Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 – Regular bail -- 7040 intoxicant tablets and 3000 intoxicant capsules recovered from co-accused, no recovery from the petitioner -- Interim bail granted by the Ld. Trial Court on 03.09.2019, thereafter, surrendered on 17.02.2020, not misused the concession of interim bail – In the disclosure made by the main accused, there is no allegation that petitioner facilitated or abated the commission of the offence – Mere allegation is that petitioner also used to purchase the contraband from “K” -- “K” is found to be innocent during investigation -- Charges are yet to be framed, trial will take sufficient long time -- Further incarceration would not serve any purpose – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 8,9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Fundamental Rights – Protection of -- Article 32 of the Constitution constitutes a recognition of the constitutional duty entrusted to Supreme Court to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Right to speech and expression – Fundamental right of Journalist – Airing of views -- Exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) -- Exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Article 19(2) -- Right of a journalist under Article 19(1)(a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express.

(Para 32)

C. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- F.I.R. -- Allegation against police -- Transfer of Investigation to CBI -- Power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances” – An accused person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency – Court do not find that levelling such allegations would by and itself constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of the investigation.

(Para 35-44)

D. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 – Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR -- Petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC -- Petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court – Held, a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable.

(Para 49)

E. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- One cause of action – FIR against -- Multiple FIRs and complaints – Quashing of -- Multiple FIRs and complaints in several states and in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir – Fairness in the administration of criminal justice would warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 to quash all other FIRs -- Filing of multiple FIRs arising out of the same telecast of the show hosted by the petitioner is an abuse of the process and impermissible -- Quashing of those FIRs would not amount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of the FIR which is being investigated.

(Para 2, 51)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Quashing of complaint/summoning order after Proclaimed offender order – Held, it would be in the interest of justice to see at the first instance whether any offence is made out against the petitioners as per allegations levelled against them in the complaint or not -- Because if the complaint fails, as a necessary corollary, all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom would automatically go.

(Para 1, 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Summoning order -- Proclaimed offender order – Quashing of -- Father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law – Role of – Specific allegations – Requirement of – No direct and specific allegations against the petitioners that they had given beatings to the complainant or demanded any dowry article or misappropriated the shtridhan – It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498-A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives – Casual reference of their names that husband of the complainant gave her beatings at the instance of petitioners – Held, case in hand is a sheer abuse of process of law -- Consequently, the complaint and all subsequent proceedings including the summoning order and order declaring proclamation offender, qua petitioners are quashed.

(Para 1,18,19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance under DV Act – Liability of husband to pay – Both proceedings are independent, however, while fixing the maintenance to the wife, earning capacity of the husband has to be seen as well -- Husband ordered to pay Rs.8,000/- p.m. u/s 125 Cr.P.C. and Rs.8,000/- p.m. under DV act – Held, petitioner-husband is at liberty to pay the said amount either in the terms of the order u/s 125 Cr.P.C. or under the D.V. Act.

(Para 7-14)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 19 -- House rent for accommodation – JMIC awarded Rs.5,000/- p.m. towards house rent -- Rs.8,000/- p.m. maintenance out of pension of Rs.23,000 p.m. already awarded -- An additional amount of Rs.5000/- towards rent would mean he is paying a total of Rs.13,000/- out of Rs.23,000, which is more than 50% what he gets -- No doubt, the petitioner being the husband is duty bound to maintain his wife and allow her to live life with dignity according to their social status and strata, but it has to be within his means -- Amount of Rs. 5000/- towards rent is highly excessive – Amount reduced to Rs. 1000/- per month.

(Para 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 -- Cheating for getting employment -- Regular bail -- Co-accused are alleged to have made the fraudulent assurance to the complainant of getting employment for him in FCI and to have received the amount from him -- Petitioner is merely alleged to have accompanied the complainant for his joining on asking of his co-accused and did not make any fraudulent representation and did not receive any amount from the complainant -- Question as to involvement of the petitioner in commission of the subject offences is to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be produced during trial -- Due to pandemic of Covid-19 trial is likely to take long time -- Petitioner deserves the concession of regular bail, he is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 9,10)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Ingredients of offence – Strict interpretation -- To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that the accused intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe in any public place within public view -- Since these are the penal provisions, the same are to be given a strict construction and if any of the ingredients are found lacking, it would not constitute the offence under the SC/ST Act.

