Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A, 506 – Dowry case – Criminal breach of trust – Embezzlement of istridhan – Quashing of FIR -- FIR is a document first in point of time is very foundation of the case – Only general, vague and ambiguous allegations, no specific entrustment of any of the articles of Ishtridhan to any of accused-petitioners nor there is any allegation that they have embezzled the same and refused to return back these articles which were meant for the exclusive use of the bride/complainant – Husband is residing where he was employed and where too the complainant wife had put up after the marriage – Material question arises how the articles of Ishtridhan have come about in possession of the in-laws – Proceedings held to be misuse of the process of the court against innocent relations of the husband resulting in gross miscarriage of justice, needs to be set aside -- FIR and all the proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302 – Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Examine/Cross-examination of – Right of -- Assistance given by the victim’s counsel is meant to be given to the prosecution in general -- A victim’s counsel should ordinarily not be given the right to make oral arguments or examine and cross-examine witnesses.

(Para 11-12.4)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Cross-examination of – Right of -- If the victim’s counsel feels that a certain aspect has gone unaddressed in the examination of the witnesses or the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor, he may route any questions or points through the Public Prosecutor himself – If the victim’s counsel finds that the Public Prosecutor has not examined a witness properly and not incorporated his suggestions either, he may bring certain questions to the notice of the Court -- If the Judge finds merit in them, he may take action accordingly by invoking his powers under Section 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 12.4-12.5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 87, 89, 390 – Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Under this Section the Magistrate can issue warrants of arrest against a person:-

(a) Who is an escaped convict

(b) Proclaimed offender

(c) Person accused of ‘non-bailable’ offence and is ‘evading arrest’.

Held that u/s 73 the Magistrate can issue warrants against a person who is evading arrest, only if such a person was required to appear before the court under some other order passed under some other provision; like u/s 87, 89 or 390 of Cr.P.C.; during the trial or at the time of or after taking cognizance -- Neither there is any necessity for a warrant of arrest for arresting an accused during investigation nor has the court been given any specific power in this regard by any specific provision of Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82, 173 – Cognizable offence -- Investigation report -- Arrest warrant – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Before filing report u/s 173 the police cannot get a warrant of arrest against a person, without any specific reason -- A person cannot be declared as a proclaimed person or offender in routine by following procedure u/s 82 of Cr.P.C.; only because despite having power to arrest an accused the police had not succeeded in arresting such a person or might not have chosen to arrest such a person.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41 – Cognizable offence -- Power to arrest of police -- Provisions of Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. are quite clear that unless a cognizable offence is committed by a person in the presence of such police officer, police officer cannot arrest an accused only on the basis of his whims that he suspects the said person to have committed some offence -- If such person has committed some cognizable offence, which is punishable for imprisonment, then before arresting the person, the police officer has to satisfy himself that the arrest of such person is necessary; for the purposes delineated in the Section itself.

(Para 12)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Police use the power of the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest against an accused, only as a tool to avoid its responsibility to carry out the investigation to the logical end; and only for the purpose of getting such an accused declared as proclaimed offender –        This methodology is normally adopted by the police just to get rid of the responsibility of putting a report before the Magistrate qua investigation – As a result, lots of persons are got declared as proclaimed offenders; and forgotten altogether by the police thereafter, Held;

--       Before the Magistrate/court has taken cognizance of any offence, the power of issuance of warrants of arrest under any provision of Cr.P.C., on an application of a police officer, cannot be invoked by the Magistrate as a routine matter.

--       Only for arresting a person; the police do not require any warrant as such. Hence, it would not lie in the mouth of the police to allege before the Magistrate, without there being any specific reasons or any barrier in their way, that the accused is evading arrest.

--       During investigation; even if there is some specific legal or factual obstacle or barrier, which makes the arrest without warrant impossible, and if the police intend to seek warrant of arrest from the Magistrate for such arrest, under any provision of the Cr.P.C., the police are required to specify the obstacle, which the warrant issued by the court would remove and because of which such obstacle or the barrier in way of the police; the accused was succeeding in evading his arrest.

