A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Endeavour on the part of the Court should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal  -- If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal.

(Para 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution -- Such would not be a correct approach.

(Para 33)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 -- Murder – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence by High Court -- High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. -- All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts -- High Court has done is something impermissible -- In the overall view of the matter, High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts – Appeals allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside -- Convicts ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of three days.

(Para 34-40)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(2)(i), 190, 200, 202 – Submission of Final report – Role of Magistrate -- Magistrate may either:

(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue process,

(2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the investigation officer,

(3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC.

(Para 49)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2)(i), 173(8) – Final Police Report -- Further investigation – Delay -- Mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Cognizance by Magistrate -- Further investigation – Power of police -- Sub section (8) of Section 173 of the CrPC permits further investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the court takes cognizance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted.

(Para 64)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Acceptance by Magistrate – Further investigation – Double jeopardy – Hearing to accused -- There is no bar against conducting further investigation u/s 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted u/s 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted:

-- Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed.

-- Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation.

-- There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(Para 64-77)

E. Precedents – High Court order -- Contrary view from co-ordinate Bench – Sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers – Ground of Per incuriam – While it is open to a learned Judge to differ with a view of a Co-ordinate Bench the sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers being placed before the learned Chief Justice -- The learned Judge cannot simply say "with due respect, I do not agree to the ratio..." or “the decision is per incuriam as a binding judgment of the Supreme Court has not been considered….” and proceed to take a contrary view as done in the impugned order -- Such an approach would result in conflicting opinions of Co-ordinate Benches, resulting in judicial chaos and is, thus, improper -- This is something atrocious and unacceptable.

(Para 24, 81)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), Section 173(2), 173(8) -- Further investigation after long lapse of time -- It is settled law that the criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an individual -- Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay -- Mere delay in approaching a Court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case -- Though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict -- Assurance of a fair trial is to be the first imperative in the dispensation of justice.

(Para 84-86)

G. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), 17 – Criminal misconduct by public servant -- Investigation by police – Consent order from Superintendent of police or and higher officer in rank – Nature of -- A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced -- Before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary.

(Para 88)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 29, 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Regular bail -- Can the provision of Section 37 of the Act, be construed to have same efficacy throughout the pendency of trial, notwithstanding, the period of custody of the accused -- Held, the Constitutional guarantee of expeditious trial cannot be diluted by applying the rigors of Section 37 of ND&Ps Act in perpetuity -- Petitioner is in custody since 24.02.2021 and the facts suggest that the trial is not likely to be concluded in near future -- Co-accused has already been released on bail – Bail petition allowed.

(Para 7-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Curable infirmity or defect can be removed by amending the complaint.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Amendment cannot be allowed to change the basic core, crux and tenor of the complaint.

(Para 19)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Amendment, which results in prejudice to the other side, cannot be allowed -- Amendment sought for to the complaint, if does not cause prejudice to the other side, the same can be allowed.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Addition of name of company/ firm  -- When the amendment application pertains to addition of company or firm as a principal offender, after taking cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaint by the Magistrate, company or firm cannot be added.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 --  Maintainability of Complaint -- Company/ Firm not impleaded as party – Vicarious liability of Director/ Partner -- If the cheque is drawn on the account of company or firm, then the principal offender is the company or firm and therefore, in the absence of the company or firm being arraigned as accused in the complaint, the prosecution against the Directors or Partners cannot be maintained.

(Para 19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Contempt of Court – MoU between the parties during the pendency of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- MoU was filed before the Trial Court, wherein, the Respondent/ accused gave an undertaking to the Trial Court that the entire settlement amount shall be paid on or before 29.02.2020 and it was further stated that in case of default, he would become liable for contempt of Court – Respondent/ accused has only paid a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs and has failed to pay the balance of Rs. 2,40,84,782.14 as per the undertaking – Respondent held guilty of contempt for wilful breach of terms of the MoU and the undertakings given – Contemnor, ordered to undergo two (02) months imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000 -- In default of payment of the fine, he shall further undergo fifteen (15) days simple imprisonment.

