A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 -- Appeal against acquittal – Condonation of delay of 111 days – Declined  -- Reason/ground for condonation of delay in the application has not specifically been explained – State does not have the right to file appeals at belated stage on the ground of procedural delay -- State is expected to expedite the matter in case they want to prefer appeal against judgment of acquittal or conviction -- No proper explanation has been given by the State -- Application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 120-B -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Murder case -- Appeal against acquittal – Trial Court gave a specific finding that accused was not named neither by the complainant nor by PW-5 stating him to be a part of conspiracy -- As per FSL report, the weapon was found to be in a working condition but none of the live cartridges were ever used by respondent/ accused in the commission of offence – By giving the benefit of doubt, he has rightly been acquitted.

(Para 16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127, 362 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Court not to alter judgment – Applicability of -- Magistrate does not become functus officio after passing an order u/s 125 Cr.P.C., as and when occasion arises the Magistrate exercises the jurisdiction from time to time -- Legislative Scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. clearly enumerated the circumstances and incidents where Court passing a judgment or final order disposing the case can alter or review the same -- Embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus, clearly relaxed in proceeding u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127, 362 -- Settlement between the parties – Non-honouring of – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Court not to alter judgment – Applicability of -- Maintenance rights of wife -- When the appellant-husband did not honour its commitment under settlement, can the wife be left in lurch by not able to press for grant of maintenance on non-compliance by the appellant of the terms of settlement -- The answer is obviously ‘No’ -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. has to be interpreted in a manner as to advance justice and to protect a woman for whose benefit the provisions have been engrafted -- Held, order passed by Family Court reviving the maintenance application of the wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. by setting aside order passed on settlement is not hit by the embargo contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. -- Family Court has done substantial justice in reviving the maintenance application of the wife.

(Para 29-32)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 (c) – NDPS case -- Sentence reduced to already undergone --  Recovery of 700 gram from appellant and 300 gram of opium from co-accused – Conviction for one year RI and fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo RI for 02 months – FIR relates to the year 2016 -- Sentence undergone 4 month, 17 days -- It is a fit case wherein sentence can be reduced to the period already undergone -- Sentence of fine and default clause shall remain intact -- Appellant be released forthwith on deposit of fine.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Medical negligence death – No Medical Board opinion – Compromise between parties – Quashing of FIR -- No expert opinion of the medical board that petitioner ever committed any negligence, while performing operation and was responsible for the death of wife of complainant -- Compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties -- FIR registered u/s 304-A IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed.

(Para 8)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222, 223 -- Demand of bribe – Disproportionate assets – Two F.I.R. – Clubbing of -- First FIR was registered on account of demanding a bribe and when a trap was laid down, he was caught red handed while accepting the said bribe -- Subsequent to the first FIR, when the official residence was searched, a huge amount in cash and certain documents regarding disproportionate assets were found in possession of the petitioner, qua which the second FIR was registered – Held, both the FIRs are based on different set of allegations and cannot be clubbed or tried together.

(Para 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 273, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- FIR u/s 406, 498-A – Application for examining of prosecution witness through video conferencing – Held, JMIC clearly erred in dismissing the application -- Impugned order set aside, application for examination through video conferencing allowed -- Accused would be allowed all adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 182, 401 -- Acquittal in 182 Cr.P.C. proceedings -- Revisional jurisdiction of High Court is quite limited -- Court is to interfere only if there is an illegality or infirmity apparent on the face of the judgment/order passed by a Court below or the same is perverse -- Merely because another view in the matter is possible, no inference with such judgment is to be done – Revision dismissed.

(Para 13-15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Cancellation report by police – Non-acceptance by Trial Court – Case adjourned for complainant’s evidence – Challenged by accused – Remedy of – Held, after the complainant produces the evidence, Ld. Magistrate may or may not summon the accused -- If the accused are summoned, they have got remedy of challenging that order by way of filing a revision petition before the Court of Sessions or/and filing appropriate application (s) in the trial Court itself – Accused have not been summoned so far – Petition dismissed.

