Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 194, 195, 199, 200, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Regular bail -- Two material witnesses examined and have not supported the prosecution case -- Whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to inculpate the petitioner and his co-accused shall be adjudicated upon during the course of the Trial – Petitioner in custody since 15.10.2021 and only 08 out of 36 prosecution witnesses have been examined – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of  trial – Held, such an exercise, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Quashing of proceedings -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of IPC is very limited -- High Court has almost conducted a mini trial and quashed the proceedings -- High Court has elaborately discussed the statements of the witnesses recorded u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C. -- It is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the chargesheet -- Order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 4-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 153, 153-A, 212, 216, 120-B -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Regular bail – Allegation that petitioner alongwith other unknown persons was illegally supplying arms and ammunitions and funding separatists with an intent to create disturbance in the name of religion, at the instance of Pakistani Agency ISI and, to target the leaders of religious organizations and political leaders to disturb peace and tranquility in Punjab – Petitioner is in preventive custody for past more than 11 months -- Petitioner is a 23-year old young student, was aspirant to study further in Canada, where he had though secured admission, but was apprehended at the airport when he was leaving from India -- He has already done his food course from the Food Craft Institute and also worked for the Taj group at the Taj Hotel Resorts and Palaces -- No probability of tampering with evidence as the same has already been seized by the investigating agency -- Co-accused of the petitioner have been granted concession of bail -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 6-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4, 5 -- Conviction u/s 452, 324, 323, 506 IPC – Accused released on probation – Probation period already stands expired -- Compensation as ordered by the Appellate Court already stand deposited – Held, nothing survives in the criminal revision, dismissed.

(Para 1-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Abetment to suicide – Regular bail -- Petitioner is a lady of the age of 33 years having two minor children -- Petitioner was married to the deceased – Although the allegations have been levelled against the petitioner not only in the FIR but also so stated in the suicide note but these are to be seen only at the time of adducing evidence -- Incarceration of the petitioner is more than 6 months – Petition allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trivial nature of offence -- Long pendency of trial -- Quashing of Chargesheet -- Considering the nature of allegations which are of very trivial nature and considering the fact that there is no progress made in the proceedings since the chargesheet was filed in the year 2015, continuing the proceedings would be a persecution and harassment to the appellant -- Proceedings pending in the court of CJM against the appellant quashed and set aside.

(Para 3-7)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial -- Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.

(Para 10)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Competence of the court trying the accused would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time -- In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law.

(Para 10)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution from Superior authority – Validity of – Challenge to -- Special Judge, while dismissing the third application filed by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by the prosecution, specifically held that the sanction accorded by the government which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid -- Such findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said sub-section (3).

(Para 14)

D. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution -- Discharge of accused -- Interlocutory application seeking discharge in the midst of trial would not be maintainable -- Once the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act -- Issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same was not pressed for -- Only stage open to the accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in the trial in accordance with law.

(Para 15)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 17 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS case – Regular  bail – Recovery of 1.5 kg of opium -- Custody 3 months and 3 days -- Petitioner on interim bail since 29.09.2022, not misused the liberty granted; not involved in any other case under NDPS Act; challan was presented on 20.08.2022, however, charges have not yet been framed and in all there are 16 witnesses -- Trial is likely to take a considerable time, thus his further incarceration would not serve any useful purpose -- Regular bail allowed.

(Para 2, 6, 7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Non-signatory to cheque – Vicarious liability – Quashing of complaint -- Complainant alleged that the appellants/ accused were liable for transactions of the company and that they were fully aware of the issuance of the cheques and dishonour of the cheques – Most important averment required is that the directors were in charge of, and were responsible for the conduct of the company – Appellants/ accused are neither the signatories to the cheques nor are whole-time directors -- Statutory notice was admittedly not served to the accused -- Complaint quashed qua appellants/ accused.

(Para 9-11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Vicarious liability -- Incharge of the company – Responsible for conduct of business of company -- Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract sub-section 1 of Section 141 of the NI Act -- Words "was in charge of" and "was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read conjunctively in view of use of the word "and" in between.