--       Unless, there is any specific obstacle; because of which the police were not able to arrest; and which could not be removed by the police on their own and without the aid of the warrant of the court, the issuance of warrant of arrest by the Magistrate, only on assertion of the police that the accused was evading arrest, would be only a routine exercise, and would be only for the aid of the investigating officer, which could not be done by the Magistrate.

(Para 14)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Application seeking issuance of warrant against the petitioner, is silent qua any reason -- Not only this, no reason, whatsoever, has been spelt out in the application, even qua the requirements of arrest as mentioned in Section 41 Cr.P.C, to justify arrest of the petitioner, except to say that the petitioner is evading arrest -- Magistrate has issued the warrant only to enlarge the effort of the police qua its investigation and that there is no stay of arrest -- Although the Magistrate may not be required to record any detailed reasons, however none of these reasons given is germane to the provisions under which the Magistrate is required to exercise his powers to issue warrants of arrest -- Impugned warrants of arrest and consequent orders impugned are quashed.

(Para 15-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed offender -- Order challenged after 4 years -- There may not be any reason to allow, however keeping in view the fact that the matter actually arises out of proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and petitioner undertakes to continue appearing before the trial Court on each and every date and also and a mother of two minor children (less than 10 years of age), impugned order set aside, upon the petitioner furnishing adequate bail bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 1)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 36(A) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 173(2) -- Challan without Chemical examination report – Default bail – Right of -- It would not be appropriate to hold that in absence of report of the chemical examiner from the FSL or such like agencies, the accused is entitled to default bail -- Held, attention of the Division Bench in Ajit Singh @ Jeeta and another, Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121 was not drawn to two Supreme Court judgments (Narender Kumar Amin’ case, (2015) 3 SCC 417 and Abdul Azeez P.V.’s case, (2014) 16 SCC 543, interpreting this very question of default bail in absence of report from FSL or similar agencies -- Held, that the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench is “per incuriam” -- No ground to release the petitioner on bail is made out.

(Para 6-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21A, 21B, 21C, 22A, 22B, 22C, 42(1), 50 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- NDPS case -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- What weighed with the trial Court was the fact that both the notices u/s 42(1) and 50 of the NDPS Act were defective -- Further even on merits there was material difference in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the point of time on which the notice u/s 50 was served upon the respondent/ accused – State has not been able to justify the infraction of the mandate of Sections 42(1) and Section 50 or explain the discrepancies in the statements -- Application seeking leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 219 -- Cheque bounce case – Four cheque bounced – One legal notice issued – Consolidation of trial -- There is no provision of consolidation of cases in the Code of Criminal Procedure – Only relief that can be granted, Trial Magistrate directed to fix all the four cases on one date so that it is convenient to both the parties to attend the hearing of all the four cases on one date.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 379 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 54 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner only, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/-.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 200 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 34 -- Civil dispute – Criminal proceedings – Abuse of process of law -- After coming to know that the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the original complainant himself paid the mortgage money and got the mortgage redeemed and got the sale deed executed in his name – Complainant filed an application u/s 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which came to be rejected by the Ld. Magistrate -- Said order was not assailed by the complainant -- Thereafter he filed a private complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. which was pending before the Ld. Magistrate -- Despite the above, he filed a writ petition before the High Court, which is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- High Court ought to have closed the proceedings – For settling a civil dispute, the criminal complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4.1-4.3)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 302 -- Right of Victim to conduct prosecution / Inquiry -- Though the Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at the mere asking but the victim has a right to assist the Court in a trial before the Magistrate -- Magistrate may consider as to whether the victim is in a position to assist the Court and as to whether the trial does not involve such complexities which cannot be handled by the victim -- On satisfaction of such facts, the Magistrate would be within its jurisdiction to grant of permission to the victim to take over the inquiry of the pendency before the Magistrate.

(Para 15)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Recovery of -- In case an accused, against whom an order to pay interim compensation u/s 143A of the Act is passed, fails or is unable to pay the amount of interim compensation, the process u/s 421 can be taken resort to which may inter alia result in coercive action of recovery of the amount of interim compensation as if the amount represented the arrears of land revenue – Extent and rigor of the procedure prescribed for such recovery may vary from State to State but invariably, such procedure may visit the person concerned with coercive methods.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable u/s 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A – Section 143A held to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.

