Search By Topic: Criminal Procedural Law

1002. (SC) 14-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1), 389(3) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – In view of mandate of Section 389(3) of the CrPC, the principles are different in the case of sentence not exceeding three years and/or in the case of bailable offences -- Discretion u/s 389(1) is to be exercised judicially, the Appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Dowry death -- Object was to curb dowry death -- Section 304B does not categorize death, it covers every kind of death that occurs otherwise than in normal circumstances -- Where the other ingredients of Section 304B of the Code are satisfied, the deeming fiction of Section 304B would be attracted and the husband or the relatives shall be deemed to have caused the death of the bride -- In dealing with cases under Section 304B, this legislative intent has to be kept in mind -- Once there is material to show that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment before death, there is a presumption of dowry death and the onus is on the accused in-laws to show otherwise.

(Para 28-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389, 439 –Bail being the rule and jail an exception  -- Regular bail – Suspension of sentence – Difference between -- There is a difference between grant of bail u/s 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence u/s 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post-conviction.

-- In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.

-- In case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial.

(Para 36)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors -- There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 36)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Death took place within 7 or 8 months and there is oral evidence of the parents of cruelty and torture immediately preceding the death -- Also evidence of payment of Rs.2,50,000/- to the Respondent-Accused by the victim’s brother -- Respondent No.2-accused has not been able to demonstrate any apparent and/or obvious illegality or error in the judgment of the Sessions Court, to call for suspension of execution of the sentence. Held,

-- In considering an application for suspension of sentence, the Appellate Court is only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in the order of conviction that renders the order of conviction prima facie erroneous.

-- Where there is evidence that has been considered by the Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under Section 389 to re-assess and/or re-analyze the same evidence and take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release the convict on bail.

Appellant spent money beyond his financial capacity, at the wedding of the victim and had even gifted an I-10 car -- Failure to lodge an FIR complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim is inconsequential -- Parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete breakdown of the marriage by lodging an FIR against the Respondent No.2 and his parents, while the victim was alive. Impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender for being taken into custody -- The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

(Para 38-42)

1009. (P&H HC) 11-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 173, 482 – Delay in FIR / Investigation – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- There is unreasonable delay in registration of FIR as well as investigation of the case which warrants interference by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction – Direction given, Commissioner of police directed to ensure expeditious completion of the investigation preferably within sixty days – Chief Judicial Magistrate/ concerned JMIC to monitor investigation by periodically calling for status report from the police and to issue appropriate directions for expeditious completion thereof, if so required.

(Para 9, 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 173, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Investigation of criminal case -- Investigation has to be fair, prompt, transparent and judicious to both the victim as well as the accused. Ineffective, unfair, obscure, inexpedient and delayed investigation negates and is the antithesis of the rule of law affirmed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 197, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 166A -- Investigation of criminal case -- Deliberate inaction -- Unreasonable delay -- Failure to collect evidence -- Undue sympathy with/ shielding of the offenders – Remedy to complainant/ victim -- Complainant/victim of a crime may apply to the Judicial Magistrate, empowered to take cognizance of the offences in question on police report, for monitoring of investigation who can issue appropriate directions for expeditious completion of investigation -- Complainant/victim of a crime may also file complaint u/s 166A (b) of the IPC against the Investigating Officer -- Complainant/victim of a crime may alternatively file petition in the High Court for transfer of investigation to an independent agency such as CBI etc.

(Para 16-18)

1010. (P&H HC) 11-08-2020

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A, 147, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386, 401 (1) – Cheque bounce case -- Sentence to accused -- Revisional power – Nature of -- While exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Court possesses exercises all the powers conferred on an Appellate Court to alter the nature or the extent or the nature and extent of the sentence.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A, 147, 148 – Cheque bounce case – Not an offence against society – Imposition of sentence -- Offence u/s 138 of the Act is quasi criminal in nature -- It is not an offence against society and an accused can escape punishment by settling with the complainant -- Thus, while imposing a sentence u/s 138 of the Act, the Court must be alive to the concern of the Legislature in inserting Chapter XVII in the Act and then amending the provisions thereof to make the same more stringent as well as the jurisprudential principles of deterrence and restoration and that the offence is quasi criminal in nature.

