Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 473, 482 -- Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Summoning order – Condonation of delay -- Non-speaking order – No satisfaction regarding prima facie case and no discussion of material on record – Limitation to be reckoned from date of receipt of report of Public Analyst – Complaint filed after considerable delay of several years – No application of mind to question of limitation or condonation of delay – Impugned order not sustainable – Matter remanded for fresh consideration with direction to pass speaking order after considering limitation and material on record.

(Paras 7 to 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, Sections 342, 330, 34 – Sanction for prosecution of public servant – Police excess/ illegal custody – Complainant alleged that police officers including petitioner-SDPO kept him in illegal custody from 10.05.2005 to 01.06.2005 at different police stations and subjected him to third-degree torture causing serious injuries – Not only the acts which have been done by the public servant in exercise of his official duty but even the acts, which a public servant has done in purported exercise of official duty, would be covered under the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC, therefore, the test is whether there is a reasonable nexus between act done by public servant and his official duties -- Even if a public servant has exceeded his powers while discharging his official duties, Section 197 CrPC would come into play -- Section 197 CrPC, is a shield to the public servants, who cannot be removed from their services, without the sanction of the Govt. from their false and unwarranted prosecution, without a formal sanction to prosecute -- The idea is to protect them from any kind of harassment, at the hands of unscrupulous elements.

(Paras 15–21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Challenge to -- Petitioner and his brother have been named from the very beginning -- It has been alleged that brother was carrying a knife, while petitioner and 2/3 other boys came with sticks, batons etc. -- Even a specific role has been assigned to the petitioner that the petitioner was armed with danda (stick) in his hand and they all had attacked the deceased -- Even, the petitioner gave injuries on the head and face of the deceased with a danda (stick) and the said fact also finds corroboration from the medical evidence in the case -- Injuries, which were attributed to the petitioner, find corroboration from the medical evidence also -- Thus, the trial Court had rightly ordered the summoning of the petitioner as an additional accused, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 306(4)(b), 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 343(4)(b), 528 – Approver – Release on bail pending trial – Provisions of Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C. requiring that an approver “shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial” do not operate as a blanket ban on his release – Provision is intended not to punish the approver but to protect him from possible indignation, rage and resentment of his associates and to prevent temptation of retracting from disclosure – Once an accused is tendered pardon and makes a full and true disclosure, he ceases to be an accused and becomes a witness for the prosecution – Custody of an approver is co-terminus with fulfilment of conditions of pardon – Section 306(4)(b) of the Code appears to be directory and not mandatory -- Such a person cannot invoke the provisions of Section 439 of the Code corresponding to Section 483 of BNSS -- Continued detention despite compliance with conditions of pardon may violate right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – High Court in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 BNSS) can enlarge an approver on bail even before culmination of trial where exceptional and reasonable circumstances exist – Where approver has been examined as prosecution witness, stood by his earlier disclosure without contradiction and seeks enlargement voluntarily, he deserves to be released on bail subject to reasonable conditions – Impugned order set aside and petitioner-approver admitted to bail.

(Paras 12–21, 26, 27)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 -- Summoning of accused – Procedure – Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course – It is not sufficient that the complainant merely produces two witnesses to support the allegations in the complaint to set the criminal law in motion – Order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect due application of mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto – Magistrate must carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and determine whether any offence is prima facie made out – Magistrate may also put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers so as to ascertain the truthfulness of the allegations and then examine whether any offence is prima facie committed by any of the accused.

(Para 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of Complaint/ FIR – Inherent powers of High Court -- When an accused seeks quashing of either the FIR or criminal proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous, vexatious or malicious, the Court is duty bound to examine the matter with greater care -- It will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not -- In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case, over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, and try to read in between the lines – Court is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 482 -- Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957), Section 63, 65, 65A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 387 -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order --  Complaint only contains a bald and unsubstantiated allegations -- Statement of the complainant and witnesses (brother of the complainant) and (cousin of the complainant), do not identify any feature of the script allegedly copied -- Dispute Settlement Committee of SWA comprising experts found no similarity between the film and the script and dismissed the complaint -- Complainant and his witnesses concealed the aforesaid material fact and did not bring the same to the notice of the Court -- No material on record to prima facie conclude that there was any similarity between appellant’s film and complainant’s script – Summoning order held to be passed in mechanical manner and suffers from vice of non-application of mind -- Summoning order and complaint quashed.

(Para 16-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- Scope -- Allegations against the proposed accused are general and omnibus in nature -- Evidence sought to be relied, substantially corresponds to the material which had already been examined during investigation -- No new or compelling circumstance has emerged during trial which could justify the summoning of the proposed accused as additional accused -- Mere naming of a person by a witness in his deposition, without the support of strong and cogent evidence, cannot by itself justify the exercise of the extraordinary power u/s 319 Cr.P.C.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Dowry death -- Proposed accused are relatives of the husband of the deceased and the allegations against them are general in nature – Courts are required to exercise caution and circumspection before summoning additional persons to face trial, particularly when the evidence does not disclose specific and convincing material against them.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused – Trial in the case has already reached its culmination and the entire prosecution evidence stands concluded -- At such an advanced stage of the proceedings, the summoning of additional accused can be justified only when the evidence on record unmistakably points towards their active and direct involvement in the commission of the offence -- In the absence of such compelling material, the extraordinary jurisdiction u/s 319 Cr.P.C. ought not to be exercised.

