandate laid down u/s 82 read with Section 105 Cr.P.C thereof – Petition allowed, impugned order set aside.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182, 199, 201, 203, 211 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 482 -- Quashing of Challan/ Charge-sheet – Petitioner/ Complainant charge-sheeted in his own FIR -- Petitioner filed private complaint in which preliminary evidence has already been recorded – Not proper for the Investigating Agency to file the challan against the petitioner to prosecute him in the FIR, which was lodged on his own complaint instead of filing the cancellation report -- By not filing the cancellation report, petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to file protest petition -- Challan and Charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 11-19)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Parole for own engagement and marriage ceremony -- Petition allowed, petitioner granted parole for a period of two weeks.

(Para 1-5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 39, 192, 207, 177, 179, 187, 196 -- Jharkhand Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 2001, Section 22, 28 (i) – Cognizance against Post / Non-juridical person – Permissibility of -- Summons in a criminal case to face trial cannot be issued against positions or post as a post is not juridical person – Ld. CJM issued summons against DGM Sail, M/s. RMD Gua Ore Mines more so when such post undisputedly does not even exist -- Taking cognizance by not naming any person who was responsible for the alleged criminal act is certainly not sustainable in law – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Uttering words “go and hang yourself” – Whether abetment – No -- Sole accused, husband of the lady with whom the deceased had certain relationship and had blunt out his anger and had uttered words ‘go and hang yourself’ cannot mean that it would become the ingredients of Section 107 of the IPC for it to become an offence u/s 306 of the IPC – Reason for the deceased to commit suicide may be myriad, one of which could be the factum of him having illicit relationship with the wife of the petitioner, despite being the Father and Priest of a Church -- Charge sheet filed -- Such cases should be nipped in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Proceedings pending before the Principal District & Sessions Judge quashed.

(Para 14-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Additional evidence at Appellate stage -- Certified copy issued by Private Bank -- Application for bringing on record the certified copy issued by the private bank -- Certified copy issued by the private bank is not per-se admissible, rather the same is required to be proved by way of evidence -- In the absence of any prayer for proving such document, even if application is allowed, such document would not be admissible as an evidence -- Application dismissed.

(Para 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 200, Chapter XV – Cancellation report by police -- Protest petition – Private complaint – Right of complainant -- Magistrate had the liberty to reject the Protest Petition along with all other material which may have been filed in support of the same -- In that event the Complainant would be at liberty to file a fresh complaint -- The right of the Complainant to file a petition u/s 200 Cr.P.C. is not taken away even if the Magistrate does not direct that such a Protest Petition be treated as a complaint -- Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions and the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C..

(Para 3, 10, 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Cheque bounce complaint – Transfer of case -- Agreement executed at Pune, petitioner/accused is resident of Pune -- Cheques which were dishonoured are also issued on Bank at Pune -- In the agreement, the jurisdictional clause provide that the Court where the bank has provided loan facility will have a jurisdiction to entertain dispute between the parties -- Cheque was presented in the respondent’s Branch at Calcutta – Entire cause of action has arisen at Pune and only in order to harass the petitioner the complaints have been filed at Calcutta by manipulating the jurisdiction – Complaint transferred from Calcutta to Pune.

(Para 6-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 256 -- Acquittal/ Dismissal of complaint for want of prosecution -- Power of the Magistrate u/s 256 Cr.P.C to acquit an accused should be exercised judicially, based on a definite conclusion that the complainant no longer desires to prosecute the complaint -- Judicious course would be to direct the complainant to appear for the hearing, if it is imperative, and decide whether the drastic step of acquittal is to be passed in case he fails to appear.

(Para 15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 256, 378(4) -- Cheque bounce complaint – Absence of complainant -- Dismissed for want of  prosecution -- Neither the complainant was present for trial nor any order directing complainant to remain present was passed on the earlier occasion – Ld. Magistrate ought to have adjourned the complaint to a later date directing the complainant to positively remain present on the next date -- Held, learned Magistrate was not justified in straight away dismissing the complaint and ordering acquittal of the accused respondents on mere non-appearance of the complainant -- Impugned order quashed and set aside -- Proceedings restored to its original number.

