Search By Topic: Crime Against Women

202. (P&H HC) 23-11-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 498-A -- Dowry death case -- Summoning of additional accused -- Application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. moved after commencement of the trial -- Four witnesses already stood examined, thus the application was filed at the proper stage -- Evidence has been tested by way of cross-examination -- Persons were named in the FIR -- Only relevant question to be examined was regarding the 'degree of satisfaction' -- Death was caused due to asphyxia which was caused due to strangulation and throttling -- Thus, employment of external force in the death cannot be ruled out -- Harassment of deceased started on account of dowry immediately after the marriage -- PW-2 has attributed a specific role to father-in-law i.e. that of handing over gold jewellery of the deceased to him before she was rehabilitated on one occasion -- Thus, there exists more than prima facie case against father-in-law and the trial Court has erred in dismissing the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Charges have been framed u/s 498-A IPC as well and there was no requirement of proving anything beyond harassment for dowry for summoning the additional accused.

(Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Dowry death case – Regular bail -- Petitioner has undergone 1 year, 4 months and 12 days of custody and there is no other case pending against her – Medical evidence on record is in favour of the prosecution -- Death appears to have been caused by throttling which implies use of external force -- Moreover, prima facie, harassment on account of dowry has been established -- Death has taken place within one year and five months of marriage – Not a case of false implication -- It is not a case of inordinate delay -- Petition has no merit and dismissed at this stage.

(Para 18-21)

238. (SC) 14-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1), 389(3) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – In view of mandate of Section 389(3) of the CrPC, the principles are different in the case of sentence not exceeding three years and/or in the case of bailable offences -- Discretion u/s 389(1) is to be exercised judicially, the Appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Dowry death -- Object was to curb dowry death -- Section 304B does not categorize death, it covers every kind of death that occurs otherwise than in normal circumstances -- Where the other ingredients of Section 304B of the Code are satisfied, the deeming fiction of Section 304B would be attracted and the husband or the relatives shall be deemed to have caused the death of the bride -- In dealing with cases under Section 304B, this legislative intent has to be kept in mind -- Once there is material to show that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment before death, there is a presumption of dowry death and the onus is on the accused in-laws to show otherwise.

(Para 28-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389, 439 –Bail being the rule and jail an exception  -- Regular bail – Suspension of sentence – Difference between -- There is a difference between grant of bail u/s 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence u/s 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post-conviction.

-- In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.

-- In case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial.

(Para 36)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors -- There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 36)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Death took place within 7 or 8 months and there is oral evidence of the parents of cruelty and torture immediately preceding the death -- Also evidence of payment of Rs.2,50,000/- to the Respondent-Accused by the victim’s brother -- Respondent No.2-accused has not been able to demonstrate any apparent and/or obvious illegality or error in the judgment of the Sessions Court, to call for suspension of execution of the sentence. Held,

-- In considering an application for suspension of sentence, the Appellate Court is only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in the order of conviction that renders the order of conviction prima facie erroneous.

-- Where there is evidence that has been considered by the Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under Section 389 to re-assess and/or re-analyze the same evidence and take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release the convict on bail.

Appellant spent money beyond his financial capacity, at the wedding of the victim and had even gifted an I-10 car -- Failure to lodge an FIR complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim is inconsequential -- Parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete breakdown of the marriage by lodging an FIR against the Respondent No.2 and his parents, while the victim was alive. Impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender for being taken into custody -- The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

(Para 38-42)

245. (SC) 28-07-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Procuration of Minor girl – Doubt created by defence – Consideration of -- Sweeping generalisations and superficial analysis – Permissibility of -- Reasoning is generic and is premised upon generalisations which may not be necessarily true always -- It is indisputable that parents would not ordinarily endanger the reputation of their minor daughter merely to falsely implicate their opponents, but such clichés ought not to be the sole basis of dismissing reasonable doubts created and/or defences set out by the accused.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Procuration of Minor girl -- Father eye-witness – Delay in 5 days in FIR – Effect of -- Five-day delay in registration of the FIR gains importance -- Difficult to appreciate that a father would await a second incident to happen before moving the law into motion -- Sweeping assumptions concerning delays in registration of FIRs for sexual offences, send a problematic signal to society and create opportunities for abuse by miscreants -- Instead, the facts of each individual case and the behaviour of the parties involved ought to be analysed by courts before reaching a conclusion on the reason and effect of delay in registration of FIR.

(Para 11)

C. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Re-appreciation of evidence by Supreme Court -- Ordinarily, the Supreme Court ought not to reappreciate evidence -- However, where the courts below have dealt with the material-on-record in a cavalier or mechanical manner which is likely to cause gross injustice, then the Court in such exceptional circumstances may justifiably reappraise the evidence to advance the cause of justice -- Such re-assessment ought not to take place routinely and ought not to become substitution of an otherwise plausible view taken by the Courts below.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366-A -- Procuration of Minor girl -- Contradictions highlighted by defence -- Reversal of Burdon of proof – Permissibility of -- Trial Court has summarily disregarded the contradictions highlighted by the defense side, on the premise that such contradictions had no material bearing and that there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix -- High Court too has opined that PW-1 and PW-2 have completely corroborated each other and their testimonies were impeccable -- These reasons are not only contrary to the record but they also lead to an impermissible reversal of the burden of proof imposed in criminal trials.

(Para 17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Plausible version by accused – Analysis of – Requirements of law -- Any alternate version of events or interpretation proffered by the accused must be carefully analysed and considered by the trial Court in compliance with the mandate of Section 313(4) -- Such opportunity is a valuable right of the accused to seek justice and defend oneself -- Failure of the trial Court to fairly apply its mind and consider the defence, could endanger the conviction itself -- Unlike the prosecution which needs to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to create reasonable doubt or prove their alternate version by mere preponderance of probabilities – Held, once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defense plea.

(Para 21)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Criminal Intimidation -- Proving the intention to cause alarm or compel doing/abstaining from some act, and not mere utterances of words, is a pre-requisite of successful conviction under Section 506 of IPC -- Trial Court has undertaken no such separate analysis or recorded any finding on this count, thus calling into question the conviction for criminal intimidation – Conviction set aside.

(Para 25, 26)