A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act -- Same transaction -- While pointing out that the question as to whether a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact -- Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, which are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, the vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

(Para 20.3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 506, 376 – Rape – Threat and abuses – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act – Same transaction -- Alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016 -- Other alleged acts of hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village in Chamoli (Uttarakhand) – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either -- No allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity -- Alleged offence u/s 376 IPC and the other offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 CrPC -- Thus, the learned Sessions Judge, had rightly discharged the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction.

(Para 22.1-25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 – Acquittal of accused -- Double jeopardy – Accused having gone through the trial in relation to offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for the same charges on the same facts -- Any such process would be in blatant disregard of the settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as also Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 24.2.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 376-D, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Gang rape – Regular bail -- Petitioner is approximately 18 years whereas the age of prosecutrix is 28 years, who is also the paternal aunt of the petitioner – Petitioner was arrested on 24.07.2021 and is in custody since then – Main witness has already been examined whereas nine other prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined -- Keeping in view the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in near future and the petitioner is in custody since 24.07.2021, the petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 2-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2) (n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO matter – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Dispute amicably settled between the parties – In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so -- Respondent no.2/ girl already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other and a male child has also been born from the wedlock -- Possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 365, 452, 366, 506 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 3(i), 101(3)(a) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Acquittal of juvenile in rape case – Criminal writ petition against -- Place of occurrence i.e. the shop of the accused is situated in a public place, however, as per the deposition of the victim she was forcibly taken from her home to the shop by forcibly making her to sit on the motorcycle of the accused is also improbable as there was strong possibility of the family members coming to know of the same -- Besides this, the ocular version is not even medically corroborated beyond reasonable doubt -- Once the accused is acquitted there lies double the presumption of innocence in his favour -- Interference can be in a situation when there are perversities in the findings arrived at by the Trial Court -- If there are two views possible then the one favouring the accused should be adopted -- Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and evidence adduced on record on the anvil of the law settled, Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Juvenile Justice Board in acquitting the accused -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 446A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 34, 120-B, 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Absence from trial – Non-bailable warrants – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner had been regularly appearing before the trial Court and it was only on one occasion he absented and even his bail bonds have not been cancelled or forfeited to the State -- Keeping in view that there is only a single date default, petitioner is directed to put in appearance before the trial Court within ten days from today and on his doing so he shall be released on bail on old bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 450, 452, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Rape case – Regular bail -- Complicity of the petitioner in the offence would remain subject matter of debate before the Trial Court and the petitioner, who is in custody for the last more than 10 months would be entitled to be released on bail as 14 prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined -- Without delving into the merits or demerits, petition allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 3-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Scope of – Power is not to be invoked as a matter of routine but to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice -- This section gives the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event, it is felt that the ends of justice will require that the Court can invoke the extraordinary powers which are to be exercised with restraint and not lightly -- In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Respondent no.2/girl has already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other -- In such circumstances, the possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2/girl, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- As such, it is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law -- FIR qua the petitioner quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)n -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- POCSO matter – Rape case-- Regular bail – Petitioner is behind bars since 16.01.2020 -- Alleged occurrence took place in July, 2019 whereas, the present FIR has been lodged on 16.01.2020 -- Though the victim has supported the case of the prosecution, however, out of total 18 prosecution witnesses, 11 witnesses including all the material witnesses already stand examined -- Thus, the chances of tampering with the prosecution witnesses by the petitioner definitely does not survive any more -- Petitioner has no criminal antecedents -- Trial will take sufficient long time -- Veracity of the allegations would be assessed after conclusion of the trial and on the appreciation of the evidence -- Petition allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Acquittal u/s 304-B IPC – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC -- Dying declaration – Reliance upon – Test for admissibility is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved -- Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death -- In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge u/s 498A of the IPC u/s 32(1) of the Evidence Act -- However, certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence is admitted -- The first condition is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter, however the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility -- The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death -- How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 11, 17-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Mental cruelty -- Deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased) -- She had specifically stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl -- As a result of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison -- While she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further demands for dowry would be made -- Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had continued to illtreat the deceased -- Deceased, due to the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a saree -- Conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, upheld.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136, 137 -- Interested witness – Evidence by mother of the deceased – Value of -- It is a settled principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone -- However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness more carefully.