(Para 18-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Additional accused – Summoning -- Discretionary power is extraordinary and must be exercised judiciously only when compelling reasons exist to take cognizance against these individuals -- While summoning an individual, a prima facie case against him/her should be discernible which would reasonably lead to his/her conviction -- Evidence must be stronger than mere probability of complicity -- Trial Court is obligated to adopt a rigorous standard of appraisal of evidence, ensuring that the material on record could reasonably lead to the conviction of a person sought to be summoned.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Additional accused – Summoning – Alibi -- Contention that it had come during investigation that the petitioner was not present at the time of the alleged occurrence cannot be a ground for the learned Trial Court to not summon a person as an additional accused u/s 319 of the Cr.P.C. -- Right of an accused to present his evidence of alibi would always be available to him during trial.

(Para 10)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 482 -- Excise matter -- Superdari of vehicle – Onerous condition – Permissibility of – Superdari order with the condition that petitioner shall furnish sapurdari bonds in sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, along with cash security or bank guarantee of equal amount -- Condition imposed upon the petitioner, is an onerous condition, and therefore, the same is required to be modified -- Petitioner ordered to  furnish personal bond in sum of Rs.1.5 lac, and also additional security bond of the same amount.

(Para 2, 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 469, 471, 180, 120-B -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 23 -- Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Section 67B -- POCSO -- Permanent exemption from personal appearance – Charges framed on 14.07.2023 and only 5 PWs out of 15, have been examined so far – Personal appearance of the petitioners before the learned trial Court exempted subject to conditions.

(Para 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201, 202, 302, 341, 34 – Murder case -- Superdari of vehicle -- If the vehicle remains parked in the police station for a considerable period of time, it would become unfit for being plying on the road as keeping it parked in the sun and rain could damage its tyres, colour, machinery, battery as also interiors of the vehicle -- Value of the vehicle would also diminish in such a situation – Petition allowed, vehicle ordered to be released to the petitioner/registered owner on superdari.

(Para 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 – Excise matter – Cognizable offence -- Search and seizure without FIR -- There are two kinds of FIRs namely, the FIR can be registered by the informant which was duly signed by him -- Secondly, the FIR can be registered by the police officer himself on any information received by him -- In both the cases, the information should be reduced into writing and thereafter, the investigation must be carried out -- Ex.P1 being a panchanama, it cannot be termed as a complaint -- FIR cannot be registered on the basis of panchanama.

(Para 15, 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 – Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 (21 of 1966), Section 32, 34, 38-A -- Excise matter – Cognizance by court -- Search and seizure without FIR – FIR based on panchnama – Void abinitio – Acquittal – Respondent registered the FIR on the basis of panchanama which is erroneous and not proper – Trial Court ought not to have acted upon such FIR and cognizance should not have been taken on the strength of the said FIR – When the registration of FIR itself is void abinitio, the subsequent proceedings including the judgments are liable to be set aside – Revision allowed, judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside – Petitioners acquitted.

(Para 3, 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty -- Cognizance of – Court cannot take cognizance of an offence committed u/s 186 IPC without there being a complaint made by the concerned public servant, but there is no such requirement for offence u/s 353 CrPC -- Section 195 Cr. PC does not bar the trial of the accused person for a distinct offence, disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section.

(Para 11-15)

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 153-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Offence under UAPA – Regular bail -- Secessionist slogans painted on the walls of College and School – Petitioner not named in the FIR, arraigned as an accused on the statement of co-accused in another case -- Recovery of paint, clothes and mobile phone effected from the appellant in connection with the investigation in another FIR, no recovery made from him in the instant case -- No material to indicate that any monetary transactions had taken place and that the appellant had used a particular mobile phone for recording the incident and sending it to other accused -- Appellant in custody for 01 year and 09 months – Challan filed but charges are yet to be framed, prosecution cited 14 witnesses, therefore, the conclusion of trial would take some time – Bail allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- NDPS case – Default bail -- Extension of time for investigation for another 180 days – Report of Public prosecutor – Requirement of -- Application for extension reveals that it was prepared by the Investigating Officer and forwarded by the Public Prosecutor, with no report submitted by the Public Prosecutor as per the mandate of Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act -- Held, there has thus, been a failure to adhere to the requirements outlined in section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act -- Order of the trial Court granting extension of time to the investigating agency for completing investigation was erroneous -- Consequently, the impugned order set aside -- As a sequel to the above, since the investigation remained incomplete on the day application u/s 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner, he deserves to be enlarged on default bail – Default bail allowed.