(Para 20-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent jurisdiction of High court -- Section 482 Cr.P.C. deals with inherent powers of the High Court providing that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Proclaimed offender – Compromise between the parties -- Relationship was not based on a false promise of marriage – Affidavit submitted by the prosecutrix establish that the relationship was consensual with the prosecutrix, 28 years at that time -- Both were major and capable of taking a reasoned decision to enter into a physical relationship -- It is also not the case of the prosecutrix that the act complained off occurred only once or that she had been subjected to any kind of force -- It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her --  FIR would further reflect that the marriage was not being solemnized on account of his parents not giving their consent – Held, it could not be said that he had made a false promise of marriage, only to entice her into the said physical relationship -- Very offence of rape would not be established -- FIR u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceeding including the order declaring him to be a proclaimed offender are quashed since the continuation of the same would tantamount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 5, 15-18)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce case – Rebuttal of presumption -- Initial presumption is in favour of holder of the cheque in view of Section 139 of the Act, however, the same is rebuttable -- It is permissible for the accused to rebut the same on the basis of evidence led by the prosecution.

(Para 6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Signatures on the cheque is not denied, yet the complainant has failed to prove any friendly relationship with the accused -- No acknowledgement has been placed on record nor in the income tax returns Mark `A’ and Mark `B’, there is any reference of loan when it is an admitted fact that the wife of attorney (complainant) had been into the business of Hire Purchase and Investment for the last 20 years -- It is permissible for the accused to point out contradictions/deficiencies in the evidence led by the prosecution and that it is not necessary for the accused to lead evidence in defence to rebut the presumption -- No ground to grant leave to appeal. ANSS Raja Shekhar’s case (2019) SCC 185 & Kishan Rao’s case (2018) 8 SCC 165 relied.

(Para 14-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 325, 379-B, 506, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 10, 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420 -- Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of 1983), Section 24 -- Complaint case – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Postponement of process – Power of issuance of summons -- Being a pure legal issue can be tested on the basis of admitted facts on record and can be raised at any stage -- Petitioners/accused are operating their office at Jalandhar and the contract for permanent residency in Australia was signed at Jalandhar by the respondent/complainant – Held, complaint filed before the Magistrate at Kapurthala, it was mandatory for the Magistrate to comply with Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- Impugned summoning order set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial Court to pass order afresh after holding an enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. Abhijit Pawar's case 2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 405 (SC) relied.

(Para 12, 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A – Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioners have solemnised marriage and the complainant, who is mother of petitioner No.1, has suffered a statement before learned Magistrate in support of compromise -- Continuation of the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant FIR qua the petitioners shall be an abuse of the process of law -- FIR u/s 363 and 366-A IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6,7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 -- Second Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Double jeopardy -- Trial court convicted the accused – Appellate Court acquitted the accused solely based upon Yogendra Pratap Singh’s case, 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 550 -- Hon’ble Apex Court held in that case, where the complaint was filed before the expiry of the period 15 days stipulated in the notice, the Court cannot take the cognizance thereof, however, the second complaint on the same cause of action has been held to be maintainable and the delay in filing such complaint shall be deemed to have been condoned -- Held, it cannot be said that the filing of the second complaint and passing of the summoning order therein, amounts to double jeopardy to the petitioner.

(Para 6-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Accused summoned u/s 138 NI Act -- Absence of complainant -- Dismissal of complaint for non-prosecution – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Maintainability of -- On account of absence of complainant on one occasion dismissal of the complaint for non-prosecution was not justified, since, it is always desirable that a lis should be decided on merits, rather than, non-suiting the parties on technical grounds -- Present petition challenging the impugned order is maintainable and no fault can be found with the same -- Petition accepted; impugned order set aside and the complaint is ordered to be restored at its original number.

(Para 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 9, 12, 13 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 409 – Exemption from personal appearance of accused -- Appellant is appearing before the learned Trial Court on each and every Friday since 2013 -- Appellant is a permanent resident of Delhi and is the Director on the Boards of several companies -- Distance between Delhi and Hyderabad is approximately 1500 kms – Normal rule is that the evidence shall be taken in the presence of the accused, however, even in the absence of the accused, such evidence can be taken but then his counsel must be present in the court -- Nothing is on record that, at any point of time, any effort has been made by the appellant to stall/delay the trial -- Exemption on the very same grounds of two co-accused in cases arising of the same FIR have been allowed, one by High Court, another by Trial Court – Personal appearance of the petitioner dispensed with conditions. Bhaskar Industries Ltd.’s case (2001) 7 SCC 401 relied.