(Para 13, 14)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 144 – Maintenance -- Striking off defence -- Procedure -- Opportunity to file reply -- Family Court hastily strike off the defence after only two effective opportunities -- Previous order did not warn the petitioner that it was a last opportunity to file reply -- Interest of justice requires adjudication on merits -- Petitioner permitted to file a reply subject to a cost of Rs.5,000/-.

(Para 2-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B  -- Quashing of FIR -- Forgery and Cheating – Premature Exercise of Jurisdiction – High Court quashed FIR alleging forgery while the investigation was ongoing and documents were pending examination by the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL) – Held: It is wholly unjustified for a High Court to quash an FIR at the threshold when the Investigating Agency is awaiting a handwriting expert’s report on disputed signatures – High Court glossed over vital aspects of investigation and prematurely concluded that ingredients of fraud were not made out –Prosecution of accused cannot be stifled when prima facie evidence of criminal misappropriation and falsification exists – Impugned order of the High Court set aside.

(Para 14-24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 302 and 120-B -- Summoning of Additional Accused – Murder – Conspiracy -- Trial Court need not establish guilt or conduct a detailed credibility assessment at this stage -- Pre-trial scrutiny should not resemble a mini trial -- Oral evidence alone, if credible, may suffice – Trial Court overstepped the intended scope of pre-trial scrutiny -- Inconsistencies in the overall testimonies of witnesses is a matter of trial and not within the Court’s scope at the time of considering an application under section 319 CrPC -- Testimony, on oath, by 3 witnesses, including the complainant no less, is sufficient in the facts of the case to meet the strong and cogent evidence standard – Appeals allowed, persons who sought to be produced as additional accused are ordered to be produced.

(Para 9-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(x) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506, 34 -- Enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. – Role of -- An inquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. was conducted and a report was submitted – Summoning order is completely silent on the material collected during the inquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. and lacks any discussion of the essential ingredients of the offences alleged cannot be sustained being a non-speaking order passed without due application of mind -- Summoning of an accused is a serious matter and cannot be done in a mechanical manner and that absence of such indication amounts to non-application of mind – Summoning order set aside, matter remitted back to the learned trial Court for fresh consideration.

(Para 5-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Cheque bounce complaint – Expert evidence – Specimen handwriting of stranger/ third party – Permissibility of – Persons whose specimen handwriting is sought are neither the complainant nor the accused in the proceedings and are only witnesses to the case – Being third parties to the litigation, the Court cannot direct them to give specimen handwriting -- Application rightly dismissed.

(Para 5-8, 11)

Scope of S. 528 BNSS -- Inherent powers u/s 528 BNSS are to be exercised sparingly and cannot be used unless the order reflects patent illegality or miscarriage of justice

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Inherent power u/s 528 of BNSS -- Scope of – Cane be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice -- Jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution and interference is warranted only where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or results in manifest miscarriage of justice -- Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible or to re-appreciate the factual aspects which have already been considered by the trial Court.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Marking or exhibiting of a document does not dispense with the requirement of proving the same in accordance with law -- Party relying upon the document still carries the burden to establish its execution, authenticity and admissibility -- If such proof is not forthcoming, the Court is always competent to eschew the document from consideration at the stage of final adjudication.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint  – Evidence by attorney -- Once the attorney had been duly substituted to prosecute the complaint on behalf of the complainant and the complainant’s evidence was still continuing, the tendering of documents during the course of such evidence cannot be said to be wholly impermissible – Contention that the documents could not have been tendered by the Special Power of Attorney without prior permission of the Court does not merit acceptance -- Other party retains full liberty to challenge the admissibility, mode of proof and evidentiary value of such documents during cross-examination and at the stage of final arguments.

(Para 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Summoning of handwriting and fingerprint expert -- Belated stage -- Power u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is of a very wide amplitude and can be exercised by the Court at any stage of inquiry or trial if the evidence sought to be adduced appears to be necessary for the just decision of the case -- Merely because the application was moved at a later stage of the trial would not by itself render the order illegal.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Summoning of handwriting and fingerprint expert – Government FSL report already on record – Effect -- Evidentiary value of such testimony would always remain subject to cross-examination and appreciation at the stage of final adjudication -- No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner merely by permitting the examination of the said expert.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summoning u/s 311 Cr.P.C – No statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. earlier – Effect -- Proposed witness was not cited in the list of witnesses or that his statement was not recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be accepted as a ground to disallow the application -- Object of Section 311 Cr.P.C is to enable the Court to summon any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential for the just decision of the case -- Provision is not restricted only to those witnesses whose statements were recorded during investigation -- Trial Court, in its discretion, is competent to summon any such witness if the circumstances of the case so warrant.

(Para 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 323, 498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – General and omnibus allegations against in-laws -- High Court quashed proceedings against sister-in-law but declined similar relief to other in-laws – FIR disclosed that allegations against appellants and sister-in-law were identical – No specific overt act, date or place attributed to appellants – Mere allegation that appellants used to quarrel does not constitute ingredients of offences alleged – Applying different standards to similarly placed accused held erroneous – Where allegations against accused persons stand on identical footing, relief granted to one accused on ground of general and omnibus allegations must equally extend to others – Different standards cannot be applied -- Proceedings against appellants also quashed.

