Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque dishonoured after its validity/ 3 months – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque in question was issued on 18.05.2018, which was ultimately dishonoured by Banker of the accused on 8.11.2018 -- In view of RBI circular dated 04.11.2011, maximum validity period for a cheque could be for 3 months only and even on the cheque in question it was specified that the same is valid for 3 months only – Substantive provision i.e. Section 138 of NI Act is that cheque be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier – Petition allowed and complaint with all subsequent proceedings including summoning order quashed.

(Para 4-7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 50 -- NDPS Case – Acquittal – Non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act – It is not the case of the prosecution that polythene from which the police party recovered the contraband was already thrown away by the appellant but it was in the hand of the appellant -- Thus, compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act is imperative in nature, which had not been made – Recovery of 10 grams heroin, which is non-commercial quantity -- Nothing on record to show that the appellant has any criminal antecedents -- Police party did not join any independent witness -- Held, prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the reasonable doubt as the compliance of provisions of Section 50 of NDPS Act has not been made in this case -- Appeal allowed -- Impugned order convicting and sentencing the appellant set aside and the appellant is acquitted.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 406, 370, 120B -- Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (2 of 2013), Section 13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Smuggling of human – Cheating -- Anticipatory bail --  Allegations against the petitioner are he along with other co accused cheated the complainant to the tune of Rs 33,00,000/- on the pretext of sending complainant’s son to USA -- Petitioner is the father of the main accused -- Given the penal provisions imposed and the sentence provided by the Legislature, the nature of allegations coupled with the fact that the petitioner is a first offender, and one of the relevant factors would be to provide an opportunity to course-correct – Petition allowed.

(Para 1-9, 24)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(15) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – FIR under SC/ST Act – Duty of police officer -- Officers, who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty-bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused -- Officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand – Police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position.

(Para 38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 427, 420, 419, 406, 471, 468, 448, 120B – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(15) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- There is a huge, and quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating dispute with regard to the ownership of the land in question, and the criminal case has been lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits, coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/her family members -- Resort to criminal proceedings is with ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is a clear case of vengeance -- Even if the allegations are taken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the appellant -- Complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive – High Court fell in error in not invoking its wholesome power u/s 482 of the Code to quash the FIR -- FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom, quashed and set aside.

(Para 37-39)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989) -- Chhattisgarh State Scheduled Tribes Commission Act, 1995, Section 9(1)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- FIR under SC/ST Act – Quashing -- Complaint before the ST Commission seeking registration of FIR against the petitioner under SC/ST Act, 1989 – Complaint does not fall within the scope of Section 9(1)(a) of the Act, 1995 warranting cognizance of the Commission – Commission is absolutely unjustified in passing the order impugned for registration of FIR against the petitioner under the Act, 1989 -- Order passed by the Commission,  quashed.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC-- FIR on account of absence of the petitioner which was subsequently regularized on his appearance after he was granted bail by the Court -- Continuation of the proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC shall be abuse of the process of the Court – Order declaring Proclaimed Person along with subsequent proceedings arising out of the same including FIR u/s 174-A of IPC quashed, subject to payment of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138(b) – Dishonour of cheque – Demand notice – Demand of other amount than cheque – Legality of -- In a demand notice, if other amounts is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted in a legal term of the Section 138 (b) of the Act, 1881.

(Para 24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102 – Freezing of Bank account of Company -- Imposition of the bank guarantee and the freeze orders solely on the grounds of criminal proceedings being alive against one person, who is alleged to be connected to the appellant company -- Said person lateron discharged, he was never an employee/ share holder/ director or a key managerial person in the appellant company – Said person was in no way connected to the appellant company, the trial faced by him, was in his individual capacity, and not vicariously on behalf of the appellant company -- Operation of the freeze order against the appellant company, is not legally tenable.

-- Even if accused discharge is subsequently reversed, and he is convicted, such a conviction would still have no bearing on the properties of the appellant company, since the appellant company is not alleged to be a part of the crime.

-- freeze order against the appellant company’s properties is redundant qua the investigation, since the appellant company itself is not necessary for the conclusion of the investigation.

