Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Complaint against SHO -- Summoning order – Quashing of complaint and summoning order -- Two Complaints u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.c. dismissed by the Illaqa Magistrate – Petitioner being SHO of the area has not registered FIR on same complaint -- Allegations against the petitioner that he has failed to exercise his power u/s 154 Cr.P.C to register an FIR are apparently illegal and not sustainable as the petitioner being SHO of area cannot form an opinion other than formed by Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 1, 26, 27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Opportunity of hearing – Requirement of – When the order was passed by the High Court, the appellants were not present either in person or through counsel – Order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remitted before the High Court to pass a fresh order after hearing the appellants on the application for cancellation of bail, in the interest of justice.

(Para 3-5)

Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Sections 66(B), 66(C), 66(D), 66(E), 67, 67(A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Petition on various grounds -- However, during the pendency of petition, mediation took place -- Settlement/agreement arrived – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 2-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468(2)(c), 482 -- Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Limitation to prosecute starts from the date of receipt of report of public analysts and not from the date of collection of sample -- If, the complaint is filed beyond the period of limitation of three years, the same is not maintainable -- Premises was raided on 16.07.2011 – First report qua misbranding of first sample received on 25.07.2011 and second report on 01.02.2012 – Sanction applied on 19.08.2014 and the same was granted on 10.11.2014 i.e. within three months -- In case, the period of three months is excluded, the impugned complaint filed on 22.07.2015 can still easily be declared being hopelessly time barred -- Impugned complaint and summoning order along with all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Rape case -- Compromise to solemnise marriage -- Resile from statement – Re-examination u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Witnesses resiled on account of the allurement of marriage and a chance of a blemish free life for the prosecutrix and, therefore, it can safely be said that the statement given in court denying that the offence of rape was committed, was not a statement given freely or without any fear -- An application u/s 311 of the Code may be allowed at any stage of trial -- Allowing witnesses to be recalled would be in consonance with the cardinal principle that the truth must prevail.

(Para 14-19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. by Complainant – Maintainability of -- Resile from statement under assurance of marriage -- Public Prosecutor himself cross examine the witnesses after they had turned hostile in order to elicit the truth – Public Prosecutor did not raise any objection to application u/s 311 of the Code as filed by the complainant itself raising the question of maintainability, it can be safely assumed that the said application had the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor -- Once the court is of the opinion that to ensure fair trial, an application is to be allowed in order to elicit the truth, then it should not be bound down by technicalities.

(Para 14, 20-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 441 -- Involvement in 31 cases – Bail by trial court -- Number of Sureties – Submission that the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties – Order modified to the extent that petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- and there shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- -- Court clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

(Para 6-8)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468,473,482 – Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Report of the Government Analyst received by the complainant on 26.06.2007 -- Complaint could have been filed, at the best, within a period of 3 years from the date of receipt of report of the Government Analyst -- However, the complaint has been filed after 8 years from the said date -- No application for extension of time under provision of 473 Cr.P.C – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,30(3), 33 -- Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 473, 482 – Misbranded article -- Dealer’s prosecution – Quashing of complaint -- Sample was taken as a sealed container in original packing -- This fact duly finds mention in the Form XX prepared by the Insecticide Inspector; on the spot at the time of taking of the sample -- Petitioners-dealer would be, entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) of the Insecticide Act – Initiation and continuation of a complaint and the consequent proceedings against the petitioners-dealer, are not legally justified and sustainable – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 2, 15,16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 433 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Life imprisonment – 11 years actual sentence undergone – Total sentence undergone 14 years including remission -- Direction given to State, having regard to the peculiar factual circumstances, to consider the case of the appellant for premature release on completion of total sentence of 14 years including remission, as a special case -- In the event of any delay in taking the decision, the appellant shall be released on self-bond, on completion of fourteen years including remission, making it subject to the decision of the Competent Authority.

 (Para 3, 4)

View of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 32 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – Section 497 IPC effectively creating a dent in individual dignity of women -- Emphasis on element of connivance or consent of husband tantamounts to subordination of women which violates Article 21 of Constitution – If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere -- It is better to be left as a ground for divorce -- As a criminal offence it will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely, dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship between the two – Held, Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional -- When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

(Para 41-56)

View of R.F. Nariman, J.

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down -- Section 198, CrPC is also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence -- Held, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid.

(Para 81-86)

View of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery -- Constitutional Validity – Criminal law must be in consonance with constitutional morality -- Being antithetical to the constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and equality, Section 497 does not pass constitutional muster – Held, Section 497 lacks an adequately determining principle to criminalize consensual sexual activity and is manifestly arbitrary -- Section 497 is a denial of substantive equality as it perpetuates the subordinate status ascribed to women in marriage and society -- Section 497 violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is based on gender stereotypes about the role of women and violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21 of the Constitution; and Section 497 is unconstitutional.