(Para 6,7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155 – F.I.R. – Delay in -- Complaint was written immediately after the occurrence -- FIR is based only on this complaint and it does not contain anything more or less than the complaint -- Contents of the FIR cannot be said to be interpolated.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157 – Procedure of investigation – Compliance of -- Mere delay in compliance of Section 157 by itself is not fatal to prosecution -- Even if prosecution has failed to prove that Section 157 Cr.PC was complied with then also the effect thereof has to be assessed.

(Para 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134, 136 -- Interested witness – Evidential value -- Six persons heavily armed, two of them with guns, killed the deceased in broad day light -- While leaving the place of occurrence they threatened all gathered there by saying that anybody who tried to interfere would meet the same fate -- In such a situation no other villager who may have been present would turn up to give evidence – Two of the witnesses have spoken up and their evidence has been corroborated on all counts -- Evidence does not show that the enmity or dispute between these two witnesses and the accused was of such a nature that these two witnesses would make false statements only to settle scores with the appellants thereby leaving the real culprits to go scot-free -- Merely because these witnesses are interested witnesses their testimony cannot be discarded.

(Para 19)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134, 136 – Direct ocular evidence – Medical evidence – Non-examination of Ballistic expert -- Report of the ballistic experts have not been proved and all the bullets recovered from the spot have not been sent to the ballistic expert -- Guns seized may or may not be the guns used – Held, when the ocular evidence is direct and clear in this regard, and this ocular evidence is fully supported by the medical evidence, the negligence of the investigation team cannot be used by the defence in support of their case.

(Para 21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 -- Investigaiton report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. – Magistrate’s power – Nature of Magistrate’s duty u/s 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the Section.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Furnishing of documents – Fair trial -- Furnishing of documents to the accused u/s 207 of the 1973 Code is a facet of right of the accused to a fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65-B – Electronic record – Document – Admissibilty of -- Electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence u/s 3 of the 1872 Act -- Any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a “document” and shall be admissible in evidence subject to satisfying other requirements of the said provision.

(Para 21-25)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 29 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 3(18) – Memory Card – Document – Held, contents of the memory card would be a “matter” and the memory card itself would be a “substance” and hence, the contents of the memory card would be a “document”.

(Para 26-31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A -- Disclosure of identity of the victim – Effect of -- Explanation offered by the appellant is plausible inasmuch as the prosecution itself had done so by naming the victim in the First Information Report/Crime Case, the statement of the victim under Section 161, as well as under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, and in the chargesheet/police report filed before the Magistrate.

(Para 34)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of -- Privacy of victim – Right of Accused:

--       Accused, who are interested in reassuring themselves about the genuineness and credibility of the contents of the memory card in question or that of the pen-drive produced before the trial Court by the prosecution on which the prosecution would rely during the trial, are free to take opinion of an independent expert agency, such as the CFSL on such matters as they may be advised, which information can be used by them to confront the prosecution witnesses including the forensic report of the State FSL relied upon by the prosecution forming part of the police report.

--       Considering that this is a peculiar case of intra-conflict of fundamental rights flowing from Article 21, that is right to a fair trial of the accused and right to privacy of the victim, it is imperative to adopt an approach which would balance both the rights.

–       Court is duty bound to issue suitable directions -- Even the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the 1973 Code, is competent to issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice.

--       If the accused or his lawyer himself, additionally, intends to inspect the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in question, he can request the Magistrate to provide him inspection in Court, if necessary, even for more than once alongwith his lawyer and I.T. expert to enable him to effectively defend himself during the trial.

--       If such an application is filed, the Magistrate must consider the same appropriately and exercise judicious discretion with objectivity while ensuring that it is not an attempt by the accused to protract the trial. While allowing the accused and his lawyer or authorized I.T. expert, all care must be taken that they do not carry any devices much less electronic devices, including mobile phone which may have the capability of copying or transferring the electronic record thereof or mutating the contents of the memory card/pen-drive in any manner.