Appellant permitted to withdraw the amount along with 4% simple interest, which shall be payable from 08.05.2006 till the date of actual payment.

(Para 10-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail -- Rape – Consenting party --  Misrepresentation -- In statement u/s 164 prosecutrix has categorically stated that they became friends through Facebook; he told her that he is Hindu and on his Facebook profile also he used his surname as “Dixit” and at the inception of the relationship applicant/ accused misrepresented himself and trapped the prosecutrix in his love; had applicant/accused not misrepresented to be of her faith, the prosecutrix would not have given in to the applicant/accused – Anticipatory Bail rejected.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386, 391 – Re-trial – Remand for re-trial in appeal – Additional evidence -- A re-trial is to be ordered only in exceptional circumstances where the Court is satisfied that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or that the Trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or irregularities or where the prosecutor or an accused for reasons beyond their control were prevented from tendering material evidence -- Proper course open for the Appellate Court in such circumstances where additional evidence is required to be taken is to resort to the provisions of Section 391 Cr.P.C.

(Para 9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Presumption – Rebuttal -- There is a difference between an ‘ordinary criminal case’ and a ‘complaint under Section 138 of NI Act’ -- In ordinary criminal case, presumption of innocence is in favour of accused, whereas in a case in complaint under NI Act, presumption is in favour of complainant with reverse onus upon the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 258 – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Notice of accusation – Discharge of accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In case ingredients for filing complaint u/s 138 of NI Act are in existence, then presumption is there, as provided under law, and to rebut the same, definitely, evidence would be required, which would be possible only in the trial Court, but in case essential ingredients are lacking, then the trial Court, at the time of framing of charge/putting notice of accusation, can quash the criminal proceedings.

(Para 21)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Security Cheque -- Presumption is in favour of the complainant and against the petitioner/accused – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Magistrate for summoning the petitioner – Petitioner shall have every right to rebut the presumption by placing on record relevant material before the Trial Court at appropriate stage during trial -- Quashing petition dismissed.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Petitioners/ accused are residents of Kapurthala, much beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandigarh, it was required for learned Magistrate to make compliance of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- In case inquiry as contemplated u/s 202 Cr.P.C is conducted through the Police or any person authorised by the court and the accused is involved in the inquiry, he will be able to put forth his defence and then, on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Police or the authorised person, Court will be in a better position to come to the conclusion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not, for summoning of the accused – Matter remanded back to the trial Court to make compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C and only thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 384, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail -- No post mortem conducted – Death on 02.09.2021, matter was reported to the police on 05.09.2021 -- Allegations of honey trapping and black mailing in the FIR but the exact date and month of the same is not given -- Genuineness of the suicide note will be determined by the trial Court, after the recording of evidence -- Mens rea, if any, on the part of the petitioners, is also matter of evidence -- No prior complaint with regard to alleged honey trapping and black mailing of the deceased by the petitioners -- Further, the petitioners have joined the investigation -- Petition allowed and interim order made absolute.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 Part I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Appellant tried to commit suicide along with her children in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour but her life was prevented by her niece -- Case not covered under the exceptions enumerated u/s 300 of the IPC -- More so, when there was no consent from the persons who were fed and died upon consuming the pesticide administered by the  Appellant -- Court not persuaded to convert the conviction from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part I, IPC.

(Para 14-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Life imprisonment – Premature release -- Appellant tried to commit suicide herself along with her children not with a view to continue her illicit relationship with her paramour but rather, in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour – Positive recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release of the appellant, has been rejected by the State – Held, it cannot be simply bracketed as a ‘cruel and brutal’ offence -- No valid reason/ justifiable ground for the State not accepting the recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release -- Appellant held entitled to the benefit of premature release.

(Para 16-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Chain snatching case -- Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence – Applicant has undergone total custody of 01 year & 09 months (1/3rd) out of the substantive sentence of 05 years -- Without commenting on the merits of the case the application allowed and the sentence of the applicant/ appellant suspended during pendency of the appeal.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after Conviction – Acquittal -- Since the revisionist and the complainant have settled the dispute, the offence u/s 138 of the Act gets compounded -- Consequently, the revisionist is entitled to acquittal from the charges as levelled against him -- Orders under challenge set aside -- Revisionist acquitted.