(Para 19-21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Amendment/ correction w.r.t. to cheque number in complaint -- Typographical error, which originated from the legal notice, was indeed unintentional -- Application to correct the cheque numbers approved -- Proceedings shall continue based on the corrected cheque numbers, which are already on record before the trial court for further proceedings in the trial -- Proceedings shall commence from the same stage.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 489-A, 489-B, 489-C, 489-D, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Counterfeited currency – Regular  bail -- Petitioner in preventive custody merely on an unfounded suspicion that if he is let out, he may either tamper with evidence and/or influence witnesses -- Offence allegedly committed by petitioner is of non-violent nature and in that sense his release on bail is not a threat to society at large by committing any violent crime – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 -- Charge – Grievous hurt -- Injury resulted into avulsion fracture, completely severing the digital phalanx of the two fingers of the complainant -- Specific allegation in the FIR that weapon used was iron rod having sharp edge -- Injury is grievous in nature -- No reason for the Trial Court to decline the application for addition of Section 326 IPC -- Impugned order set aside -- Trial Court directed to frame charge u/s 326 IPC as well.

(Para 13-15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 216 – Charge – Alteration of charge -- Prima facie case -- Charge can be altered as per Section 216 Cr.P.C. at any stage before pronouncement of judgment -- Only prima facie case is to be seen at the stage – Charge should be as wide as possible – Ultimately, if offence of lessor gravity is found to have been committed comparing to the offence charged, conviction can be recorded accordingly -- However, if on conclusion of trial, graver offence is found to have been committed as compared to the offence charged, then de novo trial may have to be ordered depending upon the circumstances.

(Para 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Anticipatory bail – Regular bail -- Paramount considerations in cases where bail or anticipatory bail is claimed are the nature and gravity of the offence, the propensity or ability of the accused to influence evidence during investigation or interfere with the trial process by threatening or otherwise trying to influence the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused to flee from justice and other such considerations -- During the trial, the court is always in control of the proceedings, and it is open for it to impose any condition which it deems necessary to ensure the accused’s presence and participation in the trial.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Bail after chargesheet -- Once the chargesheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course -- However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the Trial Court -- High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach -- Impugned order of rejecting the bail and directing the appellant, to surrender and later seek bail, therefore, cannot stand and set aside.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Dowry case -- Cruelty – Anticipatory bail -- Regular Bail -- Directions given in Arnesh Kumar’s case (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15107 reiterated and other directions issued:

-- All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC;

-- All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

-- The police officer- shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

-- The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

-- The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

-- Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

-- Directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the case under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a terms which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine.

-- The High Court shall frame the above directions in the form of notifications and guidelines to be followed by the Sessions courts and all other and criminal courts dealing with various offences.

-- Likewise, the Director General of Police in all States shall ensure that strict instructions in terms of above directions are issued. Both the High Courts and the DGP’s of all States shall ensure that such guidelines and Directives/Departmental Circulars are issued for guidance of all lower courts and police authorities in each State within eight weeks from today.

-- Affidavits of compliance shall be filed before this court within ten weeks by all the states and High Courts, though their Registrars.

High Courts and the Police Authorities in all States are required to comply with the above directions in the manner within the time frame mentioned.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor – Re-summoning of POCSO victim for cross-examination -- Bar u/s 33(5) POCSO Act may not be absolute and balance of rights needs to be maintained u/s 33(5) of POCSO Act and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. -- Court’s discretion in exercising its power to re-summon a witness for cross-examination has to be exercised with circumspection, caution and utmost sensitivity – Crucial word used in Section 33(5) of POCSO Act is “called repeatedly” -- This Section thus has to be interpreted to balance and applied with the right u/s 311 Cr.P.C. of accused and right to fair trial of an accused depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor -- Re-examination of POCSO victim for cross-examination – Change of counsel -- Victim was only seven years of age at the time of incident in the year 2016 -- Child victim re-lived the trauma of perverse sexual assault upon her at a very tender age of seven years, once, when she was sexually assaulted, thereafter while recording her statement before the police and u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate and thereafter before the learned Trial Court while recording her evidence – Victim cannot be directed to appear once again after six years to depose about the same incident, only on the ground that the previous counsel had cross-examined the witness in a manner which the new counsel does not find sufficient or appropriate -- Change of counsel cannot be a ground for re-summoning of the witnesses -- Though the accused has to be granted and ensured a fair trial, it cannot mean being afforded unjustified repeated opportunities of cross-examination in every case to indicate fair trial.