(Para 1, 2, 13-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(iii)(b) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Ganja seeds for plantation – Regular  bail -- Petitioner in custody since 20.05.2022 – Materials on record show that the petitioner has supplied Ganja seed for cultivation -- As per the definition of Ganja in Section 2(iii)(b) of the NDPS Act, 1985, it is not a banned contraband -- No specific allegation that the Ganja seeds were supplied by the petitioner to the other person with an intention to receive back the grown Ganja after cultivation – Charge-sheet already filed -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling for cross-examination -- Application is silent about the material things which were left to be put up the witness and on what point -- Simply contending that effective cross-examination could not be conducted is no ground to re-call the said witnesses for cross-examination.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling for cross-examination -- Unless there are specific reasons or grounds, prayer for re-examination of the witnesses cannot be granted -- The person cannot be re-examined in the trial at the mere asking.

(Para 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section  307, 325, 147, 148, 323, 325, 307, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Injury on the head with iron rod – Nothing on record of trial court to show injury was grievous or dangerous to life -- However as per medical record produced by the petitioner one of the injuries found to be grievous in nature – Petitioner in custody for the last more than 1 year and 2 months and is having no criminal history – Complainant and injured are already examined but it will take considerable time for the trial to conclude -- Nothing on record to show that if released on bail the petitioner is going to abscond or will tamper with the evidence -- Petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Charge -- Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence -- Charge can be framed even on the basis of strong suspicion, if the same is supported with material on record.

(Para 4)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Rash and negligent driving – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Charge u/s 304 IPC -- Allegation that petitioner was driving the oil tanker at a high speed, without blowing any horn, in a zig zag manner and intentionally struck with the scooter, which resulted in the death of all the three occupants of the scooter -- Prima facie, it appears to be a case of extreme negligence and rashness -- Alternative charge u/s 304A IPC has not been framed, such an error can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. – Charge u/s 304 affirmed, Ld. Trial Court advised to look into the alteration/amendment of the charge.

(Para 5-8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 – Defective charge – Whether vitiate trial -- Accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of charge against him, but the error in the charge, if any, can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. -- The defect in framing of the charge, per se, may not vitiate the trial.

(Para 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Account closed – Defence that accused misused the security cheque by filling up the name of wife -- Cheque was written and signed by the accused -- Return memo indicates that on the date when the cheque drawn, the bank account already closed -- Complainant caused notice, which was received by the accused -- In the cross examination it is elucidated from the complainant that her husband and sons are running business in wax printing and they have business transaction with the accused – Held, this fact is no way rebut the presumption enumerated under Section 139 of N.I.Act -- Accused cannot take a plea that the said cheque was given as a security for the transaction, which took place four years ago.

(Para 14-16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Capacity to pay -- As far as the source of income, the complainant in the cross examination has indicated her source and also though she is an house wife, her husband and son being the earning members, it cannot be ruled out that she has no wherewithal to lend Rs.5,00,000/- to the accused – Contention that subject cheque was given only as a security and the complainant has no wherewithal to advance Rs.5,00,000/-, both factually not proved even by preponderance of probability -- While there is a statutory presumption, mere denial or adducing evidence which does not shake the foundational fact proved by the complainant, can be taken as a probability.

(Para 17)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Sections 69, 132(1)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437 – Bail – Pre-condition to deposit Bank Guarantee of Rs.1.5 crores – Pre-condition of furnishing bank guarantee imposed by the High Court is not liable to be sustained, set aside.

(Para 5, 6, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2), 378 – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction by Appellate court -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence -- Principle of according opportunity of hearing to the convict before sentencing him is equally applicable where the sentencing is done by the appellate court -- Convicts are entitled to opportunity of hearing on sentence.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2) -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence – As a general rule, the trial court is duty bound to adjourn the matter to a future date after recording the conviction so as to call upon both the sides to hear on the question of sentence before sentencing the accused persons -- Court is obliged to hear the accused persons after their conviction on the quantum of sentence before passing a sentence against them.