(Para 10-15)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Talks on mobile – Mens rea -- Alleged conversation over the mobile phone was not in a public gaze nor witnessed by any third party, the alleged use of caste words cannot be said to have been committed within the public view -- Merely uttering such wrong words in the absence of any public view does not show any intention or mens rea to humiliate the complainant who besides being Sarpanch, belongs to Scheduled Caste community -- It would not, thus, ipso-facto, constitute acts of commission of offence, which are capable of being taken cognizance under the SC and ST Act, 1989.

(Para 10-12)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Offence under SC/ST Act and IPC -- Discharge by Trial court – Power of -- It is a settled law that if two views are possible and one gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at that stage, it is not to be seen whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

(Para 13)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 24(2) -- Chemical Examiner’s report – Manufacturer right -- Copy of – Although Section 24(2) of the Insecticides Act, 1968 does not itself lay down that Chemical Examiner’s report is to be conveyed to the manufacturing firm or to other accused but it is expected in the interest of natural justice and fair trial that a copy of the Chemical Examiner's report be conveyed to the manufacturing firm also especially if the manufacturing firm is also to be prosecuted.

(Para 12)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 24(2) -- Chemical Examiner’s report – Re-examination of – Right of -- Provisions of section 24(2) of the Act do not mandate that each and every of the accused is to be afforded an individual opportunity of re-analysis -- If in a given case, re-analysis has been got done at the instance of any one of the accused, then certainly there is no need for any further re-analysis.

(Para 13-15)

C. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Managing Director – Role of -- Managing director need not be assigned a specific work as he, in such capacity is overall in-charge of conduct of business of the firm -- Thus, cannot escape from his liability on account of the insecticide having been found misbranded which was manufactured by the company of which he is the Managing Director.

(Para 23-25)

D. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Quality Incharge – Role of -- A person who is monitoring the quality of the product being manufactured by the firm is the key person who would be responsible for ensuring quality of the product -- He is also liable to be prosecuted on account of misbranding of the insecticide in question.

(Para 27)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 – Complaint – Contents of -- Complaint is not expected to be encyclopedic and it is only during the course of trial that the complainant can fully substantiate the averments and allegations made in the complaint as regards the role and responsibility of the accused.

(Para 28)

F. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 – Godown Incharge – Role of -- Since the insecticide in question, in any case is in sealed condition, therefore the Godown Incharge whose primary job is to keep the articles intact and to further pass on the same to the Distributors and Dealers and is himself not supposed to sell the same cannot be said to have committed any offence under Insecticides Act 1968 so as to have rendered himself liable for prosecution -- As such, the complaint qua him deserves to be quashed.

(Para 29)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 377 (2) – Appeal against inadequacy of sentence – Accused’s right to plead for acquittal – Held, accused is justified in contending that it is open to the said accused to challenge the finding and order of conviction recorded against him in the appeal filed by the State -- In the appeal filed against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy, the accused may plead for his acquittal or for reduction of the sentence.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 304 Part I, 326 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Total five accused, State pursuing appeal against one accused -- Death of deceased by one fatal blow on the head, which was with the intention of causing his death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the case would be covered by Section 304 Part I, IPC -- It is certainly not a case to simply proceed u/s Section 326 of the IPC -- Accused convicted for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I and Section 148, IPC.

(Para 1, 12-16)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 2(c), 2(c)(xi) – Deemed University -- Trustee of the Trust running Deemed University – Whether Public Servant :

--       “Deemed University” is not excluded from the ambit of the term “University” under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.

Object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants.

--       It cannot be stated that a “Deemed University” and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein.

Discharge order against respondent-accused-trustee set aside – Trial Court directed to proceed with the case.

(Para 3, 17, 34-44, 53-57)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 10 and 13 (1)(b) and 13(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Framing of charge – Discharge of accused – Power u/s 227 of Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Respondent allegedly was collecting certain extra amount over the prescribed fees on the pretext of allowing the students to fill up their examination forms – Alleged amount was a condition precedent before filling up the forms, to appear for the examinations -- Large number of cheques which were found during the raid is more than sufficient to establish a grave suspicion as to the commission of the alleged offence -- Prima facie, a grave suspicion is made out that the respondent was rendering his service by dealing with the students and the examination aspect of the University – Held, jurisdiction of this Court, with regards to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be exercised by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences -- Case is not an appropriate one to have exercised the power u/s 227 to discharge the accused-respondent.

