Search By Topic: Crime Against Women

103. (P&H HC) 16-11-2022

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B, 406, 302, 34, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Conviction u/s 306 IPC -- Appeal by complainant seeking conviction for dowry death/ murder -- A young girl expired in less than 02 years after her marriage by suicide -- The mental state of the father can very well be imagined -- However, this alone would not be sufficient to put the blame on respondents No.2 and 3 (husband and mother-in-law) and to fasten criminal liability, the prosecution would be required to prove its case against them beyond reasonable doubt – No complaint was ever made to any authority with regard to the torture being meted out to deceased, no Panchayat was ever convened and no other step was taken – Showed feigned ignorance in cross-examination about her medical condition which was disclosed by DW1/ Doctor, as per whom deceased remained admitted in hospital till 27.07.2018 on account of pregnancy in her fallopian tube for which she had to undergo surgery -- Expenses for the surgery were borne by respondent No.3 and his family -- The ld. trial Court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the ingredients of Sections 304-B or 302 IPC and even those of Sections 406 and 498-A IPC did not stand fulfilled – No perversity in the view taken by the trial Court either on facts or on law and the impugned judgment is well reasoned -- It is now well settled that Courts have to be extremely careful while hearing appeals against acquittal and the judgments of acquittal should not be interfered with lightly – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 8-12)

105. (SC) 02-11-2022

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19(1), 21, 27 – Reporting of offence -- Prompt and proper reporting of is of utmost importance -- Its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act -- Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act – Clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape – If it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault -- A conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

(Para 15, 22)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Medical evidence in sexual offences -- In relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO case – Quashing of FIR and charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.

(Para 18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145, 157 – Evidential value of statement u/s 161,  164 Cr.P.C. – Statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for such purposes.

(Para 20)

106. (SC) 01-11-2022

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 164-A, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Rape case Guidelines -- Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka by Nonavinakere Police vs. Shivanna alias Tarkari Shivanna, (2014) 8 SCC 913 exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution issued interim directions in the form of mandamus to all the Police Stations-in-Charge in the entire country to follow:

“10.1. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the investigating officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. A copy of the statement under Section 164 CrPC should be handed over to the investigating officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 CrPC should not be disclosed to any person till charge-sheet/report under Section 173 CrPC is filed.

10.2. The investigating officer shall as far as possible take the victim to the nearest Lady Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate.

10.3. The investigating officer shall record specifically the date and the time at which he learnt about the commission of the offence of rape and the date and time at which he took the victim to the Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate as aforesaid.

10.4. If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking the victim to the Magistrate, the investigating officer should record the reasons for the same in the case diary and hand over a copy of the same to the Magistrate.

10.5. Medical examination of the victim : Section 164-A CrPC inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in CrPC imposes an obligation on the part of investigating officer to get the victim of the rape immediately medically examined. A copy of the report of such medical examination should be immediately handed over to the Magistrate who records the statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC.”

Supreme Court gave suggestion to every High Court that the appropriate modifications/amendments be made to the Criminal Practice/Trial Rules incorporating provisions consistent with the directions issued in the decisions in Shivanna’s case (2014) 8 SCC 913.

(Para 1-7)

107. (P&H HC) 29-10-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- Power of Court -- Power u/s 319 Cr.P.c. is discretionary and extra ordinary, which is to be exercised very sparingly only when strong and cogent evidence has been led against a person, who is sought to be summoned -- Court must be satisfied from the evidence collected during the enquiry or in the trial that the person sought to be summoned as an additional accused has committed an offence for which he deserves to be tried alongwith already arraigned accused.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – POCSO matter -- Rape -- Summoning of additional accused – In the complaint there is no allegation whatsoever against MK (sister of main accused/ JS) – Only reference in the FIR is that MK is the sister of JS and she used to talk with the prosecutrix on phone -- In the statement recorded u/s 164 of the Code, the prosecutrix stated that MK used to say that she wants that the prosecutrix should become her Bhabi (sister-in-law), and that the prosecutrix revealed about the incident to MK but she assured her that there is nothing to worry as JS would get married to her -- However, in her deposition, the prosecutrix has stated that, it was MK, who had called her on phone and forced her to accompany them on a trip, but when she reached the hotel, she found that MK was not present there – It is evident that there is a consistent change in the version of the incident by the prosecutrix to enmesh the sister of JS in the criminal case -- Parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh’s case (2014) 3 SCC 92 and Manjeet Singh’s case 2021 SCC Online 632 are not fulfilled and the order passed by the Trial Court declining the application for summoning MK does not call for any interference -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8-10)

109. (SC) 21-10-2022

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail –While granting bail High court observed “… Though on the one side, there is a possibility of such hugs and kisses being manifestations of affection by an uncle, one cannot ignore the possibility of such show of 'affections' being coloured by sexual overtones. However, those are all matters for investigation.” – Held, observations made are totally unwarranted and have been made overlooking the specific allegations contained in the FIR, duly supported with the Statement of the victim-girl child u/s 164 of the Code – High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction in granting protection against arrest, as the Investigating Officer deserves free-hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11, 29 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail –Victim-girl is traumatized to such a high degree that her academic pursuits have been adversely impacted alone, coupled with the legislative intent especially reflected through Section 29 of the POCSO Act, are sufficient to dissuade a Court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in granting pre-arrest bail.