(Paras 7, 10, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 323, 498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Matrimonial dispute – Delay in lodging complaint – Counter-blast to divorce proceedings --  Marriage solemnised in July 2019 – Husband filed divorce petition in March 2021 – Criminal complaint against in-laws lodged in March 2022 – Though delay alone not sufficient ground for quashing, viewed in conjunction with the absence of any specific allegations attributable to them, the delay lends credence to the submission that the criminal complaint against the in-laws may have been instituted by way of a counter-blast to the divorce proceedings initiated by the husband -- When these two considerations are read together, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants cannot be sustained.

(Para 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 187(3), 193 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- Default bail -- Challan report without FSL report – Held, mere non-filing of the FSL report along with the police report does not render the challan incomplete so as to confer an indefeasible right of default bail upon the accused -- The FSL report, being a piece of corroborative evidence, can be filed subsequently by way of supplementary challan and its absence at the initial stage does not vitiate the prosecution or revive the right to default bail.

(Para 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 468, 469, 473 -- Limitation for taking cognizance – Misbranded drug complaint – Where identity of accused emerges during investigation, limitation begins from the date when identity of offender becomes known u/s 469(1)(c) Cr.P.C. – Complaint filed within three years from such date held within limitation.

(Para 26-36)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 – Complaint by Public servant -- Magistrate is not required to examine the complainant and the witnesses, if a public servant is acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty or a Court has made the complaint -- An official complaint was made on authorisation by the State Government -- In this factual setting, Section 202 of the Code would necessarily have to be construed harmoniously with Section 200 of the Code when considering postponement of the issue of process.

(Para 40)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 17(b)(c), 18(a)(i), 27(d) -- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Rule 96  -- Misbranded drug complaint – High Court’s quashed the complaint -- Respondents-Directors were in the accused-Company’s management, whether or not, they were ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company’ are questions of fact -- These questions are best left to be determined by the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage -- Impugned Judgment, set aside.

(Para 58, 59)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n), 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Rape on false promise of marriage -- Consensual relationship -- Quashing of FIR -- Complainant, a married woman and mother of two children, employed in a massage parlour and in charge of running the same, had a physical relationship with the appellant who visited the parlour as a customer – Relationship commenced in August 2023 and continued till March 2024 – Complainant informed appellant of pregnancy on 15.03.2024 – FIR lodged after appellant’s marriage on 12.03.2024 alleging rape on promise of marriage – No allegation that she was divorced from her husband or even separated from him – Held, there was a consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant into a physical relationship on the pretext of marriage – Even if FSL report establishes paternity, consent demolishes allegation of rape on promise of marriage – Order of High Court refusing to quash proceedings set aside and FIR quashed.

(Para 7 to 9)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348, 438(2), 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397(2), 482 – Dismissal of application u/s 311 CR.P.C/ 348 BNSS – Maintainability of revision -- Ordinarily revision not maintainable being an interlocutory order – What is explicitly barred, cannot be granted backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers -- But this bar on the inherent powers is subject to a rider, whereby the High Court must examine if any gross injustice has been done -- If interlocutory order caused gross injustice, it would not only be justified for the High Court, but also it would be a duty of the High Court to invoke inherent powers and prevent injustice.

(Para 4)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Cross-examination of witness – Closing of same -- Duty of Trial court – Amicus curiae/ legal aid should have been given --  Petitioners/ accused filed an application u/s 311 CrPC, explaining the reason for inability of the defence counsel to appear -- Although, learned trial court was not convinced, even then, the learned trial court could have invoked the power on its own to ensure no injustice was caused – It is not just the accused who suffers injustice, it is the entire trial gets vitiated -- Presence of legal assistance for the accused facing a trial is the core element of fair trial -- Court should either appoint an amicus curiae or should direct the local legal services authority to send some legal aid counsel -- In the name of expeditious trial, fairness of the trial cannot be allowed to become a casualty – Matter remanded back to trial court.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife/ child – Education of wife will not come in way to claim maintenance – No evidence to establish that the revisionist No.1/ wife is presently employed or earning -- Mere fact that she is a post graduate and has done ITI Diploma in tailoring by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that revisionist No.1/wife is working for gain -- Revisionist No.1/ wife staying at her parental home and taking care of her child without any financial or emotional support from the opposite party No.2/husband -- Complete responsibility of meeting the daily need, education and medical expenses of a minor child lies upon both the parents -- Held that both the revisionist No.1/ wife as well as the minor son are equally entitled to maintenance from the opposite party No.2 and he is legally liable to maintain both his wife and minor son – Matter remanded back to the learned Family Court for fresh determination of maintenance.

(Para 15-18)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 425 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 384 – Criminal appeal against conviction – Dismissed in default – Permissibility of -- Dismissal of Criminal Appeal in default on account of absence of learned counsel for the appellant is contrary to law and is not in consonance with Section 425 of the B.N.S.S. (corresponding to Section 384 Cr.P.C.) -- Criminal Appeal restored to its original number.