(Para 52-56)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape case -- Compromise quashing -- Money changed hands – Would certainly fall within the ambit of 'undue influence' as it would amount to bestowing an unscrupulous gift to influence the prosecutrix from pursuing criminal proceedings against the accused – Serious and grave allegations levelled by the prosecutrix against the petitioner who unabashedly indulged in blackmailing and threatening her and her family -- Allegations levelled in the FIR, prima facie reflects the mental depravity of the petitioner who tried to exploit a hapless married woman by fraudulently luring her into a relationship with him, raping her and thereafter putting her matrimonial ties with her husband in peril by coercing her to continue her dalliance with him -- Not a fit case to invoke inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR.

(Para 12-19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Summoning of witnesses u/s 311 Cr.P.C – Power of -- Cardinal principle is that the presence of the witnesses and the production of evidence is necessary for the just decision of the case -- With this in mind the evidence proposed to be adduced by the petitioner deserves to be examined -- It is not mandatory for the trial court to summon a witness, if his evidence is not essential for the correct decision of the case.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – Acquittal in rape case – Leave to appeal – Accused was driver of the official vehicle of husband of prosecutrix – She was pregnant on the date of alleged incident – Prosecutrix and her husband did not report about the alleged incident dated 04.03.2014, to the police, till 02.02.2015 -- Even during the next 15 days after the alleged incident, she kept on accompanying accused in the official vehicle for medical check-up -- There is no corroborative evidence in the shape of medical report, to strengthen the testimony of prosecutrix regarding the alleged rape -- No reliable evidence for continuously giving threats to the prosecutrix, on her mobile phone -- Trial Court appreciated the evidence led by the parties in right perspective, while giving benefit of doubt to respondent No.2/accused -- There is no illegality in the impugned judgment – Application seeking grant of leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 2, 17-19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Application for cross-examine the prosecution witness – Accused’s right -- Procedural law is meant to prevent failure of justice on account of mistake of either of the party to bring on record valuable evidence -- Cross examination of prosecution witnesses in any case would advance the cause of justice -- Technicality, if any, should not come in the way of substantial justice – One opportunity needs to be granted to the petitioner for cross examining the prosecution witnesses -- For the delay caused by the petitioner, he would however, deposit a cost(s) of Rs.5000/- with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 7-11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 36(A) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 173(2) -- Challan without CFSL report – Default bail – Right of -- Report u/s 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C. was filed by the police before expiry of the period of 60 days without the CFSL report, which cannot be said to be incomplete -- Accused is not entitled to bail u/s 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. on the ground of filing of incomplete report.

(Para 29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 324/34, 452/120-B, 506 -- Compromise of matter after conviction – Held, there is no statutory embargo against invoking powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C., after conviction of accused by the trial Court and during pendency of the appeal against such conviction -- Conviction maintained however, their order of sentence recorded by the trial court under Sections 324/34, 452/120-B and 506 IPC is modified to the period, if any, already undergone by them.

(Para 1,7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 308, 323, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder -- Compromise quashing – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR u/s 308, 323, 506, 34 of the IPC (Challan presented u/s 307, 323, 506, 34 of the IPC) and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 454, 323, 506 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR alongwith all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner, on the basis of compromise subject to costs of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife – Wife running play-way school – Non-production of Pan card and Bank account details by wife – Effect of -- Held, once the respondent-husband had taken a specific plea that the petitioner-wife was running a play-way school and coupled with her own admission that she is maintaining a bank account and had a PAN card, the petitioner should have adduced evidence to substantiate that she had no source of income -- Family Court rightly came to the conclusion that the petitioner had not approached the court with clean hands and is not entitled to any maintenance.

(Para 14)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS case -- Recovery of 1 Kg 800 gms of ganja – R.I. for one year and fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default further S.I. for a period of 2 weeks – Appellant is not a previous convict, he is a poor person having his wife, who has since died – Appellant has undergone actual imprisonment for a period of 08 months and 04 days – Quantity of contraband is marginally above the small quantity and in such circumstances, some more leniency in the matter of sentence can be extended to the appellant -- Sentence of the imprisonment reduced to the period already undergone without alteration with regard to the sentence of fine.

(Para 3, 11-13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Cheque bounce case – Cheque lost plea – Denial of signature on cheques -- Case of the accused that the three cheques were lost but neither any complaint to the police nor any information was given to the bank qua the same at any stage -- Accused/ petitioner has denied his signatures on the cheques in question, but has failed to produce any expert nor any such objection has been raised by the drawee bank -- Adverse inference drawn against the petitioner/accused.