Such multipronged approach may subserve the ends of justice and also effectuate the right of accused to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(Para 38-43)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 207,  327(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 228-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 – Memory Card – Pen Drive – Copy of – Inspection of -- Fair Trial – Right of -- Held, contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document -- If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial -- However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial -- Court may issue suitable directions to balance the interests of both sides.

(Para 44)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act -- Dismissal of complaint – Appellant/complainant has averred that the amount of cheque is part of sale consideration which stands belied from the reading of registered sale deed -- Once on preponderance of probabilities the defence creates doubt, the onus shifts on the complainant to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt and the protective umbrella of Section 139 of the N.I. Act is no more available. Dismissal of complaint order, upheld. Rangappa’s case, (2010) 11 SCC 441 relied.

(Para 1,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A, 506 – Dowry case – Criminal breach of trust – Embezzlement of istridhan – Quashing of FIR -- FIR is a document first in point of time is very foundation of the case – Only general, vague and ambiguous allegations, no specific entrustment of any of the articles of Ishtridhan to any of accused-petitioners nor there is any allegation that they have embezzled the same and refused to return back these articles which were meant for the exclusive use of the bride/complainant – Husband is residing where he was employed and where too the complainant wife had put up after the marriage – Material question arises how the articles of Ishtridhan have come about in possession of the in-laws – Proceedings held to be misuse of the process of the court against innocent relations of the husband resulting in gross miscarriage of justice, needs to be set aside -- FIR and all the proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302 – Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Examine/Cross-examination of – Right of -- Assistance given by the victim’s counsel is meant to be given to the prosecution in general -- A victim’s counsel should ordinarily not be given the right to make oral arguments or examine and cross-examine witnesses.

(Para 11-12.4)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(w)(a), 24(8), 225, 301(2), 302, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Victim’s Counsel – Oral Arguments – Cross-examination of – Right of -- If the victim’s counsel feels that a certain aspect has gone unaddressed in the examination of the witnesses or the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor, he may route any questions or points through the Public Prosecutor himself – If the victim’s counsel finds that the Public Prosecutor has not examined a witness properly and not incorporated his suggestions either, he may bring certain questions to the notice of the Court -- If the Judge finds merit in them, he may take action accordingly by invoking his powers under Section 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 12.4-12.5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 87, 89, 390 – Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Under this Section the Magistrate can issue warrants of arrest against a person:-

(a) Who is an escaped convict

(b) Proclaimed offender

(c) Person accused of ‘non-bailable’ offence and is ‘evading arrest’.

Held that u/s 73 the Magistrate can issue warrants against a person who is evading arrest, only if such a person was required to appear before the court under some other order passed under some other provision; like u/s 87, 89 or 390 of Cr.P.C.; during the trial or at the time of or after taking cognizance -- Neither there is any necessity for a warrant of arrest for arresting an accused during investigation nor has the court been given any specific power in this regard by any specific provision of Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82, 173 – Cognizable offence -- Investigation report -- Arrest warrant – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Before filing report u/s 173 the police cannot get a warrant of arrest against a person, without any specific reason -- A person cannot be declared as a proclaimed person or offender in routine by following procedure u/s 82 of Cr.P.C.; only because despite having power to arrest an accused the police had not succeeded in arresting such a person or might not have chosen to arrest such a person.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41 – Cognizable offence -- Power to arrest of police -- Provisions of Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. are quite clear that unless a cognizable offence is committed by a person in the presence of such police officer, police officer cannot arrest an accused only on the basis of his whims that he suspects the said person to have committed some offence -- If such person has committed some cognizable offence, which is punishable for imprisonment, then before arresting the person, the police officer has to satisfy himself that the arrest of such person is necessary; for the purposes delineated in the Section itself.