(Para 26)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(f), 12, 29 -- Domestic violence case – Alternative remedy – Inherent powers of High Court -- High Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain a petition u/s 482 of the Code and the statutory remedy of appeal under the DV Act would not be an embargo in exercise of such power.

(Para 6-7)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(f), 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic relationship -- Domestic violence case against in-laws – Maintainability of – Quashing under inherent power of High Court --  Allegations leveled may attract the offences under the IPC, but in order to invoke the jurisdiction under the DV Act, it is necessary that the parties should be in a “domestic relationship” as defined under Section 2 (f) of the DV Act -- Tone and toner of the complaint shows that the primary allegation by the respondent is against her husband -- Occasional visit by the petitioners to the matrimonial house of the respondent would not bring it within the four corners of the definition of domestic relationship or shared household -- Petitioners, both of whom are more than 75 years of age, do not have any domestic relationship nor have they lived together in a share household with the respondent and the institution of the complaint against them under the provisions of the DV Act is an abuse of the process of law and the same deserves to be set aside -- Accordingly, the petition allowed -- Complaint u/s 12 of the DV Act as well as all proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Cancellation of bail -- Supreme Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the Appellate Court -- Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be cancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial.

Aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 506 -- Rape case -- Cancellation of bail -- High Court granted bail on sole ground of delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR -- Criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainant and State has also confirmed that he is involved in at least four criminal cases – After bail, photographs appearing in the social media with his snapshots prominently displayed on posters/ hoarding in the forefront with the faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop, welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back to Bhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman” -- Brazen conduct of the respondent No.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainant that she would not get a free and fair trial and that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses -- Representation by appellant’ father to the Superintendent of Police expressing the very same apprehension – Held, respondent No. 2 does not deserve the concession of bail -- Impugned order quashed -- Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender.

(Para 26-31)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Sexual harassment case -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties -- FIR is an outcome of a petty dispute, which has been settled -- Perusal of the allegations levelled in the FIR shows that the ingredients of Section 354-A, IPC are not fulfilled -- As the parties have decided to bury the hatchet, continuation of the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and the same deserve to be set aside – Petition allowed.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(N), 506, 328, 34 (Sections 313, 406, 366 were added later on and Section 34 was deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape case -- Second regular bail application – Investigation Officer deposition took place – Prima facie, appears to be a consensual relationship, prosecutrix was a 30 years old woman -- Contention that there has been no material change in circumstances, after the withdrawal of the previous petition is bereft of any merit, as the Investigating Officer has since been examined -- Material witness/ prosecutrix also stands examined – 09 prosecution witnesses examined out of the 16 prosecution witnesses cited, there is no likelihood of the trial concluding in near future -- Court, therefore, deemed it fit to extend the concession of bail to the petitioner during the trial, as he has been in custody since 14th January, 2021.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 406, 498-A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law, controversy does not indicate that the same involves heinous or serious offences and furthermore, the matrimonial dispute has been sought to be amicably settled – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 6-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 316, 323, 406, 498-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Causing death of quick unborn child (Section 316 IPC) – Dowry case -- Compromise quashing of FIR --  Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Dowry death case -- Summoning of cousin sister-in-law as additional accused – Challenge to -- Complaint shows that the petitioner alongwith other co-accused had been harassing and pressurizing the deceased for bringing more dowry -- Deceased was being forced to bring Rs.2.00 lacs from her parents for sending D S abroad -- Investigating Agency despite having recorded the statements of some of the independent witnesses regarding the accusation of harassment of the deceased at the hands of petitioner, which is apparent from the perusal of the zimni has chosen to ignore the statements and for reasons best known to it and has given a clean chit to the petitioner -- As to whether the petitioner is a close relative of the deceased or a distant one and as to whether she is staying in same house or in another locality of the same village, are all matters to be tested by the Trial Court during the course of the trial – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Trial Court -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Matrimonial dispute – Non-recovery of dowry articles -- Anticipatory bail – Petitioner joined investigation on interim bail -- Recovery of disputed dowry articles would not come in the way of confirmation of interim bail -- If at some stage the parties agree to reconcile their differences then the fact that they had spent some time in custody would be a circumstance which may come in the way of amicably settling the matter – Interim bail granted to petitioner made absolute -- Rajesh Sharma’s case (2018) 10 SCC 472 and Anil Rajput’s case 2010(6) RCR (Criminal) 1126 relied.