(Para 15,16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Cheque bounce case – Revisional jurisdiction -- In a revision petition, High Court is not to re-appreciate the evidence like Court of an appeal - - Not pointed out as to how the findings given by the courts below are perverse or against the evidence -- Nothing has been pointed out as to which material evidence has been misread and which material evidence has not considered by the courts below -- Presumption u/s 139 of the N.I.Act arose against the accused and it was first for him to rebut the same -- But he failed to rebut the presumption -- Rather, the complainant led even cogent evidence to prove his case beyond any doubt -- Concurrent findings given by both the courts below based on appreciation of evidence in right perspective – Revision dismissed.

(Para 17-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 323, 148, 149 – Kidnapping matter -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR u/s 363, 323, 148, 149 IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 9,10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Settlement between parties – No allegation against the petitioner that he was directly involved in the rash and negligent work of the Contractor, which resulted into death of two workers – No offence under Section 304-A IPC is made out against the petitioner -- Legal heirs/family members of two deceased have received Rs. 10,40,000/- each as compensation and have shown their satisfaction that they have received sufficient amount -- Even Insurance Company has paid an amount of Rs. 2,40,000/- to the legal heirs/family members of each deceased as well as the State of Haryana has also paid a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to legal heirs/family members of each deceased -- In view of the above facts and circumstance and also in view of the fact that the matter stands amicably settled, the petition is allowed and FIR u/s 304-A IPC with all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. hereby quashed.

(Para 17-21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 365, 366-A -- FIR u/s 365 – Challan u/s 363, 366-A – Run-away couple marriage – Proclaimed person -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Petitioner no.1/girl had gone out of her own free will and solemnised marriage with petitioner no.2 -- Offence u/s 363, 366A of IPC not made out against the petitioner no.2 – Petition for police protection was also filed by the petitioners -- FIR and all consequential proceedings including order declaring petitioner No. 2 as proclaimed person being abuse of process are liable to be quashed for securing the ends of justice -- In view of the settlement between the parties, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak -- Continuation of the criminal case will subject petitioner No. 2 to great oppression and injustice – FIR and consequential proceedings including order declaring petitioner no. 2 as proclaimed person are quashed.

(Para 11-16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 -- Appeal against acquittal – Condonation of delay of 111 days – Declined  -- Reason/ground for condonation of delay in the application has not specifically been explained – State does not have the right to file appeals at belated stage on the ground of procedural delay -- State is expected to expedite the matter in case they want to prefer appeal against judgment of acquittal or conviction -- No proper explanation has been given by the State -- Application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Murder case -- Appeal against acquittal – Trial Court gave a specific finding that accused was not named neither by the complainant nor by PW-5 stating him to be a part of conspiracy -- As per FSL report, the weapon was found to be in a working condition but none of the live cartridges were ever used by respondent/ accused in the commission of offence – By giving the benefit of doubt, he has rightly been acquitted.

(Para 16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127, 362 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Court not to alter judgment – Applicability of -- Magistrate does not become functus officio after passing an order u/s 125 Cr.P.C., as and when occasion arises the Magistrate exercises the jurisdiction from time to time -- Legislative Scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. clearly enumerated the circumstances and incidents where Court passing a judgment or final order disposing the case can alter or review the same -- Embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus, clearly relaxed in proceeding u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127, 362 -- Settlement between the parties – Non-honouring of – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Court not to alter judgment – Applicability of -- Maintenance rights of wife -- When the appellant-husband did not honour its commitment under settlement, can the wife be left in lurch by not able to press for grant of maintenance on non-compliance by the appellant of the terms of settlement -- The answer is obviously ‘No’ -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. has to be interpreted in a manner as to advance justice and to protect a woman for whose benefit the provisions have been engrafted -- Held, order passed by Family Court reviving the maintenance application of the wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. by setting aside order passed on settlement is not hit by the embargo contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. -- Family Court has done substantial justice in reviving the maintenance application of the wife.

(Para 29-32)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 (c) – NDPS case -- Sentence reduced to already undergone --  Recovery of 700 gram from appellant and 300 gram of opium from co-accused – Conviction for one year RI and fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo RI for 02 months – FIR relates to the year 2016 -- Sentence undergone 4 month, 17 days -- It is a fit case wherein sentence can be reduced to the period already undergone -- Sentence of fine and default clause shall remain intact -- Appellant be released forthwith on deposit of fine.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Medical negligence death – No Medical Board opinion – Compromise between parties – Quashing of FIR -- No expert opinion of the medical board that petitioner ever committed any negligence, while performing operation and was responsible for the death of wife of complainant -- Compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties -- FIR registered u/s 304-A IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed.