(Para 12)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73, 82 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Police use the power of the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest against an accused, only as a tool to avoid its responsibility to carry out the investigation to the logical end; and only for the purpose of getting such an accused declared as proclaimed offender –        This methodology is normally adopted by the police just to get rid of the responsibility of putting a report before the Magistrate qua investigation – As a result, lots of persons are got declared as proclaimed offenders; and forgotten altogether by the police thereafter, Held;

--       Before the Magistrate/court has taken cognizance of any offence, the power of issuance of warrants of arrest under any provision of Cr.P.C., on an application of a police officer, cannot be invoked by the Magistrate as a routine matter.

--       Only for arresting a person; the police do not require any warrant as such. Hence, it would not lie in the mouth of the police to allege before the Magistrate, without there being any specific reasons or any barrier in their way, that the accused is evading arrest.

--       During investigation; even if there is some specific legal or factual obstacle or barrier, which makes the arrest without warrant impossible, and if the police intend to seek warrant of arrest from the Magistrate for such arrest, under any provision of the Cr.P.C., the police are required to specify the obstacle, which the warrant issued by the court would remove and because of which such obstacle or the barrier in way of the police; the accused was succeeding in evading his arrest.

--       Unless, there is any specific obstacle; because of which the police were not able to arrest; and which could not be removed by the police on their own and without the aid of the warrant of the court, the issuance of warrant of arrest by the Magistrate, only on assertion of the police that the accused was evading arrest, would be only a routine exercise, and would be only for the aid of the investigating officer, which could not be done by the Magistrate.

(Para 14)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 73 – Proclaimed person/ offender -- Cognizable offence – Non-bailable offence -- Arrest warrant – Power of Magistrate -- Application seeking issuance of warrant against the petitioner, is silent qua any reason -- Not only this, no reason, whatsoever, has been spelt out in the application, even qua the requirements of arrest as mentioned in Section 41 Cr.P.C, to justify arrest of the petitioner, except to say that the petitioner is evading arrest -- Magistrate has issued the warrant only to enlarge the effort of the police qua its investigation and that there is no stay of arrest -- Although the Magistrate may not be required to record any detailed reasons, however none of these reasons given is germane to the provisions under which the Magistrate is required to exercise his powers to issue warrants of arrest -- Impugned warrants of arrest and consequent orders impugned are quashed.

(Para 15-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed offender -- Order challenged after 4 years -- There may not be any reason to allow, however keeping in view the fact that the matter actually arises out of proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and petitioner undertakes to continue appearing before the trial Court on each and every date and also and a mother of two minor children (less than 10 years of age), impugned order set aside, upon the petitioner furnishing adequate bail bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 1)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 36(A) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 173(2) -- Challan without Chemical examination report – Default bail – Right of -- It would not be appropriate to hold that in absence of report of the chemical examiner from the FSL or such like agencies, the accused is entitled to default bail -- Held, attention of the Division Bench in Ajit Singh @ Jeeta and another, Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14121 was not drawn to two Supreme Court judgments (Narender Kumar Amin’ case, (2015) 3 SCC 417 and Abdul Azeez P.V.’s case, (2014) 16 SCC 543, interpreting this very question of default bail in absence of report from FSL or similar agencies -- Held, that the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench is “per incuriam” -- No ground to release the petitioner on bail is made out.

(Para 6-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21A, 21B, 21C, 22A, 22B, 22C, 42(1), 50 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- NDPS case -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- What weighed with the trial Court was the fact that both the notices u/s 42(1) and 50 of the NDPS Act were defective -- Further even on merits there was material difference in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the point of time on which the notice u/s 50 was served upon the respondent/ accused – State has not been able to justify the infraction of the mandate of Sections 42(1) and Section 50 or explain the discrepancies in the statements -- Application seeking leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 219 -- Cheque bounce case – Four cheque bounced – One legal notice issued – Consolidation of trial -- There is no provision of consolidation of cases in the Code of Criminal Procedure – Only relief that can be granted, Trial Magistrate directed to fix all the four cases on one date so that it is convenient to both the parties to attend the hearing of all the four cases on one date.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 379 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 54 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner only, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/-.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 200 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 34 -- Civil dispute – Criminal proceedings – Abuse of process of law -- After coming to know that the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the original complainant himself paid the mortgage money and got the mortgage redeemed and got the sale deed executed in his name – Complainant filed an application u/s 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which came to be rejected by the Ld. Magistrate -- Said order was not assailed by the complainant -- Thereafter he filed a private complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. which was pending before the Ld. Magistrate -- Despite the above, he filed a writ petition before the High Court, which is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- High Court ought to have closed the proceedings – For settling a civil dispute, the criminal complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4.1-4.3)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 302 -- Right of Victim to conduct prosecution / Inquiry -- Though the Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at the mere asking but the victim has a right to assist the Court in a trial before the Magistrate -- Magistrate may consider as to whether the victim is in a position to assist the Court and as to whether the trial does not involve such complexities which cannot be handled by the victim -- On satisfaction of such facts, the Magistrate would be within its jurisdiction to grant of permission to the victim to take over the inquiry of the pendency before the Magistrate.