(Para 1, 7-9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Life and liberty of victim/ accused -- Article 21 of the Constitution protects lives and personal liberties of both the victim and those accused of having committed an offence.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 154 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Arrest of accused -- To strike a balance, distinction is drawn between power of arrest of an accused person u/s 41 and registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Code -- While registration of an FIR is mandatory, the arrest of the accused on registration of the FIR is not -- FIR is registered on the basis of information without any qualification like credible, reasonable or true information -- Reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for registration of the FIR -- However, for making arrest in terms of Section 41(1)(b) or (g), the legal requirements and mandate is reflected in the expression ‘reasonable complaint’ or ‘credible information’.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – Foreclose of investigation -- Under Section 157(1) of the Code, a Police officer can foreclose the investigation if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate -- Requirement of Section 157(1) for the Police officer to start investigation is that he has “reason to suspect the commission of an offence” -- Therefore, the Police officer is not liable to launch investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating to commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 16)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157(1), 173, 202 -- Cognizable offence – Mandatory registration of FIR – Life and liberty of accused – When the Police officer forecloses investigation in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1), he must submit a report to the Magistrate -- Here, the Magistrate can direct the Police to investigate, or if he thinks fit, hold an inquiry -- Where a Police officer, in a given case, proceeds to investigate the matter, then he files the final report u/s 173 of the Code -- The noticeable feature of the scheme is that the Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of investigation -- Magistrate, who has little or no scope to interfere with the investigation, is not absolutely powerless in view of the powers conferred in terms of Sections 159 and 173, and infra, Section 202 of the Code.

(Para 16-18)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Inherent power of the High Court -- This power is normally exercised when the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged -- When an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere into an investigation, however, if the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation can be permitted.

(Para 19-20)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) – Cognizable offence -- FIR -- The operandi for registration of information in a cognizable offence and eventual investigation is not limited to Police -- Sub-section (3) to Section 156, subject to legal stipulations, gives the ameliorating power to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order an investigation in a cognizable offence -- Two different powers vested with two distinct authorities, namely the Police and the Magistrate, who discharge distinct functions and roles under the Code as indicated above are not entirely imbricating.

(Para 23)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 -- Postponement of issue of process -- Section 202 not only refers to an inquiry but also to an investigation -- In such cases, the Police cannot on its own exercise the power of arrest in course of making its report in pursuance of the direction u/s 202 of the Code.

(Para 26)

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 202 -- Magistrate is required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under Section 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure under Section 202. He can also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police.

(Para 38)

I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 397, 401 – Right of accused pre-summoning proceedings – Revision -- Accused do not have any right to appear before the Magistrate before summons are issued -- However, the law gives them a right to appear before the revisionary court in proceedings, when the complainant challenges the order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code.

(Para 39)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(1) -- Compounding after conviction u/s 138 of NI Act -- Total cheque amount received by the complainant and the complainant has given consent for compounding the offence -- Keeping in mind the object of Section 147 of the NI Act, which is an enabling provision which provides for compounding the offence inserted by way of amendment towards special law, would give overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 320 of Cr.PC, matter considered as compounded -- Judgment and order of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Amendment of loan amount in complaint and affidavit of evidence -- Wrong amount of loan mentioned in demand notice/ complaint as Rs. 6,60,000/- instead of Rs.7,20,000/- -- Affidavit also adduced for wrong amount --  Complainant was cross-examined on such statement on oath -- Again in cross-examination he admitted to have stated that he had given Rs.6,60,000/- to the accused -- Loan amount cannot undergo a change because the same forms the very basis of the complaint -- This would certainly change the very nature and character of the case – Held, complainant cannot be permitted to change the very foundation of his case midway during trial.

(Para 3-8)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 19, 21 -- Child rape victim – Marital status -- There is no distinct category within child victims of rape as those who are married and those who are not.