(Para 10-14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Cheque bounce case – Cheque amount of Rs.4 lacs -- Maximum sentence of R.I. for two years imposed -- Compensation of payment of the cheque amount along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of issuance of cheque till the date of the judgment also awarded -- Award of maximum sentence is held to be arbitrary -- Petitioner is a poor person and having undergone a protracted trial of almost 10 years, also exist -- Sentence is reduced to RI for a period of one year and six months along with payment of compensation as awarded by the trial Court.

(Para 15-17)

1022. (SC) 28-07-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Procuration of Minor girl – Doubt created by defence – Consideration of -- Sweeping generalisations and superficial analysis – Permissibility of -- Reasoning is generic and is premised upon generalisations which may not be necessarily true always -- It is indisputable that parents would not ordinarily endanger the reputation of their minor daughter merely to falsely implicate their opponents, but such clichés ought not to be the sole basis of dismissing reasonable doubts created and/or defences set out by the accused.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Procuration of Minor girl -- Father eye-witness – Delay in 5 days in FIR – Effect of -- Five-day delay in registration of the FIR gains importance -- Difficult to appreciate that a father would await a second incident to happen before moving the law into motion -- Sweeping assumptions concerning delays in registration of FIRs for sexual offences, send a problematic signal to society and create opportunities for abuse by miscreants -- Instead, the facts of each individual case and the behaviour of the parties involved ought to be analysed by courts before reaching a conclusion on the reason and effect of delay in registration of FIR.

(Para 11)

C. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Re-appreciation of evidence by Supreme Court -- Ordinarily, the Supreme Court ought not to reappreciate evidence -- However, where the courts below have dealt with the material-on-record in a cavalier or mechanical manner which is likely to cause gross injustice, then the Court in such exceptional circumstances may justifiably reappraise the evidence to advance the cause of justice -- Such re-assessment ought not to take place routinely and ought not to become substitution of an otherwise plausible view taken by the Courts below.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Procuration of Minor girl -- Contradictions highlighted by defence -- Reversal of Burdon of proof – Permissibility of -- Trial Court has summarily disregarded the contradictions highlighted by the defense side, on the premise that such contradictions had no material bearing and that there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix -- High Court too has opined that PW-1 and PW-2 have completely corroborated each other and their testimonies were impeccable -- These reasons are not only contrary to the record but they also lead to an impermissible reversal of the burden of proof imposed in criminal trials.

(Para 17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Plausible version by accused – Analysis of – Requirements of law -- Any alternate version of events or interpretation proffered by the accused must be carefully analysed and considered by the trial Court in compliance with the mandate of Section 313(4) -- Such opportunity is a valuable right of the accused to seek justice and defend oneself -- Failure of the trial Court to fairly apply its mind and consider the defence, could endanger the conviction itself -- Unlike the prosecution which needs to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to create reasonable doubt or prove their alternate version by mere preponderance of probabilities – Held, once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defense plea.

(Para 21)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Criminal Intimidation -- Proving the intention to cause alarm or compel doing/abstaining from some act, and not mere utterances of words, is a pre-requisite of successful conviction under Section 506 of IPC -- Trial Court has undertaken no such separate analysis or recorded any finding on this count, thus calling into question the conviction for criminal intimidation – Conviction set aside.