 (Para 153)

View of Indu Malhotra, J.

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery as offence -- Right to equality – Procedure to prosecute -- Constitutional validity – Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution -- Section 198(2) of the Cr.P.C. which contains the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the I.P.C. shall be unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

(Para 165-171)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- High Court awarded Rs.9,000/- maintenance per month -- Maintenance on the basis of notional minimum income as per the current minimum wages, is untenable -- Regard must be had to the living standard of the respondent and his family – Respondent is highly qualified and an able-bodied person; his monthly income while working in Canada in the year 2010 was over Rs.1,77,364/- -- Supreme Court had prima facie found in earlier appeal that the cause of justice would be subserved if the appellant is granted an interim maintenance of Rs.20,000/- p.m. commencing from November 1, 2014 – Keeping in mind the spiralling inflation rate and high cost of living index today, respondent shall pay a sum of Rs.20,000/- p.m. to the appellant towards the maintenance w.e.f. January 2010 and @ Rs.25,000/- p.m. w.e.f 1st June, 2018 until further orders.

(Para 2,13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 401, 482 -- Conviction u/s 138 of the NI Act – Compounding at Revisional stage -- Conviction by Ld. JMIC upheld by Ld. ASJ -- Parties are allowed to compound the offence, consequently, judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Ld. JMIC and judgment passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge stand set aside.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Affidavit in evidence – Wrong date of cheque mentioned – Re-examination of -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is allowed -- Complainant allowed to appear as a witness and submit a fresh affidavit.

(Para 2-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Civil and Criminal proceedings – Stay of – Automatic vacation of stay -- Proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied -- Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up -- At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay -- Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up -- In an attempt to remedy this, situation, Directions given that :

-- in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended.

-- In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order.

-- The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized.

-- The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.

(Para 35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Framing of charge – Challenge to – Power of -- Stay of proceedings -- Framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order -- Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution -- However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered -- Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter.

-- Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period.

-- Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally.

-- If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated.

-- In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters.

-- Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts.

-- Trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced -- High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

A copy of order sent to all the High Courts for necessary action.

(Para 37, 38)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Sanction required under PC Act -- Question of law sought to be raised in the appeals is as to whether prior sanction for prosecution qua allegation of corruption in respect of a public servants is required before setting in motion even the investigative process under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act offences read with the Cr.P.C. is required to be settled by a larger Bench – Matter referred for constitution of Bench of appropriate strength.

(Para 1,36,37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Age of the prosecutrix – School Leaving Certificate – Evidential Value of -- Prosecutrix gave her age as 18 years in her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and when she appeared in the witness box claimed herself to be 16 years old – Entry in the school leaving certificate (Ex.P1), without proving its source, was not sufficient to conclude that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of occurrence -- Despite being referred to the dental and radiological opinion regarding the age of the prosecutrix, she was not taken thereto for examination -- Held, it can be said that the prosecutrix was major and an attempt had been made by the prosecution to withhold her correct age.

(Para 32-38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Kidnapping and rape – Consenting party – Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction can be based on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix, but at the same time, it cannot be mechanically applied to every case of sexual assault -- In the first version given to the Magistrate in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C., she had stated that she had gone of her own, but later she retracted therefrom while appearing in the witness box and alleged kidnapping and rape by the accused for the obvious reason that she had succumbed to the pressure of her parents – Victims taken to Safidon in three wheeler, but she had not raised alarm – Stand of the prosecutrix that she had told the three wheeler driver about her kidnapping but no help was extended, does not convince the Court – Victims had changed three vehicles to reach Safidon, she had the opportunity to raise alarm and seek help – Place from where she had remained with the accused was a construction site where other huts were constructed – Accused used to leave her in the earthen hut for hours together, she remained there for more than four days and it is highly improbable that the stay was without her consent – Medical evidence also goes contrary to her version – Victims went missing on 25.10.2014, but the matter was reported on 27.10.2014, no explanation as to why the matter was reported so late to the police – Circumstances support to the plea of accused that the prosecutrix had left home on her own and she was neither confined, abducted or raped – Judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside, accused is acquitted.

(Para 40-48)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 309 – Examination of witnesses – Adjournment by Trial courts – Held,

(i)    The trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. as reiterated in judgments of this Court, inter alia, in State of U.P. versus Shambhu Nath Singh and Others (2001) 4 SCC 667], Mohd. Khalid versus State of W.B. (2002)7 SCC 334] and Vinod Kumar versus State of Punjab (2015)3 SCC 220].