(Para 14-24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 120-B – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12 -- Punjab Travel Professionals Regulation Act, 2014, Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Permission to accused to go abroad -- Nothing on record to doubt the bona-fides of the petitioner -- Petitioner is ready and willing to furnish sufficient sureties including that of his father, for coming back; in case the Court so requires -- Also expressed undertaking before this Court that she would be ready to appear before the trial Court at any time, even on a notice of one week's time and she would not have any objection to the proceedings undertaken by the trial Court in her absence, in case the counsel for the petitioner is present before the Court – Petitioner is granted permission to go abroad for a period of six months.

(Para 7-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 506, 120-B/34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- Cheating and forgery – Acquittal of – Leave to appeal -- Accused are Sarpanch and her husband -- Main allegation against the respondents/accused is that they had affixed the thumb impressions in the muster-roll regarding disbursement of the amount of Rs. 4212/- in August and Rs. 2268/- in October – Muster-roll Ex. P1, was prepared by the Gram Sachiv -- All the Panches of the Gram Panchayat had signed the said muster-roll -- Other members of the Gram Panchayat, who were signatories to the muster-roll (Ex. P1), had not been arrayed as accused -- Even complainant had also put his thumb impressions on the said muster-roll -- On the complaint moved by the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, exonerated of the charges levelled against them -- Even  as per the FSL report, the thumb impressions were not matchable – Appellate court acquitted the respondents – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 379-B, 506, 148 & 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Although the FIR involves Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act, however, the fact of the case will show that the alleged weapon recovered in the case is licensed gun of the petitioner and the injury allegedly caused to the injured/witness was not that much serious, therefore, the FIR u/s 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act can be quashed on the basis of compromise -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the present petitioner.

(Para 8,9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 61, 62, 63 – Abetment to suicide -- Photocopy of dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Original dying declaration not brought on record -- Trial court never made any effort to ensure proving of documents by even secondary means by resorting to the provisions of Sections 61, 62 and 63 of the Evidence Act – Mere photostat copy cannot be allowed to be exhibited and read into evidence and therefore, by no stretch of imagination such a document exhibited can be a legal piece of evidence.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Abetment to suicide -- Onus to prove -- Stand in statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C that deceased had given birth to two children at different point of times and who died soon after birth and therefore, was cause of depression for the deceased and compelled her to take this step on account of this stress -- Prosecution has not proved any particulars with cogent evidence of previous history of physical torture/beatings by the husband and the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring to an end her life – When the wife put herself on fire, the husband came to her rescue and after putting off the fire, rushed her to a hospital is a conduct which goes to establish and show that the husband had taken every possible step to save life of the wife, therefore, improbalizes the theory of the prosecution that the husband abetted to this suicide.

(Para 7)

Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(1)(c), (6), (15) – Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), Section 43(2), (3)(c)(i) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 309 – Custody of 60 days – No-cognizance taken by Court – Power of remand – Default bail – Held, section 309 Cr.P.C., would come in to operation only after taking cognizance -- It is undisputed that remand cannot be beyond 60 days u/s 167 Cr.P.C. and further remand could only be at post cognizance stage -- Petitioners are lying incarcerated in custody beyond the period of 60 days without the trial Court having taken cognizance and the petitioners, in such circumstances, are entitled to statutory bail, it being their indefeasible right – Petitioners are ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 1, 18-24)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(2), 389 – Appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Suspension of Sentence – Pre-condition of deposit 20% -- Power of -- Amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the Appellate Court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant-Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant-Accused under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Provision of 20% deposit – Mandatory or Directory -- Nature of -- Considering the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act, though it is true that in amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned – Such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Sec 138 of the N.I. Act.

(Para 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Conclusion of trial – Bifurcation of trial -- Absconding accused trial -- Summoning of additional accused – Power of trial court -- Following substantial questions of law arise for further consideration:

I. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?

II. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial?

III. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

Direction given to the Registry to place the matters before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength for considering the aforesaid questions.