(Para 1,2,6,7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is pending, challan has not been presented -- Held, petition is premature at this stage -- Petitioner would be at liberty to approach the court after filing of the challan.

(Para 3-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 504, 406, 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Acquittal in dowry matter – Revision against -- No medical evidence on record to prove the allegations of physical assault – Allegation of  physical assault in the presence of two cousins, but neither of them were examined during trial nor cited as prosecution witnesses -- Petitioner/complainant while appearing as PW-1 did not utter a word, much less, by way of a whisper regarding the allegations of physical assaults – A panchayat was convened between the parties with regard to the harassment but none of the members of the said panchayat were either examined during trial nor cited as prosecution witnesses -- Allegations of misappropriation of the dowry could not be proved by any cogent or reliable evidence in the absence of any evidence of entrustment of dowry – Revision against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 18 – POCSO matter – Regular bail -- Allegation that petitioner has tried to do bad act with victim by forcibly kissing her and with intention to commit rape, he has broken the string of her Salwar – Prosecutrix is stated to be 17 years and 02 months of age -- Prosecutrix when was taken to hospital, she made a statement that she does not want to be medico-legally examined as no rape was committed with her -- Without commenting upon the merits of the case, considering the fact that the petitioner is in judicial custody for the last about 01 year and 11 months; he is not involved in any other case and also considering the fact that statement of the prosecutrix already stands recorded, the petition allowed -- Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 1-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 498-A – Dowry case – Anticipatory bail -- Petitioner has joined the investigation, however, the gold articles are yet to be recovered -- It is apparent that there are allegations and counter-allegations which is totally a subject matter of the investigation -- Interim bail made absolute.

(Para 6-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439(2) -- Cancellation of bail -- Once bail has been granted, the Courts should act with great circumspection in cancelling it unless, of course, some material is brought to the notice of the Court that the accused has breached the conditions of bail imposed upon them or a perverse order has been passed while granting the concession of bail.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 406 -- Anticipatory bail – Cancellation of bail – Non-recovery of dowry articles – Effect of -- Pursuant to the interim order, both accused had joined investigation -- Though, it was submitted by the Public Prosecutor that recovery of all dowry articles had not been effected from the respondents, however, it would not be out of place to observe that an FIR registered under Section 498-A, 406 of IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising out of them, cannot be converted solely into recovery proceedings -- Allegations of entrustment and misappropriation of dowry articles of the petitioner being disputed questions of fact, cannot be looked into by the Court while deciding a petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C.

(Para 6)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 22 – Limitation under DV Act -- Argument raised that the petition filed under the DV Act is barred by limitation, the same is not sustainable in view of the judgments that there is no limitation prescribed under the DV Act to institute claim seeking relief under Sections 17 to 22 of the DV Act.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s) – Aggrieved person -- Domestic relationship – Respondent -- Shared household – Under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- Definition of an ‘aggrieved person’ may be read in this context wherein an aggrieved person has been defined to mean any women, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent -- Going further, the term ‘domestic relationship’ too has been defined, which means a relationship between two persons, who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage etc.

(Para 7)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(a), 2(f), 2Q), 2(s), 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 -- Maintenance under DV Act -- Domestic relationship – Shared household – Void marriage – Ground of -- Argument that the complainant is not a legally wedded wife, as on the date of marriage she was not divorced from her husband has no merit -- Held, under the provisions of this Act, the right to claim protection against a person on account of domestic violence is not limited to a wife only -- There is no dispute that the petitioner was in a relationship as he married the complainant -- Question whether the marriage would be void or not is a matter of trial -- Courts below while granting interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.25,000/- per month qualified that the maintenance is subject to set off/adjustments of interim maintenance received by the respondent-complainant in the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act – No ground is made out to interfere with the orders passed by the courts below and the same are upheld.