(ii)   The eye-witnesses must be examined by the prosecution as soon as possible.

(iii)  Statements of eye-witnesses should invariably be recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as per procedure prescribed thereunder.

The High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the trial courts for compliance of the above.

(Para 13,14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Supplementary charge-sheet – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- No external agency can dictate the course of investigation in a criminal case -- It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the police -- Court also cannot supervise the investigation -- However, in exceptional situations, Superior Courts may monitor an investigation -- But that is not the same as supervision -- Supplementary Report filed by the Police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.

(Para 7-9)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- Commission is empowered to conduct an inquiry to “whether proper charge sheet has been filed mentioning the relevant sections of IPC together with the PCR Act, 1955 and SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 in Court” -- This is not a power to dictate the course of the investigation -- Commission is competent to point out any lapses or laches in the investigation -- Commission could only have brought to notice of the Police the need for a proper or further investigation and it was for the Police to take a call.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Partly quashing of charge – Power of High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part -- U/s 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the CrPC or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice – A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers u/s 482 to the extent of the abuse -- No requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.

(Para 7-9)

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972 (2 of 1973), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Offence under money-laundering -- Conditions imposed for grant of bail – Sustainability of -- Section 45 of the 2002 Act struck down as a whole – Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- All the matters pending before Supreme court, in which bail has been denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in Section 45, will now go back to the respective Courts which denied bail -- All such orders are set aside, and the cases remanded to the respective Courts to be heard on merits, without application of the twin conditions contained in Section 45 of the 2002 Act.

(Para 20-45)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Cheque bounce case – Sentence for simple imprisonment of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.11,50,000/-, in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months -- Parties amicably settled their dispute -- Parties to abide by the terms and conditions as contained in the Memorandum of Settlement without fail -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and sentence imposed upon the appellant quashed.

(Para 2-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Non-appearance of the petitioner before Ld. Trial Court is justified for the reason that he was not served at the given address -- After passing of the order, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail -- Matter compromised, complainant has withdrawn the complaint u/s 138 of the NIA Act -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC would amount to abuse of process of law – Order declaring proclaimed person and subsequent FIR quashed.

 (Para 1, 7,8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Discharge of accused – Compounding of offence -- Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect –Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused -- Court is entitled to close the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 143 of the Act read with Section 258 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11, 18 (i)-(iii), 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Online hearing of case – Online appearance of accused – Exemption of accused from personal appearance -- Service of summons can be by post/ e-mail/ courier -- Summons ought to indicate that the accused could make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before the specified date and inform the court and the complainant by e-mail -- If the accused complies with such summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the Court can ascertain the objection, if any, of the complainant and close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with the case -- Some cases of Section 138 cases can be decided online -- If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused -- Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used -- Personal appearances can be dispensed with.

(Para 16, 17, 20)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 64 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Discretion of the Magistrate to hold that it was undesirable to try the case summarily as sentence of more than one year may have to be passed -- Court has jurisdiction u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with further powers of recovery under Section 431 Cr.P.C -- With this approach, prison sentence of more than one year may not be required in all cases.

(Para 12, 18(iv))

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 264, 357(3) – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Procedure for summoning -- Evidence of the complaint can be given on affidavit -- Bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to record any further preliminary evidence -- Such affidavit evidence can be read as evidence at all stages of trial or other proceedings – Normal rule for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow the summary procedure except where exercise of power under second proviso to Section 143 becomes necessary.

(Para 18(iv), (v), 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Chapter XXIA -- Cheque bounce complaint – Plea bargaining -- Speedy trial -- It will be open to the Court to consider the provisions of plea bargaining -- Trial can be on day to day basis and endeavour must be to conclude it within six months.

(Para 20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim maintenance to wife/minor son -- Respondent /wife claims that the petitioner is serving in private company and has been earning Rs.25,000/- per month -- Amount of Rs.7,000/- per month by no stretch of imagination can be said to be on higher side for maintenance of the wife and minor son especially in the present scenario of high rise in the cost of living.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Petitioner could not appear before the trial Court as he was stated to have not been served at the address, where he was residing -- After the passing of the impugned order declaring him as a proclaimed person, he had surrendered before the trial Court and was ordered to be released on bail -- In such circumstances, especially, when the petitioner has duly surrendered before the trial Court, continuation of proceedings under Section 174-A IPC would be an abuse of the process of Court.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357, 389, 401 -- Cheque bounce case – Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Accused was sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of 1 year and compensation for amount of cheques in question – Accused preferred an appeal -- Suspension of sentence given, with a direction to accused-appellant to deposit 1/3rd of the compensation amount – Accused is aggrieved by such condition – Held, no merit in the revision petition, rather the same is not maintainable -- Appellate Court is justified in imposing any term or condition while suspending the sentence of the accused-appellant, rather the Appellate Court showed indulgence to the accused appellant by asking him to deposit 1/3rd of the compensation only, instead of the complete one -- No illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, which might have called for interference.