(Para 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Revision – Sentence of cheque amount – While suspending the sentence High Court imposed a condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- -- Further, imposed condition that the petitioner shall deposit another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of four weeks after immediately coming out on bail – Both the conditions were duly complied with by the petitioner – Petitioner ready and willing to settle the remaining cheque amount within the stipulated time fixed by this Court – Conviction confirmed, sentence set aside on condition that the petitioner shall deposit the remaining cheque amount namely a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- on or before 29.05.2023.

(Para 5-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 283 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Opening of shop in residential area -- Quashing of FIR -- There is no specific averment to the effect that any danger obstruction or injury has been caused to any person, nor it is coming forth that any public way or public line of navigation has been obstructed by the petitioners in any way -- It is difficult to perceive how by opening his shop in a residential area, petitioner has committed the offense under this section -- FIR quashed.

(Para 8, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 427 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Mischief causing damage – Quashing of FIR -- With respect to offense u/s 427, there is no averment that what mischief has been committed by the petitioner or to whom loss or damage has been caused through that mischief -- Mere vague allegations in the FIR, consisting of words used in the definition of an offense, in the absence of any corroborating details, does not lead to prima facie satisfaction for constituting that offence -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Validity of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Dishonor of cheque with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” -- It was not mentioned on the cheque that the same is valid for 3 months -- Controversy involved is totally a disputed question of facts and the same is to be appreciated by the learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence led by both the sides regarding the contentions raised that whether the cheque is valid for 3 months or not -- Petition for quashing dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to frame charge u/s 7 of PC Act -- Appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance – This is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective -- However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned -- Therefore, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to Frame a Proper Charge – Omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder -- Framing of charge -- While framing charge u/s 307 of IPC, what the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section and It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder – Head injury -- Blow of sharp-edged weapon -- Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence u/s 307 of the IPC and intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from the surrounding circumstances -- Injury on the vital part of the body and among other things, considering the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blow inflicted, prima-facie case u/s 307 IPC is made out.

(Para 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Bail -- Local surety -- Condition relating to production of local surety dispensed with -- Not only High Court while exercising its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., but even other Courts including Session/ Magistrate Courts are empowered to modify the bail conditions if parameters, as specified in the case, are satisfied.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- There is double presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent-accused -- Initial presumption of innocence is on account of the basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty -- Secondly, said presumption is reinforced by the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court after trial based on the evidence – In these circumstances, onus is heavy on the petitioner/ complainant to show the illegality or impropriety of the finding recorded by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405 – Criminal breach of trust – Following ingredients must be proved to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust –

(A) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property;

(B) that the person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or (b) dishonestly used or disposed of that property or willfully suffered any other person to do so in violation, (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Misappropriation of 1657 bags i.e. 1055 quintals 50 kg and 942 grams of paddy -- 6614 bags weighing 4286 quintals 60 kg paddy were stored for the purpose of milling -- Prosecution utterly failed to prove the dominion of the accused over the said property – Civil suit filed by the petitioner/ complainant/ FCI for recovery, on the same allegations, has already been dismissed by the Civil Court despite the fact that burden of proof in the civil suit is of much lesser degree compared to the criminal case – Prosecution utterly failed to prove the entrustment of the paddy bags, which was allegedly misappropriated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10, 12, 13)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 362 – Bail under SC/ST Act – Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court -- Changed circumstances -- Once an appeal under Section 14A against the order passed by the Special Court rejecting the application under Section 439 of the CrPC is decided on merits or otherwise by High Court, subsequent appeal under change of circumstances would not be directly maintainable under Section 14A before High Court even on change of circumstances and remedy to the accused, if any, is to file an application before the Special Court for grant of bail.

(Para 31)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court – Regular bail -- Power to grant bail u/s 439 of the CrPC has only vested to the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act and High Court is only empowered to hear appeal under Section 14A(2) of the POA Act against refusal or grant of bail by the Special Court under the Act.