(Para 15)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Recovery of -- In case an accused, against whom an order to pay interim compensation u/s 143A of the Act is passed, fails or is unable to pay the amount of interim compensation, the process u/s 421 can be taken resort to which may inter alia result in coercive action of recovery of the amount of interim compensation as if the amount represented the arrears of land revenue – Extent and rigor of the procedure prescribed for such recovery may vary from State to State but invariably, such procedure may visit the person concerned with coercive methods.

(Para 12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143A – Section 138, 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable u/s 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A – Section 143A held to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.

(Para 14-24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420, 120-B – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12 -- Punjab Travel Professionals Regulation Act, 2014, Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Permission to accused to go abroad -- Nothing on record to doubt the bona-fides of the petitioner -- Petitioner is ready and willing to furnish sufficient sureties including that of his father, for coming back; in case the Court so requires -- Also expressed undertaking before this Court that she would be ready to appear before the trial Court at any time, even on a notice of one week's time and she would not have any objection to the proceedings undertaken by the trial Court in her absence, in case the counsel for the petitioner is present before the Court – Petitioner is granted permission to go abroad for a period of six months.

(Para 7-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 506, 120-B/34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- Cheating and forgery – Acquittal of – Leave to appeal -- Accused are Sarpanch and her husband -- Main allegation against the respondents/accused is that they had affixed the thumb impressions in the muster-roll regarding disbursement of the amount of Rs. 4212/- in August and Rs. 2268/- in October – Muster-roll Ex. P1, was prepared by the Gram Sachiv -- All the Panches of the Gram Panchayat had signed the said muster-roll -- Other members of the Gram Panchayat, who were signatories to the muster-roll (Ex. P1), had not been arrayed as accused -- Even complainant had also put his thumb impressions on the said muster-roll -- On the complaint moved by the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, exonerated of the charges levelled against them -- Even  as per the FSL report, the thumb impressions were not matchable – Appellate court acquitted the respondents – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 379-B, 506, 148 & 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Although the FIR involves Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act, however, the fact of the case will show that the alleged weapon recovered in the case is licensed gun of the petitioner and the injury allegedly caused to the injured/witness was not that much serious, therefore, the FIR u/s 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act can be quashed on the basis of compromise -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the present petitioner.

(Para 8,9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 61, 62, 63 – Abetment to suicide -- Photocopy of dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Original dying declaration not brought on record -- Trial court never made any effort to ensure proving of documents by even secondary means by resorting to the provisions of Sections 61, 62 and 63 of the Evidence Act – Mere photostat copy cannot be allowed to be exhibited and read into evidence and therefore, by no stretch of imagination such a document exhibited can be a legal piece of evidence.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Abetment to suicide -- Onus to prove -- Stand in statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C that deceased had given birth to two children at different point of times and who died soon after birth and therefore, was cause of depression for the deceased and compelled her to take this step on account of this stress -- Prosecution has not proved any particulars with cogent evidence of previous history of physical torture/beatings by the husband and the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring to an end her life – When the wife put herself on fire, the husband came to her rescue and after putting off the fire, rushed her to a hospital is a conduct which goes to establish and show that the husband had taken every possible step to save life of the wife, therefore, improbalizes the theory of the prosecution that the husband abetted to this suicide.