(Para 1-4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B – Dowry death -- Additional accused – Summoning of – In statement recorded during trial there is no specific allegations against the respondents with regard to demand of dowry or harassment to the deceased in connection thereof – Conversation with regard to alleged demand and beating by in-laws family members of the deceased was made between the deceased and her mother – Statement of the brother, in this regard, is mere hearsay – Mother of the deceased has not been examined – Beatings by all the five family members of her in-laws do not find corroboration from the post mortem report – Testimony of the brother is not at all sufficient to satisfy the test of more than a prima facie case for summoning the additional accused.

 (Para 7-14)

B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (Act No. 28 of 1961), Section 2 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry – Dowry death case -- Demands relating to birth of child -- Any demand made in connection with birth of the child does not fall within the definition of dowry u/s 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

(Para 12)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Cheque bounce case -- Additional evidence at appellate stage -- In application pleading that he was not well-conversant with the technicalities of law and even his earlier counsel also did not give him proper advice and as such due to the negligence of his previous counsel, he could not produce the certified copies of the complaints as well as copy of the FIR – Held, respondent cannot be permitted to take the said pleas.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Cheque bounce case --Additional evidence at appellate stage -- Evidence sought to be produced by way of additional evidence regarding filing of similar complaints under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by the complainant against some other persons was well within the knowledge of the respondent, but he did not make any effort to lead any evidence to that effect before the trial Court itself at the time of his defence evidence – Application should not have been allowed by the Ld. Appellate court.

(Para 13, 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Cheque bounce case -- Additional evidence -- Bearing on the case -- Production of copies of complaints, judgments and the FIR so to be lodged by the respondent by way of additional evidence has no material bearing on the facts of the case inasmuch as each case has to be decided on its own merits -- Judgments of other cases may not influence while deciding a particular case and cannot be a guiding factor as each case has its own peculiar facts.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Written statement – Right of – Defence struck off -- Court has proceeded with the case in a hurry without appreciating and realizing consequence of rendering the petitioner handicap in making his written submissions to contest claim of the respondent-wife -- No doubt, provisions under Section 125 Cr.P.C. were enacted with an intent to provide immediate succor to destitute wife, neglected children and parents etc., equally true is that the proceedings are summary in nature but at the same time, without finding any fault on the part of a litigant, his rights to submit his pleadings before the Court cannot be scuttled -- A serious prejudice is likely to be caused to the petitioner in case he is not permitted to file his written statement and give his side of the story to contest claim of the respondent-wife -- Order passed by the Court below striking off defence of the petitioner cannot be allowed to sustain and liable to be set aside.

(Para 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.c. -- Degree of satisfaction required under Section 319 Cr.P.C., is much more higher than the prima facie satisfaction at the time of summoning -- Test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as required at the time of framing of charge and just short of final conclusion.

(Para 13,14)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Depositions made by the complainant during course of investigation was not found sufficient to even frame charge against the petitioner -- With the improved statements that too on the basis of disclosure made by the mother soon before her death would not be sufficient to presume existence of more than prima facie case for summoning the petitioner under Section 319 Cr.P.C. -- Degree of satisfaction required for summoning at this stage has to be based upon material to be sufficient to create reasonable prospects of conviction of the petitioner.

(Para 15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 --  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 482 – Cheque bounce case – Vicarious liability – Quashing of complaint -- Contention that the cheque in question not issued and signed by petitioner  – Fact of complaint are that he was director and authorized signatory and the firm issued cheque in question and upon presentation it was dishonoured with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” – Held, the petitioner has been summoned in view of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act which imposes vicarious liability upon every person who at the time of offence was in charge of conducting the business of the company – No ground to quash the impugned complaint or to interfere with the well reasoned order of summoning.

(Para 2,8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Cheque bounce case – Cross-examination of complainant – Re-calling the witness – Petitioner- company seeks to recall the complainant on one date to cross examine, whether the amount in discharge of which the cheques in question in favour of the respondent has been issued finds reflection in his accounts/income tax returns – Held, examination of the complainant on the afore issue would have a bearing on the adjudication of the dispute between the parties -- Application under Section 311 Cr. P.C to recall allowed.

(Para 7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Quashing of -- Loan agreement nowhere shows that cheques in question have been taken by the respondent as security cheques -- Whether the respondent has taken blank signed cheques as security or post-dated cheques for payment of loan installments in case of default as security is to be decided by the trial Court on the basis of the evidence produced before it -- Finding of fact cannot be given at this stage by High Court without any evidence – No ground is made out for quashing the complaints.