(Para 13-21)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned.

(Para 14)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Misuse of POCSO law – Ground of -- Any law, whether gender based or not, has the potential of being misused -- Legislature cannot stop enacting laws nor judiciary can stop applying such laws since they have been enacted to curb the larger menace of commission of such offences and getting justice to genuine victims.

(Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 458, 460, 323, 285, 302, 148, 149 -- Additional accused -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Discussion on merits of evidence – Stage of -- Merits of the evidence has to be appreciated only during the trial, by cross examination of the witnesses and scrutiny of the Court not to be done at the stage of Section 319 -- High Court did not appreciate the important fact that the charges being faced by the accused were u/ss 458, 460, 323, 285, 302, 148 and 149 of IPC -- For attracting the offence u/s 149 IPC, one simply has to be a part of an unlawful assembly, any specific individual role or act is not material -- At the stage of summoning an accused, there has to be a prima facie satisfaction of the Court -- Court can stop the trial at that stage itself if such application had been moved u/s 319 -- Prosecution had fully made out its case for summoning u/s 319 Cr.PC -- Order of the High Court set aside.

(Para 4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 201, 210 – FIR as well as private complaint – Same incident – Summoning in complaint case – Permissibility of -- JMIC was conscious of the fact that FIR was registered on account of the same incident – Impugned order summoning the petitioners have been passed in derogation of the procedure as prescribed under Section 210 Cr.P.C -- It was incumbent upon the trial Court to stay the proceedings of the inquiry/ trial and call for a report on the matter from the Police Officer, who is conducting the investigation -- Trial Court having failed to resort to the mandatory procedure, the impugned order cannot be sustained, set aside.

(Para 6-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 190, 482 – Police investigation – Criminal complaint -- Magistrate came to the conclusion that the application be treated as criminal complaint and directed the petitioner to lead his preliminary evidence in the matter -- Petitioner has not been deprived of his legal remedy, as such – While dealing with the application u/s 156 (3), the Magistrate is not required to give any detailed reasons for not referring the matter for investigation by the Police – Arguments of the petitioner that he cannot collect the evidence and, therefore, the matter should have been referred to the Police is of no help – Even during trial; if the Magistrate so finds and feels it necessary that the assistance of the police is required on certain aspect of the matter, then the Magistrate can very well order the Police concerned to investigate the said aspect – It is for the Magistrate to decide whether he should refer the matter to the police for investigation or proceed with the matter as a complaint – No illegality in the order -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8-13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Regular bail -- Delay in concluding the trial – Life and liberty -- Sometimes, the trial gets delayed without any fault on the part of the accused and this violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India, because every accused has also a right to speedy justice -- Sometimes, when the trial gets delayed unnecessarily, it is not in the interest of justice that the accused should be detained in jail for an indefinite period.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Murder -- Regular bail -- Delay in trial – No doubt petitioner is facing a serious charge, but that, by itself, should not deter the Court from allowing the bail application, when there is no serious contention of the State that the accused, if enlarged on bail, would interfere with the trial or tamper with the evidence -- Petitioner is languishing in jail since 15.12.2019 i.e over 03 years and 07 months and the prosecution had only examined 02 witnesses out of total 19 witnesses -- Most material witness, complainant has already been examined as PW-1 and there are no chances of tampering with the prosecution evidence -- Without commenting on the merits of the case, the bail allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Mutation in favour of the petitioner is relating to only that land, which was validly allotted and he had made the complete payment -- If the revenue official had initially entered a deficient mutation and the same is corrected subsequently; either on the application of the petitioner or otherwise, no fault could be found with that – Any other fact, regarding some DDR entry or some order or absence of any other order passed by any Authority is only ancillary fact; which cannot be raised to the level of introducing criminality -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Quashing of FIR –  Permissibility of -- Submission that challan has been filed, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed -- Court not found any substance in the said argument -- Once, the complaint itself is baseless, then merely because some witnesses have repeated the ipse dixit of the complaint which is based on non-existent facts or the facts against the undisputed record, before the Investigating Officer; that does not lend any legal or jurisprudential support to the report filed by the Investigating Officer -- FIR can be quashed even after filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 104 – Impounding of passport -- Power u/s 104 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to impound a passport -- Reason is that the provisions of the PP Act which deal with the specific subject of impounding passports shall prevail over Section 104 of Cr.P.C. Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674 referred.

