Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 201, 202, 302, 341, 34 – Murder case -- Superdari of vehicle -- If the vehicle remains parked in the police station for a considerable period of time, it would become unfit for being plying on the road as keeping it parked in the sun and rain could damage its tyres, colour, machinery, battery as also interiors of the vehicle -- Value of the vehicle would also diminish in such a situation – Petition allowed, vehicle ordered to be released to the petitioner/registered owner on superdari.

(Para 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 – Excise matter – Cognizable offence -- Search and seizure without FIR -- There are two kinds of FIRs namely, the FIR can be registered by the informant which was duly signed by him -- Secondly, the FIR can be registered by the police officer himself on any information received by him -- In both the cases, the information should be reduced into writing and thereafter, the investigation must be carried out -- Ex.P1 being a panchanama, it cannot be termed as a complaint -- FIR cannot be registered on the basis of panchanama.

(Para 15, 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157 – Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 (21 of 1966), Section 32, 34, 38-A -- Excise matter – Cognizance by court -- Search and seizure without FIR – FIR based on panchnama – Void abinitio – Acquittal – Respondent registered the FIR on the basis of panchanama which is erroneous and not proper – Trial Court ought not to have acted upon such FIR and cognizance should not have been taken on the strength of the said FIR – When the registration of FIR itself is void abinitio, the subsequent proceedings including the judgments are liable to be set aside – Revision allowed, judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside – Petitioners acquitted.

(Para 3, 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty -- Cognizance of – Court cannot take cognizance of an offence committed u/s 186 IPC without there being a complaint made by the concerned public servant, but there is no such requirement for offence u/s 353 CrPC -- Section 195 Cr. PC does not bar the trial of the accused person for a distinct offence, disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section.

(Para 11-15)

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 153-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Offence under UAPA – Regular bail -- Secessionist slogans painted on the walls of College and School – Petitioner not named in the FIR, arraigned as an accused on the statement of co-accused in another case -- Recovery of paint, clothes and mobile phone effected from the appellant in connection with the investigation in another FIR, no recovery made from him in the instant case -- No material to indicate that any monetary transactions had taken place and that the appellant had used a particular mobile phone for recording the incident and sending it to other accused -- Appellant in custody for 01 year and 09 months – Challan filed but charges are yet to be framed, prosecution cited 14 witnesses, therefore, the conclusion of trial would take some time – Bail allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- NDPS case – Default bail -- Extension of time for investigation for another 180 days – Report of Public prosecutor – Requirement of -- Application for extension reveals that it was prepared by the Investigating Officer and forwarded by the Public Prosecutor, with no report submitted by the Public Prosecutor as per the mandate of Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act -- Held, there has thus, been a failure to adhere to the requirements outlined in section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act -- Order of the trial Court granting extension of time to the investigating agency for completing investigation was erroneous -- Consequently, the impugned order set aside -- As a sequel to the above, since the investigation remained incomplete on the day application u/s 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner, he deserves to be enlarged on default bail – Default bail allowed.

(Para 11-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Acquittal -- Leave to appeal -- Ordinarily, the order of acquittal will not be interfered with, merely because another view is possible -- Upon passing the order of acquittal, presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened.

(Para 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Proprietorship Firm not impleaded as party – Neither it is the case of the petitioner/ accused that the amount in question had been advanced as loan to the firm nor the cross-examination of the complainant suggest any such stand of the petitioner -- Firm in question is a sole proprietorship firm of the petitioner/ accused and, as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner would not be responsible for the affairs of the said firm – Guilt of the petitioner/ accused upheld.

(Para 9)

A. “May” – “Shall” – Interpretation -- Word “may” ordinarily does not mean “must” -- Ordinarily, “may” will not be construed as “shall” -- But this is not an inflexible rule -- The use of the word “may” in certain legislations can be construed as “shall”, and the word “shall” can be construed as “may” -- It all depends on the nature of the power conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of the exercise of the power -- The legislative intent also plays a role in the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the word “may” has been used is also relevant.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the case is being tried as a warrant case -- In the case of a summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Recovery of -- By a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery -- Section 421 of the Cr.PC deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence -- Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr.PC. for recovery of interim compensation -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered treating it as fine -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered by the Trial Court by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property of the accused -- If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A from the complainant.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A(5) – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-payment of interim compensation – Right to defend -- Non-payment of interim compensation by the accused does not take away his right to defend the prosecution.