(Para 12)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21, 42A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198(1), 198(3) – Child victim -- Mandatory reporting of an offence -- Held, Section 19 read with Section 21 of the POCSO Act shall override the restrictions imposed under Section 198(1) read with Section 198(3) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 16)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 472, 473 -- Child victim – Delay in reporting of offence – Extension of limitation -- In appropriate cases where minor victims are not able to file their complaints within time, the Trial Court has the power to extend the period of limitation, if it deems appropriate.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Endeavour on the part of the Court should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal  -- If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal.

(Para 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence -- Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution -- Such would not be a correct approach.

(Para 33)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 -- Murder – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence by High Court -- High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. -- All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts -- High Court has done is something impermissible -- In the overall view of the matter, High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts – Appeals allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside -- Convicts ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of three days.

(Para 34-40)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(2)(i), 190, 200, 202 – Submission of Final report – Role of Magistrate -- Magistrate may either:

(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue process,

(2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the investigation officer,

(3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC.

(Para 49)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2)(i), 173(8) – Final Police Report -- Further investigation – Delay -- Mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Cognizance by Magistrate -- Further investigation – Power of police -- Sub section (8) of Section 173 of the CrPC permits further investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the court takes cognizance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted.

(Para 64)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Acceptance by Magistrate – Further investigation – Double jeopardy – Hearing to accused -- There is no bar against conducting further investigation u/s 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted u/s 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted:

-- Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed.

-- Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation.

-- There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(Para 64-77)

E. Precedents – High Court order -- Contrary view from co-ordinate Bench – Sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers – Ground of Per incuriam – While it is open to a learned Judge to differ with a view of a Co-ordinate Bench the sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers being placed before the learned Chief Justice -- The learned Judge cannot simply say "with due respect, I do not agree to the ratio..." or “the decision is per incuriam as a binding judgment of the Supreme Court has not been considered….” and proceed to take a contrary view as done in the impugned order -- Such an approach would result in conflicting opinions of Co-ordinate Benches, resulting in judicial chaos and is, thus, improper -- This is something atrocious and unacceptable.

(Para 24, 81)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), Section 173(2), 173(8) -- Further investigation after long lapse of time -- It is settled law that the criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an individual -- Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay -- Mere delay in approaching a Court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case -- Though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict -- Assurance of a fair trial is to be the first imperative in the dispensation of justice.

(Para 84-86)

G. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), 17 – Criminal misconduct by public servant -- Investigation by police – Consent order from Superintendent of police or and higher officer in rank – Nature of -- A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced -- Before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary.

(Para 88)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 29, 37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Regular bail -- Can the provision of Section 37 of the Act, be construed to have same efficacy throughout the pendency of trial, notwithstanding, the period of custody of the accused -- Held, the Constitutional guarantee of expeditious trial cannot be diluted by applying the rigors of Section 37 of ND&Ps Act in perpetuity -- Petitioner is in custody since 24.02.2021 and the facts suggest that the trial is not likely to be concluded in near future -- Co-accused has already been released on bail – Bail petition allowed.

(Para 7-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Curable infirmity or defect can be removed by amending the complaint.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Amendment cannot be allowed to change the basic core, crux and tenor of the complaint.

(Para 19)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Amendment, which results in prejudice to the other side, cannot be allowed -- Amendment sought for to the complaint, if does not cause prejudice to the other side, the same can be allowed.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment of complaint -- Addition of name of company/ firm  -- When the amendment application pertains to addition of company or firm as a principal offender, after taking cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaint by the Magistrate, company or firm cannot be added.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 --  Maintainability of Complaint -- Company/ Firm not impleaded as party – Vicarious liability of Director/ Partner -- If the cheque is drawn on the account of company or firm, then the principal offender is the company or firm and therefore, in the absence of the company or firm being arraigned as accused in the complaint, the prosecution against the Directors or Partners cannot be maintained.

(Para 19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Contempt of Court – MoU between the parties during the pendency of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- MoU was filed before the Trial Court, wherein, the Respondent/ accused gave an undertaking to the Trial Court that the entire settlement amount shall be paid on or before 29.02.2020 and it was further stated that in case of default, he would become liable for contempt of Court – Respondent/ accused has only paid a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs and has failed to pay the balance of Rs. 2,40,84,782.14 as per the undertaking – Respondent held guilty of contempt for wilful breach of terms of the MoU and the undertakings given – Contemnor, ordered to undergo two (02) months imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000 -- In default of payment of the fine, he shall further undergo fifteen (15) days simple imprisonment.