(Para 8)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222, 223 -- Demand of bribe – Disproportionate assets – Two F.I.R. – Clubbing of -- First FIR was registered on account of demanding a bribe and when a trap was laid down, he was caught red handed while accepting the said bribe -- Subsequent to the first FIR, when the official residence was searched, a huge amount in cash and certain documents regarding disproportionate assets were found in possession of the petitioner, qua which the second FIR was registered – Held, both the FIRs are based on different set of allegations and cannot be clubbed or tried together.

(Para 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- FIR u/s 406, 498-A – Application for examining of prosecution witness through video conferencing – Held, JMIC clearly erred in dismissing the application -- Impugned order set aside, application for examination through video conferencing allowed -- Accused would be allowed all adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 182, 401 -- Acquittal in 182 Cr.P.C. proceedings -- Revisional jurisdiction of High Court is quite limited -- Court is to interfere only if there is an illegality or infirmity apparent on the face of the judgment/order passed by a Court below or the same is perverse -- Merely because another view in the matter is possible, no inference with such judgment is to be done – Revision dismissed.

(Para 13-15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Cancellation report by police – Non-acceptance by Trial Court – Case adjourned for complainant’s evidence – Challenged by accused – Remedy of – Held, after the complainant produces the evidence, Ld. Magistrate may or may not summon the accused -- If the accused are summoned, they have got remedy of challenging that order by way of filing a revision petition before the Court of Sessions or/and filing appropriate application (s) in the trial Court itself – Accused have not been summoned so far – Petition dismissed.

(Para 20-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent jurisdiction of High court -- Section 482 Cr.P.C. deals with inherent powers of the High Court providing that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Proclaimed offender – Compromise between the parties -- Relationship was not based on a false promise of marriage – Affidavit submitted by the prosecutrix establish that the relationship was consensual with the prosecutrix, 28 years at that time -- Both were major and capable of taking a reasoned decision to enter into a physical relationship -- It is also not the case of the prosecutrix that the act complained off occurred only once or that she had been subjected to any kind of force -- It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her --  FIR would further reflect that the marriage was not being solemnized on account of his parents not giving their consent – Held, it could not be said that he had made a false promise of marriage, only to entice her into the said physical relationship -- Very offence of rape would not be established -- FIR u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceeding including the order declaring him to be a proclaimed offender are quashed since the continuation of the same would tantamount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 5, 15-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce case – Rebuttal of presumption -- Initial presumption is in favour of holder of the cheque in view of Section 139 of the Act, however, the same is rebuttable -- It is permissible for the accused to rebut the same on the basis of evidence led by the prosecution.

(Para 6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Signatures on the cheque is not denied, yet the complainant has failed to prove any friendly relationship with the accused -- No acknowledgement has been placed on record nor in the income tax returns Mark `A’ and Mark `B’, there is any reference of loan when it is an admitted fact that the wife of attorney (complainant) had been into the business of Hire Purchase and Investment for the last 20 years -- It is permissible for the accused to point out contradictions/deficiencies in the evidence led by the prosecution and that it is not necessary for the accused to lead evidence in defence to rebut the presumption -- No ground to grant leave to appeal. ANSS Raja Shekhar’s case (2019) SCC 185 & Kishan Rao’s case (2018) 8 SCC 165 relied.

(Para 14-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 325, 379-B, 506, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 10, 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420 -- Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of 1983), Section 24 -- Complaint case – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Postponement of process – Power of issuance of summons -- Being a pure legal issue can be tested on the basis of admitted facts on record and can be raised at any stage -- Petitioners/accused are operating their office at Jalandhar and the contract for permanent residency in Australia was signed at Jalandhar by the respondent/complainant – Held, complaint filed before the Magistrate at Kapurthala, it was mandatory for the Magistrate to comply with Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- Impugned summoning order set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial Court to pass order afresh after holding an enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. Abhijit Pawar's case 2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 405 (SC) relied.