(Para 12)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Power of Trial Court – It can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty -- Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint u/s 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Word “may” used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as “shall”. Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

(Para 14)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

(Para 15)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Financial distress -- Factors to be considered while exercising discretion -- When the court deals with an application u/s 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A -- Presumption u/s 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation -- At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration –  Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted – Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused -- If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation -- Factors set out are not exhaustive -- There could be several other factors, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. -- While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

(Para 16)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Law summarised:

a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.”

b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.

c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.

iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc.

v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.

(Para 19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 482 -- Transit anticipatory bail – FIR in another State -- Court of Sessions or the High Court as the case may be can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail/ transit bail by way of interim protection for a limited duration even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction -- FIR registered at Hyderabad City -- Petition disposed of with the directions that the arrest of the petitioner shall remain stayed for a period of 15 days to enable him to file an appropriate petition for the grant of anticipatory bail before the appropriate Court at Hyderabad in the State of Telangana.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Foreign citizen -- Absconding -- Proclamation -- Petitioner was resident of UK since 1988 i.e. well before the relevant FIR was filed -- According to Section 82, a proclamation may be issued against an individual by the Court if it is reasonably believed that the person for whom a warrant has been issued has absconded or is hiding, making it impossible for the warrant to be carried out -- A person cannot be said to be “abscond” or “evade” the execution of warrant when he had gone to a distant place before the issue of the warrant.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Foreign citizen – Proclaimed person -- Petitioner is a resident of UK and has been a citizen of UK since the year 1988 i.e. 28 years – Petitioner has been shown to be a resident of Village in District Hoshiarpur but for all intents and purposes, the residence of the petitioner was in UK, therefore, there was no occasion for him to evade the process of law intentionally, as he was never served in accordance with law – Thus the proclamation order is in gross violation of Section 82 Cr.P.C – Impugned order vide which the petitioner has been declared proclaimed person, is bad in law and not sustainable, set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 21, 22 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Mining offence – Quashing of FIR -- Registration of the FIR is bad in the eyes of law, as cognizance of an offence under the MMDR Act can only be taken upon a criminal complaint -- MMDR Act is a special statute provisions regarding procedure must be adopted, general provisions of the IPC or the Cr.P.C. will not be attracted -- FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 25 and 29(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – NDPS case – Regular bail -- No effective steps taken to conclude the trial -- Petitioner was arrested on 11.03.2022 and is in custody since then -- Bail declined, the Special Judge directed to make an endeavour to conclude the trial expeditiously and preferably within six months.

(Para 5, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating -- Forgery – Quashing of FIR -- Information under RTI Act – Signature on application alleged to be forged -- No provision under the RTI Act or Rules made thereunder to file a complaint against an applicant, who sought any information under the said Act -- No loss of property or valuable security has been caused to the complainant, who is an official working under the DITS -- He had no locus standi to lodge prosecution against the petitioner(s) -- FIR ought to have been filed by SK, whose signatures are alleged to have been forged -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 13, 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 415, 463, 464 -- Cheating – Forgery – Essential ingredients for commission of offence of cheating are deception and inducement to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property – There must be an intention to induce a person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and the act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property – Further, to attract ingredients of forgery, there must be making of a false document or false electronic record with an intention to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471 -- Forgery -- Making of the false document is sine qua non for launching prosecution u/s 467, 468, 471 IPC.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471 -- Forgery -- Ingredients of forgery are attracted; if a person (i) made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorized by someone else; (ii) materially altered or tampered a document; (iii) procured a document by deception from a person, who is not in control of his senses.