(Para 8)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102(1) – Seizure/ Impounding of passport -- Section 102 (1) of Cr.P.C., the Police have the power to seize the passport but there is no power to impound the same -- If the power of seizure of a passport is exercised u/s 102, the Police cannot withhold the said document and the same must be forwarded to the Passport Authority -- Thereafter, Passport Authority to decide whether the passport needs to be impounded. Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674 referred.

(Para 8)

C. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91, 102 -- Passport taken in custody u/s 91 of Cr.P.C – Court fail to understand why the passport of the appellant was required for the purpose of the pending criminal case -- As there was neither a seizure of the passport nor impounding thereof, the appellant was entitled to return of the passport.

(Para 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Appeal against acquittal -- Accused paid an amount of Rs.50,000/- during proceedings of the complaint clearly stating that he be given time to pay the balance amount – He did not dispute at that time that his liability was only to the extent of Rs.50,000/- -- This statement, making payment of Rs.50,000/- by the accused, also indicates that accused had the legal liability towards the complainant – Cheque for Rs. 2,25,658.08 dishonored on account of insufficient funds – Respondent/ accused failed to make payment despite statutory notice -- Acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be at all sustained, set aside -- Accused-respondent held guilty u/s 138 of the NI Act and convicted.

(Para 15-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Sentence for 2 months 29 days -- Considering that petitioner is first time offender and has faced agony of trial for a considerable long period, to meet the ends of justice sentence reduced to 2 months & 29 days, the period already undergone by him.

(Para 9-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 256, 378 -- Complaint dismissed in default – Restoration of complaint – Permissibility of -- Acquittal – Appeal -- Once the complaint dismissed in default for want of prosecution, due to absence of the complainant but in the presence of the accused, the said dismissal amounted to acquittal and the only remedy for the complainant was to file the appeal -- Magistrate did not have the power to restore the complaint.

(Para 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34, 326, 324, 323, 201 – Attempt to murder -- Regular bail -- Version and cross-version case -- Which party is the aggressor party would be adjudicated upon during the course of trial -- Petitioner is in custody since 15.03.2023 and none of the 14 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- Trial is not likely to be concluded soon -- Co-accused have been granted the concession of anticipatory bail -- As such, the further incarceration of the petitioner is not required ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 3-7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366 -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Penetrative sexual assault – Marriage with minor girl – Acquittal -- In statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC, the victim deposed that she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized because she was adamant to live with the appellant -- No doubt, she resiled from her statement, yet, the medical evidence indicated that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts – Prosecution was not able to establish that there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant – Held, M’s statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events -- Impugned judgment set aside the charge u/s 366 IPC against the appellant -- Charges u/s 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 20-22)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 150, 153 -- Theft of electricity – Civil Liability – Jurisdiction of Special Court -- Special Court constituted u/s 153 of the Act do not have jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide civil liability in absence of pendency of trial of offence referred to in Sections 135 to 140 and Section 150 of the Act.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 338 – Grievous hurt endangering life or personal safety – Limitation – Cognizance by court -- No Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation and the period of limitation shall be 03 years, if the offence is punishable with an imprisonment for a term exceeding 01 year, but not exceeding 03 years and the period of limitation shall commence from the date of the registration of the FIR – FIR is dated 24.07.2011, even till today, a formal charge-sheet has not been filed by the police and the cognizance in the present case shall be barred by the period of limitation -- Prosecution is apparently barred by limitation – FIR u/s 338 of IPC alongwith all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B -- Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Sections 10, 12 – Regular bail -- Fake bank guarantees for issuance of license to develop housing project -- Petitioner's continued custody is based on the alleged coerced custodial statement of Co-accused, which lacks independent credibility and may not be per se admissible in trial – Transfer of Rs. 30,00,000/- into the petitioner's account from the company's account, explained -- Petitioner languishing in jail for the past more than 2 months in preventive custody – Petitioner is the sole bread winner, his father requires constant medical attention -- Petitioner has clean antecedents -- Investigation qua petitioner complete and petitioner is not required for custodial interrogation -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 2, 6-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 22, 25, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone more than 04 years of custody -- No contraband has been recovered from him coupled with the fact that no other material except the disclosure statement of the co-accused has been brought to the notice of this Court so as to connect the petitioner with the allegation alleged in the FIR, the petitioner has made out a case for the grant of regular bail.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 299 , 302, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Murder – Culpable homicide – Death by Fire arm -- Gross negligence -- When the incident occurred, the change lever was not kept in a safety position by the appellant and therefore, SAF got cocked which resulted in the firing of five bullets -- Appellant must take the blame for not taking the elementary precaution of keeping the change lever in the safety position -- U/s 313 of CrPC, the case of the prosecution that he intentionally opened fire by aiming at the deceased was not put to the appellant -- Theory of the prosecution that the appellant fired intentionally has not been established – Accidental fire took place and that is how the appellant became responsible for the death – Not a case of culpable homicide as defined u/s 299 of IPC -- Gross negligence on the part of the appellant which led to a loss of human life -- Appellant is guilty of a lesser offence punishable u/s 304A of IPC, conviction u/s 302 of the IPC set aside.