(Para 31)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1), 482 -- Proclamation – 30 days’ time for appearance – Quashing of proclamation order -- Proclamation was effected on 10.01.2020 for 14.01.2020 – For appearance giving only 04 days’ time to the petitioner, clearly falls short of the statutory period of 30 days prescribed u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C -- Petitioner was declared as proclaimed offender on 12.03.2020; whereas for the said date, there was no proclamation u/s 82 (1) Cr.P.C. was either ordered or effected – Order dated 12.03.2020 being violative of Section 82 Cr.P.C. set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(1) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Procedure of proclamation – Mandatory and inviolable -- Provisions of Section 82 (1) Cr.P.C. provides procedure for appearance of an individual before the Court in the criminal proceedings and thus, regulates the liberty of an individual as such it stems from Article 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly becomes mandatory and inviolable.

(Para 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of complaint -- Loss of cheques – Plea of – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- FSL Report proving signatures on cheques -- Two cheques issued to repay debt – Petitioner did not deny the fact of execution of any deed of agreement on payment of such amount – Signature in the deed of agreement and two cheques are found to be similar – FSL report reveals that the signatures of the accused/petitioner in two cheques and in deed of agreement are similar in nature – Disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated upon in a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 -- Cheque bounced complaint -- Account Closed – Presumption -- Both the cheques were issued by the accused/ petitioner after closing of his account -- It transpires that the petitioner had knowledge regarding closer of his bank account and in spite of that he issued the cheques in favour of the respondent No.2/claimant -- Under such backdrop, it can be assumed that the presumption u/s 139 N.I. Act will come into play at this stage.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 48 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B -- Criminal trial – False implication -- Preservation of CDRs and telecom record -- A case of chance recovery, so preservation or production of the electronic record is not going to affect the source of secret information – As per the notification dated 21.12.2021 issued by Ministry of Communication, Govt. of India, the telecommunication company shall maintain all call details record etc. for at least two years for scrutiny and two years has not lapsed till date of recovery -- Investigating Officer and Telecommunication Company directed to preserve the CDRs of the Police Officials, private persons and petitioner and co-accused with liberty to the petitioner to summon the same at the appropriate stage of trial, for the purpose of putting the same to confront the prosecution witnesses or to produce it in defence evidence -- Admissibility and relevance of said electronic record will be subject to the provisions of Section 65A and Section 65B of Evidence Act.

(Para 7-13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability -- Vicarious liability is a specific species and assumes critical importance, particularly when there is criminal liability involved and therefore, cannot be taken lightly -- If such an extension of principle of vicarious liability were to remain, it would go against the very grain and texture.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Officer in Company -- Vicarious liability – Merely holding a designation or office in a company not sufficient for liability under section 141.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Bald averment against petitioner – Some accused dropped -- Bald averments against Accused No. 3-8 being directors of Accused-Company and in-charge of and responsible for the conduct, affairs and business of the company -- No specific averment made that this was so at the time of the commission of the offence -- Signatory of the cheque was also the Managing Director of the Company would be deemed to be in-charge, it was not as if the complainant was remediless -- Considering that Accused No.4 to 8 were dropped by the complainant, there was no reason for the complainant to have continued with proceedings against Accused No.3.

(Para 18)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Incharge of Company – Vicarious liability – Letter head of company – Reliance upon -- Merely the mention of the name of Accused No.3 on the letter head as being the Head of the Group, does not ipso facto or ipso jure make him in-charge of and responsible for the affairs and business of the company at the time the offence was committed.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Non-Executive Director – Non-executive director may be the custodian of governance of the Company but are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of running its business and only monitor executive activities of the Company -- Phraseology used in Section 141 of the Act of being in charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of Company is a reference to an “executive activity” which imports an element of running day-to-day affairs of the Company and would not be extended to a role which is essentially supervisory, policy oriented, of oversight or regulatory i.e. non-executive in character.