(Para 6-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Cancellation of bail -- Bail once granted should not be cancelled unless some cogent case based on some supervening circumstance is brought to the notice of a Court.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 406, 498-A and 120-B -- Cancellation of bail -- Non-recovery of dowry articles – Ground of -- Bail granted to an accused cannot be simply cancelled because of the non-recovery of some of the dowry articles.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 389 -- Dowry death – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence – Initially, applicant was declared innocent by the police during enquiry and she was summoned u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Already undergone actual sentence of 04 years, 07 months and 29 days out of rigorous imprisonment for life – Case is covered by Dharam Pal's case, 1999(4) RCR (Criminal), 600 -- Appeal is not likely to be heard in the near future, the remaining sentence of applicant is ordered to be suspended during pendency of the appeal.

(Para 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376-AB – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- POCSO matter -- Bail to juvenile -- Rape with minor – Victim was just 01 year and 09 months old -- 11 prosecution witnesses remain to be examined -- Prima facie, there are very serious allegations levelled against the petitioner, for which the Court is not inclined to extend the concession of bail to the petitioner -- However, since the petitioner has been in custody since 09th August, 2019, the Juvenile Board/trial Court concerned is directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably, on or before 30th November, 2021.

(Para 2-4)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 115 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 376AB -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO matter -- Rape with minor – Bail to juvenile -- Petitioner was declined bail on the ground that release of the petitioner on bail would defeat the ends of justice – Held, a juvenile can be denied the concession of bail, if any of the three contingencies specified under Section 12 (1) of the J.J. Act is available – J.J. Act is a beneficial legislation and gravity or seriousness of the offence would not be a ground to decline concession of bail to the juvenile – No purpose will be served in keeping the petitioner in custody -- Impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, are liable to be set aside -- Petition allowed, petitioner is directed to be released on bail.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape case – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.2 had lodged a complaint alleging, inter alia, that the appellant had committed an offence u/s 376 of the IPC -- Both the accused (appellant) and respondent No.2 were living together for a considerable while -- Complainant’s allegation is that the appellant duped her by misrepresenting to her that he is divorced -- Complainant, according to the accused, is not unmarried and her marriage subsists -- A child was born in the meanwhile as a consequence, a mediated settlement limited to the maintenance and upkeep of the child was arrived at by them -- Having regard to these facts and the submissions made on behalf of the complainant, who does not dispute that this may not be an appropriate case for pursuing the prosecution further -- Criminal proceedings must be quashed.

(Para 3-6)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 498-A, 304B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail -- Dowry death case -- Father-in-law and mother-in-law – Earlier anticipatory bail was granted with the observation that, after charge sheet is filed, it is open for the petitioners to surrender and apply for the Regular Bail before the Competent Court – Held, same does not preclude the petitioners to apply for anticipatory bail u/s 438 Cr.P.C. after filing of the charge sheet -- It also cannot be said, that same is a second application for grant of anticipatory bail -- Husband of the deceased was granted Regular Bail after he was arrested – Held, it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail.

(Para 2-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 406, 354-A (Section 377 added later on) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Dowry case – Anticipatory bail – Non-recovery of dowry articles – Effect of – Stated that petitioner has joined the investigation, however, recovery of gold ornaments and a motorcycle, which were given and entrusted to the petitioner and his family at the time of marriage has not been effected – Held, entrustment of gold ornaments as alleged are disputed questions of fact and would be considered at the time of trial -- Petition is allowed and interim order made absolute.

(Para 1-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 304-B, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide -- Discharge u/s 306 IPC – Permissibility of – High Court discharged the parents in law u/s 306 IPC -- Considering the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, respondents no.1 and 2 (parents in law) ought not to have been discharged of the offence u/s 306 IPC, especially when the charges u/s 304B IPC and other related sections had already been framed and confirmed – Order of High Court set aside.

(Para 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 8 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – Anticipatory bail by juvenile – Maintainability of -- Petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C. on behalf of the juvenile is not maintainable.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Dowry case -- Criminal breach of trust – Anticipatory bail to parents-in-law -- Pursuant to order, passed by High Court, the petitioners have joined the investigation –Contended that certain dowry articles have yet not been returned by the petitioners -- A perusal of the FIR does not reveal that there is any allegation much less whisper against the petitioners of entrustment of any dowry article at the time of the marriage of their son to the complainant – In the circumstances, Court failed to comprehend as to which jewellery/gold ornaments are required to be recovered from the petitioners -- Petition allowed, interim order made absolute.