(Para 11-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Acquittal -- Leave to appeal -- Ordinarily, the order of acquittal will not be interfered with, merely because another view is possible -- Upon passing the order of acquittal, presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened.

(Para 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Proprietorship Firm not impleaded as party – Neither it is the case of the petitioner/ accused that the amount in question had been advanced as loan to the firm nor the cross-examination of the complainant suggest any such stand of the petitioner -- Firm in question is a sole proprietorship firm of the petitioner/ accused and, as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner would not be responsible for the affairs of the said firm – Guilt of the petitioner/ accused upheld.

(Para 9)

A. “May” – “Shall” – Interpretation -- Word “may” ordinarily does not mean “must” -- Ordinarily, “may” will not be construed as “shall” -- But this is not an inflexible rule -- The use of the word “may” in certain legislations can be construed as “shall”, and the word “shall” can be construed as “may” -- It all depends on the nature of the power conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of the exercise of the power -- The legislative intent also plays a role in the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the word “may” has been used is also relevant.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the case is being tried as a warrant case -- In the case of a summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Recovery of -- By a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery -- Section 421 of the Cr.PC deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence -- Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr.PC. for recovery of interim compensation -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered treating it as fine -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered by the Trial Court by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property of the accused -- If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A from the complainant.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A(5) – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-payment of interim compensation – Right to defend -- Non-payment of interim compensation by the accused does not take away his right to defend the prosecution.

(Para 12)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Power of Trial Court – It can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty -- Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint u/s 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Word “may” used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as “shall”. Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

(Para 14)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

(Para 15)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Financial distress -- Factors to be considered while exercising discretion -- When the court deals with an application u/s 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A -- Presumption u/s 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation -- At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration –  Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted – Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused -- If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation -- Factors set out are not exhaustive -- There could be several other factors, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. -- While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

(Para 16)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Law summarised:

a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.”

b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.

c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.

iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc.

v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.

(Para 19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 482 -- Transit anticipatory bail – FIR in another State -- Court of Sessions or the High Court as the case may be can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail/ transit bail by way of interim protection for a limited duration even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction -- FIR registered at Hyderabad City -- Petition disposed of with the directions that the arrest of the petitioner shall remain stayed for a period of 15 days to enable him to file an appropriate petition for the grant of anticipatory bail before the appropriate Court at Hyderabad in the State of Telangana.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Foreign citizen -- Absconding -- Proclamation -- Petitioner was resident of UK since 1988 i.e. well before the relevant FIR was filed -- According to Section 82, a proclamation may be issued against an individual by the Court if it is reasonably believed that the person for whom a warrant has been issued has absconded or is hiding, making it impossible for the warrant to be carried out -- A person cannot be said to be “abscond” or “evade” the execution of warrant when he had gone to a distant place before the issue of the warrant.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Foreign citizen – Proclaimed person -- Petitioner is a resident of UK and has been a citizen of UK since the year 1988 i.e. 28 years – Petitioner has been shown to be a resident of Village in District Hoshiarpur but for all intents and purposes, the residence of the petitioner was in UK, therefore, there was no occasion for him to evade the process of law intentionally, as he was never served in accordance with law – Thus the proclamation order is in gross violation of Section 82 Cr.P.C – Impugned order vide which the petitioner has been declared proclaimed person, is bad in law and not sustainable, set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 21, 22 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Mining offence – Quashing of FIR -- Registration of the FIR is bad in the eyes of law, as cognizance of an offence under the MMDR Act can only be taken upon a criminal complaint -- MMDR Act is a special statute provisions regarding procedure must be adopted, general provisions of the IPC or the Cr.P.C. will not be attracted -- FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 25 and 29(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS case – Regular bail -- No effective steps taken to conclude the trial -- Petitioner was arrested on 11.03.2022 and is in custody since then -- Bail declined, the Special Judge directed to make an endeavour to conclude the trial expeditiously and preferably within six months.