(Para 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of cheque bounce complaint -- Several complaint cases u/s 138 of the N.I. Act are pending in the Court at Gurugram, Haryana and it is a solitary case which was instituted in the Court at Dwarka – Parties to the proceedings are residents of Gurugram and the witnesses are also hailing from Gurugram – Complaint transferred from Dwarka Court, New Delhi to the Court of the Gurugram, Haryana.

(Para 3-6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry before summoning -- Enquiry with respect to Section 202 CrPC can be conducted by the Magistrate himself – It is restricted only to find out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process has to be issued or not -- Neither there was any requirement to join the accused nor it is required that all the witnesses shall be examined.

(Para 4, 6, 6.1)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 202 – Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Enquiry before summoning -- Process issued after the complainant examined as many as six witnesses including himself and a handwriting expert after considering the documents brought on record by the complainant and the documents/ reports brought on record by the handwriting expert -- Requirement of enquiry substantially complied with.

(Para 4, 6.2)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Handwriting expert -- Defence set up by the petitioner/ accused is that the cheque in question had been issued not for the purpose of returning any loan, but for the purpose of making a donation to a Saint -- Mere fact that the body writing on the cheque in question is not of the accused or of the complainant and is in the hand of some 3rd person, would not have any bearing either on the case of the complainant or on the defence plea being set up by the accused – Application for examining Handwriting expert dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Handwriting expert -- Accused would be required to prima facie show that the witness sought to be examined does have a relevance with the defence plea sought to be substantiated by the accused or has a potential to demolish the case of the complainant.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(e) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 109 – Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 8(3) – Suspension of conviction/ sentence -- High Court overturned the acquittal and has convicted the appellant for three years – Appellant who is a MLA will incur disqualification as a result of the conviction -- High Court has not considered the main question whether the view taken by the Special Court was a possible view -- Conviction and sentence suspended. Afjal Ansari’s case (2024) 2 SCC 187 relied.

(Para 2-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of complaint – Basic ingredients – Requirement of -- Submission that complaint does not contain date of presentation of cheque before the bank, the date of return of the cheque as unpaid from the bank, the date of issuing mandatory notice within 30 days and the date of service of such notice on the drawee – Held, complaint cannot proceed u/s 138 of the N.I. Act without the basic ingredients being mentioned therein – Proceedings of Complaint case quashed.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 18, 29, 67 – NDPS Case – Acquittal -- Confessional statement – Reliance upon -- Witnesses turned hostile, appellant was convicted and sentenced by taking recourse to Section 67 of the NDPS Act – Impugned order set aside, appellant acquitted of all the charges. Balwinder Singh (Binda)’s case (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1213 relied.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Appeal against acquittal – Duty of Appellate Court -- Limitation -- Trial Court acquitted the appellants -- Sessions Court convicted the appellants, however, granted a relief of probation -- High Court has not gone into the question, whether the Sessions Court was aware of the limitations of the appeal against acquittal -- 3 prosecution witnesses and 7 defence witnesses have been examined, there is not even a reference to the depositions of the said witnesses in the impugned judgment -- Impugned order set aside, matter  remanded for fresh consideration by the High Court.

(Para 3-5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 -- Cheque bounce case -- Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence – Pre-condition of deposit of 20% of compensation amount -- Appellate Court required to consider whether the case falls in the exception or not -- Appellate Court directed to re-examine the case.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Settlement in cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Proceedings under the N.I. Act culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – F.I.R. u/s 174-A of IPC along with all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-13)

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (104 of 1956), Section 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Objectionable position at Spa Centre – Quashing of FIR – For the past 4½ years, none of the prosecution witnesses has been examined and the petitioner is facing the agony of prolonged trial – Owner as well as the Manager of the Spa against whom specific allegation was levelled, have been exonerated by the Investigating Agency – Petitioner at best was found in the objectionable position with one of the girls working in the said spa – No offence u/s 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the 1956 Act read with section 120-B IPC made out – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5-7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability -- Loan -- Money lending licence – Requirement of -- Complainant was involved in money-lending business without possessing any valid license -- Respondent/ accused used to borrow money from him -- Claim of the applicant/ complainant against the respondent is an unenforceable claim and thus, cannot be considered a legally enforceable liability u/s 138 of the NI Act.