(Para 5, 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Arbitration clause -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Quashing of -- Contention that there is arbitration clause in the agreement, therefore, complaints are not maintainable – Held, this argument has no force -- When the cheques have been dishonoured and returned back unpaid by the Bank and legal notices have been sent, then non-payment of the amount within prescribed period gave cause of action to file the complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(Para 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Cheque bounce case -- Application for additional witness -- Complaint was filed by Prop. of Firm through G.P.A. -- During the pendency of the proceedings, an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. was filed to the effect that proprietor of firm was inadvertently not examined during the evidence of complainant – Held, filing of application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is nothing but has been filed to fill up the lacuna in this case -- If application is allowed and the complainant is allowed to fill up the lacuna, then it will cause prejudice to the case of the accused – Application rightly dismissed.

(Para 6-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 --  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 421(1), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 70 – Cheque bounce case – Compensation not paid – Default sentence undergone -- Whether the compensation still recoverable -- High Court held that despite the fact that the default sentence was undergone, yet, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compensation was recoverable – Held, object of the legal fiction created by Section 431 is to extend for the purpose of recovery of compensation until such recovery is completed and this would necessarily take not only to Section 421 of the Cr.P.C. but also to Section 70 of the Penal Code – Judgment of High Court, upheld.

(Para 4, 29)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 397, 401 – Right to Appeal – Right to Revision -- Right of appeal or revision is creation of a Statute and, therefore, if the Statute does not confer any right, a person cannot avail of such a remedy, which is not specifically provided for under the Statute -- As the law stands the right to appeal against inadequacy of the sentence has been given only to the State Government and the complainant or a third person has no such right.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 397, 401 – Appeal/ Revision for enhancement of sentence – Right of -- As per Section 372 Cr. P.C. Proviso thereto, right of appeal has been provided to a victim in particular specified circumstances only -- A victim of crime can, under the following circumstances, prefer an appeal against (i) an order of acquittal of the accused; (ii) convicting the accused of a lesser offence; and (iii) imposing inadequate compensation – It is thus apparent that no appeal lies for enhancement of sentence -- There is no restriction or bar on a victim to approach the Courts conferred with revisional powers for invoking and exercising their revisional jurisdiction even for enhancement of sentence.

(Para 10-13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Revision – Right of -- Section 401 (4) of the Code, remedy of revision is limited to the situation where remedy of appeal is not available to party -- This would not mean that any person can maintain a revision who cannot file appeal -- Power of invoking revisional jurisdiction by a party has to be seen in the context of the intention behind the amendment made in the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, has to be viewed in the context of remedy of appeal – Appeal has been restricted to the 'victim(s)' only -- Therefore, it can safely be said that the revision can be maintained by a victim alone, irrespective of the fact whether he is a complainant or not and none else.

(Para 13)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 397, 401 -- Complainant – Victim – Revision for enhancement of sentence – Maintainability of -- Complainant was neither present on the spot nor has he suffered any loss or injury, thus, not a victim -- Revision would not be maintainable as the complainant herein is not a victim as defined under Section 2 (wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- If that be so, the revision preferred by the complainant could not have been entertained by the Additional Sessions Judge.

(Para 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 319 -- Additional accused – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Evidence collected by I.O. during investigation – Consideration of -- Trial court would be competent to exercise its power on the basis of examination-in-chief -- However, in a case, where plethora of evidence was collected by the I.O. during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether ‘much stronger evidence than mere possibility of complicity has come on record -- There is no satisfaction of this nature – High Court too blissfully ignored the said material -- Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been done -- Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny -- Order of summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C., set aside.

(Para 15,16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155, 207 -- First Information Report – Right of accused – Uploading on police website – Directions issued:

(a)     An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as prescribed under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.

(b)     An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his representative/agent/parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy from the Court. On such application being made, the copy shall be supplied within twenty-four hours.

(c)     Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the same shall be given by the Court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.

(d)     The copies of the FIRs, unless the offence is sensitive in nature, like sexual offences, offences pertaining to insurgency, terrorism and of that category, offences under POCSO Act and such other offences, should be uploaded on the police website, and if there is no such website, on the official website of the State Government, within twenty-four hours of the registration of the First Information Report so that the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate application before the Court as per law for redressal of his grievances. It may be clarified here that in case there is connectivity problems due to geographical location or there is some other unavoidable difficulty, the time can be extended up to forty-eight hours. The said 48 hours can be extended maximum up to 72 hours and it is only relatable to connectivity problems due to geographical location.