(Para 21)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 -- Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 175 – Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 104, 203 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Non-executive Co-chairman – Managing Director and executive directors are appointed for a company to ensure that all executive decisions – Non Executive Directors are to advice or oversight of the functioning of the company -- Even the role of ‘Chairman’/ ‘Chairperson’ is not typically of an executive nature -- Creeping up an escalating liability to Chairpersons of large conglomerates/ companies for cheques issued in day-to-day affairs of the business of a company would unfairly and unnecessarily expand the provisions of vicarious liability under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act – No prejudice is caused to the complainant as the signatory of the cheque, the Managing Director is already arrayed as accused -- Proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13, 22-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) – Statutory/ Default bail -- Two extensions granted by the Court not challenged by the petitioner at that stage – Second extension was in presence of accused -- When the chargesheet has been filed within the period of extension, the accused is not entitled to be released on statutory/default bail.

(Para 7)

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(a)(i), 27(d) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 -- Complaint after expiry of limitation period of three years – Quashing of complaint  --- Maximum punishment would be for a period of two years -- Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. bars the concerned Court from taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation – Report of the Laboratory came into the hands of the Drugs Inspector on 02.07.2015 and thus, the limitation expired on 01.07.2018 while complaint was filed on 05.02.2019 i.e. approximately after 7 months when period of limitation was over – Complaint and all other consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Police remand beyond 15 days – Permissibility of -- In the case of Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141, Supreme Court observed that there cannot be any police custody beyond 15 days from the date of arrest  -- View taken requires re-consideration -- On 16.04.2021, the ld. Special Judge allowed police custody of the respondent-accused for seven days i.e., up to 22.04.2021, the respondent-accused got himself admitted in the hospital 18.04.2021 and obtained interim bail on 21.04.2021 which came to be extended till 08.12.2021 when his interim bail came to be cancelled by the learned Special Judge by observing that the accused has misused the liberty – By not permitting the CBI to have the police custody interrogation for the remainder period of seven days, it will be giving a premium to an accused who has been successful in frustrating the judicial process -- Appellant-CBI permitted to have the police custody remand of the respondent for a period of four days.

(Para 7-10)

A. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 – Territorial jurisdiction of Court to take cognizance --  Irrespective of where the FIR relating to the scheduled offence was filed and irrespective of which Court took cognizance of the scheduled offence, the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Special Court to take cognizance of a compliant under PMLA should be decided with reference to the place/places where anyone of the activities/processes which constitute the offence under Section 3 took place.

(Para 3, 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint – Lucknow to Kerala -- Lack of jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a complaint can be no ground to order its transfer.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint -- Lucknow to Kerala -- 7 out of 10 accused persons are residents of Kerala can hardly be a ground for ordering the transfer of investigation -- Majority of witnesses are also from Kerala/ South India is also no ground to order the transfer of the complaint.

(Para 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Malicious prosecution – On conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted -- Held, Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage -- Same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial -- Order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings against the accused set aside.

(Para 4-5.1)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 211, 251, 317 – Summons case – Framing of charge – Personal appearance of accused – Requirement of -- In a summons case when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offences has to be put to him and asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make – It is not necessary to frame formal charge by the Magistrate – Appearance of the accused can either be personal or through his advocate as is provided u/s 205 of the Code which empowers the Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance of the accused, if he sees reason so to do and permit him to appear by his pleader.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 323, 342, 354, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Bail by trial court – Cancellation of bail by High Court – Explanation from Trial Judge – Legality of -- Trial Judge granting bail on the ground that the chargesheet had been submitted and that the other accused were on bail was eminently fair and reasonable – Order of the High Court directing that the appellant be arrested immediately and seeking an explanation from the Second Additional Sessions Judge was wholly disproportionate and was not warranted -- Members of the district judiciary cannot be placed in a sense of fear if they were to exercise the jurisdiction lawfully entrusted to them for granting bail in appropriate cases -- Application for cancellation of bail dismissed, bail confirmed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Additional evidence -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Who can file -- It is not necessary that the applicant has to be either complainant or prosecution or victim or a listed witness -- The provisions can be invoked by any other person who is able to show that the evidence of witness sought to be examined will be necessary for just decision of the case.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65-B – Certificate u/s 65-B of Evidence Act – Competent witness -- Certificate u/s 65-B and proving of the same, certainly goes to the root of the matter and therefore, the only person who is duly authorised regarding the same can be a competent witness in this regard.