(Para 12)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11, 29 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail -- Charge-sheet filed -- It will be unfair to presume that the Investigating Officer does not require Respondent No.1 for custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation.

(Para 14)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Custodial interrogation -- In many anticipatory bail matters, one common argument being canvassed that no custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be granted -- There appears to be a serious misconception of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail -- Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail.

(Para 15)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail – Prima facie case – Nature of offence -- Custodial interrogation -- There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted anticipatory bail -- First and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused -- Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment -- Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail -- However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail.

(Para 15

F. Binding precedent – Judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of High Court --  Decision of the Kerala High Court rendered in the Joy’s case (2019) 1 KLT 935 deals with Section 29 of the POCSO Act -- When the learned Judge decided the anticipatory bail application, the decision of the coordinate Bench in the case of Joy was binding to him -- He could not have ignored a binding decision -- It is a different thing to say that if he may disagree with the view taken and accordingly refer it to a larger Bench.

(Para 16)

113. (SC) 28-09-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

114. (Delhi HC) 20-09-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

115. (P&H HC) 20-09-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

121. (SC) 16-06-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act -- Same transaction -- While pointing out that the question as to whether a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact -- Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, which are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, the vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

(Para 20.3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 506, 376 – Rape – Threat and abuses – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act – Same transaction -- Alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016 -- Other alleged acts of hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village in Chamoli (Uttarakhand) – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either -- No allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity -- Alleged offence u/s 376 IPC and the other offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 CrPC -- Thus, the learned Sessions Judge, had rightly discharged the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction.

(Para 22.1-25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 – Acquittal of accused -- Double jeopardy – Accused having gone through the trial in relation to offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for the same charges on the same facts -- Any such process would be in blatant disregard of the settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as also Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 24.2.1)

127. (P&H HC) 01-06-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Scope of – Power is not to be invoked as a matter of routine but to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice -- This section gives the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event, it is felt that the ends of justice will require that the Court can invoke the extraordinary powers which are to be exercised with restraint and not lightly -- In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Respondent no.2/girl has already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other -- In such circumstances, the possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2/girl, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- As such, it is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law -- FIR qua the petitioner quashed.

(Para 8-12)

129. (SC) 13-05-2022

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)

130. (P&H HC) 09-05-2022

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(f), 12, 29 -- Domestic violence case – Alternative remedy – Inherent powers of High Court -- High Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain a petition u/s 482 of the Code and the statutory remedy of appeal under the DV Act would not be an embargo in exercise of such power.

(Para 6-7)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(f), 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic relationship -- Domestic violence case against in-laws – Maintainability of – Quashing under inherent power of High Court --  Allegations leveled may attract the offences under the IPC, but in order to invoke the jurisdiction under the DV Act, it is necessary that the parties should be in a “domestic relationship” as defined under Section 2 (f) of the DV Act -- Tone and toner of the complaint shows that the primary allegation by the respondent is against her husband -- Occasional visit by the petitioners to the matrimonial house of the respondent would not bring it within the four corners of the definition of domestic relationship or shared household -- Petitioners, both of whom are more than 75 years of age, do not have any domestic relationship nor have they lived together in a share household with the respondent and the institution of the complaint against them under the provisions of the DV Act is an abuse of the process of law and the same deserves to be set aside -- Accordingly, the petition allowed -- Complaint u/s 12 of the DV Act as well as all proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 9-11)

131. (SC) 05-05-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Cancellation of bail -- Supreme Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the Appellate Court -- Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be cancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial.

Aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506 -- Rape case -- Cancellation of bail -- High Court granted bail on sole ground of delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR -- Criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainant and State has also confirmed that he is involved in at least four criminal cases – After bail, photographs appearing in the social media with his snapshots prominently displayed on posters/ hoarding in the forefront with the faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop, welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back to Bhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman” -- Brazen conduct of the respondent No.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainant that she would not get a free and fair trial and that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses -- Representation by appellant’ father to the Superintendent of Police expressing the very same apprehension – Held, respondent No. 2 does not deserve the concession of bail -- Impugned order quashed -- Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender.

(Para 26-31)

143. (P&H HC) 01-10-2021

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 22 – Limitation under DV Act -- Argument raised that the petition filed under the DV Act is barred by limitation, the same is not sustainable in view of the judgments that there is no limitation prescribed under the DV Act to institute claim seeking relief under Sections 17 to 22 of the DV Act.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s) – Aggrieved person -- Domestic relationship – Respondent -- Shared household – Under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- Definition of an ‘aggrieved person’ may be read in this context wherein an aggrieved person has been defined to mean any women, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent -- Going further, the term ‘domestic relationship’ too has been defined, which means a relationship between two persons, who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage etc.

(Para 7)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s), 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 -- Maintenance under DV Act -- Domestic relationship – Shared household – Void marriage – Ground of -- Argument that the complainant is not a legally wedded wife, as on the date of marriage she was not divorced from her husband has no merit -- Held, under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- There is no dispute that the petitioner was in a relationship as he married the complainant -- Question whether the marriage would be void or not is a matter of trial -- Courts below while granting interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.25,000/- per month qualified that the maintenance is subject to set off/adjustments of interim maintenance received by the respondent-complainant in the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act – No ground is made out to interfere with the orders passed by the courts below and the same are upheld.

(Para 6-9)

149. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)