(Para 1-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Third regular bail application -- Rape case – Prosecutrix turned hostile -- Similarly, her husband also resiled from the statement recorded earlier before the Addl. Sessions Judge -- Petitioner is stated to be the husband of the Bua – Since the parties are closely related and the complainant had not supported her own case, Court is of the opinion that no tangible purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in further custody since the trial is likely to take some time to conclude.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail -- Co-accused father-in-law and brother-in-law have already been granted bail -- No suicide note left by the deceased – Petitioner/mother-in-law is in custody since 1.3.2021 -- Investigation is complete, challan has been presented -- There are no allegations in the FIR with regard to any physical injury etc being inflicted by the petitioner -- Conclusion of trial is likely to take time; no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind bars and more-over considering the age of the petitioner, she is granted bail.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 376, 120-B – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (104 of 1956), Sections 4, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389 – Suspension of sentence – Applicant undergone sentence of 3 years, 11 months and 23 days out of 7 years -- No other case pending against him -- Appeal being of the year 2020 is not likely to be heard in near future, so taking into consideration the period undergone and the attending circumstances and the fact that sentence of co-accused of applicant has already been suspended, sentence of applicant/appellant No.2 suspended during the pendency of the appeal.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Abetment to suicide -- Regular bail -- Custody of 03 months and 03 days – Challan has already stands presented and the petitioner is the sister-in-law of the deceased – Court find in agreement with the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner that any further incarceration of the petitioner is not warranted in the case -- Petition is allowed.

(Para 2-6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry death – Object of -- It endeavors to address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

(Para 22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Doctor found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries -- As the death was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence – Evidence, when the brother of the deceased visited her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry -- Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter -- She was brought back to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father -- Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house -- However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry -- Aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him -- Chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased -- Since the ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption u/s 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified u/s 304-B of IPC.

(Para 23-28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Suicide by wife – Presumption of -- For the offence u/s 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed -- Prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same -- With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113-A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions -- Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

(Para 33)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Dowry death – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

(Para 36)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(f), 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape case – Victim resiled -- Petitioner has been behind bars for a substantial period of more than 1 year -- Further detention of the petitioner will not serve any useful purpose -- Petition accepted and the petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail.

(Para 1, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 365, 366-A, 376, 467, 468, 420, 471 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- POCSO case – Rape and kidnapping – Regular bail -- Detention for more than six months – As per Voter I. Card and statement given by her before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, her Date of Birth happens to be 07.08.2001 -- She further stated that she had married the petitioner at her own will on 13.10.2020 and wanted to live with him – Prosecutrix is now residing with her parents, it would be fair to assume that the petitioner even if now released on bail would not be in a position to exert any undue influence or administer threat upon her -- Trial is likely to take its own considerable time to complete due to ongoing covid-19 pandemic, the prayer of the petitioner for regular bail is allowed.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (offences u/s 109, 328, 354-B, 506, 509 IPC added later on) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Rape case -- Anticipatory bail -- Complainant as of now is about 51 years of age having grandson and was on visiting terms with the family of the petitioner and visited Singapore and Malaysia with the petitioner -- There are entries of matrimonial status in the passport and joint affidavit of the parties, which according to the petitioner were prepared in order to ward off any objection in the foreign country for living smoothly – allegation of consensual relationship under the pretext of marriage -- Complainant was also married from whom she has not taken any divorce by lawful mechanism except to allege that a Panchayati divorce -- Parties are in advance stage of their life -- Both are having families -- Petitioner being already married is evident from the photographs of birthday celebration of son of the petitioner, which was attended by the complainant and her son – In the light of consensual relationship, it would remain debatable as to whether offence under Section 376 IPC is attracted or not -- Petition allowed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 -- Domestic violence – Prima facie case -- Summoning of -- Section 18 of the 2005 Act stipulates for a protection order in favour of a woman -- Section 20 of the 2005 Act deals with the monetary relief to the aggrieved party and the same can be granted by a Court -- Before issuing notice, the learned Magistrate has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of a domestic violence.