(Para 4)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Acquittal by Trial court – Leave to appeal -- Power of the Appellate Court to unsettle the order of acquittal on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidence is subject to the settled law that where two views are possible and out of the two, one points towards the innocence of the accused, the view which favours the accused should prevail over the other pointing towards his guilt.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Complaint – Dismiss in default – Permissibility of -- Before issuance of process u/s 204 of Cr.P.C. the complaint cannot be dismissed in default for non-prosecution due to the non-appearance of the complainant.

(Para 6-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 406 -- Transfer of cheque bounce complaint -- Proprietor of the Complainant Company is working at Mumbai -- Yet the cheque was presented before the Bank at Darbhanga which led to the proceeding u/s 138 of the Act initiated before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga, Bihar -- Just because the respondent/ complainant who is a permanent resident of Darbhanga or has business interest in Bihar, may not justify filing of a case in another Court when all the transactions were in Mumbai -- Project site is at Maharashtra -- Complaint transferred to Mumbai.

(Para 4-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Appellant was a mere employee, apart from being a lady, and was not the main accused -- Main accused was the sole proprietor, the allegations are primarily against him, who is no more -- No purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings against the appellant -- Impugned orders are set aside.

(Para 2-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 372, 377 -- Appeal by victim for enhancement of sentence – Maintainability of -- Right of petitioner/ victim to prefer an appeal against an order of the criminal Court are in the following three cases only i.e.,

1. Acquittal of the accused person;

2. Conviction of the accused person for a lesser offence; and

3. Imposition of inadequate compensation.

No appeal by the victim against the adequacy of sentence awarded is envisaged by the Criminal Procedure Code -- Only the State Government is empowered u/s 377 of Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal against the adequacy of the sentence awarded and seek enhancement of the same – Appeal by petitioner/ victim not maintainable.

(Para 6-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Resignation of Director – Effect of -- Whether a appellant/ Director who has resigned from such position and which fact stands recorded in the books as per the relevant rules and statutory provisions, can be held liable for certain negotiable instruments, failing realization – Complainant not placed any materials on record indicating complicity of the appellants in the alleged crime -- Appellants had no role in the issuance of the instrument -- After the appellants have severed their ties with the Respondent-Company and, therefore, can in no way be responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time – All criminal proceedings pertaining to the appellants arising out of the complaints filed by the respondent quashed.

(Para 2-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Regular bail -- Speedy trial -- “Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception” -- Right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained person -- However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal jurisprudence, which is “the presumption of innocence”, besides the gravity of offence(s) involved.

(Para 8)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 18 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO -- Attempt to unnatural offence -- Regular bail -- Petitioner is not involved in any other criminal case -- Statement of victim (minor child), recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C, does not support the case of prosecution -- No fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars, who has faced incarceration of about 07 months and 10 days -- Trial is not likely to conclude anytime soon – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397, 401 – Summoning of material witness u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Maintainability of revision – The highest Court of the land has unequivocally ruled on the non-maintainability of a revision petition against an interlocutory order passed u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Disregarding or revisiting a judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court would undermine the integrity of the legal system and erode the foundation of justice itself – Revision petitions dismissed, being not maintainable.

(Para 1, 9-11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(a), 22 -- NDPS case – Recovery of unbranded loose capsules -- Out of 1130 capsules, two samples of 10 capsules each were separated and therefrom only one sample was sent to FSL -- As per report of FSL, 648 mg of “Dextropropoxyphene Napsylate”, was found in each capsule -- Entire recovery could not have been presumed to have contained the salt of “Dextropropoxyphene Napsylate” -- Ld. Special judge convicted the respondent/ accused for sentence already undergone of 06 months & 02 days besides imposition of fine of Rs.3000/- and in case of default, RI for 15 days -- No illegality or perversity – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 18, 25, 29 -- NDPS case -- Summoning of call details -- High Court directed all Courts in the State of Rajasthan that whenever an application is moved to summon the Call-details by the accused during the criminal proceedings, the same shall not be deferred and will be decided forthwith -- Accused cannot invoke and would not have right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. at the stage of framing of charge -- Impugned order set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Section 21 (1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Mining case – Anticipatory bail -- On the contention that petitioner has already obtained all requisite permissions including the registration certificate from the competent authority, no mining material has been recovered at the spot, involved in the case on the basis of the statement of the co-accused, FIR indicates that no offence under Section 379 of IPC and Act, 1957 is a special statute that provides a complete mechanism for dealing with any violation of the Act and Section 379 of the IPC was added in the FIR only to make the offence non-bailable, which is in violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioner was admitted to interim bail -- Petitioner has joined the investigation and is no more required for custodial interrogation – Interim order made absolute.