(Para 1, 2, 13-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(iii)(b) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Ganja seeds for plantation – Regular  bail -- Petitioner in custody since 20.05.2022 – Materials on record show that the petitioner has supplied Ganja seed for cultivation -- As per the definition of Ganja in Section 2(iii)(b) of the NDPS Act, 1985, it is not a banned contraband -- No specific allegation that the Ganja seeds were supplied by the petitioner to the other person with an intention to receive back the grown Ganja after cultivation – Charge-sheet already filed -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling for cross-examination -- Application is silent about the material things which were left to be put up the witness and on what point -- Simply contending that effective cross-examination could not be conducted is no ground to re-call the said witnesses for cross-examination.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling for cross-examination -- Unless there are specific reasons or grounds, prayer for re-examination of the witnesses cannot be granted -- The person cannot be re-examined in the trial at the mere asking.

(Para 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section  307, 325, 147, 148, 323, 325, 307, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Attempt to murder – Regular bail -- Injury on the head with iron rod – Nothing on record of trial court to show injury was grievous or dangerous to life -- However as per medical record produced by the petitioner one of the injuries found to be grievous in nature – Petitioner in custody for the last more than 1 year and 2 months and is having no criminal history – Complainant and injured are already examined but it will take considerable time for the trial to conclude -- Nothing on record to show that if released on bail the petitioner is going to abscond or will tamper with the evidence -- Petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Charge -- Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence -- Charge can be framed even on the basis of strong suspicion, if the same is supported with material on record.

(Para 4)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Rash and negligent driving – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Charge u/s 304 IPC -- Allegation that petitioner was driving the oil tanker at a high speed, without blowing any horn, in a zig zag manner and intentionally struck with the scooter, which resulted in the death of all the three occupants of the scooter -- Prima facie, it appears to be a case of extreme negligence and rashness -- Alternative charge u/s 304A IPC has not been framed, such an error can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. – Charge u/s 304 affirmed, Ld. Trial Court advised to look into the alteration/amendment of the charge.

(Para 5-8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 – Defective charge – Whether vitiate trial -- Accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of charge against him, but the error in the charge, if any, can be corrected by invoking the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. -- The defect in framing of the charge, per se, may not vitiate the trial.

(Para 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Account closed – Defence that accused misused the security cheque by filling up the name of wife -- Cheque was written and signed by the accused -- Return memo indicates that on the date when the cheque drawn, the bank account already closed -- Complainant caused notice, which was received by the accused -- In the cross examination it is elucidated from the complainant that her husband and sons are running business in wax printing and they have business transaction with the accused – Held, this fact is no way rebut the presumption enumerated under Section 139 of N.I.Act -- Accused cannot take a plea that the said cheque was given as a security for the transaction, which took place four years ago.

(Para 14-16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Capacity to pay -- As far as the source of income, the complainant in the cross examination has indicated her source and also though she is an house wife, her husband and son being the earning members, it cannot be ruled out that she has no wherewithal to lend Rs.5,00,000/- to the accused – Contention that subject cheque was given only as a security and the complainant has no wherewithal to advance Rs.5,00,000/-, both factually not proved even by preponderance of probability -- While there is a statutory presumption, mere denial or adducing evidence which does not shake the foundational fact proved by the complainant, can be taken as a probability.

(Para 17)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Sections 69, 132(1)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437 – Bail – Pre-condition to deposit Bank Guarantee of Rs.1.5 crores – Pre-condition of furnishing bank guarantee imposed by the High Court is not liable to be sustained, set aside.

(Para 5, 6, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2), 378 – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction by Appellate court -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence -- Principle of according opportunity of hearing to the convict before sentencing him is equally applicable where the sentencing is done by the appellate court -- Convicts are entitled to opportunity of hearing on sentence.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 235(2) -- Opportunity of hearing before sentence – As a general rule, the trial court is duty bound to adjourn the matter to a future date after recording the conviction so as to call upon both the sides to hear on the question of sentence before sentencing the accused persons -- Court is obliged to hear the accused persons after their conviction on the quantum of sentence before passing a sentence against them.