(Para 14-20)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Extension of period of Parole – Petitioner released on parole -- Suffered a fracture on his right ankle joint – Held, jurisdiction at this stage not exercisable by High Court, but is exercisable only by the Competent Authority -- Review jurisdiction exercisable only in case a declining order is made by the Competent Authority -- Prayer is mis-constituted, and, is liable to be rejected – However, one week protection from step into prison given and one week time granted to move application before competent authority for extension of parole, then on such application valid speaking order shall be expeditiously recorded.

(Para 3, 4)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2 (xxiii-a), 2 (vii-a), 8, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS Case -- Regular bail – Recovery of 795 grams of charas from the petitioner – Petitioner is in custody since 26.04.2023 -- As per Table prepared u/s 2 (xxiii-a) and Section 2 (vii-a) of the Act, 1985, lesser than 100 grams of charas is small quantity and greater than 01 Kilogram of charas is commercial quantity (Entry No.23) – There is no reason to keep the applicant behind the bars for an indefinite period --  Bail allowed.

(Para 2-8)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Penetrative sexual assault -- Rape on woman under 12 years of age/Section 376AB IPC – Regular bail -- During the trial, victim aged about 14 years (PW1) and informant (PW2), mother of the victim, have been examined – Victim (PW1) and her mother (PW2) did not support the case of the prosecution and applicant has no criminal history – Held, there is no reason to keep the applicant behind the bars for an indefinite period, therefore, without expressing any opinion as to the merit of the case, applicant deserves bail at this stage -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by Karta of HUF – Summoning of members of HUF – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- When cheque was issued by “karta” in the name of HUF and liability of the HUF is not disputed, in the absence of “Karta”, it cannot be denied that liability of HUF on account of cheque issued in its name still remains, which will obviously devolve on its members or upon the one who shall become “Karta” – At this stage, pending proceedings before the trial Court cannot be quashed -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 2-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 325, 148, 149 –  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 54, 59A – Attempt to murder/307-IPC – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon/148-IPC – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statement of parties with regard to compromise recorded -- No useful purpose would be served to continue with the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant F.I.R. – F.I.R and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 341, 323, 506 –  Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to commit culpable homicide/308-IPC – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statement of parties with regard to compromise recorded -- No useful purpose would be served to continue with the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant F.I.R. – F.I.R and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS Case – Regular bail -- Recovery of 41.26 grms. of Heroin on secret information -- As per the pleadings it is a case of false implication and the petitioner was forcibly picked up in a private vehicle by Crime Branch and thereafter implicated in the present case – Recovery from the petitioner is of non-commercial quantity and he is in custody since 07.04.2023, challan stands presented qua the petitioner -- Conclusion of trial is likely to take time, no useful purpose would be served by depriving the personal liberty of the petitioner – Bail granted.