(Para 6-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While invoking power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. trial court should consider the statements of the witnesses adduced before it and it should not place reliance upon the material available in the charge-sheet or the case diary.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While passing the summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. court must consider whether more than prima-facie case is made out, or not -- Mere prima-facie case is not sufficient -- It is to analyze, whether before the trial court material was sufficient to summon the revisionists u/s 319 Cr.P.C. or not.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 376(2)(i), 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Acquittal -- Rape of four-year old girl – Circumstantial evidence -- Omission in FIR – Investigation lapses -- First Information Report, despite the informant’s professed complete knowledge of the incident, is bereft of even the most rudimentary details, neither the name of the accused person (appellant herein) nor those of the purported witnesses of the last seen together circumstance find mention -- Investigation hopelessly botched and a trial conducted with a  pedantic rigidity that obscured, rather than unveiled, the truth -- Highly unnatural conduct of the witnesses, marked by gross insensitivity/ rank apathy, contradictions and apparent concoctions raises serious doubts about the reliability of the prosecution’s case -- Yet, in face of this disturbing matrix, the accused-appellant stands convicted and has remained behind bars for nearly thirteen long years – Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-52, 78)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 393 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 354 -- Criminal trials – Judgment must contain -- More structured and uniform practice must be adopted to enhance the legibility of criminal judgments -- Directions issued to all trial Courts across the country for :  

Preparation of Tabulated Charts in all the judgments:

All trial Courts dealing with criminal matters shall, at the conclusion of the judgment, incorporate tabulated charts summarizing: -

a. Witnesses examined,

b. Documents exhibited, and

c. Material objects (muddamal) produced and exhibited.

These charts shall form an appendix or concluding segment of the judgment and shall be prepared in a clear, structured and easily comprehensible format.

Standardized Chart of Witnesses

Each criminal judgment shall contain a witness chart with at least the following columns:

a. Serial Number

b. Name of the Witness

c. Brief Description/Role of the Witness, such as: Informant, Eye-witness, Medical Jurist/Doctor, Investigating Officer (I.O.), Panch Witness, etc.

The description should be succinct but sufficient to indicate the evidentiary character of the witness. This structured presentation will allow quick reference to the nature of testimony, assist in locating the witness in the record, and minimize ambiguity.

Specimen Chart for Witnesses Examined

Standardized Chart of Exhibited Documents

A separate chart shall be prepared for all documents exhibited during trial. This chart shall include:

a. Exhibit Number;

b. Description of document;

c. The Witness who proved or attested the document.

Illustratively, the description may include: FIR, complaint, panchnamas, medical certificates, FSL reports, seizure memos, site plans, dying declarations, etc.

The requirement of specifying the witness who proved the document ensures traceability of proof and assist the Court in appreciating compliance with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/ Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

Specimen Chart for Exhibited Documents

Standard Chart for Material Objects (Muddamal)

Whenever material objects are produced and marked as exhibits, the trial Court shall prepare a third chart with:

a. Material Object (M.O.) Number;

b. Description of the Object;

c. Witness who proved the Object’s Relevance (e.g., weapon, clothing, tool, article seized under panchnama, etc.)

This enables clarity regarding the physical evidence relied upon.

Specimen Chart for Material Objects/Muddamals

Special Provisions for Cases Involving Voluminous Evidence

In complex cases, such as conspiracies, economic offences or trials involving voluminous oral or documentary evidence, the list of witnesses and exhibits may be substantially long. Where the number of witnesses or documents is unusually large, the trial Court may prepare charts only for the material, relevant, and relied-upon witnesses and documents, clearly indicating that the chart is confined to such items. This ensures that the charts remain functional reference tools rather than unwieldy compilations.

Application to Defence Witnesses and Evidence

The aforesaid directions shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to all witnesses examined and all evidence adduced by the defence.

Adoption of Specimen Format and Permissible Deviations

The specimen charts provided herein shall ordinarily serve as the standard format to be followed by trial Courts across the country.

Observations Regarding Applicability to Civil Proceedings

While these directions are primarily intended to streamline criminal trials, we leave it open to the High Courts to consider, wherever appropriate,  the adoption of similar tabulated formats in civil matters as well, particularly in cases involving voluminous documentary or oral evidence, so as to promote clarity, uniformity, and ease of reference.

High Court may consider incorporating the above directions in their respective rules governing the procedure of trial Courts.

(Para 86-90)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304B, 328 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Dowry death – Presumption – Regular bail by High Court – Cancellation of -- Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage – Dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC -- Consequently, the presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1/ husband -- High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles -- Courts has to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail – Held, such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society -- Judicial passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice -- A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative, not only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry -- Bail cancelled.

 (Para 17.1, 17.2, 25-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 376(2)(n), 507 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Rape -- False promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married -- FIR also states that in September 2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and I will live my life” -- At that time, the appellant assured her that they would get married and asked for some time from respondent No.2, to which she refused -- However, despite her refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet him at Hotel and engaged in physical relations with him – Held, not a case where the appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished -- Relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time -- They remained close and emotionally involved -- In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage – FIR quashed.

(Para 24-28, 41)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) -- Criminal jurisprudence – Police complaint against public servant by Gram Pradhan – Maintainability of -- No provision in the Cr.P.C., which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence -- No specific provision in the 1984 Act which limits the eligibility of the person making the complaint – Held, High Court manifestly erred in law in holding that since the Gram Pradhan was not the competent authority to lodge an FIR, the action of the Special Judge in taking cognizance and summoning the accused is bad in law -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 7-11)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 – Additional evidence -- Video footage and photographs -- Placing on record – On application moved by complainant, the learned trial Court permitted the complainant to place certain documents on record, i.e. the video footage and photographs of the incident – Claimed by the complainant that in the video footage and photographs, the incident has been recorded and given to the Investigating Officer also, but the Investigating Officer having been under the influence of accused-petitioners, has not collected the above mentioned evidence – Held, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court in permitting the complainant to bring the above mentioned documents on record -- At this stage, when permission to produce the above mentioned documents has been accorded, the admissibility of the above mentioned documents cannot be looked into -- Appreciation of above mentioned point can take place at the time of final adjudication of the trial.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife -- Quantum -- It is well settled that maintenance may be granted up to 25% of the husband’s net income – On Rs. 65,000/- as considered by the Trial Court, 25% comes to Rs. 16,250/- per month, which substantially aligns with the maintenance of Rs.18,000/- per month awarded by the learned Trial Court -- Revisionist/husband is an able-bodied person and, therefore, cannot shirk his legal obligation to maintain his wife and child -- Impugned order passed by the Trial Court does not warrant interference -- Order granting maintenance upheld.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 397, 401 – Maintenance – Revision -- Trial Court decided the Section 125 Cr.P.C. application without framing any points for determination, which is mandatory as per Section 354(6) Cr.P.C. -- In the absence of framing any points for determination, it is difficult to ascertain the basis on which the Trial Court passed the order or awarded the maintenance amount -- Copy of order to be circulated to all the District Judges and to all Principal Judges, Family Courts, for communication and necessary compliance.