(Para 27, 28)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- Divorce by compromise – Criminal case not withdrawn by wife – Contempt petition dismissed – Quashing of FIR – Held, if the parties had arrived at a settlement and decided to withdraw the cases filed by each of the parties against the other, the compromise ought to be effectuated in complete sense – Leaving aside the technicalities, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to quash the proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the respondent-wife -- Further proceedings in said FIR now stand quashed.

(Para 8)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce by compromise – Right of daughter for maintenance etc. -- Waiver of – Permissibility of -- As per term 6 of Consent Terms, It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan but she could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned -- By exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Clause (6) of the Consent Terms set-aside.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction in murder case – Delay in filing appeal – Dismissal of – Permissibility of -- Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was delay of 1192 days in preferring the appeal -- Held, since the matter arose out of conviction u/s 302 IPC, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and heard the matter on merit – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 --Superdari of vehicle -- Registered owner – Possessor of vehicle – Right of -- Trial court issued release order in favour of complainant/possessor of vehicle – Order affirmed by  revisional court -- Both court below gave finding that prima facie the petitioner has transferred ownership in favour of complainant though he remain registered owner – Order in favour of complainant/possessor of vehicle, upheld.

 (Para 1-4,13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 – Default bail given – New sections/offences added – Anticipatory bail applied -- Petitioner was given benefit of bail u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as challan was not presented against him – Main case of the prosecution remains the same regarding disproportionate assets – Held, if some other offences have been added in the FIR, even then, the petitioner is not required for further interrogation purposes etc. – Petition allowed, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in newly added Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

(Para 6-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 319 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 448, 294(b) and 506 Additional accused – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C – Vague details in FIR/161 Statement – Effect of -- In the FIR/ 161 statement, the names of the appellants or any other description have not been given so as to identify them – No assertion in respect of the villages to which the additional accused belong – Allegations in the FIR are vague and can be used any time to include any person in the absence of description in the FIR to identify such person -- Held, no strong or cogent evidence to make the appellants stand the trial for the offences u/s 147, 448, 294(b) and 506 of IPC.

(Para 14)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Additional accused – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C – Strong and cogent evidence – Requirement of -- Additional accused cannot be summoned u/s 319 in casual and cavalier manner in the absence of strong and cogent evidence – U/s 319, additional accused can be summoned only if there is more than prima facie case as is required at the time of framing of charge but which is less than the satisfaction required at the time of conclusion of the trial convicting the accused.

(Para 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(8), 190, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204 – Complaint to Magistrate – Cognizance  of – Nature of -- In case the Magistrate takes the cognizance of the offence and proceeds u/Ss 200 to 204 Cr.P.C then it would be tried as a 'complaint case', however, if at the stage prior to cognizance, the police is asked, u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C, to investigate and to file a report; then Magistrate would be taking the cognizance on the police report, therefore, it would be tried as a case 'on police report' -- However, it is purely the discretion of the Magistrate to decide the course of action, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case; whether to order an investigation and to seek a report from the police or not – As per section 202 even during the trial of the complaint case, if at any stage, the Magistrate thinks it fit, he can again direct the police to conduct the investigation qua any aspect -- In case of a trial on police report, the Magistrate has the power to order investigation on any aspect at any time; u/s 173(8) Cr.P.C.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 203, 204 -- Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Power of Magistrate – Speaking order – Requirement of -- If no reasons are required to recorded by the police for registration of FIR and for investigating the same, then there is no question of the Magistrate being required to record reasons for the same -- Non-recording of reasons does not vitiate the order of the Magistrate -- Such an order of Magistrate has been taken at par with supervisory administrative or executive order; instead of taking it as part of a strictly judicial process.

(Para 15-18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Affidavit – Requirement of -- Insisting upon affidavits at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C may not be desirable; because an affidavit is a sworn statement, which if submitted before the Magistrate, may not be possible for him to ignore at that time; even if it turns out to be false later on.

(Para 19)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Investigaiton order – Revisional jurisdiction -- Revision can be maintained only on one ground; that the Magistrate himself was not competent to take cognizance of the offences qua which he has ordered investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C.