(Para 7)

Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(1)(c), (6), (15) – Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), Section 43(2), (3)(c)(i) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 309 – Custody of 60 days – No-cognizance taken by Court – Power of remand – Default bail – Held, section 309 Cr.P.C., would come in to operation only after taking cognizance -- It is undisputed that remand cannot be beyond 60 days u/s 167 Cr.P.C. and further remand could only be at post cognizance stage -- Petitioners are lying incarcerated in custody beyond the period of 60 days without the trial Court having taken cognizance and the petitioners, in such circumstances, are entitled to statutory bail, it being their indefeasible right – Petitioners are ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 1, 18-24)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(2), 389 – Appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Suspension of Sentence – Pre-condition of deposit 20% -- Power of -- Amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the Appellate Court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant-Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant-Accused under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Provision of 20% deposit – Mandatory or Directory -- Nature of -- Considering the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act, though it is true that in amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned – Such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Sec 138 of the N.I. Act.

(Para 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Conclusion of trial – Bifurcation of trial -- Absconding accused trial -- Summoning of additional accused – Power of trial court -- Following substantial questions of law arise for further consideration:

I. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?

II. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial?

III. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

Direction given to the Registry to place the matters before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength for considering the aforesaid questions.

(Para 27, 28)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- Divorce by compromise – Criminal case not withdrawn by wife – Contempt petition dismissed – Quashing of FIR – Held, if the parties had arrived at a settlement and decided to withdraw the cases filed by each of the parties against the other, the compromise ought to be effectuated in complete sense – Leaving aside the technicalities, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to quash the proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the respondent-wife -- Further proceedings in said FIR now stand quashed.

(Para 8)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce by compromise – Right of daughter for maintenance etc. -- Waiver of – Permissibility of -- As per term 6 of Consent Terms, It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan but she could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned -- By exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Clause (6) of the Consent Terms set-aside.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Conviction in murder case – Delay in filing appeal – Dismissal of – Permissibility of -- Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was delay of 1192 days in preferring the appeal -- Held, since the matter arose out of conviction u/s 302 IPC, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and heard the matter on merit – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451 --Superdari of vehicle -- Registered owner – Possessor of vehicle – Right of -- Trial court issued release order in favour of complainant/possessor of vehicle – Order affirmed by  revisional court -- Both court below gave finding that prima facie the petitioner has transferred ownership in favour of complainant though he remain registered owner – Order in favour of complainant/possessor of vehicle, upheld.

 (Para 1-4,13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2), 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 – Default bail given – New sections/offences added – Anticipatory bail applied -- Petitioner was given benefit of bail u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as challan was not presented against him – Main case of the prosecution remains the same regarding disproportionate assets – Held, if some other offences have been added in the FIR, even then, the petitioner is not required for further interrogation purposes etc. – Petition allowed, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in newly added Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

(Para 6-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 319 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 448, 294(b) and 506 Additional accused – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C – Vague details in FIR/161 Statement – Effect of -- In the FIR/ 161 statement, the names of the appellants or any other description have not been given so as to identify them – No assertion in respect of the villages to which the additional accused belong – Allegations in the FIR are vague and can be used any time to include any person in the absence of description in the FIR to identify such person -- Held, no strong or cogent evidence to make the appellants stand the trial for the offences u/s 147, 448, 294(b) and 506 of IPC.

(Para 14)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Additional accused – Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C – Strong and cogent evidence – Requirement of -- Additional accused cannot be summoned u/s 319 in casual and cavalier manner in the absence of strong and cogent evidence – U/s 319, additional accused can be summoned only if there is more than prima facie case as is required at the time of framing of charge but which is less than the satisfaction required at the time of conclusion of the trial convicting the accused.