(Para 12, 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A – Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioners have solemnised marriage and the complainant, who is mother of petitioner No.1, has suffered a statement before learned Magistrate in support of compromise -- Continuation of the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant FIR qua the petitioners shall be an abuse of the process of law -- FIR u/s 363 and 366-A IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6,7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 -- Second Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Double jeopardy -- Trial court convicted the accused – Appellate Court acquitted the accused solely based upon Yogendra Pratap Singh’s case, 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 550 -- Hon’ble Apex Court held in that case, where the complaint was filed before the expiry of the period 15 days stipulated in the notice, the Court cannot take the cognizance thereof, however, the second complaint on the same cause of action has been held to be maintainable and the delay in filing such complaint shall be deemed to have been condoned -- Held, it cannot be said that the filing of the second complaint and passing of the summoning order therein, amounts to double jeopardy to the petitioner.

(Para 6-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Accused summoned u/s 138 NI Act -- Absence of complainant -- Dismissal of complaint for non-prosecution – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Maintainability of -- On account of absence of complainant on one occasion dismissal of the complaint for non-prosecution was not justified, since, it is always desirable that a lis should be decided on merits, rather than, non-suiting the parties on technical grounds -- Present petition challenging the impugned order is maintainable and no fault can be found with the same -- Petition accepted; impugned order set aside and the complaint is ordered to be restored at its original number.

(Para 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 9, 12, 13 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 409 – Exemption from personal appearance of accused -- Appellant is appearing before the learned Trial Court on each and every Friday since 2013 -- Appellant is a permanent resident of Delhi and is the Director on the Boards of several companies -- Distance between Delhi and Hyderabad is approximately 1500 kms – Normal rule is that the evidence shall be taken in the presence of the accused, however, even in the absence of the accused, such evidence can be taken but then his counsel must be present in the court -- Nothing is on record that, at any point of time, any effort has been made by the appellant to stall/delay the trial -- Exemption on the very same grounds of two co-accused in cases arising of the same FIR have been allowed, one by High Court, another by Trial Court – Personal appearance of the petitioner dispensed with conditions. Bhaskar Industries Ltd.’s case (2001) 7 SCC 401 relied.

(Para 6,7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155 – F.I.R. – Delay in -- Complaint was written immediately after the occurrence -- FIR is based only on this complaint and it does not contain anything more or less than the complaint -- Contents of the FIR cannot be said to be interpolated.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157 – Procedure of investigation – Compliance of -- Mere delay in compliance of Section 157 by itself is not fatal to prosecution -- Even if prosecution has failed to prove that Section 157 Cr.PC was complied with then also the effect thereof has to be assessed.

(Para 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134, 136 -- Interested witness – Evidential value -- Six persons heavily armed, two of them with guns, killed the deceased in broad day light -- While leaving the place of occurrence they threatened all gathered there by saying that anybody who tried to interfere would meet the same fate -- In such a situation no other villager who may have been present would turn up to give evidence – Two of the witnesses have spoken up and their evidence has been corroborated on all counts -- Evidence does not show that the enmity or dispute between these two witnesses and the accused was of such a nature that these two witnesses would make false statements only to settle scores with the appellants thereby leaving the real culprits to go scot-free -- Merely because these witnesses are interested witnesses their testimony cannot be discarded.

(Para 19)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134, 136 – Direct ocular evidence – Medical evidence – Non-examination of Ballistic expert -- Report of the ballistic experts have not been proved and all the bullets recovered from the spot have not been sent to the ballistic expert -- Guns seized may or may not be the guns used – Held, when the ocular evidence is direct and clear in this regard, and this ocular evidence is fully supported by the medical evidence, the negligence of the investigation team cannot be used by the defence in support of their case.

(Para 21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 -- Investigaiton report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. – Magistrate’s power – Nature of Magistrate’s duty u/s 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the Section.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Furnishing of documents – Fair trial -- Furnishing of documents to the accused u/s 207 of the 1973 Code is a facet of right of the accused to a fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65-B – Electronic record – Document – Admissibilty of -- Electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence u/s 3 of the 1872 Act -- Any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a “document” and shall be admissible in evidence subject to satisfying other requirements of the said provision.

(Para 21-25)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 29 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3(18) – Memory Card – Document – Held, contents of the memory card would be a “matter” and the memory card itself would be a “substance” and hence, the contents of the memory card would be a “document”.

(Para 26-31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A -- Disclosure of identity of the victim – Effect of -- Explanation offered by the appellant is plausible inasmuch as the prosecution itself had done so by naming the victim in the First Information Report/Crime Case, the statement of the victim under Section 161, as well as under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, and in the chargesheet/police report filed before the Magistrate.