(Para 5)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 --  Cheque bounce complaint -- Successive presentation of cheque – Permissibility of -- As per settled law and proviso (a) of Section 138 of the 1881 Act, successive presentation of cheque is permissible within the period of its validity -- Drawee is required to be bound by successive information received about encashment or return, and demand for payment within 30 days from any fresh information can be raised -- Clause (c) makes it mandatory to file complaint in case drawer fails to make payment within 15 days of receipt of notice which means once demand notice is issued, thereafter no presentation is permitted.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Successive presentation of cheque – Merger of Banks -- Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order – Challenge to – Cheque dishonoured for the reason "other reason-Bank is merged" -- Same was again presented but was again returned with remarks "other reason-bank is merged" -- Thereafter, a demand notice was issued followed by filing of complaint and the summoning order – No ground is made out for any intervention by High Court --  Petition dismissed.

(Para 4, 5, 15)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 27-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS Case – Regular bail – Jump of bail – Recovery of 6 gram of smack – Though the conduct of the petitioner having misused the concession of bail twice does not merit any relief -- However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the petitioner has suffered incarceration of more than 1 year, 2 months and 18 days and no other case is pending against him as on date under the NDPS Act -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail with conditions.

(Para 1-5)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 363, 377, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO matter – Regular bail -- FSL report has shown the offence having been committed by the petitioner -- However, it is not disputed that the complainant and the father of the victim have not supported the case of the prosecution and that the petitioner is in custody for the past about more than two years and two months -- No other case -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail pending trial.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant -- Necessary ingredients of an offence u/s 188 IPC are:-

(a) there must be an order promulgated by a public servant,

(b) such public servant must be lawfully empowered to promulgate such order,

(c) Such order should direct the accused to abstain from an act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management,

(d) Accused disobeys the order knowingly,

(e) Such obedience must cause or tend to cause –

(i) obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed; or

(ii) danger to human life, health or safety; or

(iii) causes or tend to cause riot or affray.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance by court -- No Court can take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC except on a written complaint made by the concerned public servant, whose order has been disobeyed.

(Para 6-8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 269 -- Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – Essential ingredients for commission of offence under Section 269 IPC are:

(i) The disease in question was infectious and dangerous to human life.

(ii) The accused did an act, which was likely to felicitate spreading of the disease

(iii) The accused did the act unlawfully or negligently

(iv) The accused knew or had reason to believe that his act was likely to spread the disease.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 – FIR -- Police report -- Cognizance by Court -- In view of the bar placed by Section 195 CrPC, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on the challan filed by the Police for offence u/s 188 IPC -- Not the case of the respondent/State that the petitioner was suffering from corona virus or any other disease on the date of alleged offence, which could spread the infection to others and thus, ingredients of Section 269 IPC are completely missing – FIR u/s 188 & 269 of the IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 9-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act – Stage of -- Accusation to accused – It is only where the accused “pleads not guilty” of the accusation made in the complaint that interim compensation u/s 143A (1) can be granted -- Magistrate did not issue the order after the plea of the accused was entered, but before that i.e. after he answered the summons – Compensation order quashed.

(Para 6-8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A -- Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act – Stage of -- Trial has proceeded and is at an advanced stage -- It is open at this stage too for the complainant to seek appropriate relief, including u/s 143A, since it can be claimed at “any stage”.

(Para 9)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 14 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – SARFAESI proceedings – Jurisdiction of High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- High Court quashed the order passed u/s 14 of the SARFAESI ACT u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Held, remedy against such order can be availed only under the SARFAESI ACT – Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 3-5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Proceedings u/s 188 of the IPC can only be initiated on the basis of complaint in writing by the concerned public servant -- No FIR can be registered for the offence u/s 188 of the IPC and no report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C. to the concerned Court can be filed on the basis of evidence collected in the said FIR.