(Para 7)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483(2)  -- Cancellation of bail – Once bail has been granted by a competent Court, the same can be cancelled only when there is cogent material showing that the accused has misused the concession of bail, has tampered with evidence or there has been a subsequent supervening circumstance warranting such cancellation -- Mere reiteration of allegations forming the basis of FIR or apprehension of misuse is not sufficient ground for cancellation of bail -- Cancellation of bail already granted requires demonstration of supervening circumstances such as misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence, intimidation of witnesses or deliberate evasion of the judicial process – Mere dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the Court which has granted the bail or the seriousness of the offence by itself, is not sufficient to recall such an order.

(Para 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 59 -- Injured eye witness version -- Ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it -- Testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a special status in law -- As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be doubted -- Deposition by the injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies -- Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical evidence, testimony does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants.

(Para 33-37)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons -- Motive even in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the prosecution’s case -- Fact of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available -- Fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 4, 302 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Nature and extent of injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted -- Use of the sharp edges of spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder -- Thus, the circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC do not exist.

(Para 45)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay in FIR -- It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the delay in filing the FIR is well explained.

(Para 46)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular evidence.

(Para 49)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 -- Omission by Investigation officer – Effect of -- Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution’s case -- Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors such omission by the investigating agency -- Otherwise, it would shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice.

(Para 50)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, Section 195(1)(b)(i), 340 -- Threatening Witness – Offence u/s 195A IPC – FIR  by police -- Permissibility of -- Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as an offence distinct and different from those u/ss 193 IPC, 194 IPC, 195 IPC and 196 IPC -- Those offences require a complaint to be made only by those named in Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC and they were all non-cognizable offences -- However, an offence u/s 195A IPC was a cognizable offence -- Threatened witness or other person may take immediate steps by either giving oral information of the commission of this cognizable offence to the concerned police officer, u/s 154 CrPC, or by making a complaint to a jurisdictional Magistrate, u/s 195A CrPC, so as to set the process of criminal law in motion.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided -- Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions -- However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

(Para 76)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – The words, “Whether sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants to persuade the Sessions Court not to order any deposit is left entirely to its discretion and satisfaction.”, used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, would include a reduction of the amount below 20%, because if the Appellate Court can exempt the entire 20%, it can also reduce the deposit below 20% depending upon the convict’s financial capacity -- Any other interpretation would imply that even if a convict is willing to pay some amount, e.g., 15%, 10%, or 5%, and the Appellate Court exempts the entire amount, thereby preventing the complainant from collecting whatever the convict can afford to pay.

(Para 22)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation :

First proposition -- “Whether imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable or not, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation?”

Answer to the first proposition is that the imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation.

(Para 16-36)

Second proposition -- “Whether the right of the convict-appellant being on bail in pending appeal, can be subjected to the compliance of direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act?

Answer to the second proposition was once addressed by Surinder Singh Deswal supra [Second case] (2020) 2 SCC 514, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when an Appellate Court suspends the sentence on a condition, then the failure to comply with that condition adversely affects the continuation of the suspension.

The Appellate Court that has suspended the sentence on a condition, after observing non-compliance, could reasonably hold that the suspension stood vacated due to the non-compliance, and it is the responsibility of the said Appellate Court, which granted the suspension, to consider the non-compliance and make an appropriate decision. Nonetheless, non-compliance with the suspension condition is enough to declare that the suspension has been vacated.

(Para 37-41)

Third proposition -- “Whether the right of bail can be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance of the direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act, for any justifiable or un-justifiable reason, as discussed in the cases of Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises ?

Answer to the third proposition is that the right of bail cannot be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance with the direction of paying 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act. Whenever an Appellate Court directs a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act and imposes conditions on the suspension of sentence, such conditions must be just conditions.

Here it requires to be understood that once the issue regarding deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount, payable under Section 148 of NI Act, is decided by the concerned Appellate Court by following the spirit of the observations made in the judgments of Jamboo Bhandari (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, and condition, if any, is imposed while suspending the sentence, the same would be deemed to be just and fair, and undoubtedly such condition requires its fulfillment at the end of the appellant, who seeks suspension of sentence.

(Para 42-52)

Fourth proposition -- “Whether it is a pre-condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, for getting an appeal decided?