(Para 34)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of -- Privacy of victim – Right of Accused:

--       Accused, who are interested in reassuring themselves about the genuineness and credibility of the contents of the memory card in question or that of the pen-drive produced before the trial Court by the prosecution on which the prosecution would rely during the trial, are free to take opinion of an independent expert agency, such as the CFSL on such matters as they may be advised, which information can be used by them to confront the prosecution witnesses including the forensic report of the State FSL relied upon by the prosecution forming part of the police report.

--       Considering that this is a peculiar case of intra-conflict of fundamental rights flowing from Article 21, that is right to a fair trial of the accused and right to privacy of the victim, it is imperative to adopt an approach which would balance both the rights.

–       Court is duty bound to issue suitable directions -- Even the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the 1973 Code, is competent to issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice.

--       If the accused or his lawyer himself, additionally, intends to inspect the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in question, he can request the Magistrate to provide him inspection in Court, if necessary, even for more than once alongwith his lawyer and I.T. expert to enable him to effectively defend himself during the trial.

--       If such an application is filed, the Magistrate must consider the same appropriately and exercise judicious discretion with objectivity while ensuring that it is not an attempt by the accused to protract the trial. While allowing the accused and his lawyer or authorized I.T. expert, all care must be taken that they do not carry any devices much less electronic devices, including mobile phone which may have the capability of copying or transferring the electronic record thereof or mutating the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in any manner.

Such multipronged approach may subserve the ends of justice and also effectuate the right of accused to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 38-43)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207,  327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of – Inspection of -- Fair Trial – Right of -- Held, contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document -- If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial -- However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial -- Court may issue suitable directions to balance the interests of both sides.

(Para 44)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act -- Dismissal of complaint – Appellant/complainant has averred that the amount of cheque is part of sale consideration which stands belied from the reading of registered sale deed -- Once on preponderance of probabilities the defence creates doubt, the onus shifts on the complainant to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt and the protective umbrella of Section 139 of the N.I. Act is no more available. Dismissal of complaint order, upheld. Rangappa’s case, (2010) 11 SCC 441 relied.

(Para 1,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A, 506 – Dowry case – Criminal breach of trust – Embezzlement of istridhan – Quashing of FIR -- FIR is a document first in point of time is very foundation of the case – Only general, vague and ambiguous allegations, no specific entrustment of any of the articles of Ishtridhan to any of accused-petitioners nor there is any allegation that they have embezzled the same and refused to return back these articles which were meant for the exclusive use of the bride/complainant – Husband is residing where he was employed and where too the complainant wife had put up after the marriage – Material question arises how the articles of Ishtridhan have come about in possession of the in-laws – Proceedings held to be misuse of the process of the court against innocent relations of the husband resulting in gross miscarriage of justice, needs to be set aside -- FIR and all the proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302 – Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Examine/Cross-examination of – Right of -- Assistance given by the victim’s counsel is meant to be given to the prosecution in general -- A victim’s counsel should ordinarily not be given the right to make oral arguments or examine and cross-examine witnesses.

(Para 11-12.4)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Cross-examination of – Right of -- If the victim’s counsel feels that a certain aspect has gone unaddressed in the examination of the witnesses or the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor, he may route any questions or points through the Public Prosecutor himself – If the victim’s counsel finds that the Public Prosecutor has not examined a witness properly and not incorporated his suggestions either, he may bring certain questions to the notice of the Court -- If the Judge finds merit in them, he may take action accordingly by invoking his powers under Section 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 12.4-12.5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 87, 89, 390 – Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Under this Section the Magistrate can issue warrants of arrest against a person:-

(a) Who is an escaped convict

(b) Proclaimed offender

(c) Person accused of ‘non-bailable’ offence and is ‘evading arrest’.

Held that u/s 73 the Magistrate can issue warrants against a person who is evading arrest, only if such a person was required to appear before the court under some other order passed under some other provision; like u/s 87, 89 or 390 of Cr.P.C.; during the trial or at the time of or after taking cognizance -- Neither there is any necessity for a warrant of arrest for arresting an accused during investigation nor has the court been given any specific power in this regard by any specific provision of Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82, 173 – Cognizable offence -- Investigation report -- Arrest warrant – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Before filing report u/s 173 the police cannot get a warrant of arrest against a person, without any specific reason -- A person cannot be declared as a proclaimed person or offender in routine by following procedure u/s 82 of Cr.P.C.; only because despite having power to arrest an accused the police had not succeeded in arresting such a person or might not have chosen to arrest such a person.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41 – Cognizable offence -- Power to arrest of police -- Provisions of Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. are quite clear that unless a cognizable offence is committed by a person in the presence of such police officer, police officer cannot arrest an accused only on the basis of his whims that he suspects the said person to have committed some offence -- If such person has committed some cognizable offence, which is punishable for imprisonment, then before arresting the person, the police officer has to satisfy himself that the arrest of such person is necessary; for the purposes delineated in the Section itself.