(Para 22)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of summoning order -- Abuse of process of law – Petitioners, mother-in-law aged 65 years is 40% disabled from eyes, and is suffering from old age ailments, father-in-law, aged 73 years, is a chronic kidney patient and has been on dialysis thrice a week and married sister-in-law is a Government Teacher and since her marriage in 2009, she has been residing in her matrimonial home and looking after her two minor children -- A pure matrimonial dispute between husband and wife, has been given a colour of the proceedings under the 2005 Act so as to rope in hapless parents-in-law and a married sister-in-law -- They have been roped in with an oblique motive to harass and mentally torture them -- Moreover, the allegations leveled in the complaint are vague, general and omnibus in nature -- Proceedings qua the petitioners, are nothing, but a clear abuse of process of law -- Summoning order and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 33-36)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 304-B, 406, 498-A, 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 211, 216, 401 -- Dowry death case – Charge of Murder – Requirement of -- Charges framed u/s 304-B, 406, 498-A IPC – Prayer to add 302 IPC -- Perusal of contents of the FIR itself reveals that the complainant had raised only a suspicion qua the deceased having been poisoned to death – If during trial any new evidence comes on record, the trial Court concerned is fully competent u/s 216 Cr.P.C., to add and/or alter any such charge as it may deem fit -- Acid test would be based on the material, which may come to light during the course of the trial -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 5-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Dowry death – Regular bail -- Plea in bail application that the deceased was “suffering from severe headache and was mentally disturbed since the past nine months” and that she was taken to a doctor by the first respondent -- Medical prescription, would prima facie indicate that there was no serious ailment -- Medical prescription of the Ayurvedic doctor and the remedies prescribed belie such a claim -- Prima facie, there are serious allegations in the FIR in regard to the harassment suffered by the deceased in close proximity to her death over demands for dowry by the accused -- In view of the provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC, as well as the presumption which arises u/s 113-B of the Evidence Act, the High Court was clearly not justified in granting bail.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail – Setting aside of -- Order of the High Court granting bail contains absolutely no reasons at all -- High Court has merely recorded the submissions and in the extract proceeded to grant bail without any evaluation of the rival submissions – Seriousness of the alleged offence has to be evaluated in the backdrop of the allegation that she was being harassed for dowry; and that a telephone call was received from the accused in close-proximity to the time of death, making a demand -- An order without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the norms which guide the judicial process – Order of the High Court granting bail set aside.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2) (N), 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3 (W) (I) and 3 (2) (V) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Rape case – Repeated complaints – Regular bail -- Prosecutrix is a married woman -- She lodged F.I.R. u/s 376 IPC against another person, who has been acquitted in the case -- Further got registered an F.I.R u/s 376 IPC against another, who was also acquitted -- Similarly she got one more F.I.R registered – Petitioner is behind bars for more than eight months and petitioner is not said to have any past criminal record, Court find it a fit case to accept the present petition and grant benefit of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 363, 366-A, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 3, 4 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – POCSO case – Bail to juvenile -- No reasonable explanation or finding given as to how the petitioner, if released on bail, would come into association with any known criminals -- Petitioner who is a juvenile, is in judicial custody since 14.10.2019 -- Both the Courts below have not referred to any social investigation report prepared by the respondent-State, as to the background of the petitioner or with whom he associates with -- To reject the appeal on a presumption that he would come into association with any criminal is wholly unjustified – Impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, are liable to be set aside -- Revision petition allowed, petitioner directed to be released on bail.

(Para 4-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 6, 8 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- POCSO case – Hostile witnesses -- Regular bail -- Prosecutrix and her mother have not supported the prosecution version while appearing in the witness box and have been declared hostile -- Petitioner has been in custody since 13.1.2020 -- Trial will take time to conclude because of Covid-19 pandemic -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars – Petition allowed.

(Para 1, 6, 7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 216 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354, 376-D -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO matter -- Rape – Alteration of charge -- In FIR and statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. made by the victim, she has not specifically alleged rape and has only stated that the accused tried to outrage her modesty – Victim is 17 year old, when was medically examined, it was disclosed to the Doctor concerned that the victim had been raped -- Report of FSL also discloses that human semen was detected from the under-garments and from the vaginal swabs – No infirmity, whereby the trial Court has proceeded to alter the charges so as to frame charges for offences u/s 376D IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

(Para 6)