From the judgments of Noor Mohammed (2002) 9 SCC 23: 2022 and Vijay D. Salvi (2007) 5 SCC 741), it is clear that non-deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount would not disentitle the accused from availing any of his substantive rights, including the right of appeal. The case of Vijay D. Salvi, (2007) 5 SCC 741, clearly answers the fourth proposition of law. Thus, to get the appeal decided, there cannot be any precondition for depositing the amount ordered under Section 148 of the NI Act by the Appellate Court. The fourth question is answered accordingly.

(Para 53-57)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari, (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

(65-72)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- False complaint – Kalandra u/s 182 of IPC – Quashing -- Complaint submitted to Director General, State Vigilance Bureau and marked to Deputy Superintendent of Police -- Proceedings u/s 182 IPC initiated by Superintendent of Police -- Held, complaint u/s 182 IPC could be filed only by the concerned public servant or the authority to whom he is administratively subordinate – Even such power cannot be delegated -- Initiation of proceedings by Superintendent of Police void ab initio being without jurisdiction -- Cognizance taken by Magistrate illegal -- Kalandra and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65B – Electronic records – Document – Exhibition of Compact Disc (CD) – Playing of CD during deposition – Requirement of -- Author of the video not only deposed that he recorded the video, but he also gave a certificate, as contemplated under subsection (4) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, to make the CD admissible in evidence – High Court did not dispute that the electronic record was duly exhibited -- High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video – Held, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s) -- It is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video.

(Para 19)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – NDPS – Chemical examiner – Deposition of – Requirement of – As far as non-production of Chemical Examiner as a witness is concerned, u/s 293 of CrPC, report of a Chemical Examiner is admissible even if he is not produced as a witness though, the Court may summon and examine him as to the subject matter of the report -- There is no requirement of law that Chemical Examiner would have to be called in each NDPS case to prove the report when it is otherwise admissible under sub-section (1) of Section 293 of CrPC.

(Para 21)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS – Production of contraband in Trial – Requirements of – Mere non-production of the seized contraband during trial may not be fatal if there is reliable evidence in respect of its seizure, drawing of samples therefrom, and FSL report relating to the sample drawn from the seized material – However, to ensure that no adverse inference is drawn against the prosecution for non-production of the seized contraband, documents prepared in terms of the provisions of Section 52-A, inter alia, evidencing preparation of inventory of seized contraband and drawing of samples therefrom, would have to be brought on record – Likewise, evidence should be there that the sample drawn from the inventory was sent to FSL in a sealed container/ envelop, as per guidelines, and that the seal was found intact at the end of FSL – This is to obviate any doubt regarding sample being tampered in transit – Similarly, FSL’s report along with the sample tested by it is to be placed on record so that there remains no doubt regarding the sample tested.

(Para 30, 31)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386(b)(i), 391 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS -- Re-trial – Additional evidence -- High Court, observed that the representative sample was not opened before the Court at the time of recording of statement of the concerned witness -- Be that as it may, this was not a ground to direct for a retrial when the appellate court has power to take additional evidence u/s 391 of CrPC, which, inter alia, can be exercised to exhibit a document or material already on the record of the Court -- And if those defects are fatal to the prosecution, the appellate court is free to take its decision as may be warranted in the facts of the case. But, in any event, it cannot be a ground to direct a re-trial.

(Para 33)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 531 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) -- Maintainability of Anticipatory bail  after BNSS, 2023.

-- The Sanhita, 2023 is upholding the importance of protecting personal liberty -- The restrictions on granting anticipatory bail under Section 438(6) of the Code (as amended by the State of Uttarakhand) are no longer in effect -- When the Parliament enacts more liberal provisions, the benefit thereof should be available to all persons who may be affected, regardless of when their cases originated -- Accused held entitled to the benefit of the more liberal provisions introduced by the Sanhita, 2023.

Matter referred to a larger Bench by formulating the following question:-

“Whether the provision of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 would prevail over the Uttarakhand State Amendment under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and since the provisions of the Sanhita, 2023 are beneficial to the accused, can it be applied with respect to earlier cases (regardless of when the case of the accused originated)?”

(Para 19-26)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 2(k) -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35, 74 – Juvenile -- Determination of Age – Public servant – Public record -- Public documents -- Public School-the first attended school is not a Government School -- Held, neither the Headmaster/ Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively -- Deposition of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable -- Other school certificates were issued following this and therefore, meet the same fate inasmuch as they cannot be treated as correct, in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also the Medical Report which state to the contrary -- Respondent No.2 cannot be said to have been a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the unfortunate incident.

(Para 22-25)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused: Statutory requisites for summoning any person not being the accused:

(a) such person has committed an offence;

(b) his complicity is revealed from the evidence collected during inquiry or trial; and 

(c) for such offence, he can be tried together with the accused already facing trial.

Principles that the Trial Court ought to follow while exercising power under this Section are :

(a) This provision is a facet of that area of law which gives protection to victims and society at large, ensuring that the perpetrators of crime should not escape the force of law;

(b) It is the duty cast upon the Court not to let the guilty get away unpunished;

(c) The Trial Court has broad but not unbridled power as this power can be exercised only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not any other material collected during investigation;

(d) The Trial Court is not powerless to summon a person who is not named in the FIR or Chargesheet; they can be impleaded if the evidence adduced inculpates him;

(e) This power is not to be exercised in a regular or cavalier manner, but only when strong or cogent evidence is available than the mere probability of complicity;

(f) The degree of satisfaction required is much stricter than the prima facie case, which is needed at the time of framing of charge(s);

(g) The Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage as the expression used is ‘such person could be tried’ and not ‘should be tried’.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- It ought to have considered that the standard of satisfaction required is short of the standard necessary for passing a final judgment after trial.