(Para 12)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Police use the power of the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest against an accused, only as a tool to avoid its responsibility to carry out the investigation to the logical end; and only for the purpose of getting such an accused declared as proclaimed offender –        This methodology is normally adopted by the police just to get rid of the responsibility of putting a report before the Magistrate qua investigation – As a result, lots of persons are got declared as proclaimed offenders; and forgotten altogether by the police thereafter, Held;

--       Before the Magistrate/court has taken cognizance of any offence, the power of issuance of warrants of arrest under any provision of Cr.P.C., on an application of a police officer, cannot be invoked by the Magistrate as a routine matter.

--       Only for arresting a person; the police do not require any warrant as such. Hence, it would not lie in the mouth of the police to allege before the Magistrate, without there being any specific reasons or any barrier in their way, that the accused is evading arrest.

--       During investigation; even if there is some specific legal or factual obstacle or barrier, which makes the arrest without warrant impossible, and if the police intend to seek warrant of arrest from the Magistrate for such arrest, under any provision of the Cr.P.C., the police are required to specify the obstacle, which the warrant issued by the court would remove and because of which such obstacle or the barrier in way of the police; the accused was succeeding in evading his arrest.

--       Unless, there is any specific obstacle; because of which the police were not able to arrest; and which could not be removed by the police on their own and without the aid of the warrant of the court, the issuance of warrant of arrest by the Magistrate, only on assertion of the police that the accused was evading arrest, would be only a routine exercise, and would be only for the aid of the investigating officer, which could not be done by the Magistrate.

(Para 14)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Application seeking issuance of warrant against the petitioner, is silent qua any reason -- Not only this, no reason, whatsoever, has been spelt out in the application, even qua the requirements of arrest as mentioned in Section 41 Cr.P.C, to justify arrest of the petitioner, except to say that the petitioner is evading arrest -- Magistrate has issued the warrant only to enlarge the effort of the police qua its investigation and that there is no stay of arrest -- Although the Magistrate may not be required to record any detailed reasons, however none of these reasons given is germane to the provisions under which the Magistrate is required to exercise his powers to issue warrants of arrest -- Impugned warrants of arrest and consequent orders impugned are quashed.

(Para 15-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed offender -- Order challenged after 4 years -- There may not be any reason to allow, however keeping in view the fact that the matter actually arises out of proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and petitioner undertakes to continue appearing before the trial Court on each and every date and also and a mother of two minor children (less than 10 years of age), impugned order set aside, upon the petitioner furnishing adequate bail bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 1)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 36(A) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 173(2) -- Challan without Chemical examination report – Default bail – Right of -- It would not be appropriate to hold that in absence of report of the chemical examiner from the FSL or such like agencies, the accused is entitled to default bail -- Held, attention of the Division Bench in Ajit Singh @ Jeeta and another, Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121 was not drawn to two Supreme Court judgments (Narender Kumar Amin’ case, (2015) 3 SCC 417 and Abdul Azeez P.V.’s case, (2014) 16 SCC 543, interpreting this very question of default bail in absence of report from FSL or similar agencies -- Held, that the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench is “per incuriam” -- No ground to release the petitioner on bail is made out.

(Para 6-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21A, 21B, 21C, 22A, 22B, 22C, 42(1), 50 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- NDPS case -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- What weighed with the trial Court was the fact that both the notices u/s 42(1) and 50 of the NDPS Act were defective -- Further even on merits there was material difference in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the point of time on which the notice u/s 50 was served upon the respondent/ accused – State has not been able to justify the infraction of the mandate of Sections 42(1) and Section 50 or explain the discrepancies in the statements -- Application seeking leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 219 -- Cheque bounce case – Four cheque bounced – One legal notice issued – Consolidation of trial -- There is no provision of consolidation of cases in the Code of Criminal Procedure – Only relief that can be granted, Trial Magistrate directed to fix all the four cases on one date so that it is convenient to both the parties to attend the hearing of all the four cases on one date.

(Para 3-5)