(Para 25, 26)

1024. (P&H HC) 24-07-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail – Delay in furnishing bail bonds – Effect of -- Petitioner did “avail of” his right u/s 167(2) of the Code and furnished personal bail bond with surety, which was accepted and attested by the Court, he would be deemed to have been released from custody -- Petitioner was not released because two other cases were pending against him – Surety withdrew the surety furnished by him -- Court permitted the petitioner to furnish fresh bail bond with surety -- Since he was in custody in other cases, therefore, he did not furnish the fresh bail bond with surety – After granted bail in other cases, petitioner requested the Court to accept the personal bail bond with surety as directed vide earlier order, which was declined – Held, mere delay in furnishing personal bail bonds/surety cannot visit the petitioner with adverse consequences and the order granting bail u/s 167(2) of the Code does not cease to exist or comes to an end or stand eclipsed -- Petitioner is directed to furnish personal bail bonds with surety and thereafter ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Judgment passed by Supreme Court of India -- Courts below ignoring the judgment by saying not applicable, without discussion – Permissibility of -- Ld. Court below, in the order has taken notice of the judgment, but refuses to follow the same by observing that “these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case” – Held, a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India -- No doubt, the ratio decidendi laid down in a judgment is binding and not obiter dicta -- However, before distinguishing judgment, the Court is required to analyse that what is the ratio laid down in the judgment and thereafter, proceed to explain the same -- Manner in which the ld. Court below has ignored the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not appreciable.

(Para 11)

1031. (P&H HC) 02-07-2020

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 1 -- POCSO Act was enforced on 14.11.2012, therefore, the incident which occurred on the eve of Lohri festival in 2011 cannot be made basis to try and convict the appellant under POCSO Act.

(Para 28)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 164 – Contents of FIR – Statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. – Deposition before court – Improvements  in -- Slight change in the facts -- One cannot be expected to have eidetic/photographic memory -- Natural variation do happen and such depositions are considered and relied upon by the courts after its careful analysis.

(Para 34)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – FIR – Contents of -- FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire case of the prosecution -- An FIR is a mere first information sent to the prosecuting agency for setting criminal law in motion -- It is wrong to expect that in the FIR, complete detail of all the incidents must be disclosed -- An FIR is not expected to contain the proposed evidence to be produced by the prosecution.

(Para 35)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 8, 42 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 354-A -- Sentence cannot be awarded both under POCSO Act and Indian Penal Code simultaneously with respect to the offences enlisted in the Section 42 of POCSO Act -- Section 354-A overlaps to certain extent with offence u/s 7 of POCSO Act – Trial court committed an error in convicting the appellant u/s 354-A IPC as well as Sections 8 of POCSO Act -- Sentence awarded to the appellant u/s 354-A is set aside.

(Para 51, 52)

1032. (P&H HC) 23-06-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211  -- Framing of charge – Prima-facie -- At the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to sift and weigh the prosecution material on record only for the limited purposes to find out if it, prima-facie, discloses the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence against the accused and their involvement in the crime.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Attempt to murder –Framing of charge – Intention or knowledge – Prima facie -- Intention has to be absolute and specific and cannot be confused with the recklessness of the offender -- Unless and until this necessary ingredient is present, the charge u/s 307 IPC would not be made out -- Court has to satisfy itself that at least, prima-facie, the act by accused irrespective of its result was done with such intention or knowledge and under the circumstances, as mentioned in the section.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211  -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Medical opinion -- Framing of charge -- Medical opinion given by a doctor is only a guiding factor for the Courts and the opinion does not carry a binding effect -- Courts are free to examine and evaluate the nature of injuries independently to arrive at a just conclusion.

(Para 15)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 326 – Attempt to murder – Injury on head – Relevance of -- Merely because the injury was caused on the head, this alone would not be sufficient to charge for the offence punishable u/s 307 IPC -- Nowhere mentioned that the assailants had come with an intention to commit murder -- Nature of injury does not, prima-facie, make out an offence punishable u/s 307 IPC -- Considering the nature of the weapon (Spade/kassi) used while causing grievous hurt, a prima-facie case u/s 326 IPC would be made out for charge.

(Para 15,17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 447 -- Criminal trespass – Joint land – Framing of charge – Partition suit is still pending and rights of co-sharers are yet to eb determined -- Land in question was described as joint -- Necessary ingredients to constitute the offence of criminal trespass punishable u/s 447 IPC are not made out.