(e)     The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website shall not be taken by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any person holding equivalent post. In case, the States where District Magistrate has a role, he may also assume the said authority. A decision taken by the concerned police officer or the District Magistrate shall be duly communicated to the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate.

(f)      The word 'sensitive' apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard being had to the nature of the FIR. The examples given with regard to the sensitive cases are absolutely illustrative and are not exhaustive.

(g)     If an FIR is not uploaded, needless to say, it shall not enure per se a ground to obtain the benefit under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.

(h)     In case a copy of the FIR is not provided on the ground of sensitive nature of the case, a person grieved by the said action, after disclosing his identity, can submit a representation to the Superintendent of Police or any person holding the equivalent post in the State. The Superintendent of Police shall constitute a committee of three officers which shall deal with the said grievance. As far as the Metropolitan cities are concerned, where Commissioner is there, if a representation is submitted to the Commissioner of Police who shall constitute a committee of three officers. The committee so constituted shall deal with the grievance within three days from the date of receipt of the representation and communicate it to the grieved person.

(i)      The competent authority referred to hereinabove shall constitute the committee, as directed herein-above, within eight weeks from today.

(j)      In cases wherein decisions have been taken not to give copies of the FIR regard being had to the sensitive nature of the case, it will be open to the accused/his authorized representative/parokar to file an application for grant of certified copy before the Court to which the FIR has been sent and the same shall be provided in quite promptitude by the concerned Court not beyond three days of the submission of the application.

(k)     The directions for uploading of FIR in the website of all the States shall be given effect from 15^th November, 2016.

(Para 12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 41-A – Arrest of Advocate/ Doctor – Procedure of law violated – Life and liberty of accused -- Compensation to accused arrested -- Arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest -- Dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized -- It is an assault on his/her identity – Said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution – Article 21 has been violated and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation – Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (1997) 1 SCC 416, there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of Cr.PC -- A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation is awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence -- It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

(Para 22-27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheating – Civil Dispute -- On a perusal of the FIR, it is clear to us that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, but a maladroit effort has been made to give it a criminal colour – No ingredient of Section 420 IPC is remotely attracted -- Even if it is a wrong, the complainant has to take recourse to civil action – Not the case where cognizance of the offence can be taken by the court and the accused can be asked to face trial -- Entire case projects a civil dispute and nothing else – Prosecution initiated against the petitioners stands quashed.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Compounding of offence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- There is a distinction between the power of the Court to compound an offence under Section 320 Cr. P.C. and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr. P.C.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- Offence u/s 304 A of IPC – Nature of -- It would indeed be paradoxical and incorrect to hold that the offence under Section 304-A is private in nature -- When a person or persons lose their life/lives due to the rash and negligent act of the accused, the question of mens rea or intention in such a situation pales into insignificance.

 (Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR -- To quash the proceedings under Section 304-A solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise arrived at between the accused and the legal representatives is not permissible -- Inclusion of the legal representatives in the definition of victim does not clothe him/them to enter into such a settlement, though the legal representative, undoubtedly has the authority to file an appeal or receive compensation -- However, power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can nevertheless be exercised in appropriate matters where it is felt that a prima facie case is not made out in consonance with the settled principles of law – There can indeed be no fetter on this power to act for securing the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of law – However this observation for a moment is not to be construed as taking the possibility of a conviction being bleak due to settlement, to be a relevant factor for quashing the FIR under Section 304-A IPC.

(Para 19,20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR – Reference: whether the crime registered u/s 304-A IPC can be quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at by the legal heir/legal representative of the victim/deceased with the offender – Reference is answered in the negative as there can be no quashing of an offence registered u/s 304-A and subsequent proceedings, solely on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the legal heirs/representatives of the victim (deceased) and the accused.

(Para 1, 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 406, 420, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Misappropriation of Istridhan – Criminal breach of trust -- FIR against sister-in-law and her husband – Quashing of FIR -- Main grouse of the complainant was that with respect to the illness of husband before the marriage -- There is not even a whisper that the petitioners were entrusted with any dowry articles -- Entrustment is sine-quo-non for the offence under Section 406 IPC -- It cannot be believed that the petitioners who are admittedly residing separately were entrusted with the istridhan -- No overt act had been attributed to the petitioners, not even a single instance of harassment or cruelty or demand of dowry had been referred against the petitioners – On the basis of wild allegations, the petitioners cannot be put to the ordeal of trial -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be sheer abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR and consequent proceedings taken therein, against the petitioners are quashed.