(Para 22)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- “R”, although not charge sheeted, was named in the FIR, and the evidence thus far, leads, prima facie, to reveal his role -- Therefore, at this stage, there is sufficient material to put him on trial.

(Para 23)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 -- Summoning of additional accused -- High Court proceeded to conduct a mini trial -- It erred in giving a categorical finding on the merits -- High Court erred in observing that witnesses have stated nothing about the motive of the crime; that the depositions are silent on the aspect of common intention; absence of the manner or sequence of occurrence of the incident; or that it cannot be inferred who is the aggressor -- All these questions, amongst others, are relevant or not is a matter to be considered at the stage of final adjudication -- It is a settled law that the power under Section 319 CrPC must be exercised sparingly -- However, where the evidence reveals the complicity of the prospective accused, it becomes obligatory for the authority to exercise the power provided under the said Section -- Summoning order passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 24-26)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 413, 419(4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Leave to appeal – Right of appeal -- Scope and ambit of proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C./413 BNSS are inherently broader and more accommodating when juxtaposed with the comparatively narrower confines of Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C., 1973/ 419(4) of BNSS, 2023 – Matter relegated to Session Judge :

-- The appeal, along with accompanying application(s) remitted to the learned Sessions Judge with a direction to treat the same as having been filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C., 1973/ Section 413 of BNSS, 2023. The said learned Sessions Judge may entrust the appeal to himself or assign it to another Court of competent jurisdiction for its disposal, as per law.

-- The Registry directed to send, expeditiously, the complete records of the present appeal (including the paper-book) to the said learned Sessions Judge.

(Para 3, 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 413, 419(4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Leave to appeal – Delay/ Limitation -- Appeal before Session’s Court -- Application u/s 378(4) Cr.P.C. disposed of by directing the learned Sessions Judge to treat the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed u/s 372 of the Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to any appropriate Court to try the same -- The concerned Court shall decide the appeal on merits as per law, as expeditiously as possible -- Concerned Appellate Court need not to adhere to the delay aspect, if any, involved in the case, for the purpose of considering the issue raised in the appeal and its disposal on merit.

(Para 5, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 446 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 461, 528 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Jump of bail – Surety for Rs. 1 lakh – Liability of -- Delay of 511 days in appeal condoned -- Appellant/ surety had no knowledge that the convict would not surrender on time and there are no allegations of collusion between the appellant and the accused with regard to the accused not surrendering before learned trial Court -- Penalty reduced to Rs.20,000/- from Rs.1,00,000/-.

(Para 3, 7-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Causing death by negligence -- In order to attract the offence u/s 304A, the death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act of the accused -- Petitioner cannot be attributed with criminality in taking up the work, since the harm involved, due to the passing of live electric wires, adjacent to the building was not foreseeable -- Unfortunate incident occurred when the worker stretched his hand while fixing the reducing coupling, as part of the plumbing work, and accidentally touched the live wire -- In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot be attributed with either rashness or negligence – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 142, 148, 323, 506 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 9 -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Plea of alibi – Held, plea of alibi put forward by the petitioners cannot form a ground for quashing the impugned challan -- Veracity of the defence put up by the petitioners can be gone into by the trial court – High Court in exercise of its powers u/s 528 of BNSS cannot hold a mini trial -- In case, the petitioners feel that their defence of alibi has not been investigated by the Investigating Agency, it is open to them to approach the learned trial Magistrate before whom charge sheet has been filed and seek further investigation of the case -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187, 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest of accused – Non-production before Magistrate – Regular bail – Right of -- Petitioner admitted in hospital for last 45 day after the date of his arrest – His status is not of a free person but of an arrestee -- No order u/s 187 BNSS was passed by the Magistrate -- In absence of any order of remand beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in custody -- Since such non-production of the petitioner, even through video conferencing mode, beyond 24 hours in custody amounts to violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, his fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also violated and, on that count, the petitioner is entitled to go on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 14-18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest – Production before Magistrate -- Arrestee shall have to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours -- Where the arrestee is injured and requires urgent medical care have to be rushed to the hospital for providing urgent medical treatment -- However, in such cases also the Magistrate may ascertain the condition of the arrestee through video conferencing or personally visiting such arrestee -- After the arrest of a person if he is not released on bail, an order for remand to judicial custody has to be made -- Magistrate may authorize his detention either in judicial or in police custody -- Unless, such an order is passed, the initial arrest of the petitioner beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, would become illegal.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Relevant fact – Absconding of accused – Effect of -- Mere absconding by itself does not constitute a guilty mind as even an innocent man may feel panicky and may seek to evade the police when wrongly suspected of being involvement as an instinct of self-preservation -- But the act of abscondence is certainly a relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence and is a conduct u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which points to his guilty mind -- Needle of suspicion gets strengthened by the act.

(Para 10.9.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive is something that is very difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the deep recess of the mind of the person concerned and in the absence of any open declaration by the person concerned himself, the motive has to be inferred from the activities and conduct of the person -- While proof of motive certainly strengthens the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, failure to prove the same cannot be fatal.