(Para 16)

1038. (SC) 18-06-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(2),  203 – Registration of FIR – Cancellation report – Protest petition – Dismissal of complaint u/s 203 Cr.P.C. -- Whether amounts to rejection of application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Magistrate, u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. directed the police to register a criminal case, investigate and submit police report in 90 days -- Police after investigation submitted a report u/s 173(2) that the accusations were false – Protest petition was registered as complaint case -- Magistrate, after hearing the respondent/complainant, not being satisfied, dismissed the complaint u/s 203 Cr.P.C. – Held, it was therefore not a rejection of an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(2),  203, 401 – Registration of FIR – Cancellation report – Dismissal of protest petition u/s 203 Cr.P.C. – Right of accused for hearing in revision -- Additional Sessions Judge, in a revision preferred by the respondent against the dismissal of his complaint, set aside the dismissal order, effectively restoring the complaint case arising out of a protest petition and directed further inquiry by the Magistrate -- High Court declined to interfere with the order – Held, restoration of the complaint by the Additional Sessions Judge was undoubtedly to the prejudice of the appellant -- Matter is remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge to hear the revision application afresh after notice to the appellant also.

(Para 5-8)

1046. (SC) 19-05-2020

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Fundamental Rights – Protection of -- Article 32 of the Constitution constitutes a recognition of the constitutional duty entrusted to Supreme Court to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Right to speech and expression – Fundamental right of Journalist – Airing of views -- Exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) -- Exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Article 19(2) -- Right of a journalist under Article 19(1)(a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express.

(Para 32)

C. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- F.I.R. -- Allegation against police -- Transfer of Investigation to CBI -- Power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances” – An accused person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency – Court do not find that levelling such allegations would by and itself constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of the investigation.

(Para 35-44)

D. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 – Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR -- Petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC -- Petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court – Held, a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable.

(Para 49)

E. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- One cause of action – FIR against -- Multiple FIRs and complaints – Quashing of -- Multiple FIRs and complaints in several states and in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir – Fairness in the administration of criminal justice would warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 to quash all other FIRs -- Filing of multiple FIRs arising out of the same telecast of the show hosted by the petitioner is an abuse of the process and impermissible -- Quashing of those FIRs would not amount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of the FIR which is being investigated.

(Para 2, 51)

1047. (P&H HC) 15-05-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Quashing of complaint/summoning order after Proclaimed offender order – Held, it would be in the interest of justice to see at the first instance whether any offence is made out against the petitioners as per allegations levelled against them in the complaint or not -- Because if the complaint fails, as a necessary corollary, all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom would automatically go.

(Para 1, 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Summoning order -- Proclaimed offender order – Quashing of -- Father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law – Role of – Specific allegations – Requirement of – No direct and specific allegations against the petitioners that they had given beatings to the complainant or demanded any dowry article or misappropriated the shtridhan It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498-A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives – Casual reference of their names that husband of the complainant gave her beatings at the instance of petitioners – Held, case in hand is a sheer abuse of process of law -- Consequently, the complaint and all subsequent proceedings including the summoning order and order declaring proclamation offender, qua petitioners are quashed.

(Para 1,18,19)

1050. (P&H HC) 14-05-2020

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Ingredients of offence – Strict interpretation -- To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that the accused intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe in any public place within public view -- Since these are the penal provisions, the same are to be given a strict construction and if any of the ingredients are found lacking, it would not constitute the offence under the SC/ST Act.

(Para 10-15)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Talks on mobile – Mens rea -- Alleged conversation over the mobile phone was not in a public gaze nor witnessed by any third party, the alleged use of caste words cannot be said to have been committed within the public view -- Merely uttering such wrong words in the absence of any public view does not show any intention or mens rea to humiliate the complainant who besides being Sarpanch, belongs to Scheduled Caste community -- It would not, thus, ipso-facto, constitute acts of commission of offence, which are capable of being taken cognizance under the SC and ST Act, 1989.

(Para 10-12)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Offence under SC/ST Act and IPC -- Discharge by Trial court – Power of -- It is a settled law that if two views are possible and one gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at that stage, it is not to be seen whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

(Para 13)