(Para 1-4)

Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 33A, 49  -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 33A, 43 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 --  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 4(2), 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Offence for Water and Air pollution and Section 188 of IPC – Criminal complaint – Section 33A of The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, the provisions of Indian Penal Code are expressly excluded -- Statutory scheme under Act, 1974 and Act, 1981 provides that the prosecution under them can only be launched by way of a complaint case an FIR cannot be registered under the provisions of the same – Held, impugned FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are void ab initio and are liable to be quashed -- FIR quashed.

(Para 6-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 307 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Murder – Anticipatory bail -- No documentary evidence or allegations leveled in the FIR that the petitioner at the time of alleged occurrence had instigated the main accused, or even provided the weapon of offence -- Only his presence at the time of alleged occurrence had been shown and that too, in the supplementary statement after two days of the alleged occurrence – Anticipatory bail allowed.

(Para 1, 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Enhancement of compensation u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Jurisdiction of High Court -- Revision against conviction -- Complainant filed an application u/s 482 of the Code primarily seeking enhancement of compensation – No jurisdictional error on the part of the High Court in passing the order after entertaining the application u/s 482 of the Code.

(Para 2, 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder of husband – Regular bail -- Petitioner was arrested on 01.04.2021 and is in custody since then -- Out of 13, 4 witnesses, who are private and vital witnesses, have been examined -- Taking into consideration the period already spent by the petitioner in custody, coupled with the fact that she is required to take care of her three minor children, however, without expressing any views on the merits of the case, bail granted.

(Para 4, 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Amendment in title of complaint – Trial court allowed amendment of title of the complaint by replacing (Firm name) as the complainant with only (Name of Director) – Held, amendment is merely formal in nature and does not impact the heart of the case -- Moreover, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by the amendment allowed in the case title and he can still raise all pleas available to him.

(Para 4, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 243 – Prosecution witness in defence -- Whether a witness which has been shown in the prosecution list but not examined on behalf of the prosecution, can be permitted to be examined as a defence witness – Held, there is no bar in the law for examining the said witness as defence witness – Appellant permitted to examine the prosecution witness as defence witness.

(Para 2-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Fixed sentence – Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Out five years, the appellant has undergone half of the sentence – Appeal not likely to reach before he completes the entire sentence, a case is made out for grant of suspension of sentence – When there is a fixed term sentence and especially when the appeal is not likely to be heard before completing entire period of sentence, normally suspension of sentence and bail should be granted.

(Para 1-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8), 190 – Further investigation – Protest petition -- Second respondent was not put up for trial for offences u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC – Appellant, instead of moving protest petition, moved an application captioned as “under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.” -- Averments made in that application reveal that the appellant protested against deletion of charges u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC and she made an endeavour to bring on record the material which would prima facie establish the commission of these offences – Magistrate can treat it as Protest Petition and then decide the same on merits -- A technicality like the caption of the application/petition could not be an impediment.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating – Protracted trial – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Criminal complaint filed in the year 1998, the petitioner is facing agony of a protracted trial, which has lasted for approximately 25 years -- Out of the total sentence of 3 years u/s 420 IPC, the petitioner has undergone actual sentence of 6 months and 7 days -- In the interest of justice sentence reduced to the period already undergone by petitioner -- Fine increased to Rs.10,000/- in default of fine rigorous imprisonment for one month.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Interference in finding on facts – Sub-clause No.(c) of Section 41 (1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, enables the High Court for the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, to reappreciate the evidence, if the decision is suffering from substantial error or defect resulting in defect in the decision of the case -- Consequently, it is permissible for the Court while deciding second appeal to re-appreciate the evidence if the decisions of the Courts suffer from perversity --  However, it is not permissible to interfere if two views are possible -- Interference in the second appeal has to be restricted to rare and exceptional cases where the court finds that the findings of fact stand vitiated by erroneous approach based on miss application of evidence or reliance on inadmissible evidence.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 73 – Agreement to sell – Handwriting expert -- It is well settled that invariably the Handwriting and Finger Print Expert gives a favourable opinion to the person who has engaged him – U/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Presiding Judge is not debarred from carefully comparing the signatures and finger prints on various documents -- Adverse inference could not be drawn against the defendants for failure to examine Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert.