(Para 20-24)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Investigaiton order – Quashing of FIR -- Remedy of – Person affected can approach the High Court for quashing of the FIR, like any other FIR, on the grounds for which an FIR can be quashed -- But in such petition as well, the challenge has to be to the FIR on merits and not to the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 25)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Fixing the case for preliminary evidence – Second revision -- Inherent power of High Court -- Petition challenging judgment passed by the ASJ whereby he has upheld the Order passed by the JMIC, declining to send the complaint of the petitioner to the police; for investigation and instead, ordering recording of preliminary evidence in the complaint -- Petitioner only tried to get adjudicated upon correctness, validity and propriety of the order passed by the courts below -- Hence this is nothing but a second revision petition in the garb of invoking the powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Petition not maintainable.

(Para 30)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Offence by Company – Liability of Director – Quashing of Complaint by High court -- Law requires that the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company’s business at the time when the offence was committed – High Court, in deciding a quashing petition u/s 482, Cr.P.C., must consider whether the averment made in the complaint is sufficient or if some unimpeachable evidence has been brought on record which leads to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time -- High Court must exercise its power u/s 482, Cr.P.C. when it is convinced, from the material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court.

(Para 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102, 451, 457 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder case – Seizure of truck – Requirement of -- Truck in question could not have been directed to be seized since there is no evidence that it was used in the commission of the offence of murder -- Merely because there were rival claims about the ownership of the truck; that does not warrant the seizure of the truck -- Truck in question ordered to be released on Sapurdari to its registered owner.

(Para 2, 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cheating -- Anticipatory bail -- Condition requiring the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakh), that too directly to the informant/complainant, is harsh and unacceptable -- Condition set aside -- Appellant must comply with other conditions specified in the impugned order for availing the benefit of anticipatory bail.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Dowry death case -- Acquittal of co-accused/wife in separate trial -- Discharge application by appellant/husband – Consideration of -- In acquittal judgment of wife, categorical findings have been recorded that she along with her husband/appellant were present in particular State on the date of the occurrence, which attained finality – No reason, why the High Court has taken the view that accused appellant was in that State on the date of occurrence needed to be proved in the course of the trial – High Court, ought to have discharged the accused/appellant – Appeal allowed, order of the High Court set aside -- Appellant ordered to be discharged.

(Para 3-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 (Fifthly), 376 – Rape case – Conviction u/s 376 of IPC – Quantum of sentence -- Prior to the Amendment 13 of 2013, the conviction u/s 376(1), the punishment shall not be less than seven years – Accused was aged about 23 years at the time of occurrence in 2009 and victim was aged about 14 years and 5 months -- Consent of victim is of no consequence to reduce the sentence less than minimum sentence of seven years – Considering the period of sentence already undergone and also the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is reduced from 10 years to the statutory minimum period of seven years.

(Para 1,4,5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Complaint against SHO -- Summoning order – Quashing of complaint and summoning order -- Two Complaints u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.c. dismissed by the Illaqa Magistrate – Petitioner being SHO of the area has not registered FIR on same complaint -- Allegations against the petitioner that he has failed to exercise his power u/s 154 Cr.P.C to register an FIR are apparently illegal and not sustainable as the petitioner being SHO of area cannot form an opinion other than formed by Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(Para 1, 26, 27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Opportunity of hearing – Requirement of – When the order was passed by the High Court, the appellants were not present either in person or through counsel – Order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remitted before the High Court to pass a fresh order after hearing the appellants on the application for cancellation of bail, in the interest of justice.

(Para 3-5)

Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Sections 66(B), 66(C), 66(D), 66(E), 67, 67(A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Petition on various grounds -- However, during the pendency of petition, mediation took place -- Settlement/agreement arrived – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 2-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468(2)(c), 482 -- Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Limitation to prosecute starts from the date of receipt of report of public analysts and not from the date of collection of sample -- If, the complaint is filed beyond the period of limitation of three years, the same is not maintainable -- Premises was raided on 16.07.2011 – First report qua misbranding of first sample received on 25.07.2011 and second report on 01.02.2012 – Sanction applied on 19.08.2014 and the same was granted on 10.11.2014 i.e. within three months -- In case, the period of three months is excluded, the impugned complaint filed on 22.07.2015 can still easily be declared being hopelessly time barred -- Impugned complaint and summoning order along with all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Rape case -- Compromise to solemnise marriage -- Resile from statement – Re-examination u/s 311 Cr.P.C -- Witnesses resiled on account of the allurement of marriage and a chance of a blemish free life for the prosecutrix and, therefore, it can safely be said that the statement given in court denying that the offence of rape was committed, was not a statement given freely or without any fear -- An application u/s 311 of the Code may be allowed at any stage of trial -- Allowing witnesses to be recalled would be in consonance with the cardinal principle that the truth must prevail.