(Para 10.11.2, 10.11.3)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, Court see no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Onus of proof -- Recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Prosecution cannot depend on the false alibi or unproven defence plea since the onus is always on the prosecution to prove the prosecution case and the onus never shifts to the accused – If weapon of crime was traced to the accused, it was incumbent upon the appellant/ accused  to explain the circumstances of the recovery of the weapon with which a linkage has been established with the injury suffered by the deceased through scientific evidence -- Apart from claiming ignorance and denying the various incriminating evidence presented during the trial, the appellant chose not to adduce any evidence to explain these circumstances -- Silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution.

(Para 10.15)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Non-explanation of evidence by accused -- Adverse inference -- Examination of an accused u/s 313 CrPC is to enable the accused to prepare and strategize his defence – Accused will have all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution witness or question any evidence and lead his defence evidence if any -- Despite the incriminating evidence which has come up against him has been pointed out to him by the Court, he has not explained any of these but merely denied or feigned ignorance to which necessary inference can be drawn against him.

(Para 10.16.1, 10.16.2)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory – Dead body of the deceased was recovered in a decomposed state, three days after the deceased was last seen together with the appellant -- As per postmortem, the death occurred 3/4 days before the postmortem examination -- Dead body was discovered with gunshot wounds on the head -- A double barrel gun with 2 spent and 1 live cartridges were recovered at the instance of the appellant -- As per the opinion of the ballistic expert, the gun showed signs of discharge and was in working condition, pellets and wads were recovered from the brain/ skull of the dead body, and these could have been fired through the gun examined and the double-barrel gun could be dismantled. Following circumstances and acts of the appellant strengthens the linkage.

(i) The appellant remained hidden from 11.07.2006 till 22.07.2006. He was arrested on 22.07.2006 after extensive search on numerous locations after the identification of the identity of the dead body on 14.07.2006.

(ii) The appellant had misled his friends, his family members and that of the deceased.

(iii) Personal effects of the deceased like gold chain was recovered from the appellant.

Appellant’s silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution -- Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court which the High Court upheld does not warrant any interference.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 239 -- Discharge of accused – Discharge under the CrPC is salutary – Magistrate is under an obligation to discharge the accused where, from the chargesheet and the appended documents, it is noticed that the trial of such charges is worthless -- Section 239 of the CrPC, which deals with the trial of warrant cases by a magistrate, confines the examination to the final report and documents sent with it u/s 173 of the CrPC -- Allegations in the FIR, transformed through investigation and the collection of evidence, are shaped into a final report -- This receives the attention of the magistrate to decide whether the charge so presented against the accused is groundless -- Magistrate neither acts as a post office nor conducts a mini-trial of the report and the documents before it while exercising the power u/s 239 of the CrPC.

(Para 26, 26.1, Para 26.2)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 239, 397, 401 – Discharge of accused – Revisional powers -- Since the order of discharge is amenable to the jurisdiction of the revisional court, the order of discharge must speak for itself, and only a warranted conclusion is arrived at by the magistrate -- Deviation from the discretionary limits attracts the supervisory jurisdiction of the revisional courts.

(Para 26)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 173, 199 – FIR for defamation – Permissibility of -- Whether there can be a Chargesheet u/s 500 IPC -- Procedure for initiating any Complaint for defamation, has been specifically provided u/s 199 Cr.P.C – FIR could not have been registered u/s 500 IPC, in view of the express bar u/s 199 Cr.P.C. -- Cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC could have been undertaken only on a Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C filed by the “Person Aggrieved”; no cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC can be taken on an FIR -- Furthermore, even the contents of the Complaint do not prima facie establish any case of defamation -- Summoning Orders set aside.

(Para 38-43, 57, 58)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 199 – FIR for defamation – Offences under other Sections also – Permissibility of -- Irrespective of there being other Sections involved in the FIR or not, the cognizance u/s 500 could have been only on the Complaint and not on the FIR.

(Para 45)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Defamation -- In order to constitute “defamation? u/s 499, there must be an “imputation” with the “intention” to harm the reputation of the person about whom such imputation is made -- It would have to be shown that the accused intended or knew or had the reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant or that he would be directly or indirectly suffered by it.

(Para 52)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Abatement of suicide – Discharge of accused -- No normal person could have imagined that a scolding, that too based on a complaint by a student, would result in such tragedy due to the student so scolded taking his own life -- No mens rea can be attributed to the appellant much less, with regard to abatement of suicide committed by the deceased -- Appeal allowed, order framing charge against the appellant under Section 306 of the IPC set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Petitioner claiming to be the owner of the attached property – Magistrate framed an opinion that the objections of the petitioner would be considered only after attachment order is implemented on spot – Held, procedure adopted by learned trial Magistrate is not countenanced by law -- Impugned order set aside -- Learned trial Magistrate directed to proceed ahead and decide the objections filed by the petitioner to the attachment order most expeditiously after hearing the parties, without waiting for the compliance report of the Deputy Commissioner.

(Para 6-8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Section 84 of Cr.P.C. does not bar raising of objection prior to the attachment -- Thus, if a third party raises an objection prior to the attachment of the property, the court has to decide the same and if the court comes to the conclusion that the property does not belong to the accused, the court can pass an order, either declining to attach the property or withdraw the attachment order.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 397, 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Settled amount paid to bank -- Respondent-Bank shown no objection to compounding of offence -- Object and purpose of enactment is to provide a compensatory mechanism for expeditious recovery of money as opposed to punishing the accused -- Amendment carried out in the year 2002 in the NI Act intended to make the nature of offence u/s 138 of the NI Act as a civil wrong while making it compoundable -- Conviction and order of sentence quashed/ set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 3, 5-8)