(Para 18,19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Object of provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C -- If any person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, who is unable to maintain herself or her legitimate or illegitimate child (children) unable to maintain itself (themselves), or his father or mother who are unable to maintain himself/herself, the Court upon proof of negligence or refusal, order such person to pay maintenance to his wife or child (children) or parents, as the case may be -- Primary object is to secure relief to the deserted and destitute wives, discarded and neglected children and disabled and helpless parents and to ensure that no wife, child or parent is left beggared and destitute on the scrap-heap of the society so as to be tempted to commit crime or to tempt others to commit crime in regard to them.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim maintenance -- As far as 'interim' maintenance is concerned, Section 125 of the Code was originally enacted, did not expressly empower the Court to make such order and direct payment of interim maintenance -- Court is having implied power to pass such an order -- Remedy provided by Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a summary remedy securing reasonable sum by way of maintenance subject to a decree passed by the competent civil court -- In absence of any express bar or prohibition, Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication to make interim order of maintenance subject to final outcome in the application -- As per provisions of the Section, two conditions are precedent to show that the wife is unable to maintain herself and that the husband has neglected or refused to maintain his wife.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife – Duty of husband -- It is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, he cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning.

(Para 14)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife – Object of provision -- When the woman leaves the matrimonial home, the situation is quite different -- She is deprived of many a comfort -- Sometimes the faith in life reduces -- Sometimes, she feels she has lost the tenderest friend -- There may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her the misfortune -- At this stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary comfort -- That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed to resign to destiny.

(Para 16)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife – Husband’s income of Rs. 35,000/- per month – Wife awarded maintenance @ Rs. 20,000/-  p.m. – Once the respondent-wife has made a specific averment with regard to capacity of the petitioner then onus shift upon the husband-petitioner to prove that he does not have sufficient means to pay maintenance -- Petitioner has not brought on record his income-tax returns and has not rebutted the averments with regard to his income -- Mere denial to earn anything is not a ground to deny maintenance -- It is only in case the wife is unable to maintain herself, then maintenance is to be paid by the husband -- Nothing on record to show that respondent-wife has any independent source of income -- Appropriate maintenance commensurate with the needs of wife keeping in view the paying capacity of her husband, which is a legitimate right of the wife and same should not be denied to her -- No element of greed should be seen into genuine needs of the wife – Maintenance of Rs.20,000/- p.m. affirmed.

(Para 1,20,21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Unable to maintain – Capable of earning -- Highly qualified wife – Nowhere it has been mentioned, the wife who is capable of earning is not entitled for maintenance -- Wife who is unable to maintain herself is entitled for maintenance.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife and children – Object of -- Section 125 Proceedings are of summary in nature and are intended to enable destitute wives and children, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate and to get maintenance in a speedy manner -- It is meant to achieve social purpose and to prevent vagrancy and destitution -- It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim maintenance to wife – An amount of Rs. 20,000/- per month has been awarded to wife as interim maintenance from the date of filing of the application -- Husband is serving in a private company and earning handsome salary i.e. Rs. 1,10,000/- per month after deduction of the tax – Awarded amount cannot be said to be on the excessive side.

(Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 319 -- Summoning of accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. -- Permissibilty of -- Exercise of the power u/s 319 of the Cr.P.C., must be placed on a higher pedestal -- An order for addition of an accused made after considering the evidence cannot be undone by coming to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused without appreciation of evidence -- Accused summoned u/s 319 of the Cr.P.C., are entitled to invoke remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of the power u/s 319, but cannot have the effect of the order undone by seeking a discharge u/s 227 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 10-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Compounding of offence -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court :

--      Power conferred u/s 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences u/s 320 of the Code. No doubt, u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

--       When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i)   ends of justice, or

(ii)  to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(Para 31 (I), (II))

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376, 395 – Heinous offence offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

(Para 31 (III))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- For offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(Para 31 (III)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence of civil character – Matrimonial disputes -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(Para 31 (IV))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court – While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(Para 31 (V))

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings :

--       Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.

--       However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.

--       It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(Para 31 (VI))

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Timing of compromise – Role of -- While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role :

--       Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.

--       Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.

--       On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

(Para 31 (VII))

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise after conviction -- Where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court -- Here charge is proved u/s 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

(Para 31 (VII))

Q.1 What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised?

Q.III Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 193, 200, 201, 202, 319, 398 – Summoning u/s 193 Cr.P.C. -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Exercise of power -- Stage of -- Evidence – Meaning of – In Dharam Pal's case, AIR 2013 SC 3018, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation -- Such cognizance can be taken u/s 193 Cr.P.C. and the Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' u/s 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning an additional accused.

Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial.

--     As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry.

--     Inquiries u/ss 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and u/s 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C.

--     Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power u/s 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet.

In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

(Para 110)

Q.II Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Evidence – Cross-examination of – Requirement of -- Considering the fact that u/s 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event u/s 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.