(Para 14-19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(D) -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. by Complainant – Maintainability of -- Resile from statement under assurance of marriage -- Public Prosecutor himself cross examine the witnesses after they had turned hostile in order to elicit the truth – Public Prosecutor did not raise any objection to application u/s 311 of the Code as filed by the complainant itself raising the question of maintainability, it can be safely assumed that the said application had the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor -- Once the court is of the opinion that to ensure fair trial, an application is to be allowed in order to elicit the truth, then it should not be bound down by technicalities.

(Para 14, 20-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 441 -- Involvement in 31 cases – Bail by trial court -- Number of Sureties – Submission that the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties – Order modified to the extent that petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- and there shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- -- Court clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

(Para 6-8)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468,473,482 – Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Report of the Government Analyst received by the complainant on 26.06.2007 -- Complaint could have been filed, at the best, within a period of 3 years from the date of receipt of report of the Government Analyst -- However, the complaint has been filed after 8 years from the said date -- No application for extension of time under provision of 473 Cr.P.C – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,30(3), 33 -- Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 473, 482 – Misbranded article -- Dealer’s prosecution – Quashing of complaint -- Sample was taken as a sealed container in original packing -- This fact duly finds mention in the Form XX prepared by the Insecticide Inspector; on the spot at the time of taking of the sample -- Petitioners-dealer would be, entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) of the Insecticide Act – Initiation and continuation of a complaint and the consequent proceedings against the petitioners-dealer, are not legally justified and sustainable – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 2, 15,16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 433 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Life imprisonment – 11 years actual sentence undergone – Total sentence undergone 14 years including remission -- Direction given to State, having regard to the peculiar factual circumstances, to consider the case of the appellant for premature release on completion of total sentence of 14 years including remission, as a special case -- In the event of any delay in taking the decision, the appellant shall be released on self-bond, on completion of fourteen years including remission, making it subject to the decision of the Competent Authority.

 (Para 3, 4)

View of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 32 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – Section 497 IPC effectively creating a dent in individual dignity of women -- Emphasis on element of connivance or consent of husband tantamounts to subordination of women which violates Article 21 of Constitution – If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere -- It is better to be left as a ground for divorce -- As a criminal offence it will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely, dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship between the two – Held, Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional -- When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

(Para 41-56)

View of R.F. Nariman, J.

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down -- Section 198, CrPC is also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence -- Held, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid.

(Para 81-86)

View of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery -- Constitutional Validity – Criminal law must be in consonance with constitutional morality -- Being antithetical to the constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and equality, Section 497 does not pass constitutional muster – Held, Section 497 lacks an adequately determining principle to criminalize consensual sexual activity and is manifestly arbitrary -- Section 497 is a denial of substantive equality as it perpetuates the subordinate status ascribed to women in marriage and society -- Section 497 violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is based on gender stereotypes about the role of women and violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21 of the Constitution; and Section 497 is unconstitutional.

 (Para 153)

View of Indu Malhotra, J.

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery as offence -- Right to equality – Procedure to prosecute -- Constitutional validity – Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution -- Section 198(2) of the Cr.P.C. which contains the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the I.P.C. shall be unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

(Para 165-171)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- High Court awarded Rs.9,000/- maintenance per month -- Maintenance on the basis of notional minimum income as per the current minimum wages, is untenable -- Regard must be had to the living standard of the respondent and his family – Respondent is highly qualified and an able-bodied person; his monthly income while working in Canada in the year 2010 was over Rs.1,77,364/- -- Supreme Court had prima facie found in earlier appeal that the cause of justice would be subserved if the appellant is granted an interim maintenance of Rs.20,000/- p.m. commencing from November 1, 2014 – Keeping in mind the spiralling inflation rate and high cost of living index today, respondent shall pay a sum of Rs.20,000/- p.m. to the appellant towards the maintenance w.e.f. January 2010 and @ Rs.25,000/- p.m. w.e.f 1st June, 2018 until further orders.