(Para 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(8), 190, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204 – Complaint to Magistrate – Cognizance  of – Nature of -- In case the Magistrate takes the cognizance of the offence and proceeds u/Ss 200 to 204 Cr.P.C then it would be tried as a 'complaint case', however, if at the stage prior to cognizance, the police is asked, u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C, to investigate and to file a report; then Magistrate would be taking the cognizance on the police report, therefore, it would be tried as a case 'on police report' -- However, it is purely the discretion of the Magistrate to decide the course of action, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case; whether to order an investigation and to seek a report from the police or not – As per section 202 even during the trial of the complaint case, if at any stage, the Magistrate thinks it fit, he can again direct the police to conduct the investigation qua any aspect -- In case of a trial on police report, the Magistrate has the power to order investigation on any aspect at any time; u/s 173(8) Cr.P.C.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 203, 204 -- Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Power of Magistrate – Speaking order – Requirement of -- If no reasons are required to recorded by the police for registration of FIR and for investigating the same, then there is no question of the Magistrate being required to record reasons for the same -- Non-recording of reasons does not vitiate the order of the Magistrate -- Such an order of Magistrate has been taken at par with supervisory administrative or executive order; instead of taking it as part of a strictly judicial process.

(Para 15-18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Affidavit – Requirement of -- Insisting upon affidavits at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C may not be desirable; because an affidavit is a sworn statement, which if submitted before the Magistrate, may not be possible for him to ignore at that time; even if it turns out to be false later on.

(Para 19)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Investigaiton order – Revisional jurisdiction -- Revision can be maintained only on one ground; that the Magistrate himself was not competent to take cognizance of the offences qua which he has ordered investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C.

(Para 20-24)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Investigaiton order – Quashing of FIR -- Remedy of – Person affected can approach the High Court for quashing of the FIR, like any other FIR, on the grounds for which an FIR can be quashed -- But in such petition as well, the challenge has to be to the FIR on merits and not to the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 25)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Section 156(3), 397, 401, 482 – Complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Fixing the case for preliminary evidence – Second revision -- Inherent power of High Court -- Petition challenging judgment passed by the ASJ whereby he has upheld the Order passed by the JMIC, declining to send the complaint of the petitioner to the police; for investigation and instead, ordering recording of preliminary evidence in the complaint -- Petitioner only tried to get adjudicated upon correctness, validity and propriety of the order passed by the courts below -- Hence this is nothing but a second revision petition in the garb of invoking the powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- Petition not maintainable.

(Para 30)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Offence by Company – Liability of Director – Quashing of Complaint by High court -- Law requires that the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company’s business at the time when the offence was committed – High Court, in deciding a quashing petition u/s 482, Cr.P.C., must consider whether the averment made in the complaint is sufficient or if some unimpeachable evidence has been brought on record which leads to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time -- High Court must exercise its power u/s 482, Cr.P.C. when it is convinced, from the material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court.

(Para 9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 102, 451, 457 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder case – Seizure of truck – Requirement of -- Truck in question could not have been directed to be seized since there is no evidence that it was used in the commission of the offence of murder -- Merely because there were rival claims about the ownership of the truck; that does not warrant the seizure of the truck -- Truck in question ordered to be released on Sapurdari to its registered owner.

(Para 2, 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cheating -- Anticipatory bail -- Condition requiring the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakh), that too directly to the informant/complainant, is harsh and unacceptable -- Condition set aside -- Appellant must comply with other conditions specified in the impugned order for availing the benefit of anticipatory bail.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Dowry death case -- Acquittal of co-accused/wife in separate trial -- Discharge application by appellant/husband – Consideration of -- In acquittal judgment of wife, categorical findings have been recorded that she along with her husband/appellant were present in particular State on the date of the occurrence, which attained finality – No reason, why the High Court has taken the view that accused appellant was in that State on the date of occurrence needed to be proved in the course of the trial – High Court, ought to have discharged the accused/appellant – Appeal allowed, order of the High Court set aside -- Appellant ordered to be discharged.

(Para 3-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 (Fifthly), 376 – Rape case – Conviction u/s 376 of IPC – Quantum of sentence -- Prior to the Amendment 13 of 2013, the conviction u/s 376(1), the punishment shall not be less than seven years – Accused was aged about 23 years at the time of occurrence in 2009 and victim was aged about 14 years and 5 months -- Consent of victim is of no consequence to reduce the sentence less than minimum sentence of seven years – Considering the period of sentence already undergone and also the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is reduced from 10 years to the statutory minimum period of seven years.

(Para 1,4,5)