(Para 110)

Q.IV What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Degree of satisfaction – Requirement of – Though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity -- The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction -- In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. -- The degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person u/s 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for framing a charge -- Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial -- Therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.

(Para 99, 110)

Q.V Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not chargesheeted or who have been discharged?

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300, 319, 398 -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Person not named in the FIR – Person discharged – Summoning of -- A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned u/s 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial -- However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.

(Para 110)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 200, 202, 204, 209 – Case triable by Session -- Additional accused – Summoning of -- Role of Magistrate -- Magistrate has a role to play while committing the case to the Court of Session upon taking cognizance on the police report submitted before him under Section 173(3) Cr.P.C.

--       In the event the Magistrate disagrees with the police report, he has two choices.

--       He may act on the basis of a protest petition that may be filed, or he may, while disagreeing with the police report, issue process and summon the accused.

Thereafter, if on being satisfied that a case had been made out to proceed against the persons named in column no.2 of the report, proceed to try the said persons or if he was satisfied that a case had been made out which was triable by the Court of Session, he may commit the case to the Court of Session to proceed further in the matter.

(Para 4-Question i and ii, 5, 22-24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 200, 202, 204, 209 – Police report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. -- Procedure for Magistrate – Having decided to issue summons, was the Magistrate required to follow the procedure of a complaint case and to take evidence before committing them to the Court of Session to stand trial or whether he was justified in issuing summons against them without following such procedure? – As to the Procedure to be followed by the Magistrate if he was satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out to go to trial despite the final report submitted by the police. In such an event, if the Magistrate decided to proceed against the persons accused, he would have to proceed on the basis of the police report itself and either inquire into the matter or commit it to the Court of Session if the same was found to be triable by the Session Court.

(Para 4-Question iii, 5, 25)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 193, 209, 319 – Committal of case -- Additional accused – Summons u/s 193 or to wait till the stage u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Power of --

--       Session Judge was entitled to issue summons u/s 193 Cr.P.C. upon the case being committed to him by the learned Magistrate.

--       Provisions of Section 209 will, have to be understood as the learned Magistrate playing a passive role in committing the case to the Court of Session on finding from the police report that the case was triable by the Court of Session. Nor can there by any question of part cognizance being taken by the Magistrate and part cognizance being taken by the learned Session Judge.

--       Session Courts has jurisdiction on committal of a case to it, to take cognizance of the offences of the persons not named as offenders but whose complicity in the case would be evident from the materials available on record. Hence, even without recording evidence, upon committal u/s 209, the Session Judge may summon those persons shown in column 2 of the police report to stand trial along with those already named therein.

--       Decision in Kishun Singh’s case, (1993) 2 SCC 16  was the correct decision and the learned Session Judge, acting as a Court of original jurisdiction, could issue summons u/s 193 on the basis of the records transmitted to him as a result of the committal order passed by the learned Magistrate.

Held that the decision in the case of Kishun Singh vs. State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 16 and not the decision in Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 149 lays down the law correctly in respect of the powers of the Session Court after committal of the case to it by the learned Magistrate under Section 209 Cr.P.C.

(Para 4-Question iv to vi, 5, 23-31)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 –Non-compoundable offence – Compromise quashing -- Inherent powers of High Court -- Section 320 CrPC is not exercisable in relation to a case of non-compoundable offence -- Refusal to invoke power u/s 320 CrPC, however, does not debar the High Court from resorting to its inherent power u/s 482 CrPC and pass an appropriate order so as to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 10, 14,15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise in Non-compoundable offence -- Inherent power of High Court -- Stage of case -- Magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 CrPC but such a power, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420,467,468 – Compromise after conviction – Inherent power of High Court -- Negation of the compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together as a joint family – It would also lead to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of justice delivery system – Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power u/s 482 CrPC after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards – Petition allowed, judgement and order of conviction set aside.

(Para 4, 10, 20-22)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Account closed – Payment stopped – Referred to drawer -- Signature do not match – Image is not found -- Expression “amount of money …………. is insufficient” appearing in Section 138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of that genus – Dishonour on the ground that the “signatures do not match” or that the “image is not found”, which too implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of the Act.

-- Question whether or not there was a lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued would be a matter that the trial Court will examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it and keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.

(Para 15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Payment Stopped -- Dishonour on the ground that the payment has been stopped, regardless whether such stoppage is with or without notice to the drawer, and regardless whether the stoppage of payment is on the ground that the amount lying in the account was not sufficient to meet the requirement of the cheque, would attract the provisions of Section 138.

(Para 16)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Fraud – Allegations of fraud and the like are matters that cannot be investigated by a Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and shall have to be left to be determined at the trial after the evidence is adduced by the parties.

(Para 17)