(Para 2,13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 401, 482 -- Conviction u/s 138 of the NI Act – Compounding at Revisional stage -- Conviction by Ld. JMIC upheld by Ld. ASJ -- Parties are allowed to compound the offence, consequently, judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Ld. JMIC and judgment passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge stand set aside.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Affidavit in evidence – Wrong date of cheque mentioned – Re-examination of -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is allowed -- Complainant allowed to appear as a witness and submit a fresh affidavit.

(Para 2-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Civil and Criminal proceedings – Stay of – Automatic vacation of stay -- Proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied -- Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up -- At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay -- Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up -- In an attempt to remedy this, situation, Directions given that :

-- in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended.

-- In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order.

-- The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized.

-- The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.

(Para 35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Framing of charge – Challenge to – Power of -- Stay of proceedings -- Framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order -- Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution -- However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered -- Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter.

-- Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period.

-- Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally.

-- If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated.

-- In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters.

-- Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts.

-- Trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced -- High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

A copy of order sent to all the High Courts for necessary action.

(Para 37, 38)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Sanction required under PC Act -- Question of law sought to be raised in the appeals is as to whether prior sanction for prosecution qua allegation of corruption in respect of a public servants is required before setting in motion even the investigative process under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act offences read with the Cr.P.C. is required to be settled by a larger Bench – Matter referred for constitution of Bench of appropriate strength.

(Para 1,36,37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Age of the prosecutrix – School Leaving Certificate – Evidential Value of -- Prosecutrix gave her age as 18 years in her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and when she appeared in the witness box claimed herself to be 16 years old – Entry in the school leaving certificate (Ex.P1), without proving its source, was not sufficient to conclude that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of occurrence -- Despite being referred to the dental and radiological opinion regarding the age of the prosecutrix, she was not taken thereto for examination -- Held, it can be said that the prosecutrix was major and an attempt had been made by the prosecution to withhold her correct age.

(Para 32-38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Kidnapping and rape – Consenting party – Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction can be based on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix, but at the same time, it cannot be mechanically applied to every case of sexual assault -- In the first version given to the Magistrate in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C., she had stated that she had gone of her own, but later she retracted therefrom while appearing in the witness box and alleged kidnapping and rape by the accused for the obvious reason that she had succumbed to the pressure of her parents – Victims taken to Safidon in three wheeler, but she had not raised alarm – Stand of the prosecutrix that she had told the three wheeler driver about her kidnapping but no help was extended, does not convince the Court – Victims had changed three vehicles to reach Safidon, she had the opportunity to raise alarm and seek help – Place from where she had remained with the accused was a construction site where other huts were constructed – Accused used to leave her in the earthen hut for hours together, she remained there for more than four days and it is highly improbable that the stay was without her consent – Medical evidence also goes contrary to her version – Victims went missing on 25.10.2014, but the matter was reported on 27.10.2014, no explanation as to why the matter was reported so late to the police – Circumstances support to the plea of accused that the prosecutrix had left home on her own and she was neither confined, abducted or raped – Judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside, accused is acquitted.

(Para 40-48)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 309 – Examination of witnesses – Adjournment by Trial courts – Held,

(i)    The trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. as reiterated in judgments of this Court, inter alia, in State of U.P. versus Shambhu Nath Singh and Others (2001) 4 SCC 667], Mohd. Khalid versus State of W.B. (2002)7 SCC 334] and Vinod Kumar versus State of Punjab (2015)3 SCC 220].

(ii)   The eye-witnesses must be examined by the prosecution as soon as possible.

(iii)  Statements of eye-witnesses should invariably be recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as per procedure prescribed thereunder.

The High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the trial courts for compliance of the above.

(Para 13,14)