(Para 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Revision – Sentence of cheque amount – While suspending the sentence High Court imposed a condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- -- Further, imposed condition that the petitioner shall deposit another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of four weeks after immediately coming out on bail – Both the conditions were duly complied with by the petitioner – Petitioner ready and willing to settle the remaining cheque amount within the stipulated time fixed by this Court – Conviction confirmed, sentence set aside on condition that the petitioner shall deposit the remaining cheque amount namely a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- on or before 29.05.2023.

(Para 5-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 283 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Opening of shop in residential area -- Quashing of FIR -- There is no specific averment to the effect that any danger obstruction or injury has been caused to any person, nor it is coming forth that any public way or public line of navigation has been obstructed by the petitioners in any way -- It is difficult to perceive how by opening his shop in a residential area, petitioner has committed the offense under this section -- FIR quashed.

(Para 8, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 427 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Mischief causing damage – Quashing of FIR -- With respect to offense u/s 427, there is no averment that what mischief has been committed by the petitioner or to whom loss or damage has been caused through that mischief -- Mere vague allegations in the FIR, consisting of words used in the definition of an offense, in the absence of any corroborating details, does not lead to prima facie satisfaction for constituting that offence -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Validity of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Dishonor of cheque with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” -- It was not mentioned on the cheque that the same is valid for 3 months -- Controversy involved is totally a disputed question of facts and the same is to be appreciated by the learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence led by both the sides regarding the contentions raised that whether the cheque is valid for 3 months or not -- Petition for quashing dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to frame charge u/s 7 of PC Act -- Appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance – This is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective -- However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned -- Therefore, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 464 -- Failure to Frame a Proper Charge – Omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder -- Framing of charge -- While framing charge u/s 307 of IPC, what the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section and It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228 -- Attempt to murder – Head injury -- Blow of sharp-edged weapon -- Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence u/s 307 of the IPC and intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from the surrounding circumstances -- Injury on the vital part of the body and among other things, considering the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blow inflicted, prima-facie case u/s 307 IPC is made out.

(Para 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Bail -- Local surety -- Condition relating to production of local surety dispensed with -- Not only High Court while exercising its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., but even other Courts including Session/ Magistrate Courts are empowered to modify the bail conditions if parameters, as specified in the case, are satisfied.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- There is double presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent-accused -- Initial presumption of innocence is on account of the basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty -- Secondly, said presumption is reinforced by the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court after trial based on the evidence – In these circumstances, onus is heavy on the petitioner/ complainant to show the illegality or impropriety of the finding recorded by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405 – Criminal breach of trust – Following ingredients must be proved to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust –

(A) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property;

(B) that the person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or (b) dishonestly used or disposed of that property or willfully suffered any other person to do so in violation, (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Misappropriation of 1657 bags i.e. 1055 quintals 50 kg and 942 grams of paddy -- 6614 bags weighing 4286 quintals 60 kg paddy were stored for the purpose of milling -- Prosecution utterly failed to prove the dominion of the accused over the said property – Civil suit filed by the petitioner/ complainant/ FCI for recovery, on the same allegations, has already been dismissed by the Civil Court despite the fact that burden of proof in the civil suit is of much lesser degree compared to the criminal case – Prosecution utterly failed to prove the entrustment of the paddy bags, which was allegedly misappropriated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10, 12, 13)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439, 362 – Bail under SC/ST Act – Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court -- Changed circumstances -- Once an appeal under Section 14A against the order passed by the Special Court rejecting the application under Section 439 of the CrPC is decided on merits or otherwise by High Court, subsequent appeal under change of circumstances would not be directly maintainable under Section 14A before High Court even on change of circumstances and remedy to the accused, if any, is to file an application before the Special Court for grant of bail.

(Para 31)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14, 14A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Jurisdiction of High Court/ Special Court – Regular bail -- Power to grant bail u/s 439 of the CrPC has only vested to the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act and High Court is only empowered to hear appeal under Section 14A(2) of the POA Act against refusal or grant of bail by the Special Court under the Act.

(Para 31)