(Para 27(17))

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32, 33 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C was neither relevant nor admissible in evidence as the plaintiff failed to fulfill the requirements of Section 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 27(18))

D. Agreement to sell -- Examination of the regular scribe was important.

(Para 27(21))

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200, 482 -- Criminal  breach of trust – Criminal intimidation – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence u/s 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients -- Dispute pertains to the revision of rate per unit in an ongoing commercial transaction -- A commercial dispute, which ought to have been resolved through the forum of Civil Court has been given criminal colour by lifting from the penal code certain words or phrases and implanting them in a criminal complaint – There is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation, this would constitute a mere bald allegation -- Criminal complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 19-21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200 -- At the stage of issuing summons a magistrate only needs to be satisfied with a prima facie case for taking cognizance, the duty of the magistrate is also to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

(Para 18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – False promise to marry -- If the consent of the victim is based on misconception, such consent is immaterial as it is not a voluntary consent -- If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2), 377, 504, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – False promise to marry – Quashing of charge-sheet -- Physical relationship started in 2012, though prosecutrix claimed that it was a forced relationship, she did not make any grievance about it till February 2018 -- In February 2013 and in December 2017, the prosecutrix was pregnant -- It is not the case of the prosecutrix that from February 2013 to December 2017, the appellant forced the second respondent to maintain the physical relationship -- In July 2017, there was an engagement ceremony between the appellant and the prosecutrix – Taking the prosecution case as correct, it is not possible to accept that the prosecutrix maintained a physical relationship only because the appellant had given a promise of marriage – Charge-sheet and further proceedings quashed.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 -- Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Criminal defamation – News article – Freedom of speech -- News article published bearing a title “Advocate ne pan masala vyavasayi par karaya jhuta mamla darj” -- News article in question was published in good faith and in exercise of the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India – All proceedings in pursuance of the complaint filed by the respondent-complainant u/s 500 of the IPC quashed.

(Para 2, 8-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- Petitioner never raised any grievance by filing a complaint to the senior police officers -- Improvements made while deposing before the learned trial Court cannot form the basis for exercising the extraordinary power u/s 319 Cr.P.C -- Mere statement of the complainant, which is not substantiated by any credible material, cannot be a ground to invoke the discretionary and extraordinary power of the  Court to summon an additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- In the absence of any material suggesting existence of more than prima facie case available during the course of trial of an offence, courts ought to refrain themselves from exercising its discretionary and extraordinary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34, 362, 201, 392, 411, 414 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Murder – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody since 8.10.2018 but only 02 of the 33 prosecution witnesses have been examined so far -- Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for a right to speedy Trial which prima facie seems to have been violated in the instant case -- Further incarceration of the petitioner is not required – Bail allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420,406, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust -- Breach of agreement to sell -- Every breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless the fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction -- Allegations of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate the criminal proceedings -- Agreement to sell in favour of the complainant, however, sale deed in favour of other -- Complainant, instead of initiating the civil proceedings, had got the FIR registered -- Both the petitioners were the attesting witnesses to the agreement and had joined the investigation -- Documents had already been collected by the police and their custodial interrogation is not required -- Interim orders made absolute.

(Para 1, 7, 8)