(Para 7)

B. Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Penalty -- Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Any offence under the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 is deemed to be an offence u/s 188 of the IPC – So procedure u/s 188 of the Code is to be followed by the prosecuting agency for prosecuting a person under the Epidemic Diseases Act -- No complaint has been filed but police after registration of the FIR submitted the challan – Held, it is a clear violation of the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

C. Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d) -- Punishment for obstruction – Cognizance of offence – Maximum punishment for Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act is two years, so offence is non cognizable and complaint is required to be filed in the Court and Court can take cognizance only on the complaint made by the concerned authority for violation of any provision of the said Act.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 -- Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195, 482 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Obstruction of officer/ employee – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation was completed and final report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. was filed before the concerned Magistrate -- Mandatory provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. not followed -- Only complaint could be filed by the officer whose orders were violated and not by the police on the basis of investigation -- Registration of FIR is abuse of the process of law -- Petition allowed, FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Aggravated penetrative sexual assault – Punishment – Amendment of 2019 – Effect of -- On the date of the commission of the offence, R.I. for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed -- From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years -- However, the amended provision will not apply as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019.

(Para 10)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Less than minimum sentence – Power of Court -- When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence - - Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence -- No such provision in the POCSO Act -- No question of showing any leniency.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 299, 308 -- Appellant/ Bus Conductor -- Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Question is whether the appellant had knowledge that he, by virtue of the act of ringing the bell, was likely to cause death -- It is not possible to say that the appellant while ringing the bell, had knowledge that his act is likely to cause the death of PW-1 – In the absence of intention and knowledge as contemplated by Section 299 of IPC, the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder was not made out.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 338 -- By applying principles incorporated in sub-section (2) of Section 222 of the Cr.P.C, the Court can consider whether the appellant has committed any other offence which is a minor offence in comparison to the offence for which he is tried – Appellant charged u/s 308 IPC, however convicted u/s 338 IPC.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 338, 308 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Charges u/s 308 IPC – Conviction u/s 338 IPC -- It was the duty of the appellant as a conductor to take care of the passengers -- Hence, before he rang the bell and gave a signal to the driver to start the bus, he ought to have verified whether all passengers had safely boarded the bus -- Appellant did not verify whether the passengers had properly boarded the bus -- This was an act of recklessness on his part -- Grievous hurt was caused to PW-1 as she suffered fracture of pelvis – Appellant is guilty of the commission of an offence punishable u/s 338 of IPC -- Omission to frame charge u/s 338 of IPC will not be fatal -- Appellant has undergone the sentence for only 36 days -- Considering the fact that the incident is of the year 2005 and other factual aspects, a sentence of simple imprisonment for six months will be an appropriate punishment -- High Court had imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000/- which amount has been deposited -- In addition to the sum of Rs.50,000/- already deposited -- Appellant to deposit an additional amount of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 14,15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Fraud and forgery -- Originally the complaint was sent to the police station u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. and FIR was registered -- After investigation, the said FIR was cancelled -- Petitioner filed complaint and led preliminary evidence -- Complaint was dismissed – Revision also dismissed -- Power of attorney was executed but later on same was got cancelled -- It cannot be prima-facie gathered that respondents had any intention to cheat the complainant at the time of receiving the money for selling the property – No illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court and there is no ground to interfere in the same -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Child witness -- In case of a child witness under 12 years of age, unless satisfaction as required by the said proviso is recorded, an oath cannot be administered to the child witness.

(Para 7)

B. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- In the deposition of PW-1, it is mentioned that his age was 12 years at the time of the recording of evidence -- Proviso to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not apply -- However, in view of the requirement of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was under a duty to record his opinion that the child is able to understand the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to the questions put to him -- The Trial Judge must also record his opinion that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence -- A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring -- However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness -- Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness -- Scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution -- It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.

(Para 8, 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 324, 449, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Investigation Officer did not make investigation by recording the statements of the elder brothers of PW-1/ Minor for verifying whether they were away from the house on the date of the incident -- Shoes of the appellant did not match the moulds of the imprint of the shoe taken by the prosecution -- Possibility of the PW-1/ minor witness, being tutored cannot be ruled out -- There is no support or corroboration to the testimony of PW-1, apart from other deficiencies in the prosecution case -- It will not be safe to base the conviction only on the testimony of PW-1/ Minor which does not inspire confidence – Appeal allowed, impugned judgments aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offences.

(Para 10,11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 133 – Removal of nuisance -- Proceedings u/s 133 Cr.P.C. are not intended to settle private disputes between different members of the public -- Lawful and necessary trade ought not to be interfered with, unless it is proved to be injurious to health or physical discomfort of the general public.

(Para 8)