Search By Topic: Crime Against Women

151. (P&H HC) 01-10-2021

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 22 – Limitation under DV Act -- Argument raised that the petition filed under the DV Act is barred by limitation, the same is not sustainable in view of the judgments that there is no limitation prescribed under the DV Act to institute claim seeking relief under Sections 17 to 22 of the DV Act.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s) – Aggrieved person -- Domestic relationship – Respondent -- Shared household – Under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- Definition of an ‘aggrieved person’ may be read in this context wherein an aggrieved person has been defined to mean any women, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent -- Going further, the term ‘domestic relationship’ too has been defined, which means a relationship between two persons, who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage etc.

(Para 7)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s), 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 -- Maintenance under DV Act -- Domestic relationship – Shared household – Void marriage – Ground of -- Argument that the complainant is not a legally wedded wife, as on the date of marriage she was not divorced from her husband has no merit -- Held, under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- There is no dispute that the petitioner was in a relationship as he married the complainant -- Question whether the marriage would be void or not is a matter of trial -- Courts below while granting interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.25,000/- per month qualified that the maintenance is subject to set off/adjustments of interim maintenance received by the respondent-complainant in the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act – No ground is made out to interfere with the orders passed by the courts below and the same are upheld.

(Para 6-9)

157. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

167. (SC) 28-05-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry death – Object of -- It endeavors to address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Doctor found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries -- As the death was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence – Evidence, when the brother of the deceased visited her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry -- Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter -- She was brought back to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father -- Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house -- However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry -- Aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him -- Chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased -- Since the ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption u/s 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified u/s 304-B of IPC.

(Para 23-28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Suicide by wife – Presumption of -- For the offence u/s 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed -- Prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same -- With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113-A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions -- Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

(Para 33)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

(Para 36)

171. (P&H HC) 07-04-2021

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 -- Domestic violence – Prima facie case -- Summoning of -- Section 18 of the 2005 Act stipulates for a protection order in favour of a woman -- Section 20 of the 2005 Act deals with the monetary relief to the aggrieved party and the same can be granted by a Court -- Before issuing notice, the learned Magistrate has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of a domestic violence.

(Para 22)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of summoning order -- Abuse of process of law – Petitioners, mother-in-law aged 65 years is 40% disabled from eyes, and is suffering from old age ailments, father-in-law, aged 73 years, is a chronic kidney patient and has been on dialysis thrice a week and married sister-in-law is a Government Teacher and since her marriage in 2009, she has been residing in her matrimonial home and looking after her two minor children -- A pure matrimonial dispute between husband and wife, has been given a colour of the proceedings under the 2005 Act so as to rope in hapless parents-in-law and a married sister-in-law -- They have been roped in with an oblique motive to harass and mentally torture them -- Moreover, the allegations leveled in the complaint are vague, general and omnibus in nature -- Proceedings qua the petitioners, are nothing, but a clear abuse of process of law -- Summoning order and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 33-36)

173. (SC) 06-04-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)

174. (SC) 05-04-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Dowry death – Regular bail -- Plea in bail application that the deceased was “suffering from severe headache and was mentally disturbed since the past nine months” and that she was taken to a doctor by the first respondent -- Medical prescription, would prima facie indicate that there was no serious ailment -- Medical prescription of the Ayurvedic doctor and the remedies prescribed belie such a claim -- Prima facie, there are serious allegations in the FIR in regard to the harassment suffered by the deceased in close proximity to her death over demands for dowry by the accused -- In view of the provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC, as well as the presumption which arises u/s 113-B of the Evidence Act, the High Court was clearly not justified in granting bail.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail – Setting aside of -- Order of the High Court granting bail contains absolutely no reasons at all -- High Court has merely recorded the submissions and in the extract proceeded to grant bail without any evaluation of the rival submissions – Seriousness of the alleged offence has to be evaluated in the backdrop of the allegation that she was being harassed for dowry; and that a telephone call was received from the accused in close-proximity to the time of death, making a demand -- An order without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the norms which guide the judicial process – Order of the High Court granting bail set aside.

(Para 10-13)

197. (SC) 20-01-2021

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357-A – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Writ jurisdiction -- Rape victim – Rights of -- Held, petitioner being a rape victim deserves treatment as rape victim by all the authorities – A rape victim suffers not only a mental trauma but also discrimination from the society – Petitioner has two sons and one daughter – One son major, two children of the petitioner are still minor – Section 357A of the Cr.P.C provides procedure for grant of compensation, the petitioner had already made application to seek compensation under the above Scheme and payment of compensation has already been made. Directions given :

-- The Deputy Commissioner, to take measure to ensure that minor children of the petitioner are provided free education in any of the Government Institutions in District where the petitioner is residing till they attain the age of 14 years.

-- The Deputy Commissioner may also consider the case of the petitioner for providing house under Prime Minister Awas Yojna or any other Central or State Scheme in which petitioner could be provided accommodation.

-- The Senior Superintendent of Police, and other competent authority shall review the Police security provided to the petitioner from time to time and take such measures as deem fit and proper.

-- The District Legal Services Authority on representation made by the petitioner shall render legal services to the petitioner as may be deemed fit to safeguard the interest of the petitioner.

(Para 16-19, 25-27)