(Para 5, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating -- Forgery – Quashing of FIR -- Information under RTI Act – Signature on application alleged to be forged -- No provision under the RTI Act or Rules made thereunder to file a complaint against an applicant, who sought any information under the said Act -- No loss of property or valuable security has been caused to the complainant, who is an official working under the DITS -- He had no locus standi to lodge prosecution against the petitioner(s) -- FIR ought to have been filed by SK, whose signatures are alleged to have been forged -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 13, 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 415, 463, 464 -- Cheating – Forgery – Essential ingredients for commission of offence of cheating are deception and inducement to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property – There must be an intention to induce a person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and the act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property – Further, to attract ingredients of forgery, there must be making of a false document or false electronic record with an intention to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471 -- Forgery -- Making of the false document is sine qua non for launching prosecution u/s 467, 468, 471 IPC.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471 -- Forgery -- Ingredients of forgery are attracted; if a person (i) made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorized by someone else; (ii) materially altered or tampered a document; (iii) procured a document by deception from a person, who is not in control of his senses.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of cheque bounce complaint -- Several complaint cases u/s 138 of the N.I. Act are pending in the Court at Gurugram, Haryana and it is a solitary case which was instituted in the Court at Dwarka – Parties to the proceedings are residents of Gurugram and the witnesses are also hailing from Gurugram – Complaint transferred from Dwarka Court, New Delhi to the Court of the Gurugram, Haryana.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry before summoning -- Enquiry with respect to Section 202 CrPC can be conducted by the Magistrate himself – It is restricted only to find out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process has to be issued or not -- Neither there was any requirement to join the accused nor it is required that all the witnesses shall be examined.

(Para 4, 6, 6.1)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry before summoning -- Process issued after the complainant examined as many as six witnesses including himself and a handwriting expert after considering the documents brought on record by the complainant and the documents/ reports brought on record by the handwriting expert -- Requirement of enquiry substantially complied with.

(Para 4, 6.2)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Handwriting expert -- Defence set up by the petitioner/ accused is that the cheque in question had been issued not for the purpose of returning any loan, but for the purpose of making a donation to a Saint -- Mere fact that the body writing on the cheque in question is not of the accused or of the complainant and is in the hand of some 3rd person, would not have any bearing either on the case of the complainant or on the defence plea being set up by the accused – Application for examining Handwriting expert dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Handwriting expert -- Accused would be required to prima facie show that the witness sought to be examined does have a relevance with the defence plea sought to be substantiated by the accused or has a potential to demolish the case of the complainant.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(e) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 109 – Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 8(3) – Suspension of conviction/ sentence -- High Court overturned the acquittal and has convicted the appellant for three years – Appellant who is a MLA will incur disqualification as a result of the conviction -- High Court has not considered the main question whether the view taken by the Special Court was a possible view -- Conviction and sentence suspended. Afjal Ansari’s case (2024) 2 SCC 187 relied.

(Para 2-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of complaint – Basic ingredients – Requirement of -- Submission that complaint does not contain date of presentation of cheque before the bank, the date of return of the cheque as unpaid from the bank, the date of issuing mandatory notice within 30 days and the date of service of such notice on the drawee – Held, complaint cannot proceed u/s 138 of the N.I. Act without the basic ingredients being mentioned therein – Proceedings of Complaint case quashed.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 18, 29, 67 – NDPS Case – Acquittal -- Confessional statement – Reliance upon -- Witnesses turned hostile, appellant was convicted and sentenced by taking recourse to Section 67 of the NDPS Act – Impugned order set aside, appellant acquitted of all the charges. Balwinder Singh (Binda)’s case (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1213 relied.

(Para 1-3)