(Para 19)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153-A, 295-A, 298, 323, 406 and 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 --  Forcible conversion of religion -- Third petition – Regular bail --  Petitioner in jail for more than 1 year and 4 months -- 16 out of 34 witnesses have been examined -- Petitioner not involved in any other case except for one more FIR which was lodged on the next day pertaining to the similar kind of allegations – Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153-A, 295-A, 342, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Forcible conversion of religion -- Third bail petition – Regular bail -- Incarceration for more than 1 year and 5 months -- 8 out of 31 witnesses examined -- Petitioner not involved in any other case except for one more FIR which was lodged one day prior to the present case pertaining to the similar kind of allegations -- Court deemed it fit and proper to grant regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 43)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 407 -- Transfer of petition – Maintenance petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Rewari to Jhajjar – Four more cases between the parties pending at District Court Jhajjar – It would be in the interest of justice and fitness of things, if petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C pending before District Court Rewari is transferred to District Court, Jhajjar – Petition allowed.

(Para 6-9)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 7 – Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1988, Clause 3, 7 -- Acquittal -- Unauthorised possession of gas cylinders -- Action taken by sub-Inspector of the Police who, as per the Government Order, is not authorised -- It is a settled law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all -- Other methods are necessarily forbidden – Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellants u/s 7 of the Act set aside.

(Para 14-17)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7 -- Corruption case – Acquittal – Demand of illegal gratification – Recovery of money -- Complainant as well as shadow witness turned hostile -- No evidence produced on record to prove the demand of illegal gratification -- PW-8 is only a witness who stated that he had recovered the money from the appellant -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally sustained -- Appeal allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court and that of the Trial Court are set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheques -- Demand notice -- Three cheques for an amount of Rs.14,00,000/- -- Legal notice to pay the cheque amount and in case of legal action, to bear the entire cost of the proceeding, interest on the amount besides legal fee – It is not a case that the opposite party demanded an amount more than the cheque amount of Rs.14,00,000/- -- Impugned notice cannot be said to be not in conformity with law.

(Para 4-7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheques -- Demand notice with additional claim – Legality of -- Defect in notice cannot invalidate the proceeding when the demand is only for the cheque amount with additional claim towards the miscellaneous expenses.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide -- Insulting the deceased by using abusive language or maltreatment will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of the suicide is imperative -- Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against the indictment -- Mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non to convict a person under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 9-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Simply because of the fact that the wife (deceased) committed suicide in matrimonial home, itself does not make her in-laws and husband liable for harassment and abetment to commit suicide -- No concrete or conclusive evidence to prove their complicity in the commission of the crime -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – Acquittal affirmed.

(Para 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 377, 498A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Matrimonial dispute – Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(5), 374, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 411 -- Conviction u/s 379-B, 411 IPC -- Setting aside of Judgment of conviction and sentence in appeal – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Exercise of -- Court invokes the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC and the appellate jurisdiction, quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence qua the appellant(s) and the accused/appellant acquitted.

(para 1-3,13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A, 376(2)(N) – Regular bail – Cancellation of bail – Earlier bail u/ss 363, 366-A IPC – Later Section 376(2)(N) IPC added -- Section 376(2)(N) of IPC was not in the picture at the time of consideration of bail – Held, simply because the offence u/s 376(2)(N) of IPC has been added is no ground to cancel the bail -- Petition dismissed -- State is at liberty to take the requisite action if so required in accordance with law.

(Para 1, 2, 5)